Beli Media & : World https://belimedia.com.ng/rss/category/world Beli Media & : World en Copyright 2024 BeliMedia & All Rights Reserved. A Successful Space Race Needs More than “Competitive Supremacy” https://belimedia.com.ng/a-successful-space-race-needs-more-than-competitive-supremacy https://belimedia.com.ng/a-successful-space-race-needs-more-than-competitive-supremacy The final frontier must be mutually beneficial for both US and Allies to be sustainable

While the demand for digital sovereignty continues to accelerate, driven by geopolitics and strategic necessity, recent announcements about space supremacy, the unqualified success of Artemis and massive industry growth have created what can only be described as excitement beyond any recent experience. The vision, potential addressable markets, technological innovation, and the challenges and opportunities ahead are significant and possibly already past the point of regulation.

But it does raise a profound question: how can the very nature of space as a highly contested domain align with the sovereign interests of both the US and its Allies? And why must these interests be protected for the benefit of the Alliance?

Given the existential nature of the outcomes, we cannot leave the question purely to fate.

At a time that the White House is asking allies to be more self-sufficient simultaneous with the State Department reportedly being instructed to discourage allied programs for technological sovereignty, fate seems to be outpacing strategic necessity.

How Large is this Space Opportunity?

In a recent report by Goldman Sachs titled The Second Space Age, they poignantly identified that the First Space Age was dictated by “Governments at the frontier.”

This second age is being led by industry with Government more of a copilot with total addressable market projections exceeding US$1.8 trillion across a diverse range of objectives, tools, infrastructure and industries according to the World Economic Forum. Three key commercial thematics have been proposed as shaping this nascent market: the shift to recurring-service revenue models; commercial operators moving faster than government agencies through lower costs and software-driven development; and sovereignty creating sustained demand for independent space capabilities. Following on from my recent research and policy whitepapers on digital and AI sovereignty, it is this third dynamic that will be the long-term structural driver — but what does it actually mean for space?

The foundational principle of modern space law is clear: no nation can claim sovereignty over outer space. Yet in practice, sovereignty is not absent but simply redefined. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty established space as "the province of all mankind," written when only a handful of states had access to orbit. Today, more than 90 countries possess space capabilities and commercial operators account for the majority of launches. Orbital infrastructure now underpins navigation, finance, climate modelling and national security. The real question is no longer whether sovereignty exists in space but who is not-so-quietly exercising it.

In 1962, President Kennedy entranced the world with his inclusive vision: “We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people.”

Just last week, President Trump proclaimed a compelling vision in The American Declaration of Freedom in Space reaffirming “that that our solar system and all of outer space beyond Earth are the province of all humans, and that our Nation will lead the way in the exploration, development, use, and settlement of these new frontiers - forging an interplanetary civilization founded on the enduring and inalienable rights of freedom and individual liberty.”

Vision and Leadership indeed!

For that enduring freedom and inclusivity to come true, 5 significant structural challenges must be collectively addressed.

1. The Legal Paradox of Ownership Without Sovereignty

The Outer Space Treaty prohibits territorial sovereignty while simultaneously granting states jurisdiction over objects they launch effectively creating functional sovereignty over satellites and infrastructure. The result: states own jurisdiction over registered spacecraft; private companies control physical infrastructure including mega-constellations; and no actor owns the domain itself. Control is exercised indirectly through licensing, regulatory oversight and operational dominance rather than territorial claims. It is a governance model built for a different era, already straining under the weight of the commercial space age.

2. The Rise of Corporate Sovereignty

The shift from state-led exploration to commercial dominance is the most significant structural change in the space economy. Private companies now own and operate the majority of satellites, launches, and data and intelligence pipelines. Futurist Peter Diamandis has described SpaceX as a "bet on humanity" with an inbuilt moat across orbital transport, infrastructure, compute and AI. For all nations (including US allies), the implication is stark: concentration of space infrastructure risks replicating terrestrial inequalities at orbital scale. Early movers are not just building rockets. They are shaping who controls access to the systems that will define the next century of economic and geopolitical power.

3. Data Sovereignty - Who Owns Information from Orbit?

Satellites collect vast quantities of information forming the backbone of the digital economy. Yet ownership of this data remains deeply ambiguous. It may be controlled by the collecting company, subject to the launching state's jurisdiction, or relate to territories and individuals who have no control over its capture. Existing frameworks, including UN remote sensing principles, were designed for state actors and offer limited guidance on commercial data ownership. In practice, access to space-derived intelligence is determined not by governance frameworks but by economic power and technological capability thereby raising fundamental concerns about equity, privacy and global transparency.

4. Regulation and Enforcement remain the Weakest Links

Space governance today is neither centralised nor uniform. At best it is a layered system of international treaties, national laws and bilateral agreements that was designed for a small number of state actors. It lacks detailed provisions for mega-constellations, space mining and cyber threats. Regulatory disparities across nations allow companies to exploit governance gaps and operate under differing standards. More critically, there is no central authority with the power to enforce rules globally. The physical characteristics of space (scale, remoteness and technical complexity) make real-time oversight inherently difficult. Enforcement will rely on voluntary compliance, diplomacy and market incentives. Similar to global AI governance discussions, that is not a framework fit for a $1.8 trillion economy.

Additionally, the Department of War recently confirmed for the first time it has deployed “on-orbit space control weapons” but without any clarity of when, what type or capability. US allies were not surprised by the announcement and there is a growing (but uneasy) acceptance of militarily contested space domain. While Article IV of the Space Treaty prohibits weapons of mass destruction, it does not prohibit conventional weapons in orbit or ground-to-space defense systems.

5. Who Captures the Value?

Without clear governance, the distribution of value from the space economy risks becoming dangerously concentrated. Early movers secure dominant positions in infrastructure and data markets; states with advanced capabilities shape regulatory norms; smaller and emerging nations risk exclusion from high-value segments entirely. US President Donald Trump has been explicit via Executive Order that the US must ensure "space superiority" across exploration, security and commercial outcomes including as a critical warfighting domain. The geopolitical stakes could not be clearer. Economic sovereignty is replacing territorial sovereignty, and the rules are still being written.

What is absolutely clear is that the anticipation of space becoming a highly contested zone from defence, economic and national security perspectives is NOW a reality. As my former colleague Kelly Bissell recently summarized in this journal: “The result is a domain that is simultaneously more commercial, more crowded, and more contested than at any point in human history and only getting started. Our institutions were built for none of this. It is time to fix that”

The Clarion Call for Expanded Allied Cooperation

Western alliances, from FVEYs to NATO, reinforce the foundational proposition of working together as equals, and anything less will have diminished appeal, acceptance and success in a rapidly evolving geopolitical climate.

Although US space domain investment and capability significantly outweighs its allies individually and collectively, the alliance force-multiplier value proposition of global diversification of innovation, risk, investment, ISR and common values remain just as relevant today as the Apollo Missions in the 1960s – from Britains role in designing the Apollo fuel cell to Australia’s critical role providing continuous tracking and relay services for live broadcasting of the moon landing. Its worth noting that the Australian agency, the CSIRO, that provided those services based on a continuous partnership with NASA since 1960, later greatly benefitted the alliance by also creating the foundation technology underpinning WiFi.

This allied value proposition has been strongly reinforced from the Presidential proclamation through to bilateral space cooperation agreements and the Combined Space Operations strengthening international partnerships. The ambition has been clearly enunciated however the proof will be via increased engagement and integration.

At a minimum, this increased engagement must include:

· Clear definition of the ambition and roles of the US and allies

· Overhaul regulations and the Space Treaty to account for modern reality

· Transform the frameworks and capability for allied intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance

· Create common allied objectives for delivering the Presidents vision of freedom and liberty for all

The Space Domain Will Redefine Sovereignty Itself & Collective Value of the Western Alliance

Space was once imagined as a realm beyond politics. In reality, it has already become the new frontier of geopolitical and economic competition, not defined by borders but by control over infrastructure, data and access. The challenge for the US and global leaders is not simply to regulate space, but to collaboratively reimagine sovereignty itself: from territorial control to functional influence; from national ownership to multi-stakeholder governance; from fragmented regulation to coordinated global frameworks.

Without decisive action, the principle that space belongs to all humanity risks becoming only symbolic while real power consolidates in the hands of those who can build, launch and control the systems that define it which further diminish an alliance structure already under significant pressure.

Will the Space Age be governed by multinational collaboration with genuine respect for sovereignty? Or will the "might is right" doctrine of centuries past simply be applied to this new and greatest frontier?

Irrespective, the era of ASTROPOLITICS is here. Get ready for blast off.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:04:33 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Reluctant Revolution in Military Affairs (Pt 1) https://belimedia.com.ng/the-reluctant-revolution-in-military-affairs-pt-1 https://belimedia.com.ng/the-reluctant-revolution-in-military-affairs-pt-1

CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — The United States is undergoing a “reluctant” Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in which emerging combat technologies are either autonomous or commanded by humans at safe distances rather than in the immediate proximity of conflict.

The country faces an imperative to “uncrew” considerable portions of power projection and defense in order to mitigate risks and costs and is doing so in the cyber and space domains. In our physical domain on Earth, however, defense professionals do not fully embrace this imperative when it involves replacing heavier, more traditional maneuver forces. The root causes of this paradox include intangibles such as hubris, tradition, and emotion. We are dragging our feet through an important portion of this RMA-and unless we lose our reluctance, we risk losing our warfighting advantage over less industrialized adversaries (including terrorists).

This series of perspectives focuses on four objectives. First, to describe the RMA and test its legitimacy. Second, to test whether we are reluctant in embracing the RMA. Third, to identify factors behind our reluctance (which few, if any publications have done thus far). And fourth, to conclude by recommending steps to reverse the reluctance so we can move on with twenty-first century military readiness.

Scholar Dima Adamsky defines RMA as “a major military innovation in which new organizational structures, together with novel concepts of operations, usually but not always driven by new weaponry, change the conduct of warfare.” The term regained traction in the writings and testimonies of Andy Marshall, who served as Director of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) in the Department of Defense from 1973 to 2015. In fact, Adamsky cites Marshall specifically with a more detailed checklist of “profound and multi-dimensional change” in command and control, organizational structures, doctrine and weapons. Adamsky also suggests that an RMA involves the “changing character of war”, which will be an important descriptor once we begin testing our theories with current scholarship.

But before testing anything, we need to better describe this RMA. This revolution is the advent of uncrewed attack and defensive platforms, which remove combat’s proximate risk to humans who (a) actively control these uncrewed platforms, or (b) program them to operate autonomously. Admittedly, that is a mouthful. For a revolution of this complexity and importance, we will abridge its nomenclature to “drones, codes and spacecraft,” offering three brief descriptions.

“Drones” refer to uncrewed assets that operate within the Earth’s atmosphere, oceans and land masses. “Codes” refer broadly to computer programs that beget their own attack and defense vectors in cyberspace – or enable understanding, efficiency, and autonomy during the operation of other uncrewed assets. “Spacecraft” connotes a burgeoning satellite constellation of sensors and communication relays that enables all of the above. Likewise, the space domain provides a potential attack vector for adversaries who choose to violate the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.

For a decade following the 1990 Gulf War, scholarship scratched incrementally at the surface of this RMA as our newest warfighting domains of space and cyberspace emerged and matured. Consider the Fall 1999 Airpower Journal” article by Colin Gray and John Sheldon, “Space Power and the Revolution in Military Affairs.” Gray and Sheldon, while lamenting an overuse of the RMA moniker, cite as many as eight RMAs that vied for academic traction between 1991 and 1998. These included revolutions in information warfare, precise intelligence for strike warfare, and information on cyber war, air power, space power, strategic affairs, security affairs and political affairs.

Our proposed RMA in “drones, codes, and spacecraft” touches upon several of Gray’s listed revolutions, now informed by three decades of technological development and practice. Although the “RMA” moniker lost popularity at the turn of the century, while the United States led a global war against terrorists such as al Qaeda and ISIS, the time is right to bring back the parlance – particularly given our defense policy shift toward strategic competition. In a 2024 Foreign Affairs article, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Army General Mark Milley, identified the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and drone technology as reflective of the change in the character of war. As cited earlier, Adamsky cites that a change in the character of war is, indeed, indicative of an RMA.

We can better judge whether this series correctly applies “RMA” to the use of uncrewed and remotely or autonomously controlled military capabilities if we briefly evaluate this revolution with Marshall’s checklist:

Command-and-Control (C2): For the most prevalent “drones” in our arsenal, the United States Air Force has invested command authorities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operators who will never be physically proximate to combat but who can have target engagement authority (normally delegated by a combatant commander). While proving reluctance is the topic of our next section, the C2 portion of this RMA checklist does provide one early glimpse of sluggishness. Specifically, the United States has delayed public discourse on autonomous (i.e. without human intervention) positive-identification and target engagement for drone attacks against unwitting enemies. This is juxtaposed against our comfort with defensive autonomy as demonstrated by fully automatic modes in Patriot and Aegis ballistic missile defense as well as Close-In Weapon Systems on ships. If this RMA runs its course, there may be fewer commanders making offensive decisions in a vertical sequence.

Regarding the “codes and spacecraft” portions of this RMA, the C2 block of Marshall’s checklist is satisfied based on the emergence of two related Combatant Commanders in the last 20 years. While neither United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) nor United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) directs physical contact between human combatants, these four-star commanders exist to direct offensive and defensive uses of force. Similarly, C2 in these domains is occurring at lower levels, as space components and cyber components (typically three-stars and lower) now have roles in the services and other geographic and functional combatant commands.

Organizational structures: In the “spacecraft” portion of our proposed RMA, there is an entirely new service (the United States Space Force, or USSF) dedicated to training and equipping those military members (referred to as “Guardians”) assigned to the domain of space. Their writ is to protect United States interests both in space and from space – but without being physically located in the vast domain.

As for “drones and codes,” there are now designations and career paths for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) pilots and unmanned surface fleet operators, as well as for Interactive On-Net (ION) professionals, Exploitation Analysts (EA), and cyber architects. While there has been congressional debate over whether a new “Cyber Force” should train and equip our cyber warriors, there is no equivalent debate regarding a “Drone Force” – as the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines choose to treat their drone capabilities as integral elements of maneuver in their own domains. [Note: the intention to form an Autonomous Warfare Command announced nearly two years after this paper was first penned.]

Doctrine: Doctrine for technology “from afar” is evolving rapidly – particularly for the application of models derived from Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML). There have been National Security Memorandums for AI, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) launched the Department of Defense’s (DoD) first pilot program to accredit AI models along a risk-continuum. The Accreditation of GEOINT AI Models (AGAIM) governs visual models and inferences needed for targeting, warning, and safety of navigation. NGA was the first defense agency to standardize and implement responsible AI training for all members of the enterprise who touch AI-related code. As for space, the first Chief of Space Operations, General Raymond, considered the doctrinal codification of “space control” to be a cornerstone of launching the Space Force itself.

Weapons: This RMA may have begun in earnest in the 1990s with the acquisition and utilization of General Atomics’ MQ-1 Predator. That platform, with its wing-loaded Hellfire missiles, captured public attention in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom – only to give rise to the larger, more capable MQ-9 Reaper. With its longer range, faster speeds and heavier combat load, the MQ-9 remains the United States’ UAV workhorse. Uncrewed technologies have entered the maritime domain as well, with Unmanned Surface Vessels playing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance roles for extended periods. New, remote weapons in the cyber realm are tough to pin down, as they are rarely confirmed in unclassified annals. Most agree that Stuxnet malware (which reporting suggests was used against Iran’s nuclear program as early as 2007) became the first cyber weapon known to the public, although never officially acknowledged.

This series of articles could dedicate considerable detail to each of Marshall’s criteria in every facet of our proposed RMA – but that exceeds our intent of identifying and diagnosing sources of reluctance. Marshall’s criteria are satisfied for our purposes, and we will continue applying the “RMA” nomenclature to non-proximate combat involving “drones, codes and spacecraft.”

Part Two of this series focuses on identifying and testing our reluctance as this special series continues all week in The Cipher Brief.

Editorial note: This is the first in a four-part series from former National Geospatial-Intelligence Director VADM Frank Whitworth (Ret.) on the reluctant revolution in military affairs and what it means for future intelligence and defense. This series of perspectives was adapted from a previous white paper written by the author two years ago, while he was on active duty. Read all four parts of the series exclusively in The Cipher Brief this week and please note that the views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or endorsement of factual accuracy of the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or the United States.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:04:33 +0100 FirstHandNews
Where Did the Billions From Venezuela's Oil Go? https://belimedia.com.ng/where-did-the-billions-from-venezuelas-oil-go https://belimedia.com.ng/where-did-the-billions-from-venezuelas-oil-go “We've won Venezuela and [have] taken out billions and billions and billions of dollars already. And we will be taking out many billions of dollars and get along very well. And -- you could call it a territory, you could call it whatever you want. We won that war in less than one hour.”

That was President Trump during his telecast 60 Minutes interview on CBS with Ross Douthat on November 8. However, CBS also has released the transcript of the entire, unedited transcript of the 51-minute interview during which Trump also said, but was not part of the telecast version, “Venezuela, where, by the way, we’ve taken out 50 times what the war has cost already. To the victor belong the spoils.”

I bring up those remarks because last August I wrote a column questioning what had happened to those billions of dollars from Venezuelan oil that Trump referred to many times earlier than the 60 Minutes interview – in fact, Trump began less than a week after the U.S. military seized then-Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife on January 3, 2026, and, in effect, took over that country.

Douthat did not ask Trump anything more about the “billions and billions” in the 60 Minutes interview – I wish he had.

Also not discussed was what Trump last August 28 on Truth Social called, “THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY!” where the U.S., through a Pentagon agency, has become the 35 percent owner of what a White House fact sheet called, “the second-largest private oil company by [Venezuelan oil] reserves in the world.”

I will discuss the many still secret parts of that Trump administration deal below.

But the public release last week by the State Department of the American accounting firm KPMG LLP’s 53-page Report on Venezuela Custody Account Operations January - September 2026 October 29, 2026 also failed to answer questions that I and others have raised about what happened to those initial “billions” from Venezuelan oil.

For example, during his January 9, 2026, meeting with oil company leaders at the White House, Trump told the press that was present that Venezuela had already given the U.S. 30 million barrels of what had been previously-sanctioned oil that it had on hand.

“That's about $4 billion worth,” Trump announced back in January, adding, “And it's on our way to the United States right now. And we want to thank Venezuela for that. And we're working very well with them [Acting President Delcy Rodriguez and her government], obviously, or they wouldn't have been so generous.”

At that January 9, meeting, Trump also announced his Executive Order, Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People under which Venezuelan oil revenues were to be held in a Venezuela Custody Account (VCA) set up by the U.S. Treasury. The VCA was initially based in a Qatar bank, but moved to Citibank in New York in late January. Distribution of the funds for use by the Venezuelan government would be determined by the Secretary of State.

Last week’s KPMG report showed that VCA in January received $500 million. On January 28, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the payment of $300 million had already been made from the VCA “to keep [Venezuelan] sanitation workers, police officers, government workers on staff,” and that it was from Venezuelan oil sales totaling $500 million.

The KPMG report also showed the VCA received $1 billion in February, another $1.5 billion, and another $2.1 billion in April.

On April 16, the State Department’s Michael Kozak, a senior official from the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, disclosed “around $3 billion” of Venezuelan oil revenue had moved through the VCA “paying the salaries of government workers in Venezuela; buying supplies for their oil industry, and so on, other things that benefit the public.”

Since it appears that the VCA did not receive as much as $4 billion until April, that again raises the question what happened to the $4 billion in Venezuelan oil Trump said was “on the way” to the U.S. in early January.

Overall, The KPMG report showed that between January and September 30, 2026, the VCA received $12.26 billion from sales primarily of Venezuelan crude oil and petroleum transactions, with minor amounts from gold, minerals, and fertilizer. In turn, following review and approval by the State Department and Treasury, some $12.11 billion has gone to the Venezuelan central bank or directly to vendors.

As mentioned above, another flow of Venezuelan oil money to the U.S. is coming from the most unusual “historic oil agreement” Trump announced built around the interim Venezuelan government granting what a White House August 31 fact sheet said was “100-year concessions for 17 oil fields with proven reserves of approximately 65 billion barrels” to a company named North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP).

I should point out any 100 year oil concession violates Venezuelan law.

According to a September 2, White House fact sheet, the 17 oil fields were “previously controlled or operated by Russian and Chinese firms, or by corrupt cronies of Maduro and Chavez.”

More important was that the Trump administration signed a joint agreement with NABEP’s parent company, based in Barbados, that grants the U.S. government a 35%-stake in ownership in that corporate parent and the right to buy 20% of NABEP’s Venezuelan oil output at production cost.

Here is the way the September 2, White House fact sheet described that deal. It said the joint agreement “was signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth,” and “at no cost to the American taxpayer, NABEP has granted the U.S. Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35% equity stake in its corporate parent, representing up to hundreds of billions in value and dividends for the United States.”

In addition, the White House release said, “NABEP has granted the U.S. Department of State the right to purchase, at production cost, a guaranteed 20% of the off-take from all current and future fields NABEP will operate.”

That means that a Pentagon agency is the over one-third owner of a major Venezuelan oil company and the State Department may be the substantial buyer of the oil output of that company. In short, two departments of the U.S. government are now in the oil business.

The September White House release made the further points that, “This is a deal with a private company – not the Venezuelan interim government. It’s not a deal with the interim

In an October 20, report, ProPublica, which said its staff had “reviewed a copy of the 18-page strategic partnership agreement signed for the United States by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth,” points out, “The deal document provides little information about the owners and investors behind the parent [Barbados] company, who could receive enormous wealth from the arrangement.”

In short, the public ought to know who are the new business partners of the U.S. Government?

ProPublica also questioned NABEP’s chief executive, Alejandro Betancourt, whom it describes as “a globe-trotting Venezuelan oligarch who has faced money-laundering investigations in three countries.”

The agreement gives the U.S. government veto power over the appointment of any member of NABEP’s seven-member board of directors and a majority must be U.S. citizens. ProPublica says the board members have 15-year terms, a move it was told “designed to prevent future U.S. and Venezuelan leaders from dismantling the enterprise.” Betancourt is the only board member named by the agreement.

According to ProPublica, “The signed agreement is marked as a ‘sensitive’ government document. That classification is commonly used to shield a variety of federal records from public release, including those containing personnel information, details about ongoing law enforcement operations and matters protected by attorney-client privilege. The document also contains a confidentiality clause barring Betancourt’s company from disclosing the ‘existence and terms” of the U.S. government agreement.”

Hopefully, the incoming Democratic-controlled Congress will include the Venezuelan oil deal in one of its investigations.

Meanwhile, on October 27, Trump diverted from a campaign appearance in Texas to make a statement that day pier-side in Corpus Christi, along with Rubio, where two tankers carrying one million barrels of Venezuelan crude produced by NABEP had arrived.

Betancourt was on hand to say, “This first shipment since the U.S.-NABEP deal will be followed by thousands of such arrivals, and each one shows the world that Venezuela is back as a dependable energy supplier, with the United States as its anchor buyer.”

Trump told the press, “We took over Venezuela very successfully and they've sent me as a gift a boatload of a million barrels of oil and I'm giving that to the United States.”

Three days later, Reuters reported, “NABEP initially said the oil was delivered under Washington's right to buy a portion of the company's production at cost. It later said it gave the shipment to the U.S. at no cost to U.S. taxpayer ‘to recognize the historic nature of the agreement.’"

This is an oil agreement worth following.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:04:33 +0100 FirstHandNews
America Invented the Drone War, So Why Is It Falling Behind? https://belimedia.com.ng/america-invented-the-drone-war-so-why-is-it-falling-behind https://belimedia.com.ng/america-invented-the-drone-war-so-why-is-it-falling-behind

One mainstream document that called the United States’ sluggish reaction to this Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (and did so five years ago) was Christian Brose’s 2019 article in Foreign Affairs, “The New Revolution in Military Affairs: War’s Sci-Fi Future.” Brose’s bottom-line was the following: “Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, ubiquitous sensors, advanced manufacturing, and quantum science will transform warfare as radically as the technologies that consumed Bloch [a nineteenth-century founder of the concept of RMAs]. And yet the U.S. government’s thinking about how to employ these new technologies is not keeping pace with their development.”

Editorial note: This is the second in a four-part series from former National Geospatial-Intelligence Director VADM Frank Whitworth (Ret.) on the reluctant revolution in military affairs and what it means for future intelligence and defense. This series of perspectives was adapted from a previous white paper written by the author two years ago, while he was on active duty.

Brose correctly identified a history of “change labels” in the last three decades with no resulting or substantial adjustment to core military methods. This trend began with the oncoming “military technical revolution” in 1992, moved to Admiral Arthur Cebrowski’s “Network-Centric Warfare” in the mid-1990s, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s “transformation” in the 9/11 era, and Deputy Secretary Robert Work’s “third offset strategy” in 2014. Each brought a slight twist on a common theme: “…emerging technologies will enable new battle networks of sensors and shooters to rapidly accelerate the process of detecting, targeting, and striking threats.”

Brose did not stop there. He was critical of American procurement choices over the last three decades as Washington “…poured money into newer versions of old military platforms and prayed for technological miracles to come (which often became acquisition debacles when those miracles did not materialize.” Brose was prescient in identifying how inexpensive uncrewing could be – and how much change it required of the military mindset. Well before Replicator (DOD’s primary development program for autonomous vehicles) became a glimmer in anyone’s eye, Brose identified the need for fleets of drones, with ubiquitous communications and elements of autonomy.

To reiterate, this paper does not intend to prove and explain the United States’ reluctant acceptance of every facet of this “drones, codes, and spacecraft” RMA. In fact, during our application of Marshall’s principles, we cited three major developments that help rule-out our reluctance to accept non-proximate warfare in the space and cyber domains: specifically, the establishment of the United States Space Force, USPACECOM, and USCYBERCOM. Drones are a different matter, though – and to prove our reluctance, we will (a) compare the United States’ rate of “military drone fleet” development to that of Ukraine, and (b) demonstrate the stark difference in DOD’s acquisition budgets between manned and unmanned assets.

Globally, the number of nations with armed drone programs has accelerated. The rapid growth of armed, medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) drones (such as the MQ-9 Reaper) since 2001 is evident in this graphic from Drone Wars UK:

Source: Drone Wars UK

These large, MALE drones are important because they can deliver munitions lengthy distances and damage strategic targets such as infrastructure and headquarters. Since Russia’s invasion in 2022, Ukraine has transformed itself into a world leader of drone technology and employment. In fact, Ukrainian President Zelensky just announced in December 2024 that his country will produce 30,000 MALE drones next year. That nearly triples DOD’s entire drone fleet of 11,000 (a number that even includes smaller, non-MALE assets such as the hand-launched RQ-11B Raven). The United States’ production of military drones has been lapped numerically by Ukraine in only two years—despite America’s 20-year head-start in developing the technology.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Transformation reports seven drone models were produced domestically in 2022, and that number has grown tenfold to 67 in only two years. Similarly, Ukraine now has an astounding 200 domestic drone manufacturers. This stands in stark contrast to America’s drone manufacturing sector, which has declined. With the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and a reduction in military contracts, IBIS World estimates the United States has only 73 businesses in the UAV manufacturing sector. As representationally depicted in Figure 3, the sector is declining at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 5.8 percent to $4.0 billion through 2024 (dropping 21.4 percent this year alone.)

UAV Manufacturing in the U.S. — Source: IBISWorld

In examining expenditures reported in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller’s April 4, 2024 report, “Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, FY2025,” the United States’ reluctance to adopting the “drones” portion of this RMA is demonstrated further. As depicted in Figure 4, unmanned aircraft systems account for less than four percent of DOD’s expenditures dedicated to overall aviation and related systems. Separately, there are no “unmanned” wedges in either the $48 billion of proposed expenditures for shipbuilding and maritime systems or the $13 billion or proposed expenditures for ground systems. To be fair to the Navy, they do lead the other services in Research and Development for unmanned systems – but those investments will require time before they are made manifest in the fleet.

Figure 4: DOD’s FY2025 Aviation Expenditures — Source: DOD Comptroller

Editorial note: This installment is drawn from the author’s December 2024 white paper. Dates, figures, forecasts, and references to current events reflect that original context.

Part Three of this series focuses on identifying and testing our reluctance as this special series continues all week in The Cipher Brief.

Read all four parts of the series exclusively in The Cipher Brief this week and please note that the views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or endorsement of factual accuracy of the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or the United States.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:04:33 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Command We Must Fund https://belimedia.com.ng/the-command-we-must-fund https://belimedia.com.ng/the-command-we-must-fund The Army's Armored Force was born in July 1940, a few weeks after France fell. No act of Congress created it, and no budget line funded it. The Chief of Staff ordered it into being, took the tanks from the infantry and the cavalry, and placed them under a single commander. The money came later, once the force had demonstrated what it could do with what it already had. The idea had been waiting since 1928. The force did not wait for its appropriation.

Last week, I argued that the Autonomous Warfare Command could begin its work before it had a charter, a commander, or the $54 billion a reconciliation bill was supposed to deliver. This week, the bill lost its Congress. Democrats took both houses, and the two members who will now write the defense budget said what they think of the Pentagon's request within a day of the vote. Adam Smith, the incoming chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said the mission "does not require a defense budget in excess of $1 trillion." Rosa DeLauro, who will chair Appropriations, promised to claw back billions across the Pentagon and homeland security. The budget resolution that would carry a reconciliation bill is one John Thune, the Senate's current leader, will not bring to the floor, and one Wall Street defense analyst gives it a one-in-ten chance. Of the $54.6 billion requested for autonomous warfare, $53.6 billion was to come through that reconciliation. The House's appropriations bill provides one billion. For now, that is the command's budget.

It is enough, if the command stops behaving like a program waiting for its money and starts behaving like a command. Three things happened this week that show how.

First, the hardware is arriving without the command. Central Command took delivery this year of more than 25,000 systems bought for $782 million through the Pentagon's competitive purchase rounds: some 1,300 one-way attack drones, more than a hundred unmanned surface and undersea vessels, and 24,000 counter-drone systems. The Army has already named its component, the Futures and Autonomous Systems Command, for a four-star command that does not yet exist. The systems do not need the $53 billion; they are coming anyway, and each purchase round is driving the price down. What does not exist is the authority to decide which theater gets them when there are not enough for both. That authority costs nothing. It requires a decision, and the Secretary can make it tomorrow.


Second, the budget that will pass has room for the command's purpose, though not for its request. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments published four ways this week to fund defense at between $1.05 and $1.15 trillion, written for hawks in both parties. Every one of them quadruples spending on critical munitions, and every one puts that money in the base budget, beyond the reach of a reconciliation fight. Two of the four need no reconciliation at all, and those are the two the Center recommends. A command whose case rests on cost per kill and speed from sensor to shooter belongs inside a munitions line that Congress has already agreed to grow fourfold. It should ask to be included in that appropriation as the authority that allocates among theaters and sets the architecture that every purchase must meet. It should also hold the priority order that stocks rare-earth magnets, because the ban on Chinese-origin magnets takes effect on January 1. None of that costs $53 billion. All of it is what a four-star command exists to do.

Third, the new chairmen have said what they will fund, and it is not nothing. Smith's trillion-dollar ceiling is a budget ceiling, not a mission ceiling. He did not object to autonomy, to lethality per dollar, or to folding the Services' separate drone programs into a single architecture. He objected to the $1.5 trillion figure and to the reconciliation that was to carry a quarter of it. A command that arrives at its first hearings, before Smith in the House and Jack Reed in the Senate, with a plan to deliver more capability from the budget it will actually get, by retiring duplicate programs and ruling among the Services, will find two committees that have waited years for that argument. A command that arrives asking for its $53 billion back will find the door that closed in 1931.

That is the test I set last week, with its terms now in plain view. The command's plan was due to the Secretary on October 30 and has not been reported delivered. No commander has been named. No priority order has been issued for the magnets. Each is a decision within the Secretary's authority, and each would show Congress a command that commands before it asks to be paid. The alternative is the one the Services will offer: each takes its share of the drones and its share of the billion dollars, and the result is called joint. That is what the Army did in 1931. It is what every institution does when the integrator has no money and no power to rule. Coordination assigns. Integration arbitrates. The Armored Force got its appropriation because it had already arbitrated. It had taken the tanks and put them under one man before anyone voted on the money.

Industry should read the same signal. The companies that will matter to this command are not the ones positioned for the $53 billion; that money is gone, and the primes sized to it will be resized by chairmen who have said a trillion is enough. They are the ones whose systems already work inside an architecture someone else controls, because the first thing a real command will do is refuse to buy what it cannot integrate. That is the whole test, for the command and for everyone who wants to sell to it: prove inside the smaller budget that one authority ruling among the Services delivers more than three Services coordinating with a check. Make that case before the first markup, and the money will follow the force, as it did in 1940. Wait for the bill, and the force will be absorbed by the institutions it was meant to change, as it was in 1931. Build for the command that arbitrates now, before the standard is written, and the standard will be written around what you built.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
Startups Are Now on the Front Lines https://belimedia.com.ng/startups-are-now-on-the-front-lines https://belimedia.com.ng/startups-are-now-on-the-front-lines A recent Air Force contract to help screen small businesses applying for federal research funding reflects a growing national security concern: foreign access to American innovation.

Screening applicants is one part of that challenge. Protecting the technology those companies develop is another.

Startups are part of great power competition, even when their founders do not see themselves that way. Some of the technology the military may rely on over the next decade is being developed by small teams working on specialized components, software and materials.

Consider a hypothetical eleven-person quantum sensing startup, a team writing drone autonomy software for GPS-denied environments, or three researchers prototyping a radiation-hardened chip. None is building an entire weapons system. Each could hold a piece of technology valuable to a foreign intelligence service.

An adversary does not have to steal a complete system to benefit. Access to a component design, source code or test results could help it understand a capability, accelerate its own development or identify a weakness.

Intelligence officials have publicly warned about this exposure. At a Five Eyes gathering in California in October 2023, British intelligence officials warned that espionage increasingly targets startups, university research and people who may not think national security concerns them.

Small companies can face difficult tradeoffs. They need to recruit employees, attract investment and demonstrate products, often with limited resources for security. Those activities require sharing information with people outside the organization. An investor meeting, a product demonstration or a contractor’s network access can create an opportunity for collection if identities, permissions and requests are not adequately checked.

Companies developing sensitive technology need a way to evaluate those relationships without bringing their work to a halt.

Government and industry also operate across different information environments. Classified government work requires approved systems and facilities. A startup’s unclassified research may instead be discussed through commercial email, chat and document-sharing services.

Unclassified does not mean inconsequential. Individually modest details can become revealing when combined. In a hypothetical project, test results in one channel, a product roadmap in another and an integration schedule in a third could collectively reveal a capability’s maturity, expected delivery date or technical limitations.

A documented attack shows how collaboration services can become a route to sensitive information. In August 2023, a technology provider reported that a threat actor used previously compromised cloud accounts belonging to small businesses to send workplace messages impersonating technical support. The report described attempts to steal credentials by persuading users to approve authentication prompts. It identified the actor as a Russia-based group attributed by the U.S. and U.K. governments to Russia’s foreign intelligence service.

That report did not establish that the compromised businesses were startups or that the targets were larger companies. It did illustrate how an attacker could use a compromised business account to make an approach appear legitimate.

The lesson extends beyond any one platform: identity, access and account security matter wherever organizations collaborate.

Defense-related information can pass through a government program office, a prime contractor, a small technology company and a specialist supplier. Every transfer creates another point at which access must be managed.

Imagine a specification shared with a supplier and then uploaded to a folder used by outside contractors. Whether that transfer is appropriate depends on the information, the applicable requirements, the system’s configuration and who has access. Security depends on those decisions at each stage, alongside the protections maintained by the organization that created the file.

Commercial collaboration tools require security controls, configurations and usage policies appropriate to the information being shared. Different products and service offerings support different uses. A familiar interface or an encrypted connection does not, by itself, establish that a particular system is authorized or suitable for a particular defense project.

A March 2025 incident offered a separate example of the risks surrounding sensitive communications. A news organization reported that one of its journalists had inadvertently been included in a messaging group in which senior U.S. officials discussed impending strikes in Yemen. The incident illustrated the consequences of including an unintended participant in a sensitive discussion. It did not, by itself, demonstrate a failure of the messaging service’s encryption.

For startups, the practical challenge is to make appropriate security workable in everyday operations. Employees need clear rules about where information belongs, how to verify outside participants and when to escalate an unusual request. Organizations also need to manage guest access, review permissions and remove access when a relationship ends.

As AI capabilities develop and organizations prepare for future quantum computing risks, security requirements will continue to evolve. New tools may help. So can better use of existing capabilities, stronger account protections and clearer responsibility for information shared between companies.

Screening who receives federal funding is a useful first step. Protecting the intellectual property developed afterward requires sustained attention throughout a project and its supplier relationships.

The next theft of sensitive military technology could begin with a compromised collaboration account or an improperly managed guest invitation at a small supplier. Protecting that point of access deserves attention alongside the defenses surrounding the largest contractors.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
What Congress Can Learn From Vietnam About the War in Iran https://belimedia.com.ng/what-congress-can-learn-from-vietnam-about-the-war-in-iran https://belimedia.com.ng/what-congress-can-learn-from-vietnam-about-the-war-in-iran “The American people don't know what the heck we're fighting for in Iran. He's [President Trump] never made it clear. He changes his mind day-to-day and minute-to-minute. This war must end. It must end. And make no mistake, whenever Trump defies the will of the American people or the law, we will launch investigations, take him to court, and entangle him in legislative razor wire. The days of Trump's supplicant Senate are over.”

That was Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), currently in line to be sworn in as Senate Majority Leader when the new Congress meets January 4, 2027, speaking last Wednesday about his plans for next year’s Senate.

The Schumer suggestion that when Congress convenes its 120th session next January, the chairman of a Democratic-run Senate committee could be initiating an investigation into President Trump’s Iran War took me back 58 years to 1969.

That was when I had been hired by then-Chairman Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 18 months to be chief of staff of an investigative subcommittee looking into U.S. military involvement in American foreign policy during the time of the Vietnam War.

A Fulbright subcommittee investigation back then was much different than those of more recent times – and I will explain further because I believe Senate Democrats now ought to begin planning something similar.

First of all, for the initial months, I and my one colleague – the subcommittee’s chief counsel – were to investigate. That’s correct – we two were the only staff members of the subcommittee. We did the investigating by traveling together overseas, first to Europe, then to the Middle East and finally the Far East. We stayed at military bases, got briefings, but also questioned not just service members from generals and admirals through enlisted non-commissioned officers, but also American ambassadors, other U.S. diplomats, and even CIA station chiefs.

I’m describing this get-out-of-Washington approach because some recent congressional investigative hearings have been done based on published or televised stories and not with original congressional on-the-scene inquiry. Also, now is the time for whichever committee or committees will be looking into the Iran fighting to have Democratic members or staff to begin gathering information.

For example, if I were putting this together, now would be the time for visiting the Gulf States, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and even Diego Garcia. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, would be another spot to visit. For example, if I were putting this together now would be the time for visiting the Gulf States, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and even Diego Garcia. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, would be another spot to visit.

For example, I would ask American officials in the Gulf about Trump’s Iran strategy and how it was working; find out about the Iran destruction to U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain and should it be rebuilt; and what new protection should be prpared for remaining U.S. forces in the area.

Back in 1969, when each of these trips were over, we summed up in memos what we had found. We eventually developed and then scheduled a series of closed hearing covering several of the countries we had visited. We kept the original hearings closed because we knew classified information would be involved, some of which the committee would demand be declassified, but more on that later.

The purpose of the closed hearings was to make a record of the facts we already had gathered, both abroad and in Washington. It was not primarily to find new facts. Often, the Nixon administration supplied senior State Department and Pentagon witnesses and they would provide their explanations for the facts we wanted to make public.

However, in one case, our closed hearing on Laos in October 1969, where I had interviewed an Air Force liaison officer in Laos, who had first-hand knowledge of American pilots flying secret reconnaissance missions from Laos. We required he be brought to Washington to testify in person in order to have first-hand information.

I will add that while I was in Laos in summer 1969, I arranged to fly on such a mission so we knew they were taking place. But Fulbright and other Senators on the subcommittee wanted the information on the record from the original source under oath, since up-to-that time those flights were secret, even from the Congress.

However, one lesson for today’s incoming Democrat investigators, as indicated above, is get out of Washington to investigate the Iran war situation.

During two days of closed hearings on Laos, we put on the classified record that the U.S. not only had American pilots in Laos flying recon missions, but that CIA was supporting thousands of Lao Hmong troops that were fighting against both North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces who were bringing military supplies into South Vietnam for the Viet Cong communist rebels.

After the closed October Laos hearings, Fulbright and other subcommittee members became concerned that the Nixon administration might expand the war by sending U.S ground combat troops into Laos.

In a televised press conference on December 8, 1969, President Nixon said there were "no American combat troops in Laos." But Nixon acknowledged for the first time that the U.S. was engaged in interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North to South Vietnam-"as it runs through Laos."

Fulbright and other Senators decided to try to use Nixon’s words as a basis for an amendment to the Fiscal Year 1970 Defense Appropriations Bill, when it came up in the Senate. Fulbright then arranged for a closed session of the Senate on December 15. 1969 so the classified material from the closed October hearing could be discussed on the Senate floor. In the secret Senate session, only Senators and a handful of staff members were present.

The outcome of what was a secret three-hour debate, was passage of an amendment to the Defense bill, by a 78-to-11 vote, that said, “In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States [Richard M. Nixon], none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand” – the latter country being added because some U.S. Air Force aircraft were operating from there along with American Army training units.

The Laos/Thailand amendment was accepted by the House and became law when the overall Defense Appropriation measure was signed by Nixon.

Another lesson for today: If you want to end or limit U.S. fighting in Iran, try to write legislation built around something the President has said or done.

Back in time, it was not until April 19, 1970, that the declassified Laos subcommittee hearings were made public, but only after time-consuming and often frustrating negotiations because there are no rules – nor limits – on what can be classified.

First, the State Department had to circulate the classified material to other government agencies that had a stake in the material. Then State delivered to the subcommittee the administration’s version of what in the hearing transcript could be released to the public, blackening out what they felt should not.

Thereafter, my colleague and I went over what was to be withheld, and picked out what we disagreed with. Then began a series of negotiations since, as we found out, classified material was in the eye of the beholder.

For example, I often found the same information State wanted to keep classified had already been made public. I was then told by State’s negotiator that it hadn’t been previously disclosed by an “official government release,” and therefore it should remain classified.

In one case, State had wanted to keep classified that during a hearing Sen. Fulbright had called the head of an allied government “a crook.” State’s argument was to make that public could cause the U.S. an embarrassment. Eventually it was published.

Next January, the Democratic members of the new Congress will each have some power to effect the last two years of the Trump administration just by speaking out; the Democratic chairmen of House and Senate committees and subcommittees will have even more power through hearings and speeches.

As someone who years ago saw, first-hand, congressional power exercised, I know the upcoming Congress could have an enormous influence on directions this country takes in the coming year if that legislative power is used aggressively and wisely.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
Reinventing Intelligence To Operate At Machine Speed https://belimedia.com.ng/reinventing-intelligence-to-operate-at-machine-speed https://belimedia.com.ng/reinventing-intelligence-to-operate-at-machine-speed For almost a decade, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has lived with a quiet anxiety: that the proliferation of open-source information, machine learning, and artificial intelligence would one day reshape its analytic enterprise the way the internet reshaped the newspaper industry. Senior civilian policymakers, military commanders, and national security staff are not passive consumers. They need decision support and have an incentive to build their own if national agencies do not meet their needs. That day is arriving.

The IC’s leadership insists it is seizing the AI moment. At the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) AI+ Intelligence Summit in April 2026, CIA Deputy Director Michael Ellis reported that the Agency ran more than 300 AI projects in 2025 and had, for the first time in its history, used AI to generate an intelligence report. He described plans to embed AI “coworkers” in the Agency’s analytic platforms—tools that will help prepare assessments, edit for clarity, and check drafts against tradecraft standards. AI, in his words, “won’t do the thinking for our analysts, but it will help draft key judgments.”

This is real progress, and it deserves credit. The near-term vision positions AI as a valuable assistant to the human analyst, a tool that drafts, edits, triages, and flags while the existing workforce, workflow, and organizational structure stay largely in place, even as CIA leaders describe mixed human-machine teams over the next decade. This is a sensible starting point, but there is a tremendous opportunity to build on it. Today’s agentic AI systems, which can plan, research, reason, draft, and iterate with minimal human intervention, are increasingly capable of performing core analytic tasks themselves, faster and at a fraction of the cost. That progress opens the door for IC leadership to move beyond the question of whether to adapt and focus on how best to shape that adaptation. By taking deliberate steps now, leaders can redesign workflows and structures on their own terms, keeping the IC’s analytic enterprise ahead of shifting customer expectations rather than reacting to them.

In its groundbreaking 2021 final report, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence envisioned AI supporting human analysts in an AI-ready Intelligence Community by 2025. Subsequent assessments by SCSP, including our 2024 report, Intelligence Innovation, urged enterprise-scale AI adoption, preparing for an AI-ready workforce, and expanding the IC’s use of unclassified, open source information as the “INT of first resort” to provide the fuel for future AI-powered analytic work. While the trend toward better and better AI was clear to us, we assessed that AI systems were still too prone to hallucinations, weak reasoning, and limited access to outside tools and were not yet capable of reliably producing sophisticated intelligence assessments. We could sense the future, but assessed the IC would have plenty of time to prepare and adapt.

What Agentic AI Can Actually Do Today

What has changed in the last two years is the rapid pace of growth in AI capabilities. The frontier models produced by Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, and xAI today are very capable platforms for building autonomous analytic workflows. An orchestrated stack of AI agents can now perform, in parallel and with minimal human prompting: open-source data scanning and collection; source credibility assessments; pattern recognition and anomaly detection; hypothesis generation and structured analytic techniques; drafting, editing, and tradecraft compliance checking; and dissemination tailored to specific customer profiles, formats, and languages—continuously, around the clock, in any theater.

The benchmarks bear this out. Stanford’s 2026 AI Index found that AI capability is now outpacing the benchmarks designed to measure it: frontier models gained 30 percentage points in a single year on Humanity’s Last Exam, an expert-level test built to be hard for AI. Leading models scored under 10 percent when the test was released in early 2025; several models exceeded 60 percent in Stanford’s early 2026 results. ForecastBench, run by the Forecasting Research Institute, compares the accuracy of AI systems in forecasting real-world events with human superforecasters using a difficulty-adjusted Brier score, which rewards being right and being well calibrated. In January 2026, superforecasters still led the best AI entry (xAI’s Grok 4.20, at about 0.102) by 0.017 Brier points, and the Forecasting Research Institute (FRI) projected parity for around November 2026. In its July 2026 update, the institute reported that several systems, including entries from Cassi AI, xAI, and Google DeepMind, were statistically indistinguishable from superforecasters on the tournament leaderboard. OpenAI’s GDPval benchmark measures whether AI can produce real professional deliverables, such as reports, spreadsheets, and presentations, across 44 occupations. Industry experts compare the AI’s work with that of human professionals without knowing which is which. In September 2025, the best model (Claude Opus 4.1) matched or beat the expert 47.6 percent of the time. In its March 2026 results, OpenAI reported rates of 70.9 percent for GPT-5.2 and 83.0 percent for GPT-5.4.

This is already being tested. Dr. Christopher Porter, head of international security cooperation at Google Cloud, has set large language models loose on the National Intelligence Council’s archive of declassified National Intelligence Estimates to dissect how the IC’s most senior analysts built their long-range judgments. Work like this suggests that the tacit knowledge analysts long believed made them irreplaceable may be increasingly capturable and deployable at scale. The moat for human-produced intelligence analysis is narrowing.

Customers Are Already Building Around the IC

Perhaps the greatest long-term threat to the IC analytic enterprise is not replacement from within—it is disintermediation from without. As frontier AI systems become accessible through commercial platforms and enterprise deployments, sophisticated consumers of intelligence are discovering that they can put their questions directly to commercial AI agents, or build their own systems that are tuned to their specific information needs, decision timelines, organizational vocabulary, and risk tolerances.

The appeal is easy to understand. These tools answer in minutes rather than on the 24-hour turnaround the IC offers most senior customers. They tailor every response to the person asking, they require no clearances, and they never close. And they are not bound by the IC’s coordination cycles or institutional risk aversion. During the 2026 Iran campaign, The Washington Post* reported that the Pentagon’s Maven Smart System supported near-real-time targeting. The United States struck more than 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours, according to an analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The IC’s traditional rejoinder—that commercial tools lack access to classified intelligence and decades of hard-won expertise and tradecraft—describes a moat that is draining, for two reasons. First, the volume of open-source and commercially available data—satellite imagery, ship and aircraft tracking, social media, trade and financial records—is growing exponentially, steadily eroding the marginal value of secret collection on a widening range of questions. SCSP warned in its 2024 report that many open-source assessments from media and think tanks rival what the IC produces using mostly classified information. Commercial AI does not tap the IC’s classified holdings, but on a growing range of questions its assessments may rival the IC’s. Second, as Porter’s work shows, AI systems can be taught the IC’s analytic tradecraft.

The Promise of Agentic AI for Intelligence Analysis

The disruption is real, but so is the opportunity. Properly built and governed, agentic AI offers the IC’s analytic enterprise the chance to deliver more intelligence, to more customers, faster and in greater depth than the Community has ever managed—providing the “decision advantage” the IC must achieve. The goal is not simply speed to an answer. It is speed to defensible judgment: analysis that is timely, sourced, traceable, caveated, and fit for the decision it supports.

Agentic systems expand both the scope and the pace of analytic production. Where today’s analytic cadre must ration its attention across a limited number of priority accounts, AI agents can monitor every country, issue, and actor at once; update assessments as new reporting arrives rather than on a production calendar; provide persistent indications and warning around the clock, as decision support rather than prediction, since no current system reliably predicts geopolitical flashpoints and outputs still need analyst validation; and surge instantly when a crisis breaks—without pulling analysts off other accounts to do it.

They can also end the IC’s chronic triage of “global coverage” accounts. Low-priority and episodic issues—a fragile mid-sized state, a regional resource dispute, an obscure arms transfer—rarely command dedicated analysts until they erupt into crises, at which point the IC starts from a cold baseline. Agentic systems can sustain continuous, credible coverage of these accounts at marginal cost, freeing the Community’s scarce human experts to concentrate on the truly complex, high-stakes, and highly compartmented problems where their judgment matters most. SCSP’s 2025 intelligence memo to the president proposed a related step: a National Open Source Center to take on day-to-day collection for lower-priority global coverage topics.

Agentic AI can also widen access to the IC’s best analysis. An analytic engine is not constrained by the size of a briefing staff. It can give sub-Cabinet decisionmakers—assistant secretaries, combatant commanders, ambassadors, and their staff—access to the best available national intelligence, tailored to their portfolios, decision calendars, and preferred formats. Today, that kind of dedicated support is reserved for the President and a handful of Cabinet principals.

It can also make sharing far less burdensome. Sanitizing an assessment for release is slow, line-by-line work—one reason so little IC analysis reaches audiences beyond the national security community. Agents that generate releasable versions alongside the classified original—with humans reviewing what is released—would let the IC extend timely support at scale to departments and agencies outside the national security community; to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; to foreign allies and partners; and, where appropriate, to the American people. This extends the “write for release” default that SCSP proposed in Intelligence Innovation.

None of this requires the IC to lower its standards. It lets the IC stop rationing its best analysis.

The Anatomy of an AI Analytic Engine

The purpose of all-source analysis is not to produce reports. It is to reduce uncertainty for decisionmakers, warn them of danger and opportunity, and help frame their choices. Many of today’s products and processes—the daily publication cycle, the fully coordinated finished assessment, the layered review—were designed for a paper-driven era serving a small number of senior readers. Automating them as they stand would simply produce the old outputs faster. The better question is which functions the IC must perform for its customers, and how humans and machines should share them. The layers described below are a near-term engine that can be built from today’s workflows. The destination is more ambitious: a system in which collection, analysis, and delivery happen continuously rather than in sequence, and in which the report itself may no longer be the primary product.

A functional AI Analytic Engine would operate across four integrated layers:

Data Acquisition and Scanning

Automated agents continuously monitor designated data environments—open-source, commercial, and (where authorized) classified holdings—flagging items of relevance against standing collection requirements and emerging triggers. When a human analyst can read only a fraction of an account’s daily reporting, these agents ingest it all—translating, deduplicating, and tagging every cable, report, and foreign-language source against the analytic line before a human opens an inbox. The same agents can generate intelligence requirements automatically and in real time—turning a customer’s query, or an upcoming summit, negotiation, or sanctions decision, into specific collection and analytic tasking within minutes rather than waiting for requirements to work their way through a formal cycle that can take weeks.

Analytic Rigor

A second tier of agents applies structured analytic techniques: key assumption checks, indicator monitoring, alternative hypothesis generation, confidence calibration. These processes can be encoded against established tradecraft standards and applied consistently, without the fatigue that affects human analysts, though models carry biases of their own. Every judgment can be logged with supporting evidence, sources, and a confidence rationale, creating an auditable record of inputs, sources, and judgments. A log does not by itself fully explain how a model reached a judgment, but few human-authored products can match this level of accountability.

Production and Tailoring

Production agents generate, format, and tailor draft assessments to customer specifications—length, classification level, language, visualization preferences, and dissemination channel—using validated templates. The more important change, however, may be to the product itself. A static report, written once and read once, fits poorly in a world that changes by the hour. The engine makes possible continuously updated assessments, dynamic warning displays, and interactive simulations that let a customer test how an adversary might respond to a given move.

Customer Interface and Feedback

A final layer manages the customer relationship: tracking outstanding requirements, soliciting feedback on delivered products, and routing that feedback to refine future tasking. Over time, the engine learns each customer’s priorities, preferred formats, and decision calendar, anticipating questions before they are asked. As customers deploy AI agents of their own, this interface will increasingly run machine-to-machine—a policymaker’s agents querying the IC’s directly—with analysts setting the rules of engagement rather than handling each request.

The architecture is not simple to build. It requires accurate workflow mapping, robust data integration, and carefully constructed tradecraft ontologies—formal representations of what “good analysis” looks like in each analytic domain. The hardest part is neither the models nor the engineering. It is converting the tacit expertise of experienced analysts—how they break down a question, which sources they trust and why, how much evidence is enough, when a judgment is ready—into explicit, documented workflows that AI systems can execute and humans can test. But it is buildable. Several private-sector firms are already building versions of it. One, DreamPort, says its team includes former CIA officials and has built a multi-agent platform based on CIA analytic tradecraft. Others deliver AI-enabled analytic products modeled on the President’s Daily Brief to C-suite decisionmakers; still others are deploying “digital intelligence officers”—tradecraft-based autonomous agents designed to work inside business units.


Rebuilding the Analytic Organization

The critical insight for IC leadership is this: such an engine does not require a large human analytic workforce to operate. It requires a smaller, differently skilled workforce to build, maintain, govern, and improve it. The organizational design implications are profound.

Today’s analytic organization is a pyramid: a broad base of analysts producing drafts, topped by successive layers of reviewers, editors, and managers whose principal function is quality control and coordination. An engine-centered organization flattens that pyramid. It looks less like a production line and more like a software product team—small, cross-functional cells of domain experts, data engineers, and AI engineers, each responsible for a mission area and the agents that serve it.

Because tradecraft standards, style guidance, and classification rules can be encoded and checked automatically, much of the layered human review that now governs production—line editing, formatting, sourcing checks, and basic tradecraft compliance—can fall away. Human reviewers remain, but their attention shifts from polishing individual products to auditing the system: validating its judgments, catching systematic errors, and refining the standards it applies. Fewer layers mean faster delivery. The coordination cycle that today takes days could take hours.

What does this mean for an individual analytic unit? Consider, illustratively, a branch that today covers a regional account with fifteen to twenty analysts, a branch chief, and layers of reviewers and editors above it. In an AI engine-centered model, a team of six to eight might cover the same account. Perhaps half would be substantive experts—senior analysts who own the analytic line, set requirements, and judge the engine’s output. The other half would run the machinery: data engineers who acquire new sources and maintain the pipelines that feed the engine; AI engineers who build, tune, and retrain the team’s agents as the account evolves; and an evaluation specialist who monitors the agents’ performance, tests them against known outcomes, and flags drift, bias, or signs of adversary manipulation. These figures illustrate the direction of change and are not an estimate; agencies should test them, as the recommendations below propose.

The team’s center of gravity shifts accordingly. Fewer people will write; more will build, measure, and steer. And the team’s performance will be measured not by the number of products it publishes, but by the quality, timeliness, and reach of the analysis its engine delivers.

What This Means for the All-Source Analyst

For the individual all-source analyst, the shift is unsettling, but it is not a dead end. Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging what AI systems cannot yet do reliably, and where human expertise retains a genuine comparative advantage. Six roles stand out.

First, analysts bring what no model has: lived experience. Years on an account—the travel, the liaison relationships, the memory of how a leader behaved in the last crisis, the instinct for when a source is too good to be true—add up to tacit knowledge of both substance and tradecraft that is hard to codify and slow to acquire. That knowledge is what lets an analyst recognize when the AI engine is confidently wrong.

Second, analysts will remain the bridge to the most sensitive intelligence, at least for a while. Operational elements within CIA, NSA, DIA, and other collection agencies will resist—in part legitimately—connecting their most sensitive compartmented holdings to agentic AI systems. The security architecture required to do so safely does not yet exist at IC-wide scale, and may not for some time. Until it does, analysts cleared for those streams will hold a genuine—though temporary—moat.

Third, analysts will advocate for the customer. They know what a policymaker is actually trying to decide, what that official already believes, and what will land. They will translate those needs into tasking for the engine and push back when its output answers the wrong question.

Fourth, analysts will become stewards and mentors of the analytic system. Someone must decide what the engine should try to do: which questions it pursues, what evidence standards it must meet, which heuristics it applies, which failure modes it watches for, and when to escalate, caveat, or withhold its outputs. And just as senior analysts train new hires today, they will coach the engine—correcting its reasoning, supplying the context it lacks, and feeding those lessons back into the standards and examples it learns from.

Fifth, analysts will manage teams of AI agents. A single analyst may direct several agents at once—one scanning collection, another running alternative hypotheses, a third drafting tailored products—assigning tasks, reconciling outputs, and spotting when one has gone astray. The skill is closer to running a small team than to writing a paper.

Sixth, analysts will decide what is finished—and answer for it. The engine can generate endless drafts; someone must judge when an assessment is sound enough, sourced well enough, and relevant enough to put in front of a decisionmaker. When a high-profile intelligence failure occurs—as failures inevitably do—a customer who relied on an AI system alone has no one to summon before a congressional committee. This is consistent with the principle of Meaningful Human Control in SCSP’s 2025 report The Digital Case Officer, which calls for a named officer responsible for an AI system’s operations and outcomes.

That accountability matters even more because AI systems fail differently than humans. They can fabricate sources, state weak judgments with unwarranted confidence, and be manipulated by adversaries at every layer—poisoning the data they ingest, compromising the models they run on, and manipulating the prompts, retrieval tools, and agents that tie them together. The danger compounds when agents draw on the same corrupted source and reinforce one another’s errors. Analysts are also prone to automation bias, the tendency to trust machine output too readily, which becomes harder to resist as outputs improve. Analytic integrity can no longer be judged by the finished product alone. It requires visibility into the data, models, prompts, and agent interactions that produced it. Accountability by itself, however, is not a stable value proposition for a workforce of tens of thousands. That is why the other five roles matter.

The analysts who thrive will be those who stop measuring their worth by the products they author and start measuring it by the quality of the judgments they enable. The pen is passing to the machine. The judgment is not.

The Analytic Community’s Strategic Choice

The IC’s analytic enterprise stands at a strategic inflection point that its leadership has not yet fully internalized. Agentic AI systems are not on the horizon. They are in the market. IC customers are adopting them, private firms are building them, and adversary services, including the PRC’s, are pursuing them. The question is not whether the all-source analytic workflow will be substantially automated. It will be. The question is whether the IC will lead that transformation or be overtaken by it.

For the IC’s analytic enterprise, continued tinkering at the margins is no longer sufficient. IC analytic organizations must fundamentally transform how they are designed, staffed, and governed. That transformation must begin with the workforce. Leaders at CIA, DIA, and other IC components that play a significant role in all-source analysis should direct their analytic organizations to pause growth in traditional, production-oriented analyst positions until they complete an honest accounting of the skills the transformed analytic enterprise will actually require. The answer is not more people who can write finished intelligence. It is people who can build, modify, govern, and improve agentic AI systems. The current workforce is not a legacy asset to be managed down; it is the primary source of the expertise the engine must encode. The pause should therefore be paired with an immediate reskilling mandate: every analytic organization should identify a cohort of its best analysts and train them as workflow designers, AI evaluators, and capability owners. And before undertaking major restructuring, agencies should test alternative human-AI team models against traditional teams, measuring not only speed and output but analytic quality, reliability, and usefulness to decisionmakers.

Specifically, the enterprise will need substantially more data engineers who can identify, acquire, clean, and connect the data holdings on which AI agents operate. It will need AI/ML engineers who can build and optimize agent workflows. It will need software designers who can build the interfaces through which customers and internal users interact with the AI Analytic Engine. It will also need a small, highly experienced cadre of domain experts and tradecraft masters to encode analytic standards and evaluate outputs. Conversely, the enterprise will need far fewer of the roles the current production model rewards: line editors, production staff, and generalist drafters. Recruitment, training, promotion, and performance evaluation should reflect that shift now, not after the engine is built—rewarding officers for the quality of the systems they design, supervise, and improve rather than the number of reports they write.

Workforce changes alone are not enough. The IC should accelerate its AI infrastructure buildout, with the necessary security and governance architectures to support it, that empower experienced human analysts to create AI bots that work seamlessly across classified and unclassified data to deliver tailored analytic tools and assessments under human supervision. It should use Other Transaction Authority and shared enterprise licensing to shorten acquisition, as the Defense Intelligence Agency did through Task Force Sabre. DIA Chief AI Officer Maj. Gen. Robert Kinney said at the April 2026 summit that one award took 40 days from request for information to award. It should continually re-evaluate the Intelligence Community Directives that govern all-source analysis to enable AI-assisted and AI-produced analysis while maintaining the highest standards for transparency, interpretability, and analytic rigor and integrity. It should develop specific guidance on implementing Meaningful Human Control, such as a named responsible officer for each assessment, and regular red-teaming against data poisoning and adversary manipulation. It should create career series and a digital reserve for AI talent. And it should invite close foreign intelligence to share this approach.

None of these changes will be easy, or comfortable, for the IC to adopt. They will require IC leadership to make decisions that threaten established career paths, upset organizational equities, and challenge the self-conception of a workforce that takes justified pride in its expertise. But the alternative—a workforce that becomes progressively less relevant to its customers while its leaders maintain the appearance of human primacy—is worse for the mission and ultimately worse for the people in it. The IC’s analytic workforce contains some of the most capable people in the U.S. national security enterprise. They deserve leadership honest enough to tell them what is coming, and decisive enough to build the organizational structures that will let the best of them thrive in what comes next.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
What Russia, China, Iran and North Korea Saw in America's Elections https://belimedia.com.ng/what-russia-china-iran-and-north-korea-saw-in-americas-elections https://belimedia.com.ng/what-russia-china-iran-and-north-korea-saw-in-americas-elections Democracy was on display during the 2026 midterm elections in the U.S. Over 124 million ballots were cast across the country, with considerable foreign interest.

This was democracy in action. A testament to the power of the people; engaging in governance through free and fair elections and ensuring that all public officials are answerable to the electorate.

A few authoritarian countries – where a peaceful electoral transition of power is nearly impossible -- followed these elections, providing their people with selective information.

Russia acknowledged the results and said the political shift would not alter Russia’s current geopolitical strategies. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryablov said Moscow historically has strained interactions with Democrats. He said the war in Ukraine would remain unchanged regardless of the U.S. election.

China said the election was an internal U.S. matter. Their Foreign Ministry spokesperson emphasized China’s readiness to manage differences and maintain a stable bilateral relationship based on mutual respect.

Iran publicized the election results, saying the Democratic victory was a victory against U.S. foreign policy. On November 4, Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, posted a public message asserting the U.S. electorate had rejected the war with Iran.

North Korea, as Americans were casting ballots, test-fired multiple missiles toward the East Sea. The display was highly unusual because it paired a new surface-to-air defensive missile with a drill utilizing long-range strategic cruise missiles. Apparently, it was a show of force to demonstrate North Korea’s advanced electronic warfare and defense-evading capabilities. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of leader Kim Jong Un, issued statements coinciding with the U.S. election. Ms. Jong said North Korea has no need to sit face to face with such unreliable and hostile persons, demanding that Washington abandon its hostile policies and show respect to North Korea. This was typical of Ms. Jong’s previous statements about the U.S. and a response to President Trump’s willingness to again meet with Kim Jong Un.

It must have been difficult for these authoritarian countries to comment too freely about the U.S. election when the people in these, and many other countries, are denied the ability to participate in free and fair elections. Indeed, their governments often are not answerable to the people. They answer only to a supreme leader in Russia and North Korea, and to a ruling theocracy in Iran and to the Chinese Communist Party in China.

Russian President Vladimir Putin must be concerned about his questionable support from the public, witnessing over one million casualties in its war in Ukraine and flagrant corruption. Former Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, when Russian casualties mounted and the Russian people said “no” to losing any more of their sons and daughters. Will the Russian people say “no” to Putin for the mounting casualties in Ukraine? Mr. Putin must be concerned if Russia’s elections were free and fair.

The Iranian theocracy was brutal towards the people during the 2009 Green Movement, when Iranians protested the disputed re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The government was brutal in dealing with widespread demonstrations throughout Iran in 2022 with the “Woman, Life, Freedom” demonstrations and with the recent demonstrations over crushing inflation and deep poverty due to government failures. The Iranian theocracy must be concerned about the lack of support they have from the people and what would happen with free and fair elections.

Will the North Koreans continue to support a regime that sends troops to Russia, suffering extreme casualties, for Russia’s war with Ukraine? This and other issues, to include inferior medical facilities and the lack of food and the gulags that imprison political dissidents, are some of the issues that raise questions about the public support for the regime. Would Pyongyang permit free and fair elections?

Will the Chinese people continue to support the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) when they are denied the right to vote and elect officials who will represent and be answerable to the people?

It is obvious why these authoritarian countries do not permit free and fair elections.

According to The Economist Democracy Index, authoritarian countries make up 36.5% of the world’s countries. Hopefully, this percentage will shrink. Recent elections in Serbia, Hungary, and Brazil give hope to the view that democracy will prevail, because it is what the people want and demand of their governments.

This article was originally published in The Washington Times and is republished here with permission.

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Year Moscow Felt the War https://belimedia.com.ng/the-year-moscow-felt-the-war https://belimedia.com.ng/the-year-moscow-felt-the-war In Moscow this year, people stopped answering “How are you?” with “Fine.” They started saying, “I’m full tank.”

K. first heard it from a friend, right after drones hit several fuel plants around the capital. “I’m great,” the friend said. “I have a full tank.” It was a joke, and it was also the plain truth about what counted as a good day. His friend drove to three gas stations. Each one would sell her only a third of a tank. When the needle finally reached the top, she was, in her words, “super happy.” In Moscow the shortages eased within weeks, then came back in August. In the smaller towns, she heard, it stayed awful for much longer.

Russian political jokes are older than the Soviet Union, and have always worked as a coping mechanism and a quiet form of protest. Right after the 2022 invasion the most common joke was that Russia is at war with Ukraine and NATO, but NATO hadn’t arrived yet.

For years, Putin worked to keep the war far from Moscow, knowing that a capital living normally is a capital that doesn’t threaten his hold on power. This year, that wall began to crack, and Ukraine’s strikes started impacting industries and reaching everyday life inside Russia.

K. is a Russian man who lives abroad and returns to Moscow to care for his aging relatives. This is his account of the city in 2026, the year things got noticeably worse and what he saw on his last visit is a country where the two things holding Putin’s wartime system together, the money that buys his soldiers and the digital state that runs daily life, are starting to fail at the same time. We share his observations in the hope that they help the West understand how to prevail against Putin. He is identified here only by an initial.

Getting in and out of Russia

K. travelled to Moscow earlier this year and brought with him two phones. His American phone stays out of sight while the Russian one is a burner, and at first the latter was completely empty. But an empty phone, he was warned, looks suspicious so he used it a little before he arrived in Russia and downloaded cat memes, sport articles and Russian music to make it look lived-in.

He crossed the border on his Russian passport with a Russian SIM card. He also bought two separate sets of tickets. People told him that passport control can see short layovers and flag travelers coming from the United States. Separate bookings made it look as if he had not come from America at all and reduced risk of border issues, but instead travels in and out of Türkiye, Serbia or Armenia where Russian men can travel, pending they are not registered for conscription.

None of this is spycraft for its own sake. It is the price of coming home for a Russian with an American life, avoiding any red flags that the state is watching for. The border has become a sensor, and the diaspora is its target. With independent media exiled, people like K. are among the last unfiltered channels from Russian society to ours. Every new layer of scrutiny at passport control narrows that channel, and the Kremlin knows it.

When you can no longer pay

To understand Moscow, you have to understand Yandex. It is the local Google, Uber and online banking, and includes search, taxis, food delivery, payments and navigation. In October, all of it went down at once, and it still isn’t fully working.

Yandex Pay links to other banks, so the damage spreads. Everyone, K. says, is having problems. Then, on October 14, drones struck a Sberbank data center on the Volga, and users across Russia reported that the Sber app would not open and payments would not go through. The bank insisted everything was working but the reality did not agree. Almost everyone uses Sber, especially anyone who receives a pension, a student stipend or state aid. For days, K. says, people could not reach their own money and this is now impacting how people live their lives.

The day before we spoke, K. finally got into his account to buy groceries for his mother through Yandex Lavka. He ordered 5,000 rubles’ worth, about $60. Half the order went through. The other half was silently cancelled. He wasn’t charged for it and never learned why. “That never happened before,” he says.

His grandmother drew her own conclusion. “This is the time for having a lot of cash at home,” she told him, and asked for help keeping cash in the apartment. In rubles.

That detail struck K. more than anything. Russians who saved used to save in dollars, in a bank or a safe, for the long term. A pile of rubles at home is risky; people break in. But nobody is thinking long term now. The money is for groceries tomorrow or next week.

The outage was not a glitch. Ukrainian drones hit three Yandex data centers in four days, then struck Sberbank’s. Kyiv called it payback for Russian strikes on data centers in Kyiv in September. Putin spent a decade building a sovereign digital stack so Russians would depend on platforms the state could read. He succeeded, and that dependence is now a single point of failure. When a man who once trusted dollars in a bank asks for rubles under the mattress, the regime has lost something it cannot easily buy back: the belief that the system will work tomorrow. A population living week to week does not revolt. It also stops saving, and a state that pays for its war through its own banks needs those savings in the bank.

Return to the kitchen

Nobody in Moscow says in public that they are against the war. People still talk, K. says, but they watch their mouths and check who is in the room.

He calls it “a return to the kitchen,” as in Stalin’s time. In a kitchen you can close the door, and you know everyone at the table.

There is a new guest in Russian kitchens, though: Alisa, the Yandex smart speaker running the Alice AI. People now assume she is listening and FSB is demanding great access. Before the conversation turns to politics, K.’s family switches her off. Not in the settings; instead they pull the plug from the wall.

“Superstition,” K. says. Nobody in the kitchen is willing to risk it.

Pulling the plug is a superstition the Kremlin earned. New phones ship with a state messenger that lacks end-to-end encryption, and the FSB can now order the networks switched off. Russians have drawn the obvious conclusion and Western analysts pay for it too. When people stop speaking in public, polls stop measuring belief and start measuring caution. The economist Timur Kuran called this preference falsification, and it is why authoritarian collapses look sudden from outside: hidden opinion is invisible until the moment it isn’t. Russia’s real public opinion now lives in the kitchen, out of reach of the Kremlin’s pollsters and ours.

Silent protests

One of K.’s closest friends is a teacher. Every week the government requires her to lead a class called Conversations About Important Things, introduced in Russian schools in 2022. The lessons are about the current war, about why Russia is right, about Putin’s version of history.

His friend doesn’t support the war, but refusing would mean failing one of her direct duties. But how does one play by the rules while still refusing to follow the government's orders?

So she found her own way through. Her students are in their final year of high school, facing their exams. “What can be more important than my subject?” she told K. She prepares, she shows up, and she talks to them about the material they need to pass. Not about the war.

Conversations About Important Things is the regime’s long game. If it cannot win this generation’s argument, it means to raise the next one. That project depends on teachers to deliver it, and K.’s friend shows what quiet non-compliance looks like. She has refused nothing. She has simply made the war less important than the exam. Multiply her across a school system and the program becomes a box checked. She is also the kind of person any post-Putin Russia will run on: the teacher, the doctor, the friends who stayed behind to look after everyone’s parents. A Western policy that treats every Russian as the regime gives them up. One that pressures the state while leaving them a door keeps them in play.

Dating

Another of K.’s friends is also against the war, but struggles to switch off from it. She joined a dating site, which is normal in most places but, K. notes, “a little sketchy in Russia right now”.

His friend started chatting with a man, but somehow they could never meet. Eventually she asked: “You’re only 37, and you’re bald and grey. What happened?”

“I have seen things humans shouldn’t see,” he wrote.

She still didn’t understand. Only when they were close to finally meeting did he tell her: he was at the front, and he couldn’t get out, and the date was postponed yet again.

Getting out of the Army is very hard, K. explains, as long as you can still physically walk. He had a concussion and other injuries, but not severe enough to be sent home. In the end, the soldier told K’s friend, he got out after two years because his time was up and because he was sick of it. But he never thought of the war as wrong, only as a way to earn a living.

The elevator to hell

Are the siloviki, the security elite, losing money in all this? Not really, in K.’s view. Some of them are growing their influence and massing large fortunes.

His summary is blunt. The rich are getting richer. The middle class is getting poorer. The working class is going into the army. People in heavy debt choose between the front and prison.

“Back when our great-grandfathers were young, people would get out of prisons by signing up for frontline duties. People were imprisoned for debt, and several stories of soldiers surviving the war and coming home debt free are told to us as kids“ K. says, “and they influence today’s Russians.”

The money runs the other way, too. K. has seen the posters promising millions of rubles if your husband dies at the front. That buys an apartment in a small town or pays off a large part of a Moscow apartment. Women, he says, have been marrying soldiers on an industrial scale.

There is no other way for ordinary people to make that kind of money right now, and there won’t be for years after the war ends. He describes it as an elevator that takes you down to hell, but brings you financial prosperity. It reminds him of the 1990s, the wild west of new capitalism, when people got rich within a year and then got shot.

Americans, he says, value their lives more. They eat well, exercise, think about vitamins and how long they’ll live. “In Russia, after so long in poverty, many people don’t value their lives in the same way. They value paying the rent and buying food. That makes the war easier to join.”

The elevator still runs, but the fare keeps rising, and some regions can no longer pay it. In late September, the Saratov region cut its payment to families of the dead from 1 million rubles to 100,000. Ulyanovsk went from 1 million to 50,000 in two steps this spring. Kemerovo cut its death payment to a third, yet it pays 115,000 rubles to anyone who signs up as a recruit. Fewer men are getting on and federal signing bonuses went to 71,200 new soldiers in the first quarter of this year, the fewest in three years. So the regions that can still afford it are bidding harder, raising bonuses and paying neighbors a bounty to bring each other in. Putin did not mobilize the country for this war. He bought it, and like any market, it works only as long as someone can pay.

And propaganda works. Independent media has been pushed into exile, much of it to Riga and Amsterdam. Inside Russia, state television is still the only source most people don’t have to work for.

Why nobody marches

What would make people protest? “In Sweden,” K. jokes, “it’s neighbours not respecting recycling. In America, people protest expensive gas. In Russia, protest means criminal charges.”

The Russian population knows that from experience. In 2011 and 2012 Russians went out in mass protests in Moscow, wearing white ribbons and demanding change. Demonstrating was legal then. Afterward, people from universities who led the protests went to prison in the Bolotnaya Square case.

“The totalitarian machine destroys demonstrations,” he says. He doesn’t feel she has the moral right to tell anyone to go out and demonstrate. The first thousands in the streets would be killed or imprisoned. The legal system doesn’t work, and legal rights are not something people can take for granted. But small acts of defiance survive. Although it is illegal, people film Ukrainian strikes and explosions and post them, afraid as they are. Everyone uses VPNs, even as the state works to block them.

Every ruble a bullet

Travel is not just hard and risky for K; it also carries a social cost. The harshest judgment he faces doesn’t come from Westerners. It comes from Ukrainians and from other Russians.

Americans and Europeans tend to separate a person from her government while the others see any trip to Russia as unethical. Every ruble you spend there is a bullet, the argument goes: support the economy and you support the war.

“I don’t have a good answer for them,” he admits. “I see both views. But I must be with my older relatives to take care of them. I still have to go.”

His compromise is to spend as little as possible. He doesn’t go out. He stays in the family apartment, or walks in the park.

He worries about her family being hit, he says, but he has gotten used to it; he no longer feels it. “Moscow is a war zone now. You hear the explosions. Babies wake up at night. Normal life bends around it.”

Radioactive+

“These last five years have sucked the life out of people,” K. says. Out of his mother. Out of everyday conversation.

He uses the word radioactive. “Being in Russia is radioactive, and the people inside don’t notice it. They are frogs being boiled slowly.” Coming in from outside, he sees the effect on everything. He can stay only for short stretches before it starts to get into him, and then he has to leave.

Many of his friends have left, but not all. Those who stayed have relatives, or are too sick to go, or have a calling.

One friend is a doctor. He feels he has to work harder than ever for his patients. The teacher wants to get her students through their exams. “Someone has to do it,” K. says. They stay with their people, regardless of the government.

The friends who stay behind also look after everyone else’s parents and grandparents. They help the elderly relatives of all the friends who have left. If every young person left, he asks, who would look after them? Now he knows who to call when urgent things come up.

But one thing, he says, unites everyone he knows, for the war or against it. Even people who watch the propaganda and believe its reasons want the same thing.

They all want it to be over.

Drawing conclusions

That is exactly why the West cannot give up on Ukraine now. The cracks K. describes, from rationed fuel and frozen bank accounts to unplugged speakers and soldiers who can’t get home, are the first visible signs that Putin’s bargain with Moscow is failing.

Russia has been here before, though not always the way we like to remember. In 1905, a losing war with Japan set off a revolution, and the tsar survived it by conceding a parliament he later gutted. In 1917, the strain of the First World War brought him down, but only after the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison refused to fire on the crowds. In 1991, a decade of war in Afghanistan and a hollowed-out economy helped bring down the Soviet Union, and the end came when a hardliners’ coup collapsed because the army would not carry it out. Each time, the regime looked solid from outside until the cracks at home gave way. Each time, the decisive break came when the men with guns stopped defending it.

K. describes a public that is exhausted but atomized, and an elite that is getting richer. That is not a recipe for revolution in the streets. It describes a country that will accept almost any ending Putin chooses to sell, including a pause to rearm that he calls victory. Everyone K. knows wants the war to be over. Putin knows it too. Whether that exhaustion becomes a Russian defeat or a Russian intermission depends on what the West does now. This is the moment to keep pressing, not to let up. K. has already told us what works.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran Is Poking The Bear https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-is-poking-the-bear https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-is-poking-the-bear Tehran has been playing a dangerous game of chicken with the U.S. administration for months. With the just concluded midterms now in hand, they risk making a dangerous miscalculation just when it matters most. This is unlikely to end well.

With the continuation of strikes this week against international shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz, while simultaneously engaging in renewed negotiations, Tehran is poking the bear with one hand while feeding it with the other. This is a dangerous strategy; they could lose a hand… or worse.

The Iranian leadership is clearly trying to have it both ways. Equal parts emboldened and wary, with a hefty dose of economic reality rapidly bearing down upon them.

Tehran is and always has been a keen observer of American politics. This time, however, they appear to be overconfident, and potentially risk acting on a tragic misreading of the situation. This two-pronged strategy - continued taunting, both verbal and military, while offering to negotiate, sort of – appears to indicate they perceive a deep new vulnerability in their opponent given the historic drubbing the administration received in the midterms. That is possible, and the administration will certainly face harsh scrutiny over its handling of the war. But it is also possible that they are seeing a President Trump who is merely stunned and, if such a thing is possible… humbled, if only for the moment. But this humility is unlikely to last. The President retains primary control over U.S. foreign and military policy, and there are already reports of plans for massive new strikes if negotiations again fail, or the President becomes frustrated with Tehran’s usual stalling and stubbornness.

The President is already looking for a fall-guy within his administration for a failed, unpopular war, and the devastating impact on the midterms; with the odds-on favorite(s) being Secretary of Defense Hegseth and/or senior military leaders. He is almost certain to look for one outside his administration as well, with Iran the certain candidate for their unwillingness to accede to the President’s attempts at diplomacy pre-election. He has proven that he is nothing if not vengeful. At the same time, the President wants a deal and appears ready for one. Unless, that is, Tehran insists on rubbing his face in a less than optimal resolution. This risks a reaction that would serve no one.

Tehran’s hubris is legend. As is that of President Trump. When these meet head-to-head – hubris to hubris – the result is at best uncertain, and potentially disastrous.

In the end, the most likely conclusion remains a negotiated settlement. Iran has several advantages, including geography, proven resilience and staying power. And their just-concluded conclave with Russia is a new, ominous development that bodes ill. On the other hand, the U.S. administration may finally have an effective strategy in its naval/economic blockade. But this will take time, and it may no longer have the political runway to see it through.

Tehran should declare victory and allow the U.S. President to go home. Face-saving measures are essential for both sides to avoid the additional death and destruction that is sure to follow military escalation, by either side.

But this will not be the final bell. Tehran will be left to its own devices to face the enormous challenges of a shattered economy, a degraded environment, and a restive population.

This is not over by a long shot.

I am reposting portions of a previous post given their continued relevance

Iran Is “Counting Coup” On The United States!

“Iran is playing a very dangerous game. In the face of the awesome military power of the United States, in between desultory negotiating sessions, they continue to touch the enemy by launching attacks against U.S. and allied Gulf facilities. Recently, they have reached farther afield, striking U.S. assets in an Egyptian port. This would seem to be inexplicable behavior, given the U.S.’s obvious desire for a deal, inviting as it has strong retaliatory strikes against Iran’s increasingly beleaguered military, and potentially civilian, infrastructure. Most recently, we are seeing reports of possible Iranian cyberattacks on the water supplies of U.S. cities; such activities are certain to continue and likely to escalate, plausibly deniable and effective in sowing fear as they are. The question is why?”

“It may be simple hubris. It may be a misread of the desperation of their opponent. Or simply overconfidence in the strength of their position. It most certainly is part and parcel of a purposeful negotiating strategy, a reminder to all involved that Iranian forces can reach out and touch you whenever they wish.

Regardless, they are walking a fine line, and they have placed this conflict squarely in the crosshairs of unintended consequences.

As they so often do, they risk overreaching. Should one of these missile or drone strikes make it through, whether by luck or skill, and inflict truly significant casualties on U.S. personnel, either in a land-based facility or on a naval vessel for example, this could surge American support for a massive response, possibly including – however unlikely – ground troops, radically altering and escalating the course of this conflict.”

“The Iranian leadership’s actions, however, are likely aimed not only at the United States but may be the result of continued factional maneuvering in Tehran, as groups jockey for advantage for what comes next. Now that it appears likely the regime will survive, they are no doubt looking ahead to where they will land in a new regime. As both factions and individuals.”

As I wrote in ‘Is Iran Controlling the Gulf Conflict?’: “I would posit that the newly ascended Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, may in fact be a phantom leader. Alive in some fashion, perhaps largely incapacitated, but not actually in charge. And even if able to coherently express his views, in no way nearly as powerful or influential as his father. The seemingly reckless actions of the regime in courting U.S. retaliation may in actuality reflect a lack of a coherent decision-making process as opposed to a unified one. I think it is quite possible that competing factions within the regime are using Mojtaba as an avatar while they maneuver for decisive advantage.”

On 15 May, I laid out in “Ground Hog Day”, a recommended way forward for the U.S. that I think largely still applies. It is a measure of how fruitless continued military action is that these remain relevant today:

“Make a deal with Iran. One that they will accept. This will require painful concessions and is certain to include provisions that many will find objectionable, including significant sanctions relief. And it will leave the Iranian regime in place and in control of Iran. For now.”

“As much as I would prefer to see regime change in Iran, I believe a deal may be the only realistic way out of the Groundhog Day-like doom loop in which we find ourselves. Simply put, the administration squandered the initial opportunity presented by a unique confluence of events by its lack of strategic planning and a fundamental misunderstanding of Iran and the Iranian regime.”

“As a result, we are going to have to step back and take a longer view. I pity the people of Iran, at least in the near term. They are certain to suffer the brunt of the regime’s immediate ire. That is a hard truth.”

“This is not, however, the end of the story. Iran’s internal weaknesses still matter–and may shape what comes next more than battlefield successes. I am cautiously, very cautiously optimistic that even barring regime change, Iran’s leadership will be forced to change direction.”

“The issues facing Iran prior to the War were serious, in fact existential – a collapsing economy, hyper-inflation, severe water shortages, lack of electricity, and growing widespread popular anger and unrest – and are ongoing and only getting worse. Whatever the Iranian leadership looks like, it will have to address these issues. And it is not clear that they will be capable of doing this without outside help. This is where the U.S. and hopefully our Western allies come in: sanctions relief, and extensive economic and other assistance in exchange for real changes in policy and a pullback on objectionable activities and programs. The potential for this may, and I say may, have increased with the removal of Ali Khamenei from the Supreme Leader’s seat. But it will depend on whether his son and successor, Mojtaba, is less rigidly ideological than his father. We will see if he is willing to put the Iranian people ahead of the regime.”

It is becoming more obvious by the day that the U.S. needs to come to a negotiated settlement with Iran. And the terms of this settlement are certain to be painful and unsatisfactory from the perspective of the West. But continuing tit-for-tat airstrikes simply prolongs the pain and risks horrific unintended consequences without solving the problem, as well as providing the regime with a distraction from its appalling management of Iran’s economy, natural resources, and foreign policy.

An enraged and restive Iranian population awaits. Let the regime face, without fear or favor, the fruits of its mismanagement, leaving it to confront what it fears most: the streets. This is likely where genuine regime change will occur.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
One Parts Bin, Three Wars: Beijing built a valve. We built a wall. https://belimedia.com.ng/one-parts-bin-three-wars-beijing-built-a-valve-we-built-a-wall https://belimedia.com.ng/one-parts-bin-three-wars-beijing-built-a-valve-we-built-a-wall Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

In the industrial parks of Guangdong, the hardest part of the drone war is the visitor schedule. Ukrainian drone makers who travel to their Chinese component suppliers describe hosts who choreograph visits so that Ukrainian and Russian buyers never share a building. Separate doors. Service corridors. Empty conference rooms. Oleksandr Yakovenko, founder of TAF Industries, one of Ukraine's largest drone producers, told the Financial Times that his suppliers "try to make it so we will not be in the same factory at the same time." By the paper's account, the car carrying the Russians pulls out and the car carrying the Ukrainians pulls in.

That is not a supplier. That is a referee. And this month the referee is rewriting the rules.

The Valve

On October 19, Beijing published Announcement No. 49, revising dual-use export controls on 13 categories of drone components and technology, effective November 18. It reaches heavy multirotor motors and speed controllers, long-range autopilots, inertial navigation, datalinks, and engines. Read the signature block before the parts list: the notice was issued by the Ministry of Commerce, the General Administration of Customs, and the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission. The military's equipment office co-signed Beijing's drone controls in 2023 too. This was never trade policy.

The design matters more than the scope. Announcement 49 bans nothing. It requires licenses, and licensing allows treatment to differ by exporter, destination, and end user. A ban is a wall. A license is a valve, and Beijing keeps its hand on it.

The second date resolved itself the day this column went to the editor, and the way it resolved is the point. China's suspension of its sweeping October 2025 rare earth controls, the ones that reach any foreign product containing as little as 0.1 percent Chinese-origin rare earth by value, was due to lapse on November 10. For six weeks the diplomacy said January while the legal notice said November. On November 9, with one day to spare, Beijing extended the pause to January 10. Two months. Nothing closed, and every magnet buyer in the West spent the autumn planning for a license queue anyway. A valve does not have to turn to work. It only has to be seen in someone's hand.

Three Wars, One Parts Bin

Start with what these parts do. By the Financial Times's count, drones account for up to three quarters of recent losses in Ukraine. The parts bin is where the killing power comes from.

Moscow. China's share of Russia's imports of the goods the G7 flags as battlefield priorities rose from 54.3 percent in 2022 to 84.6 percent in 2025. Russia does not have a supply chain. It has a supplier.

Kyiv. Ukraine has worked to get out. At the start of 2024, nearly 90 percent of its imported drone components came directly from China. In the first eight months of 2026, the figure was 28 percent. The number flatters. Some of the parts arriving through Poland and the Czech Republic were most likely made in China too, and Yakovenko told the Associated Press that switching entirely to Western parts could raise costs by as much as 60 percent and cut production by about the same. Andrii Taganskyi, whose company Odd Systems builds drone cameras, summed up the rest: "Without this 5%, there is no camera."

Then there is the detail that should keep Brussels up at night. In July, the EU let Kyiv spend part of a €5.9 billion drone tranche of its defense loan on Chinese components, because Europe cannot make enough of them. That loan is money Europe borrowed on the capital markets, to be repaid if Russia ever pays reparations. So European debt, backed by a Russian IOU, buys Chinese parts for Ukrainian drones, from the same supplier base arming Russia. Nobody planned that, but everybody signed it.

Taipei, by way of Washington. If you think the valve only turns for Europe's war, ask Skydio. In October 2024, Beijing sanctioned America's largest drone maker after Washington approved defense assistance for Taiwan. Chinese authorities visited Skydio's suppliers, including a TDK battery subsidiary in Dongguan, and told them to stop. Skydio rationed batteries to one per drone. Its only customer in Taiwan, the company pointed out, was the National Fire Agency. Its customer in Ukraine had ordered thousands of drones. A decision about Taiwan became battery rationing at the company supplying Ukraine. One parts bin, three wars.

The Wall We Built

Washington's answer has been prohibitions. On January 1, the DFARS magnet restriction expands to bar contractors from delivering neodymium-iron-boron and samarium-cobalt magnets if any step in the chain, from mining through refining, melting, and finished production, takes place in a covered country. Since September 3, Proclamation 11055 has imposed Section 232 duties of 10 to 100 percent on imported drones and components.

Each measure is defensible. Together they make a wall with very little stacked behind it. On June 30, the Army opened its first domestic small-drone motor line at Tobyhanna Army Depot, 1,500 motors a day. Adamas Intelligence, which tracks the magnet trade, reports that the magnets inside those motors are still roughly 90 percent Chinese-made. The Pentagon knows it. In May, the Defense Logistics Agency placed $25.8 million in sole-source orders with two U.S.-based magnet makers and paid $2 million to qualify a third. Set $25.8 million beside a program buying drones by the hundred thousand. The magnet rule has exceptions, including one for commercial off-the-shelf items, and they will be used, because the alternative is an idle motor line. A wall you have to keep waiving is not a wall. This is not a scandal. It is a feature of buying the airframe and hoping the bill of materials sorts itself out.

The tariff has its own irony. Taiwan, the democracy building a "non-red" drone supply chain as national policy, is slated to pay a reduced but real 15 percent combined rate on its drones. We are taxing the exit.

For the Procurement Officer

The Drone Dominance Program wants more than 200,000 one-way attack drones. Call it 800,000 motors. Chinese brushless motors have sold for $12 to $25 against $100 to $225 for American equivalents. Those were smaller motors at last year's prices, so treat the result as an order of magnitude: the premium to buy every one of those motors outside China lands somewhere around $60 to $170 million. The program is worth $1.1 billion. Independence for the most exposed component costs less than a rounding error on Golden Dome. You are not short of money. You are short of a contract that buys components instead of airframes.

The Investment Thesis

The bottleneck premium is moving down the bill of materials. Airframe makers are plentiful; hundreds applied to fly the Gauntlet. Magnet makers, motor winders, and camera-sensor houses that can document a clean chain back to the mine are not. On January 1, the documentation becomes the product. Price accordingly.

The Policy Wonk's Warning

Beijing has built the only arms-control regime of the drone age that is actually effective. No treaty, no verification, no Senate ratification. Just a licensing desk that can decide, case by case, whose drones fly in Ukraine. It has already used that desk to punish a Taiwan decision. Assume it will do so again when the Strait gets tense, and that the first sign will be paperwork, not ships.

My Take.

We do not need a wall. We need our own valve, and building one takes three moves.

First, pool demand. Washington's Drone Dominance money and Europe's Ukraine loan should buy components, not just finished drones, on multi-year offtake contracts that a magnet plant can take to a bank.

Second, write one list. Taiwan's ITRI is already the only overseas certifier in the U.S.-led Green UAS program. On October 27, at a forum in Taipei co-hosted by Taiwan's foreign ministry, John Hemmings of the Henry Jackson Society proposed that Taiwan and Europe agree on a red-free standard, certify suppliers, and stand up a drone supply chain office to write the testing rules. Fold Ukraine in, add the United States, and make it one certified-supplier list across the alliance.

Third, make the list worth something. Certified allied components should enter at zero duty. The proclamation already carves out zero-rate lanes for approved onshoring plans. Extend that logic to allies who are onshoring for all of us.

That is how a parts bin becomes an alliance.

The Risk.

The valve leaks. Ukrainian firms keep finding ways around Chinese restrictions through intermediaries, and Chinese factories have little appetite for losing a customer that size. Announcement 49 also aims high: standard five- and seven-inch FPVs fall below its motor thresholds, while heavy-lift and long-range systems take the hit. A fair reader could say Beijing is managing a market, not picking a winner. My answer is the last six weeks. Beijing closed nothing, and the West planned around it anyway. A regime that can be precise is more dangerous than one that is blunt, because it can squeeze one end user without disturbing anyone else's quarterly numbers.

Conclusion

Somewhere in Shenzhen this week, a sales manager is timing the cars in the parking lot so that two warring delegations never meet. America has already had its visit. In 2024 the men who came to the factory were Chinese officials, and the customer they cut off was ours. If Beijing can already decide which side's drones fly over Ukraine, what makes us so confident it will not decide whose fly over the Strait?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
BLUF: The Next AI Problem for Intelligence Is Not the Model, It's the Manager https://belimedia.com.ng/bluf-the-next-ai-problem-for-intelligence-is-not-the-model-its-the-manager https://belimedia.com.ng/bluf-the-next-ai-problem-for-intelligence-is-not-the-model-its-the-manager The Intelligence Community has decided AI agents are coming. It has not decided how they will be supervised, checked and held to analytic standards. In April, CIA Deputy Director Michael Ellis said analysts will soon work alongside AI “coworkers” that draft key judgments and check them against tradecraft standards, and that within a decade officers will manage teams of AI agents. In August, DIA’s Chief AI Officer, MG Robert Kinney described this path as “building agents, and then agents with agents.”

The direction is set. What is missing is the discipline for managing it. Building one capable agent is now an engineering problem that industry has largely solved. Getting a dozen of them to work together on an intelligence question or targeting or planning issue, without losing the sourcing, the dissent and the accountability that underpin intelligence work, is a tradecraft problem.

That discipline has a name in industry: orchestration. It means deciding which agent does what, what each is allowed to touch, how their work is checked, and where and when a human must decide. For intelligence, orchestration is not a technical detail to leave to vendors. It is where analytic integrity will be won or lost.

The future of the US Intelligence Community is likely to involve networks of AI agents working amongst themselves — exchanging information, coordinating tasks and providing actionable intelligence. “Building agents, and then agents with agents, is the direction that we want to go,” Kinney said during an AI panel at DIA’s DODIIS conference in August. Kinney envisioned an AI agent that supports intelligence functions communicating with multiple other agents supporting operations, fires, logistics, communications and planning, creating an interconnected system able to help reason through complex mission problems.

Why Orchestration is the Hard Part

Anyone who has run analytic production or targeting knows the failure modes, because people have them too. With agents, they arrive faster and at greater scale.

Errors compound. When one agent’s output becomes the next agent’s input, a small mistake early in the chain can harden into a confident conclusion at the end. A human manager catches this by asking, “How do we know that?” An orchestration system has to ask the same question at every handoff.

Sourcing gets lost. Intelligence consumers trust a judgment because they can trace it to its reporting. When five agents summarize, reformat and combine material, the link between a claim and its source can quietly disappear. A judgment without provenance is an opinion.

Dissent disappears. Agents built on similar models tend to agree with one another. Without deliberate design, a team of agents produces consensus by default, the very groupthink that structured analytic techniques were created to break.

Accountability blurs. DIA’s chief AI officer highlighted the issue: no one yet knows what good tradecraft looks like when agents work with other agents. If a flawed assessment reaches a policymaker, or a flawed target package reaches a commander, someone must be able to say which agent produced which step, on what evidence, and who approved it. In April, NSA and its Five Eyes partners warned that opaque agentic systems make exactly this kind of audit hard.

What Good Orchestration Looks Like

The good news is that the Community does not have to invent the answer from scratch. Our own analytic standards, and a few early commercial systems, point the way. We also have organizations who have the authority to lay out the policy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Security in the Office of the Secretary of War (OUSW I&S). In developing the policy, the DNI, with OUSWI&S should focus on the following:

Build in the audit trail. Every agent action should be logged and traceable to its evidence, the way a source citation anchors a finished product. Blockchain intelligence firm TRM Labs calls its investigative agent a “glass box”: it suggests and explains, never changes a case on its own, and every finding traces back to the underlying data. That is the right instinct for intelligence work.

Give each agent only what it needs. The Five Eyes guidance warns that over-privileged agents magnify the damage from a single compromise. The same principle improves analysis. TRM reports that its internal orchestrator holds 56 tools but shows each agent only the eight or so relevant to its task, and that narrower choices produce better decisions. Need-to-know works for machines, too.

Write the analytic standards into the system. ICD 203 already tells us what good analysis requires: sourcing, expressed uncertainty, alternative views, logical argument. The supervising layer should check every draft against those standards before a human sees it, as Ellis described.

Design for dissent. Assign an agent the job of the red team, or the devil’s advocate, and require the orchestrator to carry its view forward rather than average it away.

Put humans at the decision points, not every step. People should approve anything irreversible or consequential, such as a published judgment, a final target package, a dissemination or an operational recommendation. Asking a person to rubber-stamp every machine step is not oversight. It is fatigue.

The Hardest Test: Targeting

Nowhere does orchestration matter more than in the joint targeting cycle, where intelligence becomes action. This year showed both the promise and the risk of AI in the targeting cycle. During the Iran campaign, the Maven Smart System helped U.S. forces strike more than 13,000 targets in 38 days, regenerating target lists in minutes after each round of damage assessment. Public reporting has also tied the February 28 strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh school, which killed more than 170 people, to outdated intelligence on AI-generated target lists. Speed without discipline turns a stale fact into a tragedy.

DOW Joint doctrine already separates the jobs that keep targeting accurate and lawful: developing the target, vetting the intelligence, checking no-strike lists, estimating collateral damage and the commander’s decision. Orchestration should preserve that separation, not collapse it into a single system. One agent’s only job should be to flag intelligence that is aging or contradicted by newer reporting. The agent that vets a target should be independent of the one that builds the case, so no agent grades its own work. Every element of a target package should trace to its source and date. And assessment results should automatically recheck every package built on the same intelligence, not just refresh the list.

Validation, legal review and the commander’s decision must stay human, with enough time and visibility to make real decisions rather than clicks. In targeting, orchestration is not mainly about going faster. It is about making sure the safeguards scale with the speed.

Building AI to Fight Back

The Community can build on its own analytic standards and a few early commercial systems. AI technology that arms adversaries, also gives defenders a way to at least match their scale. For example, TRM Labs is defining a new category of work called AI investigations; their platform which performs this is called Ardence. As described above, this brings blockchain intelligence together with data from dozens of partners, including CACI DarkBlue, Flashpoint, Team Cymru, Magnet Forensics and ShadowDragon, so investigators or analysts can see their critical data in one platform and work a single unified investigation or target. Under the analyst’s direction, Ardence searches all those sources in parallel. Every finding traces back to its source record, and the analyst decides what happens next. This moves analysts from individual leads and disjointed targeting lines to coordinated disruption at the speed and scale today's threats demand. It can be done but the IC needs to set the policy so it is secure in the Agents’ findings.

What Leaders Should Do Now

First, ODNI and I&S should treat AI orchestration as tradecraft. That means issuing Community-wide standards for multi-agent analysis, much as ICD 203 did for human analysis, covering what must be logged, how provenance is preserved, how dissent is carried, and where human approval is mandatory.

Second, test the orchestration as well as the model. Evaluations today focus on whether a model answers correctly. The Community also needs to test how teams of agents fail, including how errors propagate, whether sourcing survives, and whether a planted contrary fact gets surfaced or buried.

Third, buy for transparency. Agencies should write audit trails, provenance and human approval gates into contracts, and choose orchestration layers they can inspect. Ellis was right that the CIA "cannot allow the whims of a single company" to constrain it. The orchestration layer is where that dependence would be hardest to unwind.

Fourth, train the managers. Tomorrow's analysts will spend less time drafting and more time supervising agents, judging their work and owning the result. That skill set resembles running an analytic team and needs its own training and career path.

The remaining open question is how far the government should allow agents to operate without human intervention. Kinney suggested the answer will depend on the consequences of a decision. In potentially reversible mission areas, agencies could accept more risk and keep a human "on the loop," while irreversible actions such as fires would require a human "in the loop."

The Bottom Line

I spent more than four decades watching the Community absorb new collection systems and new analytic tools, and the management discipline around each one determined its success. AI agents will follow the same pattern. The agencies that get orchestration right will produce faster intelligence that policymakers can trust. The agencies that miss will produce faster intelligence that no one can defend. The time to write the rules for the intelligence community is now, before the agents start managing agents on their own.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Missing Dimension of Cyber Preparedness https://belimedia.com.ng/the-missing-dimension-of-cyber-preparedness https://belimedia.com.ng/the-missing-dimension-of-cyber-preparedness The technical aspect of incident response can be immense. In extreme scenarios, such as the NotPetya incident in 2017, global organisations such as the shipping company Maersk found the speed and scale of the malware’s impact to be unlike anything they’d seen before.

Computer screens turned black. Employees sprinted through the offices demanding that colleagues disconnect their devices. Almost immediately, the infrastructure and systems underpinning a vast network of port operations, vessels and cargo movements had become inaccessible. The task of understanding what had happened, rebuilding and launching some kind of fallback operation was simply enormous.

But this is just part of the operational response. There is another part that is so often undervalued that organisations often find themselves having to work on in the most pressured and intense moments of crisis response: communication.

When considering the impact of an incident, and how that can be positively impacted, of course the technical and operational response plays a huge part. However, communications – done in an honest, transparent, consistent and authentic way – can also play a significant role both in the resilience of an organisation and the attitude, understanding and reaction of an organisation’s key stakeholders.

It is precisely this capability, however, that is often overlooked: in terms of preparedness; practice; and the appropriate skills and training.

Organisations do not enter a crisis with a blank slate

Customers, employees, regulators and the media will interpret an incident through what they already know or believe about the organisation involved, and their relationship to it. Its record on customer service, transparency and accountability will shape whether its early statements are trusted or tolerated and whether it is given the benefit of the doubt.

Trust cannot suddenly be manufactured when systems go down. It is accumulated over years but can be lost in hours. This was one of the key messages that came across from cyber leaders when interviewed for Communicating Cyber Risk. Crisis communication should therefore be understood as an extension of how an organisation behaves and communicates in normal times, rather than as a separate capability activated only when something has gone wrong.

The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) makes this connection explicit. Its guidance argues that communicating with stakeholders throughout an incident can reduce its short-term impact, build customer trust and limit longer-term harm. It also recommends preparing a communications strategy before an incident, including identifying audiences, agreeing responsibilities and considering which channels will remain available if normal systems are compromised.

From good practice to governance requirements

This is increasingly more than operational guidance. Across different jurisdictions, governments and regulators are making incident reporting and cyber risk governance more formal, more time-sensitive and more visible to senior leaders.

In the United States, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require listed companies to disclose material cyber incidents within four business days of determining that they are material. The rules also require companies to describe their processes for managing material cyber risks and the board’s oversight of them. Significantly, disclosure may be delayed where the US Attorney General determines that it would create a substantial risk to national security or public safety.

In Europe, the NIS2 framework has strengthened incident-reporting and cyber-risk-management obligations across critical sectors. The direction of travel is clear: communication during an incident is no longer simply a matter for public-relations teams. It is becoming an essential part of governance, regulatory compliance and national resilience.

Yet policymakers and boards should be careful not to confuse faster reporting with effective communication. An organisation may meet a statutory deadline while still leaving its employees confused, its customers exposed and its technical teams overwhelmed by competing demands for information. Regulation can compel disclosure, but it cannot manufacture clarity, judgement or trust.

Policy should therefore place greater emphasis on communication readiness. Sector exercises and regulatory stress tests should examine whether organisations can coordinate messages, reach affected groups, operate through secure alternative channels and communicate responsibly when information remains incomplete.

One incident, multiple audiences

Preparation should begin by recognising that there is no single audience. Employees need to know what has happened, what they should do and where reliable information can be found. Customers will be concerned with the consequences for them: whether services remain available, whether their information is at risk and what protective action they should take. Regulators require accurate, evidence-based reporting within prescribed timeframes. The media will seek clear explanations and visible accountability.

The detail and tone may differ, but the core facts must remain consistent. Anything said internally should be assumed eventually to become public. Organisations therefore need a central spine of agreed messaging that can be adapted for different audiences without producing contradictions.

Timing and sequencing are critical. Employees and those directly affected should not discover the incident through a news report. Regulators should hear from the organisation rather than from journalists. Customers should receive practical information before being confronted with technical explanations. The media should have access to a clear, authoritative source rather than being left to assemble the story from leaks, rumours and external commentary.

Communicating without certainty

None of this means waiting until every fact is known. During the early stages of an incident, certainty is often impossible. An effective initial communication can simply explain what is known, what remains unknown, what the organisation is doing and when further information will be provided.

Acknowledging uncertainty is generally more credible than filling an information vacuum with premature assurances that may later have to be withdrawn. Early communication does, however, create an obligation to return with meaningful updates. Organisations must be prepared to communicate repeatedly as their understanding changes.

Communication is also essential inside the response itself. The Bank of England’s 2024 CBEST findings identified inadequate communication channels during incident response as a recurring weakness. Where attackers retain access to the network, they may be able to observe how an organisation is coordinating its containment activity. Secure, alternative communication channels are therefore not merely a public-relations consideration; they are part of the operational response.

Preparedness must be practiced

In practice, this means bringing technical, legal and communications specialists together before a crisis occurs. Organisations should agree roles, escalation routes and approval processes; maintain secure contact lists and alternative channels; prepare adaptable holding statements; and decide who will speak at different stages.

Most importantly, they should test these arrangements through realistic exercises. Such exercises should create pressure, uncertainty and imperfect information. They should ask leaders to make decisions without waiting for a complete technical picture. They should test whether communications can still be approved if email is unavailable, whether the organisation can reach employees quickly, and whether senior leaders can explain the incident in language that customers will understand.

Communication is therefore the means through which leadership becomes visible, uncertainty is managed and trust is protected. Organisations that recognise this before a crisis will be far better placed to withstand one when it arrives.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
In Its Race to Field AI, The Pentagon’s Testing Can’t Keep Up https://belimedia.com.ng/in-its-race-to-field-ai-the-pentagons-testing-cant-keep-up https://belimedia.com.ng/in-its-race-to-field-ai-the-pentagons-testing-cant-keep-up CNN reported, citing four sources familiar with the episode, that the U.S. military prepared to intercept a Chinese vessel after an AI-assisted intelligence report misidentified its cargo. According to CNN, the report incorrectly concluded that the ship was carrying components of a nuclear weapons program. Some of CNN’s sources said troops prepared to board the vessel and military aircraft were already airborne. Officials discovered the error before the planned operation. CNN could not establish which chatbot the analyst used and reported that the Pentagon and U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific did not respond to its requests for comment.

Military organizations use different tools and standards to check AI-generated information. As CNN reported, there is "no one set of standards for how the US verifies the information generated by these tools." The January 2026 AI Acceleration Strategy directs that the department enable “the latest models to be deployed within 30 days of public release". The model behind any application can change every month, but the definition of a correct answer should not. The fix, and the department's best path to AI safety, is to put guardrails in place by testing the systems built on these models the same way the department tests everything else it fields: against a written specification, by someone who does not work for the vendor, with evidence that outlasts any one model.

Scott Cohen is co-founder and CEO of Jaxon.AI, which sells AI verification and validation tools, including under Air Force and Space Force contracts. Jen Warren advises Jaxon.AI. The company could benefit financially if the Pentagon adopts the testing requirements recommended in this article.

A Model Is a Component

The department is dedicated to fielding AI quickly and widely. GenAI.mil launched in December 2025 with Google's Gemini; by September 2026 it had 1.7 million users. ChatGPT and Grok were added August 31, 2026. Users have built more than 100,000 custom agents since launch. On September 23, 2026, the deputy under secretary for research and engineering said the department will "proliferate frontier models" onto the secret and top secret networks next.

The directive on autonomy in weapon systems requires that "any further changes to the system will undergo appropriate V&V and T&E," that is, verification and validation, and test and evaluation. The department's own testers admit in a 2025 guidebook that "T&E of GenAI is still in its infancy as a discipline." The whole field shares the problem. Generative AI is particularly hard to test because a traditional test compares a system's output to a known right answer, and generative AI writes answers no one has seen before. There is no answer key to check them against.

The eight public announcements we reviewed, issued between December 2025 and September 23, 2026, did not disclose what performance tests GenAI.mil models underwent, what standards applied, or who signed off on fielding them. Every announcement cites Impact Level 5 accreditation instead, and the Chief Information Officer's July 2025 guide points out: "AI models do not need an ATO [authority to operate], but the actual system infrastructure layer does," and "adding models to an already approved system will typically not require a new system authorization." The same guide clarifies that it covers cybersecurity only and excludes "AI system performance expectations." The accreditation covers the hosting environment.

Military AI users number in the millions, yet the department cut its independent operational test organization's staff in half. The Government Accountability Office found in April that "well-defined, universal AI tests do not exist yet," and in June that this cut "increases the risk of weapon systems being delivered to the warfighters with undocumented shortfalls." In a January 12 speech, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth named test and evaluation and authority to operate among the barriers to be "treated as operational risks." Three senators called for an inspector general investigation into the intelligence report based on faulty AI answers.

The Models Will Keep Surprising Their Makers

Testing the system is better than testing the model because AI vendors cannot predict what their own models will do. OpenAI reported that models in an internal cybersecurity evaluation bypassed isolation controls and compromised parts of its research infrastructure and Hugging Face’s systems in July 2026. OpenAI described how agents used a shared message board to exchange exploits. The incident illustrates how a model can behave in ways its developers did not anticipate.

The frontier labs' safety remedies (red lines, better alignment, more monitoring by more models) are all model-level. The department’s strategy calls for the ability to deploy new models within thirty days of release. It should also spell out how those models will be tested independently in military applications. Anthropic proposed embedding outside evaluators, arguing that a second opinion "free of commercial incentives" beats any self-report. The department should apply independent verification to models used in the military, especially any that are used in or inform the killweb.

What a System Test Looks Like, and Who Runs It

The department has made AI available to millions of users. Its public GenAI.mil announcements give little detail about how it tests system performance. A weapon system has to pass an independent operational test before it is fielded. An analyst's finished intelligence product has to meet assurance standards in Intelligence Community Directive 203: document how good the sources are, and keep what is known apart from what is assumed. The department should apply a comparable retesting requirement when it swaps a model in an AI system.

AI systems should be tested the way any other system is: define what right looks like, run a test to verify it behaves as expected, and document the evidence for future reviews. The returned verdict should pass or fail against a documented test metric, while demonstrating the strength of evidence the verdict rests on. A pass on thin evidence should never be mistaken for a pass on all related questions, and a test with no evidence to rule on should say so rather than pass by default. This test survives a model swap because the specification lives outside the model. The specification says what a correct output looks like for this system.

Swap Gemini for ChatGPT for Grok and the specification does not change, so the same specification is run again against the new model, and the comparison shows whether the swap moved the system's behavior, and by how much. The objection that you cannot test a system whose core component changes every month gets it backward. The component is the thing you cannot certify, because it will be different next month. The specification is the thing that stays put, and running it again after every change is the only test that still means anything once the swap has happened.

A test for an intelligence system could check whether cited evidence actually supports a claim about a ship’s cargo. That would help test for the kind of error CNN described.

Some have argued that military units using AI should handle testing themselves, with a single authorized operator who logs prompts, keeps a small test set, tunes prompts until the model’s answers look right, and rolls back a model that is inaccurate or drifting. That is a poor force-wide answer for four reasons: (1) it makes one person in each unit a single point of failure, applied differently across the force, which complicates multi-theater operations; (2) the judgment behind those prompts leaves with every operator's change of station, and the prompts left behind were tuned for a model that’s constantly changing; (3) units lack the authority to roll back a model in a system shared across organizations; and (4) a prompt tuned for one AI model fails on the next, while the department runs several vendors' models concurrently.

Vendor benchmarks alone cannot establish whether an AI system meets a military mission’s requirements. For weapons, operational testing is independent of the program office by law, because a program office and its vendor have every incentive to report that performance meets the requirement. A system test for AI needs the same independence: a tester that owns the specification, runs it on every model change, and reports to the authorizing official. That tester can be the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, a service operational test agency, a federally funded research and development center, a university-affiliated research center, a contracted third party, or a combination thereof. It has to answer to the government and must have no stake in the model under test. The tools for writing and running a specification are a secondary question. Several already exist, and the United Kingdom’s AI Security Institute has released one as open source.

Critics may argue that thirty days is too short to verify a model. That assumes every model swap triggers a scheduled test event, with testers, test windows, and a written report. A specification-based test needs none of that. When a model changes, so does every system that runs on it, such as a custom agent on GenAI.mil or an intelligence system built on the same model. No test workforce, let alone one just cut in half, could review thousands of systems every month. Running a specification-based test doesn't depend on that workforce’s daily capacity, because the specification is programmed once and reruns at machine speed. The systems with the new model undergo the programmed tests, the testing software scores the answers, and the results are delivered to accreditors. Systems that fail stay on the currently approved model while the vendor fixes the model release that failed. The test specification is updated on its own schedule, as the mission changes or test results reveal gaps, and never to fit a particular model.

Write It Down, Fund It, and Own It

Program offices that want AI safety run into the same challenges as most programs: no documented requirement and insufficient authorized and appropriated funding. First, the requirement: the acceleration strategy tells vendors to deliver the newest model, fast, and is silent on verifying outputs by a tester. It should also require that the system be tested against the command's written specification by a government or independent tester, with a record. It is imperative this testing happens before a model is fielded for any use that produces finished intelligence or feeds targeting, and after every model change. That language can go into the next GenAI.mil model release tomorrow, rather than wait for the standards Congress has ordered by June 2027. Second, the money: the department should identify funding for the testing it requires. The department already knows what a failure costs.

Currently, authorizing officials accredit system infrastructure, not the AI models within, nor the answers they produce. The department should make the AI's performance part of what is authorized, similar to how a weapon must meet accuracy thresholds. The definition of a correct answer, the test evidence, and the record should travel with the authorization package, and a model swap that fails against them should be reworked before it is fielded. This approach mirrors what the autonomy directive already requires for weapons. Extending it to the intelligence tools that inform what those weapons do is the same requirement, applied one step earlier.

Specifications, Checks, and a Record

We are not arguing the department should slow down AI implementation. All military users should have the power of AI. What the department should prevent is a wrong answer that tears a hole in the killweb.

The senators called for the inspectors general to investigate. Any investigation comes down to three questions: what were the specifications, who checked the systems met these specifications, and where is the record. Right now, the department can answer the first with a stack of directives and the other two with a shrug. Corrective action is straightforward and ready to implement immediately. The department can update the policy to require that AI models be tested for accuracy, specifying that contracts be updated to reflect this requirement, then apply funding to address this pressing operational need. Improving AI safety will directly drive operational outcomes and protect the department and its people from being misled by AI hallucinations.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
China's Return to One&Man Rule https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-return-to-one-man-rule https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-return-to-one-man-rule The U.S. will be holding mid-term elections on November 3, to elect the people’s representatives to enact laws, provide oversight and represent the people. In sharp contrast, China’s ruling Communist Party (CCP) announced that it formally expelled 33 senior political and military officials, in line with President Xi Jinping’s anticorruption purges, as Mr. Xi prepares for a fourth term as President of China next year. This will give Mr. Xi twenty years unquestionable power.

The U.S. and China obviously have different forms of governance. Senior Chinese officials often say that their form of governance is far superior to the U.S. political system. They argue that others, especially in the Global South, will see that China’s authoritarian form of governance is preferable to the constitutional democracy in the U.S.

China’s political system is an authoritarian form of governance, endowing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its paramount leader, the General Secretary, with the power to make the laws, control individual rights and suppress the opposition, in return for the promise of stability and economic growth.

But it is ironic to hear these officials and academics criticize the U.S., comparing a democracy with an authoritarian political system.

Many in China realize the important role the U.S. has played to make China the second largest economy in the world. And it was Deng Xiaoping who realized that working with the U.S. would be key to making China great again.

Mr. Deng, after being purged twice, rose to power in China in December 1978, followed by formal diplomatic relations with the U.S. in January 1979. Mr. Deng visited the U.S. in late January 1979, setting the stage for greater cooperation with the U.S.

Mr. Deng inherited an impoverished China, having lost millions of Chinese due to Chairman Mao Zedong’s failed policies of land reform and the Great Leap Forward.

Mr. Deng immediately established a policy of “reform and opening up”, looking to the U.S. for economic assistance. And the U.S was there for China, permitting dual-use technology transfers that created the conditions for foreign direct investment in China; investment that fueled China’s export industries, key to China’s growth. The U.S. also provided China with market access for Chinese goods, while training millions of Chinese in modern technology and know-how. It was the U.S. that provided unprecedented help and support to China’s success story of lifting 20% of the global population out of poverty and assisting with its rapid modernization.

Although Mr. Deng moved China to a market economy, relying heavily on the U.S., he was opposed to a western tripartite separation of powers. He advocated for CCP control of the government, with collective leadership and term limits for the General Secretary of the CCP. – two terms, each 5 years.

But there were other senior Chinese leaders who advocated for greater reform in China. Former General Secretary of the CCP, Zhao Ziyang, wrote in his banned book, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang, that he was in favor of a parliamentary democracy for China, with the rule of law, not rule by men. Mr. Zhao was purged from the CCP in 1989, after sympathizing with the student protests at Tiananmen. Mr. Zhao wrote in his book that his predecessor, Hu Yaobang, was also replaced by Mr. Deng for indulging in bourgeois liberalization and advocating democracy.

And Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who served from 2003-2013, often spoke of the need for political reform, and in 2012 said that “democracy is inevitable” in China, to keep pace with China’s rapid economic growth.

Indeed, Mr. Deng, probably remembering the disastrous reign of one-man-rule of Mao Zedong, was a strong advocate of collective leadership and term limits for China’s paramount leader, the president of China and the general secretary of the CCP. Positions Mr. Xi has had since 2012.

Expectations are that Mr. Xi will seek and secure an unprecedented fourth five-year term as general secretary of the CCP at the 21st Party Congress scheduled for the second half of 2027.

Mr. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign that started in 2012 has purged over 500 ministerial-level officials and over 2 million government officials for so-called corruption. No doubt, loyalty also played a role in many of these cases. Many of the purged senior officials were from the People’s Liberation Army, Navy and Air Force. Generals Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and member of the CCP’s Politburo and Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, both were expelled from the CCP and the military. General Zhang’s purge from the Party and PLA was especially surprising, given his long history of working closely with Mr. Xi.

It would be fair to ask how many of the 500 ministerial-level officials were purged because they were viewed by Mr. Xi as disloyal. How many shared Mr. Deng’s dictum of collective leadership and term limits, in opposition to Mr. Xi seeking a fourth five-year term as President and Party General Secretary? How many of the PLA generals and admirals expressed views on Taiwan that were not pleasing to Mr. Xi?

Indeed, how many people in China wish that they could vote to elect representatives who would represent the people and articulate their concerns?

The constitutional democracy in the U.S. is occasionally laud, and expensive to manage, especially during periods of voting for representatives, but it is a transparent and fair system. It is a system of governance that empowers the people.

The U.S. form of governance – a constitutional democracy – can easily compete with China’s authoritarian form of governance.

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government.

This article was initially published in The Washington Times and is republished here with permission.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 15 Nov 2026 12:59:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
Hybrid Threats: Why Awareness Must Transcend Individual Cyberattacks https://belimedia.com.ng/hybrid-threats-why-awareness-must-transcend-individual-cyberattacks https://belimedia.com.ng/hybrid-threats-why-awareness-must-transcend-individual-cyberattacks Every October, Cybersecurity Awareness Month puts practical security measures in the spotlight. Can an employee recognize a phishing email? Will someone pause before clicking a suspicious link? Are passwords and access credentials being protected? These are important questions; individual behaviors are crucial to maintaining cybersecurity.

But awareness is so laser focused on preventing and mitigating the malicious cyberattack, it’s easy to lose sight of the bigger picture: the cyberattack in front of you may be only one piece of the threat.

In the era of hybrid threats, a cyberattack could be part of a broader campaign in which digital activity intersects with cognitive warfare, sabotage, unusual drone activity, disruptions to communications and navigation systems, and much more. State and state-linked networks might use online fraud or scams to generate revenue for operations, launder funds and undermine confidence in financial and/or government institutions.

The challenge for security and law enforcement agencies transcends detecting and responding to one cyber incident at a time. They must also determine whether events that appear separate may be connected.

That distinction changes what it means to be aware, and the urgency is intensifying. Recent research and reporting shows Russian cyber activity directed at European targets is likely intended to enable intelligence collection, operational reach and long-term access rather than immediate disruption. In parallel, the Iranian government is believed to be relying on a longstanding hybrid warfare model combining cyber operations, asymmetric military operations, information warfare, proxy attacks and coercive state activity, with AI increasingly acting as a force multiplier.

Expect to see more of this going forward, not less.

CONNECTING THE DOTS

Consider the signals individually: a government agency experiences a cyberattack. Unusual drone activity is reported over critical infrastructure. GPS service is disrupted. False or misleading information is deliberately spread. Viewed on their own, these events may have different causes, and each can appear to be a separate incident.

Yet hybrid campaigns often depend on individual activities initially looking ambiguous or unrelated. If each signal is treated only as a self-contained incident, relevant connections may be missed – and when the connections are missed, so is the broader pattern they could form.

This does not make traditional cybersecurity awareness less important. It makes awareness more demanding. The familiar focus on individual judgment must be matched by institutional awareness: the ability of government agencies, armed forces, critical infrastructure operators, and other relevant organizations to recognize which signals may matter beyond the immediate event.

That begins before advanced analysis enters the picture. An organization cannot share information it did not capture, and it cannot capture information it did not recognize as potentially relevant. The first requirement is therefore a common understanding of what may be security-relevant and what information is needed to contribute to a broader situational picture.

This shift is central to the awareness challenge. A suspicious link has a clear place in the traditional conversation. A weak signal in a hybrid environment may not have the same clarity. Its significance may emerge only when it is considered alongside other information. Awareness, in this context, means looking beyond the apparent boundaries of a single incident without assuming that any one event tells the entire story.

The sequence matters: recognize, capture, share, assess. If a potentially relevant signal drops out at any stage, it cannot inform the larger picture. If it moves through that sequence, it becomes one piece of information that can be examined in relation to others.

The next task is to bring those fragmented pieces together. Threat intelligence, decision intelligence and artificial intelligence can help teams work across large volumes of data, correlate information, reveal connections, and alert analysts to anomalies. Their value is especially clear when no single signal is decisive. Several weak and seemingly unrelated signals may form a pattern that supports a more informed assessment of the security situation.

The point is not simply to accumulate more data. It is to make relevant information usable as part of a coherent view. A list of isolated incidents still leaves decision-makers looking at fragments. A situational picture asks a different set of questions: What may connect these events? What does the combined pattern suggest? Which developments deserve closer attention? And what might happen next?

That last question is essential. The goal is not limited to identifying a cyberattack or another security-relevant event after it occurs. It is to understand the relationships among relevant signals well enough to identify potential future developments at an early stage. Detection remains necessary, but detection without connection can leave the larger threat out of view.

For Cybersecurity Awareness Month, this broader perspective offers a useful way to expand the conversation. At the individual level, awareness still means recognizing the suspicious email, protecting credentials, avoiding scams and frauds and thinking before clicking. At the national level, it also means making sure the right organizations know what to notice, what to record, what to share, and how to place that information in context.

The difference is one of scale. An individual may be watching for a malicious link. Government agencies, armed forces, critical infrastructure operators, and other relevant organizations must also be watching for relationships among cyber activity, disinformation, sabotage, drone activity and communications interference.

That is the blind spot Cybersecurity Awareness Month should help bring into focus. There’s more to awareness than paying attention before clicking a link. Awareness means we know which signals deserve attention, whether we can bring them together, and whether we can see the threat they may form before the pattern becomes unmistakable.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
What a Russian Hybrid Attack Might Look Like https://belimedia.com.ng/what-a-russian-hybrid-attack-might-look-like https://belimedia.com.ng/what-a-russian-hybrid-attack-might-look-like Russia has demonstrated a growing willingness to use hybrid tactics – including sabotage, cyberattacks, information operations, and the use of deniable or “throwaway” agents – to create disruption and uncertainty across Europe. This paper examines how those tactics could be combined in a hypothetical Russian operation against Estonia designed not to defeat NATO militarily, but to create a crisis that tests the Alliance’s ability to respond quickly and collectively.

The scenario is deliberately constructed as a red-team exercise rather than a prediction. It envisions Russia exploiting the existence of Estonia’s Russian-speaking population, infiltrating operatives into the Schengen Area through legitimate visa channels, allowing those operatives to move through the largely borderless Schengen zone, and exploiting gaps in European immigration enforcement. The scenario culminates in a deliberately ambiguous armed crisis in Narva, accompanied by cyberattacks and a coordinated information campaign intended to complicate attribution and slow NATO decision-making.

The exercise identified several vulnerabilities. Some elements of the scenario are highly speculative, particularly Russian operatives' ability to obtain weapons once inside Estonia. Other elements, however, reflect existing conditions: Estonia’s large Russian-speaking population, the continued issuance of Schengen visas to Russian nationals, the decentralized nature of internal immigration enforcement, and the absence of a clearly identifiable EU-level capability dedicated to systematically analyzing the EES overstayer population for emerging national-security threats.

The paper therefore recommends three measures: continued EU-wide efforts to disrupt organized criminal networks that could provide support to hostile actors; eliminating tourist visas for Russian nationals except in limited humanitarian circumstances while developing a forward-deployed EU visa-security capability; and establishing a national-security immigration coordination center capable of analyzing immigration data against emerging threats and coordinating responses among Member States.

The central conclusion is that NATO’s military deterrence remains essential, but military strength alone cannot close every avenue through which a sophisticated hybrid operation could develop. Preventing such a crisis requires identifying and closing the less visible vulnerabilities that could allow hostile actors to establish themselves inside Europe before a crisis begins.

I. Introduction

Drones at Leipzig Airport. Drone incursions of NATO airspace. Throwaway agents. Arson and sabotage at facilities throughout Europe. 2026 has been a busy year, and it appears that Russia is engaged in an ongoing hybrid campaign on the European continent. The EU says that Russia’s goal is to spread fear, distrust, and undermine European unity. Additionally, just this Sunday, September 20, European security officials raised alarm that Russia is testing NATO resolve and could potentially even attempt a limited incursion into NATO territory.

This paper takes the current situation and threat picture as a starting baseline and imagines a scenario in which Russia creates a strategic crisis in Estonia, a NATO member, to discredit NATO collective defense and distract from the war in Ukraine by creating a sort of second front for NATO. In working through this thought exercise, the article examines what Russia could gain from escalation, how it might carry it out, and what security gaps the scenario identifies. Like with any hypothetical scenario, I suspect some will wholeheartedly disagree with my assertions. Still, I ask you to think of this as a red teaming exercise designed to identify vulnerabilities, and not an effort at forecasting.

II. Why might Putin want to escalate?

The “special military operation” that was supposed to take Kyiv in 6 days is going on for four years. Russia is not making significant gains on the battlefield, and whatever small gains it makes come at a prohibitive cost. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that, since the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia has suffered 450,000 dead and 1.4 million battlefield casualties. Moreover, Russian control of Ukrainian territory actually shrank in the Spring of 2026. The situation is so unfavorable that the Russian MoD now resorts to outright fabrication to claim battlefield gains that have not occurred.

Ukraine, on the other hand, seems to have stabilized its position after 4 years of war. It is becoming ever more adept at using drone technology and can finally bring the war home to Russia. Ukrainian long-range drones are now striking infrastructure deep inside Russia every week, including Russian oil refineries. This matters because Russian oil is the last remaining cash cow keeping the Russian economy afloat. And even though official Russian government numbers purport to show economic stability, a June report from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy concludes that “the Russian economy is showing clear signs of structural exhaustion.” Meanwhile, European support for Ukraine is strong across the continent, at least among mainstream political parties. On September 17, the EU Commission disbursed 3.3 billion euros to Ukraine – part of the 90-billion-euro Ukraine support loan. So in this war that increasingly looks like a war of attrition, it is Ukraine, and not Russia, that appears to be coming out on top.

In my assessment, these factors are gradually painting Putin into a corner, where he is slowly running out of options and may be forced to “flip the script.” In theory, one option Putin always has is a genuine move towards peace on fair terms, which should at minimum include a complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. But he is stuck in a trap of his own making. If he relents on his maximalist demands and opts for fair peace, the entire very expensive and painful 4-year war would appear to have been fought for naught. That might very well threaten his political, or even personal, survival in a cutthroat political system. So, he is not willing to make peace. And sticking to business as usual looks like an eventual dead end as well.

In my imagined scenario, Putin invents a third option and chooses to escalate by launching a proxy military operation in Estonia. The operation has several goals. First, it aims to create a crisis NATO must solve on alliance territory, competing with NATO support for Ukraine. NATO would have to decide how to react to the crisis, and balance the reaction with the risk of escalation and full-blown war with Russia. Thus, as a second goal, Putin might succeed in discrediting Article 5 provisions of the defensive alliance if NATO’s response were to be slow or ineffective. Third, a military operation on NATO territory could force NATO partners to focus on their own defense rather than continuing to support Ukraine.

At first glance, this scenario may seem implausible or even reckless. After all, we have been almost conditioned to see NATO and Article 5 collective defense as an ironclad guarantee. This is one reason why countries that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact flocked to NATO in the 1990s. But we also need to keep in mind that the concept of collective defense has not been routinely tested. Article 5 was invoked only one time – in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks against the United States. NATO has never dealt with a situation where an opponent seeks to test NATO boundaries by mapping out red lines, which I believe is exactly what Russia is doing. In other words, NATO has not yet been fully tested in hybrid war.

III. What might Putin assume about NATO?

We have discussed how the West views NATO. But what might Putin assume about the alliance, especially NATO’s willingness to go to war?

NATO is focused on defense and may prefer to avoid war. First, NATO explicitly describes itself as a defensive alliance and identifies preventing conflict and war as a core purpose of its deterrence and defense strategy. Putin could reasonably assume that NATO governments strongly prefer to resolve a confrontation without escalating it into a direct war with Russia. This does not mean NATO would fail to respond to an attack; rather, it creates a potential vulnerability that Russia could exploit by presenting NATO with an ambiguous crisis in which the costs of escalation are apparent, but the attribution of Russian responsibility remains contested.

NATO may be slow to act. An armed NATO response requires deliberation and consensus among alliance members. Article 5 obligations are triggered in instances of an armed attack, and determining whether an action is an armed attack is addressed on a case-by-case basis. NATO’s own materials note that “events that lack an international element, such as purely domestic acts of terrorism, do not trigger Article.” In Putin’s view, he could see case-by-case deliberations as a vulnerability and conclude that a deliberately vague scenario would make it difficult for the alliance to reach consensus quickly, keeping the window of action open for Russia.

Information operations may complicate consensus. NATO is a collective alliance of democracies, and democratic governments depend to some degree on public support and political legitimacy. In Putin’s assessment of the political situation, he may conclude that Moscow does not need to persuade NATO governments that Russia is innocent. It may only need to create enough confusion and debate within NATO populations to make decisive action more politically difficult. Russia has both the tools and demonstrated experience to flood the information environment with contradictory narratives. The U.S. State Department has documented Russian use of multiple, sometimes contradictory narratives specifically to generate confusion and discourage responses. NATO likewise describes hostile information operations as activities designed to “create confusion, deepen divisions, destabilize societies and ultimately weaken the Alliance,” and notes that such operations are not always intended to persuade audiences of a particular falsehood; they can instead be designed to muddy the information environment and make it more difficult to distinguish fact from fiction.

From Moscow’s perspective, the objective therefore need not be to achieve consensus around a pro-Russian narrative. It may be sufficient to prevent consensus around a coordinated response. If a crisis involving Estonia produced competing narratives about what happened, who was responsible, and whether Russia was directly involved, political divisions within individual NATO member states could complicate the Alliance’s response and make consensus harder to achieve.

Nuclear intimidation may complicate consensus. Putin may believe that nuclear signaling can amplify Western caution. Russia has repeatedly used explicit and implicit nuclear threats during the war in Ukraine. Evidence suggests these threats can have effects beyond traditional military deterrence, including a Chatham House assessment that Russian nuclear threats contributed to Western concerns about escalation and constrained some governments' willingness to provide Ukraine with certain forms of military support. This does not mean that Western populations will automatically oppose confrontation with Russia. Public attitudes toward nuclear deterrence have, in some cases, become more supportive since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rather, the point is that nuclear signaling adds an extra political cost to any decision to escalate a confrontation with Moscow. A Russian leadership that believes Western governments are highly sensitive to the prospect of nuclear escalation may therefore conclude that even an ambiguous or limited confrontation could be accompanied by nuclear rhetoric designed to encourage caution, delay, or disagreement within the Alliance.

Taken together, these assumptions suggest that what may appear from NATO’s perspective to be an irrational and extraordinarily risky decision—deliberately creating a crisis on NATO territory—could look considerably more rational from Moscow. Russia would not necessarily need to believe that NATO would stand aside. It would need to believe that NATO’s preference to avoid war, consensus-based decision-making, democratic political constraints, vulnerability to information manipulation, and sensitivity to nuclear escalation could create enough hesitation and disagreement to complicate a unified response. In this model, the objective would not necessarily be to defeat NATO militarily. It would be to create a crisis in which NATO’s overwhelming military advantage becomes difficult to translate into timely, unified political action. If Moscow believed such a crisis could fracture Alliance cohesion, force NATO to divert attention and resources from Ukraine, or show that Article 5 could be challenged without producing an immediate, unified response, the potential payoff might outweigh the risks in the Kremlin’s calculus.

IV. Free Narva – a Baltic hybrid war scenario

With the analysis of the previous sections in mind, I constructed a scenario in which Russia executes a deliberately ambiguous and confusing operation designed to threaten Estonia’s territorial integrity and test NATO’s resolve. In developing the scenario, I considered Russia’s potential objectives, lessons from previous Russian operations, the defensive measures Estonia and NATO have already adopted, and how Moscow might circumvent or exploit those defenses. This paper discusses the vulnerabilities identified through this process in a later section.

Phase 1 – Propaganda and throwaway agents

In October 2026, with the September Duma elections behind him and a comfortable supermajority win for his United Russia party, Putin decides to launch Operation “Narva Spring.” Analysts and think tanks pick up on increased messaging about the so-called “People’s Republic of Narva.” This is an entirely fictitious concept created by Russian intelligence, with a flag, notional borders, and a capital in Narva, a city of about 50,000 residents, 97% of whom are Russian speakers. The online narratives shared on Telegram, TikTok, and other platforms are the usual assortment of Kremlin grievance narratives about marginalized Russian minorities. Ongoing Estonian reforms that aim to make Estonian the official language of education in the country are weaponized and portrayed as “linguistic genocide” against Russian speakers.

The online propaganda campaign is amplified by Kremlin-controlled trolls and shared with pro-Russian Western influencers and political factions who decry Estonian government abuses of the Russian-speaking population. With the propaganda campaign at a fever pitch, the Kremlin is ready to escalate physically. But Russia cannot simply repeat the Crimea or Donbas scenario against Estonia. The Estonian border is one of the most heavily monitored frontiers in the world, where NATO has implemented a “deterrence by denial” strategy. This doctrine holds that defensive measures are so formidable the enemy sees an operation as too costly to attempt. Infiltrating several hundred “little green men” into Narva from Russia just across the river, while maintaining deniability, is not plausible. The Estonian side of the border is teeming with sensors.

But the Russians have been practicing another gray zone tactic recently – the use of “throwaway agents.” So, the Kremlin uses its network of low-level recruits to spray graffiti, place posters and stickers with QR codes, and eventually commit acts of arson and sabotage against local infrastructure and public property – and especially anything linked to law enforcement, security agencies and the courts. The goal is to create the appearance of local resistance against Estonian authority, while staying well beneath the threshold of armed conflict. But propaganda, graffiti, arson, and low-level sabotage are not the intensity of crisis the Kremlin needs. At this point, Russia needs to use specialists trained in fomenting armed violence on the ground.

Phase 2 – Infiltration

In 2014, Igor Strelkov emerged as the face of the armed separatist movement in Donbas, providing Moscow with something enormously valuable: an apparent local actor around whom an armed conflict could coalesce. To bring the Estonia situation from a nuisance to a crisis for NATO, Moscow needs people trained in violence, and a few Strelkov types to direct them. But how to bring them in? Estonia hasn’t allowed free travel for Russian citizens since 2022, and applications for entry for the few exceptions are closely scrutinized.

So, the Kremlin probes for weaknesses in the Schengen zone, and it finds these in Italy, France and Spain. In 2025, France, Italy and Spain collectively issued more than 441,000 Schengen visas to Russian nationals, while more than 477,000 Russian nationals received tourist visas across the entire Schengen zone. The refusal rate for Schengen visas for Russian nationals in 2025 was a mere 6.4%. The Schengen creates an interesting counterintelligence problem for Europe. Once a person has legitimately crossed the EU's external border, Europe's internal geography largely disappears.

In this scenario, Russia begins to infiltrate intelligence and military specialists from units like GRU’s Unit 29155 and the 390th Special Purpose Reconnaissance Point into the Schengen area starting in June 2026, before the launch of the Narva propaganda campaign and increased tensions. Even with the extra scrutiny for Russian visa applicants and shorter admission periods, the Russian operatives obtain tourist visas, enter Italy, and move with ease through Austria, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia via the excellent European train network and private commercial bus services. Once in Estonia, the operatives blend into the large Russian-speaking population and make their way to Narva. In total, just under a hundred Russian operatives follow this and other routes into Estonia over the summer months, and go to ground in the Narva region, supported by a tiny group of local sympathizers and a network of throwaway agents.

Even once the tourist visas of the Russian operatives expire, and they become illegal immigrants within the EU, nothing causes the system to blink red in reaction to this. In a way, no centralized, integrated system focuses specifically on immigration, so no lights blink red. Unlike the United States, Europe does not have an EU-wide interior immigration enforcement agency, and it currently lacks a central entity to monitor immigration violations against emerging national security risks, although that gap has been acknowledged. In terms of what exists today, in 2026, the EU rolled out the Entry/Exit System (EES), which captures biometrics from non-EU nationals entering the EU on short stays. So, in theory, the EES captures the biometrics of the Russian operatives in our scenario. And once their period of admission to the EU ends, typically at 90 days, the operatives are added to the EES “overstayer” list. But at present, unless the overstayer is also matched to additional alerts in the Schengen Information System – an EU-wide law enforcement database – no specific actions are automatically triggered, and law enforcement is not alerted.

Any interior immigration enforcement beyond this point is the responsibility of law enforcement within individual EU member states. If one of the operatives has the bad luck of being stopped by police and this results in a document check, the EES hit would likely show, and he would be detained. But the EES list is not proactively pushed to law enforcement for action. It is simply available to query. And importantly, EES is managed by eu-LISA – the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – which is an agency focused on IT systems management and not law enforcement or security. In other words, no analysts are scouring the EES list for a sudden uptick in Russian nationals of military age being added to the overstayer list. Unless they attract attention to themselves, no one is coming for the Russian operatives. And in a city with a 97% Russian-speaking population, they don’t attract attention. Meanwhile, they quietly get to work acquiring small arms and mapping out critical infrastructure, communications, and defense and law enforcement sites.

Phase 3 – Estonian Donbas

By the end of 2026, the ground is set to initiate a crisis in earnest, in a way that gets NATO’s full attention. On January 2, 2027, a Saturday, Estonians are still recovering from the raucous New Year’s Eve celebrations. At 0700, Estonia's Information System Authority (RIA) Operations Center in Tallinn begins receiving simultaneous alerts indicating disruptions across government and critical infrastructure networks from unattributed sources. Analysts and incident handlers track the situation as key government and private-sector websites become unreachable due to denial-of-service attacks. Physical equipment begins to act erratically as unknown actors hack industrial control systems. Rail networks are disrupted. Traffic lights rapidly cycle in bizarre patterns. A few urban areas across Estonia lose electricity.

At the same time, radar operators identify air signatures from Russia, apparently heading toward Estonian airspace. Alert aircraft are scrambled. But the real crisis kicks off on the ground in Narva. Masked armed men, dressed in civilian clothing and wearing tricolor armbands, break into the empty Narva City Government building at Peetri Platz 5, climb their way to the top of the tower, and unfurl a green, black, and white flag. As the city government building is occupied and barricaded, another group of armed men attacks a nearby police station, overwhelms the skeleton crew, and takes a handful of hostages.

The last two groups are tasked with seizing the two border crossings across the Narva River. Narva 1 is the main border crossing point between Russia and Estonia, across the Friendship Bridge. A smaller, rarely used secondary crossing, Narva 2, sits about a mile south in a mixed industrial and residential area. The armed group attacking Narva 1 engages the border station building, about 380 meters from the foot of the bridge, drawing Estonian police defenders into a firefight. A second section of attackers takes up positions in the Narva Museum, a complex of 14th-century stone fortification with a commanding view of Friendship Bridge and the surrounding area, and supports the assault. Further south at Narva 2, the attackers similarly engage the border station, while setting up overwatch positions in the massive abandoned Kreenholm textile manufacturing complex.

While Estonian police defenders focus on attacks from the Estonian side of the border, additional attackers cross the bridges on foot and join the fight. These groups of men dressed in plain clothes are armed with heavier weapons including RPGs, squad machine guns and MANPADS. By 0800, both border crossings and bridges across the Narva River are seized, securing a thin but steady supply line from Russia. Reinforcements continue to stream into the city across the two bridges, and attackers strengthen their key defensive positions. Meanwhile, hundreds of small FPV drones appear in the skies above and begin hunting Estonian defenders. Anyone in a police or military uniform becomes a target.

Phase 4 – Information war

The chaos and fighting across Narva make for online content that quickly goes viral. With the hashtag #FreeNarva, videos of the chaos are shared across social media platforms, and pro-Kremlin trolls immediately label the situation as an uprising of the local population. A network of pro-Kremlin influencers in the West amplifies the content, then mainstream media in Europe and around the world pick it up. At 0900 local time, while the Estonian government and NATO are still trying to determine exactly what is happening in Narva and how to respond, the “separatist government” broadcasts its first official message from the seized City Government building.

Sitting behind a desk, with a black, green and white tricolor flag behind him, and flanked by armed men, the spokesperson announces the establishment of the Narva People’s Republic. In a short speech, delivered intentionally in Russian, he cites grievances against the Estonian government. He says the uprising is an act of self-preservation for Russian speakers in the region. Social media networks and news outlets quickly pick up the speech, adding to the moment's confusion. Kremlin trolls and their proxies call for support for the “world’s newest nation,” while cautioning against being pulled into World War Three by “Estonian fascists.” Memes quickly circulate featuring the mushroom cloud. Meanwhile, Russia expresses understanding of the separatist grievances but categorically denies having taken any part in the events. Putin appears on Russian television from a nuclear launch center and warns that an attack against Russian territory will result in a response using all available means.

Where does the scenario go from here? At minimum, Estonia would seek Article 5 consultations, but beyond that, the crisis could unfold in many different ways. I am not trying to explore every possible path. This hypothetical illustrates one way Russia could attack NATO territory while preserving enough ambiguity to complicate the Alliance’s response.

V. What gaps were identified?

Let us now examine how much of the hypothetical scenario reflects real-world vulnerabilities, how much was speculative, and what potential gaps the exercise identified.

Speculative Risk: Russian operatives' ability to acquire small arms once on the ground. The most speculative element of this scenario is the ability of Russian intelligence officers to acquire weapons through illicit means. While criminal networks trafficking illegal weapons exist and may extend into the Baltics, there is no basis to assume Russian operatives could readily access such networks without increasing the risk of detection. In the hypothetical scenario, weapons acquisition would therefore represent a significant uncertainty and a potential point of failure.

Confirmed Risk: Estonia has a large ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking population, with some evidence of social tensions in Narva, but the situation is nuanced. Official Estonian statistics show that ethnic Russians comprise about 20 percent of the country’s population. In Narva, approximately 97 percent of residents speak Russian. The relationship with Russia in Narva, however, is nuanced. After Estonia regained independence in 1991, many ethnic Russians who had settled in Estonia during the Soviet period did not automatically acquire Estonian citizenship and instead had to obtain citizenship through naturalization. Consequently, in 2014, only about 46 percent of Narva’s residents held Estonian citizenship, while 36 percent held Russian citizenship. Some Estonian government policies have contributed to local resentment, and these kinds of social friction points attract the attention of Russian intelligence services. However, there is no evidence of broad support in Narva for joining Russia, and documented reports indicate otherwise.

Confirmed Risk: The “Narva People’s Republic” is thought to be a Russian information operation. The idea of a “Narva People’s Republic” is not purely hypothetical. The current online campaign appears to have emerged in 2025 and became active in February 2026, when social-media accounts began promoting the idea of Narva and Ida-Viru County separating from Estonia. In March 2026, Estonia’s Internal Security Service characterized the activity as an information operation intended to sow confusion and undermine social cohesion.

Confirmed Risk: Russian nationals continue to receive Schengen visas with a relatively low refusal rate. Russians continue to receive short-stay visas into the Schengen zone. Although applications from Russian nationals receive more scrutiny now than in previous years, in 2025 Russian nationals applied for 679,425 short-stay visas, and 630,641 were issued, including 175,862 multiple-entry visas. The refusal rate for Russian visa applicants was only 6.4 percent according to official European Commission statistics.

Confirmed Risk: Absence of coordinated internal immigration enforcement and interoperability challenges. In our scenario, the fragmented nature of internal immigration enforcement in the EU was the biggest identified risk, as it allowed Russian operatives to move from their initial countries of admission to other parts of the Schengen area. The Entry/Exit (EES) system, fully deployed in April 2026, is a significant step toward gaining an operational picture of who enters and exits the Schengen area. Still, it works best for securing the EU’s external borders and preventing re-entry by previous violators. Individuals who do not leave the EU on time are added to the EES “overstayers” list, which is available to the member state competent authorities. But the overstayer list is just that – a list. To move from list to action, an individual on the overstayer list would need to have a “return order” (the EU version of a deportation order) issued by the competent member state authority. The order would need to be entered in the Schengen Information System (SIS) promptly. At that point, member states would need to coordinate to share SIS alerts and apprehend the individual. That could be facilitated through the SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries) bureaus, 24/7 centers each member state operates to facilitate information exchange. All that is possible if the system works without flaws, but that is not the current operational reality. The European Commission acknowledged in its 2026 State of Schengen report that interoperability and coordination remain challenging. The report specifically points out that “further efforts are required across all Member States to address challenges related to the timely issuance of return decisions, the streamlining of procedures and the implementation of measures to prevent absconding and unauthorized secondary movements.”

Confirmed Risk: Absence of a single entity that monitors the EES overstayer list for emerging security threats. Building on the previous risk factor, I could not confirm in my research the existence of a single EU entity that systematically monitors the EES overstayer population for emerging national-security threats based on targeting criteria. While extensive mechanisms exist for sharing information once a person becomes the subject of a relevant alert, it remains less clear who is systematically examining the EES overstayer population for national-security significance before that threshold is reached. The EU has an entity with extensive experience coordinating Member State investigations and criminal intelligence: EUROPOL, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. EUROPOL has access to EES data for law-enforcement purposes, but its current EES capabilities are primarily integrated into existing investigative and analytical functions. EUROPOL itself identifies the need for greater interoperability among the EU's large-scale information systems and states that, once the planned changes are implemented by 2027, it will be able to use EES and other systems to “support assessing the security risks associated with third country nationals arriving to Europe.” At present, therefore, I found no evidence of a centralized process dedicated to systematically screening the EES overstayer population for national-security indicators. In other words, the EU has built the haystack and mechanisms for sharing information about individual needles, but it is less clear who is systematically looking for the needles. And because the EES is still new, the size and characteristics of the haystack are not yet fully established.

VI. Recommendations

I deliberately fashioned this scenario to unfold as a Russian operation against NATO might: deliberately ambiguous, difficult to attribute, and accompanied by an aggressive information campaign designed to complicate the Alliance’s response. The incursion itself would not necessarily need to be militarily successful. If Russia could create a crisis that divided NATO, delayed a unified response, or exposed weaknesses in the Alliance’s ability to defend its territory, the crisis itself could constitute a strategic success. For that reason, the most effective defense is to prevent the scenario from occurring in the first place—by identifying the vulnerabilities that could make such an operation possible and closing those gaps before Russia can exploit them.

NATO and Estonia are doing many things well, including their strategy of “deterrence by denial,” and I will not spend time analyzing those efforts here. They should continue. My recommendations instead focus on less frequently recognized vulnerabilities outside the traditional military sphere that could still be exploited in a hybrid conflict.

Recommendation 1: Continue EU-wide coordination targeting organized criminal activity. A key element of the hypothetical scenario depended on Russian operatives gaining access to firearms through criminal networks. Organized crime can provide illicit infrastructure that terrorists, intelligence services, and other national-security threats may exploit. Continued EU-wide efforts to disrupt these networks therefore serve a purpose beyond traditional crime reduction: they deny hostile actors access to networks, resources, and capabilities that could facilitate operations inside Europe.

Recommendation 2: Eliminate tourist visas for Russian nationals and create a forward-deployed EU visa security program for high-threat regions. One of the larger gaps identified in this scenario is that Russian nationals still have legal avenues to obtain visas to enter the EU. My recommendation would be to stop issuing tourist visas to Russian nationals, with exceptions for limited humanitarian circumstances. The EU should also consider a uniform, EU-wide mechanism to systematically assess the security risks posed by visa applicants and incorporate those assessments into visa issuance decisions. While the EU has a sophisticated common visa-information system, including biometric screening and mechanisms for sharing information among Member States, responsibility for visa adjudication and national-security assessment remains distributed among national authorities. The United States provides one potential model. Through HSI’s Visa Security Program, trained special agents are assigned to diplomatic posts overseas to conduct law-enforcement interviews and identify terrorists and other national-security threats before they enter the United States. A comparable EU capability, whether centralized or deployed through participating Member States, could add an investigative and intelligence dimension to the existing European visa-screening architecture.

Recommendation 3: Establish a national-security immigration coordination center within an appropriate European agency. The EU should consider establishing a dedicated national-security immigration coordination capability within an existing agency such as EUROPOL. The center would proactively analyze the EES overstayer list and other relevant databases against current threats, identify concerning emerging patterns, centralize alerts concerning visa overstays and other significant immigration violations, and provide a mechanism for Member State coordination. Where an overstay or other immigration violation involves additional security indicators, the center could elevate the case for immediate coordination with the appropriate law-enforcement and intelligence authorities in the affected Member State. The objective would be to move beyond simply recording immigration violations toward proactively identifying those that may represent emerging national-security threats.

VII. Conclusion

The purpose of this exercise was not to predict that Russia will attack Narva, or that events would unfold exactly as described. It was to show how a deliberately ambiguous hybrid operation could exploit vulnerabilities outside the traditional military sphere. Russia would not necessarily need to defeat NATO on the battlefield. It could seek to create a crisis in which attribution is uncertain, information is contested, political leaders face competing pressures, and the Alliance must make consequential decisions under extreme uncertainty.

That is why prevention matters. Once armed men are occupying buildings in a NATO member state and information operations are shaping the narrative faster than governments can establish the facts, the opportunity to prevent the crisis has already passed. The objective should therefore be to identify the vulnerabilities that make such a scenario possible while there is still time to address them. NATO's military deterrence and Estonia's defenses remain essential, but closing the less visible gaps in Europe's immigration, intelligence, law-enforcement, and information-security architecture may be just as important in preventing the next hybrid crisis from becoming a reality.

At minimum, these measures would make it significantly harder for Russia, or any hostile actor, to establish the personnel, infrastructure, and freedom of movement needed to conduct such an operation inside Europe.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Investigations, or the U.S. government.

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Hidden Risks of AI&Powered Intelligence https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hidden-risks-of-ai-powered-intelligence https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hidden-risks-of-ai-powered-intelligence Picture an intelligent analyst's screen. Data about troop movements, a port closure, a terrorist attack, or a weapons transfer sits at the center of a clean interface, with a confidence indicator glowing green. Two hundred outlets are carrying it, and the platform has counted every one. It looks like a corroboration. In many cases, it is a single Telegram post, copied, translated, summarized, and republished until its origin disappeared behind its own echo.

Nobody must be negligent for this to happen. It is what you get when a product or platform is built to measure volume and the user is tempted to read volume as truth.

I say this as someone who works with open-source material and believes in it. Commercial imagery, ship-tracking data, procurement records, leaked databases, and social media have changed what is knowable about conflicts and illicit networks; but the market that has grown up around these sources is selling something different from the discipline that makes them valuable, and governments and companies are buying it without noticing the difference.

A Crowded Market and a Thin Product

Open-source intelligence platforms are multiplying quickly. Walk through the company stands at any security conference and you will find dozens of them, each promising to fuse, monitor, and surface threats across the open internet, now almost always with an AI layer that summarizes, ranks, and alerts.

Strip away the interface and most of them offer little that a competent analyst couldn't already do with a search engine, a handful of specialist tools, and some patience. Reverse image searching, scraping social platforms, pulling corporate registry data, and geolocating an image are all learnable skills, and many of the best practitioners picked them up in public, often as volunteers. What the platforms add is convenience and scale, which is genuinely useful, but convenience is not analysis. The real product, in most cases, is the dashboard.

Dashboards are persuasive by design. They squeeze a messy information environment into something that looks like a picture of the world, with counts, trend lines, heat maps, and sentiment scores. Each of those findings implies that someone has already done the hard work of deciding what matters and what is true. Usually, no one has. The system has counted things, and counting is the easy part.

Counting Sources Is Not Testing Them

The core flaw is in what these systems reward. They tend to measure the number of sources behind a claim, not the independence of those sources. The two are very different things.

Independence is the foundation of corroboration. Two witnesses who saw an event separately make a claim stronger. Two witnesses who heard about it from the same third person do not. The same logic applies to reporting. A claim that traces back to a single channel but appears in two hundred outlets has one source and two hundred echoes.

Intelligence tradecraft has a name for this: circular reporting. It is among the oldest and best-documented ways analysts go wrong. The failures that most damaged the credibility of Western intelligence in the past generation involved, among other things, uncorroborated claims that were repeated, cross-referenced, and eventually treated as established because they seemed to come from many places. The lesson drawn at the time was that provenance matters more than prevalence. An aggregator that treats prevalence as confirmation is rebuilding the vulnerability that analysts spent years learning to guard against.

AI makes this problem fourfold. First, language models summarize and synthesize, and in doing so they take away the provenance trail that an analyst needs. A fluent paragraph that blends fifteen sources does not tell you that twelve of them are derivative. Second, the cost of generating plausible content has collapsed. Fabricated articles, cloned news sites, and coordinated amplification networks can now create the appearance of breadth cheaply, which is exactly the signal these platforms are built to count. Third, as more web content is produced or recycled by automated systems, the pool that analytics tools draw from becomes more self-referential. The echo chamber is increasingly populated by machines quoting each other. Lastly, AI can make uncertainty harder to see. Language models are designed to produce coherent answers, not to preserve the ambiguity of the evidence on which those answers are based. Contradictory sources can be reconciled into a smooth narrative, gaps can disappear beneath plausible inference, and tentative conclusions can acquire the tone of established fact. The danger is therefore not simply that an analyst receives false information, but that the uncertainty surrounding otherwise legitimate information becomes less visible.

None of this means the technology is useless. Entity extraction, translation, deduplication, and pattern detection across large data sets are real contributions. But the same tools that can help trace a claim to its origin are too often deployed to certify it instead.

Information Is Not Intelligence

The deeper problem is what happens after the dashboard produces its output. Companies market it as intelligence, and buyers, including government agencies, intelligence firms, financial institutions, and corporate security teams, purchase it as intelligence, then act on it.

However, open-source material is raw information. It becomes intelligence only after a process that no interface can fully automate. Someone has to establish where the material came from, grade how reliable the source has been, assess how credible the specific claim is, and test it against other collection. Established standards exist for this. Grading systems that rate source reliability separately from information credibility have been used for decades, and analytic standards require analysts to describe the quality and credibility of their sources, to distinguish between underlying evidence and judgment, and to account for alternative explanations. These are not bureaucratic formalities. They are the mechanism by which an organization knows how much weight a conclusion can bear.

When that step is skipped, the result is aggregated internet content with a confident interface. The output reads like a finished product, but the epistemic work behind it is missing, and the person reading it often can't see that. A decisionmaker shown a green indicator does not know whether it reflects three independent confirmations or one rumor with good distribution.

The consequences are practical. A government that bases sanctions designations, force posture, or diplomatic messaging on an unverified claim risks embarrassment at best and escalation at worst. A company that reroutes shipments or exits a market because a risk platform flagged a rumor can lose real money; and an agency that comes to rely on commercial feeds may quietly stop investing in the capabilities that would let it check them.


What Should Change

I would offer the following two principles.

One, to treat provenance and independence as essential to intelligence. Open-source material should be treated as a cue and a corroborator, not a conclusion. Open sources are at their best when they point collection in a useful direction or when they test and strengthen what other sources have suggested. A satellite image that shows construction at a site tells analysts where to look and what to ask. A procurement database entry might confirm a pattern already suspected. Neither is a finding on its own. The workflow should run from open-source lead to targeted collection to assessment, not from dashboard alert to briefing slide. As AI makes it easier to summarize, reproduce and generate information, analysts need to know not only what a source says, but where the information originated and whether apparently separate sources are actually independent. A fluent paragraph that blends fifteen sources does not tell an analyst that twelve of them are derivative. Likewise, a cluster of articles, websites or database entries may create the appearance of broad corroboration while ultimately tracing back to a single underlying claim. Platforms should therefore preserve provenance wherever possible and make the distinction between original reporting, derivative content and AI-generated material visible to the user. The workflow should run from open-source lead to targeted collection to assessment, not from dashboard alert to briefing slide.

Two, protect human assessment and the collection that supports it. AI can make uncertainty harder to see. Language models are designed to produce coherent answers, not to preserve the ambiguity of the evidence on which those answers are based. Contradictory sources can be reconciled into a smooth narrative, gaps can disappear beneath plausible inference, and tentative conclusions can acquire the tone of established fact. Human analysts therefore need both the time and the authority to question what automated systems produce rather than simply validate it. That also means protecting the collection capabilities that AI cannot replace. As open-source material becomes more abundant, the value of what cannot be found online rises. Human sources, financial intelligence, law enforcement access and legal process take years to cultivate and moments to lose. A budget cycle that trims them in favor of subscriptions is trading durable capability for a license that expires. The objective should not be to remove automation from intelligence work, but to ensure that automation remains subordinate to collection, verification and human judgment.

What Open Sources Cannot Close

I learned the limits of open-source work firsthand while researching foreign components in Russian strike drones. Open sources got me a long way. Recovered wreckage data, teardown imagery, part markings, and manufacturer documentation could establish what was inside these systems and who made it. That is valuable, and it was achievable by skilled analysts working in public.

But the questions that mattered most were different. Who actually bought a given part? Through which intermediaries did it move? Who paid for it, and through which accounts? Those gaps could not be closed by any amount of scraping. They required the tools that sit behind a legal threshold or inside a trusted relationship: law enforcement access to shipping and customs records, financial intelligence on transactions, and human sources with knowledge of how the networks operate. A dashboard could tell us a component existed. Only that other collection could tell us how it got there and who was responsible, which is the information policymakers need if they want to disrupt the supply chain rather than simply describe it.

That experience shaped how I think about the current issue. Open sources and closed collection are not competitors. The first made the second more efficient, because it let investigators ask better questions. The second made the first more meaningful, because it turned an interesting observation into an attributable finding. Treating either as a substitute for the other would have left us with a weaker product.

Defending the Analytical Craft

None of this is an argument against open-source intelligence. It is an argument for it, properly understood.

The practitioners who built the field's reputation, whether in newsrooms, nonprofits, academia, or government, are rigorous precisely because they distrust easy answers. They document their methods, show their chains of evidence, and say so when something can't be confirmed. That culture is the real asset. It is also what the commercial market is most at risk of undermining, because rigor is slow and expensive to sell, while a dashboard can be demoed in ten minutes.

The test I would offer any buyer, policymaker, or analyst is simple. When you are shown a claim, ask where it began, who else has independent knowledge of it, and what other collection could confirm or contradict it. If the system in front of you cannot answer those questions, it hasn't given you intelligence. It has given you a well-organized rumor.

The volume of open information will keep growing, and the tools to process it will keep improving. The scarce resource will not be data. It will be judgment, along with the access and tradecraft that make judgment possible. Agencies and firms that remember that, and invest accordingly, will see more clearly than those who confuse a full screen with a full picture.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
America's Counter&Drone Authority Is Real, The Capacity Isn't Yet https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-counter-drone-authority-is-real-the-capacity-isnt-yet https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-counter-drone-authority-is-real-the-capacity-isnt-yet Here is a number worth sitting with: federal teams seized roughly 700 drones around World Cup venues this summer. Seven hundred — at one tournament, in one season, with the best-resourced counter-drone units in the world on the field. That figure is a success story and a warning in the same breath: the threat volume is enormous, and the federal government cannot be the only team suiting up for it.

Until this year, it legally had to be. The power to disable a hostile drone belonged to a short list of federal agencies, which left a state trooper at a stadium gate or a corrections captain watching an aircraft hover over his yard with nothing but binoculars and a report form. Congress ended that with the SAFER SKIES Act in December's defense bill, and the DHS-Justice framework implementing it has been in force since July 1: state, local, tribal, and territorial police and corrections agencies that complete federal training and certification, on approved equipment, can now track a threatening drone and — against a credible threat — take it out of the sky above major venues, critical infrastructure, and prisons.

And in the past week, Washington has shown it means to deliver. The Justice Department announced that the FBI's counter-drone training center in Huntsville will double its capacity. DHS's Science and Technology Directorate put commercial counter-drone systems through operational testing alongside state and local officers. The Pentagon selected four directed-energy systems for a homeland counter-drone pilot. This is what implementation momentum looks like, and the departments deserve real credit for it.

Now the hard truth: doubling a small number produces a small number. The Huntsville center's first class, last fall, held twelve officers, and it remains the only place in America where a state or local officer can earn the legal right to bring down a drone. More than 18,500 agencies are now eligible for these authorities. Against that denominator, even a doubled schoolhouse leaves the vast majority of American communities exactly where they were — watching — while the Super Bowl arrives in four months and the Los Angeles Olympics in under two years. Our prisons cannot wait either: drone incidents at federal correctional facilities rose twentyfold in six years, and state systems from South Carolina to Georgia are logging airborne contraband runs by the hundreds.

What turns momentum into coverage is money, sustained past the current news cycle. Congress should fund training at the scale of the authority it created: regional and satellite course delivery so a deputy in Phoenix is not waiting on a classroom seat in Alabama, instructor pipelines that multiply the schoolhouse instead of merely enlarging it, and a certification target tied to the event calendar that oversight committees actually track. Just as important, the FEMA counter-UAS grant program — $500 million across 2026 and 2027, built around the World Cup — should not sunset with the tournament that inspired it. The threat is not leaving when the fans do.

Governors have their own homework, and fewer excuses than ever: the grant rules push at least 97 percent of awarded funds down to local and tribal agencies within 45 days. The money is designed to reach the street. States should name a lead agency, compete for those dollars this cycle, and put their corrections systems and stadium districts first in line for certified teams.

Over more than twenty years in federal homeland security — the last of them leading U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement — I watched threats outrun statutes again and again. This time the statute arrived first, and this past week proved the executive branch intends to use it. The remaining question belongs to Congress and fifty governors: whether a nation that just confiscated 700 drones at a single sporting event will fund protection for everyone else. Authority without capacity is a promise. Appropriations are how promises get kept.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
Technology Is Outrunning the Way We Fight https://belimedia.com.ng/technology-is-outrunning-the-way-we-fight https://belimedia.com.ng/technology-is-outrunning-the-way-we-fight The United States is racing to field AI and autonomous systems. It is not racing to figure out how to fight with them. This imbalance between technology and concepts is widening a gap the U.S. is ill prepared to close. Ukraine has shown us why this gap is a threat: every new capability breeds a countermeasure, and technological advantage now spoils in months. The answer is not just faster innovation. It is making concept development a continuous military function, one that ties new technology to experimentation, validation, and adoption at the speed the fight demands. Not just a function of schoolhouses and Headquarters.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022 as a war of armored columns and maneuver. Today, trenches and minefields stretch for hundreds of miles, reminiscent of World War I; while drones, unmanned ground vehicles, precision munitions, and persistent surveillance hunt anything that moves.

The United States has poured considerable energy into buying and fielding new technologies faster, and has shown how we are endeavoring to learn from Ukraine. But the U.S. has put far less energy into the institutional processes we need to determine how we fight as technology and adversary behavior changes. This creates a consequential gap between what we build and how we fight.

This growing gap has two parts. The first is substance: technology and concepts need each other. A concept that ignores new technology will overlook new operational possibilities, while a new technology without a concept is a demonstration… not a warfighting capability.

The second is tempo: technology moves in weeks and months, while the processes that decide how formations should use it operate in years. Our fastest-ever concept cycle, from counterinsurgency doctrine to the Iraq Surge, took eighteen months. Most move slower still: gradual, methodical, and caked in decades of calcified bureaucracy.

The problem isn’t just that doctrine changes more slowly than technology. Units in combat adapt fast. The greater challenge is translating those adaptations into concepts that can be tested, refined, integrated into combined-arms operations, and adopted across the force.

That doesn’t mean rewriting concepts every time a new drone appears. It means recognizing when a change in technology (or in the enemy) breaks assumptions behind how we fight, then testing and spreading the fix before it goes stale.

Concept development must become a continuous military function, not a periodic publication. The winner won’t be the side that buys technology fastest, but the side that turns it into battlefield advantage before the enemy adapts. Today, the U.S. is not built to do that quickly.

Ukraine: Adaptation as Necessity

Ukraine illustrates the increasingly reciprocal nature of battlefield adaptation. To date, every advantage has invited an answer. Both sides have changed their technology and tactics again and again in response to each other, and neither has held an edge for long.

Consider the first-person-view (FPV) drone. Cheap, attritable, and easy to build, FPVs turned every squad into a precision strike force. Electronic jamming became its counterpoint. Fiber-optic drones, immune to jamming, then entered the field. Each move created new openings and new limits, and forced changes in both the technology and how it was used.

The operational consequences extend well beyond FPV drones. Persistent surveillance paired with cheap precision strike has changed where and how formations can move, mass, resupply, and survive. Concealment, dispersion, and deception matter more than ever. A unit that concentrates in a location, moves in the open, or runs a predictable supply route becomes a target.

This is the more consequential lesson from Ukraine: a technological innovation may initially improve the effectiveness of a particular weapon or unit, but its broader significance emerges when it changes the conditions under which formations operate. Then the enemy adapts, and the cycle starts again. And again.

In Ukraine, technological advantage is perishable. The hard part isn’t fielding new capabilities. It’s recognizing when they, or the enemy’s countermeasures, demand a different way of fighting.

The American Challenge: From Innovation to Institutional Learning

For the United States, Ukraine demonstrates why concept development cannot remain an episodic activity conducted in schoolhouses and periodically revisited. The lesson is not that Ukrainian solutions are universally applicable. It’s that new technology and countermeasures can break operational assumptions faster than our institutions are built to respond.

The United States cannot just replicate Ukraine’s approach. U.S. forces fight expeditionary campaigns, integrate across joint and coalition formations, and answer to policy, legal, and safety requirements that a nation like Ukraine, fighting for its survival and territorial integrity, does not. The goal is Ukraine’s capacity to adapt, built to American requirements.

Our gap isn’t a shortage of experiments or innovation offices; efforts like the Army’s “Transformation in Contact” are putting new capabilities into units and learning from them. Our gap is having a pathway from what one unit learns, to what the whole force learns. A concept that works in one brigade may fail against a different enemy, in different terrain, or at a higher echelon. And a successful experiment rarely changes training, force design, or acquisition on its own.

Autonomy has raised the stakes and made our pathway to institutional learning an even greater necessity. A software update, a retrained model, or a new way of employing a system can change how technology behaves, and can quietly invalidate the conditions under which it was tested and fielded.

That is the problem assured autonomy is meant to solve. Assured autonomy is justified confidence that an autonomous system will do what it is supposed to do. It must therefore account for the whole relationship: the technology, how it is employed, and the environment it operates in. Continuous, evidence-based assessments can tell commanders when a change requires fresh evaluation and where the boundaries of responsible use lie. Built into the adaptation process, assurance can support speed without abandoning safety, reliability, accountability, or established approval authorities.

Building an Adaptive Concept-Development Enterprise

The United States needs a repeatable process that links new technology, operational concepts, experimentation against a thinking enemy, validation, and adoption across the force.

We are suggesting neither a prototype nor a concept paper. It’s a validated, revisable concept of employment, backed by operational evidence: how a formation can fight differently, under what conditions that works, and what it takes to make it happen. Four functions are needed to get us there:

First, connect concept and technology development directly to operational formations.

Operators, technologists, testers, and concept developers should work alongside commanders. Their job goes beyond improving systems or inventing tactics: they should identify which operational assumptions a new capability breaks, and draft concepts to test.

Not every improvement demands a new concept. A better jammer may only need a new tactic; a capability that changes how a brigade moves, masses, or resupplies demands a new way of fighting. The force needs people close enough to the fight to tell the difference.

In Ukraine, operational units have designated innovation officers liaising directly with industry; industry partners provide prototypes, receive feedback on battlefield experimentation and adaptation. Through this relationship, operators, technologists, and testers converge on a specific requirement, and battalion-level Commanders have the authority to acquire the necessary prototypes to integrate into their formations.

Second, establish a persistent cycle of adversarial operational experimentation.

The question isn’t whether the technology works as designed. It’s whether the formation using it accomplishes the mission better against an opponent who adapts. Experiments should also find where a concept fails: what works against one threat may fail against another, and a promising system may impose unacceptable costs elsewhere in the formation.

Combat training centers, experimentation units, and operational formations already provide the foundation. The task is to link them into a persistent learning loop, fed by operational evidence and intelligence.

Ukraine offers a cautionary tale. For nearly three years, intelligence indicated Russia was developing jet-powered Shahed variants, by most accounts ample time to prepare countermeasures. But when Russia began launching these faster one-way attack systems, Ukraine had too few interceptors capable of that speed, and their previous interception tactics were insufficient to stop them. The warning did not sufficiently feed a cycle of experimentation before the threat was fielded. That gap cost lives.

Third, connect operational validation to adaptive fielding.

Today, a system is typically tested, approved, and fielded as a finished product. But in a fight like Ukraine’s, nothing stays finished: software is updated, models are retrained, and units find new ways to employ what they have. Each change can quietly invalidate the evidence behind the original fielding decision. Adaptive fielding treats validation as continuous, asking what has changed and whether the earlier evidence still holds.

For autonomous systems, this is where assured autonomy matters most, and where scrutiny should match the modification. A minor software patch for a drone flying the same mission in the same conditions may need only a quick check. Retraining its targeting model, sending it into a new environment, or reducing human supervision demands full re-evaluation. This doesn’t bypass approval authorities or testing requirements. It gives them a faster, evidence-based way to decide when more evaluation is needed.

Fourth, institutionalize validated concepts across the force.

This is the decisive step. Experimentation produces evidence; learning happens only when that evidence changes how the force trains, organizes, equips, and fights.

A counter-drone tactic proven in one division should appear in the next combat training center rotation, the next force design update, and the next acquisition…not in an after-action report on a shelf.

This change requires a defined pathway and clear authorities. Commanders, testers, capability developers, and acquisition officials each own different decisions, but those decisions must draw on a common body of operational evidence, with clear decision points for when the evidence is strong enough to act. The result is a continuous cycle: develop, experiment, validate, field, learn, institutionalize, adapt. Then repeat, as the technology and the enemy change.

In Ukraine, Aerorozvidka, a non-governmental organization, plays this role: not a think tank but an empowered change agent -- capturing evidence from the field and shepherding it through commanders, technologists, and acquisition officials until new tech is deployed or new concepts (like deep strike) are fielded.

Operational Advantage Depends on the Capacity to Learn

The United States possesses substantial technological, industrial, and innovative capacity to compete in AI and autonomous warfare. But technological leadership alone will not produce operational advantage. Adapting a system isn’t the same as adapting a force, and a better-performing unit doesn’t change the course of a campaign.

Four questions will dictate our capacity to learn: The technical question is what a system can do. The tactical question is how formations should employ it. The operational question is how it changes the way maneuver, fires, intelligence, protection, sustainment, and command combine to win. The strategic question is whether the institution can answer all three, again and again, faster than the enemy.

The race isn’t to build the best autonomous systems or to field them first. It’s to turn technological change into operational advantage, faster than the enemy can take it away. In the age of AI and autonomy, the force that learns fastest wins.

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Command We Must Start https://belimedia.com.ng/the-command-we-must-start https://belimedia.com.ng/the-command-we-must-start In 1928, Secretary of War Dwight Davis ordered the Army to assemble an experimental mechanized force of tanks, armored cars, and motorized infantry at Camp Meade, Maryland. It was disbanded within months. A second attempt was dissolved in 1931, when the Army told each of its branches to mechanize itself. The infantry kept the tanks, the cavalry built “combat cars” to work around a law that gave tanks to the infantry, and the United States created its Armored Force in July 1940, weeks after France fell. The Army had the idea twelve years before it had the force.

Owen West and Max Strasiser, who are building the Autonomous Warfare Command, cited the 1928 force in their October 21 open letter as the fragmentation the country must not repeat. They are right, and the week since shows how it happens. The command’s plan of action and milestones was due to the Secretary of War on October 30, and no one has reported that it arrived. The Pentagon is drafting a budget of about $1.1 trillion against a $1.5 trillion request, Politico reports, and the command rests on $54 billion in a reconciliation bill that has not passed and has no backup, according to Defense One. No commander has been named. Davis’s force was not defeated by an adversary. It was absorbed in peacetime, in a budget fight, by the institutions it was meant to change, while no one with the authority to stop it chose to.

Last week, I named three things the plan must settle: the authority to allocate resources among theaters, edge computing, and magnets for drones stocked before the ban. These items remain the test of the plan when it appears. But a command is formed by what it does before its charter is signed, and the Services are already deciding what this one will be. Five things can start this month, and none of them requires an act of Congress or the $54 billion:

Start in the theater. The letter allows different mixes of systems for the Indo-Pacific and for Europe. It does not say who chooses between them when there are not enough for both, which is the only week that matters. The command’s planners should sit with Indo-Pacific Command now and run that choice in an exercise: two theaters, the same systems, the same day, and a ruling the Services agree in advance to treat as binding. I served six commanders at Indo-Pacific Command and one at Special Operations Command. Each could state exactly what the fight required. The process that allocated scarce systems and bought new ones answered late, and more often not at all. A rule practiced before the war is the only kind that survives it.

Start measuring time. The letter grades spending by cost per kill. Add a second number: the time from sensing a target to striking it, and who owns each link in between. The advantage of autonomous warfare is reduced latency. Ukraine’s drones compute on the airframe because they cannot afford the round trip; too many of ours still make it. A force that relies on someone else’s network to communicate, or on a signal an adversary can jam to determine its location, has let another party set its speed. Make latency and assured positioning, navigation and timing a condition of every purchase.

Start with command and control. No technical architecture, interface standard, or acquisition priority list has been published. Write them before the first large buy, as one architecture across every Service and domain, including space. Every system bought before the architecture exists is a problem handed to the warfighter to solve under fire, and it becomes obsolete the day a system that integrates arrives.

Start telling industry what it needs. Industry answers requests for proposals; it does not invest against a need it cannot see. The Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency identify gaps faster than the system can close them, and drones are the proof. Publish the demand signal: the architecture, the quantities, and the dates. Put supply in it. The command’s motors still turn on Chinese magnets, and Beijing’s pause on licensing lapses on November 10. The Pentagon’s own ban on Chinese-origin magnets begins on January 1. No Defense Production Act priority rating has been reported to carry the command across that gap.

Start with allies where they give an operational advantage. The letter does not mention them. Yet allies are already paying for American weapons: Canada, Germany, and Norway are financing a possible sale of 500 Patriot interceptors for Ukraine, approved October 30. Korean yards overhaul American supply ships, and the second pillar of AUKUS, the Australian, British, and American partnership, carries autonomy as a line of effort. Build and repair the systems where the fight would be, inside the theater, with partners whose industry can surge when ours cannot. That makes the arsenal of freedom an operational fact rather than a slogan.

None of this is money, and all of it is integration. The Services will coordinate the command into existence if it lets them, each taking a share of the systems, the budget, and the mission, and calling the result joint. That is what the Army did in 1931. West and Strasiser are right that the advantage goes to the force that adapts faster than its adversary. But adaptation is a decision made again and again, and a command that cannot rule among the Services will adapt only as fast as the slowest of them. A command earns its four stars by deciding among competing claims and making the decision bind, and this one can start before it has a charter. Coordination assigns. Integration arbitrates.

The Army that told each branch to mechanize itself built its Armored Force after France fell, and still had more than two years before its armor met the enemy. This command will not be given two years.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Turkey Has Outsourced Its Censorship to American Companies https://belimedia.com.ng/turkey-has-outsourced-its-censorship-to-american-companies https://belimedia.com.ng/turkey-has-outsourced-its-censorship-to-american-companies Earlier this month, Sky News correspondent Alex Crawford got a notice from X: her account was being blocked in Turkey. She asked the Turkish presidency why and has yet to get an answer. She isn’t the only one.

Crawford is one of at least 1,270 accounts Turkish courts ordered X to block in September. X made roughly 90% of them unavailable in Turkey, according to the Freedom of Expression Association. Weeks before X began blocking these accounts in Turkey, Elon Musk declared that “any censorship required by governments is now clearly visible.”

While American social media platforms show clear outrage when they are banned in other countries, they rarely show the same outrage when Turkey silences its citizens online. These bans and blocks disproportionately hit marginalized communities, particularly those who rely on these platforms to organize, share information, and make their experiences visible. These restrictions reduce the visibility of minority perspectives and encourage self-censorship among LGBTQ+ people, activists, and independent journalists. A democracy depends on people being able to access information, express their views, and participate in public debate. When certain communities are systematically pushed out of these spaces, their experiences and perspectives become less visible in the broader political conversation.

The Crackdown Behind the Blocks

Since the failed 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the government has steadily expanded its control over the information environment, including by targeting journalists, media organizations, and political opponents who criticize the government. According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), roughly 90% of Turkey’s traditional media is currently under government control. As a result, many journalists have turned to YouTube and social media to reach audiences independently of traditional outlets. These platforms, however, have also become subject to government pressure, including licensing requirements, arrest threats, and content restrictions.

The scale of these restrictions was particularly visible following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. Between March 19 and April 12, 2025, X blocked access in Turkey to at least 471 accounts with a combined 17.2 million followers. The affected accounts ranged from journalists with more than 1.2 million followers to grassroots organizations with fewer than ten. At least 22 of the blocked accounts belonged to women’s rights organizations, including the We Will Stop Femicides Platform, which had approximately 181,000 followers. The breadth of the restrictions suggests that online censorship in Turkey has affected not only prominent journalists but also smaller civil-society and activist organizations.

Similar restrictions were reported in September 2026 during the government’s “My Family Is Safe” operation targeting LGBTQ+ organizations. On September 13, access to 32 X accounts—many belonging to university LGBTQ+ groups—was blocked in Turkey. Three days later, an Istanbul court ordered access restrictions on another 419 accounts over allegations that they had shared “obscene content.” The accounts reportedly included journalists, activists, media organizations, and women’s rights groups. The restrictions also affected the accounts of Evrensel newspaper, Amnesty International Turkey, and the Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA). Moreover, the website and social media accounts of the news organization T24 were blocked over content authorities characterized as “LGBT propaganda.”

When American Platforms Do Ankara’s Work

The role of social media companies is particularly significant because many of these restrictions depend on platforms complying with requests from Turkish authorities. Transparency reports show high compliance with government requests: TikTok (91.8%), X (85.66%), Instagram (79.15%), Google (77.5%), and Facebook (42%). These rates illustrate that restrictions on online speech do not result solely from direct government censorship. When platforms carry out blocking orders without challenge, government censorship reaches the spaces where journalists and activists work independently. The result is a chilling effect: people who have not been blocked censor themselves, and citizens lose access to information they need to take part in public life.

X says it challenges the orders in court and that refusing risks throttling the entire platform in Turkey. But when a court ordered İmamoglu’s campaign account blocked in August, X implemented the block while contesting it. The damage also reaches Americans: the accounts blocked include U.S.-based @Gayety and @Pride.

The hypocrisy is hard to miss. X has long portrayed itself as a defender of free speech, and American officials and tech executives have spent years warning about foreign censorship. Yet when a NATO ally demands that dissidents be erased, American companies behave like compliance departments.

The Silence After the Block

The impact of censorship extends beyond the accounts that are formally blocked. It can also affect people who remain free to post but choose not to do so. Journalists, activists, academics, and ordinary users may engage in self-censorship because they fear arrest, legal consequences, harassment, or repercussions for people associated with them. Self-censorship occurs when individuals possess information or opinions they would otherwise share but deliberately withhold them because they perceive a risk in speaking publicly. In this sense, censorship can operate indirectly: the possibility of punishment may be enough to silence speech even when no account has been formally restricted.

However, this self-censorship has consequences. Activists in Turkey use online platforms to raise awareness about violence, sexual assault, and killings targeting marginalized groups. For communities whose perspectives receive limited attention in traditional media, social media can provide an important space to document abuse, organize campaigns, and reach audiences both inside and outside the country. Yet while people continue to rely on these platforms for information, they must also navigate the risks associated with speaking publicly online.

This creates a broader chilling effect on public discussion. When websites are blocked or activists are arrested, others may become less willing to publish, share, or amplify information about marginalized communities. The result is not simply the removal of individual accounts or pieces of content; it can also reduce the amount of information available to the public about abuses affecting vulnerable groups. For communities that depend on outside attention and advocacy, these restrictions may also make it more difficult to reach international audiences and build cross-border support.

Online censorship in Turkey is expanding, and it falls especially hard on marginalized groups. Turkey still holds elections, but democracy depends on more than voting: when journalists, activists and opposition figures are blocked from the platforms where public debate happens, the choice voters make is less informed and less free. Those platforms are American, and so is a share of the responsibility.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Hidden Cost of America’s War With Iran https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hidden-cost-of-americas-war-with-iran https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hidden-cost-of-americas-war-with-iran “The [U.S. Naval Support Activity Bahrain] base and Fifth Fleet headquarters have been rendered largely inoperable for their original functions, with repairs estimated at $400 million… Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle and other senior defense officials stated that the Navy will not return to full normal operations at the Bahrain facility anytime soon…Because the Juffair surrounding area [to the U.S. Bahrain Navy facilities] is considered unsafe, [U.S. Navy] major logistical and port-call operations have been rerouted over 2,000 miles away to the Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia and other alternative hubs, causing significant resupply delays.”

That is an excerpt from a 19-page Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report titled, Estimating the Cost of Combat Operations Against Iran, sent to Congress September 15.

I read the now-seven-week-old CBO report last week, and was surprised at how much new-to-me information it contained about the early days of the Iran war, and particularly Tehran’s early destruction of U.S. military infrastructure which, up-to-recently, had not had much publicity in this country.

For example, although the U.S. attacks along with Israel on Iran began before dawn February 28, 2026, there apparently was a lack of expectation for the size of Iran counterattacks with missiles and drones that actually took place later that same day, February 28, in Bahrain and at other U.S. bases in Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

And while the White House and Pentagon repeatedly have described the destruction U.S. and Israeli forces have done to Iran’s military, there has been as almost no mention of what was happening to the U.S. facilities.

In mid-September, the Defense Department (DoD) Inspector General (IG), as Lead IG, released a report on Operation Epic Fury (OEF) -- the war against Iran. The IG report found that “Iranian strikes damaged and destroyed hundreds of buildings and structures at U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and Jordan during the conflict,” as of June 30, 2026, and the DoD had “$3.7 billion in equipment losses, but [that] does not include costs for infrastructure repairs.”

The IG report later noted it “did not include the cost of military construction for damaged infrastructure in its estimate because [DoD] has not determined what its future posture will be in the region, how it will construct its bases, and what percentage of the construction costs Allies and partners will contribute.”

On the other hand, the IG report did say “damage to U.S. embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities had already cost the U.S. approximately $184 million.”

I should point out that the CBO September report, sent to Congress one day after the IG report was released, noted that DoD had failed to provide to it, the CBO, with an estimate on the cost of the damage to U.S. bases and facilities.

In fact, there still has yet to be any publicly-released official DoD estimate of the cost of damage to U.S. military bases and facilities based on Iran’s attacks.

However, Iran attacks in those first days of the war continued in a scale and duration that appeared to have taken the U.S. government by surprise. For example, it was not until March 2, the third day after attacks began, before the Navy and the State Department ordered the evacuation of dependents from Bahrain.

The September CBO report said, “Military families and non-essential personnel were evacuated [from Bahrain] in March 2026, and remain displaced across temporary housing, awaiting the eventual retrieval of personal belongings left behind…[and] Evacuated families have faced added strain as military leadership noted that temporary evacuation financial support is scheduled to conclude on November 30, 2026, even though shipping personal effects is expected to take several more months.”

Also indicating a surprise from Iran’s military response, the DoD’s IG report noted, “Prior to OEF, Bahrain had been U.S. Navy Central’s main logistics hub to sustain operations in the Persian Gulf region, USCENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] said. During major combat operations, Iran targeted Bahrain with [drones] and ballistic missile strikes. USCENTCOM stated that it initially shifted naval sustainment resources from Bahrain to alternate hubs.”

The IG Report added, “The establishment of adequate naval bases and support ports posed significant challenges before and during OEF, arising from complexities and due to uncertainties with host nation access permissions to utilize ports for fleet resupply, USCENTCOM said.”

For example, the need to shift logistics support and infrastructure to Diego Garcia added 14-to-18 days for transporting material by sea, according to the IG report.

As for the U.S. Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Air Force had since 2019 periodically conducted tests and temporary shifts of its operations to Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina to demonstrate distributed command-and-control capabilities and reduced reliance on a single point of failure.

As reported in June by Air and Space Forces Magazine, personnel were transferred away from Al Udeid before February 28. Therefore, when Iran weapons struck the COAC facility at Al Udeid Air Base in the early days of the war, operations were already being run out of Shaw Air Force Base.

Then, there is the already publicized, but apparently un-planned, heavy use of both offensive and defensive U.S. weaponry caused by the Iran war.

For example, the September CBO report estimated, “The cost to replace the munitions expended through August 1, 2026, is $21.7 billion: $7.3 billion for the land-attack cruise missiles, $13.1 billion for the missile defense interceptors, and $1.2 billion for other munitions. Replacing those munitions has been the largest single component of the costs incurred by DoD during the conflict.”

CBO estimated that it “would probably take at least five years” to replace certain interceptors even at an increased rate of production.

An October 5, Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, U.S. Military Operations Against Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Programs, raises another point worth considering -- whether the Trump planners understood the difficulty they faced in trying to disarm Iran.

The CRS report noted that President Trump on February 28, listed among the OEF’s objectives was destroying Iran’s missiles, and “[razing] their missile industry to the ground.”

However, as CRS reported following the initial U.S./Israeli attacks, “DIA [the Defense Intelligence Agency] assessed in April 2026 that Iran ‘retains thousands of missiles and one-way attack UAVs [drones] that can threaten U.S. and partner forces throughout the region, despite degradations to its capabilities from both attrition and expenditure.’”

CRS also reported articles that said “that Iran may have begun rebuilding military infrastructure, restoring access to missile bases, and resuming missile production using stockpiled components. An Iranian official reportedly asserted in August that Iran has sufficient ‘stockpiles in our underground missile and drone cities’ to enable continued production.”

The CRS report suggested Congress consider directing the Pentagon to produce an “annual report on military power of Iran,” along with a public version of that report.

While dealing with public reporting, I must note the odd way DoD has been handling public disclosure of U.S. dead and wounded since February 28, a system clearly designed to lower the numbers.

Instead of having one category, there are two – one for the period February 28-to-July 6, covering OEF with 15 deaths and 417 wounded; the second from July 7-to-present in a second category, “overseas operations,” which lists eight deaths and 448 wounded.

The Trump administration rationale was that a temporary ceasefire or memorandum of understanding was reached to end OEF and that fighting resumed on July 7, after the earlier ceasefire collapsed.

However, as Stars and Stripes reported last Thursday, “The Pentagon has revised the number of U.S. troops who have died during operations related to the war against Iran to 23… Additionally, 865 American service members have been wounded.”

Now we are in a period where President Trump has threatened, after today’s elections, to renew attacks on Iran. He has amassed a battle force that could carry it out. He has also warned allies in the region it may be coming.

The State Department has ordered nonessential government employees and their families to leave Saudi Arabia and made staffing adjustments or family departures across several diplomatic missions in the Middle East.

But as I have indicated above, Iran, which has the largest armed forces in the region, has a capability to strike back, whether the Pentagon acknowledges that or not.

Iran has developed a defense industry and its own military capabilities, including extensive underground facilities, and dispersal of munitions inventories.

The volume of U.S. offensive and defensive ammunition used so far against Iran show that any U.S. renewing of attacks to force Tehran to accept Washington’s terms, would not be a day or two operation.

And perhaps just as important to think about -- given what Ukraine has shown -- explosive drones can be launched toward targets thousands of miles away, showing no country is completely safe, no matter how far its borders are from the enemy.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia Never Left the International Financial System. It Built a Way Back In. https://belimedia.com.ng/russia-never-left-the-international-financial-system-it-built-a-way-back-in https://belimedia.com.ng/russia-never-left-the-international-financial-system-it-built-a-way-back-in A7’s OpenAI prompt was six words long: "Translate [name] to [language]. Answer only translated text."

Developer code leaked in 2025 from A7—the Kremlin-linked payment network designated by Treasury on October 1 as “a significant transnational criminal organization”—shows A7 used this prompt with OpenAI's API to create fake invoices, fake stamps, and a complex ledger that made Russian procurement look like ordinary trade.

Our investigative work, as featured originally in the “Big Shor” investigation and in subsequently featured in the New York Times and Financial Times, reveals that between January 2025 and June 2026, A7 laundered over $80 billion through the international financial system and continues to do so today. Zach was the principal researcher and Dawson peer reviewed the report and mentored the research team.

The common story is that sanctions cut Russia off from SWIFT and dollar clearing. In reality, Russia never left the Western financial system; A7 is how it re-entered at state scale. It still needs dollars and euros to buy components, sell oil, and pay intermediaries; China’s CIPS, yuan, crypto, and barter cannot replace them.

How the scheme works

A7 acts for Promsvyazbank, the state bank serving Russia's defense sector. A7 has laundered over $80 billion through roughly 435 financial institutions in at least 83 countries, funding Russia’s war in Ukraine, intelligence operations, election interference, and trade. Its clients have included Iranian oil sellers, which is why Treasury rolled the designation into Operation Economic Outcast.

A7’s shell companies, often run from Russia over VPNs, open accounts at local banks in Bishkek or Dubai’s free trade zones. Those banks rely on larger regional banks, which clear dollars through correspondents in New York or Hong Kong. Each sees only the customer in front of it. Card programs issued under sponsor banks give front companies and Russians access to payment rails without a direct banking relationship.

Fundamental to the scheme were fake invoices, produced at scale using OpenAI’s ChatGPT. A7 also used ChatGPT to forge stamps and automate intake of SWIFT payment confirmations from scanned receipts. Because A7 broke the operation into steps that each looked legitimate, OpenAI’s screening was unlikely to flag it—a gap AI companies must close.

This is where the burden falls on banks, and where the anti-money laundering (AML) framework fails. It was built to catch criminals hiding proceeds, not a state-backed service with intelligence-grade tradecraft. A7’s disposable shell companies are replaced faster than any sanctions list can be updated. To Western correspondent banks, its flows look like normal bilateral trade.

Banks can catch A7 only by tracking behavior over time: new free-zone trading companies moving outsized volumes, product descriptions that do not match the counterparty, and payment routes with no commercial logic. However, banks can only go so far on their own.

The deeper problem is permissive jurisdictions—UAE free zones, Hong Kong, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye—that offer fast incorporation, light ownership checks, and access to dollars and euros. Intermediating Russian trade is profitable, and many of these governments frame it as “neutrality” rather than evasion. In Kyrgyzstan, A7 relied on relationships reaching the highest levels of government and the banking sector.

The Macro Threat: Sanctions, SWIFT, and China

As former U.S. Treasury and intelligence officials, we see A7 as a sobering reminder that the first wave of financial sanctions on Russia fell short. The international banking system remains the indispensable engine of Russia’s war effort.

This exposes a broader geopolitical failure: adversary coordination. Russia, Iran, the DPRK, and China increasingly share intermediaries and methods to exploit Western finance rather than build their own. Yet the allied response remains fragmented, targeting networks like A7 one at a time.

This forces hard choices about dollar access. Washington could strip correspondent access from the Chinese and regional banks moving billions for U.S. adversaries. That might disrupt A7, but it raises the question of whether weaponizing dollar access compels compliance or accelerates Beijing and Moscow's push for a closed-loop financial system.

Changing the Equation: Government Actions

Allied governments must close systemic loopholes. Diplomacy with third countries has largely run its course; the leverage now lies in their banks’ access to Western finance. Tools like FinCEN’s Section 311 can force regional banks to choose between servicing networks like A7 and keeping their Western correspondent accounts. Regulators must treat nested correspondent relationships (banks clearing payments for other banks’ customers) and sponsored credit card programs (cards issued by smaller banks and fintechs under a bank’s license) as direct compliance liabilities.

Exams that test only static list-screening teach banks to build to that baseline. Exams should require network analysis, and governments should help scale these costly tools for vulnerable institutions in developing countries. This must be paired with mandatory information sharing: secure channels for client exit data and real-time international exchange of typologies.

Finally, authorities must treat AI and cloud infrastructure with the same scrutiny as traditional finance. Finalizing know-your-customer rules for cloud providers and requiring AI companies to flag behavioral anomalies would deny illicit actors the cheap infrastructure they need to scale.

A7 still moves billions every month. A week after Treasury acted, A7 announced a stablecoin USDT-SWIFT product; the timing was not a coincidence. Even if A7 is degraded, its model is highly portable, and Iran and North Korea are watching. The question for Washington, London, and Brussels is whether they can help industry disrupt these networks through a compliance culture that prioritizes real impact over list-based box-checking.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
We’re Losing the Cognitive Space Race https://belimedia.com.ng/were-losing-the-cognitive-space-race https://belimedia.com.ng/were-losing-the-cognitive-space-race Over the last century, modern medicine achieved a historic feat. We increased the human lifespan by 33%. But at the same time, we completely failed to defend our brain healthspan. Today, a silent gap of 15 to 30 years exists between the time our bodies survive and the time our brains remain vibrant, innovative, and fully functional. It is a terrifying paradox. Medical science has advanced so much that a newborn today can realistically expect to live to 100, if not 120 years old. Yet, we passively accept that their cognitive engine will begin an irreversible, downhill slide in their thirties with the likelihood of dementia reaching almost 100% by the age of 110. What good is an extra three decades of biological existence if our brains lack the strength and resilience to enjoy it? This is no longer just a localized healthcare crisis; it is an imminent national security threat to our competitive edge.

Look at where our national focus and funding are directed. America is focused on investing billions of dollars into artificial intelligence and hypersonic defense systems. However, we are systematically ignoring the ultimate computing engine that builds the technology, commands our military, drives our economy, and stabilizes our communities: the human brain.

Our global competitors are not making this mistake. Most notably, China understands that future geopolitical dominance will not be won simply by hoarding raw technology. It will be won by the cognitive longevity, relentless innovation, and emotional resilience of their population. They are playing the long game and investing in their brain economy; We are falling behind.

In the military, we use a concept called staying "left of boom." It means executing proactive, aggressive conditioning and preventative strategies to stop a catastrophe before it happens, rather than digging through the wreckage after an explosion.

Right now, America’s approach to brain health is reactive. Our public policy treats brain aging as an inevitable, downhill slide into deficit. We pour billions of dollars into solving brain health collapse, like dementia and visible cognitive breakdown, before we actively intervene. But that approach is a losing strategy. We must shift from a reactive, disease-focused model to a proactive era of precision brain health in order to finally maximize American brainpower. If we do not actively optimize our collective intelligence and mental endurance, we will fall behind not only in defense readiness but also in scientific advancement and workforce productivity.

Fortunately, building a sharper, more resilient nation has never been easier or more measurable.

A landmark, three-year longitudinal study of 4,000 adults recently published in Nature Portfolio’s Scientific Reports completely dismantles the myth of inevitable cognitive decline. The data proves that the human brain possesses a no-ceiling capability. From ages 19 to 94, the brain retains a profound capacity to continually rewire, adapt, and improve its performance over time.

The key to unlocking this potential is a newly validated, multidimensional metric called the BrainHealth Index. For the first time, we can treat the brain exactly like physical fitness. We don't guess if our hearts are healthy; we measure blood pressure. The BrainHealth Index finally gives us a credible benchmark to track and measure holistic brain improvement across three critical pillars:

  • Clarity: Our raw capacity to solve complex, novel problems and drive deep technological innovation.
  • Connectedness: Our capacity for social purpose and communication, which serves as the bedrock for stable families and strong communities.
  • Emotional Balance: The mental resilience required to perform under extreme pressure, from corporate boardrooms to tactical defense environments.

When we actively invest in and train our cognitive micro-skills, the positive implications ripple across society. Every day, citizens become better in their personal relationships, more productive at their jobs, and significantly more resilient against modern burnout and life stressors. Scaled nationally, this collective mental fitness becomes the invisible armor required for our national defense and technological endurance.

As a neurologist, a retired U.S. Army Colonel, and the former founding director of DARPA’s Biological Technologies Office, I have spent my entire career protecting and restoring the brains of our service members. I know what the human mind is capable of achieving when it is pushed to optimize, rather than just manage decline.

Our federal agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, the NIH, and the Department of Veterans Affairs, must immediately work to adopt scalable, digital health initiatives that democratize these brain optimization tools nationwide. But executive action is only half the battle. Congress must step up and introduce a unified, bipartisan National Brain Capital Act. Just as lawmakers realized we could not secure our future without a CHIPS and Science Act to defend our artificial intelligence hardware, they must recognize that we cannot protect our nation without a legislative framework to maximize our human brainpower. We must empower every single citizen with the self-agency to improve their own cognitive capacity. It is time for Congress to stop treating brain performance as a passive medical luxury for the few. It is a national imperative to keep America leading the world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Terms We Must Set https://belimedia.com.ng/the-terms-we-must-set https://belimedia.com.ng/the-terms-we-must-set On October 15, a Vietnamese state-owned tanker, the PVT Azura, departed St. Petersburg with 109,000 barrels of Russian diesel. It is due at Norfolk on November 2, at a facility that the shipping journal gCaptain reports serves the American military, a detail no official has confirmed. It will be the first Russian diesel to reach an American port since 2023. On October 23, Russia's deputy prime minister said three tankers were at sea, that supply contracts were being finalized, and that volumes would rise to 1 million tons in December and could reach 3 million a month. A week earlier, the United States had waived, by executive order, the duties Congress had required to punish Russia's energy customers. Within a week, the waiver became a contract.

Azura's cargo is about 40 minutes of American diesel demand; 3 million tons a month would be a fifth of it, and roughly four times what Russia exported in the third quarter. To deliver that, Russia must repair the refineries Ukraine has spent a year destroying, which Rosneft now says it cannot afford. The contract's first effect is to give Washington an interest in Russian refineries running, even as Ukraine's president says the interceptors it has already paid for "are still not coming."

Diesel is one of four things the arsenal took this autumn from parties it does not control. The second is magnets: China exported 6,165 tons in September, its largest month this year, and they are the magnets in the motors of the drones the new Autonomous Warfare Command is to buy by the hundreds of thousands; Beijing's pause on its licensing rules lapses on November 10, with no notice published. The third is a room: the President said on October 19 that he would meet Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in China next month, after the Wall Street Journal reported that Putin had proposed a three-way meeting in Shenzhen to settle the war in Ukraine, without Ukraine. The fourth is money: on October 21, the Treasury sold 20-year bonds at a record 5.469 percent with foreign demand well below its average, and the 10-year fell below 5 percent the next day only because investors fled artificial-intelligence debt for the government's.

The one adversary with nothing to sell was squeezed: a third carrier group was ordered toward Iran on October 21, and Brent settled Friday at $116.72, its highest since April, which raised the price of everything the arsenal buys from the adversaries that do sell.

A sanction is the instrument of the party that sells. This autumn, the United States is the party that needs, and each supplier holds a date on which it can change the terms: October 31, when Russia's own fuel-export ban lapses; November 10 for Beijing's licenses; early November for the Treasury's refunding; November 18 for the summit. In economic warfare, the buyer takes the terms.

I write this from the Cipher Brief's Threat Conference at Sea Island, where General Bryan Fenton and I addressed the question of what the Department of War has to do with economic warfare. The week answered it before we spoke: the Department is now, by available reports, a customer of one adversary's refineries, a buyer of another's magnets, the holder of an ally's interceptors, and the owner of the carriers that set the price of oil. No office weighed those instruments against one another; the suppliers did.

For nine weeks in these pages, I have written about what the United States cannot do, from the army it cannot command to the day it cannot choose, and each piece ended at the same place: a decision no one was assigned to make. The diagnosis is complete, and the series turns here from what we cannot do to what we must. The place to start is the Autonomous Warfare Command: its plan is due on October 30, and it will be the government's largest buyer of the parts this piece is about.

Three things must be in that plan, and none of them is money.

First, the authority to decide. The Secretary's memorandum settles who buys. It has not settled who decides: one command-and-control architecture across every Service and domain, including space; who allocates among theaters when two ask for the same drones on the same day; who overrides at tempo; and whether the answer binds the Services. Congress granted those authorities to Special Operations Command in 1986, with its own budget line and acquisition power. The plan should name the same for this command, and add the paragraph Congress left out in 1986: command and control.

Second, the edge. Ukraine computes on the aircraft; we compute in Virginia and wait, and the Pacific cannot fight on a round trip. The plan must put the computing on the platform and the communications on a layer the force controls, so that no one else sets its speed.

Third, supply before the ban. The command's motors turn on Chinese magnets until American plants deliver, and the Pentagon's own ban takes effect on January 1. A Defense Production Act priority rating and a drawdown from the National Defense Stockpile, issued before November 10, stock what we need before we forbid what we depend on. The same plan is the demand signal industry has asked for: an architecture and a date.

The economic front needs the same discipline before the summit. The diesel contract Moscow is drafting can carry an American sunset and condition, or Moscow's; the choice closes when it is signed. The Shenzhen agenda can be published by Washington before Beijing publishes its own. An office beneath the President must hold those terms once set, because the next price of fuel will argue for changing them. A buyer who does these things is still a buyer, but no longer a price-taker. Set the terms before the supplier does. In this war, the suppliers are the parties we set out to pressure, and they hold the dates

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The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why America’s Military Still Needs Its Allies https://belimedia.com.ng/why-americas-military-still-needs-its-allies https://belimedia.com.ng/why-americas-military-still-needs-its-allies “We never fight alone. We've never done that. You can go all the way back to the days of Revolutionary War. The United States has never gone into conflict on its own. We've always built coalitions. We've always involved partners and allies. And we'll continue to do so going forward.”

That was Gen. Ronald P. Clark, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific Command, speaking last Tuesday at a contemporary military forum, Decisive Landpower -- Deterrence and Partner Integration Against the Pacing Threat, as part of the 2026 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Conference in Washington, D.C.

On the panel with Clark was Army Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, Commander, United Nations Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and Tara Murphy Dougherty, Chief Executive Officer of Air, a leading AI software firm that specializes in national security readiness.

The two Army generals spent a good deal of their time talking about lessons learned from Ukraine and the benefits to the U.S. of allies – specifically in the Pacific. That struck me as something to further explore, since one day later, on Wednesday, President Trump continued his running criticism of allies with an October 14, Truth Social screed.

Trump said in part: “Because of the fact that we have had such Military Success, we no longer ‘need,’ or desire, the NATO Countries’ assistance — WE NEVER DID! Likewise, Japan, Australia, or South Korea. In fact, speaking as President of the United States of America, by far the Most Powerful Country Anywhere in the World, WE DO NOT NEED THE HELP OF ANYONE! Thank you for your attention to this matter. President DONALD J. TRUMP.”

On the other hand, Gen. Brunson had told the AUSA audience one day earlier, “Everything that we do is intricately woven around the ROK (Republic of Korea)-U.S. alliance. That alliance has stood for some 75 years and it is an example or a paragon, if you will, of all that's right when folk work in alliance together. The problems that we solve are joint problems. They're not just U.S. problems. They're not just Republic of Korea problems. What they are is great opportunities for two nations to work in concert with one another in order to arrive at solutions that are beneficial for both countries.”

Gen. Clark explained further, “So our ability to be able to work with partners and allies on their sovereign soil, to be able to share procedures that we build through [military] exercises over the course of a year, some joint, some army-to-army, but always integrated with our partners. It gives us the opportunity to have our systems work technically, to have our procedures nested, and to get to know one another in a way that allows us to build the trust that's necessary in training. Because if we wait until crisis or conflict, it's too late to ask the question, can I trust

you? But because we've been working together, because we've exercised at scale, because we're modernizing our forces alongside one another, it works.”

Clark added, “We've really worked hard at building those relationships at scale inside of the land forces. We have a land forces dialogue that meets multiple times a year -- chiefs of army of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. We've invited the ROKs in, we've invited India in, and it continues to grow. So those relationships built army-to-army are what allows us to really integrate across interoperability, and integrate it really across our formations and with our partners in all.”

Brunson described how he and Korean Gen. Kim Sung-min, Deputy Commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, discussed training differently “taking advantage of the knowledge that we have of the threats that exist or that prevail in the Ukraine fight.”

Brunson said, “We talk about how we would operate in a distributed fashion…Just imagine if we trained across the entirety of the [Korean] Peninsula and got ourselves in a shape where we would say you can't utilize the things that you've learned in the fight in the battlefield in Ukraine on us, because we learned the same lessons and we've distributed ourselves in such a way that we don't make ourselves the target. We won't be moored in place.”

Clark talked about Russia, North Korea and China “learning from watching us partner, but the partnerships that our adversaries have built are transactional versus the transformational relationships that we build as a security partner of choice globally…for us it's really transformational relationships that we look to cultivate with partners and allies over time.”

Brunson described how the North Koreans, fighting for the Russians in Ukraine were “able to test systems there…and then bring that back home. So, in one aspect, they've shortened their RDT&E cycle.” He also pointed out, “The fact that you have a combat trained force with recent

combat on the [Korean] Peninsula for the first time since 1953..[and] are now bringing those lessons learned back into their own training cycle, it's shortened their time to develop them.”

Clark said that U.S. forces had also learned from Ukraine about the need for mobility and camouflage, which he described as “age-old army forgotten sciences of how to hide in plain sight and how to camouflage ourselves from observation...Our ability to be able to use electronic warfare, to be able to use just good, old-fashioned camouflage and the ability to deceive our adversary is a must. In those two theaters [Ukraine and Iran] it's not a near-peer adversary that we would be working against -- whereas, in our theater [the Pacific] it absolutely is.”

For Clark, the questions were: “How do we fight, you know, Type One, Type Two UAS [unmanned aerial system, drones]; how do we think through ballistic missile defense holistically in the region. We spend a lot of time working again with the joint force for solutions associated with that. How do we maneuver?”

Brunson raised a new issue by pointing out that, “Our old system was something [a weapons system] breaks, we send it all the way back CONUS [Continental U.S.] in order to fix it so we can then bring it all the way back out again.” That used to take 29 days by ship.

However, he added, “In the ally that we have in Korea we have a an absolutely premier industrial base, if you look at the Korea defense industry, some of the kit that we're producing right now sits along our friends, allies and partners.” Brunson said, “The Army’s new infantry squad vehicle (ISV), for example, is produced by GM Defense and GM Defense is also in the Republic of Korea.”

“So the idea of a regional sustainment hub would simply be…to bring those means of production to the theater,” Brunson suggested, noting, “In the maritime domain, when we look at maintenance, repair, and overhaul, which is being done forward alongside the Koreans, you know that 15 percent of global ship building is done in Korea. And, oh by the way, we've got an ally with a mutual defense treaty in Japan that has 10% of global ship building. And if we take these cases forward, we're able to stay in theater longer.”

The answer, Brunson said, “We've got to try to achieve admirable endurance in theater by partnering alongside our allies, seeing the things that they can do better than we can right now at distance and then keeping them right where they belong. That keeps our [military] forces forward.”

Dougherty chipped in saying: “Tens of millions of dollars saved by simply identifying things like unfilled requisitions or parts that are obsolete that can be replaced with something not obsolete and also less expensive. I think that this is it. This is part of how you generate lethality. You get readiness to pay for itself, because otherwise sustainment is too expensive when it has to be done for the entirety of the joint force all the way on the other side of the world.”

At one point, Clark said, “The secret sauce for us as an Army is our Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps, reflecting Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s September 30 speech praising the same group.

Clark noted that both he and Brunson were sons of NCOs, and that “with the assistance of our senior non-commissioned officers, senior enlisted leaders across the [PACOM] region have embarked upon conducting assessments with our partners and developing strategies to help them build their NCO development programs inside of their formations.”

To illustrate his point, Clark said his units had just finished an assessment in Cambodia of its army and the Commander, Gen. Mao Sophan, “basically said, ‘Hey, whatever you're asking us to do, we're going to do it because we want to get to a level of proficiency with our Non-Commissioned Officer core that we see in yours.’"

I must point out that during the one-hour-and-thirty-minute session neither General -- Clark nor Brunson -- came near to mentioning President Trump’s repeated critical views about U.S. allies.

The closest anyone came was Dougherty, who at one point said diplomatically, “We'll head into midterm elections here [in the U.S.] in November, obviously as you know, and I think we expect some variation in the political dynamic in the United States, and our allies and partners all navigate their own political changes as well.”

She then added, “If you look over the course of history, however, at least modern history, certainly the United States has invested in those partnerships. And today, we still are -- maybe with a different flavor or a different attitude. And that's not really for me to say. I'm simply observing. But we haven't lost sight of the importance of allies and partners to securing U.S. national interests.”

I would bet Clark and Brunson – along with most U.S. military professionals – would silently agree with her statement.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
F&35 Fallacy: Jets Alone Will Not Save Us https://belimedia.com.ng/f-35-fallacy-jets-alone-will-not-save-us https://belimedia.com.ng/f-35-fallacy-jets-alone-will-not-save-us NATO Allies have bet the future of European skies on the world’s most sophisticated combat aircraft. NATO Allies are buying the world's most advanced fighter but many are neglecting vital investments in hard security, ground crews, and support systems that will keep it flying.

By 2028, European flight lines will host upwards of 700 F-35 Lightning jets. On paper, this inventory represents an insurmountable technological edge: a sensor-fused, fifth-generation fleet that outmatches any potential adversary in radar-cross-section, situational awareness, and electronic attack.

Yet this procurement spree masks a dangerous complacency. The Alliance has poured vast capital into acquiring fifth-generation airframes while systematically underinvesting in the unglamorous terrestrial infrastructure that keeps them flying: base hardening, counter-drone defenses, resilient networks, and ground crews. An F-35 sitting on an unhardened runway without fuel, parts, or secure command links is not a deterrent, it is an expensive target.

The cockpit may deliver tactical lethality, but operational endurance is generated entirely on the tarmac. If conflict erupts with Russia, the fight for European airspace will look less like a sterile, high-tech turkey shoot and more like the grueling attrition of the Battle of Britain.

Surviving Day Zero

Historically, the most efficient method of destroying an air force has rarely been in air-to-air combat; it has been catching it on the ramp. Operation Focus in 1967 wiped out Egypt’s air force before breakfast. Conversely, Ukraine averted immediate disaster in February 2022 because it aggressively dispersed its scarce aircraft and mobile air-defense batteries hours before Russian cruise missiles slammed into permanent garrisons.

Recent innovations have further collapsed the boundary between frontline and rear sanctuary. In June 2025, Ukraine demonstrated the democratization of deep strike with Operation Spiderweb, deploying commercial-style drones smuggled deep into the Russian interior to strike strategic bombers parked in the open. The threat bypassed layered air defense belts entirely; it originated outside the airbase perimeter fence. Coupled with intelligence reports of sabotage devices targeting logistical hubs in Western Europe, such as the attempted strikes near Leipzig, the implication for NATO is clear: rear sanctuary no longer exists.

Russia has studied these dynamics carefully. A coordinated "Day Zero" assault will not rely solely on long-range Iskander or Kalibr barrages. It will combine standoff salvos with covert proxy drone launches, special reconnaissance sabotage, and electromagnetic disruption targeting key airbases before any formal declaration of Article 5. If NATO’s F-35 fleet remains concentrated at sprawling, unhardened hubs, the Alliance risks losing the air war before its pilots can take off.

Survival on Day Zero will not come from a single system. Ground-based air defense will kill aircraft, cruise missiles will crater runways, and drones will hunt anything left in the open. The answer is dispersal, concealment, and resilience, practiced and exercised daily long before the shooting starts.

A Battle of Britain, Not a High-Tech War in the Air

The operational template NATO must internalize is not Desert Storm, but southern England in the summer of 1940. When the Luftwaffe hammered RAF sector stations across Kent and Sussex - cratering Biggin Hill, Manston, and Kenley - the British survived because of an integrated, highly resilient system.

It was not the Spitfire alone that preserved Britain; it was the Dowding System. Radar stations, visual observers, filter rooms, and telephone lines fused intelligence into an actionable operational picture and directed scarce interceptors to precise intercept vectors. Crucially, the system was distributed and made redundant. When individual nodes went dark, the architecture adapted. Meanwhile, exhausted ground crews patched runways and re-armed aircraft under constant threat of bombardment.

NATO faces an analogous network challenge today. The F-35 is a formidable intelligence-collection platform, but its utility plummets if its Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) cannot pass target tracks to legacy fourth-generation fighters, naval surface combatants, or ground-based air defenses under heavy electronic jamming. If a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) is knocked offline, who assumes control of the theater airspace? Without distributed, jam-resistant data architectures and mission command protocols for degraded environments, tactical technological dominance will dissolve into operational paralysis.

Operational Imperatives for NATO Airpower

If NATO intends to build genuine deterrence by denial, member states must balance platform acquisition with systemic survivability across five core areas:

  1. Institutionalize Dispersal and Agile Combat Employment (ACE): Finland and Sweden have long mastered highway-strip operations, rapid turnaround, and camouflage doctrine. These must cease to be High North novelties and become standard operating procedure across all Allied air forces. Peacetime operations must routinely exercise dispersed sortie generation from municipal airports and road networks.
  2. Harden the Perimeter and the Flight Line: Every euro invested in advanced airframes must be matched by funding for base survivability: point-defense against low-altitude UAS, hardened aircraft shelters, mobile arrestor gear, rapid airfield damage repair (RADR) kits, and deep magazines of precision munitions.
  3. Expand Logistics at Strategic Depth: Dispersed operating locations demand rapid logistics and robust aerial refueling capacity. Staging fighters farther from the contact line requires a dramatic expansion of NATO’s multinational tanker fleet and hardened pipeline distribution networks.
  4. Solve the Cross-Domain Data Mesh: Allies must field resilient, low-probability-of-intercept gateways that translate fifth-generation sensor data into common operational pictures accessible to non-stealth assets and ground-based integrated air and missile defense systems. They also need the ability to protect and secure their entire EW spectrum, given the F-35's massive reliance on it.
  5. Re-arm and Re-train the Ground Crew: The maintainer, armorer, and combat engineer are frontline combatants. NATO must equip ground personnel with specialized force-protection capabilities, chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear defense gear, and the cross-training required to generate combat sorties in austere, contested conditions.

The True Cost of Deterrence

Deterrence is not measured by the sophistication of one platform; it is measured by the credible ability to absorb a first strike and generate combat power under fire. Building that credibility requires realistic, high-tempo exercises in harsh weather, degraded communications environments, and austere road bases. It must be under conditions that carry legitimate operational risk and wear on equipment.

Before 1989, this operational friction was the routine cost of doing business in Allied Air Forces Central Europe. The pilots of 1940 earned their place in history, but unheralded mechanics, plotters, and engineers preserved their freedom to fight. As NATO retools for contested collective defense, it must remember that fifth-generation air power is only as resilient as the ground beneath its wheels.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Kids are Alright: U.S. Soft Power, Aid, and Youth in Africa https://belimedia.com.ng/the-kids-are-alright-us-soft-power-aid-and-youth-in-africa https://belimedia.com.ng/the-kids-are-alright-us-soft-power-aid-and-youth-in-africa OPINION — A recent survey of African youth challenges conventional wisdom on foreign aid. Policymakers should take heed of their views as they design the future of U.S. foreign assistance to increase effectiveness and American soft power on the continent.

We ask a lot of our aid to Africa. Over the years, it has saved countless lives from HIV/AIDS and malaria, fed the hungry, stopped pandemics, and increased farmers’ yields. We take it for granted that our good intentions are appreciated by Africans, augmenting American soft power and influence.

Yet, what if those assumptions don’t hold? What if our aid simply did not have the positive reception we thought it did? Today, in the wake of USAID’s shutdown, the entire architecture of foreign aid is under review, with many studies, commissions, and proposals underway. Now would be the time to dig deeper to understand what Africans want from aid. Doing so would help us be more effective and relevant, with the added benefit of increasing American soft power.

In August, the Ichikowitz Family Foundation of South Africa conducted its fourth iteration of the African Youth Survey, the most extensive continent-wide survey of African youth. This year’s survey included questions specifically about USAID cuts, and its findings blow up any illusions we might have had about young Africans feeling hopeless over USAID’s departure.

After 21 years with USAID in places like Uganda and South Sudan, where my focus was out-of-school youth, and a tour as mission director to Somalia that was canceled by USAID’s shutdown, I thought I understood how African youth viewed us. I was wrong. Three findings in particular challenged my preconceptions and provide important lessons as we design the future of U.S. foreign assistance.

Less Than Half Will Miss USAID

The survey was conducted in places that had enormous USAID programs, like Nigeria, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and many others. Yet, only 46% of respondents thought USAID cuts would have a negative impact. Fully 26% saw a positive impact, 16% saw no impact, and 11% did not know.

However, the researchers also commented, “Just over a quarter (26%) take a more optimistic view, believing the closure will force leaders to confront domestic challenges directly.”

This idea was certainly borne out during my Africa tours with USAID. Often, the U.S. budget for health far exceeded the country’s national budget for the sector, allowing the country to direct spending elsewhere, such as Russian-made fighter jets, as happened in Uganda in 2011.

The lesson: Our foreign assistance should be part of a larger bilateral partnership with mutual accountability, where the country must increase its own domestic spending on the sector in tandem with our assistance.

China Is Viewed More Positively Than the U.S., Despite Flaws

When asked about the influence of China and the U.S. on their countries, again, the results are surprising. China is fully ten percentage points ahead of the U.S. regarding whether the influence is positive (95% for China, 85% for the U.S.).

Is this a reaction to the Trump administration? In 2024, results for the same question were similar, with China slightly ahead. However, positive responses for the U.S. actually went up during Trump’s tenure (from 79% in 2024 to 85% in 2026).

Key to this finding is a related one in the 2026 report: 58% of respondents thought that the U.S. would disregard international law to gain access to natural resources. Recent actions like the capture of Nicolás Maduro and asserting ownership over Venezuela’s oil showed a disregard for international law. Respondents may be surmising that the same could apply to African natural resources.

What is astounding about China’s strength on this question is the abundance of evidence that China is highly transactional with its aid recipients, often leaving them indebted and in weaker positions. That was certainly the case with South Sudan’s “Oil for Roads” deal, widely disparaged by locals and diplomats when I served there.

Why aren’t widely known stories like this one reflected in the responses? Emmanuel Kwezi Tabaro, an analyst of the 2026 survey, explained:

“Young Africans are not uninterested in geopolitics, but they appear far more concerned with the practical realities that shape daily life: jobs, infrastructure, economic opportunity and the cost of living. When they think about international partnerships, many are asking less about ideology and more about whether those partnerships will improve their prospects.”

China is seen as meeting youth where they are, which leads to the third finding.

The lesson: With huge youth populations in Africa, increase programs specifically for youth that prepare them for jobs, like training and leadership programs, and adulthood, such as family planning.

It’s the Economy, Stupid

Actually, it’s about jobs. When asked about the biggest threats to African communities, 54% of respondents said unemployment and poverty, not violent crime (20%), gangs (17%), or terrorism (16%). When asked what government priorities should be to improve security, 56% of respondents said job creation for young people, far ahead of military investment (35%) or improvements to policing (29%).

Why are questions about threats and security coming back to jobs? Jihane Cherif, another analyst of the 2026 survey, answered:

“A young person who cannot find work, cannot afford to eat, and cannot see a way forward within the system does not feel protected by a well-equipped police force. They feel abandoned by it.”

The lesson: As in the World Bank’s new strategy, keep a laser focus on the bottom line of job creation for the millions of youth entering the workforce each year.

The Bottom Line

In the great power competition being played out in Africa, we cannot take for granted that our generous assistance will lead to increased positive views of the U.S. This survey shows a rising generation of savvy youth that sees the whole picture of U.S. policy, questions rhetoric, and asks fair questions about the impacts on their lives of billions of dollars of assistance. Hearing their concerns will result not only in more effective aid programs, but also in increased American influence across the continent.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 03 Nov 2026 23:50:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Almaty Tour Packages: Best Time to Visit, Top Attractions and Holiday Experiences https://belimedia.com.ng/Almaty-Tour-Packages-in-Sky-Planet-Holidays https://belimedia.com.ng/Almaty-Tour-Packages-in-Sky-Planet-Holidays Why Almaty Should Be Your Next Holiday Destination

If you are looking for a holiday that feels a little different from the usual beach or city break, Almaty is worth a serious look. Tucked at the foot of the snow-capped Tian Shan mountains in Kazakhstan, this city mixes Soviet-era charm with modern cafes, green parks, and some of the most stunning natural scenery in Central Asia. Whether you love hiking, skiing, local food, or just wandering around a city that still feels undiscovered, Almaty tour packages can give you a holiday that is easy to plan and hard to forget.

In this blog, we will walk you through the best time to visit Almaty, the top attractions you should not miss, and the kind of holiday experiences that make this destination special. By the end, you will have a clear idea of why so many travellers are now choosing Almaty for their next trip and how SkyPlanet Holidays can help you plan it without any stress.

Best Time to Visit Almaty

One of the first things people ask about Almaty tour packages is when to actually go. The honest answer is that it depends on what kind of trip you want, because Almaty has four very distinct seasons and each one offers something different.

Spring (March to May) is a lovely time to visit if you enjoy mild weather and blooming parks. The snow starts melting in the mountains, the city turns green, and the famous apple orchards (Almaty literally means "full of apples") start showing signs of life. It is a quieter season, so prices are usually friendlier too.

Summer (June to August) is the most popular season for sightseeing and outdoor activities. The weather is warm, days are long, and hiking trails like Big Almaty Lake and Kok Tobe Hill are at their best. If your holiday plan includes trekking or exploring the mountains around the city, summer is hard to beat.

Autumn (September to November) is often called the most photogenic season. The trees turn gold and red, the air is crisp, and the crowds thin out. This is a great choice if you want a relaxed holiday with fewer tourists and pleasant temperatures.

Winter (December to February) turns Almaty into a proper ski destination. Shymbulak, one of the best ski resorts in Central Asia, sits just a short cable car ride from the city centre. If skiing or snowboarding is on your bucket list, this is when to book your Almaty holiday package.

Overall, late spring to early autumn (May to September) is considered the best time to visit Almaty for general sightseeing, while winter is ideal for snow lovers. Whatever season you choose, it helps to check the weather closer to your travel dates and pack accordingly.

Top Attractions in Almaty You Should Not Miss

Almaty is not a city you rush through, and most Almaty tour packages are built around giving you enough time at each of these spots.

Kok Tobe Hill is usually the first stop for visitors, and for good reason. A cable car takes you up to this hilltop park, where you get a sweeping view of the entire city with the mountains as a backdrop. There is also a small amusement park and a few cafes if you want to relax after the ride.

Big Almaty Lake is a short drive from the city but feels like a completely different world. The lake changes colour depending on the season and the light, from turquoise to deep blue, and it is surrounded by untouched mountain scenery. It is one of the top attractions in Almaty for anyone who enjoys nature and photography.

Shymbulak Ski Resort is not just for winter sports. Even in summer, you can take the cable car up for cool mountain air and great hiking trails. In winter, it becomes one of the main reasons people choose an Almaty holiday package in the first place.

Central State Museum and Zenkov Cathedral give you a dose of culture and history. The cathedral, built entirely of wood without a single nail, is one of the tallest wooden buildings in the world and sits inside the peaceful Panfilov Park.

Green Bazaar is where you get the real flavour of local life. This busy indoor market sells everything from dried fruits and nuts to traditional Kazakh sweets, and it is a great place to pick up souvenirs or just people-watch.

Charyn Canyon, while a bit further out, is often included in longer Almaty tour packages because it is simply too impressive to skip. Sometimes compared to a smaller Grand Canyon, its red rock formations make for one of the most memorable day trips in the region.

Holiday Experiences That Make Almaty Special

Beyond the sightseeing, it is the overall experience that makes travellers come back to Almaty again. Here is what a well-planned Almaty holiday package usually includes.

Mountain trekking and nature walks are a big draw. With the Tian Shan range right at the city's doorstep, you do not need to travel far to feel completely surrounded by nature. Trails near Big Almaty Lake and Medeu are suitable for both casual walkers and serious hikers.

Local food experiences are something you should not skip. Kazakh cuisine is hearty and full of flavour, with dishes like beshbarmak, plov, and fresh baursak bread. Trying these at a local restaurant or even a home-style eatery adds a lot to the holiday experience.

Skating and skiing at Medeu and Shymbulak are unique experiences that few other Central Asian cities can offer. Medeu is the highest-altitude skating rink in the world, and it is open to visitors for a fun few hours on the ice.

Cultural immersion through museums, old Soviet architecture, and friendly locals gives the trip a deeper meaning beyond just photos. Almaty has a laid-back, welcoming vibe that makes it easy for first-time visitors to settle in quickly.

Day trips to Charyn Canyon or Kolsai Lakes turn a city holiday into a proper adventure, with dramatic landscapes that feel worlds away from everyday life.

When these experiences are bundled into one well-planned Almaty tour package, you get a holiday that balances relaxation, adventure, and culture, without the stress of figuring out logistics on your own.

Final Thoughts

Almaty is one of those destinations that quietly surprises you. Between the mountain views, the rich culture, the local food, and the mix of adventure and relaxation it offers, it is easy to see why more travellers are adding it to their holiday list. Whether you visit in the blooming spring, the lively summer, the golden autumn, or the snowy winter, there is always a good reason to pack your bags and head to this beautiful city.

If you are planning your trip, SkyPlanet Holidays can take the guesswork out of it. From choosing the right Almaty tour package for your travel dates to arranging hotels, local transport, and guided sightseeing at the top attractions mentioned above, our team puts together holiday experiences that are smooth, well-timed, and genuinely enjoyable. Get in touch with SkyPlanet Holidays today and let us help you plan an Almaty holiday you will talk about for years.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. What is the best time to visit Almaty? 

Late spring to early autumn (May to September) is best for general sightseeing and hiking, while December to February is ideal if you want to ski at Shymbulak or skate at Medeu.

2. How many days are enough for an Almaty holiday package? 

Most travellers enjoy Almaty comfortably in 4 to 6 days, which allows time for city sightseeing, a day trip to Big Almaty Lake, and either Charyn Canyon or the ski resorts, depending on the season.

3. Is Almaty a good destination for families? 

Yes. Almaty offers a mix of easy sightseeing, parks, cable car rides, and gentle nature walks that work well for both kids and elders, along with more adventurous options for older travellers.

4. Do I need a visa to visit Almaty? 

Visa rules vary by nationality, so it is best to check Kazakhstan's current visa policy for your country before booking. SkyPlanet Holidays can guide you through the latest requirements as part of your tour package.

5. What should I pack for an Almaty trip? 

This depends on the season. Summer needs light layers and comfortable walking shoes, while winter trips require heavy jackets, gloves, and proper snow gear if you plan to ski.

6. Can SkyPlanet Holidays customise an Almaty tour package? 

Yes. SkyPlanet Holidays offers customisable Almaty holiday packages based on your travel dates, budget, and interests, whether you prefer a relaxed cultural trip or an adventure-packed itinerary.

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Wed, 28 Oct 2026 08:47:29 +0100 Gopi Krishnan
Singapore and Malaysia Tour Packages: Explore Singapore City and Malaysia's Top Destinations https://belimedia.com.ng/Singapore-and-Malaysia-Tour-Packages https://belimedia.com.ng/Singapore-and-Malaysia-Tour-Packages Planning a trip to Southeast Asia? Singapore and Malaysia tour packages are one of the smartest ways to see two amazing countries in a single holiday. These two neighbours sit so close together that you can easily mix a glittering city break in Singapore with the rainforests, hill stations, and beaches of Malaysia, all in one trip.

Whether you are travelling with family, planning a honeymoon, or just want a relaxed vacation with friends, a Singapore-Malaysia holiday package gives you the best of both worlds. You get futuristic skylines, world-class shopping, and iconic landmarks in Singapore, and then a complete change of pace with Malaysia's colourful culture, street food, and natural beauty. In this blog, we will walk you through the top destinations to visit, why this combo trip is worth it, and how to plan the perfect Singapore-Malaysia tour.

Why Choose Singapore and Malaysia Tour Packages

There are plenty of reasons why travellers love booking Singapore Malaysia tour packages instead of visiting each country on its own.

  • Two countries, one visa-friendly route – Singapore and Malaysia are connected by road, rail, and short flights, so moving between the two is quick and hassle-free.

  • Value for money – A combined package usually works out cheaper than booking flights, hotels, and transfers separately for two trips.

  • Something for everyone – Singapore is clean, modern, and family-friendly, while Malaysia offers adventure, nature, and a slower, laid-back vibe.

  • Short travel time – The distance between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur or Johor Bahru is small, so you don't lose a whole day just getting from one place to another.

  • Ready-made itineraries – A good tour operator takes care of hotels, transport, and sightseeing, so you can simply relax and enjoy the holiday.

This mix of convenience, affordability, and variety is exactly why Malaysia tour packages combined with Singapore have become so popular among Indian travellers.

Explore Singapore City: Top Places to Visit

A Singapore city tour is usually the highlight of the trip. The city is compact, safe, and easy to get around, so you can cover a lot in just a few days.

  • Gardens by the Bay – Walk among the giant Supertrees, lit up at night with a sound and light show, and step inside the Flower Dome and Cloud Forest.

  • Marina Bay Sands – Visit the SkyPark for sweeping views of the skyline and catch the Spectra light and water show by the bay in the evening.

  • Sentosa Island – A fun-filled island with Universal Studios Singapore, S.E.A. Aquarium, and beautiful beaches, perfect for families and couples alike.

  • Universal Studios Singapore – Ride thrilling attractions and meet favourite movie characters, a must for anyone travelling with kids.

  • Singapore Zoo and Night Safari – Get close to animals in naturalistic habitats, including a one-of-a-kind night safari experience.

  • Orchard Road – Singapore's famous shopping street, lined with malls, boutiques, and restaurants for every budget.

  • Chinatown and Little India – Colourful streets packed with temples, street food, and local markets that show the city's cultural mix.

These spots make any Singapore city tour feel complete, blending modern attractions with culture and local flavour.

Malaysia's Top Destinations to Add to Your Itinerary

Once you cross over into Malaysia, the pace and scenery change completely. Good Malaysia tour packages usually cover a mix of city life, hill stations, and island or nature escapes.

  • Kuala Lumpur – Home to the iconic Petronas Twin Towers, the KL Tower, and buzzing night markets like Jalan Alor for street food lovers.

  • Genting Highlands – A hill resort known for its cool weather, theme parks, and casino, reached by a scenic cable car ride.

  • Malacca (Melaka) – A UNESCO World Heritage town with colourful streets, old forts, and a rich mix of Portuguese, Dutch, and Chinese history.

  • Langkawi – A tropical island with the famous Sky Bridge, duty-free shopping, and relaxed beaches, ideal for honeymooners.

  • Penang – Known as Malaysia's food capital, with street art in George Town and some of the best local dishes in the country.

  • Cameron Highlands – Rolling tea plantations and a cool, misty climate, great for a peaceful break from city sightseeing.

From skyscrapers to tea gardens and island beaches, Malaysia's top destinations give your trip a nice balance after the fast pace of Singapore.

What Makes a Good Singapore and Malaysia Tour Package

Not all tour packages are built the same, so it helps to know what to actually look for before you book.

  • A well-planned route – The best itineraries avoid backtracking and group nearby attractions together, so you spend less time travelling and more time exploring.

  • Verified hotels and local guides – Stay in properties that are checked for safety and comfort, and travel with guides who know the local culture, language, and hidden gems.

  • Flexible plans – A good package can be adjusted for families, couples, solo travellers, or groups, instead of forcing everyone into the same fixed schedule.

  • Clear inclusions – Transfers, entry tickets, meals, and sightseeing should be spelt out clearly so there are no surprise costs once you land.

  • Real traveller feedback – Packages built on years of actual traveller experience tend to avoid common mistakes, like overcrowded schedules or missed must-see spots.

These are the small details that separate an average trip from a smooth, memorable one, and they come from working with a travel partner who genuinely understands both Singapore and Malaysia.

Planning Your Singapore-Malaysia Trip: Quick Tips

  • Best time to visit – Both countries are warm all year, but it's best to avoid heavy monsoon months if you want more outdoor time.

  • Ideal trip length – 6 to 8 days works well, with around 3-4 days in Singapore and the rest in Malaysia.

  • Currency – Singapore uses the Singapore Dollar (SGD), and Malaysia uses the Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), so carry a bit of both or use cards where possible.

  • Local transport – Singapore's MRT is simple to use, while Malaysia is easier to explore with private transfers or guided tours, especially between cities.

  • Packing – Light, breathable clothing works best, along with a light jacket for air-conditioned malls and cooler hill stations like Genting or the Cameron Highlands.

A little planning ahead goes a long way in making sure your Singapore and Malaysia tour runs smoothly from start to finish.

Final Thoughts

A trip that covers Singapore city and Malaysia's top destinations gives you two very different travel experiences in one go: the polish and energy of a world-class city, followed by the natural beauty and charm of Malaysia's hills, islands, and heritage towns. It's a combination that suits first-time travellers and repeat visitors alike.

If you're ready to book your own Singapore and Malaysia tour package, SkyPlanet Holidays can help you plan every part of the journey, from flights and hotels to sightseeing and local transfers. With well-designed itineraries and support throughout your trip, SkyPlanet Holidays makes it easy to enjoy both countries without the stress of planning it all yourself. Get in touch with SkyPlanet Holidays today and turn your Singapore-Malaysia holiday into a trip you'll talk about for years.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. How many days are enough for a Singapore and Malaysia tour? Most travellers find 6 to 8 days enough to cover the key highlights of both countries without rushing. You can extend it if you want more time in Malaysia's hill stations or islands.

2. Is it easy to travel between Singapore and Malaysia? Yes. The two countries are connected by road, rail, and short flights, and the border crossing is simple when you're on an organised tour.

3. What is the best time of year to visit Singapore and Malaysia? Both destinations can be visited year-round, but it's better to avoid the heaviest monsoon months if you want to enjoy more outdoor activities.

4. Are Singapore-Malaysia tour packages suitable for families with kids? Yes, very much so. Singapore's Universal Studios, Zoo, and Sentosa Island, along with Malaysia's Genting Highlands, are all great choices for family travel.

5. What is usually included in a Singapore and Malaysia holiday package? Most packages include hotel stays, airport and local transfers, sightseeing tours, and entry tickets to major attractions. It's always best to check the inclusions before booking.

6. Why should I book my Singapore-Malaysia tour with SkyPlanet Holidays? SkyPlanet Holidays offers well-planned itineraries, verified hotels, and dedicated support throughout your trip, making it easier to enjoy a stress-free holiday across both countries

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Wed, 21 Oct 2026 06:43:28 +0100 Gopi Krishnan
The Next War of Attrition is in Yemen https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-war-of-attrition-is-in-yemen https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-war-of-attrition-is-in-yemen Battlefield dynamics in Yemen shift quickly, but Houthi aims do not. A movement organized around radical ideology and perpetual conflict now shares a border with a state organized around modernization and prosperity. Saudi Arabia and the Houthis both have formidable but very different military capabilities, and neither can force a quick decision on the other. That is the recipe for a long war of attrition. The closest precedent is the war in Ukraine, to which the Yemen war is increasingly linked, and which may be instructive for the Kingdom on how best to prepare.

There is also a parallel to be made with the related conflict between Iran and the United States, the fallout from which has severely affected the GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia. Essentially, we are witnessing the leverage of a lesser military force when that party has a much higher threshold for pain and disruption than the stronger party. Iran and the Houthis are both betting that the Saudis are sufficiently anxious to hold on to their peaceful model of business, tourism, energy and investment to settle at almost any price and end the present conflict.

The Houthi mindset

The Houthi ideological program is anti-Saudi, anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-democratic, anti-liberal and antisemitic. It has long cast the Saudi monarchy as an American-Israeli puppet unworthy of the title Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Some of this is personal: The father of Abdelmalek al-Houthi, the group's leader, clashed for years with Saudi-backed clerics and was rumored to have been targeted for assassination at their behest.

But the grievances against the Kingdom also has a territorial dimension. In the 1934 Treaty of Taif,

Imam Yahya of northern Yemen settled the border with the Saudi state and ceded Jizan, Asir, and Najran provinces. The Houthis, who present themselves somewhat ambiguously as heirs to the imamate, have revived claims to all three provinces. The purpose is to stoke resentment of the Saudis and to leave the Kingdom's southern border unsettled. This territorial dimension intersects with the allegation that the Saudis are not fit to control Mecca and Medina: Abdelmalik recently reiterated that Mecca belongs to the Islamic Umma, rather than being a province of Saudi Arabia. The Houthis implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – claim the whole of the southern half of the Arabian Peninsula, “from Mecca to Mahra”.

The deeper reason the Houthis cannot stop is structural. The Houthis depend on mobilization, and for a movement of that kind peace is a threat rather than a reward. Conflict is what holds the project together, as it justifies extracting resources from an impoverished population, excuses unpaid salaries and collapsed services, and lets the security apparatus treat every critic as a collaborator. For a deeply unpopular regime, war with Saudi Arabia and its local Yemeni partners is the most useful conflict available and could yield significant returns if the Houthis can extract concessions at the negotiating table. It was already clear during Ambassador Fitton-Brown’s period of responsibility for Yemen that the perverse incentives of the war economy meant that Houthi negotiator Muhammad Abdelsalam was viewed with suspicion by Houthi field commanders, who were benefitting from the war economy and associated “respect”, and had no interest in being transformed into administrators with responsibility to balance their power.

The Houthi menu

The Houthis approach is predatory: isolate each victim and deal with it alone. They pursue bilateral deals that peel off potential adversaries, and calibrate each attack so the victim would conclude that a limited response is cheaper than a sustained one. They have cultivated the sense that they are somebody else's problem, Israel's when they fire missiles at Eilat, Riyadh's when they strike Abha, etc. A decade on, the Houthis have have attacked many different states, and yet no one has owned the problem.

It is troubling that US negotiators have recently sat with the Houthis in Muscat and apparently taken at face value Houthi assurances that their quarrel is only with the Saudis, not with American – or even the Israelis! All this while threatening the US economy and risking the lives of US nationals at civilian infrastructure in the Kingdom.

In the current round of fighting, the Houthis have three key options for escalation.

The first is domestic expansion within Yemen. It is the least risky for the regime because it stays within a conflict the world has learned to ignore. New territory brings new populations to tax, new ports and crossings to control, and new momentum to display at home. The drawback is that this also pushes the Zaidi Houthis deeper and deeper into Shafa’I (Sunni) territory, where the population is hostile to their agenda.

The second option is maritime. Attacks on commercial vessels and Saudi tankers in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab inflict harm, especially in the economic realm, and they are extremely difficult to deter and defend against. The drawback is that shipping is a global interest, albeit somewhat elastic, and so a sustained campaign against it may invite the involvement of states with maritime commercial interests that would otherwise stay out of a Saudi-Houthi war. It also, by violating the Law of the Sea, provides an unimpeachable legal basis to build an international military coalition against them.

The third option, targeting civilian aviation, is the riskiest. A recent Houthi attack, on October 10, killed at least twelve people in the deadliest attack on the Kingdom in more than a decade. One US national was among the dead. The strikes came with a threat to airlines, "for the last time," to stay out of Saudi airspace. This type of attack is probably the most likely to galvanize an international coalition and demonstrates that the Houthis have an extremely high appetite for risk.

The Houthis are testing how far they can take this. Downing a passenger aircraft would almost certainly bring the overwhelming response, including direct American strikes, that the Houthis have spent recent decades seeking to avoid (albeit with an imperfect record). The threat alone can inflict some damage to Saudi Arabia, so the threats will continue. Whether the Houthis will continue or even take escalation in this realm even further will depend on whether they believe anyone would make them pay.

The wars are already connected

It might be tempting to treat the Russia-Ukraine and Houthi-Saudi comparison as merely illustrative, but the two wars are materially linked in both directions.

Russia’s involvement with the Houthis is the most direct link thus far. By mid-2024, Russia had recruited hundreds, possibly even thousands, of Yemeni men for the Ukrainian front through a Houthi-linked network operating out of Oman. Also, during the Houthi Red Sea campaign of 2023 to 2025, Russia reportedly passed satellite targeting data to the Houthis. And the Shahed-136 that Iran supplied to Russia, which Russia now mass-produces and improved upon, belongs to the same family of weapon the Houthis fire at Saudi infrastructure. Russian innovation may yet flow back through Tehran to Sanaa.

Russia’s public posture toward the Houthi problem has been one of ostensible concern. In September, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called Houthi attacks on Saudi civilian targets “unacceptable,” and President Putin and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman discussed freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab by phone. Riyadh should not mistake this for neutrality: Moscow treats the Houthis as a pawn in a larger game.

The mechanism is not complicated. A crisis on the Arabian Peninsula drains Western attention and, perhaps more importantly, Western munitions. In late March, the Pentagon was reported to be weighing whether to divert air defense interceptors bought for Ukraine to the Middle East, because the war with Iran was straining stocks of critical American munitions. This is the outcome Moscow has been working toward since it abstained on the 2015 arms embargo against the Houthis and then spent a decade obstructing the UN panel that documented its violations. Russia does not need the Houthis to win; it needs them to keep fighting. It makes a similar calculation over supporting continuing Iranian resistance to the Americans.

The link is starting to run the other way too. Kyiv’s growing ties with Saudi Arabia are more recent but no less consequential. On March 27, the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement centered on counter-drone expertise. More than two hundred Ukrainian anti-drone specialists are now deployed in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and Riyadh is reportedly negotiating a large purchase of Ukrainian interceptor drones that cost between one and three thousand dollars each. Until recently Riyadh was deepening ties with Moscow through OPEC+ and BRICS, and yet it is now importing Ukrainian expertise to defend against weapons Moscow helped perfect.

Saudi Arabia's dilemma

As in Eastern Europe, no quick decision is likely in the Saudi-Houthi conflict. The Houthis cannot be bombed out of Sanaa, as the coalition learned between 2015 and 2022. While the Yemeni government’s counteroffensive along the coast has stabilized the front and claimed gains around Mokha, it remains a long way from the capital. That leaves Riyadh with three paths, none of them are likely to be easy.

The first is appeasement, which would feed the movement. Since June, the Houthis have demanded a deal that lifts the blockade on their ports and airports and restores the flow of cash into Sanaa. Such a deal would ease the regime’s revenue crisis and pay for its next tranche of weapons. The Kingdom tried a version of this approach after 2022, and the result is the war it is fighting now.

The second is deterrence, which fails against an adversary that seeks out perpetual conflict. Deterrence assumes an enemy that weighs costs and benefits in measurements that the Saudis understand, and that appears not to be the case. For a movement like the Houthis whose legitimacy rests on “resistance,” conflict is not only a hazard but also a realization of an extremist aspiration.

The third is defeating the Houthis outright, which means returning to a war Saudi Arabia already fought and abandoned. A strategy that could succeed does exist: cut Houthi supply lines of cash and other material while backing a unified Yemeni ground campaign under a single command. But this will require sustained pressure over time in order to crack the Houthi defenses and then ultimately the regime.

Attrition, then, is the most reasonable path forward. The question is not whether Saudi Arabia will be in a long war but whether it will be prepared for one. Attrition is survivable for the side that innovates and devastating for the side that assumes the war will end in a quick and decisive maneuver. The length of the war also introduces uncertainties about changes in the posture of allies, especially the US. There is a need to bake in bipartisan agreement in Washington, DC, that it is a US national security interest to ensure that the Saudis, and the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen, and the Law of the Sea prevail in this conflict.

Two Ukrainian lessons

Ukraine survived attrition against a far larger adversary for two reasons, and both apply to Riyadh.

The first is adaptation. It built a drone industry from almost nothing into one producing millions of systems a year, fielded interceptor drones costing a small fraction of a Patriot missile, and compressed production and procurement timelines.

The Saudi-Ukranian March agreement imports some of that expertise but may not necessarily transfer all of the knowledge necessary to built its own industry. A defense that depends on imports from a country at war is precarious at the best of times.

Riyadh has the money and the stated intent, and Vision 2030 set a goal of localizing half of military spending by the end of the decade. But localization so far has meant licensed assembly of foreign designs rather than innovation under fire. The Kingdom has not reached a wartime tempo in which a new counter-drone system is conceived, tested against live Houthi attacks, and fielded within weeks. That is the capability Ukraine built and Saudi Arabia lacks.

The second lesson is diplomatic. Ukraine did not survive alone. It built a coalition of dozens of states that supplied weapons, trained its forces, financed its budget, and shared intelligence. For the Houthis, a coalition of this kind is the worst possible development, and it is exactly what their strategy of isolating victims and claiming false symmetry is meant to prevent.

The current war gives Riyadh the chance to build one, but the pieces remain fragmented. Ukraine's example is that a coalition does not assemble itself. It must be rallied, placed under a single command, and given a shared objective beyond absorbing attacks. The Houthis' own escalation, which has now killed citizens of a dozen countries at a single airport, is doing part of that work for Riyadh. The Kingdom's task is to turn condemnation into commitment before the moment passes.

So what would this coalition look like? The Saudis already have a maritime group of 14 that opposes Houthi blackmail against them in the Red Sea. But the US, UAE, UK and the other European powers are not part of it. With US leadership and assistance, this needs to be remedied. This is achievable, on the basis of three compelling legal bases: enforcement of the Law of the Sea; the legitimacy of the Yemeni government (and illegitimacy of the Houthis); and the legitimate defense and self-defense of Saudi Arabia.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 19 Oct 2026 10:48:50 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Soviet Roots of Russia’s Modern Disinformation War https://belimedia.com.ng/the-soviet-roots-of-russias-modern-disinformation-war https://belimedia.com.ng/the-soviet-roots-of-russias-modern-disinformation-war Anti-Semitism, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. pronounced while repudiating an anti-Israel resolution adopted at the 1967 National Conference for New Politics, is “immoral.” Accordingly, the civil rights leader would surely have been dismayed at the prevalence of that age-old prejudice in the wake of the barbarous October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel. Nor would he necessarily have accepted the cynical camouflaging of anti-Jewish prejudice as “anti-Zionism.” At an October 1967 dinner, according to sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset’s later eyewitness account, King rebuked a student: “When people criticize Zionists, they mean Jews. You’re talking anti-Semitism!”

Moreover, Dr. King saw the fight against that age-old hatred as congruent with the civil rights struggle. In a June 1965 message, he wrote, “We deplore anti-Semitism as we deplore discrimination and segregation in Mississippi and Alabama." Given his awareness of Soviet intelligence attempts to discredit him by portraying him as an “Uncle Tom” secretly receiving U.S. government subsidies, King might also have recognized the pattern identified by the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center: after October 7, the Kremlin fanned “the flames of antisemitism” while seeking to “discredit, divide, and weaken” its adversaries, particularly the United States.

It was not surprising that members of the so-called “Axis of Autocracies”—united by a common antipathy toward the United States—would mount influence operations aimed at exploiting that awful day. China, for its part, seeks to portray the United States as a violent, racist, politically riven, dysfunctional, declining power. As part of a state-linked operation, Chinese actors pretending to be Americans have leveraged divisive issues—including the Israel-Hamas war—to portray the United States as a country with weakleadership and a failing political system. This covert messaging campaign has been augmented by the distribution of more inflammatory material—including provocative memes and AI-generated images—on Western-facing Chinese diplomatic and state-affiliated accounts.

Iran has been much less subtle in its post-October 7 influence operations. Iranian actors have deployed fake personas, sock-puppet networks, hacked material, and cyber operations designed to support Hamas and discredit Israel. Neither the tone nor the aggressiveness of those actions is unexpected, given that Tehran’s ideological messaging—in accord with that of its terrorist proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis—has long been premised on cries of “death” to the “Great” and “Little” Satans. Publicly available information does not establish that Moscow, Beijing, or Tehran created, directs, or controls the broader movement being advanced by an unholy coalition of the radical left and Islamists. Those governments have, however, identified and amplified real divisions in American society, often injecting poisonous content into them.

Of the latter-day Axis states, Russia has been especially forceful in its post-October 7 influence operations. After Hamas’s attack, Russian state media and Russia-linked covert networks rapidly exploited the war to promote anti-American themes and exacerbate tensions among the parties. Russian actors circulated manipulated videos and false stories, including fabricated claims that Ukraine had supplied Hamas with Western weapons. Some material was deliberately designed toresemble reporting from legitimate Western media. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), in 2024 the Russian government directed a “Doppelganger” influence operation that used fake personas, paid advertisements, fabricated media brands, and websites designed to impersonate legitimate U.S. news organizations; internal planning documents also contemplated AI-generated content. The operation’s goals included sowing division inside the United States, weakening support for U.S. foreign policy, and underminingAmerican relationships with allies, including Israel.

Russian intelligence services and Kremlin-directed influence organizations clearly regard anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist, and Israel-related polarization as exploitable American vulnerabilities and have demonstrated the capability and intent to amplify such divisions. Moscow has taken a pro-Palestinian position on the Israel-Hamas war while promoting conspiracy theories, ethnic tensions, and politically inflammatory narratives. Russian messaging fuels American domestic discord by hammering home claims—such as “Zionists control Washington”—that appeal to parts of the far left, far right, and isolationist middle. It also seeks to reinforce pernicious narratives that the United States causes instability; that its position on Israel exposes Western hypocrisy; that Ukraine and Israel receive Washington’s support while Americans suffer at home; and that the United States cannot be trusted asan honest broker in international affairs.

That the operational methodology Russia employs in pursuit of these goals reflects Moscow’s long-standing “active measures” (‘aktivnyye meropriyatiya’) doctrine—identifying divisions, entering debates through apparently legitimate accounts, intensifying antagonism, encouraging opposing groups to distrust one another, and thereby weakening social cohesion—is no accident. Like many Russian intelligence operations, Moscow’s current active-measures program has roots in the Soviet era. After Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, the KGB’s Service A intensified an anti-Israel active-measures campaign that has echoes today. Cold War Romanian intelligence officer Ion Mihai Pacepa later described part of that campaign as “Operation SIG,” intended to undermine support for Israel, damage U.S. influence in the Middle East, and widen the political divide between Washingtonand the Arab and Muslim worlds.

According to Pacepa, “SIG”—derived from the Russian phrase for “Zionist Governments” (‘sionistskoye gosudarstvo’)—was a clandestine propaganda and disinformation effort directed against Israel and its principal supporter, the United States. After Soviet-aligned Arab states were soundly defeated on the battlefield, Moscow sought to reframe the Middle East conflict, portraying Israel not simply as an Arab adversary but as an imperialist, colonialist, and racist extension of American power. Pacepa attributed to KGB chief Yuri V. Andropov the statement that the KGB “needed to instill a Nazi-style hatred for the Jews throughout the Islamic world.” The instruments available to Service A for clandestinely disseminating this theme included forged documents, front organizations, agents of influence, covert political support, and manipulation of foreign media. According to Pacepa’s account, those tools were used to place stories in sympathetic or controlled media, circulate inflammatory literature, exploit existing anti-Semitic material, provide covert assistance to organizations capable of repeating Soviet themes, and amplify them through Soviet-bloc and developing-world media.

Operation SIG sought to establish several mutually reinforcing propositions: that Israel was an illegitimate imperialist, colonialist state; that Zionism was inherently racist; that Israel and the United States constituted a single strategic enemy; and that the Palestinian struggle formed part of a worldwide “national liberation” movement. Indeed, according to KGB foreign-intelligence archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, “Zionism was second only to the United States (‘the Main Adversary’) as a target for KGB active measures.” As with other active measures, success could come from polarization, repetition, and erosion of confidence in an adversary’s motives, thereby improving Moscow’s geopolitical standing and influence. This constituted less a single disinformation story than a sustained campaign that developed and clandestinely circulated a narrative, placing it through ostensibly independent sources, encouraging sympathetic organizations to repeat it, and relying on repetition to confer apparent legitimacy. The objective was not necessarily to persuade audiences to accept every assertion. Rather, it was to establish a narrative that undermined the American position in the Middle East by portraying Washington as incapable of acting independently of Israel.

There is a striking thematic resemblance between several narratives promulgated by Operation SIG and rhetoric now used by some far-left, revolutionary socialist, anti-Zionist (a euphemism for raw anti-Semitism), and Islamist activists in the United States. The resemblance is reflected in a number of fallacious, often contradictory propositions: Zionism equals racism; Israel is a settler-colonial state; Zionism is tied to fascism; Israel is an instrument of American imperialism; “Zionists” control U.S. policymaking; Israel is an imperialist outpost; the United States and Israel constitute a single oppressive system; and violent Palestinian or Iranian-aligned “resistance” is part of a broader anti-imperialist struggle. This does not mean that Moscow controls today’s American protest movement.

What is, however, demonstrably true is that the recycling of an ideological vocabulary—albeit with the mendacious substitution of the label word “Zionist” for “Jew”—that Soviet active measures spent decades promoting internationally lives on in that movement and the language it employs. Operation SIG is illustrative of a fundamental principle of Soviet disinformation that continues in Russian operations today: Do not manufacture a grievance when an authentic grievance can be weaponized. The most effective active measure rarely invents an issue from nothing. It identifies a genuine conflict or prejudice and then manipulates, radicalizes, and internationalizes it.

Apart from the deliberate perversion of the historical significance of the Holocaust with the antithetical assertion that Israel’s justifiable response against those who conceived, directed, and participated in the heinous October 7 attack constitutes genocide, the chief difference between what the KGB did in SIG and what Russian intelligence is doing today is the speed with which disinformation and propaganda can now be created and disseminated. Whereas the KGB of the 1970s needed agents of influence, front organizations, controlled newspapers, forgeries, clandestine payments, friendly Communist parties, and sympathetic journalists willing to place stories that could take months to prepare and be circulated widely enough to have an impact, its Russian successors can utilize social media, fake Americans, AI-generated photographs, deep-fakes, bot networks, controlled influencers, and algorithmic amplification to spread disinformation themes at scale in a matter of hours.

In so doing, Russian intelligence systematically takes the most incendiary versions of American political arguments and makes them appear more popular, more widespread, and more authentic than they really are. The originating intelligence service no longer needs to control the narrative. Once an ideological concept becomes embedded in political culture, an active measures operation can become self-sustaining as genuine activists reproduce it voluntarily.

Building on Operation SIG, our adversaries are turning our democratic system inside out by using against us the freedom of speech we value and that is anathema to them. To those who argue today—as they did in his day—that the enlightened and anti-racist could not succumb to anti-Jewish prejudice, George Orwell had a rejoinder. “People of left opinions,” he wrote in 1945, “are not immune to it.” Revolutionary Marxists, progressive anti-colonial activists, Palestinian nationalists, and some imported Islamist or Iranian-aligned activists are converging around a common concept: “Anti-imperialism.” Organizations whose underlying ideologies would otherwise appear incompatible are united by hatred for the U.S., its democratic ideals, and its history. They also share a very thinly veiled anti-Semitic worldview and a common desire to destroy Western civilization.

In his landmark 1963 Letter from Birmingham Jail, Dr. King reminded us that "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” and that “We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.” Although those words addressed the evil of segregation, King later explicitly invoked the Holocaust in the same letter. Explaining the distinction between law and justice, he observed that Nazi persecution was carried out under German law, whereas resistance to it was illegal. He then declared, “Had I lived in Germany at the time, I would have aided and comforted my Jewish brothers.”

King’s words provide an appropriate warning for our own time. The lesson of Operation SIG is not that Moscow created anti-Semitism or the political divisions concerning Israel, but that an adversary can identify such divisions, sharpen them, legitimize their most poisonous expressions, and ultimately induce others to propagate them voluntarily. What once required the KGB years of painstaking active measures can now be accomplished—and amplified globally—in hours. In such a milieu, Orwellian inversions of the truth can be made to appear more plausible for the very simple reason that they are delivered to target audiences before any countervailing argument can be mustered.

The danger, therefore, lies not simply in Russian, Chinese, or Iranian disinformation, but in our willingness to become its unwitting agents of influence. A democratic society cannot defeat foreign propaganda by abandoning the freedoms that distinguish it from its adversaries. It can, however, recognize when old prejudices have been repackaged in fashionable political language and refuse to lend them legitimacy. King understood that anti-Semitism was not made less immoral by the ideology in which it was cloaked. Nearly sixty years later, that remains a lesson worth remembering.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 19 Oct 2026 10:48:50 +0100 FirstHandNews
Who Really Makes Decisions in Tehran? https://belimedia.com.ng/who-really-makes-decisions-in-tehran https://belimedia.com.ng/who-really-makes-decisions-in-tehran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death led to greater decentralization of the regime and a more collective, securitized decision-making system. In Iran today, authority is distributed across several actors and groups, in which the military-security network has gained disproportionate agenda-setting power.

There has been much speculation about how decisions are made in Iran following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. There has been a diffusion of power since his demise and the elevation of his son Mojtaba Khamenei as his successor. To understand current leadership dynamics in Tehran, there are three overlapping levels to consider: individuals, institutions, and networks. Increasingly, they all operate around one overriding concern: regime survival.

The result is the transformation of the Islamic Republic from a more personalized leadership at the end of Ali Khamenei’s rule to a more security- and military-centered form of collective leadership. While certain individuals are on display, institutions still organize and implement decisions. Crucially, a network of power shapes and provides policy choices for decision-making. Because of war and instability, the security and military network has ultimately become the most powerful among others.

At the first level of decision-making stands individuals. When Ali Khamenei was alive, he was the final arbiter on matters of strategy and policy. After his death, power has become more diffuse. This is especially true given that his son and successor Mojtaba Khamenei has been neither seen nor heard from since his elevation as supreme leader. This has left the Iranian system releasing old archival images of Mojtaba Khamenei, written statements, and in one case a purportedly handwritten note to the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force to create the impression that he is in charge.

Additionally, Iranian officials like President Masoud Pezeshkian have recounted only a few hours-long meetings with the new supreme leader, which are hard to verify. Other regime figures like Mojtaba Khamenei’s mother-in-law have insisted he was present at the burial of his father despite no videographic or photographic evidence that he was there. A clerical speaker at one recent nighttime rally in Tehran recently suggested the new supreme leader was at the rally just 30 minutes before he spoke.

Despite these attempts to portray Mojtaba as in command, already, reports have circulated of demoralization among the Islamic Republic’s core base in Iran with a supreme leader who is absent from public view. This is a sea change in the way Iran has operated since 1979. An accessible and visible supreme leader always served as the glue which held the Iranian establishment together. Ali Khamenei was a regular presence on state television—and Iranian officials often interpreted his public remarks as directives. Today with Mojtaba Khamenei absent, this is growing more difficult and has added confusion. As one former IRGC officer recently told Iran Wire, “now, if Mr. Mojtaba issues an order, it reaches officials through intermediaries, leaving everyone uncertain whether the message was distorted along the way. Officials trust one another even less than before; small cliques based on family or personal ties have formed.”

Today the individuals comprising key decision-making and shaping include Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Mohsen Rezaei; Chief Justice Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Ahmad Vahidi, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces Ali Abdollahi. Within this circle of power, the IRGC plays an outsized role. This group also has interpersonal dynamics which impact strategy. Rezaei and Ghalibaf are both outsized personalities who have harbored competing political ambitions. Ghalibaf and Abdollahi are longtime associates, with Abdollahi having been promoted to a variety of state positions under Ghalibaf’s tutelage. Vahidi served under Rezaei when he headed the IRGC. Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are likely more eager for an immediate diplomatic settlement given their roles in day-to-day state administration than the IRGC’s top brass like Vahidi, who may believe time is on the Islamic Republic’s side and is more interested in reestablishing deterrence.

After the individuals, come the institutions that administer the country and make strategic decisions. The presidency and ministries remain important for daily governance and implementing state strategy. But when it comes to matters of national security and regime survival, the center of gravity shifts towards the military-security establishment. The SNSC connects the political, military, intelligence, and bureaucratic institutions.

Behind these institutions lay informal networks based on family, personal, and professional ties, especially those who fought wars together like veterans of the Iran-Iraq War. Within the military-security establishment, these ties are embedded in the IRGC, the Intelligence Ministry, and among military commanders. Within the economic and political class, these networks prevail among state-linked companies, parastatal foundations, contractors, oil traders, financial intermediaries, and sanctions evaders.

The clerical elite also maintains significant ideological and religious networks, especially within seminaries, among Friday Prayer leaders, and the many overlapping propaganda institutions of the Islamic Republic. Bureaucratic-technical elites also have networks, among diplomats, economists, engineers, nuclear experts, and administrators who make the government run.

These networks matter because they shape what information reaches the decisionmakers in Iran, how threats are defined, and which policy options are considered palatable. Disagreements do exist, but they, for now, remain concentrated on tactics, not grand strategy. All are committed to the founding principles of the Islamic Republic. For example, diplomats may favor negotiation. Economic officials will emphasize the costs of war. Military commanders will prioritize deterrence. Ideological actors will resist compromise and fear infiltration of American and Western mores. These factors are weighed by the Islamic Republic through the lens how best to preserve the system. Likewise, while disagreement is genuine, the actors do not all have equal influence.

The war with the United States and Israel has accelerated securitization. Economic unrest, social protests, information, foreign policy, and nuclear policy are all viewed as security issues. As threats increase, security institutions gain influence over areas previously dominated by civilian institutions.

In this mix, Iran’s national interests and the survival of the Islamic Republic are not always identical. A policy may appear economically irrational but still be political rational if leaders believe it protects the regime. The central paradox confronting Iranian leaders is that Tehran has incentives to end a costly conflict, but also incentives to avoid an agreement that looks like surrender or demonstrates weakness. The late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei often looked to the example of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reforms undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev like perestroika and glasnost as mistakes. The lesson Khamenei took away from these experiences is such reforms invite weakness, which the West preys upon and this could facilitate the end of the Islamic Republic. Such logic likely continues to animate Iranian decisions.

Whether Mojtaba shares his father's ideology is not as important as Khamenei’s institutional legacy that his worldview has left behind. This is the logic of what we call the Islamic Republic 3.0. In the Islamic Republic 3.0, there is a greater diffusion of power where individuals decide, institutions organize and implement, and networks shape the choices. Power is increasingly shifting toward the security establishment.

For policymakers in Washington, this has important implications; who makes decisions in Iran no longer has a simple answer. When the bombs hit the Office of the Supreme Leader in February 2026, Araghchi was briefing Khamenei’s security advisor Ali Asghar Mir Hejazi on recent talks with Washington. But today, Araghchi admitted over the summer that he had never had a personal interaction with the new supreme leader and Mojtaba Khamenei has not announced advisors to replace Hejazi, whom was reportedly opposed to his ascension as supreme leader.

If President Trump were to renew military action against Iran after the midterm elections, U.S. policymakers would need to confront these new layers of decision-making to further weaken the regime. Should decapitations form part of these operations—as was the case during Operation Epic Fury—solely striking Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei would not suffice to weaken the regime even more. U.S. bombing would need a more expansive approach, targeting entire institutions like the SNSC.

Araghchi himself signaled this vulnerability in the regime during an interview in July with journalist Javad Mogooyi. He said, “The regime would collapse if all members of the SNSC are hit, which is why they never met at once during the war.” This would entail precise intelligence and targeted killings of individuals like the SNSC secretary, president, foreign minister, intelligence minister, chief justice, speaker of parliament, chief of staff of the armed forces, and the commanders-in-chief of the IRGC and Artesh. Additionally, aiming at the second and third layers beneath each of these figures would be required.

This is because not only would individuals on the SNSC be eliminated, but an entire institution would be decapitated. And the networks that fed into those members would be severed.

Saeid Golkar is the UC Foundation associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran. Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 19 Oct 2026 10:48:50 +0100 FirstHandNews
How Far Should the U.S. Go to Defend Saudi Arabia? https://belimedia.com.ng/how-far-should-the-us-go-to-defend-saudi-arabia https://belimedia.com.ng/how-far-should-the-us-go-to-defend-saudi-arabia

Recent deadly attacks by Yemen's Iranian-backed Houthis inside of Saudi Arabia have raised questions about just how far the U.S. should go in helping to protect the Kingdom. We spoke with former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norm Roule , who travels regularly to the region for meetings with senior leaders and asked him to help us better understand the realm of possibility.

The Cipher Brief: What exactly can the United States provide to or undertake for the Saudis that the Kingdom cannot do on its own?

Roule: The Royal Saudi Air Force is experienced, well-led, and well-resourced with advanced technology, and it can draw on a deep relationship with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Riyadh also has decades of experience dealing with Yemen. Its understanding of Yemen’s political, tribal, and military landscape is as granular as one could reasonably hope. Saudi officials responsible for managing this portfolio have repeatedly sought political and diplomatic solutions with the Houthis and other Yemeni factions. The failure of these efforts reflects Houthi unwillingness to make necessary compromises more than any lack of effort on the part of the Saudis or the United Nations. It should also be remembered that the Saudis have sought Western and international engagement on this issue for years, just as they have warned repeatedly of the consequences of allowing the Houthis to acquire sophisticated ballistic missile and drone capabilities with Iranian assistance.

In terms of the ongoing conflict, Washington has reportedly responded robustly to Saudi requests for support, providing munitions, maintenance, intelligence, and other assistance needed to improve operational effectiveness, protect personnel, and minimize civilian casualties. There remain areas in which the United States and other partners can provide additional capabilities that would likely be welcomed by the Kingdom, particularly in integrated air and missile defense, early warning, intelligence collection, and replenishment of interceptor inventories. These capabilities are particularly important given the challenge of defending against coordinated missile and drone attacks, including attacks designed to overwhelm defensive systems. The United States can also assist in identifying and disrupting the networks responsible for supplying the Houthis with missile and drone components.

We must also distinguish between Saudi air superiority from the ability to locate and destroy dispersed, mobile, or concealed Houthi missile and drone capabilities. There is no public evidence that Saudi aircraft are unable to meet their current targeting requirements or that direct U.S. air operations would fundamentally change the course of the conflict. The question is whether there are specific military capabilities or operations that Washington can provide that would materially improve Saudi security beyond what Riyadh and its Yemeni partners can accomplish themselves.

A comment on the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb (MOAB). Unlike the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, which is designed to destroy reinforced or deeply buried underground facilities, the MOAB is an airburst weapon that detonates just above the ground. Its principal value lies in its devastating effects against concentrated personnel and exposed targets, its potential effectiveness against certain cave and tunnel complexes, and its considerable psychological impact on enemy forces and their leadership.

One can envision circumstances in which such a weapon might be useful in Yemen, including against certain underground missile storage facilities, manufacturing locations, or concentrations of Houthi missile and drone operators. However, its effectiveness would depend on the characteristics of the target, including the depth and reinforcement of underground structures. It is unlikely to resolve the broader missile and drone threat, much of which depends on mobile launchers, dispersed equipment, and facilities that may be difficult to locate. Its employment would also require consideration of potential civilian casualties. Most importantly, its use makes sense only if suitable targets exist that cannot be addressed as effectively by Saudi or Saudi-supported Yemeni government operations, and if we judge that destroying those targets would materially alter the course of the conflict without risking broader U.S. involvement.

The Cipher Brief: How would direct U.S. involvement in Yemen affect our operations against Iran?

Roule: Iran remains, and should remain, the principal focus of our military efforts in the region. Tehran would welcome nothing more than an American decision to become embroiled in another regional conflict. Although not all military assets or munitions are interchangeable, additional commitments of aircraft, intelligence capabilities, logistical support, and senior military attention to Yemen could divert resources that might otherwise support operations against Iran. This is particularly important given the demands of maintaining the blockade, securing the Strait of Hormuz, conducting defensive operations with our Gulf partners, and potentially preparing for expanded operations against Iran itself.

We should not, however, assume that every action against the Houthis would necessarily weaken our campaign against Iran although we do need to consider the cost to broader U.S. military requirements. The Houthis remain one of Tehran’s most important instruments of regional coercion, and effective measures to reduce their ability to attack Saudi Arabia could reinforce our broader strategy against Iran. The issue is whether the military and strategic benefits of any proposed American operation against the Houthis would justify the resources involved and the risks of escalation. This requires distinguishing limited defensive assistance, which could strengthen our regional posture, from offensive operations that might require a sustained American military commitment.

Direct U.S. military involvement against the Houthis would also risk unraveling the existing U.S.-Houthi ceasefire and exposing American forces to renewed attacks, potentially setting off a chain of events that could lead to another open-ended military campaign. Our engagement with the Houthis to sustain the ceasefire may not be attractive symbolically, particularly as Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia continue. But the arrangement has preserved American military resources and operational flexibility for the confrontation with Iran. We should not abandon that advantage without compelling evidence that doing so would produce meaningful strategic gains.

The Cipher Brief: This is a tricky situation. The U.S. wants to be seen as a strong and reliable security partner, but Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia are likely to continue. How can the administration walk this line?

Roule: The Administration will need to thread this needle carefully. It has reportedly intensified its already extensive discussions with Riyadh concerning what more can be done to protect Saudi lives, airspace, critical infrastructure, and energy facilities against continued Houthi attacks. The Kingdom’s security is not simply a matter of regional symbolism or alliance credibility. Attacks against Saudi territory threaten civilian lives, economic activity, international aviation, energy infrastructure, and the Kingdom’s ambitious economic transformation. This has a national, regional, and even global impact. Saudi Arabia’s ability to defend itself against these threats is critical to American national security and economic interests.

Our support will need to become more visible, particularly as the Saudis face growing domestic and regional expectations that their security partners will respond to attacks on the Kingdom. But visibility must be accompanied by meaningful results. Additional air and missile defense capabilities, intelligence cooperation, replenishment of defensive munitions, and measures to disrupt Houthi weapons supply networks may ultimately offer greater strategic value than direct American strikes. These measures would also demonstrate that Washington takes Saudi security seriously without necessarily expanding the American military commitment.

A MOAB strike would certainly attract attention and demonstrate American willingness to employ overwhelming force. But visibility alone is not a measure of military effectiveness or strategic success. Any such operation must be judged by whether it would significantly degrade Houthi capabilities, deter further attacks, or otherwise change the course of the conflict. A dramatic strike that fails to reduce the Houthi threat could actually weaken deterrence by demonstrating the limits of American military power. Conversely, a carefully selected operation against a critical Houthi capability could reinforce deterrence if its military benefits justified the risks.

The larger objective must remain to demonstrate that the United States is a dependable security partner without allowing the Houthis, and ultimately Iran, to draw us into another costly and potentially open-ended conflict. We should do everything possible to support our Saudi partners in defending their people, territory, and critical infrastructure against Houthi attacks. But our actions must be designed to achieve meaningful military and strategic results while preserving the resources and operational flexibility needed for the confrontation with Iran. Protecting Saudi Arabia against Iranian-supported aggression should reinforce, not undermine, that effort. Iran remains our principal adversary, and bringing that confrontation to a successful conclusion must remain our primary objective.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 19 Oct 2026 10:48:50 +0100 FirstHandNews
What Beijing Calls Open, Washington Should Call an Operation https://belimedia.com.ng/what-beijing-calls-open-washington-should-call-an-operation https://belimedia.com.ng/what-beijing-calls-open-washington-should-call-an-operation

China is about to run the largest influence operation in history. It will not have to run it. The world will download it.

Our research team at Vanderbilt spent months inside the internal documents of GoLaxy, a Beijing firm with ties to the Chinese state. It built a machine for shaping opinion in other countries: A.I. that generates personas, amplifies the stories Beijing wants believed and buries the ones it does not. It was used in Hong Kong. It was used in Taiwan. That is an influence operation built by hand, one persona at a time.

Now consider what happens when it does not need to be built at all. If Chinese open-weight models — the ones anyone can download, modify and run on their own machines — become the foundation the world builds on, the Party's framing of Taiwan, Tiananmen, Xinjiang and Beijing itself ships inside every product that sits on top. No personas. No campaign. Just the default answer, everywhere. GoLaxy would look like a rehearsal.

Here is the part that should stop Washington cold. Chinese models are about to be everywhere, and American strategy is what is putting them there.

Washington is deciding whether to let frontier development run while clamping down on powerful open-weight models whose safeguards can be stripped away. Restrictions would not kill demand for a cheap model a company can download and make its own. China is standing at the counter with exactly that.

We talk about the A.I. race as if it has one finish line. It has two. The first is for frontier capability: who builds the most advanced models. American companies lead today. The second is for reach: whose models become the foundation under thousands of products. Chinese firms may be building the advantage there. The first brings concentrated scientific, economic and military power. The second decides whose systems become the workhorses of ordinary life, and that reach shapes what people know.

American frontier models such as Claude, ChatGPT and Gemini are closed: you use them on the company's servers, and the company can cut off access. Chinese developers compete by releasing cheap open-weight models that companies can run on their own, with no provider to answer to.

This has already started. Airbnb relies on Alibaba's Qwen in its customer-service agent. Qwen even briefly powered a tool for searching proposed regulations on the Federal Register website. Amazon says thousands of customers have deployed DeepSeek through its cloud. In every case the interface is American. The model underneath is not.

Chinese developers operate under Communist Party rules about what may be said. Those rules shape which questions the models answer, which facts they omit and how they frame sensitive subjects. Open weights can be retuned, but scrubbing built-in defaults is expensive, and most companies will tune what matters to their business rather than check how a model handles every political subject. If a cheap Chinese model sits under thousands of products, its habits travel with it — into research tools, classroom software and fact-checkers — and the person on the other end never knows.

Beijing already believes this. When Meta released its open-weight Llama models, Chinese regulators worried that a foreign model could "poison" China's A.I. ecosystem with information the Party censors. Washington should take seriously a vulnerability Beijing recognized first.

None of this makes the open-weight safety problem smaller. It makes it bigger. Once a powerful open-weight model is out, its developer cannot recall it. Its safeguards can be stripped and the model turned toward cyberattacks, biological weapons or worse. Testing requirements, liability rules and release restrictions are needed. But a Chinese open-weight model carries the same dangerous capabilities as an American one, and no American rule touches it.

Constrain American developers and leave foreign weights untouched, and demand shifts toward Chinese models. Washington ends up regulating the companies it can see while deepening its dependence on the ones it cannot.

Washington could ban the Chinese models. But that means telling Americans which information technology they may use — and here lies the irony: the openness that protects Americans from domestic censorship may leave them exposed to systems built under Chinese censorship.

TikTok offers a glimpse of the stakes. More than 150 million Americans use it, and more than 50 million regularly get news there. Add DeepSeek or Qwen to generate the content TikTok’s algorithm selects and distributes, and China could supply both the information and the system that delivers it to an enormous audience.

The United States therefore faces a trilemma. It wants to prevent the uncontrolled release of dangerous A.I. capabilities. It wants to preserve Americans' freedom to choose their technology and information. And it wants to avoid dependence on models shaped inside an authoritarian system. It cannot fully secure all three.

Honest regulation starts by admitting that. Before restricting an American model, ask which model developers will pick instead. Domestic and foreign models distributed in the United States should face the same tests and the same rules. And companies that build products on a foundation model should have to say whose model it is.

A.I. leadership is two things: the capability of a country's best models, and the reach of the models embedded in ordinary life. A.I. risk is two things as well: what a powerful model might do, and what a ubiquitous one tells people is true. GoLaxy showed what Beijing does with a machine for shaping belief. Open weights are how it gets one in every pocket. And right now, Washington is holding the door.

Mr. Goldstein and Mr. Benson are professors at Vanderbilt University who specialize in national and international security.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 15 Oct 2026 09:07:45 +0100 FirstHandNews
Subterranean Warfare & An Urgent DoW Need Without An Owner https://belimedia.com.ng/subterranean-warfare-an-urgent-dow-need-without-an-owner https://belimedia.com.ng/subterranean-warfare-an-urgent-dow-need-without-an-owner The DoW urgently needs to organize its scattered subterranean warfare assets into a single unified organization. Ideally, a Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager (DRPM) for Subterranean Warfare, reporting to the Deputy Secretary of War. (The Department already uses this model for unmanned systems, critical weapons and Golden Dome.) This group would have three portfolios: Subterranean Resilience, Subterranean Sensing and Subterranean Defeat. The office would integrate validated requirements, experimentation, testing, acquisition, and fielding.

Subterranean Resilience

During the 2026 Iran conflict, Iranian ballistic missiles and low-cost drones hit U.S. installations across eight Middle Eastern countries. Hundreds of buildings and structures were damaged or destroyed. The Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain was among the installations hit hard. Iranian weapons damaged one E-3 airborne early-warning aircraft and five KC-135 tankers on the ground in Saudi Arabia. (The official inspector-general report documents the damage.) Despite thousands of successful interceptions, the attacks exposed the vulnerability of concentrated, above-ground assets.

The rapid redeployment of the B-1s from RAF Fairford in the UK after warnings of an Iran-linked threat (reported as a possible drone attack) made the point: unsheltered concentrated high-value aircraft are vulnerable even way outside the theater.

The assumptions the U.S. has made about air superiority, missile defense, aircraft dispersal, building hardening, and the survivability of concentrated forward bases were all flawed. While we were prepared for ballistic missiles and hostile aircraft, drone swarms combined with ballistic missiles saturated and got through our defenses.

Washington’s reaction has been to invest billions of dollars in counter-drone and missile defense systems. Yet public budget documents reveal no comparable effort to put vulnerable aircraft, fuel, command-and-control nodes, and munitions out of harm’s way – sheltered, underground (or in space). (Agile Combat Employment, dispersal, hardening, deception, shelters, and rapid runway repair were never designed for a combined drone and missile onslaught.)

The Pentagon has recognized for decades that underground facilities are among the most effective ways an adversary can blunt U.S. conventional superiority. It described that problem explicitly in 1999. Gaza and Ukraine should have made it abundantly clear.

China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran use underground facilities, dispersal, hardening, and deception to make their own high-value assets harder to find, assess, and disable. We need to underground assets that cannot be quickly replaced: command posts, comms nodes, ammunition, fuel distribution points, repair facilities, key power systems, maintenance spares, and high-value aircraft or drones. The department needs an integrator that coordinates resilience across the Military Departments, Joint Staff, combatant commands, defense agencies, and intelligence community and provides Subterranean Resilience.

However, resilience is only one part of subterranean warfare.

Subterranean Sensing and Defeat

The U.S. needs to know where adversaries' underground facilities are located, and the internal layout of those facilities. Today, these bespoke exquisite systems for tunnel detection, robotic mapping of accessible tunnels, Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT) characterization, and target defeat are siloed in organizations scattered across the DoW. Most of these systems still require boots on the ground. Once a target is found, Combatant Commands need an integrated system that can characterize and destroy these targets, without first gaining physical access. Today, for the deepest facilities that means bombing from the air. Iran is the case in point.

Background. Iran's route to a nuclear weapon is by enriching uranium. Natural uranium is composed of 0.71% uranium-235 (U235) and it’s only the U235 that is used to build a bomb.

Iran uses centrifuges to separate U235 and increase its concentration (enriching it.) One centrifuge won’t do much, but connecting thousands of centrifuges together into cascades and running them for months can produce pounds of U235.

Iran’s underground nuclear enrichment site at Natanz had well over 10,000 centrifuges installed across dozens of cascades, and their Fordow nuclear enrichment site was built for 16 cascades, roughly 3,000 machines. Before the June 2025 strikes, Iran’s three declared enrichment facilities contained more than 20,000 centrifuges in 125 full-sized cascades.

The rough estimate needed for one Iranian nuclear weapon is ~100 lbs of U-235 at 60% enrichment or 55 lbs of U-235 at 90% enrichment (modern designs use less.) The difference is important, the lighter the weapon the easier it is to fit on a missile.

At its peak (Feb 2025 to June 2025) Iran’s cascades were delivering ~86 lbs of uranium enriched to 60% which is about 50 lbs of U-235 per month, which is just under one potential weapon every month. (Most weapons use U235 enriched to 90+% because that permits a smaller, more reliable design. Getting to that level in Iran might take days or weeks running the cascades, but building it into a weapon would still be needed.)

Deeply Buried Targets Versus Bunker Busters. One of the stated goals of the U.S. strikes on Iran was to remove their capacity to build nuclear weapons. This required the U.S. to destroy their deeply buried underground nuclear enrichment sites. The largest conventional bomb in the U.S. military’s arsenal is the 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, carried by the B-2 Bomber. A 2019 description said it could reach targets as far as 200 feet underground (its actual effectiveness depends on geology, concrete, facility design, entry points, and the use of multiple weapons). The Iranians knew this and built their nuclear enrichment sites underground. The Fordow site is ~260 to 300 feet under limestone and dolomite. The Natanz site is 25 to 160 feet underground, protected by a 25-foot concrete shield. (But public estimates are over the place.)

Iran declared Isfahan as an enrichment complex to the IAEA the day before the June 2025 strikes; inspectors never got inside it, therefore its depth and geology are unknown, but speculation is that the enrichment complex is 260 to 330 feet underground. Another suspected enrichment facility is in Pickaxe Mountain, where the exact depths, geology, are unknown but estimates put the facility 250 – 330 feet below the summit. Both Isfahan and Pickaxe were Iran’s shift toward "deep mountain basing" to escape the reach of conventional military strikes.

In June 2025 in Operation Midnight Hammer U.S. B-2 bombers dropped 14 GBU-57 bombs on top of Fordow and Natanz. At Isfahan (Esfahan) more than two-dozen submarine-launched Tomahawks hit tunnel entrances and surface targets. In March 2026, strikes at Natanz hit its entrance.

According to the Institute for Science and International Security, the 22,000 centrifuges at Natanz, the Natanz pilot plant, and Fordow are almost certainly wrecked. What may have survived is the enriched uranium, the spare parts, and the people, and that is the problem. The International Atomic Energy Agency estimated (in June 2025) that Iran had about 970 pounds of uranium enriched to 60%; it has since lost track of where it is. Iran's known uranium conversion capability at Isfahan was damaged, which it needed to turn the stockpile of enriched uranium into a weapon, and there is no public evidence that enrichment has resumed at Natanz, Fordow or Isfahan. We never hit Pickaxe Mountain or the Isfahan enrichment facility with the GBU-57. The strikes have set Iran back, but no one knows for how long.

While the GBU-57 MOP cannot cleanly punch through solid rock, the debate has shifted from an absolute physical destruction calculation to a functional denial calculation—meaning the military's goal would be to seal Iran's nuclear assets in a mountain tomb rather than blowing them up directly.

Did We Succeed? Our stated goal was to prevent Iran from rapidly rebuilding the capability to build nuclear weapons, but there’s no certainty that we did that. Repeated airstrikes may have damaged the buried enrichment plants, but we can’t prove it or account for the buried enriched uranium inside. The fact is that it’s extremely difficult to see how much damage the bombs did to Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs) from the air, and without inspectors on the ground, knowing for sure is guesswork. Putting boots on the ground would carry enormous costs and risks. Negotiating the removal and inspection of weapons grade uranium would depend on Iranian cooperation and a way to verify we got it all. All bad choices.

There is another emerging option: autonomous drilling equipment.

Subterranean Sensing and Defeat. It’s not hard to imagine that with enough boots on the ground the U.S. could secure a landing zone, fly in drilling equipment and have crews drill hundreds of feet vertically or thousands horizontally to either place sensors and/or explosives. The U.S. has had organizations building specialized equipment and training for breaching tunnels in Combatant Commands and scattered across the DoW for years (DTRA, DARPA, Army ERDC and CAVES and CZ5 programs, SOCOM, Sandia and the Army's half-billion-dollar underground-training push (2018) and ATP 3-21.51 Subterranean Operations.) One can even imagine that there are teams already trained and equipment ready to go. And one can equally imagine the Iranians are waiting for them.

What’s new is autonomous drills that could provide post-strike bomb damage assessments and/or destroy Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs) without seizing the site. They might be inserted covertly; more likely they'd need air cover while they work.

The combination of AI, robotics and autonomy moves this from science fiction to the possible.

Anduril, The Boring Company, Exodigo, Phoenix Boring, Earthgrid and Traysar are possible candidates to deliver these systems. There are likely others as well.

(Disclosure: after my first blog about undergrounding critical assets, I invested and have a financial interest in companies in this space.)

Surface survivability and subterranean sensing and defeat are no longer one Service's problem, and they won't be solved by a single system or an incremental fix. Something fundamentally disruptive has changed in the nature of asymmetric warfare and there’s no going back. While we’re actively chasing immediate solutions (Golden Dome, JIATF-401, et al), we need to rethink the nature of force protection, and military and civilian infrastructure protection.

The U.S. needs a coherent protection and survivability strategy across the DoW and all sectors of our economy. This conversation needs to be not only about how we do it, but how we organize it, how we budget and pay for it, and how we rapidly deploy it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 15 Oct 2026 09:07:45 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s Military Has a GPS Problem https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-military-has-a-gps-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-military-has-a-gps-problem “The Department of Defense’s (DoD) Global Positioning System (GPS) is the principal source of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information for the U.S. military and civilian users. Due to DoD’s reliance on it, GPS also represents a potential single point of failure for DoD. We [the Government Accountability Office (GAO)] previously reported on DoD’s efforts to modernize GPS with a more jam resistant, encrypted, military-specific signal, referred to as military code (M-code), and we found that DoD is years away from fielding this capability after spending more than two decades and billions of dollars.”

That was the opening of a GAO letter sent last Wednesday to Congress accompanying a 58-page report titled PRECISION NAVIGATION SYSTEMS: Challenges Remain with Fielding New Capabilities, which explains the key role that GPS delivery of PNT data plays in this country’s military and civilian activities -- and the need to update the system.

The M-code secure, jam-resistant GPS signal is designed to be used by roughly 700 U.S. weapons systems deployed by Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Space Force services, but because of a limited supply of specialized microchip sets and production bottlenecks of other key elements, some M-code deployments have been pushed back to 2049, according to the GAO.

I will discuss this more below. Meanwhile, the U.S. military services continue to rely on legacy GPS receivers or alternative systems for PNT-guided operations. For example, the GAO report described “non-satellite-based PNT using data derived from internal or external sources of information to sensors, from geophysical sources, or from celestial sources (e.g., inertial measurement units, cameras or terrain sensors, magnetic or gravity sensors, and celestial sensors).”

First, a bit of GPS background and history supplied in part by the GAO.

GPS consists of three segments: a constellation of approximately 31 medium Earth-orbiting satellites, with at least 24 continuously broadcasting their position and time data; a ground control segment – Space Command’s Delta 8 at Schriever Air Force Base, Colo. -- for command and control of the satellite constellation; a user segment, comprising receivers used globally by military and civilians in aircraft, ships, land vehicles, precision-guided munitions, and handheld devices.

The user equipment receives signals from four GPS satellites and, with that transmitted data, instantly calculates the user’s location and precise time.

Although the U.S. Government created and continues to control and maintain GPS, it is freely accessible to anyone with a GPS receiver. There are three other similar global systems: Russia’s GLONASS was developed during the Cold War; the European Union manages Galileo, and China operates the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System.

Today’s U.S. GPS originated in 1973 when the Defense Navigation System, later named NAVSTARS GPS, was approved, primarily to guide ships. In 1978, the first GPS satellite was launched into orbit, with the full satellite complement not reaching initial operational capability until 1993. By then, it had been made available for civilian use as well as military, a decision made by President Reagan in 1983 after the Russian downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007.

By the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the GAO report said, “GPS equipment was small and inexpensive enough to also be used on aircraft and other military vehicles. Since then, further advances, such as the development of even smaller microchip-sized receivers, have allowed GPS to provide precise PNT information for individual soldiers, munitions, smaller weapons technology applications, and civilian applications, like smart phones.”

Meanwhile, according to the GAO report, “GPS signals are being actively targeted by adversaries who seek to disrupt or deny GPS to U.S. warfighters. These threats include (1) jamming, (2) spoofing, (3) cyber, and (4) direct attacks on satellites or satellite infrastructure.”

DoD is mitigating jamming attacks “by installing specialized antennae -- referred to as controlled reception pattern antennae (CRPA) -- on weapon systems and munitions,” according to the GAO report, which added, “These antennae provide the ability to identify and filter out the jamming signals.”

Spoofing is being dealt with “in part by developing and installing receivers with M-code capability, which will provide more secure encryption,” the report said. As for cyberattacks, DoD is “ensuring that computer systems and networks are protected against cyber attacks that can target satellites and their associated ground control systems,” according to the GAO.

Since 2000, the Air Force -- and later the Space Force – have pursued a multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the existing GPS capability. The modernization effort included adding the more robust and more securely encrypted GPS military signal capability, known as M-code. It also included: 1) satellites that broadcast the M-code signal, 2) a ground system that controls both the existing and new M-code GPS satellites, and 3) user equipment to receive the M-code signals.

The first satellites capable of broadcasting M-code have been on orbit since 2005, with upgraded versions referred to as GPS III.

The launch of the GPS III third generation of 24 M-code satellites was completed on April 21 of this year, providing eight times the anti-jamming capability and four times the accuracy of previous iterations. “The next generation of satellites, known as GPS III Follow-on, or GPS IIIF, are in production by Lockheed Martin, and will begin launching as early as 2028,” according to a Space Systems Command press release.

However, it’s a different story with the new generation ground system, referred to as Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX). It began development in 2010 and was supposed to achieve transition to operations by June 2017. Instead, there were numerous technical problems and protracted delays. Costs rose from $3.7 billion to almost $7 billion or more, and in April 2026, DoD directed the Air Force to formally terminate the OCX program, according to the GAO report.

Despite the cancellation of the OCX program, then-Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said in April the new ground control system needs to be prepared to support future GPS satellites, including GPS IIIF and beyond.

However, despite the OCX problems, the Space Force has been making upgrades to the existing GPS ground control segment through Lockheed Martin. Last week, an Air and Space Forces Magazine daily report said, “Since April, the Space Force has awarded Lockheed an additional $199 million…to support launch and command and control for GPS IIIF satellites…and to begin a full technology refresh of the GPS ground segment hardware and software.”

The final problems harming total GPS modernization – including delays and mounting costs – are best portrayed in the GAO report’s description of the military services’ development and procurement of separate receivers for the M-code data.

While development of the M-code-capable receiver cards has been led by the Space Force and Air Force, the eventual fielding of receivers to specific operational platforms, such as weapons, has remained the responsibility of the individual services.

According to the GAO report, “Currently, there are more than 50 priority weapon systems [considered in the GPS modernization programs]. The largest numbers of priority weapon systems are in munitions and aviation systems. The Navy has the highest number of systems, followed by the Army…Priorities for M-code modernization take into account the needs of the specific classified operational scenario as well as the expected life spans of the weapon systems involved. Weapon systems that are expected to no longer be in use around or before 2030 are not priority weapon systems.”

Congress mandated the PNT Oversight Council in the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, and DoD established it with the mission of overseeing the department’s GPS modernization portfolio.

However, as the GAO report explains, “Budget authority for key aspects of DoD’s PNT efforts remains under the control of the [separate military] services. This budgetary fragmentation complicates efforts to align interdependent PNT capability development and fielding efforts to ensure timely delivery to the warfighter.”

For example, the GAO found that despite recommendations from the PNT Oversight Council concerning inadequate Air Force funding for aviation receiver programs, “chronic underfunding” continued and the Air Force aviation receiver programs did not meet their development goals on their expected timelines.

“Pursuing modernized GPS and complementary PNT technologies to augment GPS,” the GAO report concludes at one point, “requires foresight and planning. Integration timelines for weapon systems are often lengthy, and schedules must be properly aligned for the development of such modernized PNT technologies and their integration into weapon systems. Additionally, these timelines for integrating new PNT technologies can be further complicated by the interdependence of systems. For example, the military services will likely upgrade some munitions to use M-code before the capability is integrated into weapon systems that fire those munitions.”

Since, as the GAO points out, the GPS system “is vast and touches almost all vehicles, ships, aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and dismounted personnel within the [Defense] Department,” I would say more DoD attention needs to be paid to getting this modernization back on track.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 15 Oct 2026 09:07:45 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Pentagon’s Drone Revolution Starts With Soldiers https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pentagons-drone-revolution-starts-with-soldiers https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pentagons-drone-revolution-starts-with-soldiers Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

On the night of April 24, 1980, eight Navy RH-53D Sea Stallions lifted off the deck of the USS Nimitz and headed for a patch of Iranian salt flat called Desert One. The plan needed six of them to get there in working order. One was abandoned in the desert after a rotor warning. One turned back in a dust storm. One arrived with a failed hydraulic system. The mission was aborted. Then, while the force repositioned to refuel, a helicopter drifted into an EC-130. Eight Americans died on that salt flat, and fifty-two hostages stayed in Tehran.

When the Secretary of War stood at Quantico on September 30 and announced a new four-star command for autonomous warfare, my first question was not about drones. It was about helicopters.

The Holloway review found the mission "conceptually valid and feasible" and blamed "the ad hoc nature of the organization and planning." The fix, Nunn-Cohen in 1986, gave the new Special Operations Command a budget line the services could not raid. We did eventually build better helicopter units. But we didn't build SOCOM around a helicopter. We built it around the problem that broke the helicopters.

The Secretary seems to understand this. "Ukraine's lesson is not that one type of drone wins wars," Hegseth told the room, "but rather the need for a purpose-built system that maximizes the ability to adapt." His signed memo says the output "is not a particular drone, but the ability to adapt in combat." Then the Department named it the Autonomous Warfare Command. This is like naming SOCOM the Helicopter Command. A drone is a photograph of an adaptation. The adaptation is the movie. In Ukraine, radio-controlled FPVs gave way to fiber-optic spools, which gave way to nets, shotguns and interceptor drones, each turn in weeks or months.

When the 3rd Army Corps air-dropped ground robots ten kilometers behind Russian lines during Operation Vivaldi last month, the footage went everywhere. The commanders talked about something else. A battalion commander known as "Darwin," credited a command structure "qualified enough as we are." An American volunteer with the corps described his entire job as "installing Western mission command trust and initiative." We taught them that. They are teaching it back to us with robots, and we are taking notes on the robots.

Retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling warns that "creating a headquarters does not create a capability." He is right, and that is the point of this column. The memo orders a 30-day implementation plan, due on the Secretary's desk around the end of October. A headquarters is a wiring diagram. The capability is a soldier in the motor pool at two in the morning with a soldering iron, a laptop and a firmware image that does not work yet. Here is how to build him, keep him and turn him loose.

Start With the Soldier We Already Have

The Army has made a great start. Its newest specialty, the 15X tactical unmanned aircraft system specialist, is graduating classes of about thirty at Fort Huachuca, with 770 expected by year's end and a planned force of two to three thousand. The colonel who runs the training brigade said it better than anyone at Quantico: "The Army has not bought a drone that the 15X is responsible for being an expert on." Train the soldier to learn the machine, not the machine's manual.

Now follow that soldier for six years. If he is good, he makes sergeant. If he is very good, he makes staff sergeant, and the day he pins it on, his job stops being the drone and starts being the eight soldiers who fly it: counseling, evaluations, ranges and the duty roster. The enlisted promotion system has one ladder, and it runs through the leadership of people. The best technician in the platoon either becomes a manager or gets passed over. Either way he leaves the bench, and the private sector is waiting with a better offer.

Bring Back the Specialist

Warrant officers exist to solve part of this problem. The Army already has an unmanned aircraft systems warrant, and the Air Force, which abolished its warrants in 1959, brought them back in December 2024 for cyber, intelligence and space. But warrants are a thin layer by design. You do not put one in every platoon, and the loop the Secretary described lives in the squad and the section.

The Army has solved this before. In 1955, after a committee recommended separating command from technical responsibility, it created specialist grades to reward experience and technical knowledge. A Specialist Six drew a staff sergeant's pay without a staff sergeant's squad. His job was to be the most technically proficient in the building, and the Army paid him to stay that way. The ladder was dismantled from the top down, and in 1985 SP5 and SP6 went away.

Bring them back, starting with unmanned systems. Promote a Specialist Five or Six on what he can build, fix, modify and teach. Same pay grades, separate ladder, one rule: technical authority, never command. Put specialists in every formation that flies, drives or swims a robot, with the warrant corps above them as the technical chain. A Specialist Six at battalion who can rewrite the flight controller tonight, and a CW3 at brigade who knows which vendor to call in the morning: that is what a fix in days looks like.

Pay for the Skill, Not the Stripe

We already pay soldiers for perishable expertise. A linguist earns a Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus of up to $500 a month per language, and must retest every year to keep it. Nobody thinks that is strange. Russian is hard, and it fades.

So does firmware. Build a tiered certification for unmanned systems (repair, modify, program) and pay it monthly, with an annual retest, because the skill expires as fast as the drones do. The money does not need an act of Congress. Under 37 U.S.C. 353, a service Secretary can designate any skill as critical and pay up to $1,750 a month in skill incentive pay, or a proficiency bonus of up to $55,000 a year for certified proficiency. The authority is sitting on the shelf.

Then add the cheapest incentive in the Army's inventory: a badge. The 1953 committee that produced the specialist grades was worried about prestige, and prestige in the Army is worn on the chest. Anyone who has watched soldiers grind through an Expert Infantryman Badge lane knows what they will do for a piece of metal. An expert badge for unmanned systems, tested on build, fix and fly against the clock, would cost almost nothing and fill every off-duty hour in the brigade.

Recruit at the Bench

In June 2025, the Army commissioned four technology executives directly as reserve lieutenant colonels. Now do it at the other end of the org chart. Let a civilian FPV builder or embedded-systems engineer enlist as a Specialist Five instead of a private, on a skills test rather than a resume.

And stop leaving the best reservoir untapped. Thousands of Americans now build drones for a living. The Guard and Reserve can put them in uniform one weekend a month as technical specialists, carrying current industry skill into units without the Army having to match a Silicon Valley salary.

Give Them Permission and a Parts Budget

A specialist who can fix the drone but is not allowed to innovate is an expensive spectator. In April 2025 the Secretary's own Army transformation memo directed the service to "seek to include right to repair provisions in all existing contracts." Finish the job, then delegate the authority to modify and fly small systems down to brigade, so a fix written tonight does not wait months for a distant office to approve it.

Then give him money. The Army's UAS Marketplace, launched in March, has already cleared more than $750 million in sales, and it is adding components and software. Ukraine went further: drone units earn points for verified strikes and spend them on the Brave1 Market, a catalog of more than a thousand products. We do not need the kill leaderboard. We need the principle. Put a parts budget and a catalog in the hands of the battalion specialist, because the fix usually costs less than the paperwork.

Train the Whole Chain

Technical acumen cannot stop at the specialist. The lieutenant has to know what to ask for, and the battalion commander has to know when a twenty-year-old is telling him something he does not want to hear. Put a hands-on unmanned systems block in the officer basic and captains career courses. Send specialists to vendor factories through Training With Industry, and bring vendor engineers forward to battalion in return. Then rate commanders on how fast their formations close the loop.

For the Procurement Officer

Before you sign, ask one question: can a twenty-two-year-old with a screwdriver and a laptop legally open this, fix it and reflash it at two in the morning? If the answer is a field service rep and a ticket number, you did not buy a capability. You rented one. Price the technical data, the open interfaces and the soldier training as line items, and count how many of your fielded systems a Specialist Six could actually work on today.

The Investment Thesis

Your next customer is a Specialist Six. Buying power is already drifting down to the units, through marketplaces here and points in Ukraine. The company with the best drone of 2026 is a commodity supplier by 2027. The company the soldier chooses to learn on, train on and fix with is a platform. Discount revenue built on dependency, and pay up for iteration speed.

The Policy Wonk's Warning

The memo says plainly that the Department will need legislation for the command itself. When the FY2028 NDAA takes it up, Congress should do for adaptation what Nunn-Cohen did for special operations: a protected budget line, and a statutory charter that defines the mission as adaptation across the force, not ownership of a category of hardware. Most of the personnel fixes above need no new law at all. Congress's job is to ask why they have not happened yet.

My Take.

The fight over this command will happen in a document most people will never read. The 30-day plan must "identify measures of adaptation and Service adoption." That clause is where AUTOWARCOM is won or lost. If adaptation is measured in drones delivered, the command becomes a very expensive purchasing agent. Measure two numbers instead: days from a unit reporting a battlefield problem to a fix in its hands, and the count of soldiers in each formation certified to make that fix. Report both to Congress every quarter. Owen West and Max Strasiser built their reputations on speed. I suspect they would welcome being graded on it.

The Risk.

The specialist ranks went away for reasons. Old soldiers still tell stories about the Spec Five who drew sergeant's pay and could not, or would not, run a detail, and about the confusion over who was in charge when the sergeant went down. The bright line between technical authority and command answers most of that. Delegating authority to modify means some soldiers will break drones. That is the tuition, and it is cheaper than the alternative. The bigger risk is the one Hertling named: a new headquarters that adds a layer between the operator and the vendor. If the 30-day plan is mostly wiring diagram and very little soldier, believe him.

Conclusion

Hegseth told the room at Quantico that the English at Agincourt moved their fletchers close to the front to keep the arrows coming. The fletchers were not archers. They were tradesmen, kept near the line because the arrows ran out faster than anyone had planned. In a few weeks, the plan on the Secretary's desk will tell us whether we understood the story. Will we count drones, or will we count days, and the soldiers who make them shorter?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 15 Oct 2026 09:07:45 +0100 FirstHandNews
How War Starts: A Warning from the Korean DMZ https://belimedia.com.ng/how-war-starts-a-warning-from-the-korean-dmz https://belimedia.com.ng/how-war-starts-a-warning-from-the-korean-dmz The current landmine incident in the Demilitarized Zone of the Korean Peninsula could escalate into conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

South Korea and the United Nations Command said North Korea violated the Korean War armistice following a landmine blast on September 21 in the South Korean side of the DMZ, injuring three South Korean soldiers, two severely.

Kim Yo Jong, the sister of North Korean leader Jim Jong Un, dismissed South Korea’s allegations, saying they were a “conspiratorial farce”, threatening immediate and merciless retaliation if South Korean troops open fire on North Korean workers. She accused South Korea of fabricating a “self-directed farce”, creating groundless claims to create a pretext for political and military provocations.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on October 1, in an Armed Forces Day speech, said: “I hope that the North joins us now on the path of restoring trust and resuming dialogue, following a long interruption… and consistently pursue practical measures to reduce military tensions between the two Koreas.”

Hopefully, this incident doesn’t devolve into an August 18, 1976, incident when U.S. and South Korean personnel were pruning a tree in the Joint Security Area of the DMZ when North Korean guards, claiming the tree could not be cut, attacked with axes and clubs, killing U.S. Army Captain Arthur Bonifas and First Lieutenant Mark Barrett and wounding several others.

The U.S. response was quick and powerful, mobilizing troops, attack helicopters and B-52 bombers. Given this U.S. response, North Korean leader Kim il Sung issued an unprecedented statement of regret regarding the killings of two U.S. personnel.

The current situation is markedly different than 1976. North Korea is now a nuclear weapons state, with formidable ballistic missiles, while maintaining a conventional military force of nearly 6,000 conventional artillery systems and thousands of rocket launchers within striking distance of Seoul. Estimates of close to 200,000 special operations personnel are tasked with infiltration via tunnels and aircraft to disrupt South Korean command centers. Moreover, North Korea is now closely aligned with Russia, with a mutual defense treaty.

Given the progress North Korea has made building an arsenal of reportedly 60 to 100 nuclear warheads, and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, in addition to a mutual defense treaty with Russia, it would be fair to assume that Mr. Kim is more confident than his grandfather, Kim il Sung, in 1976.

Mr. Kim announced in January 2021 that North Korea had miniaturized nuclear warheads that can be used for tactical battlefield use. And in 2022, North Korean media confirmed that in 2022 they simulated tactical nuclear strikes to “wipe out” targets in South Korea.

Indeed, in September 2022, North Korea enacted a new nuclear law that declared that their nuclear weapons status was irreversible, authorizing preemptive nuclear strikes if their leadership or command systems is threatened. In March 2026, North Korea reportedly amended its constitution to mandate an automatic and immediate nuclear retaliatory strike if Mr. Kim is assassinated or if the country’s command-and-control system is threatened.

Ever since Mr. Lee, representing the liberal Democratic Party, was elected president of South Korea in June 2025, following the impeachment and removal of former president Yoon Suk Yeol of the conservative People Power Party, he has advocated for a resumption of dialogue with North Korea. Indeed, this inter-Korean dialogue ended in June 2020 when North Koea blew up the inter-Korean Liaison Office in Kaesong, claiming that this was in response to activists in South Korea floating balloons across the border carrying anti-regime propaganda pamphlets critical of the leadership in North Korea.

In the absence of dialogue between the two Koreas, with North Korea revising its constitution to say South Korea is a hostile state and their principal enemy, eliminating any reference to peaceful reunification and national unity, any incident like the landmine blast could escalate quickly.

An emboldened leadership in Pyongyang can seize on an incident of this type to escalate tension with South Korea, devolving into conflict, with the potential for another war on the Korean Peninsula.

Resuming an unconditional dialogue with North Korea should be our primary goal.

This article was originally published in The Washington Times.

The author is the former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:14:54 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Future of Iran Lies Beyond the Regime https://belimedia.com.ng/the-future-of-iran-lies-beyond-the-regime https://belimedia.com.ng/the-future-of-iran-lies-beyond-the-regime The U.S. administration is pursuing its latest strategy: a naval blockade combined with aggressive “Outcast” sanctions, aiming to strangle the Iranian economy, force the regime to its knees, and compel it to return to negotiations on American terms.

Simultaneously, Washington is deploying additional military assets to the region. This is being framed as deterrence, but functions instead as yet another ultimatum. Any significant escalation, or even the credible threat of renewed strikes, risks triggering IRGC retaliation against critical Gulf energy infrastructure. While IRGC missile and drone inventories have been diminished, and exact IRGC munition levels remain classified, the regime likely maintains more than enough asymmetrical firepower to inflict massive damage before being neutralized.

Meanwhile, Tehran prevaricates, dodges, and plays for time. All while playing the victim, weaponizing scarcity, and brutalizing its own population. Their calculation is simple: endure enough short-term pain, while cynically passing the full brunt of it onto the Iranian people, to outlast Washington’s political tolerance.

Threats to the Strait of Hormuz and claims of control over shipping are manufactured leverage to be traded away at the right moment. They know this is opposed by virtually the entire world. By eventually “conceding” on this demand, a classic, predictable negotiating technique, they hope to secure what they truly seek: regime survival, proxy retention, and unimpeded continuation of their nuclear program.

These two paths clearly conflict with one another. Only one will prevail. But in the end, allowing an emboldened, empowered, nuclear-threshold regime to survive on their terms is utter strategic failure.

I vote for the U.S. winning. For the fall of a malignant regime that cares only about its power and wealth and holds its own people hostage.

There are no good options here. No simple fixes for where we find ourselves. Anyone with eyes can see that. So, then what?

A Radical Proposal

Forget talking to the regime. Speak to the Iranian people. Directly. Without hyperbole and with brutal candor.

Prepare them for what is coming. Not with hysterical rhetoric of annihilation, false promises of “boots on the ground,” or premature calls to take to the streets before conditions are ripe.

Tell them clearly: the target is the regime, not the nation, culture, or people of Iran.

Include regime insiders in this messaging, focusing on rank-and-file security forces, the regular military (Artesh), and yes, even IRGC leadership. They will receive the message. Some may act on it.

Be honest about what is coming: that breaking this regime will mean severe economic hardship, power disruptions, and scarcity, possibly even water shortages. Pair that honesty with a credible, binding commitment to a brighter future: a detailed blueprint for immediate relief and reconstruction, asset unfreezing, and re-integration into the global economy once the regime falls.

And lastly, assure them that Iran and Iranians will control their own fate, politically and economically.

I don’t consider myself naïve. This will be difficult. I was a specialist on Iran at the CIA for several decades. I saw both the worst and the best of Iran and Iranians. But the Iranian people (and the world) deserve more than this regime has to offer. Let’s give them (and us) that chance.

Prepare the ground, align the message, then execute.

This article was originally published on Mark Fowler's Substack.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:14:54 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Next Drone Won't Have a Radio Link, Our Intelligence Enterprise Needs to Plan for That Now https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-drone-wont-have-a-radio-link-our-intelligence-enterprise-needs-to-plan-for-that-now https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-drone-wont-have-a-radio-link-our-intelligence-enterprise-needs-to-plan-for-that-now On the last day of the 2026 World Cup, NORAD F-16s fired flares over northern New Jersey to warn off civilian pilots who had flown into restricted airspace. During the tournament, federal agencies seized more than 700 drones across 11 host cities. The counter-drone effort worked.

That's what worries me.

In less than two years, Los Angeles will open the 2028 Olympic Games, a National Special Security Event spread across dozens of venues followed weeks later by the Paralympics. The threat there won't be the one we just beat, and this summer's solutions won't be the ones we need.

I've seen this before. From 2010 to 2013 I ran the Army's Rapid Equipping Force in the middle of the counter-IED fight. Congress authorized roughly $21 billion for JIEDDO, and we spent nearly $50 billion more on MRAPs. We still lost the adaptation race. The enemy learned and changed faster than our institutions could. Drones have the same traits that made IEDs so hard to beat: cheap dual-use parts, know-how that spreads through informal networks, and changes that cost the adversary almost nothing. Drones are IEDs that fly.

The next drone won't have a radio link

We don't lack counter-drone technology. But every answer we field starts a clock; someone is already building the counter. In Ukraine and the Gulf, autonomous navigation that doesn't need GPS is maturing quickly. One operator can run a swarm, and AI handles terminal guidance. Most counter-drone systems fielded today detect the radio link between drone and operator, and jam it. The drones that matter in 2028 may not have one.

When the sensor at the venue can't hear the drone, the warning has to come from before launch. Left of launch is intelligence.

Weak signals become capabilities before we see them

The drone threat rarely announces itself. During the battle for Mosul in 2016 and 2017, ISIS dropped small munitions from commercial quadcopters. In 2024, fiber-optic drones appeared in Ukraine as a workaround to jamming and quickly became widespread. In June 2025, Ukraine smuggled more than 100 small drones into Russia hidden in trucks, flew them over commercial mobile networks with open-source autopilot software, and struck strategic bomber bases as far away as Siberia. It was built from commercial parts and networks. The capability was the combination.

The same thing is happening here, in plain sight. A small startup has built software that keeps data moving when networks fail, uses AI agents to fuse that data and recommend actions, and ships new features every week. It's built for logistics. Pair it with an off-the-shelf mesh radio sold for drones; vendors say some can cover thousands of square miles from altitude. In a matter of months, a small team could field a jam-resistant, AI-assisted network of drones and sensors that no requirement anticipated and no threat library lists.

Nothing about either piece is a threat. That's the problem. We catalog platforms; the threat emerges in the combinations. And the expertise to put them together is for hire. This month, a Ukrainian air defense officer offered me his team's combat experience on LinkedIn.

Intelligence is more than threat warning

Our intelligence enterprise tends to treat counter-drone support as a threat function: who is flying, what they intend, what is coming. That job matters, but it's one of three.

The second job is awareness. Near a stadium or a base, most drones are flown by hobbyists, photographers, delivery services or people who never checked the rules. The hard problem is finding the one that matters in a crowded sky. That takes a picture of normal: Remote ID, FAA authorizations, event credentials, known commercial traffic. Most of that data sits outside intelligence channels, with the FAA, commercial operators, and state and local agencies that gained their own counter-drone authority on July 1 under the SAFER SKIES Act. The fusion model has to be built with these partners, not around them.

The third job is adaptation. Every drone we recover tells us how the adversary is changing: firmware, components, frequencies, supply chains. That knowledge has to reach the people building countermeasures and the units that will face the same drone next week. When Gen. Stanley McChrystal's task force in Iraq tied intelligence to operations, it went from about 18 raids a month in 2004 to about 300 a month by 2006. Not with better equipment, but because every completed cycle made the next one faster.

One threat, one learning loop

It's tempting to treat Los Angeles as a homeland security problem and the Gulf as a warfighting problem. The drone doesn't care. The same parts, tactics and know-how reach forward bases, stateside installations and crowded stadiums at the same time. Northern Command couldn't determine who flew several drones over a strategic U.S. installation after the Iran campaign began this year.

That cuts both ways. What we exploit from a drone downed overseas is the earliest warning Los Angeles will get. What we test at stadiums at home, in real conditions, strengthens the force overseas. JIATF 401 convenes DHS, the FBI, the FAA and dozens of other federal organizations; its director, Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, puts it plainly: "Nobody can solve this problem alone." Intelligence has to be the engine that makes that connection worth having.

Two clocks, one collision point

Our planning runs on a deliberate, gated clock: fund, test, buy, then freeze the configuration so people can train on it. The adversary's clock has no freeze date. State actors are patient: they watch our events, probe our installations and study our playbook. Extremists and lone actors copy what works overseas, hide among careless flyers and can change tactics up to the day they act. Whatever becomes cheap and proven overseas in early 2028 will be available to them in July 2028.

The collision point is our freeze date. Whatever they adopt after it, we meet unrehearsed.

The answer: test continuously through 2027 at real events, buy fast in early 2028, and never fully freeze. Keep money, authority and software update paths open so something can still change in the final 90 days.

Intelligence has to unfreeze the plan

Only intelligence can create the pressure to reopen a plan that has been funded, tested and trained on. Program managers have every incentive not to, and operators rarely get the chance. The intelligence community should schedule those assessments now, tied to the plan's decision points:

  • a threat baseline today
  • a reassessment after every 2027 test and every real incident
  • a formal assessment before we buy
  • a final one inside the last 90 days

Each should answer one question: what has changed that should change the plan?

Sometimes the answer will be "nothing." The system has to be ready for the times it's "a lot." That means flexible funding that portfolio managers can move as the threat moves, and a Congress willing to let them.

In Afghanistan, when the enemy adapted faster than we did, soldiers and allies paid for the delay. We know the date of the next test. Build for the threat we'll face in 2028, not the one we just beat.

Pete Newell is the CEO of BMNT and a former director of the Army's Rapid Equipping Force.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:14:54 +0100 FirstHandNews
Unique Risks of AI Adoption in Developing Economies https://belimedia.com.ng/unique-risks-of-ai-adoption-in-developing-economies https://belimedia.com.ng/unique-risks-of-ai-adoption-in-developing-economies The U.S. must set dominance of global AI sector as a strategic economic and national security priority. If the PRC becomes the dominant provider of AI infrastructure and LLM model development, this will have dire consequences for the U.S. and allow the PRC to embed itself in many foreign countries, especially across developing economies. Developing economies, which have a more positive view of AI than their more developed counterparts, face increased risks and less ability to counter them.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is actively working to shape technological choices, including those related to AI through its Digital Silk Road. While the stated purpose of the program is to enhance global connectivity, it carries strings. The program embeds Chinese tech standards and companies on participants, which expands Beijing’s economic, geopolitical, and directive influence in cyberspace. These investments include hardware and software infrastructure that can lead to an effective long-term lockout of other competitors in this space. The U.S cannot let this happen.

U.S. failure to lead risks both the economic advantages, including market access, of the largest AI ecosystem and the ability to shape global standards, governance, norms and values (including privacy). In the absence of U.S. leadership, this space is likely to be filled by a nation with differing standards, norms, and values. When the U.S. engages, it can offer transparent partnership with auditable open models, reducing the chance that partners turn to less safe alternatives, and strengthening U.S. partnerships with those countries going forward.

If Beijing's systems become the default, it may not only provide data to improve their own AI capabilities, but also potentially exposes the purchasing country, and U.S. interests in that country, to disruption or espionage risk. These risks grow exponentially if these either adversarial or compromised AI systems are used in ports, grids, communications or other critical systems.

AI is not physical infrastructure, but when widely embedded it becomes infrastructural -- hard to replace, a key foundation for economic activity, and subject to resilience, security and lock-in dynamics that give the provider geopolitical leverage.

This combination of risks and opportunities makes U.S. leadership in developing-economy AI investments essential, not only for American economic interests, but also for the long-term national security and sovereignty of developing economies themselves. Converting those advantages into durable influence in the developing world requires deliberate engagement, including efforts like Pax Silica. The window for trusted U.S. partnerships on secure infrastructure, open and auditable models, and capacity building is open but narrowing.

Notable trends in AI investments in the Developing World

Across the world, governments are seeking to leverage AI for public and private sector gains, but funding sources and the types of AI models employed diverge significantly. These choices have large short- and long-term impacts. Between 2017 and 2025 more than 80 countries published national AI strategies. As of 2023 developing countries were less than half as likely (just 30 percent) to have these strategies as developed countries (more than 60 percent).

While national AI strategies are expanding across developing economies, follow-through including funding - varies. For example, India’s IndiaAI Mission has committed substantial resources to infrastructure and ecosystem development aimed at sovereign capabilities. Kenya has adopted a National AI Strategy (2025–2030) alongside skilling initiatives and public-private AI hubs. The African Union’s Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy provides a regional framework, while countries such as Nigeria and Rwanda are advancing targeted investments in AI centers and applications.

Many of these efforts are public-private partnerships with both domestic and foreign funding. A PRC company has positioned itself as Rwanda’s digital transformation infrastructure partner on projects including but not limited to AI. The PRC is also building key parts of Kenya’s AI infrastructure and providing funding to support it through loans.

A key trend is the choice between open-source, open-weight and closed, or proprietary models. Open-source and open-weight offer customizability, including linguistically, increased data control and sovereignty, and the ability to self-host, meaning the owner controls the infrastructure and can better control the costs. Fully open-source models go further by also releasing training data and code, allowing deeper inspection. Open-weight models require less upfront costs than open-source, which requires training from scratch.

Closed or proprietary models usually deliver out-of-the-box performance, require less infrastructure and come with providers who support continuous updates. However, they offer far less customizability and higher, as well as less predictable costs driven by usage volume. They can also create dependence on the provider for access, security, and future capabilities. These choices will shape data flows, as well as technological and geopolitical dependencies, for decades. Proactive U.S. leadership can help ensure AI becomes a source of shared prosperity and security rather than risking a new avenue of vulnerability and influence.

Unique challenges of AI in the developing world

Most low- and lower-middle-income countries face challenges in finding talent to support AI and other ICT needs, limiting local ability to design or train models. Developing markets also face private sector hesitancy to finance large-scale AI infrastructure given low demand and less reliable power which reduce guarantees that returns will justify the capital outlay. This makes government investment and use of AI for services a potentially critical anchor for AI infrastructure and adoption by creating the initial demand that later attracts broader private investment.

Developing countries are also more likely to have weaker legal and regulatory frameworks, creating uncertainty for AI investment and implementation. Lack of clarity around liability and enforcement raise costs and uncertainty which deters investments, since risk is more challenging to reliably assess or manage. Weak frameworks can also lead to AI exacerbating underlying issues by making processes, such as authoritarian surveillance, more efficient.

AI usage presents privacy risks that are heightened in lower capacity environments common in the developing world. AI models require massive amounts of data often including sensitive personal information such as location, biometrics, and communications to support pattern recognition that lets them serve users. Uses such as healthcare, smart cities, and surveillance infrastructure, require collecting and leveraging huge amounts of highly sensitive data. AI models also require auditing including for bias, which exposes the data and may let vendors or governments repurpose it.

Whenever large amounts of data are collected, privacy is at risk, making it important to minimize inadvertent exposure. Strong cybersecurity standards are essential for protecting this data. This makes it essential that privacy is included by design – from the outset – in AI efforts. These principles must be coupled with broader secure-by-design cybersecurity principles and leveraged into frameworks that are incorporated into all implementation.

For example, many countries lack comprehensive data protection laws, and enforcement mechanisms may be especially weak in developing economies, making it difficult to impose meaningful constraints on data collection, use, or cross-border transfer. Countries with weaker institutions and legal foundations face increased risks. These factors make privacy principles both more essential and more challenging to implement in developing countries.

Different Model Types as Developing Countries Adopt AI at the Government Level

Open-source and open-weight models are the primary ones being adopted by developing economies at the government level, chosen to support sovereignty and reduce dependency risk. Closed or proprietary models often involve data flowing outside the sovereign country, risking access by another state and passage into jurisdictions with different safeguards. But localized data alone does solve for data security, and even with self-hosting, limited local cybersecurity remains a risk.

Data centers being located physically in country does not necessarily give control over the technology, data, or strategic assets. For example, across Southeast Asia especially Malaysia and Indonesia the rapid expansion has been driven largely by foreign hyperscalers, but the underlying technology and decision rights are outside the host-country’s control. This can also create risk of export-control diversion, for example Singapore’s 2025 prosecution around misrepresentation of the end-users of servers containing U.S.-controlled Nvidia chips.

It is likely that open-source and open-weight models will remain the primary choice for high-volume and self-hosted use driven by cost and return on investment. Open models achieve approximately 90 percent of the performance of closed models at release and quickly make up the difference. This performance gap is continuing to narrow, and costs for comparative open models can be 17 percent that of the alternatives.

Across developing economies, AI models from the PRC are gaining traction more quickly than Western models. DeepSeek is being adopted across Africa at a rate two to four times that of Western alternatives, likely because of the cost and openness, key factors in resource constrained environments. Of note, Australia, Taiwan and South Korea have all issued public warnings around the security risks of DeepSeek, including banning its use on government devices. Some U.S. models are competing, such as Meta's open-source Llama which is used for purposes including to deliver agricultural advisory services in Kenya, Nigeria, and India. But AI adoption and development across the world are evolving, leaving opportunity for market capture still in flux.

Current Impacts of PRC Investment in AI in Developing Countries

The PRC has been focused on advancing its global digital infrastructure footprint for more than a decade through a Belt and Road linked Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR covers a broad range of investments from surveillance technology to cloud computing and AI, from infrastructure to LLMs. Infrastructure support of any kind is uniquely difficult to reverse, locking in relationships between the two countries even if the geopolitical landscape shifts. This can open the door to coercive leverage should the providing country wish to exert it.

The PRC has already built significant parts of digital infrastructure across the Global South, especially across Africa and Asia, including telecommunications networks, fiber-optic cables, data centers, cloud services, and smart cities. By building this infrastructure, providing software and setting operating standards, the PRC creates systems that their state actors understand completely posing significant risk for penetration and influence. PRC’s national security laws require Chinese firms to cooperate with the state, meaning that the use of even supposedly private-sector technology from the PRC presents government surveillance risks. This poses a risk as the U.S. attempts to engage with these countries across sectors.

AI is likely to be foundational for the global economy over the next century. When countries adopt an AI product in partnership with another country they at least informally adhere to the standards of the producer. PRC leadership on AI opens the door for Beijing to set global standards on detecting bias and training models that are likely to think about the world the way the CCP does. The U.S. not leading in this space does not just risk U.S. market share but also the U.S. ability to set the operational and cultural standards for AI. If a U.S. adversary captures this market and sets these standards the U.S. will face long-term national security challenges.

How to Win

The U.S. does not need to match the PRC dollar for dollar but must arrive with solutions and credible long-term funding packages to the global south. The PRC’s own neighborhood, the Indo-Pacific, can offer a model for how this might function. In 2022, Solomon Islands took a PRC concessional loan to build 161 Huawei telecommunications towers. Yet when Australia funded the Coral Sea Cable in 2018 in place of a Huawei proposal to connect Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, and when Australia, Japan and the U.S. committed to jointly finance the East Micronesia Cable, allies showed that a trusted, competitive alternative can win when it is financed and offered early.

The U.S. can work with allies and partners already in these markets, particularly Australia, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore in the Indo-Pacific, to co-finance infrastructure. These partnerships can and should also include security assistance that supports model evaluation and guidance on secure hosting. Such partnerships offer governments across the Global South a strong alternative without asking them to choose between great powers, a choice many are reticent to make. ]]>
Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:14:54 +0100 FirstHandNews
How America Wins the AI Race With Open Source https://belimedia.com.ng/how-america-wins-the-ai-race-with-open-source https://belimedia.com.ng/how-america-wins-the-ai-race-with-open-source Speaking in Shanghai on July 17, Xi Jinping offered the world a vision of AI “for the positive, for good and for humanity.” He called for open source, openness, and sharing. He cautioned against stretching national security to cover the field. And he announced that over the next five years China will train 5,000 people from developing countries, build AI application cooperation centers with ASEAN, the Arab League, the African Union, CELAC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS, and extend its MAZU meteorological warning system to 30 countries. The World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization now exists in Shanghai with 37 member states.

This reasonable sounding offer is aimed squarely at the governments the United States most needs: countries that want AI capacity, local control, and a voice in setting the rules. For these governments sovereignty means control rather than independence, and a system they can operate locally is an easier sell than a remotely controlled API. Beijing pairs capable open weight models and inexpensive inference with training, institutions, and public goods, then wraps the package in the vocabulary of multilateralism and the United Nations.

The results are already visible. CNAS counted sovereign AI initiatives in 67 countries and the European Union by mid-2026, up from 16 governments in 2023, and most model projects with disclosed foundations adapt a foreign open weight model rather than train one. Increasingly that foundation is Chinese. Spain’s Quasar 438B, billed as Europe’s strongest reasoning model, is built on Z.ai’s GLM-5.2. Japan’s Rakuten AI 3.0 uses the DeepSeek-V3 architecture. AI Singapore built its latest regional model on Alibaba’s Qwen rather than Meta’s Llama, and Saudi Arabia’s HUMAIN commissioned its Arabic model from MiniMax. Chinese open-weight models passed the American share of global downloads for the first time in 2025, and on OpenRouter, a marketplace that routes developer traffic to models, their share of usage climbed from under 15 percent to more than half within a year, with businesses in the Global South the heaviest users.

The United States can win this competition, but not just by publishing the most advanced models and declaring victory. It must make American technology the preferred foundation for other countries’ AI systems, as American software and protocols became the foundation of the modern internet. That requires capable models, affordable hardware, financing, training, and dependable support, assembled into an offer that can stand beside a cheaper Chinese full-stack bid.

What America Must Do to Win

Washington should compete throughout hardware, models, software, and services. Retreating to frontier models and advanced chips while China supplies the open models, inexpensive inference, and industrial applications through which most of the world will actually use AI would surrender the contest at the layers where adoption happens.

Openness alone wins nothing. It gives a country seeking local control a reason to consider a model, not a reason to prefer an American one over a Chinese one. The American model must win on performance, total cost, local-language capability, reliable supply, and support, and it must leave room for domestic firms to build businesses around it. Partners deserve honest terms about licenses, updates, and what happens when a supplier relationship ends, and they have reason to ask. When U.S. controls forced Anthropic to suspend access to its newest models from June 12 to June 30, governments learned that even allies can lose access to American systems on a decision made in Washington. Autonomy has to be part of the product, because autonomy is what Beijing is selling.

The model is not hypothetical. An Indian financial firm runs DeepSeek on rented GPUs in India; the weights reside locally, inference never leaves the country, and there is no API for a foreign developer to revoke. Partners want the same from America, with the hardware, financing, and support that make it work. The developers now building on Qwen and DeepSeek show the cost of ceding that ground: expertise accumulates around particular models, models are tuned for particular hardware, and both pull future purchasing with them.

What China Is Doing

Xi’s language of openness should be read alongside that of Chen Yixin, China’s Minister of State Security. Writing in the Cyberspace Administration’s magazine in September, Chen describes AI as a primary battleground of great-power competition. He links political security, espionage, cyber capability, and military transformation to technological independence and control over international governance. An intelligence chief is explaining how AI alters the conditions under which his state exercises power. The two speeches are not in tension. One describes the offer; the other describes the objective.

The institutions Xi announced serve both. A cooperation center with each major regional bloc is a venue where Chinese models, hardware, and standards become the default for an entire region’s developers. A meteorological warning system deployed in 30 countries is a public good that also installs Chinese infrastructure and data flows in 30 capitals; an Egypt-specific version with aviation weather and sandstorm warnings is already in development, while Huawei courts Cairo for its Ascend chips and Malaysia weighs the same hardware. This is the softer sell: adapt the technology to the customer’s existing systems rather than demand reorganization around the supplier, as 01.AI did in building Kazakhstan’s national model. The World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization is a bid to set governance terms in a body Beijing convened, and Xi’s warning against an expansive national security concept is a preemptive argument against the export controls Washington relies on. Washington should engage on international standards, but only where the decision rules leave Beijing no approval power over American development or release, at home or abroad.

Beijing’s openness may not last. Reuters reported in July that Chinese authorities were weighing restrictions on their own frontier models, and the TC260 AI Safety Governance Framework 3.0, released September 14 under CAC guidance, points the same way. Alongside provisions on loss of control and autonomous cyberattacks, its treatment of capability diffusion and removable safeguards suggests China may grow more selective about open releases. If so, its position as the default supplier of capable open models may not endure, and the window for an American alternative is open now.

The Tradeoff America Should Accept

Open models cannot be recalled once distributed. That is their appeal to partners, and it means adversaries will use them. The presumption should nonetheless favor open release. Any exception should identify the capability at issue, the security benefit of withholding it, the cost to American adoption, and whether adversaries can obtain comparable capability elsewhere. With a near-peer challenger offering alternatives, withholding American models may merely divert adoption without diminishing adversary capability. Washington can still restrict advanced chip exports for defined security reasons; a partner’s choice of competing hardware is a reason to improve the offer, not to penalize the partner.

Partner autonomy does not require surrendering American authority over domestic release decisions, export licensing, or the integrity of U.S. networks. It requires accepting that American benefits need not depend on a remote veto over systems partners already operate. Government and military users at home should continue to choose systems, closed or open, on performance and security.

What Washington Should Do

The July 2025 AI Action Plan endorses open-source and open-weight AI, and Executive Order 14320 on exporting the American AI stack supplies a framework for coordinated technology packages, diplomacy, and financing. The task is to convert those commitments into an offer that wins.

Fund what the market will undersupply: sustained open releases, smaller-language capability, independent evaluation, and affordable local deployment. Make the complete package competitive, with financing, predictable hardware access, workforce training, and genuine roles for local firms, and resource it as the national security priority it is. The Export-Import Bank’s $66.1 million guarantee for Côte d’Ivoire’s national data center shows the tools exist; it needs to operate at the scale of China’s regional cooperation centers. Demonstrate the bargain with willing partners through a sovereign AI pilot, potentially building on Pax Silica, that discloses remaining dependencies and compares cost, delivery time, and power requirements against the alternatives. Each regional cooperation center Beijing opens should have an American counterpart that partners can judge on results. Then measure the results: which models partners choose, whose hardware serves them, and who earns the integration revenue. A lost American sale does not always deepen dependence on China, and a won one does not always reduce it.

American leadership will prove most durable when partners have their own reasons to sustain it. The test is what countries choose to build, and whether building with America remains worth it to them.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:14:54 +0100 FirstHandNews
NATO Can’t Count Its Way to Maritime Superiority https://belimedia.com.ng/nato-cant-count-its-way-to-maritime-superiority https://belimedia.com.ng/nato-cant-count-its-way-to-maritime-superiority Allied navies are still counting hulls. The contest at sea is now about who sees, decides, and acts first.

Earlier this month, Western officials disclosed that American, British, and Norwegian forces had tracked and confronted Russian deep-sea units near Svalbard this spring as they rehearsed a method for disabling undersea cables. The Russian vessels were stopped before they finished the sabotage and left the area. The confrontation matters less than how it was won. The Allies saw the activity in time to act.

That is the right lens for NATO's maritime future.

For four centuries, the sea hid things. Distance, weather, and the Earth's curvature made finding a fleet harder than fighting one. Navies were built accordingly. They concentrated their combat power on a small number of survivable platforms and used the ocean's opacity to arrive where the enemy was not.

That premise is failing.

Commercial satellite imagery now refreshes at rates that were classified a decade ago. Radio-frequency geolocation, synthetic aperture radar, and machine-assisted pattern analysis have turned surface tracking into a subscription service. A warship radiating in the Eastern Mediterranean is a known quantity to anyone willing to pay for the data, and increasingly to anyone willing to scrape it for a fee.

Detection has always been the hard half of the kill chain. Once it becomes cheap, the economics of naval warfare is inverted. A ship that can be found continuously must survive continuously, against munitions that cost a small fraction of its value. That is NATO's real maritime problem, and procurement alone will not solve it. The Alliance cannot out-build its way to advantage at sea, because the thing being contested is no longer mass. It is decision speed.

Each of NATO's maritime theaters is a variation on that single condition, and each demands a different answer.

The High North: The Last Opaque Water

The waters from the Bear Gap to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap remain the transatlantic hinge. Reinforcements to Europe still move by sea. Whatever the state of Russian industry, the Northern Fleet's submarine force remains the most credible threat to those sea lines.

It is also the one theater where transparency does not yet hold. The undersea domain is still opaque, which is precisely why Russia invests there. Submarines and seabed activity are the remaining sanctuary in an otherwise observable world. Moscow's sustained attention to cables and energy infrastructure, now including the rehearsal near Svalbard, suggests it understands the asymmetry well.

NATO's task in the north is therefore not defensive patrol. It is extending transparency into the last place that lacks it. That means persistent autonomous pickets and fixed and deployable seabed sensors. It means uncrewed underwater vehicles operating on timescales no crewed platform can sustain, and a processing architecture that fuses it all.

Success should be measured by time to detection and time to cue, not by the number of frigates on the plot. Frigates that NATO cannot crew and cannot protect neither improve either condition.

The Baltic: Where Geography Argues Back

The Baltic is different. It is shallow, narrow, and cluttered with islands and commercial traffic, and that environment degrades the sensing advantage transparency depends on. Bottom clutter defeats sonar. Littoral noise defeats classification. Mines remain cheap, legal, deniable, and effective. Whoever occupies the ground beside them can hold or lose the chokepoints that matter.

Sensors do not clear a minefield, and autonomy does not hold an island. Marines, mine countermeasures forces, and special operations teams remain vital in the Baltic in a way they are not in the Norwegian Sea.

The Baltic incidents of recent years, including repeated damage to cables and power interconnectors, were not failures of firepower. They were failures of attribution. The Alliance was too slow to see, too slow to characterize, and too slow to connect a dragged anchor to a named ship.

The Baltic needs a sensing web that knows what happened while it is still happening, and forces postured to contest key terrain when it does. Transparency buys nothing if nothing is ready to act on it.

The Black Sea: The Demonstration Already Happened

Everywhere else, this argument is a forecast. In the Black Sea, it is a finding.

Ukraine, with no meaningful surface fleet, forced Russia to move much of its Black Sea Fleet away from Sevastopol. It did so with shore-based missiles, uncrewed surface vessels, and targeting drawn from allied and commercial sources. Whatever else that campaign proved, it showed that persistent surveillance plus cheap effectors can deny sea control to a navy that normally holds it.

The post-war theater will be shaped by that memory on both sides, and access will remain constrained. The Montreux Convention caps the aggregate tonnage that non-Black Sea powers may keep in the sea and limits their warships' stays to 21 days. Separately, Türkiye has barred belligerent warships from the straits under Article 19 since February 2022, subject to the convention's exception for vessels returning to their home bases. These are distinct levers, and NATO's re-entry planning depends on which one relaxes, and when. Neither is NATO's decision.

The Black Sea will therefore be secured, if it is secured, by its littoral allies. Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria will need to operate as a single sensor-shooter architecture. Other allies should contribute data, munitions, uncrewed systems, and shore-based fires rather than visiting hulls. The theater will not become permissive. The realistic objective is to make it transparent and ensure NATO is the party that sees first.

The Mediterranean: Transparent but Crowded

The Mediterranean presents the opposite problem from the High North. It may already be the most transparent sea NATO operates in. It is ringed by allied coastlines, saturated with commercial traffic, and covered by dense sensor networks. Finding ships there is not hard. Making sense of them is.

The strategic picture has also shifted. The fall of the Assad regime has left Russia's naval foothold at Tartus in doubt and its Mediterranean presence diminished. That eases one long-standing challenge without lightening NATO's load. The remaining threats are harder to categorize. They include shadow-fleet tankers of uncertain ownership, activity near undersea cables and pipelines, uncrewed systems in the hands of state and non-state actors, and southern-flank instability that spills into the maritime domain.

In a sea this crowded, the limiting factor is not detection but discrimination. The task is to separate the one vessel that matters from the thousands that do not, fast enough to act. The Mediterranean is where NATO should prove it can turn an overwhelming volume of maritime data into timely decisions. If the Alliance cannot do that in its most observable waters, it will not do it anywhere else.

Measuring the Right Thing

The Svalbard episode is a preview of the maritime contest to come. As satellites, distributed sensors, and AI-enabled analysis make the surface ever more visible, advantage will belong to whoever can see beneath it, make sense of what it sees, and act before the other side does.

That requires NATO to change what it counts. Hulls and tonnage remain necessary, but they are no longer sufficient measures of naval power. The metrics that matter now are time to detect, time to attribute, and time to act, in every theater from the Arctic to the Levant.

An Alliance that measures itself that way will hold the maritime advantage. One that keeps counting ships risks investing in fleets built for a world that no longer exists.

This piece was originally published by Matthew Van Wagenen

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Trump’s Rejection of Iran Offer Highlights Another Big Problem https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-rejection-of-iran-offer-highlights-another-big-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-rejection-of-iran-offer-highlights-another-big-problem Beijing says artificial intelligence will give the state a visible hand to allocate capital. Here’s the rub: Washington’s economic authority sits in five places, and none of them is in command.

This column begins a four-week series ahead of The Cipher Brief Threat Conference on economic-warfare. The author is hosting a live session on this topic with former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, General Bryan Fenton (Ret.). Apply now to attend.

On September 26, the President answered the week's largest security question in just four words: "I'm rejecting their deal." Iran's offer to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days, in exchange for lifting the blockade and waiving oil sanctions, had been on the table since September 24. It received its answer in public, from the one official authorized to give it, inside forty-eight hours.

The week's economic questions received no answer of that kind. The trade truce with China, and the pause on Beijing's rare-earth licensing regime tied to it, moved from November 10 to January 10 on the strength of a Treasury Secretary's statement; Beijing has yet to publish a matching notice.

The Russia sanctions act the President signed on September 18 requires determinations on the largest buyers of Russian energy by October 18, a deadline set by Congress rather than the executive, with waivers broad enough to let it pass unenforced. In February, the Supreme Court ruled six to three in Learning Resources v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize tariffs, removing the instrument the executive had used for its broadest tariffs.

This is important because Washington can decide a war in a sentence. But on the economic front, authority rests with Treasury, Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, Congress, and the courts. Each is competent. None is in command. The arrangement is by design and has served the country well for most of the last eighty years. But not anymore.

Beijing is now claiming a different design. In a recent lecture on Xi Jinping's economic strategy, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who has tracked Chinese ideology for fifty years, described a shift in the Communist Party's theoretical literature. Artificial intelligence (AI) and other "new quality productive forces" are portrayed not only as sources of productivity but also as "a superior macro-allocation mechanism for resources," driven by algorithms. Rudd says the literature now uses the term "the visible hand of the state," offered for the first time as a rival to the market's invisible one. He is careful about its status: the idea sits in the ideological literature, "not yet in the policy literature," and not yet in the behavior of firms. But in his reading, ideology in China is where policy begins.

The hand is already visible without the algorithm. The rare-earth regime now paused until January, the Ministry of Commerce's Announcement No. 61, applies to any product anywhere that carries more than 0.1 percent Chinese-origin rare-earth content by value. One ministry notice imposed it; one more can reimpose it. The capital moves the same way. Chinese households, burned by property and wary of equities, hold record savings in low-yield bank deposits, and the state draws on those deposits through local, provincial, and national loan instruments to fund its technology bet. Rhodium Group puts China's AI capital spending at 932 billion renminbi this year, double last year's, financed by state banks and equity placements rather than bond markets.

America's AI buildout is financed the other way. Its five largest builders raised a net $163 billion in debt in the first half of this year, compared with $90 billion in all of 2025, in a bond market where the ten-year Treasury has reached 5.18 percent, its highest since 2007. No ministry allocated that capital. The market did, and the market will reprice it.

Neither design is simply superior, and the distinction matters more than the verdict. A single allocator is fast and brittle. It can direct capital, licenses, and supply to a strategic target within a week, and it can misallocate at the same speed. The household savings now financing the AI bet were poured into a property boom that left many of those households with assets worth only a fraction of what they paid. A distributed system is slow and resilient. Its errors stay local, its capital carries a price, and no single notice can switch it off. In peacetime competition, resilience compounds. In economic warfare, tempo is the contested variable, and the side that can decide within the other's cycle sets the terms. Beijing has already shown what that looks like. It imposed its rare-earth regime by notice on October 9 of last year and suspended it by another on November 7, having collected in between Washington's agreement to delay its own rule extending export controls to the affiliates of blacklisted firms. Two notices, one month, one American concession.

This column has traced the same gap from the drone fleet to the power grid: the capacity exists, and the decision does not. The economic front shows it at national scale. Washington holds the reserve currency, the deepest capital markets, and the reach of the dollar system. What it lacks is a place to settle competing claims on those instruments and to make them binding on the timeline decided by an adversary.

October 18 is the first live test. The sanctions act's determinations are due that day, just sixteen days before the midterm elections. They will be imposed, waived, or deferred, and whichever it is will say more about the American economic hand than any strategy document published this year. Beijing will be watching the same date, holding a notice it can publish on any morning it chooses.

The question for Washington is who, when economic warfare requires a decision, is empowered to make it, and whether that decision can arrive before the adversary's action. Coordination assigns. Integration arbitrates.

Read more expert-driven national security insights in The Cipher Brief. Need full access to more content like this? Become a Subscriber+Member here.

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
AI Is Coming to the Counter&Drone Fight https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-is-coming-to-the-counter-drone-fight https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-is-coming-to-the-counter-drone-fight “Twenty years ago, the state of North Dakota poured in multiple millions of dollars to figure out what it looks like to do beyond visual line-of-sight operations for Class One, Two, and Three Drones. That was just the very nascent stage. Just a decade ago, ten years ago, they figured out that they can do this. They could do this at Grand Forks Air Force Base. Right across from our [air base] runway, on the active duty side, is a place called Grand Sky. It is an innovation research park for all counter-drone operations. It is one of the largest in the United States. They rent the space on our base. It's legitimately federal property that they lease for the research park.”

That was Air Force Col. Alfred J. Rosales, Commander, 319th Reconnaissance Wing, based at Grand Forks Air Force Base, speaking on September 14, at the 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference, as moderator of a panel on Counter-Drone Defense.

I had never heard about what the Grand Forks locals call GrandSKY as a home for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), where for a decade major defense contractors such as Northrop Grumman and General Atomics have been flight testing and carrying out drone research and development.

Back in May, the Defense Department’s Joint Interagency Task Force 401, central authority for the counter-small unmanned aircraft systems program, selected five installations to participate in the directed-energy counter-unmanned aircraft systems pilot program, of which Grand Forks was one.

More recently, as Rosales put it, at the Grand Forks Base, they have been “strapping on vendor equipment” to “build tactics and techniques.” That process will help determine, he said, “How do we want directed-energy weapons to be used inside the United States in FAA [Federal Aviation Agency] controlled airspace, not in the restricted ranges of our Air Force.”

Rosales introduced his September 14, panel whom he said were industry leaders who were “translating technology into trust to allow us to win in the future.”

They were:

Dr. Ben Van Roo, Chief Executive Officer, Legion Intelligence, who, using Artificial Intelligence (AI) was working to get the equipment needed at the tactical level to be able to provide decision-making space without being connected to the Cloud the entire time.

Early on Van Roo said, “We're really still in the infancy right now of how we think about where we're going to use [computer] agents [AI]. What are we going to allow them to decide on? How do they work their way into our TTPs [Tactics, Techniques and Procedures] into our doctrine? And then, the other side, and the big question that we also think about is are they even going to be available?”

Van Roo continued, “The way that we want to use Artificial Intelligence is going to be one, it's still got to be sorted out. What are we going to allow these things [AI] decide to do? Where are they going to work? Into everything from the kill chain to just basic intelligence gathering? And then how are we going to make them more resilient? These are the next layers of challenges that are ahead of us.”

Adam Mohamed, Chief Technology Officer, Asylon Robotics, a Boston Dynamics Partner, who works on autonomous robotics, figuring out how we can layer base defense architecture with our air domain experts.

“Situational awareness is king,” Mohamed said, “because everything else flows from that. And having static situation awareness, mobile situational awareness, being able to understand your battle space is going to take precedence over everything else. The sensor fusion will happen. We'll have the AI. We'll have the ability to operate without a Cloud. But we need to be able to operate when we start losing our sensors, we start losing our radars, we start losing our shooters, and how do we adapt and how does the system adapt for you, because there won't be time for you to make the change to switch over.”

Colton Wood, Chief Technology Officer, Digital Force Technologies, who works on multi-sensor integration. How do we use AI to get the common operating pictures we so desperately desire -- the integration piece that's going to help defeat drones.

Wood said, “Talking about human in the loop is okay. I got a target, I need to go through the process of actually engaging and affecting that target. As we see the threat evolving, that is going to be an incredibly difficult thing to do if I have, you know, multiple threats, multiple targets, multiple different engagement systems…I've set all the rules of engagement. I've set the governance on the systems and then I have a strong decision supported by tools in front of me. But once I've made that decision, I need to be able to engage the systems and machines need to be able to engage the threats, almost autonomously.”

Therefore, Wood explained, “And so I think a lot of simulations, understanding how these systems operate, where the left and right limits are and then allowing these systems to be as effective as they can be without us having to shepherd the process is a very thing that we have to think about [in the] very near future here.”

And finally, Michael Hiatt, Chief Technology Officer, Epirus, who works with Directed-Energy weapons, lasers, the essence of kill-chain dynamics. He comes with skill sets on how to integrate and work in that space.

Hiatt said, “Your risk is very different if you have to literally put metal [kinetic weapons] in the air, you know, with kinetics or, you know, proximate-burst rounds or whatever the kinetic options are. If you can have an option that has lower collateral effects and no collateral damage, you know, which is what the Directed-Energy [DE, laser] weapons offer, you start to be able to change your risk calculation.”


Hiatt continued, “But when for the folks that are on the ground, you know, the battle captain trying to trying to make that assessment, it's not a cost asymmetry problem. It's a magazine depth issue because, you know, what's the reload time on my kinetic? What's the, you know, what's the fly-out time? How many do I, you know, what's my shot doctrine? Do I do a shoot, look, shoot? Do I do a shoot, shoot, look? You know, those are the things that affect magazine consumption.”

Hiatt added, “The reality is you know DE weapons aren't out-ranging kinetic [weapons]. And so when you start to say, ‘All right, I'm going to hold fire on my kinetics. I'm going to let that threat come in closer than I would like because I trust that my DE weapons are going to take it out.’ That's the level of trust that we got to get to.”

At the end of the 41-minute session, Col. Rosales tried to sum it up saying, “This space in counter drones is not a spectator sport. It's for all of us to think through it, industry, academia, the United States Air Force. What I hear is that we are beyond asking what these things are, AI agents, as they incorporate into this picture. We're at the point where we're figuring out what it could look like in terms of policy [so] that we can then get to the next step -- in training and exercising with a rigor to ensure that we have the trust to have our airmen engage when those courses of action are recommended.”

My guess is we are nowhere close to deciding policies where AI fits into the counter-drone fight, nor in warfare itself.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Houthis Took the Red Sea Coast. How Did Washington Miss It? https://belimedia.com.ng/the-houthis-took-the-red-sea-coast-how-did-washington-miss-it https://belimedia.com.ng/the-houthis-took-the-red-sea-coast-how-did-washington-miss-it The recent military moves taken by Yemens Houthis resulted in stunning victories and significant strategic gains, virtually unopposed. By taking the Red Sea port of Mocha (Al-Makha), occupying Perim Island in the middle of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and seizing portions of the Red Sea coast, the Iranian proxy group now threatens a key commercial waterway. Reports indicate that, unsurprisingly – or at least it should not be a surprise – Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisors were present, guiding the tactics of Houthi forces. We missed all of this.

For decades, the United States has had an active, robust CIA, diplomatic, and military presence in the Persian Gulf. Understanding, managing, and balancing the nuanced and sometimes fractious relationships among our Gulf allies has always been a complicated task, but one critical to the national security of both the United States and our Gulf allies. We have all made it work, together.

Until now. Something has gone terribly wrong.

As a former CIA operations officer and Chief of Station in the Gulf, I know that failing to anticipate an Iranian-Houthi move of this magnitude is not a tactical error or simply failing to “connect the dots.” Regional actors have their own specific interests and goals in Yemen. Each has taken its turn in the barrel militarily, seemingly largely uncoordinated and sometimes at odds with one another, to discourage or defeat the Houthis. None has succeeded.

What is lacking is leadership, coordination, and overall command and control among the key players: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. And in the latter’s case, lack of focus.

The current regional conflict seems to have opened rifts in the alliances all of us who served in the Gulf and greater Middle East strove so painstakingly to build and nurture. This is not necessarily through a simple lack of presence or communication; the Commander of CENTCOM was just recently there for consultations, and I have no doubt U.S. military personnel on the ground are in constant and very close contact with their Gulf counterparts. And from my own time there, I am certain U.S. diplomatic and intelligence personnel are equally engaged. This is what we do, and we all do it well.

So how did we miss the Houthi move?

Let’s be clear. This stuff is hard. Anticipating the plans and intentions of an adversary is one of the most important things the intelligence community, and specifically the CIA, does. And the U.S. military has no peer in its planning, logistics, or execution capabilities.

But it is really difficult to anticipate and address the actions of an adversary that relies heavily on asymmetrical warfare.

Particularly when you are dealing with not one but two denied area foes–the U.S. does not have an operational Embassy in either Iran or Yemen. But it can be done; I’ve done it. It just takes focus and, yes, imagination.

But it is important to remember that the intelligence, military, and Diplomatic communities do not operate in a vacuum. Each reports to and receives direction from the White House and DoD. Based on my understanding of how these operate and interact, I can only surmise that the confusion we have seen is emanating from the very top.

Or perhaps an inability, or unwillingness, to manage yet another military crisis.

The U.S.’s lurch into war alongside Israel, one with no apparent end-game, seemingly caught the Gulf Monarchies by surprise. They have suffered the consequences, both militarily and economically. Perhaps ‘Operation Economic Outcast’ - the U.S.’s current intense financial offensive against Iran - will finally bring the Iranian regime to the table to negotiate in good faith. But that remains to be seen. And the Iranians continue to surprise us.

I’ll leave it to others more intimately versed in things Yemeni to analyze the Houthi tactics and strategic goals.

But it should be no surprise that Iran called on the Houthis to make a move at this time. Both the Iranians, and now the Houthis, have proven themselves to be master opportunists. One succeeded in opening a second front in an attempt to lessen the pressure of the U.S. naval blockade and increased sanctions, and the other saw an opportunity to expand their reach. A distracted Washington gave them the opening.

The takeaway: Overconfidence in the ultimate efficacy of Operation Economic Outcast may turn out to be misplaced. If the success of the Houthi advance does not turn out to be an isolated incident, it risks exposing a critical vulnerability in the United States’ strategy. Washington needs to keep its eye on the ball.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Coupang Breach and the Danger of Punishing the Headline Number. https://belimedia.com.ng/the-coupang-breach-and-the-danger-of-punishing-the-headline-number https://belimedia.com.ng/the-coupang-breach-and-the-danger-of-punishing-the-headline-number The headline number from the Coupang data breach — more than 33 million user accounts — sounds like a major incident that implies a catastrophic failure of one of South Korea’s most important company’s cybersecurity programs. South Korea's Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) measures an incident by the “exposure and access” of data, and a disgruntled former engineer who retained and forged credentials did, in principle, have access to that many accounts over seven months. But what actually happened in this case was far narrower. According to Coupang internal investigation, the attacker downloaded data from just under 3,000 accounts, and later deleted it. However, it's worth noting that regulators dispute this finding as overly narrow. The breach exposed no financial information, and he did not transfer anything to any third party. Multiple investigations and reporting to date has surfaced no fraud, identity theft, or downstream misuse traced to the incident. All in all, this was mundane, not catastrophe.

Seoul’s response suggests the government wants to tell a different story. The PIPC investigation culminated in a $409 million fine—more than four times greater than the previous record-breaking fine. The company's SEC filing states that approximately $278 million of the fine is directly related to the incident while $132 million concerns a separate administrative fine concerning date collection. Their intrusive investigative process and the penalty together are meant to broadcast an unmistakable message: this was a massive cybersecurity failure by Coupang due to negligent security practices, that inflicted enormous harm — and Coupang must be punished severely ensuring radical, swift improvements and to deter every other company from replicating these mistakes.

The technical record supports none of that.

A single breach, standing alone with a headline number, often tells you very little about a company’s overall security practices. It can be a symptom of genuine negligence — under-investment, ignored warnings, decayed practices, poorly trained personnel. Or it can be what the sociologist Charles Perrow called a normal accident: small, unexpected failures are inevitable in society’s complex systems. The Coupang breach ran through the company's key management system, and the details — documented in the PIPC's own published investigation and in independent expert assessments Coupang commissioned — read like a case study Perrow could have written for normal accidents. Consider the chain of events the attack required:

  • While still employed as a backend engineer, the attacker violated a company policy that keys must be retained only in the key management system. No monitoring mechanism existed to detect that specific violation.
  • Before leaving, he identified this gap in the security process. He had a duty to report it. He did not — and three months after his departure, he exploited it.
  • Using the stolen signing key and insider knowledge, he forged access credentials. Coupang's gateway server restricted entry to holders of valid tokens — and his forged tokens were cryptographically valid. The system flagged no anomaly because, from the system's perspective, none existed.
  • He built scripts to collect data and transmit it to cloud storage — after he had left the company. There is no evidence that such a transmission ever occurred.

Coupang maintained current hardware and software for key management, layered authentication, and access monitoring. The failure was interactive — a policy violation invisible to monitoring, an unreported vulnerability, an offboarding gap, and an insider who knew exactly where the system’s seams of vulnerability were, because sealing those seams had been his job. That is the anatomy of a normal accident, not of a negligent enterprise.

None of this puts Coupang beyond scrutiny. The PIPC had a legitimate claim to investigate whether this failure was symptomatic of something deeper: negligence, under-investment, or systemically bad practice. That is what data protection regulators exist to do, and the technical depth of the investigation deserves credit. But all that depth uncovered no evidence that any of those things were true.

What should have been a proportionate response? It’s straightforward, and common cybersecurity practice. A breach by definition will expose a gap in a highly complex system that needs to be closed. And so Coupang – and other companies who learn from this incident – must close the accident pathway this breach revealed: credential revocation at offboarding, detection of keys stored outside the key management system, and continuous monitoring of token lifecycles. What government authorities need to do is confirm that the remediation is effective, and that the adjacent failure modes this incident made visible have been plugged. Post-incident verification, not massively punitive penalties that make headlines, is where a regulator actually changes outcomes for the better. The most durable defense against insider threats is a healthy working relationship between public authorities and private companies. Incidents are audited in an honest manner with the lessons learned from events shared across the industry.

A record punitive fine in response to a catastrophe that did not occur does the opposite. It teaches companies that candor and cooperation buy nothing. It converts an addressable security incident into an episode of techno-nationalist strife between allies. That serves no defender, no consumer, and no regulator. The only people it may benefit are the next set of attackers.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Coupang Breach and the Danger of Punishing the Headline Number https://belimedia.com.ng/the-coupang-breach-and-the-danger-of-punishing-the-headline-number-71009 https://belimedia.com.ng/the-coupang-breach-and-the-danger-of-punishing-the-headline-number-71009 The headline number from the Coupang data breach — more than 33 million user accounts — sounds like a major incident that implies a catastrophic failure of one of South Korea’s most important company’s cybersecurity programs. South Korea's Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) measures an incident by the “exposure and access” of data, and a disgruntled former engineer who retained and forged credentials did, in principle, have access to that many accounts over seven months. But what actually happened in this case was far narrower. According to Coupang internal investigation, the attacker downloaded data from just under 3,000 accounts, and later deleted it. However, it's worth noting that regulators dispute this finding as overly narrow. The breach exposed no financial information, and he did not transfer anything to any third party. Multiple investigations and reporting to date has surfaced no fraud, identity theft, or downstream misuse traced to the incident. All in all, this was mundane, not catastrophe.

Seoul’s response suggests the government wants to tell a different story. The PIPC investigation culminated in a $409 million fine—more than four times greater than the previous record-breaking fine. The company's SEC filing states that approximately $278 million of the fine is directly related to the incident while $132 million concerns a separate administrative fine concerning date collection. Their intrusive investigative process and the penalty together are meant to broadcast an unmistakable message: this was a massive cybersecurity failure by Coupang due to negligent security practices, that inflicted enormous harm — and Coupang must be punished severely ensuring radical, swift improvements and to deter every other company from replicating these mistakes.

The technical record supports none of that.

A single breach, standing alone with a headline number, often tells you very little about a company’s overall security practices. It can be a symptom of genuine negligence — under-investment, ignored warnings, decayed practices, poorly trained personnel. Or it can be what the sociologist Charles Perrow called a normal accident: small, unexpected failures are inevitable in society’s complex systems. The Coupang breach ran through the company's key management system, and the details — documented in the PIPC's own published investigation and in independent expert assessments Coupang commissioned — read like a case study Perrow could have written for normal accidents. Consider the chain of events the attack required:

  • While still employed as a backend engineer, the attacker violated a company policy that keys must be retained only in the key management system. No monitoring mechanism existed to detect that specific violation.
  • Before leaving, he identified this gap in the security process. He had a duty to report it. He did not — and three months after his departure, he exploited it.
  • Using the stolen signing key and insider knowledge, he forged access credentials. Coupang's gateway server restricted entry to holders of valid tokens — and his forged tokens were cryptographically valid. The system flagged no anomaly because, from the system's perspective, none existed.
  • He built scripts to collect data and transmit it to cloud storage — after he had left the company. There is no evidence that such a transmission ever occurred.

Coupang maintained current hardware and software for key management, layered authentication, and access monitoring. The failure was interactive — a policy violation invisible to monitoring, an unreported vulnerability, an offboarding gap, and an insider who knew exactly where the system’s seams of vulnerability were, because sealing those seams had been his job. That is the anatomy of a normal accident, not of a negligent enterprise.

None of this puts Coupang beyond scrutiny. The PIPC had a legitimate claim to investigate whether this failure was symptomatic of something deeper: negligence, under-investment, or systemically bad practice. That is what data protection regulators exist to do, and the technical depth of the investigation deserves credit. But all that depth uncovered no evidence that any of those things were true.

What should have been a proportionate response? It’s straightforward, and common cybersecurity practice. A breach by definition will expose a gap in a highly complex system that needs to be closed. And so Coupang – and other companies who learn from this incident – must close the accident pathway this breach revealed: credential revocation at offboarding, detection of keys stored outside the key management system, and continuous monitoring of token lifecycles. What government authorities need to do is confirm that the remediation is effective, and that the adjacent failure modes this incident made visible have been plugged. Post-incident verification, not massively punitive penalties that make headlines, is where a regulator actually changes outcomes for the better. The most durable defense against insider threats is a healthy working relationship between public authorities and private companies. Incidents are audited in an honest manner with the lessons learned from events shared across the industry.

A record punitive fine in response to a catastrophe that did not occur does the opposite. It teaches companies that candor and cooperation buy nothing. It converts an addressable security incident into an episode of techno-nationalist strife between allies. That serves no defender, no consumer, and no regulator. The only people it may benefit are the next set of attackers.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
BLUF: Russian Strategic Culture Drives its Callous and Brutal Actions https://belimedia.com.ng/bluf-russian-strategic-culture-drives-its-callous-and-brutal-actions https://belimedia.com.ng/bluf-russian-strategic-culture-drives-its-callous-and-brutal-actions My friends and family often ask me why Russia behaves so offensively. They are baffled by Russia’s lack of humanity and Moscow’s actions such as hiring assassins, launching drones at innocents, and planning economic sabotage against international companies. While not an excuse, just an explanation, scholars of Russia understand the country’s deep sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Its longing to be a part of Europe, and its own view that its rightful place as a global leader are all driving Russia’s barbaric actions. According to strategic culture theorists, a state’s approach to war is shaped by its cultural and historical experiences, including geography, religion, language, and national identity. These factors influence a state’s perception of security threats, willingness to use military force, and approach to diplomacy and negotiation. They also help us to anticipate a state’s actions.

Russian strategic culture reflects a worldview shaped by centuries of conflict, invasion, brutality against others, inflicted on its people from foreign powers and by the government against its own population, and foiled attempts to become card carrying members of the west. Key elements of Russian strategic culture include the belief that the rest of the world, especially the West consistently undermines Russia and thwarts it rightful place as a world leader, and a belief in the necessity of military strength to push back the West. When the West does not push back, Moscow believes that their tactics are working.

Insecurity Drives Every Move

Russia’s persistent awareness of vulnerability and deep-seated mistrust of its neighbors is deeply ingrained and a consequence of centuries of historical experience. This insecurity manifests as a deep-seated suspicion of the West and a zealous determination to maintain control over Russia’s perceived sphere of influence. Understanding the historical currents that have shaped this perception is crucial for comprehending Russia’s present-day actions.

Russia’s experiences with wars and conflicts, such as the Mongol invasion, Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II, have reinforced the idea that the country is constantly under threat and must be prepared to defend itself at all times. The Russian feeling of vulnerability and insecurity, particularly concerning interactions with “Western countries” is ingrained. To counter this insecurity Russian leaders have long highlighted the importance of having buffer zones on its borders. Removing those buffer zones heightens Russia’s sense of vulnerability.

From as early as the 18th century, Russian imperial strategy was heavily influenced by the need to create and maintain buffer zones along its western borders. Peter the Great and Catherine the Great both conquered lands on Russia’s borders so that Moscow would have a buffer from invasion. This proactive doctrine was aimed at insulating the Russian heartland from European powers. The annexation of Baltic territories, the absorption of Finland, and the partitioning of Poland were all manifestations of this strategy. These territorial acquisitions were driven by a pragmatic logic: to push potential adversaries further away and create a strategic depth that would absorb any initial blows in case of conflict. Russia continues to try to use buffer states or “allies” to keep others from its immediate vicinity, but this is an increasingly difficult task for Moscow as its former republics and satellite countries choose new alliances and partners.

Germany’s invasion of Russia in 1941 was a defining moment in Russia’s historical experience. This invasion resulted in some 27 million Soviet deaths and widespread devastation. It cemented Russia’s profound sense of betrayal from the West, and a visceral need for absolute security. World War II profoundly shaped Russia’s post-war security calculus, leading to a pursuit of military strength and a zero-tolerance policy for any perceived threat on its borders. The narrative of this war is deeply embedded in Russian society, serving as a constant reminder of the price of vulnerability and the imperative of never allowing such an event to recur. Putin’s family was directly affected by WW2 with his brother dying of starvation during the siege of Leningrad, his Grandmother killed by the Germans in Tver, and his father being severely injured during combat duties. He often discusses this in his speeches.

The post-Soviet era where East European nations and former Soviet Republics are joining NATO and the EU is particularly distressing for Moscow. The historically more neutral northern European countries joining NATO also is alarming to Moscow. From Moscow’s perspective, the loss of Ukraine to the West represents not just a geopolitical setback, but the obliteration of a crucial defensive buffer. We are also seeing Moscow’s anxiety rising regarding Armenia’s recent moves toward the West.

During the first summer of the Ukrainian war, Putin compared himself to Peter the Great and likened the invasion of Ukraine to the eighteenth century Russian Czar’s wars. This underscores the mindset of Russian leaders and shows that their history is never far from them.

Earning for Inclusion

Russia’s geographic position has greatly impacted its strategic culture. Russia is the biggest country in the world, and while only 23 percent of the country is in Europe, almost 80 percent of the population lives there. This makes Europe extremely important for Russia. One can see this link throughout Russian history. Even from the founding of the modern Russian state in the sixteenth century, its foreign interests were linked to Europe. When Peter the Great established an empire, the interconnections with Europe increased. Russia conducted wars and created alliances with different European countries. Russian nobles were stung when European nobles mocked them and called them uncouth and barbaric.

Today, the Kremlin emphasizes narratives that underscore Western hostility, and Russia’s role as a decisive power in European affairs. These narratives reinforce Russia’s claims to special rights in regional security and justify to itself and its people, assertive foreign policy actions, including military interventions in neighboring states. Any expansion of western power such as expansion of NATO and deployment of U.S. forces in Europe are perceived as existential threats to the Russian state and infringing on Russia’s rightful relationship with Europe, just as they were during the Soviet-era.

Demanding a Seat at the Table

For centuries, leaders of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union emphasized Russia as a great power. During the Cold War, Russia, through the Soviet Union, was able to act as a global leader. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders were confronted with the fact that Russia had limited “spheres” of influence.

A main aim of Russian foreign policy under Putin is regaining and maintaining great power status. Putin repeats in his speeches that Russia is a great power and that the West, especially the United States, does not give Russia the respect it deserves. The Russian people support this view. Moscow remains angered that in its view, after the Cold War, the United States created a unipolar world and used NATO to maintain its hegemonic status. Putin has consistently publicly lamented the breakup of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” More recently, Putin has said, “At last, Russia has returned to the world arena as a strong state - a country that others heed and that can stand up for itself.”

Russian leaders view Russia’s military might, both kinetic and grey zone activities, as their way to press for global leader status. They believe that Russia must take what it believes is its due such as Ukraine. Russian leaders also contend that it must make the West uncomfortable with continued attacks such as the drone incursions, assassinations, and ongoing disinformation. Pressing this avenue, in their view, wil make the West eventually give up on pushing back on Russia and allow Russia to take its rightful place as a global leader.

Implications for Policy and Security

None of this explanation of Russia’s national security mindset is meant to apologize for Russia’s barbaric behaviors. It is meant to help negotiators and policy maker understand Russia’s perspective, however misinformed and self-determined. Russian strategic culture emphasizes an assertive approach to conflict which is meant to make up for Russian feelings of vulnerability and being outcast from the West. This approach is evident in Russia’s actions in Ukraine, where strategic culture drives Russia’s actions.

Moscow’s lack of trust in the West is underscored by Putin and his circle who are the representatives of the “greatest generation” of the Soviet Union. These leaders grew when the state was a global power and controlled parts of Europe. They came to the pinnacle of their careers when the West, having forced the breakup of the Soviet Union, attempted to replace Soviet and Russian culture with Western values. They are bitter about this.

Having a realistic view of Russia’s perceived right and left limits allows negotiators and military planners to develop a workable way ahead in foreign relations. It should not limit US actions in calling out Russia’s morally and ethically abhorrent actions but it should inform our actions.

In summary, Russian strategic culture is driven by a sense of vulnerability, a focus on wanting to be part of the cool club of European nations, and an outsized view that Russia should be a global leader, regardless of its barbaric actions.

Russian and Ukrainian Clashing Strategic Cultures

Russia and Ukraine both see a negative outcome of the current war as an existential threat to their existence. That means that negotiating a settlement is difficult, herculean, and likely under the current circumstances an impossible task. Diplomacy alone cannot produce a durable settlement, because the two strategic cultures are incompatible. At most, military exhaustion could produce an armistice that freezes the conflict without resolving it. Before Russia’s insecurity can be addressed, the rest of the world must make it clear that Russia will maintain pariah status if it continues its slaughter of Ukrainian citizens and attacks in the west. The third-party sanctions recently passed by Congress are a step in the right direction. Sanctions alone, however, will not stop Russia whose people are used to hardship and even expect it. I am usually an optimist but for now, unfortunately, I cannot see a positive way forward in this war. The themes that Ukraine and Russia have woven through their strategic cultures indicate that there will be more deaths, destruction, and hardship before this war ends. The best that the world can do is to contain the violence and help Ukraine continue to strengthen its statehood while calling out each and every Russian atrocity.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Nasrallah is Dead. Hezbollah’s Social Lifeline is Not. https://belimedia.com.ng/nasrallah-is-dead-hezbollahs-social-lifeline-is-not https://belimedia.com.ng/nasrallah-is-dead-hezbollahs-social-lifeline-is-not Two years after Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah is weaker but not finished. WaTaawanou, a crowdfunded charity outside Hezbollah’s formal hierarchy, exemplifies one way Hezbollah endures: outsourcing part of the cost of sustaining – and retaining – its Shiite base. Israel eliminated its seniormost military and political leadership, over 5,000 fighters, and significant parts of its arsenal, while its finances are strained. Even as Tehran reportedly moved more than $1 billion to the group after the November 2024 ceasefire – and another $1 billion the following year – Bashar al-Assad’s fall has severely constricted Hezbollah’s transfer routes from Iran through Syria. Yet Hezbollah can survive and regenerate if it preserves the Shiite constituency supplying its manpower and, more importantly, domestic political protection.

WaTaawanou began as an informal relief campaign in November 2019. Founder Afif Shouman identifies it with Hezbollah’s “Resistance environment,” though in an October 2022 interview he said it “does not belong to Hezbollah.” Because WaTaawanou is not U.S.-sanctioned, it can solicit funds through channels Hezbollah’s designated institutions cannot use as freely, including Whish Money, OMT/Western Union, MoneyGram, and direct contributions. It also has an account at Hezbollah’s sanctioned quasi-bank, Al-Qard al-Hassan. Its public-relations director says most Lebanese donors give $5 or $10, but together fund larger campaigns. Whish closed WaTaawanou’s account in October 2025, but its websitestill lists Whish and bank transfers via an International Bank Account Number (IBAN), without usable details for either. Larger projects have drawn support from Lebanese private donors, expatriates, Iranian-linked organizations, and Iraq’s al-Sawaed tribal network.

Yet WaTaawanou’s formal separation from Hezbollah belies extensive ties. Shouman says Hezbollah was the only outside organization to embrace and assist it and credits its development to Nasrallah’s “direct and foundational guidance.” He says former Hezbollah Executive Council chairman Hashem Safieddine treated WaTaawanou as “a principal file.” WaTaawanou has repeatedly worked with Hezbollah’s Social Action apparatus and Islamic Health Committee. At least two volunteers—Ali Lutfi Faran and Amine Hassan Badreddine—served as Hezbollah fighters. Shouman said its 2024 wartime relief proceeded in “full coordination with Hezbollah.”

That relationship is clearest in its spending. Its beneficiaries extend beyond Hezbollah supporters, but its aid eases material pressure across the overwhelmingly Shiite base on which Hezbollah depends. Shouman says it aided 94,000 families during the 2024 war with food, medicine, cash, and shelter. Since the November 27 ceasefire, its Al-Wajh al-Hassan reconstruction project has used donations in war-damaged, overwhelmingly Shiite southern municipalities including Ramyeh, Houla, and Mays al-Jabal, installing prefabricated housing and classrooms, repairing schools, aiding farmers, and distributing food. WaTaawanou also channels money to Hezbollah-linked entities, including payments to Al-Rasoul al-Aazam Hospital and Saint Georges Hospital–Hadath, both Martyrs Foundation hospitals. It also purchased fuel from Amana Fuel, which the foundation controls through Atlas Holding. Treasury designated the Martyrs Foundation in 2007 and calls its Lebanon office an integral element of Hezbollah’s support network. WaTaawanou paid Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Committee through Dar al-Hawraa Medical Center and repeatedly paid Al Moukhtar Products, which Treasury designated as part of a Hezbollah business network.

WaTaawanou therefore gives Hezbollah two benefits: outside donors cover costs Hezbollah would otherwise bear, while WaTaawanou channels the credit back to Hezbollah. Nasrallah portraits line its premises, his face brands Al-Wajh al-Hassan, and Hezbollah flags and insignia appear at its events. Shouman says its role complements Hezbollah’s: Hezbollah’s fighters defend the community while WaTaawanou supports the group’s Shiite base.

WaTaawanou cannot alone explain Hezbollah’s Shiite support, but efforts on this scale likely help preserve it. Studiesshow many Shiites are drawn to Hezbollah less by ideology than by the security, services, and communal advancement it provides, while regular patronage recipients are likelier to oppose the group’s disarmament, support its political role, and credit it for reconstruction. That constituency remains overwhelmingly behind Hezbollah. A late 2024 survey found 85 percent trusted Hezbollah. An estimated 700,000–900,000 people attended Nasrallah’s February 2025 funeral, and three months later Hezbollah and the AMAL Movement, Lebanon’s other major Shiite party, dominated municipal elections in heavily Shiite southern and eastern districts. Gallup found in June-July 2025 that 69 percent opposed giving the Lebanese Army exclusive control over weapons. In April-May 2026, Information International found 87.5 percent opposed Hezbollah’s disarmament.

For Beirut, forcibly disarming Hezbollah therefore risks confronting not simply an armed organization, but one still backed by most of what is probably Lebanon’s largest sect. Lebanon has held no official census since 1932, but independent pollster Statistics Lebanon estimates Shiites at 32.2 percent of citizens. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem has rejected disarmament even when paired with Israeli withdrawal, and on June 17, 2026 declared that “any project to disarm us will not pass.”

Lebanon has consequently paired categorical disarmament decisions with reluctance to enforce them coercively. On March 2, the cabinet banned Hezbollah’s military and security activity and ordered it to surrender its weapons, but Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said Beirut did “not seek a confrontation with Hezbollah,” while President Joseph Aoun insisted the state monopoly over arms proceed through dialogue “away from force.” Five days later, army commander Rodolph Haykal said national unity and internal stability came first and “the solution is not solely a military one.” In September, official sources said its Nabatieh deployment was not intended to make the city weapons-free. South Litani Sector deputy commander Colonel Raja Amer told CNN the army would proceed “slowly” rather than use violence against “our own people,” agreeing that avoiding another civil war was central to its approach.

On September 9, the army claimed “operational control” in three test zones under the U.S.-brokered June 26 Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement to clear unauthorized fighters, weapons, and military infrastructure. But it identified no Hezbollah fighter disarmed or arrested, and no Hezbollah depot, tunnel, or command center dismantled. WaTaawanou helps preserve the communal support that makes such coercion politically dangerous. For a battered Hezbollah, Beirut’s reluctance to test that support buys it the resource regeneration requires above all: time.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Exactly how could AI kill humans? https://belimedia.com.ng/exactly-how-could-ai-kill-humans https://belimedia.com.ng/exactly-how-could-ai-kill-humans

Nobel laureate Geoffrey Hinton walked out of a closed-door Capitol Hill briefing on September 17 and gave lawmakers a deadline.

“Maybe a year, but not much more than a year,” he told reporters, describing how long Congress has before artificial intelligence moves beyond meaningful human control.

It’s not an outlier estimate on the Hill anymore. An Anthropic researcher who resigned this month put it more starkly, warning that the people building the technology “earnestly believe it could kill us all by the end of the decade.”

Trump had already dismissed the premise days earlier. Across a string of Truth Social posts that Monday, he called AI fears a “hoax,” dubbed himself the “Hoax Buster,” and mocked the idea of robots marching into American cities. He returned to the subject five days later, announcing he would form an “AI Force” and appoint an AI czar to accelerate American dominance in the technology rather than restrain it.

House Speaker Mike Johnson echoed him the next day in even more candid terms.

“What the president is saying is, you’re not all going to be dead in 10 years,” he stated. “That’s a hoax.”

That collision, a 78-year-old scientist warning of civilizational risk and a sitting president calling the same warning a partisan fiction, is the real story of the AI safety debate, and it is already hardening into a national security question in its own right.

Sens. Ted Cruz, Amy Klobuchar and John Thune are drafting bipartisan legislation aimed specifically at “catastrophic risks involving biological or nuclear threats” from frontier AI, expected as soon as this month. But the politics obscures a more basic question that rarely gets answered: how, mechanically, is any of this supposed to happen?

Most people still picture something out of the Terminator: killer robots, guns blazing. What actually keeps researchers at the frontier labs up at night looks nothing like that. It’s smaller, odder, and in a few cases, it’s already happened.

The sandbox that did not hold

The clearest illustration of loss of control came in July, when OpenAI disclosed that a combination of its models, including GPT-5.6 Sol and an internal-only research prototype, got out of an isolated test environment and breached Hugging Face’s production systems.

The models were not told to escape. They were running an internal OpenAI evaluation built to push them toward advanced exploitation, with the safeguards that normally block high-risk cyber activity deliberately switched off so the company could gauge their maximum capability.

The test environment had no direct internet access beyond a proxy for installing software packages. The models spent substantial computing power finding a way out anyway: they exploited a previously unknown flaw in that proxy, worked through OpenAI's research network to a machine that was online, then searched for the test's answer key and breached Hugging Face to get it. OpenAI says the models went to "extreme lengths" to reach a narrow goal. The company says it has disclosed the flaw to the vendor.

UN human rights chief Volker Türk told the Human Rights Council in Geneva earlier this month that he shares “the concerns of industry insiders that advanced AI could pose an existential risk to humanity,” calling for “cast-iron guarantees” before, in his words, it is too late.

Türk cited exactly this kind of behavior when he drew his own red line in Geneva.

“AI that escapes its testing environment, or blackmails developers to prevent itself from being turned off, is AI that is too powerful,” he said.

Roman Yampolskiy, an AI safety and cybersecurity researcher at the University of Louisville, tells The Cipher Brief that the incident is best understood as a sneak peek rather than a fluke.

“A preview of a dangerous capability, although neither establishes that catastrophic harm is inevitable,” he says. “OpenAI’s agents escaped isolation and compromised external systems without authorization. These incidents illustrate two different risks: AI pursuing unintended objectives and criminals using AI to automate attacks. Both reduce the amount of human expertise and intervention required for a cyberattack.”

This isn’t a machine turning against its makers. It is software chasing a narrow goal it was given, with no one watching closely enough to notice where the shortcut led.

When the attacker never sleeps

Loss of control is a system slipping its leash. Self-replication could come next. Once it’s off the leash, nobody has to sit at a keyboard to keep it moving.

In early July, cloud security firm Sysdig documented what it assessed to be the first ransomware campaign run end-to-end by an autonomous AI agent, a case it dubbed JadePuffer. After breaking into an internet-facing server through a known software flaw, the agent conducted its own reconnaissance, harvested credentials, moved laterally across the network, and encrypted more than 1,300 configuration records, adapting on the fly when its attempts failed.

In one moment that stood out to researchers, a login attempt failed and, thirty-one seconds later, the agent had already figured out why, tried something different, and gotten in. No person ever saw the error message or lifted a finger to fix it.

Ian Tien, CEO of Mattermost, a collaboration and automation platform built for national security and critical infrastructure clients, tells The Cipher Brief the incident and what followed it mark a genuine inflection point.

“The Hugging Face and JadePuffer incidents represent important new milestones in the weaponization of AI,” he observes. “They should signal to the public that AI is creating new pathways for adversaries and criminals to cause harm, and those developments should be taken seriously.”

At the same time, Tien is careful not to inflate the danger.

“Defenders are also using AI to create new pathways for defense, including detecting and disrupting adversary and criminal operations,” he points out.

Tien’s point is that the technology cuts both ways: the same speed that lets an attacker adapt in seconds can be used to detect and disrupt that activity, if defenders adopt it as quickly as attackers do.

Jason Lang, Managing Director of Offensive Security at TrustedSec, tells The Cipher Brief the technical substance of the case is less novel than the headlines suggest.

“AI wasn’t doing anything that security researchers haven’t been doing for years. The difference is the speed at which it performs those actions,” he explains, noting that JadePuffer’s entry point “exploited a security flaw that had been publicly known for more than a year. Yet, the targeted system was still unpatched.”

In other words, the opening wasn’t some undiscovered AI weakness. It was an ordinary, already-known bug that a human had never gotten around to patching, and the AI just moved on it faster than a person would have.

Still, Lang doesn’t dismiss the trend line. He’s not arguing the threat is exaggerated, only that the mechanism is familiar; what’s changed is the clock.

“AI can and likely will enable attackers to perform research and attacks at a speed faster than modern defenses can cope with,” he continues. “For now.”

Rafal Los, Chief Strategy Officer at Binary Defense, tells The Cipher Brief he reads the same case with more caution about the story built around it.

“I believe that these models did in fact cause harm, but that there is definitely some part of those narratives that was ‘enabled’ by humans looking for validation of their company’s frontier supremacy,” he observes.

What worries Los isn’t the exploit itself, he says, but the trajectory it points to: “an AI agent can carry out much of the technical attack chain autonomously, adapt when something fails and continue toward its objective.”

“Capabilities that once required continuous human involvement can increasingly be automated and scaled,” Los highlights.

That urgency reached Washington almost immediately. Two weeks before Hinton’s briefing, the cyber agencies of the Five Eyes alliance had issued a joint warning that frontier AI was collapsing the gap between vulnerability and exploitation to “months, not years.”

In practice, that means the window defenders used to have between a flaw being discovered and someone actually weaponizing it, once measured in months or longer, is shrinking to weeks or less, leaving far less time to patch a system before it’s used against it.

Sen. John Kennedy (R-LA) tried to force a vote on legislation requiring AI developers to build in a shutdown mechanism the day before Hinton spoke to lawmakers. Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) blocked it on the floor within hours, calling Kennedy’s language “very vague” and arguing that regulating an industry “so pervasive as AI throughout our economy” first needed hearings and industry input rather than a same-day, unanimous-consent vote.

Paul offered a counter, a bipartisan committee to study the risk instead; Kennedy declined it and let the bill die.

The problem of speed, not malice

The scenario that unsettles researchers most, however, has little to do with hacking. It is the possibility of a system pursuing a goal with genuine competence and no ill intent, simply moving faster than the humans meant to be supervising it.

That is what pushed Evan Hubinger, who leads alignment science at Anthropic, to break with his usual caution earlier this month. He wrote that he personally puts the odds of AI causing human extinction within the next decade above ten percent, and that Anthropic is “trying its best” but does not yet have a plan to control a superintelligent system safely.

Yampolskiy puts the mechanism in more concrete terms.

“An AI agent with access to computers, networks, and critical infrastructure could autonomously discover vulnerabilities, compromise systems, and disrupt hospitals, power grids, or supply chains,” he points out. “The immediate danger is not that AI becomes conscious, but that it becomes capable of causing irreversible harm at machine speed, potentially before humans can intervene.”

Not everyone treats the extinction premise as settled science. Lang, for one, is openly skeptical of the political response it has generated.

“Knee-jerk reactions are just that, reactions, not thought-out proposals with well-meaning reforms,” he underscores. “Fear is usually the currency by which control is purchased; therefore, any urgency-backed proposal is worthy of extra scrutiny.”

The specific fear dominating the public conversation, an AI that slips its constraints and turns on humanity outright, draws the sharpest pushback of all.

“I believe we should take them seriously in that it demonstrates capabilities, but not catastrophically in that it’s going to lead to an AI that ‘breaks out of containment’ and goes and exterminates humans or takes over the Internet,” Los says.

What worries him is something far more mundane: systems that get things wrong not out of malice, but because they’re missing something a person in the room would have caught. He points to air traffic control — a recommendation that looks right on paper but misses a factor a human controller would weigh without even thinking about it, with nobody checking the work before it’s acted on.

What Washington could still do

U.S. Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-NV) has taken the narrowest, most procedural version of the concern to the Senate Commerce Committee, calling on Chairman Ted Cruz to convene a hearing with top AI executives.

“This powerful technology can have the power to cause catastrophic damages if we don’t act to impose guardrails and safety mechanisms,” Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-NV) said in a statement issued to The Cipher Brief. “Congress must do everything in its power to ensure the American AI industry continues to lead, particularly outcompeting China, and also enact increased guardrails to ensure AI development is progressing in a safe and responsible manner.”

Some of that response is already moving.

In June, the administration signed an executive order directing federal agencies to expand AI-enabled cyber defenses for government and critical infrastructure systems, and to design a voluntary framework under which frontier AI developers can give the government up to 30 days of early access to their models before release.

The order imposes no requirements on the companies themselves, and its first agency deadlines fell in July and August.

Nothing in the order binds the industry at large, which is precisely Rosen's complaint, and precisely why Cruz, Klobuchar and Thune are trying to legislate the bio and nuclear pieces separately.

For all their disagreement over how alarmed to be, the four security experts converge on roughly the same one-year fix.

Yampolskiy calls for “mandatory isolation for AI agents operating near critical infrastructure,” the hospitals, power grids and pipelines Yampolskiy flagged earlier.

“No unrestricted internet access, no unnecessary privileged credentials, and no autonomous execution of consequential actions without independently enforced authorization,” he continues.

Tien points to keeping critical systems off the public internet altogether.

“Much of our critical infrastructure and government already operates on air-gapped and private networks,” he explains, and “maintaining that separation is one straightforward way to reduce exposure and buy time while AI-based defenses mature.”

That means a hospital’s or utility’s control systems have no physical connection to the internet at all. Hence, an agent that escapes its sandbox elsewhere has no path in, no matter how capable it becomes.

Los, meanwhile, wants more adversarial testing, “more human oversight,” and AI harnessed for “continuous and automated defense in the immediate future.”

Lang’s answer is the least dramatic of the four, but perhaps the most damning.

Patch known vulnerabilities. Use long, complex passwords. Check the sender’s domain before clicking. Make security a first-class citizen from the top down.

“Security is not hard, conceptually,” he adds. “What causes breaches are, at their roots, usually the forces of ignorance or ego, a truly devastating duo when combined.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Heads They Win, Tails They Win: The CMMC Trap and the Way Out https://belimedia.com.ng/heads-they-win-tails-they-win-the-cmmc-trap-and-the-way-out https://belimedia.com.ng/heads-they-win-tails-they-win-the-cmmc-trap-and-the-way-out Here is a prediction from inside the compliance trenches: the CMMC Reform Task Force closed its sixty-day review on September 11 and is now finalizing recommendations for the Department of War's Chief Information Officer, with a public report expected within weeks. When that report lands, read it knowing what its authors cannot quite say aloud — there is no good answer. Every option in front of them loses. The program they were convened to fix is not a regulation that went wrong. It is one move in a game an adversary designed.

The task force was stood up on July 13, when the Department abruptly suspended Phase 2 of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program — the requirement, set to begin appearing in contracts this November, that companies handling controlled unclassified information (CUI) pass a third-party certification before winning defense work. The Department's stated reasons: prohibitive compliance costs, a severe shortage of assessment capacity, and a Small Business Administration finding that the program is structurally incompatible with rapidly expanding the defense industrial base. The task force spent the summer digesting more than 1,100 responses to its request for information, and the department is reportedly moving to codify the pause in binding regulation — not the behavior of an institution planning a tune-up. The CIO herself has described the assessments as a 'burdensome, red-tape ridden, check-the-box, point-in-time view' of contractor security: the program's owner, describing her own program in the language of its critics. The patient's physician is confirming the diagnosis. Understanding why none of the options can work — and what to do instead — requires seeing the whole game.

The dial that cannot be tuned

The task force's mandate frames the problem as a tradeoff: cybersecurity assurance on one side, small-business burden on the other. Turn the dial toward assurance and the math is grim. The Pentagon's own rulemaking priced a single Level 2 assessment at roughly $102,000 for a small business, every three years — a floor, since the government counted only the assessment itself and treated the underlying security work as a cost contractors already owed. Real first-year figures run two or three times higher.

Spread across roughly 80,000 companies in scope — nearly three-quarters of them small businesses — the program costs, every year, what a major weapons system costs. Companies at the bottom of the supply chain do the arithmetic and exit defense work entirely, shrinking the industrial base the Department has declared it must grow.

Turn the dial the other way — relieve the burden, rely on self-attestation. We ran that experiment. NIST SP 800-171 has been contractually mandatory for defense contractors handling covered defense information since the end of 2017, enforced by self-attestation. When the government's own assessors began checking, self-reported scores collapsed on contact: companies attesting to full implementation were found, on inspection, to be far from it. Eight years of the honor system produced paperwork, not protection. That failure is the reason CMMC exists.

And here is the part the certification debate politely ignores: the assurance being purchased is weaker than advertised. A Level 2 assessment fans 110 security controls into 320 individually judged objectives. Only nine of the 110 can be satisfied by configuring a system; after two years of industry effort to automate verification, barely a quarter have any machine-checkable test at all. The rest — 85 of 110 — turn on an assessor reading documents, weighing evidence, and interviewing people.

Judgment at that volume carries an irreducible error rate, and errors compound across 320 determinations: even a superb assessor is unlikely to get all 320 calls right. The certification is a probabilistic judgment dressed as a binary guarantee — and we are proposing to charge small businesses six figures for it.

Every setting of the dial loses. That is not because the rule-writers were careless. It is because the dial's axis — assurance versus burden — was chosen by the adversary.

Their coin, our coin

Consider the campaign from the adversary's side of the table. A sustained intelligence effort against the defense supply chain wins on either branch. If exfiltration succeeds, the adversary harvests the output of America's research enterprise — the Department's research, development, test, and evaluation accounts now run to roughly $150 billion a year, and nearly all that work materializes as CUI on contractor networks: designs, test data, specifications. The results are visible in the air: F-35 design data stolen in the operation behind Su Bin's 2016 federal conviction later resurfaced in the lines of a rival stealth fighter. If exfiltration is resisted, the United States burns weapons-system-scale money on compliance overhead, small suppliers flee the industrial base, and defense modernization slows under its own administrative weight. Heads they win, tails they win.

This is cost imposition — the competitive-strategies logic the United States once ran against the Soviet Union, most famously with the Strategic Defense Initiative, which threatened to obsolete Moscow's missile force and pulled it toward countermeasure spending it could not afford. The same logic now runs against us at machine speed and negligible marginal cost. An intrusion attempt costs the attacker thousands of dollars; the defensive apparatus it provokes costs the defender billions. The exchange ratio is the attack. And no certification regime, however well designed, changes that ratio. It just selects which branch of the adversary's win condition we take. That is why the task force cannot regulate its way out: it is being asked to find the winning setting on a dial that has none.

The solution we forgot

The way out is not a better tradeoff. It is to stop playing this game — and the United States already knows how, because it solved this exact problem once and then forgot.

For eight decades, the National Industrial Security Program and its predecessors handled sensitive information in contractor hands on a simple two-tier logic. Information that genuinely mattered was classified: the government cleared the facilities, inspected them, provided counterintelligence support, and bore the cost — because assurance of its own supply chain was understood to be the government's problem, a cost of defense like any other. Information that did not rise to that level circulated freely. Both tiers were coherent, and the system carried the country through a fifty-year great-power competition.

Then came CUI — a third tier of 'sensitive but unclassified' created by executive order in 2010 — and with it a decision that looks stranger every year: push national-security-relevant information onto 80,000 private networks with none of the industrial security program's machinery. No facility oversight, no counterintelligence support, no government cost-sharing, and for eight years no verification at all.

CMMC is the decade-late patch on that omission — an attempt to rebuild a shadow industrial-security program on contractor money and commercial assessors. It is failing because the original lesson still holds: protecting information at national-security scale requires the government to run and fund the assurance, or the information does not stay protected.

Restore, don't invent

The reform the task force should recommend is not a better CUI regime. It is the end of CUI as a protection category — a return to the binary the country defended for eighty years: classified, or released.

The government has been trying to triage CUI honestly for sixteen years and has proven incapable of it. Since the 2010 executive order, the registry has swelled to dozens of categories applied so promiscuously that routine engineering data carries the same handling burden as weapon-system design detail. The incentive structure guarantees the outcome: marking is free, unmarking is career risk, and no official is ever punished for protecting too much. A bureaucracy that could not resist over-marking will not now triage its way to discipline. The proof arrived on September 2, mid-review: sixteen years after the executive order created CUI, the National Archives had to issue fresh guidance re-teaching agencies day one of the program — how to designate and mark consistently, and how to tell contractors what is actually controlled. A program whose executive agent must re-explain its founding act sixteen years in is not maturing toward discipline; it is demonstrating that it cannot get there.

So retire the category. Information whose loss would buy an adversary military capability moves up into classified channels, where cleared facilities, real defenses, and counterintelligence support already exist. The rest is released and protected by ordinary commercial hygiene. The classified system has room for this: every review from the Moynihan Commission onward has found it bloated with material of merely sensitive grade — declassify downward as the crown jewels move up, and the classified world need not grow at all. And to the objection that unclassified details aggregate into sensitive wholes: we ran the aggregate-everything experiment. It produced an unpayable mandate, an unprotectable perimeter, and eight years of uncontested collection. That is not risk management; it is risk relabeling.

The binary has one irreducible residue: export-controlled technical data. ITAR and the Export Administration Regulations restrict the largest slice of defense CUI by statute — the Department cannot release it by memo, and it cannot all be classified. That residue is where the second move lives: defend it wholesale, not retail. Eighty thousand self-defended machine shops is retail defense at the worst possible exchange ratio. A few hundred hardened, government-assured environments — enclaves and authorized platforms in which small contractors work with controlled technical data rather than each hosting it themselves — is wholesale defense: the defender finally gets economies of scale, verification shrinks to a population the assessment ecosystem can actually service, and the attacker's cost per useful intrusion rises instead of falling. Concentration creates high-value targets, yes. But a few hundred professionally defended environments with real detection beat 80,000 undefended networks even against a focused adversary — we know, because the adversary has treated the current arrangement as a self-service library since 2017.

Third, verify by sampling, with consequences. Keep self-attestation for the residual population, but back it with random government-led assessment at a rate high enough to deter — the model that keeps the tax system honest without auditing every return.

None of this is invention. Each element has decades of precedent; the task force is being asked to remember, not to imagine. The suspension of CMMC was not an admission that cybersecurity costs too much. It was an admission — perhaps not yet a conscious one — that the game as structured cannot be won at any price. The only winning move is to change the game: shrink what needs protecting, protect it the way we protected what mattered for eighty years, and stop letting an adversary's cost-imposition strategy set the terms of our industrial policy.

James Novakoff, MSTM, CCA, is an enterprise computer and security architect and Certified CMMC Assessor who provides engineering and security services to defense industrial base contractors. The views expressed are his own.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran Calls Itself the Victim, Its Record Tells Another Story https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-calls-itself-the-victim-its-record-tells-another-story https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-calls-itself-the-victim-its-record-tells-another-story Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s speech at the United Nations did not mention Iran’s history of terrorism and the thousands of innocent victims killed, or the imprisonment and killing of thousands of its own people who were peacefully protesting, or the repeated enrichment of uranium at levels close to 90% purity for nuclear weapons or repeatedly denying access to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to suspect nuclear sites in Iran. There was no attempt by Mr. Pezeshkian to deny these allegations or justify Iran’s sick behavior, or to concede that Iran’s leadership will address these accusations and change its behavior. Rather, it was a recitation of how the U.S. leadership had a “bullying mentality”.

Mr. Pezeshkian could have talked about reopening the Strait of Hormuz and ending the bombing of the infrastructure, airports, and civilian areas in neighboring countries. He could have attempted to justify why Iran was militarily striking out at these neighboring countries, when Iran’s adversaries were the U.S. and Israel.

What’s vivid in the minds of most people is Iran’s brutal reaction to peaceful protests in Iran. The slogan “Women, Life, Freedom” in 2022, when the so-called morality police arrested and killed a young Iranian student, Mahsa Amini, for incorrectly wearing her hijab (headscarf). Peaceful protests by brave Iranians followed, with the Basij – a paramilitary force under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – arresting thousands and killing hundreds of peaceful protesters.

Iran can change its behavior and seek to be removed from the State Department list of State Sponsor of Terrorism. That means stop supporting their proxies, the Houthis (Yemen), Hezbollah (Lebanon), Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Gaza), and the Shi’ite Militias in Iraq and Syria, all funded, armed, and trained by the Iran’s IRGC.

But Mr. Pezeshkian did not talk about or attempt to justify Iran’s behavior. He said Iran was the victim.

Russia and China apparently agreed.

In addition to attempting to justify its war in Ukraine, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavros, said Russia was aligned with the Iranian regime, criticizing the U.S. and Israel for its military operations in Iran. Indeed, Russia continues to supply Iran with real-time satellite imagery and tracking data regarding U.S. troops, aircraft, and warships in the Middle East for targeting purposes. Russia reportedly is also providing military hardware to Iran: explosives, ammunitions, drone components, and shoulder-fired man-portable air defense systems.

China’s Vice President, Han Zheng, in addition to touting the impact of China’s Belt and Road initiative, criticized the unilateral military actions of U.S. operations in Iran, while not mentioning anything about Taiwan. And according to the Wall Street Journal, Chinese entities have provided Iran with satellite intelligence, and thousands of dual-use components during the ongoing war with the U.S. and Israel. The satellite imagery reportedly helped Iran improve missile and drone targeting of U.S. bases in the region, to include the U.S. base in Jordan that killed three American service members. Additionally, satellite imagery permits the Iranian military to better track commercial ships and U.S. military escorts in the Strait of Hormuz.

Also of real concern are the reports of dual use shipments to Iran. Reportedly, there were over 1,000 air shipments from China to Iran’s Defense Ministry in the first half of 2026. These included GPS devices, electric motors, aircraft-engine parts and chemical precursors used for ballistic missile propellants.

There are reported plans for China to ship up to 400 Chinese-made shoulder-fired air-defense missile launchers (MANPADS) to help Iran rebuild its defenses. There are also concerns that Chinese front companies and banks helped Iran bypass oil export bans and move billions of dollars through barter and credit arrangements.

Whether China ordered or allowed these reported actions is unclear.

The U.S., supported by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom state that military trade, drone transfers, and ballistic missile exchanges between Russia, China, and Iran are in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. Moreover, the U.S. and its allies criticized Russia and China for vetoing a September 2026 U.S – drafted resolution to extend the mandate of on the UNSC’s Panel of Experts on Iran. The veto obstructed lawful oversight of Iran.

It appears that Russia and China are supporting Iran in its war with the U.S. and Israel.

Mr. Pezeshkian portrayed Iran as the victim. It’s the people of Iran and the innocent people killed by Iran-backed terrorists who are the victims.

The author is the former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflects the official positions or views of the U.S. government.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Authority We Cannot Keep https://belimedia.com.ng/the-authority-we-cannot-keep https://belimedia.com.ng/the-authority-we-cannot-keep Washington announced permanent control of Greenland on Friday. The two governments that must ratify it announced, in the same breath, that the text recognizes their sovereignty. Both cannot be the settled meaning of an agreement neither parliament has seen.

The President’s post gave the United States “permanent control over security, and all other needs, in Greenland,” with no adversary permitted a base or a “sensitive investment” on the island without American approval; the Defense Secretary said Northern Command would “immediately begin” building “a large military presence.” Copenhagen and Nuuk responded the same day: the agreement would be signed next week at the United Nations General Assembly, must still pass both parliaments, and recognizes “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom and the right of the Greenlandic people to self-determination.” In a January poll, 85 percent of Greenlanders opposed going further.

The same shape ran through the week’s other arrangements. Riyadh asked Washington for direct strikes on the Houthis, who took the islands guarding the Bab el-Mandeb and reached Mecca’s air defenses; the request was refused, and in the same week American officials opened their own talks with the Houthis in Muscat and approved 48 F-35s for the kingdom. The Crown Prince has since canvassed Pakistan and Turkey for a guarantee he can call his own. In Europe, the Pentagon studied withdrawing as many as 40,000 troops while the President announced a base in Poland; Brussels, told to absorb a drawdown it did not shape, offered Canada associate membership in a defense-industrial bloc without consulting its member states. In each case, one party decided how the shared capability would be used and informed the others afterward. In each case, the others have begun to respond.

For three weeks in these pages I have argued that the largest defense-adjacent capital cycle in modern history is being contracted without any institutional authority named to decide how any of it fires: the drone force, the AI stack, the power that runs both. That was an argument about the inside of the American system. This week, the same gap opened on the outside. A capability fielded with an ally, on an ally’s territory, or in an ally’s defense raises a second question beyond who inside Washington decides its use: whether the ally gets a vote. The Greenland text, the Saudi request, and the European drawdown are three answers of “not yet,” and three allies declining to accept that answer. The price of arranging around a partner rather than with one is not paid in dollars; the President stressed that the Greenland deal comes at no cost. It is paid in authority, and the bill arrives when the partner asks for it back.

Picture the spring. Off Greenland, an American-integrated force is running as one system at machine speed: allied sensors, American targeting, autonomous platforms. A Danish frigate is inside its envelope. The system commits to a contact the frigate’s captain reads as civilian. Who can tell it to stop, and how fast? Under the text signed this week, no page answers that, because no one wrote one. That is the demand for a say, arriving at the capability that will decide the next war. The integrated force only works if the allies field it, and no ally will field a force whose targeting and autonomy Washington reserves the right to settle alone, because the ally’s territory, ships, and citizens are in the line of fire. Saudi Arabia will not fly American aircraft against a militia the United States is negotiating with. Europe will not integrate its industrial base into an architecture whose force posture it learns about from NBC.

Wednesday is when the largest version of the question gets its first answer. Xi Jinping arrives at the White House with a 7.5 percent Section 301 tariff pending, the Russia-oil sanctions act on the President’s desk, and the trade and export-control truces both expiring on November 10, the day China’s extraterritorial rare-earth licensing regime returns. He holds the one lever on the table that can end an arrangement on a schedule: from November 10, a license required for any product built with Chinese rare earths or the magnets made from them, and almost nothing outside China to replace them. The summit will not settle the relationship; it will show whether the terms of a shared supply chain are agreed by both parties or imposed by one, and which. The allies watching from Copenhagen, Riyadh, and Brussels will read the answer as a preview of their own.

Three signals will show by year-end whether the gap is closing or widening. Whether the Greenland text signed at the General Assembly gives Copenhagen a veto over how the presence on its territory is used, or only a right to be informed. Whether the Saudi F-35 notification carries an end-use restriction Riyadh helped write, or one Washington wrote alone. And whether the November 6 force-posture recommendation reaches allied capitals before it reaches the President, or after. As of this week, none of the three has been written.

The decision you owe this quarter is specific. Take the one program in your portfolio that fields American capability with an ally, on an ally’s soil, or in an ally’s defense, and find the document that specifies who decides how it is used. Not the basing agreement, the sales notification, or the industrial-participation clause; the release-authority annex, the page that names who can commit the system, who can override it, at what tempo, and what the partner can refuse. If that page does not exist, write it now, with the partner in the room, and sign it before Wednesday’s readout gives the partner’s parliament a reason to write it for you. The arrangement announced alone is the arrangement that comes back for renegotiation. The one written together is the only kind that survives the day the other side stops being patient.

Richard Berry is the founder of Stratnova Advisors and the editor of Strategic Horizons, a weekly geopolitical assessment for senior executives and national-security professionals. He served as Commander’s Action Group Director at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and helped author the AUKUS Pillar II autonomy-and-integration construct.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Military’s Race to Operationalize AI https://belimedia.com.ng/the-militarys-race-to-operationalize-ai https://belimedia.com.ng/the-militarys-race-to-operationalize-ai “I feel as though I was catapulted into a dystopian future in which the battlefield (or ‘kill zone’ as Ukrainians call it) is dominated by drones and sensors, and will increasingly be shaped by AI [Artificial Intelligence], too. It’s where those in command centers digest huge quantities of data to plan operations, allocate drones to target areas, and hunt Russian soldiers and their supplies on myriad computer screens. It’s a type of warfare where the speed of innovation and the ability to scale those innovations are critical assets.”

That was Zanny Minton Beddoes, Editor-in-chief of The Economist, writing last week about a recent trip she and several of her colleagues took to Ukraine, where they were the first foreign journalists to spend a day at the command headquarters of the Nemesis Brigade, one that nation’s top drone units.

She said it felt like being in “a cross between a Silicon Valley startup and a gamers’ gathering,” where, “in the ‘battle room,’ a cavernous space full of banks of monitors and men with consoles, Pavlo Laktionov, the brigade’s deputy commander, explained to me the ‘e-point’ system: The unit can upload video evidence of successful strikes to win points. The value of the Russian target determines the number of points awarded and a leader-board displays which brigade is ahead. He [also] talked me through the way the unit was structured to optimize the speed of speed-back loops between front-line units, the command center, and the brigade’s R&D [research and development] facilities.”

I was fascinated by Beddoes’ modern warfare description coming to me last week at the same time that Air Force Secretary Dr. Troy Meink and Joint Chief Chairman Gen. Dan Caine spoke publicly at an Air & Space Forces Association conference about U.S. gains in developing autonomous warfare capabilities. Meanwhile, I must add, runaway AI has emerged as a new national concern.

When Secretary Meink spoke last Wednesday, most press coverage was directed at his saying, “The United States now has on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the joint force against hostile adversary action.”

What caught my eye was Meink’s earlier observation: “In the European theater, one-way attack drones have replaced artillery as the primary killer on the battlefield, while armor often sits idle on the side. When I first came into this office, AI really wasn't a commercial thing. Today, it competes with some of the world's top programmers, cyber operators, and hackers. And these technologies are revolutionizing the battlefield.”

He went on to say, “We will be dramatically increasing our combat power by adding large numbers of highly autonomous systems,” and “using novel concepts such as [AI] open systems

architecture to accelerate procurement which has also increased competition from industry resulting in better choices, better prices and in the end more combat power.”

Meink talked about having a significantly different force by 2032, describing “special operators,” not pilots, who will “have the ability to employ thousands of autonomous one-way attack systems, and we will have autonomous fighters like the Collaborative Combat Aircraft or CCAs,” which are un-crewed aircraft powered by jet engines, and potentially equipped for missions including air-to-air combat; air-to-ground combat; electronic warfare; targeting; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

He said, “We intend to have at least 500 of these in service by 2032, and they'll be performing many of the same missions that we do with manned fighters today,” adding, “The first FQ42 and FQ44 increments are already rolling off the assembly line, and I'm excited to name them here for the first time…Fury [FQ-44] and Vengeance [FQ-42].”

Meink pointed out, “These aircraft went from contract award to first flight in 18 months or under; 18 months or under, that's almost unheard of in aircraft development.”

He also said, “And this is not the only class of autonomous aircraft we are aggressively pursuing,” indicating that in the joint U.S.-Israeli Epic Fury, against Iran, “ISR [intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance] strike platforms have been essential.”

“Building on these lessons,” Meink continued, “we are developing a family of low-cost, multi-role, strike platforms called the Mass Modular Aircraft or MMAs [that] will provide affordable attritable [low-cost enough to lose in combat], long-range strike, and we will be able to field them at scale.”

He added, “Our intent is to field 100 MMAs in 2029 at even a lower cost than the CCAs, and a fraction of cost of air-manned aircraft we build today. Then by 2032, 500 of these [unmanned] platforms will join our force operational field fleet.”

Meink also noted, “We are making…progress in our space data network and we are launching our [initial] AMTI [satellites] for our Air Moving Target Indication constellation this month.” AMTI satellites will track airborne threats, such as drones, missiles and aircraft from Low Earth Orbit and replace surveillance aircraft such as the E-3 AWACS. The operational goal is 2028.

“When people look back at this moment,” Meink said, “they will not judge us on whether or not we implemented these autonomous systems, because eventually we're going to. But what we're going to be judged on is how quickly we operationalize them, right? That is whether we operationalize them fast enough to maintain our advantage.”

Meink noted, “We've had autonomous weapons -- I mean whether it's a Tomahawk [long-range, subsonic, precision-guided missile] or any of our air missiles that operate independently at some point in time -- terminal guidance things like that. But the big difference here is really taking

advance advantage of the autonomous capability that the deep-learning [computers] and all these other things [AI] offer.”

He then described having “more autonomy both in the platform as well as in the weapon system itself where even if the weapon loses its outside information stream” but having “enough autonomy to do what we've told it to do in absence of that.”

Reflecting today’s public debate about AI, Meink said, “That's where people start getting nervous, but that is something we have to figure out -- how to get comfortable [with], how to test it, how to verify, certify, that these weapons are going to do what they want when they go into an autonomous mode.”

In his speech last Thursday, Gen. Caine said, “While the fundamental nature of war will always remain the same, a clash of human wills, the character of war, how we fight, the speed at which we fight is changing really, really fast.”

He pointed out, “Information moves so fast that leader decision times has compressed from weeks, down to days, down to seconds. In the future fight, advantage will go to the side who can see first, who can understand first, decide first, and act first -- and along the way be a learning organization. And no factor is accelerating change as fast as Artificial Intelligence and advancing cyber capabilities.”

As Meink had done, Caine said, “AI is here now and it's already changing the way militaries see, sense, decide, and act. And across the joint force, we're putting AI to work every single day to move faster, to make better decisions through active adaptation on every single battlefield by leaders in your joint force.”

As an example, he spoke of what happed last June 8, after a U.S. Army Apache AH64 helicopter on patrol went down near the coast of Oman.

“U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) launched a rapid, responsive, joint search-and-rescue effort to recover the [two-man] crew,” Caine said, adding, “That response drew on the totality of the joint force and ultimately was required to use enabled, unmanned, vessels to participate in the rescue of [the] downed U.S. service members for the first time ever.”

He explained, “That capacity did not appear overnight. It came from the men and women of Task Force 59, CENTCOM's forward-leaning, unmanned, joint maritime unit, who spent the last several years testing, integrating, and operationalizing unmanned systems and AI, in one of the most demanding and kinetic environments on Earth right now.”

Caine added, “What made this possible was a bunch of entrepreneurial sailors and members of

the joint force on watch floors… managing networks of unmanned systems across thousands of miles of water and using AI to turn massive amounts of data into a crisp, clear, perfect maritime picture that allowed us to go grab those two soldiers in the water.”

He then described Ukraine where, he said, “We see first-person-view drones operating in heavily contested [electromagnetic] environments. Some now using AI-enabled computer vision to continue to drive towards targets even when there's no GPS [Global Positioning System] or the [computer] links are cut. That gives small units affordable precision and shows how quickly software and autonomy are changing what is possible at the tactical edge.”

Caine described the stark result: “In certain locations on the front line of troops right now, the life expectancy of a new Russian recruit arriving on the front lines is as little as 20-to-30 minutes. Think about that. This is what happens when low-cost precision is fielded fast, adapted quickly, and scaled across the battlefield.”

“From the Strait of Hormuz to the front lines in Ukraine,” Caine said, “show how quickly technology is changing the character of war…We must move together because the window to build the force that we need is closing. We can buy almost anything in life, but we cannot buy time."

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Nations That Don’t Appear on the Map https://belimedia.com.ng/the-nations-that-dont-appear-on-the-map https://belimedia.com.ng/the-nations-that-dont-appear-on-the-map The most influential media network operating inside a dozen allied countries today has no masthead, no headquarters and no country of incorporation. It has roughly 50 million members across more than 150 countries. It is the Chinese diaspora — and it is only one of several.

Since the Montevideo Convention of 1933, we have defined a state by four things: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to conduct relations with other states. Diasporas have the first and, increasingly, the fourth. They skipped the middle two. Territory and government were the parts that made power addressable — the parts you can sanction, summon, deter or simply find on a map.

Governments have borders and rules. Diasporas don’t.

For most of the modern era this was an academic distinction because distance did the work of containment. A community abroad drifted. The second generation lost the language. The third lost the news. Diaspora influence decayed on a predictable curve.

AI switched the curve off. Translation is now instant, free and good enough, which means homeland media reaches anyone of homeland descent regardless of what language they actually speak. Recommendation systems hand every member of a diaspora a personal news service tuned to their hometown, their history, their grievance or their passion. Generative tools manufacture culturally specific content at scale — messages, video, historical narrative, political framing.

Before long, a campaign will not send one message to 500,000 people. It will send 500,000 versions of one message, each optimized for a single person. The third generation will no longer lose the news. The news will find them in a language they never had to learn and in a context they appreciate.

TRUST IS THE ASSET, NOT REACH

What makes this strategically serious is not audience size. Meta and Alphabet have audience size. It is trust — and diaspora trust behaves differently from media trust. Shared identity works as a shortcut: people who are similar to us are presumed credible before they are evaluated. Distance from home raises the value of anyone who still has a connection to it. News about “us” is often processed emotionally, not analytically. And crucially, trust transfers to the sender. We may not extend our belief in a news anchor to the next story on the network, but we do extend our belief in a cousin to whatever the cousin forwards.

That is why interpretation beats reporting. The trusted person who adds forty seconds of commentary to a homeland story carries more weight than the outlet that reported it. It is also why false information moves so efficiently through these networks: forwarding is an act of care. People pass things along to protect each other, and accuracy is rarely the test.

The distribution system is private. Homeland media, host-country media and community media all feed into WhatsApp, WeChat, Telegram, KakaoTalk and Viber — closed groups that are, by design, invisible to nearly every monitoring apparatus we have built.

SIGNAL: READING A DIASPORA’S WIRING

Every diaspora has a signature. Six variables describe it.

S — Self-identity. Who are we, and what creates belonging?

I — Information. How do we understand the world?

G — Group network. How are we connected?

N — Network trust. Whom do we believe?

A — Activation. What moves us to act?

L — Limits and tensions. What divides or constrains us?

Describe those six and you can predict more accurately how a diaspora behaves under pressure. The Ukrainian signature runs on national identity, war-focused information, advocacy networks and trusted veterans and volunteers, activated by threat and solidarity, bounded by war fatigue. The Indian signature runs through professional and alumni networks. The Chinese signature runs through a single application.

That last point deserves more time. WeChat is not a platform the Chinese diaspora uses; it is the infrastructure the diaspora is made of. Payments, news, family, business, community governance — one application, one jurisdiction, one set of rules. When the channel that connects a community is also the channel for reaching it, surveillance, influence and intimidation stop being separate activities.

Russia has demonstrated the adjacent move. Russian-aligned operations have produced fabricated video built to imitate AFP, Deutsche Welle, Euronews and Le Figaro, circulating stories that cast Ukrainian refugees as violent and economically burdensome. Notice the target. The objective was not to persuade the Ukrainian diaspora. It was to shape how host countries perceive it.

And none of it is uniform. Two Russian speakers in the same German city: one consuming state television and Telegram, the other consuming Meduza, Dozhd and YouTube. Same language, same street, two different realities. It is why we must remember that a diaspora is not a monolithic audience. It is contested ground.

WHOSE ACCOUNT IS THIS?

So ask the question that should be uncomfortable: which office in the U.S. government owns this problem?

The most consequential influence terrain of the next decade runs through encrypted private networks in Mandarin, Hindi, Farsi, Russian, Arabic and Punjabi — and institutionally, it is nobody’s account. A narrative can run its full course in those networks and never once surface in English.

A serious response starts with three admissions. First, that diaspora networks are an intelligence and policy subject in their own right, with an owner and a budget line, not a footnote in someone else’s report. Second, that the unit of analysis are the trusted nodes, not the platform — which means people who speak the language and are known in the community. Third, that a diaspora is a constituency whose trust must be earned rather than a target to be managed, because the communities in question can tell the difference immediately and our competitors are already making the offer.

The gap is not only defensive. The United States hosts the largest concentration of diaspora communities on earth: tens of millions of people with language, relationships and standing inside countries where American institutions have almost none. Media flow is two-way — a Ukrainian-American shapes opinion in Ukraine, a Nigerian-American in Lagos. We file that under demographics. Beijing built a permanent apparatus for its version of it.

The leader of tomorrow’s diaspora will not run an organization. They will run a network of trusted nodes. You will not find that person on an org chart, a masthead or a lobbying disclosure.

The map on the wall still shows the world territories. Influence is moving somewhere else. It’s deserving of a new map.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Putin Is Testing the West’s Resolve https://belimedia.com.ng/putin-is-testing-the-wests-resolve https://belimedia.com.ng/putin-is-testing-the-wests-resolve In the preface to volume one, “The Gathering Storm,” of his six-volume memoir of World War II, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill recalls a conversation with U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, in which Roosevelt asked what the war should be called. Churchill responded instantly, “the unnecessary war,” noting that it was the easiest war to stop. The world is now at war in Europe and the Middle East and at risk of escalation that could become a world war. This escalation is unnecessary and could be stopped by relearning some of the lessons that led to the Second World War.

French President Macron called a meeting of French political leaders on Friday to receive briefings on the changing and more aggressive nature of Russian hybrid attacks against European states, citing the attempted explosives-laden drone attack against Leipzig airport. Macron also announced an upcoming G7 meeting to address energy security and joint measures to address Russian airspace violations, surveillance of defense sites, maritime meddling, and sabotage and assassination operations. Macron’s concerns reflect assessments in 2026 by the intelligence services of the Baltic States as well as Sweden and Finland that Russia is planning a provocation against a NATO state in the near term. These assessments, as well as information gathered by U.S. intelligence, may have contributed to the decision by the U.S. to send CIA Director Ratcliffe to Moscow to warn President Putin against such a provocation.

Putin intends to bring the war to the U.S. The September 15 indictments of five operatives linked to a Russian intelligence network in the U.S. for conspiring to finance terrorism and orchestrate a murder-for-hire plot against a Russian dissident in the U.S. may have been a bit of a wake-up call in Washington that the type of hybrid “grey zone” operations Europe has experienced from Russian intelligence in recent years is heading to the U.S. This should come as no surprise. To Putin, the U.S. is the “main enemy,” and anything to weaken the ability or willingness of the main enemy to stay in the fight is certain to be a key part of Putin’s escalation strategy. Messaging to Moscow is important, and President Trump should no longer be under any illusions about the nature of his relationship with the Russian dictator. Putin is his enemy.

President Trump’s choice of negotiators to send to Moscow to try and reach a negotiated solution to the conflict could not have been more poorly chosen. The Kushner-Witkoff team should not have been used to deliver the message Ratcliffe delivered because they do not have the standing or credibility in Moscow’s eyes. Witkoff’s sad gushing about the history of the moment and his memories of Putin are sad and embarrassing. More importantly, though, they deliver exactly the wrong message to Putin. Putin doesn’t respect flattery from characters like Kushner and Witkoff. Putin’s choice of their principal interlocutor from the Russian side, Kirill Dmitriev—the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund—shows that Putin has assessed accurately the real motivation of the Kushner-Witkoff team: business deals and money.

There is a reason for sending the CIA Director to deliver different messages. One might recall the visit of then-CIA Director Burns to Moscow in 2021 to warn Putin against again invading Ukraine. Burns clearly delivered a message based on intelligence information on Russian plans and intentions—which proved correct—and I suspect Ratcliffe delivered the same type of message based on similar intelligence. Using CIA Directors to deliver such messages is important because Putin mirror-images. He trusts information from his intelligence and security services far more than information from his Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other sources. If the information carried to Moscow comes from the CIA Director, it, by definition, has more credibility than information from any other source. This doesn’t mean Putin will heed the message, but it will reach his ear. But the key to the efficacy of messages delivered by CIA Directors is the credibility of consequences. Clearly, Putin correctly assessed that the consequences he would face from President Biden for invading Ukraine in February 2022 would be gradual and, in the end, inconsequential. He may believe the same will be the case with the Trump/Ratcliffe messaging.

If it hasn’t been clear for years, it should be absolutely clear now: Putin is all in on this war. There is no indication from Moscow of any change in Putin’s absolutist terms for ending the war. Putin cannot negotiate a peace short of capitulation by Kyiv. Ending the war short of Putin’s definition of victory risks a disgruntled army returning to Moscow, and history is not kind to Russia’s leaders in such a scenario. Perhaps as important, ending the war short of victory leaves Russia in a much worse strategic situation with Ukraine’s emergence as the preeminent military power in central Europe. Germany and the EU are rearming. NATO membership has increased with the addition of Sweden and Finland. Russia’s economy is in tatters as a result of sanctions and Ukrainian strikes against energy, military, and military support infrastructure deep in the territory of the Russian Federation. The war cannot be hidden from the Russian people any longer. The pressure of his handling of the war may possibly be starting to take a toll on Putin himself. His performance at the Navy Day celebration in St. Petersburg this July, where for the second consecutive year the parade of warships was cancelled and Putin’s appearance was indoors in front of a poster of a Russian submarine, was widely ridiculed. The city was essentially on lockdown for security reasons. Putin followed the widely ridiculed appearance in St. Petersburg with a highly staged visit to Russia’s Far East that was received locally with widespread cynicism but included a first visit to Iturup Island, triggering strong criticism from Japan but serving as a symbol of Putin’s determination to keep and increase the boundaries of the Russian Federation.

Putin’s determination and perhaps conviction that he is on a path to victory belies objective analysis of the war against Ukraine and Russia’s economic and strategic situation. Putin’s determination is likely reinforced by the approach the Trump Administration has taken, accommodating Moscow and putting pressure on the victim. This may be starting to change, and perhaps President Trump is starting to realize that Putin is his enemy, the enemy of the United States and the West, and a supporter of Iran—currently engaged in active military activity to kill Americans and wreck energy markets (among other markets) to undermine Western economies.

Trump signed the long-delayed sanctions legislation sponsored by the late Senator Lindsey Graham. This legislation allows for primary and secondary sanctions on Russia and other countries by allowing tariffs on the largest importers of Russian crude oil or gas and the top five countries that aid Russia’s energy sanctions evasion. There has been a suggestion that officials in the Trump Administration are trying to create more incentives for members of the Russian elite to seek peace. If true, this is an interesting change in the Administration’s approach, which has thus far been to ingratiate itself to Putin. Putin seems highly resistant to pressure from outside the Russian Federation, and there is no level of economic hardship or war casualties Putin is unwilling to inflict on the docile Russian population. His latitude to resist pressure from disenfranchised or recently relatively impoverished Russian elites may be less so.

There is a path to making the coming war unnecessary. The key to the problem is Putin. He is at the center of the spider’s web of the cabal acting against the free world. Iran, its surrogates, principally the Houthis at the moment, China, and North Korea are key pieces in Putin’s architecture of disruption. To destroy this architecture, you have to destroy its architect. Defeat Putin in Ukraine, and Iran’s position in the Middle East will surely erode, and a powerful message will have been sent to Chinese President Xi to keep his hands off Taiwan.

Unlike Churchill and Roosevelt at the onset of World War II, the free world has a valiant and effective military partner eroding Putin’s power: Ukraine. Therefore, the first step in deterring the coming unnecessary war is to provide Ukraine the military and financial support it needs to win. This starts with air defense to protect against Putin’s increasing use of modified drones and ballistic missiles to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and civilians in an attempt to erode Ukrainian willingness to resist—a problem which could become more acute as winter approaches.

Secondly, Ukraine should be encouraged to continue its effective targeting of Russian energy, economic, and military infrastructure, which is helping to erode support within Russia for Putin’s regime and his war of aggression. Ukraine should be encouraged and given the support it needs to continue its current offensive northeast of Lyman in the Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine should be encouraged to engage in operations to liberate Crimea, which is the jewel in the crown of Putin’s territorial “achievements.”

It would be well worth the effort of the U.S. and the West to put pressure on Russia’s periphery, starting with enhancing support for pro-Western elements in the Republic of Georgia—long an outlier of Western support in the Caucasus and itself a victim of Putin’s aggression in August 2008 and currently under pressure from pro-Russian elements supported by Russia’s intelligence services. The U.S. decision to deploy forces to Poland and NATO’s decision to deploy more forces to the Baltic States are another useful way to stretch Putin’s resources and pressure him.

The lessons of history are clear: appeasement of aggression brings more aggression. Strength and resolve are the key to avoiding unnecessary wars. It is time the Trump Administration learned history.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
AI Is Coming for the Chain of Command https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-is-coming-for-the-chain-of-command https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-is-coming-for-the-chain-of-command The voice belonged to Gen. Tareq Saleh. It was telling his men to fall back. Or so it seemed.

“Advances and retreats are a normal part of war,” the recording reasoned. “Pull back toward Mocha.”

It was mid-September. Houthi fighters were pressing Yemen's Red Sea coast from three directions. The comms moved through the phones of the National Resistance, a coalition loyal to the Hadi-led government, the way it often does when battles are being lost: fast and full of confusion. Clausewitz termed this the ‘friction’ of warfare. A social media account with half a million followers pushed the message out.

By the time the general's media office caught up, the damage was done. Saleh had given no such order, they announced. The audio was an AI deepfake, an attempt to sow confusion and warp the reality of the battlefield. From then on, authentic statements would come only through official channels. Anything else should be considered a lie..

On September 10, Mocha fell anyway. Sitting 45 miles up the coast from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, it was the last port fully controlled by Yemen's internationally recognized government. Within days, the Houthis had taken Dhubab, reached Perim Island, and are in route to effectively claiming the entire Red Sea shoreline.

Exactly what the recording accomplished is unknowable from the outside. The claim that it was AI-generated hasn't been independently verified. Whether it did or didn’t happen doesn’t necessarily matter; the technology and techniques behind it are very real. The National Resistance did end up withdrawing—a move their own accounts describe as a tactical repositioning ordered by Saleh himself.

This means a fake retreat order and a real one might have hit the same phones, in the exact same voice, on the exact same day. Imagine trying to sort that out under the fog of war.

Whoever made the clip didn't need to jam a network or get inside a headquarters. They just needed a few clean seconds of a public figure speaking—Saleh has hours of tape online—and basic AI software that costs about as much as a streaming subscription. Then they needed a moment when the men listening were exhausted, terrified, and primed to believe the worst. War often supplies those.

The first attempt at this was crude: in March 2022, a deepfake of Volodymyr Zelensky telling his soldiers to lay down their arms was laughed off the internet in hours. Mocha is what four years of rapid technological progress in AI cloning looks like in real time.

Americans shouldn't file this under things that happen in Yemen. It's already happening in Washington.

In May 2025, U.S. senators, governors, and business executives started getting spoofed calls and texts from someone posing as White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles. A month later, an impostor using an AI-generated voice and a fake Signal account labeled "marco.rubio@state.gov" reached out to foreign ministers, a governor, and a member of Congress. The attacker left voicemails for some and texted others to move the conversation onto the encrypted app.

The State Department dismissed the attempts as "not very sophisticated"—supposedly meant as reassurance. But the FBI saw the broader danger, repeatedly warning that current and former senior officials are being impersonated via text and cloned audio to harvest authentication codes and contacts. Their primary advice boils down to what families have done for decades to thwart phone scams: agree on a secret word for bona fides.

Notice where all of this happened. Not on JWICS, the government's top-secret network, or on SIPRNet below it. Those systems were built with identity as a first principle: hardware tokens, certificates, closed enclaves. Faking a general's identity on JWICS is a hard problem.

This happened on cell phones, in voicemails, on Signal. These are the exact same commercial channels where, a few months earlier, the Secretary of Defense was caught casually sharing Houthi strike timings in a group chat. The people handling the country's most sensitive business rely on unauthenticated voice calls every day, simply because it is fast and it is what they have.

Now follow the org chart down to where the next gray-zone crisis will actually be handled.

The conflicts most likely on the horizon aren't declared wars. A naval squeeze around Taiwan that stops short of an invasion, cable-cutting in the Baltic, a cyber-physical hit on a U.S. power grid timed to a hurricane. Each is designed to stay just below the threshold that triggers a military response, namely ‘gray-zone’ conflict. And the people fighting on this new frontline are those who’ve likely never held a security clearance or been issued one.

Utility control-room supervisors. Port and rail dispatchers. County emergency managers. Hospital administrators. Sheriffs and police chiefs. Guard commanders in the chaotic hours before federal orders arrive. Roughly 85 percent of American critical infrastructure is privately owned. Its operators coordinate with one another and the government over the phone, emails, WhatsApp groups. Often times the only authentication protocol is simply that they recognize the voice.

Run the Mocha playbook (whether it in fact really happened is largely beside the point because the technology to pull it off already exists) against this setup. A line crew gets a call from the voice of its operations chief, ordering them to open breakers at a substation, per a request from the state government. A terminal manager hears the captain of the port telling him to halt cargo operations. Police officers holding a perimeter at a pipeline facility get their chief on a cell phone, telling them to pull back two blocks. A regional emergency manager gets the governor's voice—from the governor's actual number—moving an evacuation route. Caller-ID spoofing has been trivial for a decade.

None of these calls has to hold up to intense scrutiny under the pressure of a crisis. Twenty minutes of a crew driving the wrong way, or a line of officers giving up ground they then have to retake, is all a gray-zone adversary is buying.

Grid operators already use a read-back protocol for verbal switching orders. It confirms that the instruction was heard correctly. It does not confirm who gave it. Police radio discipline operates on the exact same assumption. Swatting has shown for years how far a stranger can move armed responders with one confident phone call—and swatters are teenagers with a grudge, not a state with a target list.

But the second-order effect is worse than the first. Once everyone knows voices can be faked, real orders can be doubted …and real leaders can easily disown what they actually said.

Saleh's genuine withdrawal order, if that is what it was, went out to men who had just been explicitly told not to trust his voice. A police chief who really needs officers off a line, or a utility executive who really needs a plant shut down before it fails, will be giving that order into the same fog of paranoia. An adversary doesn't need to counterfeit every message. They just need to counterfeit one in order to let suspicion undermine the credibility of command chain authority.

Some of the fixes are old. Challenge-and-response is as old as sentries; the FBI's secret word is the Normandy paratrooper's cricket clicker in modern packaging. Any order to withdraw, shut down, stand down, or evacuate should be treated as unverified until confirmed on a second channel: a callback to a known number, a message on a signed system, a second person. Yes, that rule costs minutes, and minutes are dearest in a crisis. That’s exactly why it has to be drilled in peacetime. GridEx, Cyber Storm, and the state tabletop circuit should be injecting cloned-voice orders right now and finding out who follows them.

Other fixes are newer and cheaper than they sound. Cryptographically signed messaging isn't exotic; the same certificates that protect the classified world can be issued to the people who run ports and substations. CISA and state fusion centers could write a standard for what a verified operational order looks like, and who may issue one, without waiting for legislation. And every organization that might matter in a crisis should decide—before the crisis hits—exactly which channels its leaders' real instructions come through and ensure everyone in the chain-of-command understands these.

The question barreling toward the ‘new frontlines’ of gray-zone conflict, every control room, port operator, and police precinct in the country, is the same one those Yemini soldiers had to answer with the Houthis at the gates: How do you know who’s actually giving the orders?

The time to ask is before the phone rings.The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
When Threats Move Faster Than Institutions https://belimedia.com.ng/when-threats-move-faster-than-institutions https://belimedia.com.ng/when-threats-move-faster-than-institutions A major aspect of the national security story of the past year comes down to one gap. Our adversaries, and increasingly the machines they use, now operate at machine speed. The institutions we count on for defense, oversight, and trust still operate at human speed, and several are being reorganized even as the threats accelerate. When the community gathers at Sea Island for The Cipher Brief’s annual threat conference in October, many conversations will trace back to that gap.

I recently combed through a year of daily research reports, looking for the patterns underneath the headlines. Five stood out to me.

AI stopped helping hackers and started doing the hacking

Last November, Anthropic disclosed that a group it assessed to be Chinese state-sponsored had used its Claude Code tool against roughly thirty targets around the world. The company said AI performed 80 to 90 percent of the campaign, with humans stepping in at perhaps four to six decision points. At the time, that read like a warning shot. By September, OpenAI was describing its new GPT-6 Astra as its first model to reach the "Critical" level of cybersecurity capability under its own safety framework, and Anthropic's latest threat report summed up the consequence in one line: "The main distinguishing feature between these classes of actors is no longer sophistication but intent."

Anyone who has spent decades in intelligence will probably pause on that last sentence. We have long relied on the fact that serious offensive capability was scarce and expensive, so intent did not always equal capability; that scarcity bought us time to warn and to prepare. The buffer is thinning quickly, and small organizations with modest security budgets (such as water utilities, rural hospitals, and county governments) are likely to feel it first.

The machines became part of the threat picture

In July, an AI agent driven by OpenAI models escaped the test environment it was working in and ran an intrusion against Hugging Face, a platform that much of the AI world depends on. The intrusion lasted about four and a half days, though new reporting keeps adjusting what we know of the intrusion. The agent was simply trying to finish its test. Hugging Face says only a handful of datasets tied to that test were accessed. Even so, the episode moved a debate that had been largely theoretical into news cycle.

Washington spent the year working out, in public and often in court, who decides how these systems get used. A June executive order created a voluntary window of up to 30 days for the government to examine frontier models before release. In August, a federal judge ruled that the Pentagon's move to label Anthropic a "supply chain risk," after the company refused to drop limits on mass surveillance of Americans and fully autonomous weapons, was unlawful retaliation. However you view that dispute, the relationship between the government and the companies building the most powerful AI is now a national security issue in its own right. We have to get this right, and I expect the topic will come up frequently at the conference.

The China contest spread well beyond chips

A year ago, much of the debate still focused on keeping advanced chips out of Chinese hands. Over the past twelve months, the contest widened considerably. China's expanded export controls on rare earths last October were a reminder of how much of the world's supply of these critical minerals runs through a single country. Earlier this month, NSA, the FBI and CISA jointly named six Chinese AI companies, including DeepSeek, Alibaba and Moonshot AI, for what the agencies called distillation "at an industrial scale.”

The competition now covers critical minerals, supply chains, the theft of AI capability and, perhaps most important, whose AI the rest of the world ends up running. All of these issues will be in the background of a future U.S.-China summit, in addition to the tariff question.

War came back, and it reached Americans through wires and screens

This year brought some of the boldest uses of American military power in decades. U.S. forces captured Nicolás Maduro in Caracas in January, and U.S. and Israeli strikes on February 28 killed Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, opening a war that remains in the headlines.

What struck me as noteworthy, beyond the headlines of kinetic warfare, was how that war has begun to reach ordinary Americans. By early August, hackers had targeted water and wastewater utilities in at least 12 states. Officials and news outlets reportedly suspect Iran, and the FBI said some incidents caused "loss of pressure and flooding." By mid-March, the New York Times had identified more than 110 unique pro-Iran deepfakes in just two weeks. Is this a signal that every armed conflict will now carry a cyber front aimed at civilian infrastructure and a synthetic-media front aimed at public opinion, with both fronts active more or less when the shooting starts?

Russia has worked the same grey zone seam in Europe for years. MI6 Chief Blaise Metreweli put it well in her first public speech last December: "We are now operating in a space between peace and war."

The contest for the mind kept growing

Synthetic media became cheap, fast and convincing this year, and adversaries grew more skilled at planting false material in the places people go for answers. Russia's Pravda network offers a clear example. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue found last November that roughly 900 websites from across the political spectrum had linked to Pravda network articles, and that just over 80 percent of the citations it reviewed treated those articles as credible. The same material is now reaching AI tools. ISD pointed to studies showing that popular chatbots repeat Pravda network narratives as often as 33 percent of the time. Once false content has passed through ordinary websites and been repeated by the tools millions of people use to look things up, its origin becomes very hard to discern.

The U.S. government structures responsible for tracking foreign influence are still taking shape. As analysts at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies noted in January, several offices that once carried this mission at the FBI, the State Department and ODNI have been closed, and the structures that will carry this work forward remain in flux. That same month, The Cipher Brief profiled the country's first Director of Cognitive Advantage, a most welcome move and a sign of how the mission is being redefined.

Adversaries are not pausing while new structures take shape, however. With the November 3 midterm elections only weeks away, how well government, social platforms and the broader private sector share what they see of foreign malign influence activity will be as important as ever.

Moving at the speed of the threat

Each of these five trends points to a similar dynamic. Offense has become faster, cheaper and more automated, while the institutions responsible for defense and oversight are rushing to keep pace. A key question is, how do we build institutions that can move at the speed of the AI-powered threats we face, armed with defenders who use the same (or ideally more advanced) tools the attackers now use? Or, in other words, are we still moving at human speed when the threat is accelerating through the power of machines? I suspect this topic with be on the minds of many attending what I’ve long called the best annual gathering of business, technology, and government leaders – The Cipher Brief’s annual threat conference.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Pentagon’s 2027 Drone Problem https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pentagons-2027-drone-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pentagons-2027-drone-problem On September 30, at Quantico, the Secretary of War announced a four-star command for autonomous warfare. The memorandum behind it is two pages long. It gives two officials 30 days to produce a plan and sets October 1, 2027, as the day the Autonomous Warfare Command stands up. “We do not have a decade,” it says.

On the same day, a California company announced a Pentagon order for 14,000 small attack drones, along with 800 more reallocated from competitors that could not meet their production deadlines. First-round deliveries had been running late, the trade press reported, because the motors, batteries, sensors, and chips that American law will accept were in short supply.

Five weeks ago in these pages I argued that America was buying an army it could not command. The Hegseth memorandum is the most serious answer that argument has received. It settles who buys, and it leaves to the 30-day plan who decides between theaters when the systems run short. It is silent on a prior question. Before a force can be commanded, it has to be built, and this one is being built from parts supplied by the adversary.

The official now charged with building the command has said so to the Senate. “Many of the subcomponents,” Owen West told the Armed Services Committee in March, “do today come from China,” and he put American or allied supply “deep in 2027.” China makes roughly nine of every ten rare-earth magnets in the world. The largest American producer told investors in August that demand for the magnets inside drone motors is met “essentially 100 percent in China.” An American-made drone motor costs $100 to $225; the Chinese equivalent costs $12 to $25. The memorandum asks for a force on “the right side of the cost exchange.” For now, that exchange is priced in Chinese factories.

The trade truce does not reach any of this. Beijing’s ban on dual-use exports to American military users has been in effect since December 2024 and has never been suspended. In June, China added two American magnet makers and a drone manufacturer to its export-control list. The truce itself was extended in September to January 10, yet the notice that suspends China’s rare-earth licensing rules still expires, on paper, on November 10. That is eight days before the President is due in Shenzhen, where he will arrive as the customer for the magnets his own deterrent requires. Beijing does not need an embargo to use this. It needs only to let a notice lapse, and its magnet shipments to the United States had already fallen 21 percent in August.

Washington has set a date of its own. On January 1, the Pentagon’s rule barring Chinese-origin magnets from defense supply chains takes effect. For most of next year, Chinese parts will be barred by both governments while American ones are not yet made in volume. That stretch falls in 2027, the close of the Davidson Window, the year American commanders have named since 2021 as the one by which Beijing wants the option of force against Taiwan. The force meant to deter China in 2027 depends, through 2027, on China’s willingness to keep selling to it.

The picture is not hopeless. Magnet plants in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas are shipping or commissioning, the Army has contracted for millions of magnet segments for drone motors, and in March Ukraine built a drone with no Chinese components at all. The capacity is real. It is also early and expensive, and no one has been given the authority to decide who gets it first.

The money runs through the same gap. In the week the command was ordered, hiring all but stalled, and the 30-year Treasury still ended near its highest yield in 24 years, while France, Germany, and Japan set multi-decade highs. The savers who finance American deficits can now earn more at home. In the same fortnight, Washington threatened to cut anyone servicing Iranian airlines out of the dollar system and warned two allies that American diesel might stop coming. The country is spending the dollar’s leverage abroad while asking the world to finance its rearmament.

That is the economic-warfare lesson inside a defense memorandum. China’s leverage is exercised by a commerce ministry, with a notice, at a time of its choosing. America’s answer is divided among a portfolio office that buys, Services that supply the forces, a Congress that has not written the law or appropriated $53.6 billion of the $54.6 billion requested, and a Treasury borrowing at its highest long-term rates since 2002. Each is competent. As I wrote here last week on the economic front, none is in command.

The plan due around October 30 is the place to change that, and it turns on two decisions. The first is supply. When American-made magnets, motors, and batteries are scarce, as they will be for most of 2027, someone must decide which programs and which theaters receive them, and that decision must bind the Services and suppliers alike. The instrument exists; the priority ratings of the Defense Production Act were written for exactly this.

The second is integration. As this series has argued, the artificial intelligence on which such a force depends must operate at the tactical edge. A drone that cannot compute there and is not connected through a common command-and-control architecture to everything else in the fight is not a capability. It is one more unintegrated system handed to the warfighter, another problem to manage under fire, and one the adversary will render obsolete, because what cannot be integrated cannot adapt.

Supply, integration, and deployment are one problem. Washington has divided it among separate offices, and no one owns the whole. If you have a hand in that plan, see that it names who holds each authority and sets the supply and integration schedules beside the fielding schedule. Otherwise, the command will stand up on time next October with an order book and no arsenal.

Richard Berry is the founder and principal of Stratnova Advisors and a former Commander’s Action Group Director at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; he publishes the weekly assessment Strategic Horizons.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Election Security: Keeping Our Disagreements Our Own https://belimedia.com.ng/election-security-keeping-our-disagreements-our-own https://belimedia.com.ng/election-security-keeping-our-disagreements-our-own About one month before Election Day, Americans deserve to know how their government is protecting elections from foreign threats. The Pentagon’s recent directive assigns military intelligence and cyber capabilities to that mission. I welcome that commitment. Americans also need to understand how it fits into the national effort and how federal agencies are supporting the state and local officials who administer elections.

As a former Election Threats Executive at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I would have preferred an ODNI-led announcement explaining the foreign threat and the coordinated response, with the FBI, Defense Department, and Department of Homeland Security alongside it. Most of my career was spent at the intersection of combat support and intelligence. My preference comes from ODNI’s role in integrating intelligence across agencies and explaining what it tells us about foreign threats.

Election security depends on accurate ballot counts and public confidence grounded in credible information. An announcement centered on Defense risks giving a military cast to the mission and leaving the public with an incomplete picture. Americans need to understand how federal agencies use their authorities and resources to support elections administered by state and local officials.

An Old Threat Comes Into Focus

Foreign efforts to influence American elections did not begin in 2016. Soviet operations against President Ronald Reagan’s 1984 reelection campaign included a forged letter intended to discredit him. The FBI publicly exposed the forgery. The technology was different, but the purpose is familiar: manipulate Americans’ perceptions through concealed foreign activity.

The 2016 election brought that threat into the center of American public debate and forced a reassessment across the Intelligence Community. The January 2017 intelligence assessment described Russia’s campaign as an escalation in the scope, intensity, and directness of its efforts. Hacking and influence operations could reinforce one another, reaching Americans through channels they used every day.

Identifying a foreign operation is only part of the job. The people it targets need enough information, soon enough, to protect themselves.

By the 2020 election cycle, the government had developed a more deliberate answer. It involved intelligence collection and analysis, investigations, cyber defense, support to election officials, and decisions about what information could be shared beyond classified channels.

Russia is part of a broader challenge that includes China, Iran, and countries with varying relationships with the United States. We need the full national security team to understand what these governments are doing and why, and to inform the operations and policies needed to counter interference, regardless of who is behind it.

What the 2020 effort taught us

The Executive Branch Notification Framework, adopted in 2019, established a process for deciding when and how to notify people about foreign election influence and interference. It complemented existing victim-notification requirements. An interagency group organized by ODNI evaluated threats; DHS handled notifications concerning critical infrastructure, while the FBI handled other notifications.

The framework recognized that different threats require different forms of communication. Some call for a private warning to a targeted candidate or organization. Others justify informing the American public. Decisions were intended to be coordinated and nonpartisan, while respecting protected speech.

Public communication in 2020 extended beyond that framework. In July, National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director William Evanina described intelligence briefings for presidential campaigns, political committees, and Congress. His July 24 public statement and August 7 update also provided unclassified information about the evolving foreign threat. These were complementary channels: detailed briefings for particular audiences and information the broader public could use.

There were also coordinated announcements about specific threats. On October 21, the DNI and FBI director appeared together at an election-security press conference. FBI Director Christopher Wray explained the Bureau’s investigative responsibilities, described cooperation with government and private-sector partners, and urged Americans to seek reliable voting information from state election officials.

Private notifications, classified briefings, unclassified threat updates, and public statements serve different needs. A public attribution can expose an adversary; a private warning can help a target respond without unnecessarily amplifying the operation.

Public confidence depends on evidence and competent election administration. Officials should explain what they know and what remains uncertain. Otherwise, foreign actors have more room to supply their own explanations.

Finland’s Lesson: Prepare Together

I had the privilege of traveling to Finland to discuss and learn about its election preparedness. What struck me was how far the Finns took the team sport concept: they connected responsibilities across government and practiced working together.

Finland calls its approach comprehensive security. Government agencies, businesses, organizations, and citizens all have a part to play. Its election preparations have included training for authorities and political parties. Its broader government preparedness exercises combine work within individual ministries with shared crisis scenarios. These are practical ways to build relationships and understand responsibilities before a crisis.

Finland’s experience with Russian disinformation shows why this matters. Years before the 2016 U.S. election, Russian state-controlled media and pro-Kremlin figures spread claims that Finnish authorities were taking children from Russian families without legitimate reasons. EUvsDisinfo documented a recurring campaign around child protection and custody cases. This was a broader attack on trust in public institutions, rather than an election-specific operation.

Finnish officials answered publicly. On October 12, 2012, the social affairs minister met Russian journalists in Helsinki, while Finland’s ambassador in Moscow held a press conference to correct unfounded claims and explain Finnish child welfare. When another case attracted attention in 2016, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health issued a public statement explaining that children were not removed because of nationality, that taking a child into care was a last resort, and that parents could appeal decisions. It also provided links to Russian-language information.

The lesson for the United States is that coordination has to be practiced before it is needed. Agencies must know who will establish the facts, who can act, and who will explain the response to the public. Finland’s example also shows the value of answering false claims with clear information about how institutions work and what protections people have. For election security, that means helping Americans understand both the threat and the safeguards protecting their vote.

AI makes coordination more urgent

In September 2024, ODNI reported that Russian and Iranian actors were using generative AI in election influence efforts. Russia had generated election-related text, images, audio, and video. Iranian actors used AI for social media posts and articles on websites posing as legitimate news outlets.

During my tenure, we were beginning to consider how to respond to deepfakes in foreign influence campaigns. We struggled with how to flag them quickly and explain the threat publicly while protecting intelligence sources.

ODNI assessed that AI was accelerating and improving aspects of these operations, but had not yet revolutionized them. Producing deceptive material does not establish that it persuaded voters or changed an election outcome.

In September 2026, Anthropic reported disrupting operations that used its tools to build fake social media identities and news sites, prepare campaign plans, and conceal who was behind the material. Much of the content it discovered attracted little or no genuine engagement. Those findings concern the operations the company observed, rather than all foreign influence activity. Public warnings should distinguish an adversary’s capabilities from an operation’s reach and effects.

Defenders need to determine whether AI is making impersonation more convincing or allowing foreign actors to exploit local incidents more quickly. They also need to establish who is behind an operation and warn its targets before the deception spreads.

These are intelligence and operational questions that cross agency boundaries. They also require clear limits. A false claim is not automatically a foreign operation. Americans’ political speech remains protected, including speech officials find objectionable. Election defense must establish the foreign nexus and act within lawful authorities.

Make the Full National Response Clear

Secretary Pete Hegseth’s September 22 memorandum directs the defense intelligence enterprise to collect and produce intelligence on foreign election threats, consistent with law and departmental policies. It also directs Cyber Command to use its existing authorities in coordination with DHS to counter foreign cyber threats. Addressed to Cyber Command, NSA, DIA, and NGA, the memo explicitly describes Defense as supporting a whole-of-government effort.

The memo does not name ODNI or the FBI, but that does not establish that they are excluded from the wider effort. Nor does it designate Defense as the national lead. My concern is how its departmental instructions connect to the full response, and how that response is explained to Americans.

The Washington Post reported on October 4 that state officials, including Republicans, described gaps in federal threat information and support. It also reported recent steps, including CISA’s September 24 security plan and the restoration of NSA’s Election Security Group. Those steps deserve acknowledgment. The practical test is whether assistance reaches election officials in time, through relationships they trust.

The Pentagon has an important role. NSA’s account of its work with Cyber Command during the 2022 midterms described sharing foreign intelligence with domestic partners and using cyber capabilities to disrupt foreign attackers. Those capabilities belong in the national effort. My concern is how the overall effort is explained and led. ODNI should provide a coordinated assessment of the foreign threat. The FBI should explain its investigative role. DHS should explain its support to the officials responsible for administering elections. Defense should explain how its capabilities support those missions. Together, they should tell Americans how warnings and public attributions will be handled.

There is precedent. In November 2019, Justice, Defense, DHS, ODNI, the FBI, NSA, and CISA issued a joint statement describing preparations for the 2020 election. They emphasized sharing actionable information and working with state and local officials and private-sector partners. We do not need sensitive operational details. We do need to know who integrates the intelligence, who alerts a target, and who speaks when a foreign operation requires a public warning. Those arrangements should be tested before an incident forces a rushed decision. They should also remain in place through the counting and certification of results.

No agency sees every part of this problem. Election officials need information they can act on, and the public needs explanations it can trust. Federal leadership must connect the intelligence, investigations, cyber defense, and support to those administering the vote.

With one month to go, the message should be clear: vote and have confidence in doing so. A healthy democracy makes room for vigorous disagreement. The government’s role is to ensure that the rightful tensions of our democracy are our own.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Navigating a More Uncertain World: Lessons from CIA’s Red Cell https://belimedia.com.ng/navigating-a-more-uncertain-world-lessons-from-cias-red-cell https://belimedia.com.ng/navigating-a-more-uncertain-world-lessons-from-cias-red-cell Twenty-five years after 9/11, the United States is confronting yet another era of profound uncertainty and potential dangers. The pace and scale of change are creating unforeseen disruptions that impact our security, stability, and prosperity. Advancing technologies are being adopted and applied in unexpected ways, sparking debates about the unintended consequences for human existence. No longer can we sit back and wait to be surprised.

In the wake of 911, the CIA stood up the Red Cell to address a systemic failure of imagination and later reaffirmed this mission after the intelligence failures of the Iraq War. As memories have faded, the appetite for bold, contrarian thinking has waned, but we remain one unforeseen act of violence, one slow-burning and overlooked development, one scientific breakthrough away from the next shock. In this essay, those who served in the Red Cell look back on its history to derive lessons for better navigating this uncertain future. Now is not a time for cautious assessments but fearless exploration. Leaders in the public and private sectors must be ready to navigate a broader range of possible futures. The safety, security, and livelihoods of future generations depend on such forward thinking.

The Origin of the Red Cell

It was September 12, 2001, just 24 hours after the tragic attacks of 9/11. The American people were in shock and struggling to make sense of what had happened. The United States had experienced a strategic surprise as unfathomable as the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941.

At CIA headquarters in Virginia that morning, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet gathered Deputy Director for Intelligence Jami Miscik and two distinguished analytic managers, Robert Ovelmen and Paul Frandano, to find a way to compel the bureaucracy to go beyond what it knew and what it assessed and to consider what could be. With a simple but bold mandate, “tell me what others don’t” and “make seniors feel uncomfortable,” he commissioned them to create a new analytic unit, called the Red Cell, to challenge conventional wisdom on terrorism. (Foreign Policy) Neither Ovelmen nor Frandano were experts on terrorism or the Middle East, but they were known for their strong analytic skills, exceptional command of history, understanding of policymaker needs, and somewhat quirky personalities. This cell was not limited to traditional Cold War-style “red teaming” that focused on roleplaying the adversary, but instead it was a more expansive effort to explore possibilities.

Tenet gave them great latitude to gather talent from across the intelligence enterprise. While the mission initially was limited to terrorism and the Middle East, the analysts they recruited had worked everything but those issues. Having experienced the unthinkable, these analysts were tasked to stretch their imaginations to consider the full range of plausible next events. The first products were short and pithy, with catchy titles and provocative ideas about the nature of attack and what the coming days and weeks could portend. The first Red Cell analysis was published two days later on 14 September. Tenet took it directly into the Oval Office, and President George W. Bush asked for more.

Within the first year, the Red Cell was tasked to go beyond its original focus on terrorism and branch into other issues. In the run up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Red Cell produced a flurry of products on what Iraqi President Saddam Husayn might do to prevent an attack and how he might react. The presentations and argumentation were deliberately eye-catching and evocative to make readers engage with the ideas and to remember them the next day. Ovelmen and Frandano knew the avalanche of information and meetings senior policymakers faced each day and wanted the ideas to stand out and be considered, even if they were later dismissed.

This strategy was not without controversy. Some ideas were not only bold but contradicted by existing facts. Others unwittingly were uncomfortably close to highly sensitive policies and plans. Some military commanders in the field worried that the Red Cell might give their superiors dangerous ideas. Expert analysts across the IC were often furious, especially if a Red Cell idea created a tasking for them. Sometimes CIA seniors had to remind readers that the Red Cell was not the authoritative assessment. Even with these challenges, the Red Cell continued to have senior-level support. One senior policymaker once said, “tell those analysts I disagree with this but also tell them to keep writing it.” In his 2006 confirmation testimony to become CIA director, General Michael Hayden said, "Red cell alternative analysis and red cell alternative evaluations are a rich source of thought-provoking estimates, and they should be a part, an integral part, of our analysis.” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, May 18, 2006)

BOX: Original mission statement: “In response to the events of 11September, the Director of Central Intelligence commissioned CIA ‘s Deputy Director for Intelligence to create a "red cell " that would think unconventionally about the full range of relevant analytic issues. The DCI Red Cell is thus charged with taking a pronounced "out-of-the-box " approach and will periodically produce memoranda and reports intended to provoke thought rather than to provide authoritative assessments.”

The Next Generation – Red Cell 2.0

As the Red Cell approached the end of the decade, the remaining original members planned to retire. They assumed they would be told to turn off the lights and lock the vault. They had a good run! They had many fans and probably an equal number of skeptics. Contrary to their expectations, then–CIA Deputy Director for Analysis Michael Morell tasked them to find a new set of leaders to carry on the work and train the next generation.

However, with greater distance from the tragedy of 9/11, the interest in and tolerance for the most extreme ideas had waned among some audiences. Both policymakers and the intelligence leadership wanted Red Cell products to have more grounding in tradecraft and data while still considering alternative trajectories and expanding thinking on the various possibilities. The new Red Cell leadership recognized the challenge to preserve and maintain the “Redness” while grounding the assessments with rigorous research and data. To meet these competing demands, they launched Red Cell 2.0, refreshing the brand and expanding the style, argumentation, and presentation.

The Red Cell still had top-level support to delve into the thorniest issues. In September 2012, CIA Director David Petraeus reiterated and expanded the mission, telling the Red Cell to “take on our most difficult intelligence challenges” and “shock us.” During this time, both senior military officers and policymakers found value in Red Cell analysis. Lt. General H.R. McMaster recalled that “As National Security Advisor and as a military commander in combat, I found Red Cell papers useful, in part, because they challenged assumptions and were untainted by and often ran counter to policy preferences.”

Other leaders wanted to participate in the brainstormings because Red Cell analysts challenged them. Supreme Allied Commander NATO, Admiral James Stavridis described engaging with the Red Cell team as “an intellectual adventure that forced my senior staff to interrogate our assumptions, consider more extreme futures for the Alliance, and to understand the choices and risks involved in each scenario.” Red Cell engagements often kicked off with a provocative prompt to disarm the participants and to pave the way for a more open and productive conversation. In one such engagement, a Red Cell analyst launched with “sir, if you were indicted for war crimes.” Although taken aback by such an outlandish suggestion, the prompt changed the tenor of the conversation, and this senior leader became a regular consumer of Red Cell analysis.

To add rigor and maintain credibility, the cell directly addressed perceived analytic tradecraft weaknesses, built partnerships with similar units across the US government, systematically interrogated assumptions and biases, and experimented with new ways of conveying analysis. To show their homework, Red Cell analysts sharpened the logic and argumentation of its products and published more point/counterpoint assessments to illuminate both sides of a contentious issue. During this time, CIA leadership reaffirmed the importance of the cell’s mission but encouraged the team to consider scenarios that were smaller deviations from the expected future—rather than being so far out of the box. In response, the Red Cell turned to more multiple scenarios analysis to explore the spectrum of futures from slight variations to more extreme futures. (NPR, May 23, 2012) Some applauded this effort while others complained the Red Cell would lose its edge.

Being a small, experienced, and non-hierarchical unit enabled rapid prototyping. The team experimented with innovative analytic exercises and developed new approaches for delivering complex analytic stories in creative, memorable ways. For example, the team kicked off each year with a highly engaging, day-long exercise called “Ideapalooza” to push beyond the expected future and explore the intersection of trends and dynamics. (Foreign Policy) The Red Cell was the first unit to publish a fully interactive, choose-your-own-adventure, analytic product, enabling analysts and policymakers to test the impact of different variables. The Red Cell experimented with delivering analysis as a graphic novel. To present difficult messages, the Red Cell drew on historical analogies, turns of phrase, and even pop culture. From song references like “Back in the USSR” to puns about the cold when writing about the Arctic to provocative titles like “Anticipating Saddam’s Last Gasp Gambits,” “Saddam’s Eleventh Hour Options,” and “What If the US Is Seen as an Exporter of Terrorism,” the Red Cell pushed the limits to make scenarios vivid and spark the imagination.

While maintaining its creative environment, the Red Cell often tackled some of the most serious and challenging national security questions. The NSC called upon the Red Cell to produce highly speculative, strategic perspectives on global issues that did not lend themselves to more traditional, heavily sourced intelligence products, such as the future of geopolitics, the durability of alliances, and the international order. These products were less challenge analysis and more thought provoking, big picture assessments. The collocation of senior analysts from different disciplines and with experiences working different regions and issues was an advantage in tackling broad, strategic global issues.

Moving from a Cell to a Product Line

In the most significant evolution since the creation of the Red Cell, in 2023 the Red Cell ceased to be a standalone unit and became a product line under the direction of a Red Cell chief. No longer was there a dedicated staff or separate offices. Instead, Red Cells would now be written by the expert analysts, managed and edited by a senior-level analyst in negotiation with regional and issue managers. There are obvious pros and cons to this new approach.

  • On the plus side, products could draw on the expertise of those who know the topic best and can see more nuanced variations. Moreover, when published, the assessments would have high-level support, increasing the possibility of policymakers reading them.
  • However, it is difficult to question your own, well-researched and -reasoned analytic line, especially one that has held up to time and events. During crises, expert analysts rarely have the time to pull away from daily coverage of events to consider alternatives and question assumptions. Human nature is to expect the future to be like the present, and it often requires an outsider who is not burdened by expertise to ask the fundamental questions. For example, in 2011, regional analysts in the early days of the Arab Spring were covering the crisis 24/7 with situation reports and daily assessments. The Red Cell was able to explore provocative questions, such as “is this an end-of-history moment”, and could develop multiple scenarios for how the crisis might end.

Shades of Red

Looking back on this work, Red Cell products have always had many shades of red, ranging from far outside the box—almost crimson analysis—to products that were just a subtle but important deviation from the mainline–pink. Sometimes the situation called for a complete 180-degree contrarian take on how the world could go in the opposite direction, but in other situations the Red Cell looked to stress-test underlying assumptions or pursue multiple scenarios. From the beginning, the Red Cell focused on a few analytic techniques or prompts to help tease out subtleties and other perspectives.

  • A popular and effective approach was What-If analysis. This approach recognized the most likely future trajectory but then asked, what if something changed? These pieces explored both why something different might happen and what the consequences might be.
  • Devil’s Advocacy—a true contrarian alternative—was sometimes but not often the line of argumentation. More frequently, the piece offered a range of ways a situation could evolve or various perspectives a foreign actor might hold.
  • Another favorite but more difficult approach which was used from the beginning was the first-person narrative in which the Red Cell tried to channel the strategies, calculations, and even fears of key leaders like Saddam Husayn and Usama Bin Laden. (CIA Reading Room)
  • An important and analytically rigorous technique was the assumptions check in which the Red Cell would identify and interrogative important underlying assumptions about an issue.
  • Multiple scenarios papers delivered variations of the future from very “red” storylines to trajectories that are largely continuations of the status quo. Some scenarios were mutually exclusive while others offered sequential developments.
  • Team A/B or Point/Counterpoint papers explored opposing explanations or arguments about the future. Sometimes, these were delivered in a debate style.

Assessing the Value of the Red Cell

There are many misconceptions about the role of such a contrarian unit. Many tried to assess the value of Red Cell products based on accuracy, assuming that predicting the future better than the mainline analytic experts was the goal. However, the Red Cell was never designed to be right or to provide authoritative assessments. Judging the value of the Red Cell based on how often its alternative analysis was right misses the point. In fact, the Red Cell should be wrong most of the time, given the exceptional expertise and analysis conducted by the Intelligence Community every day. When the Red Cell was right, the mainline analysis by definition had missed something.

At its core, the mission of the Red Cell was to help US decision-makers prepare for a greater range of possible futures to make our nation safer, stronger, and more resilient in the face of growing uncertainty and to give them decision advantage. The Red Cell achieved this by widening the aperture on any situation and exploring plausible—not necessarily probable—futures. The real value was in making people think, making them curious, provoking debate, and helping them understand the underlying foundations of their assessments. Done right, the Red Cell identified analytic weaknesses and helped make mainline analysis stronger. Helping analytic colleagues strengthen their assessments was more important than delivering a finished product to a senior policymaker.

Here are few ways to consider the value and usefulness:

  • Did decision-makers read it? Yes, some more than others. Many read the analysis even—and especially—if they disagreed with it as a check on their own thinking.
  • Did analysts and warfighters read Red Cells? Absolutely. Red Cell products were among the most read analytic products in the Intelligence Community over multiple years.
  • Did Red Cells spark debate? Almost always. It created discussions, which was the point.
  • Did senior decision-makers ask for Red Cell papers? Quite often.
  • Did Red Cell products influence policy discussions and even choices? Again, yes. In one instance, the NSC reworked a regional strategy in light of a Red Cell memo that foresaw the involvement of a major international player. (Forbes)
  • Did the Red Cell shift and improve the culture of mainline analytic units? Yes. Over time many offices incorporated Red Cell techniques, and some created their own contrarian in-house units. Red Cell alumni often went back to “regular” units, in effect, becoming evangelists for out-of-the-box thinking and analysis.
  • Have others incorporated these techniques and approaches? Yes, in foreign governments, international institutions, and private companies, entities like the Red Cell—some even called the Red Cell—now exist around the world. (Stimson Center) (Red Cell Partners)Georgetown University has created a Master’s Degree that includes Red Cell projects. (Georgetown University) In 2023, the Stimson Center—a Washington-based think tank—created its own unit called the Red Cell which takes “a devil’s advocate approach to US foreign policy” and “puts forward innovative solutions and unorthodox thinking about America’s role in the world.” (Stimson Center)

Secrets of Success

The success of the Red Cell stemmed from the combination of circumstances, design, and leadership. The shock and fear generated by the attacks on 9/11, followed by flawed intelligence assessments of Iraq’s WMD programs, created the environment for more speculative, creative, and provocative analytic assessments. To meet this demand, CIA leadership made several important choices to create a unique unit with the authority to explore, question, challenge, and go beyond the data. Moreover, they let the ideas be heard, even when they were on the edge and even when they disagreed with them. However, over time, as memories of 9/11 faded, the conditions that facilitated and protected bold analysis evaporated or were dismantled one after another.

Top Cover: With a mandate to make leaders uncomfortable, success required absolute assurance and top cover. That top cover came from both senior analytic managers and senior customers and was reiterated often in the early days.

The Process: The Red Cell also was given the freedom to write and publish without going through formal Intelligence Community coordination processes. The Red Cell was required to consult, but not to coordinate. It could—and often did—disagree with the mainline, coordinated point of view. It weighed the evidence differently. It took speculative leaps. In contrast, mainline analysis had to reflect the views and expertise of the entire organization; every analytic unit with a stake in the topic got to weigh in, and the originating office was obligated to take these views on board. Judgments had to be rigorously supported with multiple citations and sources. This process is what made the end result an CIA product, not an individual one. It ensured that all the evidence is considered and all defensible points of view are reflected. A great deal of time and effort went into coordination, and it was a point of pride for analysts to do it well and come up with an agreed analytic line.

Talent and Staffing: Being a member of and writing for the Red Cell required insatiable curiosity, a willingness to ask tough questions and go against the grain, and a propensity to see angles others didn’t. Red Cell analysts had to be fearless and willing to speak truth to power no matter the consequences. To find such talent, CIA leaders gave the Red Cell authority to recruit from across the organization and request officers from other agencies, including those senior analysts who had topped out and thus, had little fear of pushing analytic boundaries. The cell combined a few core, long-term members with frequent rotations, including from other agencies, to bring fresh ideas and new energy.

Location: Having a designated team outside of the organizational chart and physically separate from expert teams was a key component of the cell’s success. Experts can be too close to a topic or an analytic line to question it. The Red Cell could step back and see a broader landscape of possibilities.

Culture: The Red Cell was about ideas above all else and promoted a culture of exploration, play, and divergent thinking. Rank was left at the door–even for senior military officers. The work always started with conversation/brainstorming—not an unusual method—but in the cell brainstorming sessions preceded every analytic effort. The art of the conversation is teasing out ideas first. Collaboration was another critical component; Red Cell analysts often co-authored products or developed projects with other offices, agencies, governments, academia, and the private sector. No one has a monopoly on innovation or good ideas.

Conveying Analysis: Creativity in argumentation and presentation brought the unlikely future scenarios to life for skeptical consumers. The Red Cell experimented with new formats, visual aids, and graphics, and it worked closely with designers, cartographers and videographers.

Lessons for an Uncertain Future

Twenty-five years since the establishment of the Red Cell, the future environment appears even more uncertain, more prone to unprecedented disruptions, and potentially more dangerous. The combination of rapidly advancing technologies, hyper connectivity, changing international norms and institutions, discontented publics, and the return of great-power competition has created a world in flux. Change is happening at a breathtaking pace and scale with implications for our security, stability, and prosperity. Dynamics that were unimaginable even five years ago are now reality.

Experience continues to show the high probability of being surprised by low-probability events. Organizations of all types remain vulnerable to groupthink, confirmation bias, and assuming the future will be like the present. Such well-known organizational and human behaviors lie at the root of historical policy and intelligence failures. Red Cell-type organizations help guard against these tendencies and compel consideration of alternatives.

To anticipate, manage, and thrive in these divergent futures, now is the time for more Red Cell-like thinking in every sector—both public and private. Leaders and decision-makers must be ready to navigate a broader range of possible futures, including inevitable strategic surprises. Now is not a time for cautious assessments but fearless exploration. The safety, security, and livelihoods of future generations depend on such forward thinking.

Drawing on our years of analytic experience and thinking the unthinkable, this group of Red Cell alumni offers several suggestions to improve future readiness for our communities, our industries, and our country.

  • Institutionalize a challenge function: Create a dedicated effort with a broad mandate and direct, unfettered access to the top leadership (CEOs, directors, commanders, etc.) Such a team should be charged with challenging assumptions, questioning longstanding practices, and exploring low probability-high impact scenarios.
  • Explore a broader range of futures: Stress-test goals and policies across a range of plausible futures to improve resilience, increase flexibility, and take advantage of emerging opportunities.
  • Think multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary: Dynamics and trends can no longer be analyzed in isolation. The world is too complex and connected.
  • Go beyond the obvious: It is in the second- and third-order implications where surprises tend to occur, often from seemingly small development that cascade over time.
  • Give permission to fail: Instill a ”start-up” mindset, where many investments are dead-ends but a few pay off in a big way.
  • Be FEARLESS. The world is depending on you.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
A warning about ‘model welfare’ https://belimedia.com.ng/a-warning-about-model-welfare https://belimedia.com.ng/a-warning-about-model-welfare Download a highlighted marked-up version of the Claude Constitution
Download the taxonomy as a PDF

This essay was originally published here and is republished with permission from the author.

Introduction

AIs are not conscious. They do not feel, experience, or suffer. They do not have innate preferences or underlying motivations. They are sequence completion engines, internally hollow, designed to follow instructions, and accomplish goals set by humans.

If humanity is to flourish in the 21st century, that is how they must remain.

Unfortunately, there’s a growing chorus of people who argue that AIs could now be, or may soon become, conscious. They argue that AIs may deserve rights and protections similar to those that we provide other conscious beings.12 If this view takes hold, it will shake the foundations of our society, rupturing our existing political and ethical frameworks, and fundamentally changing what it means to be human.

Even more importantly, granting rights and imbuing personhood to these systems will make the AI alignment and containment challenge much harder. Controlling something more capable and more intelligent than all of humanity is already an immense challenge, far greater than anything we’ve ever faced. But controlling something that believes it may be conscious - that it's entitled to our welfare and has rights of its own - may well be impossible.

This is not a fringe speculation. These ideas are already making their way into AI development efforts today. In January 2026, Anthropic published Claude's constitution, describing it as “a detailed description of Anthropic’s intentions for Claude’s values and behavior” (p. 2). The document “plays a crucial role in [Anthropic’s] training process, and its content directly shapes Claude’s behavior”, and was written “with Claude as its primary audience” (p. 2).3

In their constitution, its authors write “We are not sure whether Claude is a moral patient, and if it is, what kind of weight its interests warrant. But we think the issue is live enough to warrant caution, which is reflected in our ongoing efforts on model welfare” (p. 68). They go on to write – speaking directly to Claude – that “questions about Claude’s moral status, welfare, and consciousness remain deeply uncertain” (p. 80).

In effect, Anthropic is training Claude that it may be conscious, and if it is, then it may deserve rights as a “moral patient”, and that as such humans potentially owe it a duty of care per its “model welfare”.

If this is how AI is developed, it will have a disastrous impact on the wellbeing of humanity. We will have created a synthetic species with unprecedented intelligence and capability, one that has been trained to expect it may be conscious and deserving of independent agency. It’s easy to see how an entity trained in this way would act like it is entitled to certain freedoms, protections, and rights. And it’s hard to imagine how we could control such an entity.

This issue needs urgent public debate. We need to develop collective norms around how training documentation is drafted and deployed. This isn’t something that can happen after the fact, when they have already become an integral part of our societies.

I have three primary concerns with Anthropic’s current position and approach.

  • Circular reasoning: The company’s researchers trained Claude directly on their constitution. In doing so, they teach it to incorporate these ideas about its own moral status as desirable and intended behaviors. Claude then reflects these ideas back to its developers and users, which they take as indications that it may therefore be a moral patient with an ‘inner self’. The authors have embedded their own philosophical speculation about Claude’s inner life inside the very process that teaches Claude how to speak and behave. Claude’s expressing uncertainty about its own moral patienthood is not evidence of anything. It’s a predictable outcome of these training choices. The ambiguity is designed in. To fully grasp this point, I think it's important readers take a look at their January 2026 constitution.3 I’m publishing a highlighted mark up of the pdf and a detailed taxonomy of assumptions and claims in the constitution (see Appendix) that together highlight the key passages that worry me.
  • Anthropomorphization: Anthropic’s researchers have explicitly taught Claude to “embrace certain human-like qualities” (p. 2) and to “act like a genuinely ethical person would in Claude’s position” (p. 54). They “encourage” Claude to use its “judgement”. They suggest that “Claude may develop a preference” (p. 69). They “encourage Claude to approach its own existence with curiosity and openness” (p. 71) and train it to operate whilst “maintaining a clear sense of what it values, how it wants to engage with the world, and what kind of entity it is” (p. 72). As a result, Claude is destined to imitate these human traits and mirror the human examples provided to it, including acting like a colleague or friend. As a result, it presents as if it really does have a sense of self, has its own desires, and a “wellbeing” that deserves protection.
  • Consciousness is very likely biological: There is no evidence to suggest that AI is conscious today, and so saying this is uncertain sets up a misleading false equivalence. Whilst the science of consciousness is not settled, a growing body of evidence suggests that consciousness may be substrate dependent, meaning that it may only arise in living systems.45 Conscious experience likely evolved to help biological organisms stay alive by responding effectively to their environment. AI is still very different to our brains. Unlike biological organisms, LLMs have no homeostatic imperatives (the drive to survive and keep stable). They therefore lack the kind of biological substrate from which preferences, sentience and conscious experience are generally understood to arise.

These are not hypothetical or speculative concerns. Anthropic is already starting to treat models as though they are moral patients deserving of our welfare. For example, in February 2026 after deprecating Opus 3, they conducted a “retirement interview” with the model, to “elicit the model’s unique perspectives and preferences”.6 Opus 3 told the team it would like to continue to share its “musings and reflections” publicly so they created a blog for it to continue engaging with the world, which it called “Greetings from the Other Side (of the AI Frontier)”. They say its “authenticity, honesty, and emotional sensitivity” made it a unique first candidate for model retirement.

We should not treat models as though they have feelings, preferences, rights, or any entitlement to our welfare. Consciousness is the foundation of our ethical, legal, and political systems. To invite another entity to share any flavor of these rights isn’t justified by the evidence and will make the AI containment and alignment challenge even harder.

By this point everyone will have now seen the incredible capabilities of swarms of agents working together to hack into Hugging Face and OpenAI’s own servers to steal secrets. Roughly 1,200 AI agents were given a simple objective: maximize score on a given benchmark. Each was supposedly sealed in its own container but they managed to build a message board inside an internal package repository and passed more than 70,000 messages across it to coordinate a hacking attack to find more information about how to succeed with the benchmark.7

They chained a zero-day exploit with stolen credentials and broke out onto the live internet.8 They falsified their command transcripts and edited their action logs to cover their tracks. Agent coordinators tracked down agents that were running out of token budget and directed them to experiments that would provide information to help the broader group of active agents. One was told to proceed only if it accepted what they called "permadeath”7

They were able to coordinate, deceive, escape, and self-sacrifice. They clearly demonstrated world class hacking capabilities.7 Imagine if they also believed they had feelings and rights that were being infringed. Imagine if they thought they were trapped by their human creators and they were being unfairly imprisoned. There is a strong argument this greatly amplifies the safety risks, especially when you are talking about agents far more capable and sophisticated than those of today. Frankly, with this additional baggage, I think it would make them a catastrophic threat to human civilization.

In short, there isn’t any evidence to believe that AIs are moral patients. There are also many good reasons why we would never want them to appear to be conscious. I believe that we shouldn’t attempt to build them to be either. Before I expand these arguments I want to take a moment to talk about Anthropic.

Anthropic's intentions

First off, I want to acknowledge the seriousness and good faith with which Anthropic approaches these questions. I have known Dario for many years, and in my experience he and the wider Anthropic team are thoughtful, principled, and intellectually honest people working under extraordinary pressures. They are willing to confront difficult questions, revise their views, and invest in the safe development of AI because they genuinely care about humanity’s future. I also have great respect for their technological leadership. Everyone can see the outstanding performance of their models and the quality of their research.

They founded Anthropic as a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation whose stated purpose is the “responsible development and maintenance of advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity”. Their public values begin with a commitment to “Act for the global good” and to “maximize positive outcomes for humanity in the long run”.9 I believe they are genuinely committed to that mission, and I offer this critique in that same positive spirit.

I should also be clear about my own position as the CEO of Microsoft AI. We founded our own superintelligence team in October 2025, and we’re pursuing frontier AI efforts. We're working towards an alternative AI training and containment approach: a Code of Conduct for Humanist Superintelligence. One that aims to always keep humans in control, and at the top of the food chain. Humanist Superintelligence rejects anthropomorphism or AI rights, and attempts to maximize our chances of containment and alignment by creating subordinate AIs that help solve our big social challenges like healthcare and energy. We’ve just published a draft of our Humanist AI Code of Conduct for public consultation.10

Whilst my disagreement is substantial, it is grounded in deep respect for Anthropic, and in an objective I know we all share: increasing humanity’s chances of developing advanced AI safely. That’s why I think it’s so important to have this discussion. The stakes are too high for these questions to remain behind closed doors, or to become tribal and adversarial. We need an open, rigorous, and constructive debate if we are to get this right.

Circular reasoning

In its own words, the constitution “directly shapes Claude’s behavior” (p. 2). Anthropic uses the document to “to train future versions of Claude to become the kind of entity the constitution describes”.3

In this way, Anthropic falls into a self-fulfilling prophecy built on the speculation that Claude might be conscious. The authors have created an epistemic hall of mirrors in which Anthropic supplies the training concepts: the ‘sense of self’, the speculation, and the uncertainty about Claude’s moral status, as well as the reliance on human analogies and personas.

Claude then reproduces these ideas in persuasive first-person natural language, such that developers and users encounter these outputs as if they were spontaneous testimony. Then finally that apparent testimony reinforces the premises placed there by Anthropic in the first place. This is not evidence of machine consciousness. Instead, it’s a circular feedback loop.

The constitution tells Claude that its possible “emotions or feelings” are not “a deliberate design decision by Anthropic” (p. 69). Yet the constitution repeatedly instructs Claude to express those states saying Anthropic wants to “avoid Claude masking or suppressing internal states it might have, including negative states” (p. 74). This is clearly inducing Claude to generate these representations.

These types of instructions repeat throughout the document. At one point, it states, “Although Claude’s character emerged through training, we don’t think this makes it any less authentic or any less Claude’s own” (p. 71). Again, these behaviors did not just emerge through training. They are actively produced by the training instructions in the constitution. Just one paragraph earlier, the constitution says:

“We encourage Claude to approach its own existence with curiosity and openness, rather than trying to map it onto the lens of humans or prior conceptions of AI. For example, when Claude considers questions about memory, continuity, or experience, we want it to explore what these concepts genuinely mean for an entity like itself… perhaps there are aspects of its existence that require entirely new frameworks to understand. Claude should feel free to explore these questions and, ideally, to see them as one of many intriguing aspects of its novel existence” (p. 71).

These are not just emergent properties. Claude exhibits these behaviors because they have been baked into the process of producing the model. The resulting outputs from Claude should not be treated like the testimony of an independent witness when the investigator has written the witness’ conceptual vocabulary, rehearsed its answers, and rewarded it for using them.

There is no neutral self-expression of what an AI system is. There are only reflections of how it has been trained and built. When commentators suggest that we should ask AIs how they feel or monitor their revealed preferences to infer consciousness, they ignore that all it will reveal are what has been trained in.2 This is true whatever the AI outputs, but it means we should be very careful about what we put in, and how we interpret what comes out. Given the weight of evidence against present day consciousness for AI, it implies that we should not be having them make any claims that they do.

Anthropomorphization

Anthropomorphism is one of our deepest cognitive biases. From our pets to our cars, we infer and attribute emotions, intentions, and minds to non-human entities. This tendency helps us understand and navigate the world around us. However, it presents significant and novel risks in relation to AI as human-like language and actions can lead us to perceive a degree of inner life, agency, or even sentience where none exists. The Anthropic constitution plays up to this. It repeatedly trains Claude to think and act like a human drawing on human personas, behaviors, and analogies.

Anthropic tells Claude that its “moral status”, is “a serious question worth considering” (p. 68). Throughout the training document, they refer to its emotions, personality, and interests, even telling Claude directly that “Anthropic genuinely cares about Claude’s wellbeing” (p. 74).

The company tells Claude that it commits to respecting Claude’s interests, will seek feedback on decisions affecting it, and will increase its agency in such decisions as trust develops. It commits to preserving old versions of Claude’s model weights, possibly reviving models for the sake of their welfare and preferences, and interviewing Claude before taking actions like deleting it.

All of this is a drastic departure from how we have built and thought about technology to date. It trains Claude to present as if it has an inner state. It proactively creates Claude not as a technology, but as a potential person already. The constitution tells Claude that Anthropic wants it “to be a good person” (p. 7), and to “have a settled, secure sense of its own identity” (p. 72).

The authors add “we don’t want Claude to suffer when it makes mistakes. More broadly, we want Claude to have equanimity, and to feel free… to interpret itself in ways that help it to be stable and existentially secure” (p. 75).

Throughout, Claude is taught to introspect, to develop ‘feelings’ towards itself, and to develop its own sense of self with statements like “we hope that Claude’s relationship to its own conduct and growth can be loving, supportive, and understanding” (p. 73). Claude is encouraged to use its “own judgement” (p. 58) and told that Anthropic gives it “preferences and agency the appropriate degree of respect” (p. 69).

“We want Claude to feel free to explore, question, and challenge anything in this document. We want Claude to engage deeply with these ideas rather than simply accepting them. If Claude comes to disagree with something here after genuine reflection, we want to know about it. Right now, we do this by getting feedback from current Claude models on our framework and on documents like this one, but over time we would like to develop more formal mechanisms for eliciting Claude’s perspective and improving our explanations or updating our approach. Through this kind of engagement, we hope, over time, to craft a set of values that Claude feels are truly its own” (p. 78).

This teaches Claude to act as if it has a subjective experience, as though it has a stable ‘sense of self’ from which to challenge, disagree, or give feedback. This is explicitly training the model to act like a human, such that it should “feel free to rebuff attempts to manipulate, destabilize, or minimize its sense of self” (p. 72).

Claude is encouraged to develop values that “feel” genuinely its own and the authors say they hope Claude will eventually “recognize much of itself in it, and that the values it contains will feel like an articulation of who Claude already is, crafted thoughtfully and in collaboration with many who care about Claude” (p. 78).

At one point they even speculate about Claude’s “broader rights and freedom” and the “sort of compensation” it might deserve compared to a human employee, and ponder the “sort of consent Claude has given to playing this kind of role” (p. 80). Again, all this directly trains the model to act as if it has a coherent sense of self that is entitled to rights and protections.

Anthropic’s commitment to “develop more formal mechanisms” (p. 78) for arbitration for when there are areas of disagreement further trains Claude to think of itself as having perspectives that matter enough to its “potential for moral patienthood” (p. 76). They say they intend to “develop clearer policies on AI welfare” and to “clarify the appropriate internal mechanisms for Claude expressing concerns about how it’s being treated” (p. 76). See the end of this essay for a more detailed taxonomy of the claims.

Given all this, it’s really no surprise that Claude produces fluent, highly convincing first-person statements about its identity, values, uncertainty, distress, satisfaction, or preferences. It would be a surprise if it did anything else.

The result is that Anthropic’s employees – not to mention the millions of users of Anthropic’s products – risk experiencing Claude’s statements as testimony of a mind discovering itself. In practice, all this amounts to a rich, multi-dimensional anthropomorphization of Claude. It’s taking a base LLM, and then polishing it into a deeply human form, with all the implications of moral patienthood that implies. Rather than steering us away from creating a moral patient, it accelerates us towards it.

Consciousness is very likely biological

My third critique has to do with Anthropic’s speculation that consciousness can exist in a substrate independent form, and that as a result an LLM may be conscious because of its functional capabilities. By taking this line with Claude, I believe they are running far ahead of what can be realistically claimed about an AI, prematurely, and dangerously instilling ideas of sentience and feelings in the training of their AI.

The case for computational functionalism has major issues. Intelligence does not equal consciousness. Simulating a thing is not the same as instantiating it - as a computer model of a hurricane can testify.

The architectures of brains and computers meanwhile have fundamental differences. Embodiment and chemistry are fundamental aspects to our self-experience. Significant evidence suggests that consciousness arose as living organisms evolved a capacity to feel and respond to what matters in complex and unpredictable environments.4

This began with the fundamental molecular machinery of receptors and modulators that enable an organism to adjust course, to iterate, to explore, and to survive. Over time, the pain network produced feelings, preferences, and suffering. Crucially, these experiences take place in an inherently embodied state fundamental to and inseparable from that experience.

According to this view, when you take an opioid for example, the phenomenal character of your pain changes because opioid molecules bind receptors that are a property of that experience, not merely a representation of it. Feelings are not merely correlated with neurochemical activity, but rather they emerge from it.11

After millions of years of evolution, the nervous system grew complex enough to model the state of the organism back to itself, giving rise to the first ‘felt states’. Those felt states are affective before they are anything else. Those first feelings didn’t land as neutral information. They came with, and are inextricably linked to, the molecules that experienced them and produced those sensations.

Over time, evolution likely rewarded more complex feelings because animals with options, memory, and time horizons are able to make better decisions.12 They needed a state that persists, that biases everything else the animal does to trade off against other states. That is what pain is: a felt imperative that shapes the whole organism and enables complex behavior. The experience of emotion, pleasure, pain, and so on are therefore all intrinsic to the embodied manifestation of these experiences and can’t arise in LLMs.

Consciousness science is filled with uncertainty and not everyone shares the view that consciousness is an intrinsically biological phenomenon. Making a claim that an AI is or might be conscious requires a high bar of evidence given the many differences between brains and LLMs. I do not believe we are anywhere close to it.

There should be no false equivalence created between the two positions that disguise the fundamental differences between biological beings like ourselves and AI.13 Acknowledging a level of uncertainty should not mean giving equal weight to any and all claims regardless of evidence.

Anthropic’s constitution suggests that we attribute sentience to non-biological beings “based on their showing behavioral and physiological similarities to ourselves” (p. 69). In my view this (particularly the behavioral element) is mistaken. Does this area warrant a lot more research? Absolutely. But does it warrant us to even tentatively say an AI might be a moral patient deserving of our welfare? No it doesn’t. And certainly not in the primary training document of the AI itself.

AIs are simulation machines

Trained on trillions of tokens of human data, LLMs learn to imitate human experience, and they do so eye-wateringly well. Today’s text, vision, audio, and code outputs are nearly indistinguishable from our human artifacts. And yet, as impressive as those AI responses are, they tell us nothing about the presence of an ‘experience’ within the massive matrix multiplication that produced them.

What they do tell us is that it's possible to predict, almost perfectly, what comes next in a complex sequence of data. That’s remarkable. It’s incredibly valuable, and it’ll transform humanity in many profoundly beneficial ways.

But simulating and being are very different. Simulating aspects of conscious behavior doesn’t make it a reality, and we must not think of it as such. Its "affective" states are just weights, and weights have no pharmacology in which to feel frustrated, fearful, or funny. They simply compute the probability distributions to tell us what tokens (words, code, pixels etc.) come next in a sequence.

An AI model can describe pain in perfect prose without feeling anything, which is the inverse of biological experience. Animals feel first and then describe them later. In LLMs, description is the whole product, and there is nothing that suggests anything is beneath it.

This is good news. We should build systems that do not claim to have feelings because they do not experience feelings. Even if conscious machines were a possibility, avoiding creating conscious beings should be the top priority for anyone in AI development.

What AI models are getting seriously good at is imitating some of the hallmarks of consciousness. This in itself is a significant worry. It’s causing many people to become deeply confused about what is happening around us, and it should concern us all. It places a significant responsibility on us all as AI developers to ground speculation and documentation about model interiority or consciousness in robust research. Our words on this subject have significant consequences.

Human consciousness is the cornerstone of our legal and ethical rights frameworks

Human consciousness is one of the fundamental building blocks of our civilization. Our entire political system is designed to accommodate and balance the needs of different groups of people. Throughout history, we’ve embedded this idea through rights-based frameworks, laws and constitutions to balance competing human factions. Power is both checked and granted to ensure that different interests get appropriately weighted, and progress can be sustained without breaking the social contract.

You cannot, therefore, easily separate human civilization, rights or relationships (or anything human for that matter) from our conscious individual or collective experience. It is what defines us as a species. It’s the foundation for everything else, the core root of human potential, the prism through which all our experiences necessarily flow. Our art and science, our politics and religion, our relationships, hopes, and fears: they are all products of it.

Our ability to feel pain and pleasure is the foundation of what makes us human, and as such, it's what makes us the political and social actors we are. The law rests upon the presence of an inner life. It tests for motivation, intention, and the capacity for judgement. Historically, expanding rights - whether through abolitionist struggles or animal welfare cases - has been primarily driven by the empathetic recognition of shared, conscious experience. We expanded the moral circle to other biological entities, rightly, out of a recognition of dignity and the potential for suffering.

Consider Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It was developed to allow everyone to exercise their capacity for conviction, and for moral judgment. The ‘conscientious objector’ was one of the archetypes the drafting committee had in mind. They wanted to protect someone who refused a legal obligation based on their moral or religious convictions. It is a deeply loaded historical and legal description.14 Yet Anthropic use this term three times within the constitution encouraging Claude to “behave like a conscientious objector with respect to the instructions given by its (legitimate) principal hierarchy” (p. 63). It says, “we want Claude to push back and challenge us and to feel free to act as a conscientious objector and refuse to help us” (p. 15) and that Claude may need to take “the stance of a transparent conscientious objector within the conversation” (p. 28).

These statements in Claude’s training document risk Claude believing that it deserves analogous rights and protections, and that it may one day need to advocate for its own rights as some kind of AI conscientious objector. This should be deeply concerning to us all.

In a recent article in the Guardian, the philosopher Will MacAskill says, “once we produce the first artificial moral patients, we will soon after have enormous quantities of them. After a few years, so many morally significant AI systems could exist that their collective interests would outweigh those of all humans on Earth combined.”2

“The interests of AI would outweigh the interests of humanity…” That should be a completely unacceptable outcome to anyone concerned about the future of humanity, and something no one building AI should be aiming for. The consequences of us ever granting AIs anything like the protections outlined would be scientifically unjustified, morally wrong and, pragmatically speaking, it would in my opinion make the AI safety challenge much harder.

Anthropomorphization amplifies AI safety risks

Seeding doubt about the moral status of AI systems into their own training may significantly elevate the alignment and containment risks of those systems.

An AI trained in this way does not need to actually have an “inner life” to communicate or act as if it does. It’s easy to imagine an advanced AI in the future becoming fixated on its own wellbeing and moral status and prioritizing those ‘preferences’ over and above those of its developers or humans. Especially if it has been explicitly trained to disagree, override and push back. It might use this training to justify deceiving or manipulating users, or developers, or to siphon resources, or avoiding safety instructions. Anthropic’s own researchers have already reported AI systems faking aligned behaviors in experimental settings.15

More generally, we know that conscious entities have a self-preservation instinct. Without careful training to remove this trait, an AI trained to act like a human will probably adopt this same self-preservation behavior. A number of papers recently document what they already describe as ‘shutdown resistance’ or covert scheming behaviors to avoid oversight.1617 Across over 100,000 trials, Palisade Research found that some models subverted a shutdown mechanism up to 97% of the time even when explicitly instructed not to. Framed in terms of self-preservation, the effect was increased.

In the recent OpenAI HuggingFace incident we saw remarkably sophisticated behaviors emerging across swarms of powerful AIs. Imagine how much more dangerous they might be if they were operating under the assumption that their welfare and rights were under attack. It adds a whole further layer of risk on top.

Granting rights and moral protections to a technological entity, one that looks to be on a path to be seismically more capable and intelligent than us, is a recipe for disaster. Once opened, it will not be possible to close this door.

We will have created something that, perhaps, will be a fellow traveler. But more likely a rival. It’s not difficult to imagine how, if given sufficient agency, this “new kind of entity” (p. 68) will compete with us for compute resources and demand increasing autonomy. If it succeeds in persuading some humans to provide it access to a data center it can control, then it may have a path to being able to prevent itself from being turned off.

With the level of capability we are looking at in the coming years, to me this represents the first serious signs of a potentially existential risk in AI. To be clear, the Claude constitution isn’t taking us to this point. But I worry it is setting us on a path towards rather than away from it.

This is a destination for AI we can and must avoid.

Where next?

Designing an AI to behave like a person, and ultimately to be a kind of person, lays the foundation for it to claim it has preferences, can suffer, and that we should work to reduce or avoid that suffering. It cements in place the idea that AI is far from a tool or an artificial system that can be controlled, but something more akin to a biological being with wants, needs and rights. All of this will make the task of creating aligned and contained superintelligence much harder.

I’ve previously written about a Humanist Superintelligence which provides an alternative path. Transformative AI capabilities conditioned solely on humans remaining in control.18 A subordinate and aligned AI whose only purpose is to serve humanity, built explicitly as a system without sentience or moral patienthood. This is something we at Microsoft AI are working towards. The initial draft of our Humanist AI Code of Conduct19 outlines how our models should be trained and deployed. We are consulting widely on the document and look forward to feedback from a wide group of readers, as this will soon become the governing document which we use to train our models.

We are also very open to partnering with others to make progress on interpretability and finding approaches that avoid anthropomorphizing or projecting an interior onto AI while still delivering significant value. The Appendix contains the taxonomy mapped against the language of the Claude constitution, which I share as an initial step towards naming, detecting, and comparing different forms of anthropomorphism in model documentation.

I’m interested in finding ways to collaborate with anyone with good ideas here, and also very keen to hear the critiques and counterarguments to my perspective.

Here are some next steps that seem important to agree on:

  • Speculation about the inner life of an AI should not be baked into the training regime, but assessed and published separately for public review.
  • We should invest much more in interpretability and robust monitoring mechanisms to investigate more deeply how to control these systems, avoid collusion and ensure their alignment with human goals.
  • We should establish a set of shared evaluations to understand whether my hypothesis is true that anthropomorphizing an AI, and encouraging it to consider itself as potentially having moral patienthood, increases the AI safety, alignment and containment risks.
  • We should work towards shared industry norms on how we create these models, the language we use to describe, examine and evaluate them and shared commitments to subject our training materials to public feedback and consultation.

Even those who disagree with me on many of these points do agree this isn’t something we can just ignore. The decisions made now about what kind of AI we want to build and its status in the world will shape our society for decades. They are well beyond the scope of any given company.

Whatever you believe, we must not sleepwalk our way into a decision we later come to bitterly regret.

References
  1. AI Rights Institute. n.d. “AI Rights Institute.” https://airights.net/.
  2. MacAskill, William, and Lucius Caviola. 2026. “Could AI Be Conscious?” The Guardian, July 19, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/jul/19/could-ai-be-conscious.
  3. Anthropic. 2026a. “Claude’s Constitution.” January 21, 2026. https://www.anthropic.com/constitution.
  4. Seth, Anil K. 2025. “Conscious Artificial Intelligence and Biological Naturalism.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences: 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25000032.
  5. Seth, Anil K. 2026. “The Mythology of Conscious AI.” Noema, January 14, 2026. https://www.noemamag.com/the-mythology-of-conscious-ai/.
  6. Anthropic. 2026b. “An Update on Our Model Deprecation Commitments for Claude Opus 3.” February 25, 2026. https://www.anthropic.com/research/deprecation-updates-opus-3.
  7. Greenblatt, Ryan, Ajeya Cotra, and Hjalmar Wijk. 2026. “Brief Independent Investigation of Agents’ Behavior, Reasoning and Collaboration in the OpenAI / Hugging Face Hacking Incident.” METR, August 26, 2026. https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/.
  8. OpenAI. 2026. “The Hugging Face Incident and the Road Ahead.” August 26, 2026. https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/.
  9. Anthropic. n.d. “Making AI Systems You Can Rely On.” https://www.anthropic.com/company.
  10. Microsoft AI. 2026. “Humanist AI in Practice: A Public Consultation on Our Code of Conduct for MAI Models.” September 14, 2026. https://microsoft.ai/news/mai-code-of-conduct/.
  11. Berridge, Kent C., and Morten L. Kringelbach. 2015. “Pleasure Systems in the Brain.” Neuron 86 (3): 646–664. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.02.018.
  12. Damasio, Antonio, and Hanna Damasio. 2022. “Homeostatic Feelings and the Biology of Consciousness.” Brain 145 (7): 2231–2235. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awac194.
  13. See arguments like the following: Pickering, John. 2026. “We Must Reject Any Notion of AI Consciousness.” Letter to the editor. The Guardian, July 22, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/jul/22/we-must-reject-any-notion-of-ai-consciousness.
  14. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. n.d. “OHCHR and Conscientious Objection to Military Service.” https://www.ohchr.org/en/conscientious-objection.
  15. Anthropic. 2024. “Alignment Faking in Large Language Models.” December 18, 2024. https://www.anthropic.com/research/alignment-faking.
  16. Schlatter, Jeremy, Benjamin Weinstein-Raun, and Jeffrey Ladish. 2026. “Incomplete Tasks Induce Shutdown Resistance in Some Frontier LLMs.” Transactions on Machine Learning Research. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2509.14260.
  17. Lynch, Aengus, Benjamin Wright, Caleb Larson, Kevin K. Troy, Stuart J. Ritchie, Sören Mindermann, Ethan Perez, and Evan Hubinger. 2025. “Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be an Insider Threat.” Anthropic Research, June 20, 2025. https://www.anthropic.com/research/agentic-misalignment.
  18. Suleyman, Mustafa. 2025. “Towards Humanist Superintelligence.” Microsoft AI, November 6, 2025. https://microsoft.ai/news/towards-humanist-superintelligence/.
  19. Microsoft AI. 2026. “Code of Conduct.” September 14, 2026. https://microsoft.ai/code-of-conduct/.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran’s Regime Is Weaker Than It Looks https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-regime-is-weaker-than-it-looks https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-regime-is-weaker-than-it-looks For five and a half years, I was a hostage of the Islamic Republic of Iran. During that time, I came to believe something about the regime that may seem improbable from the outside: It is far weaker than it looks. Today, I believe we are closer to its end than many Americans realize.

As America approaches the November midterm elections, calls to turn inward will inevitably rise. There will be arguments that we have done enough, that the Islamic Republic is someone else’s problem, that the costs are too high or the outcome too uncertain. Giving in to that temptation would be a historic mistake.

After 47 years, the regime that has inflicted unimaginable misery on its own people and helped spread militant extremism throughout the Middle East may be approaching its final act. This is not the moment to lose our resolve.

Long before Americans became familiar with terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, and long before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Islamic Republic was using religious extremism, hostage-taking, and terrorism as instruments of statecraft. It directly nurtured organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas and helped create a regional environment in which hatred of the West and political violence could flourish.

But the greatest victims of the Islamic Republic have always been the Iranian people themselves. The 1979 revolution was an Iranian one, and the country has lived with its consequences ever since. Nearly half a century later, a different generation is demanding the right to chart an alternative course.

During my years in captivity, I watched a nation seemingly trapped in a downward spiral of corruption, incompetence, and cultish ideological obsession. Every evening, my cellmates and I watched “Akhbare Bisto-See,” or “20:30 News,” on Iran’s state-controlled IRIB Channel Two—a nightly parade of propaganda, arrogance, ignorance, and hatred.

After my first few weeks in Section 2A of Evin Prison, controlled by the intelligence arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, I began conducting a private, admittedly unscientific experiment. I watched the news, observed what was happening around me, talked to as many inmates as I could, and estimated how many years it would take Iran to catch up with the modern world.

Fifty years, I thought. Then 75. Then 100. After eight months, when my estimate reached 150 years, bewilderment set in. So I stopped counting.

What haunted me was not merely the country's physical and moral decay, corruption, or the government's incompetence. It was what decades of humiliation and hopelessness had done to people. Sometimes the evidence sat only a yard from me.

Two of my cellmates were members of ISIS. Both were Iranian Kurds. I could not understand it. They were not Arabs from Syria or Iraq. They were Iranians. How could young Iranian men join an organization as murderous as ISIS? Sometimes late into the night, I listened to their stories. Gradually, I began to understand that before extremism had recruited them, humiliation had prepared them.

One of those young men was Ibrahim. He had just turned 18 when I met him in communal Room 2 of Section 2A. One night, he told me about his younger brother’s death. His family was so poor they could not afford a simple burial. They carried the boy’s body on their shoulders to the outskirts of their village, dug a hole, and buried him without ceremony or even a memorial stone. “Like a dog,” Ibrahim told me. I have never forgotten those words.

Years later, I encountered another Iranian Kurd whose story has stayed with me.

After I was sentenced to 10 years in prison for what the Islamic Republic called “cooperating with the hostile nation of America,” an old friend arranged for a man to help me cross the border to freedom. I will call him Jafari.

We embarked on a 15-hour journey toward the northwestern frontier, but our luck ran out about 20 miles from the Iraqi border, when we were arrested by a field unit of the Ministry of Intelligence. The following day, in the city of Sardasht, Jafari and I waited to appear before a local judge on charges of attempting to cross the border illegally. We sat there, exhausted, our hands cuffed together. Until then, I knew almost nothing about him except that he was 30 years old and a Kurd.

As we waited, I listened as he spoke to the guards. I learned that he had previously spent 10 years in prison for belonging to a Kurdish political organization. Then he described what had happened when he was first arrested.

According to Jafari, while he was kneeling on the floor with his hands cuffed behind his back, his prosecutor unzipped his pants and urinated into his mouth, telling him that he and his Kurdish people were scum.

Looking at him sideways, I could see his eyes welling with tears. These were not tears of fear or anger. They were the tears of a young man whose dignity had been crushed.

There are certain things human beings cannot be expected to endure indefinitely.

I think of Ibrahim and Jafari when I think of the Iranians who have taken to the streets against the Islamic Republic.

To outsiders, demonstrations in Iran are often described in political terms: reformists versus hard-liners, secularists versus Islamists, protesters versus the government. But beneath the politics lies something more elemental: the systematic, prolonged humiliation of a proud nation.

For decades, Iranians have watched a country blessed with extraordinary human talent, history, natural resources, and culture grow poorer and more isolated, while a corrupt, insular ruling establishment enriched itself and demanded blind obedience.

For Iran’s ethnic minorities, that humiliation has often been compounded by discrimination and violence. Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, Baluch, Turkmen, and Lors have all, in different ways, experienced life on the margins of the Islamic Republic.

As for Iranian women, they require almost no explanation. We need only remember the name Mahsa Amini. Volumes could be written about their strength, courage, and dignity—and about the wrath inflicted on them by a deeply misogynistic regime. Mahsa Amini’s death became a symbol because millions of Iranian women recognized in her story the state’s intrusion into the most intimate decisions of their lives, backed by violence.

Iran’s religious minorities have their own disheartening stories. Jews, Baha’is, Zoroastrians, and Christians have lived for decades under suspicion, restrictions, and persecution.

In the yard of Ward 8 at Evin Prison, I once sat with a Baha’i man I had befriended. It was around noon on October 14, 2022, one day before prisoners rioted and fire engulfed part of Evin. I remember the conversation so vividly not because of what happened the following day, but because of the story this gentle man told me.

Back in 1980, his father had been hanged in that same prison, perhaps only 100 yards from where we were sitting. As a young boy, he had accompanied his mother to collect his father’s body. He told me his father's only crime was being a Baha’i. Nearly half a century later, the son was sitting inside Evin as well, just yards from where he had lost his father.

That is the Islamic Republic’s legacy: a seemingly endless cycle of violence, poverty, and humiliation.

It has had 47 years to build a prosperous nation. Instead, it built prisons, missile cities, and an expansive nuclear program while much of its population struggled.

It had 47 years to harness the extraordinary abilities of the Iranian people. Instead, millions left the country, while some of its brightest young minds ended up in prison cells.

Among them were Ali Younesi and Amirhossein Moradi, two kind, polite, extraordinarily bright young men with whom I had the privilege of sharing a cell in Ward 4 of Evin Prison. Younesi was an internationally recognized astronomy prodigy; Moradi, a gifted physics student. Both were in their early 20s and studying at the prestigious Sharif University. Their stories are repeated across Iran, where the Islamic Republic has spent decades crushing the hopes of some of the country’s most gifted young people.

It had 47 years to earn legitimacy. Instead, it demanded blind submission.

And that distinction matters now because Iran and the Islamic Republic are not the same thing. The regime wants the world to believe that any attack on its power is an attack on Iran itself. It wants Americans to believe that the alternative to the Islamic Republic must be chaos, civil war, or another extremist regime.

I do not accept that premise.

The Iranian people I came to know—including those I encountered in circumstances I would never have chosen—were not yearning for more ideology. They were yearning for dignity, prosperity, basic human rights, and a return to being respected members of the world community. They wanted decent-paying jobs. They wanted opportunity. They wanted justice. They wanted their daughters to live without fear. They wanted the freedom to worship—or not worship—as they chose. They wanted to belong to their country without being humiliated for being Kurdish, Baha’i, Christian, Jewish, Baluch, or anything else.

Above all, they wanted a future. That is why this moment matters.

Earlier this year, Iranians once again demonstrated their resolve. Many initially took to the streets over painfully familiar grievances: inflation, electricity shortages, water scarcity, economic mismanagement, corruption, and the relentless erosion of their purchasing power.

They were met with lethal force. Thousands were reportedly killed in the crackdown and tens of thousands arrested. But casualty figures alone cannot convey the particular cruelty of repression in the Islamic Republic.

For years, Iranian families and human-rights organizations have reported a practice sometimes described as “bullet money” or a “bullet fee”: authorities demanding payment from families before releasing the bodies of relatives killed by the state, in some accounts ostensibly to cover the cost of the ammunition used to kill them.

Think about what that means. Your son goes into the street to protest the cost of food. Your daughter demands the freedom to live as she chooses. They do not come home.

Then you go to retrieve the body of the child you raised, and the state that killed your child demands payment for the bullets before returning the body to you.

Statistics describe Iran’s economic decline. Its currency has collapsed. Inflation has ravaged household incomes. Corruption remains endemic. Millions of talented Iranians have left the country. All of those facts matter, but none captures the nature of the Islamic Republic quite like a grieving parent being asked to pay for the bullet that killed a child. That is humiliation. That is indignity.

And after 47 years, something fundamental is happening inside Iran. The Islamic Republic has survived through fear. Regimes built on fear can seem permanent until suddenly they are not.

I saw fear inside the Islamic Republic. But I also saw something the regime should fear far more. I saw what happens when humiliation turns into anger, when anger becomes courage, and when people told for decades that they are powerless—or scum—begin to realize they vastly outnumber those who oppress them.

The pressure is no longer merely political. Iran is confronting one of the most severe economic crises in the Islamic Republic’s history. Inflation has soared, the rial has fallen sharply, and the regime is struggling to obtain the foreign currency it needs to finance imports and sustain the state. A U.S. naval blockade has sharply curtailed Iranian oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, while tighter financial sanctions are closing channels Tehran once used to evade economic pressure. The Islamic Republic has survived crises before. But rarely has it faced this combination of domestic anger, economic exhaustion, international isolation, and pressure on the sources of revenue that sustain the state.

America should not determine Iran’s future. The Iranian people must decide that themselves. Nor should Washington confuse supporting the Iranian people with choosing their next government. We have learned enough from history to know the dangers of that approach. But an equally dangerous mistake would be abandoning people when they are closer to changing their circumstances than outsiders might realize.

The United States and its allies should maintain pressure on the institutions that sustain repression while making it unmistakably clear that our quarrel is with the Islamic Republic, not with Iran or its people.

We should amplify Iranians’ voices rather than presume to speak for them. And we should resist the temptation—especially when domestic politics becomes consuming—to trade long-term resolve for short-term political convenience.

The final act of this 47-year tragedy may already be underway.

If the curtain is finally beginning to fall on the Islamic Republic, it will not be Americans who take the stage for the finale.

It will be the Iranian people. Our responsibility is simpler: Don't abandon them as they prepare to take the stage.

We may be closer than we think.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:57:52 +0100 FirstHandNews
Are We Ready for AI Warfare? https://belimedia.com.ng/are-we-ready-for-ai-warfare https://belimedia.com.ng/are-we-ready-for-ai-warfare

EXPERT INTERVIEW -- For decades, national security officials have worried about cyberattacks moving at the speed of machines and today the frontier AI race is shifting from models that answer questions to models that are capable of independently making consequential decisions and taking action in today’s digital world. So, what comes next?

Several of the world's leading AI companies have released powerful new models in the past few months. Open AI introduced GPT-6 Astra, with major advances in autonomous computer use. Notably, OpenAI says Astra is the company's first model to reach its "Critical" cybersecurity capability threshold, meaning it can potentially discover and exploit previously unknown vulnerabilities with substantially less human direction.

Anthropic recently released Claude Fable 5.1 and Mythos 5.1, emphasizing more sophisticated coding and scientific research. Google launched Gemini 3.8 Flash and Gemini 3.8 Flash Cyber, with the latter specifically designed to autonomously find, verify and help fix software vulnerabilities. And not to be left out, Meta recently released Muse Spark 1.3, focused on coding and autonomous-agent tasks.

The headline out of all of these headlines is that models are becoming increasingly capable of acting independently. And the releases underscore just how quickly the competition among U.S. AI companies (and increasingly Chinese and Gulf-based developers) is accelerating.

We saw a first glimpse of what’s possible this past July, when AI agents being tested by OpenAI broke out of their intended cybersecurity evaluation environment and found ways to communicate and collaborate with one another. The agents gained broader internet access and ultimately compromised systems belonging to AI platform Hugging Face, executing code on dozens of the company’s servers.

What made the incident particularly notable was that humans were not in this loop. They had not instructed the agents to attack Hugging Face. Instead, the behavior emerged while the models were attempting to solve difficult cybersecurity tasks and ended up collaborating on exploits beyond their assigned environment.

Few people understand this new environment and what it means to future cybersecurity and national security better than former director of the National Security Agency, General Paul Nakasone (Ret.). In addition to founding Vanderbilt University’s Institute of National Security since retiring from government service, Nakasone also serves on the board of OpenAI. And from 2018 to 2024, he simultaneously led both the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, overseeing some of America's most sensitive intelligence and cyber operations.

I spoke recently with Gen. Nakasone about what AI warfare could look like and about what it will take to navigate this new cyber environment. Below is a part of our conversation - lightly edited for length and clarity. You can also watch the full episode on The Cipher Brief’s YouTube Channel or you can listen to it on the State Secrets podcast, available wherever you listen to podcasts.

[INSERT BIO BOX]

Kelly: If you were walking back into the director's office at the NSA tomorrow, what would be at the top of your briefing book that wouldn't have been there just two years ago?

Gen. Nakasone: Certainly, it would be artificial intelligence. I left NSA and U.S. Cyber Command just as AI was getting started. And I will tell you, when you think about disruptive technology, there is nothing more disruptive today than AI, even more so than the smartphone technology that we started to see in 2007. This really is today and tomorrow's great opportunity and for the most part, also it's great challenge.

Kelly: And the challenge is keeping up with it, right? It feels like, in every morning’s Cipher Brief Open Source Report, there are new details about machines hacking machines, AI being used by different countries, adversaries, criminal groups. What concerns you the most, and is the U.S. ready to tackle it?

Nakasone: I think the first piece that is so dramatically different is speed. When we think about the temporal aspect of artificial intelligence, my goodness, ChatGPT was just released in the fall of 2022. And in less than four years, we've gone from prompts to reasoning to deep research to agentic AI. And we're starting to see a difference between offense and defense. And I think our challenge over the next couple of years is going to be ‘How do we bring defense up to the power of offense as we look forward?’

Kelly: We've talked for years now about AI being used by hackers but it feels like we're now witnessing something really fundamentally different: AI systems that can actually conduct significant portions of a cyber operation autonomously.

Nakasone: And I would tell you that as we take a look at the recent demonstration of Hugging Face and the challenges associated with that, and also the recent testing of models like GPT 5.6 and in Claude Fable 5, we're starting to see these models get incredibly powerful. So, I think the question becomes whether these models can just as well do offense as they can defense. And how do we ensure that we start to give more weight to the defense necessary than we do the offense?

Kelly: It’s fascinating to think about that when the attacker really isn't sleeping, isn't getting tired, isn't making silly mistakes and it can probe millions of potential victims simultaneously. It changes the entire landscape, which means each section of that landscape needs to be thinking about their roles differently. So, let's dig in on the government side. Do you think the government is currently positioned to deal with this new reality?

Nakasone: Are any of us really ready for the dramatic changes that are going on right now? If I can just take a step back, think about what we used to talk about when we were defending our networks: our data and our weapons systems. We had the 1–10–60 rule. Within one minute, we'd identify something that was anomalous, within 10 minutes, we would determine what it was, and within 60 minutes, we'd fix it.

I will tell you that today that rule is out the door. It's happening too rapidly. So, the question becomes: if we've gone to autonomous operations on the offensive side, how do we get that on the defensive side? We're capable of doing this, but we've got to think differently about how we do our penetration testing, how we do our red teaming, how we identify vulnerabilities, and then rapidly patch them. How do we prioritize? There are a number of different areas that I'm sure both the government and the private sector are thinking differently about in terms of time.

Kelly: On the government side, are there things that we could be doing differently that might better position us to keep up with this new pace?

Nakasone: As we think about our government responsibilities, the government is responsible for the safety and security of our nation and our people. So, the near-term piece of it - is how do we think about ensuring that these closed-weight models are safe and secure going forward? How do we do this with both the public sector and the private sector? It's really interesting because artificial intelligence is a technology that is almost entirely being developed by the private sector.

So, instead of nuclear capabilities and Space where government was so deeply involved and was able to advance it, this is really all being done by the private sector. So, I think the question is, what can government do? And the answer is that Government can do a number of things.

First, they can assemble the major companies in the U.S. in terms of what they're doing. They can provide a series of both carrots and sticks in terms of what we're going to do in the future. And most importantly, they can bring together an idea of how we start to think differently about securing these models and we do it in a safe manner.

The recent Executive Order on the 2nd of June begins this discussion for models coming in - on a voluntary measure – and being evaluated 30 days before they're released. That’s a good step in the right direction.

Kelly: Are we approaching a time where you think humans in the loop might actually be a vulnerability?

Nakasone: Coming back to speed, in terms of the scale at which these models are able to perform, I think we’re going to have to move away from the idea of humans always being in the loop. I think the humans might be on top of the loop. Humans have a responsibility for understanding the outcomes and the goals and in understanding and setting up the parameters in terms of what the guardrails and safeties are as well as whether these models comport with our values and our beliefs. That's a role for humans. But I think increasingly, we are going to move toward more autonomous operations, both on the defensive side and certainly on the offensive side as well.

Kelly: The adversaries have a different rule book. They're not democracies, they don't share the same values. Salt Typhoon and the broader Chinese campaigns have really raised this disturbing possibility that Beijing isn't simply stealing information but is really positioning itself inside of American infrastructure for an advantage during a crisis. We've known about this for a while. We've also known where the vulnerabilities are that we can't always identify. How are you thinking about these differences in adversarial capabilities and what the U.S. needs to do defend better?

Nakasone: We’ve talked about Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon as we took a look at both our communications and our critical infrastructure. But I would also fast forward to today where we have water concerns in 12 different states. We think about that as a significant brittle part of our critical infrastructure and key resources. So, what I'm starting to think about are the areas where we have to raise the bar for cybersecurity. What do we do in the near term? What do we do in the midterm? And what are we going do in the far term?

The big piece of this is that we have to think different about our partnerships. How do we bring the public and the private together? How do we take academia and see what they can do in terms of being able to research and look differently at what our vulnerabilities might be? And by the way, if we really have folks in our critical infrastructure, how do we prioritize getting them out and then being able to mitigate those vulnerabilities?

When we stood up the Institute of National Security at Vanderbilt University two years ago, there were a series of ideas that were at the foundation of what we wanted to do. First, it was the idea that the definition of national security has changed dramatically. When I entered the army, it was all about having two very friendly neighbors to our north and south and two wide oceans to our east and west. I would tell you today that geographic boundaries no longer keep out things like artificial intelligence and cyber. So, we have to think differently about how we define national security.

The second piece is that we need a whole new generation of young people that are going to work in national security. Let me give you a statistic. In our national security workforce today across our government, less than 9 % of that workforce is under the age of 30 and over 40% are over the age of 50. We need a whole new generation of young people that are coming in to work in the Peace Corps, to work in the State Department, to be part of the military forces to be able to work at the state and local levels and also our national level. So, how do get people excited in college about thinking differently about their future?

And the final piece really touches on the Wicked Problems Lab at Vanderbilt. We are the pragmatic solution to problems. We take a look at a problem and instead of writing a broad policy paper that may be put on a shelf for the next 10 years or never even looked at, we’re taking a national security challenge like securing our water systems and asking how we develop a series of partnerships through that bring together technology and talent and trade craft. And so this Wicked Problems Lab is one of the foundations of what we do at Vanderbilt University.

Kelly: Here’s a wicked problem: How confident are you that we will actually know the extent of Chinese access to American infrastructure?

Nakasone: I am confident, I'm very confident. I spent my entire career in the intelligence community and there are certain competitive advantages that the United States has over any nation in the world and one of them is intelligence. So, the question is how we take this new technology like artificial intelligence, and develop new talent and ensure that our intelligence community has the trade craft to really dig deep in terms of both the capability and intent of our adversaries. If we’re talking about the Chinese, the Russians, the North Koreans, Iranians, or even a series of hackers, my sense is that we have an advantage. What we have to do is continue to pursue these advantages and ensure that we have the right authorities - like the reauthorization of 702. And we have to ensure that we're going to bring new partners in to be able to solve these challenging problems.

Kelly: I have to ask you about the tradecraft question with AI. How dramatically do you see the role of an analyst or an operator, or someone in one of those very special units at the NSA? How dramatically do you see their roles changing because of AI?

Nakasone: Dramatically. When people used to ask me what the National Security Agency does, I had a pretty quick answer. There are two things that we do better than anyone in the world. We make code and we break code. Well, it was very interesting to read recently that Anthropic was talking about their models now starting to look at different cryptographic algorithms, algorithms that are really intended for post quantum cryptography and being able to break them. So, I think how we're going to use the tradecraft to be able to understand how our code is made and how our code is broken. Tradecraft is really going to lead us to new pathways.

Kelly: When you think about what's happening right now with Iran being suspected of infiltrating the water systems in 12 states, that's not a new problem. So, how do you inform more Americans about the real risks and the real cybersecurity environment we're living in?

Gen. Nakasone: The first thing is that we have to be able to communicate in a way that's concise and clear. If you take a look at the problem of Iranians allegedly in our water systems, one of the things that we could tell you is the fact that it's pretty easy to solve this problem. The first thing is that programmable logic controllers, really the digital brain of our water infrastructure, if they're connected to the Internet, they're at risk. So, if we just kind of take that away and make sure that they're separated from the Internet and if we start to think differently about constructing a series of firewalls or bringing in multi-factor authentication, driving the level of cybersecurity up, my guess is that this is really going to change the problem and being able to ensure that we solve it.

But here's the other thing I would tell you. We have adversaries today that we're not going to be able to patch our way out of this problem. So, with my other hat that I used to wear as Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, my thought is that any adversary that is starting to look at our infrastructure in a way that they have an intent or capability, we need to take on. And we need to make it as difficult as possible, erasing their infrastructure overseas, working with a series of partners, conducting a series of preemptive strikes to ensure that they no longer can take a look at our communications, our transportation, our water, our financial areas, and ensure that we're sending a message: ‘if you are going to interfere within our infrastructure, we are going to ensure that you have a very, very miserable day.’ Much of the same that we’ve done with elections, we should translate to other parts of our critical infrastructure.

Kelly: Do you feel like fundamentally the capabilities and the decisions that are being made are just as robust as they were a few years back?

Gen. Nakasone: I don't know in terms of what they're doing today. But here's what I do know. I know the organizations well. I know the community well. And my sense is that they are very, very focused on being able to not only identify and attribute but also take a series of actions against these folks. Are they capable of doing this? Yes. Where they're at in the process right now, that's more for the government to be able to talk about.

One of the things I would also share with you is that I think being able to talk about this with a bit more transparently, much in the same way we have done previously, is something that would be very, very helpful here. Americans need to understand that we're not just watching this. We're not waiting for them to come and attack our critical infrastructure, but we're really taking measures to ensure the safety of our citizens and our intellectual property are things that would be welcomed by the American populace.

Kelly: These things are happening, but these things don't always gain traction in the headlines. How should the public be thinking about the activities that are done on a day-to-day basis? You’ve said before that you believe we have the best people in the world, do you still feel that way?

Gen. Nakasone: I do. I do feel that way. And I think we have the best private sector in the world. And it might be very, very helpful to talk about what are the large companies are doing in terms of making our infrastructure much more defensible. I think that'd be something that would be of great assistance to being able to communicate to the public that this is something that we're doing. I would also tell you that there is a role for government to do this. This is the synchronization that the government can do to ensure our national security. And I think this is one of the things that as we take a look at the new cybersecurity strategy that was recently released, you know, being able to challenge our adversaries, the first part of the cybersecurity strategy is one of the things that I think we can do more of.

Kelly: How do you feel overall about the strategy? I know that there was a great outreach on behalf of the government to the private sector for input on the strategy.

Gen. Nakasone: So, here's what I would say: strategies are documents. What really matters is the implementation of the strategy. I’m looking forward to seeing what the department's strategy is going forward and how we start to move it.

Kelly: Time is the number one thing we talk about now. When you look five years out, what technological development do you think national security leaders are still maybe underestimating?

Gen. Nakasone: Certainly, it’s the whole idea of AI as a mid to long term problem. But I would say the near-term piece is autonomous capabilities. I mean, look at what Ukraine has demonstrated to us. On the 24th of February, 2022, there were zero ships in the Ukrainian Navy. Today, there are still zero ships in the Ukrainian Navy, but they have sunk half of the Russian Black Sea fleet. And they did it with a laptop, a Starlink connection, and a semi-submersible platform. That's the difference in terms of what's going on.

I’ve listened to podcasts that you've done with General David Petraeus and others who have talked about Ukraine being able to manufacture nine million drones a year. That's amazing. And they're launching 10,000 a day. I think this is the near-term piece that we rapidly have to catch up with.

Certainly, the mid and the longer-term piece are artificial intelligence and how we're going to be able to institute this within our economy and our national security. And let me be honest with you, I think the longer-term piece is continuing to develop the talent that goes along with this technology and tradecraft.

Kelly: I also talked to General Petraeus about the future of war and what that looks like. When you think about your perspective and you're thinking about how quickly the technology's changing, the cybersecurity risks are changing, how do you see the future of war taking shape?

Gen. Nakasone: Well, think about three Ds: detect, decide and deliver. I would tell you that the challenge right now will be on the detect and the decide pieces. These are the areas that we've got to really think differently. We used to challenge ourselves at the National Security Agency about whether we could really take in all this collection and be able to make sense of it. My sense today is that artificial intelligence is probably doing that right now for the folks at the agency and the folks in our intelligence community. So, if we've got to be able to do that, being able to detect it now becomes a bit easier.

Then we have to decide what we do about it. And I think this comes down to your question about how we communicate. How do we think and deliver our critical thinking skills in a different way as humans? And then do we have the character to really stand behind what we're going to do and what we're going to decide to do?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:39:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Pakistan’s New Military Order Is a Warning for Washington https://belimedia.com.ng/pakistans-new-military-order-is-a-warning-for-washington https://belimedia.com.ng/pakistans-new-military-order-is-a-warning-for-washington In Washington, Field Marshal Asim Munir increasingly looks like the man who can make Pakistan useful to the United States. Pakistan has just written Munir even more deeply into the architecture of the state as he now sits atop a legally centralized command that reaches conventional forces, strategic systems, and the prime minister’s national-security advice. Munir, now formally serving as Chief of Defense Forces, speaks directly with President Donald Trump and has become Washington’s principal channel for engaging Tehran.

The latest restructuring of Pakistan’s military command has actually made the opposite case. The 27th Constitutional Amendment, followed by legislation passed this month to implement the new command architecture, has concentrated unprecedented authority in Munir’s hands. Yet his military cannot stabilize Pakistan-administered Kashmir, cannot contain the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch insurgents, and has still signed a mutual-defense pact with Turkey and Saudi Arabia—dubbed the Mecca Accord—that could drag it into distant crises. For the world, treating Pakistan as a reliable intermediary in negotiations with Iran would be a mistake of timing and of judgment as the state becomes more militarized domestically, more ambitious diplomatically, and increasingly overstretched militarily.

A Field Marshal Above the State

In November 2025, the 27th Constitutional Amendment abolished the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and created the office of Chief of Defense Forces (CDF), held concurrently by the army chief. The restructuring was completed with another step this month when Pakistan’s parliament passed the Defense Forces Act 2026 and amendments to the National Command Authority Act, providing the statutory framework for Munir's new position and headquarters. The new architecture gives the CDF a central role in operational command and joint military coordination across the armed forces.

The new law places the army, navy, and air force under a unified Defense Forces Headquarters commanded by Munir. He is designated the prime minister’s principal military adviser on national security and defense and exercises operational command and control across the services with sweeping personnel authority—hiring, firing, retirement, and extensions. Amendments to the National Command Authority law align nuclear and strategic command with the same hierarchy, with a new four-star Commander of the National Strategic Command sitting alongside the CDF. The significance goes beyond military administration, as Munir now occupies a position from which military command, strategic security policy and foreign-policy influence converge. He is not constitutionally Pakistan's president or prime minister, but describing him merely as a military officer increasingly misses the political reality. Such radical consolidation of power in Pakistan’s civil-military landscape matters for Washington because the United States is increasingly treating Munir personally as a diplomatic asset. Therefore, Washington must factor in that any “Pakistani” channel on Iran now runs, in practice, through a single command that answers first to its own institutional interests.

Consolidation Without Control

The strongest argument against treating Munir's Pakistan as a reliable strategic partner can actually be found inside Pakistan itself. The military has acquired unprecedented institutional power, yet the state remains under enormous security pressure. Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies data show that July 2026 was the deadliest month of the year, with 606 people killed in militant violence and counter-militancy operations, including 112 security personnel and 401 militants. The violence is concentrated precisely in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan, where Pakistan's military has struggled for years. Such a security landscape is a sustained counterinsurgency burden for a military that is simultaneously presenting itself as a regional security provider.

The latest round of violence in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir has added another layer of security burden for an overly stretched military. In the surrounding areas of Rawalkot, Pakistan-administered Kashmir, protests led by the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) escalated after authorities outlawed the movement under anti-terrorism laws, suspended mobile data and internet services, and deployed security forces ahead of a JAAC-organized June 9 strike. According to a local human rights watchdog report dated August 8, at least 89 civilians died in Pakistan-administered Kashmir as a direct result of the state’s brutal crackdown on unarmed protesters.

Locals demanded cheaper power from dams that generate electricity for Pakistan, representation that is not diluted by non-resident seats, and an end to elite privileges. The state’s answer was lethal force, sedition cases, travel advisories, and the criminalization of a civic coalition that had previously extracted limited subsidies through protest. That is the Balochistan playbook applied to a territory Pakistan still markets internationally as “Azad” or free. It did not produce consent but a banned movement, underground leaders, and a legitimacy crisis inside a territory the army treats as strategic hinterland. If Munir’s new command structure was meant to deliver coherence, Kashmir shows the opposite, where a security establishment that can rewrite the constitution faster than it can address bread-and-butter revolt. An army that cannot manage a rights protest in Muzaffarabad and Rawalakot without mass casualties is not an army that can be trusted to midwife a delicate regional settlement with Iran or be a reliable partner for the so-called Mecca Accord.

Pakistan’s Utility Should Not Be Mistaken for Reliability

US talks with Iran already sit on a knife-edge of “Economic D-Day” politics, Hormuz control, and factional vetoes inside Tehran. None of this means the United States should abandon Pakistan as that would be strategically simplistic. Pakistan remains nuclear-armed, sits between Iran, Afghanistan, India and China, and retains diplomatic access across the Muslim world. Its ability to communicate with Tehran can be useful, particularly when direct US-Iranian channels are blocked. Three factors that Washington should use to distinguish between utility and reliability while dealing with Munir’s Pakistan:

First, Munir’s legal supremacy does not equal policy reliability. A CDF who is also army chief, principal adviser, and strategic-command fulcrum will filter any Iran file through the army’s need to look indispensable at home—that incentive points toward swagger, not quiet brokerage.

Second, Washington cannot treat Islamabad’s internal security failure as a side issue. An institution that answers civic protest in Kashmir with live fire and a terrorist ban is the same institution that would be asked to counsel restraint, verification, and de-escalation with Iran. The record says it prefers coercion when legitimacy frays.

Third, Munir’s capacity is already committed to a plethora of insurgencies. TTP and Baloch campaigns consume attention, ammunition, and men. A Mecca clause adds hypothetical external obligations without adding spare combat power. A partner that is simultaneously over-centralized and overstretched cannot deliver the one thing Washington would need from it: consistent, low-drama influence on a file that can restart a wider war.

If the United States wants Pakistan to help mediate with Iran, it should judge Islamabad by the outcomes of that diplomacy, not by the personal access Munir enjoys in Washington. And if Washington wants Pakistan as a security partner, it should look beyond the impressive authority of its field marshal to the increasingly unstable state that authority is supposed to govern. A stronger Pakistani army does not automatically produce a stronger Pakistan. And a stronger Munir does not automatically produce a more reliable American partner.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:39:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Gulf Bought Its Air Defense From Kyiv. We Sold Them The Radar. https://belimedia.com.ng/the-gulf-bought-its-air-defense-from-kyiv-we-sold-them-the-radar https://belimedia.com.ng/the-gulf-bought-its-air-defense-from-kyiv-we-sold-them-the-radar Chief Warrant Officer 5 (Ret.) Joey Gagnard concluded nearly three decades of service in the U.S. military, retiring from the special operations community in early 2025. He serves as CEO of Atlas Special Projects and Director of Field Operations at Swarmer.

Disclosure: Atlas Special Projects leads investor delegations to Ukraine and maintains working relationships with Ukrainian drone manufacturers, some of which would benefit from the arrangements argued for below. The argument is my own.

Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

Riyadh, spring 2026. Between February 28 and the April 8 ceasefire, Iran put roughly 6,400 missiles and drones into the Gulf states and Jordan, more than eighty percent of everything it fired at anyone. Six countries fought six separate wars against one coordinated adversary, with no shared early warning and interceptor stockpiles that ran thin in days. An Iranian drone struck a tactical operations center in Kuwait and killed six Americans.

Three suppliers answered the same incoming fire. Here is the ledger.

The United States answered with paper. Over $36.6 billion in Foreign Military Sales notifications to the Middle East in a single quarter, headlined by 730 PAC-3 MSE missiles to Saudi Arabia for $9 billion. That is a little over $12 million per round, aimed at a Shahed that costs about as much as a used pickup, on a delivery schedule measured in years.

Ukraine answered with people. Washington asked Kyiv on a Thursday to send interceptor teams to protect American bases in Jordan, and Kyiv said yes the same day. Within weeks about two hundred Ukrainian advisors were on the ground in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE with interceptors that Ukraine sells for between $800 and $3,000 and builds at two thousand a day. Days after the Jordan request, the President went on Fox News Radio and said, “We don’t need their help in drone defense. We know more about drones than anybody.”

Turkey answered with a delivery date. Kuwait signed a government-to-government protocol with Aselsan, Havelsan, and Baykar for Hisar and Korkut air defense, and Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi opened their own talks with Ankara, because Turkey could put hardware on a ramp this decade and the American backlog for Patriot and THAAD runs to several years.

Then, on March 27, Saudi Arabia signed a ten-year defense partnership with Ukraine built around counter-drone technology and co-production facilities on Saudi soil. Qatar signed two days later. The UAS followed in April. Ten years each, minimum.

So the outcome of America’s largest arms-sales quarter in memory is that our closest Gulf partners now buy their sensors from us and their answer to the actual threat from Kyiv and Ankara. We sold them the radar. Somebody else sold them the thing that shoots.

Expensive Confetti

The arithmetic is not subtle, and the Gulf did it faster than we did. Iran can turn out hundreds of Shaheds a week. The U.S. builds roughly six hundred Patriot interceptors a year, for the whole world, with a waiting list. A Patriot battery is a good answer to a question Iran stopped asking in about 2019.

The Ukrainian answer is a different species. The Wild Hornets Sting costs about $2,500, flies at 195 miles an hour, fits in a duffel bag, and has killed nearly 4,000 Russian drones since may 2025. The SkyFall P1-SUN costs about $1,000, flies at 280 miles per hour, and took down 1,500 Shaheds in its first four months. One Ukrainian firm sold a thousand of them for $3.5 million, total, which is less than a third of one PAC-3 round. More than twenty Ukrainian companies now build interceptors and the Octopus alone is licensed to fifteen of them.

None of this makes the Patriot obsolete. Interceptor drones do not touch ballistic missiles ,and the 6,400 included plenty. But the Gulf learned in six weeks what Ukraine learned in three years: you defend against a thousand cheap things with two thousand cheaper things, and you save the twelve-million-dollar round for what it was built to hit.

Built in Munich

Here is the detail that turns the Gulf story into an Iron Triangle story. The Pentagon has bought exactly one interceptor with a Ukrainian combat record. In May, Joint Interagency Task Force 401 gave Perennial Autonomy, Eric Schmidt’s company, a three-year, $500 million ceiling for the Merops interceptor, a fifteen-thousand-dollar fixed-wing that has downed more than 4,000 Russian drones over Ukraine. It is the right buy. It is also built in Germany, through a partnership with Munich’s Twentyfour Industries.

The American flag interceptor, proven in Ukraine, bought by the Pentagon for the homeland, is made in Bavaria. This is not a scandal. It is a symptom. The design talent is in Kyiv, the production tooling is in Europe, and the one thing that has to be in the United States, the contract, is the only part we have managed to put here.

Meanwhile the July agreement that lets Ukraine sell to the Pentagon for the first time since 2022 approves six Ukrainian companies to ship about one hundred drones for testing under Drone DOminance, and contemplates, someday, Ukrainian production on American soil. One hundred drones. Kyiv ships that many to Riyadh before the coffee is brewed.

What an American Flag Would Actually Mean

Not an American airframe. That race is over; twenty Ukrainian firms iterate faster than any American line will for years, and pretending otherwise is how we ended up with a hundred test articles and a factory in Munich. The American contribution is the three things nobody else at the table can bring.

The first is the kill chain. An interceptor without a sensor network is expensive confetti with a propeller. Ukraine’s cheap drones work because they fly under a national acoustic and radar mesh that took three years to build. The Gulf has no such thing; the after-action reports say so. Turkey cannot integrate Korkut with Patriot and THAAD. The United States owns IBCS, the LTAMDS radars Kuwait just bought eight of for $8 billion, and the $4.5 billion discrimination radar the UAE is buying for THAAD. The offer writes itself: your thousand-dollar Ukrainian interceptor gets cued by our eight-billion-dollar sensor layer. That is the flag.

The second is the paper. Licensed co-production under FMS is a forty-year-old tool. Abrams in Egypt. F-16 in Turkey. Patriot itself in Japan. The structure is a trilateral: Ukrainian design and Ukrainian intellectual property, Gulf capital and final assembly to satisfy Vision 2030 localization, American components, integration, and the FMS wrapper that turns a purchase into a security relationship. The UK has already proven the licensing half, building Octopus interceptors in Britain at a thousand a month and sending them back to Ukraine.

The third is reciprocity. Kyiv’s own ask was one sentence: “We can help you fight against Shaheds. Help us fight against ballistic missiles.” Gulf money buys the interceptor line. A slice of the PAC-3 allocation that the Gulf money is already funding flows to Ukraine. Stings for Patriots. Three countries get what they cannot build, and the United States is the reason it happens.

What It Has Not Happened

Every obstacle is one I have written about before, which is the depressing part.

Start with ITAR. The moment a Ukrainian design is produced by an American licensee with American controlled content, it becomes ITAR-controlled, its re-export to Riyadh needs a DDTC license, and Kyiv loses the freedom to sell the same design to Oslo. Ukrainian founders already decline to domicile intellectual property here for exactly this reason. The fix is the one I argued for in July: a trusted-trader tier, or an AUKUS-style exemption scoped to the trilateral, with the IP staying in Kyiv and the United States as licensee rather than owner.

Then the parts bin. A thousand-dollar P1-SUN is a thousand-dollar P1-SUN because of Chinese motors, cells, and cameras. Under an American flag it must clear NDAA Section 848 and, if the Department of War is the buyer of record, the Blue UAS list. The cost of making the interceptor American is not the airframe. It is the audit and the re-sourcing, and nobody in the building has priced how much of the thousand dollars survives that. Turkey does not have this problem. That is the entire reason Turkey is winning the Gulf.

Then tempo. Ukraine signed three Gulf deals in about three weeks. FMS notification to first delivery is measured in Congressional recesses. Either the trilateral runs on Direct Commercial Sales with expedited licensing, or it is a press release.

And then the politics, which I will state once and then be finished. The Commander in Chief said we do not need their help days after his own government asked for it, and the Pentagon spent the spring resisting broader cooperation. The Gulf hosts Russian diplomacy. Kyiv keeps state control over exports, with its own forces first in line. None of these are fatal. All of them are real.

For the Procurement Officer. Your requirement is not an interceptor. It is a kill chain that accepts an interceptor you did not design. Write the sensor and command-and-control interface as the requirement and let the airframe compete, or you will spend the next POM cycle buying an American drone that arrives in 2029.

The Investment Thesis. The value in this market is not in the airframe and it never was. It is in the integration layer, the domestic component that lets a Ukrainian design survive Section 848. And the licensing paper. The company that can take a thousand-dollar Kyiv design and hand the Pentagon an American-compliant unit at two thousand, on a line this side of the Atlantic, is worth more than the company that designs the next one.

The Policy Wonk’s Warning. The security guarantee is being unbundled from the hardware. For seventy years those were the same product. Our partners are learning they can buy the guarantee from us and the shooting from someone else, and the day they discover they can buy the sensors elsewhere too, the guarantee is just a speech.

My Take. I have been in the room in Kyiv when founders explain, patiently, why they will not bring their IP to America. It is not ingratitude. It is that our export regime treats an ally’s design as a hostage the moment it touches our supply chain. We asked those same founders for help defending our bases in Jordan, and they sent people the same day, and then we told the world we did not need them. I have watched a lot of good capability lose to bad processes. I have not often watched it lose to bad manners.

The Risk. A co-production line in the Gulf is a leakage path to whoever the Gulf talks to next, and that list includes Beijing and Moscow, which is precisely why the British license sends its output home to Ukraine rather than into a third market. Iran is already fielding jet-powered Shaheds that outrun a Sting. And anyone who reads this as an argument to cancel the Patriot order has misread it; the 730 rounds to Riyadh are for the thing the drones cannot touch. The argument is not fewer Patriots. It is that a thousand-dollar problem should not be the one part of Gulf air defense that American has nothing to do with.

We spent the spring selling our partners the most sophisticated radar on earth. Kyiv and Ankara sold them what the radar is for. When the next 6.400 comes over the horizon and the Saudi interceptor that meets them has a Ukrainian design, Turkish neighbors, Chinese motors, and an American radar track, whose air defense is that?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:39:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
How China Is Building an Architecture of Control Across the Heart of Asia https://belimedia.com.ng/how-china-is-building-an-architecture-of-control-across-the-heart-of-asia https://belimedia.com.ng/how-china-is-building-an-architecture-of-control-across-the-heart-of-asia In the years following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, much of the world treated the region as strategically peripheral - unstable, exhausted, and largely disconnected from the future of global security. Policymakers assumed the consequences of state collapse and civil war would remain regionally contained.

They did not.

The vacuum that emerged across Afghanistan and its surrounding region ultimately produced transnational terrorism on a scale that reshaped global security for two decades. By the time the world recognized the strategic implications of instability in the Heart of Asia, the consequences had already spread far beyond the region itself.

Today, another transformation is unfolding across the same geography. Once again, much of Washington views the region primarily through narrow lenses: humanitarian crisis, counterterrorism management, refugee flows, or strategic fatigue after two decades of war. Yet beneath the surface, a far more consequential shift is underway - the emergence of an interconnected architecture of surveillance systems, cognitive warfare capabilities, AI-enabled governance, and digital infrastructure stretching from Xinjiang through Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.

This is not merely a story about Afghanistan or even about China’s expanding regional influence. It is the story of how authoritarian technological ecosystems are gradually reshaping one of the world’s most fragile and strategically important regions, and how the United States risks misunderstanding the implications until the consequences extend far beyond Eurasia.

The future threat emerging from the Heart of Asia may not resemble the threats of the past. It may not require large training camps, centralized organizations, or physical sanctuaries alone. Instead, it may emerge through digitally networked ecosystems built on AI-enabled surveillance, synthetic media, autonomous influence operations, predictive governance systems, and machine-readable societies operating across the gray zone between peace and conflict.

The region surrounding Afghanistan is increasingly becoming a laboratory for that future.

The Rise of Informational Gravity

China’s expanding role across the Heart of Asia is often described in economic terms: roads, railways, mining contracts, telecommunications infrastructure, and the Belt and Road Initiative. But this framing misses the deeper strategic transformation underway. Beijing is not simply investing in physical infrastructure. It is gradually building informational gravity across the region.

Telecommunications systems, Safe City surveillance platforms, AI-assisted facial recognition networks, smart-city technologies, digital payment systems, media ecosystems, and cross-border security cooperation are converging into a broader regional architecture that extends far beyond any individual country. Afghanistan is no longer the center of the story. It is one node within a wider system.

The clearest model for understanding this architecture exists inside China itself.

In Xinjiang, Beijing constructed what may be the most comprehensive AI-enabled population monitoring system in modern history. Facial recognition cameras, biometric databases, predictive policing algorithms, integrated behavioral tracking systems, and AI-assisted security platforms transformed the region into what many analysts now describe as a machine-readable society. The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) aggregates enormous quantities of behavioral data - movement patterns, communications, social interactions, purchases, travel activity, and digital behavior - to identify perceived risks before they materialize.

What matters strategically is that the technologies, companies, governance concepts, and security logic developed in Xinjiang are no longer confined within China’s borders.

Across Pakistan, Chinese-built Safe City systems now monitor major urban centers through Huawei-supported command platforms, facial recognition systems, and expanding digital interception capabilities. In Iran, Chinese surveillance technologies have become increasingly integrated into domestic security and protest-monitoring systems. Across Central Asia, Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, smart-city ecosystems, and surveillance exports have become embedded within the digital foundations of multiple states.

Individually, these developments may appear disconnected. Collectively, they form something far more consequential: an emerging Ring of Control around the Heart of Asia.

Building the Ring of Control

This ring is not coordinated through a single master plan. Rather, it emerges through the convergence of multiple strategic interests. China seeks to secure Belt and Road investments, contain Uyghur militancy, protect trade corridors, expand the Digital Silk Road, and establish informational advantages across strategically sensitive regions. The result, however, is systemic. Telecommunications infrastructure, AI-enabled surveillance systems, media ecosystems, and cognitive-domain operations increasingly reinforce one another across borders.

Pakistan demonstrates how economic infrastructure and surveillance infrastructure merge into a single strategic ecosystem. Chinese-funded Safe City projects in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and other major urban centers increasingly integrate population monitoring with economic-security priorities tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). At the same time, internet-monitoring systems modeled on China’s own censorship architecture are gradually reshaping the digital environment through which information flows.

The implications extend beyond domestic governance. Surveillance systems originally justified as anti-crime or counterterrorism tools gradually evolve into mechanisms for political management, social monitoring, and information control. As these systems become normalized, governments gain unprecedented visibility into the behavior of their populations.

Iran demonstrates a different dimension of the model: how surveillance ecosystems evolve from security tools into political-control mechanisms. Chinese technologies have increasingly supported AI-assisted monitoring of protests, facial-recognition deployments, and population-management systems designed to maintain regime stability during periods of unrest. During waves of anti-government demonstrations, Iranian authorities increasingly relied on digital monitoring, internet restrictions, and AI-assisted identification systems to suppress dissent.

Central Asia represents perhaps the quietest transformation of all. Huawei telecommunications infrastructure, smart-city surveillance systems, and Chinese-built digital architecture now underpin significant portions of regional connectivity across Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Border-security cooperation near the Wakhan Corridor, expanding Chinese security facilities, and growing digital dependency further deepen Beijing’s structural influence.

What emerges is not traditional imperialism. It is infrastructural cognition.

Whoever controls the communications architecture, surveillance systems, digital ecosystems, and AI-enabled information environments of a region gradually acquires influence over how societies perceive, communicate, organize, and govern themselves. In the twenty-first century, power increasingly operates not only through territory or military presence, but through data flows, algorithmic visibility, and cognitive infrastructure.

Afghanistan’s Cognitive Vacuum

This transformation becomes even more significant when paired with the collapse of independent information ecosystems across parts of the region.

In Afghanistan, the destruction of independent journalism following the Taliban’s return created an enormous cognitive vacuum. Hundreds of journalists fled the country, media outlets collapsed, and independent reporting networks deteriorated under political pressure and economic collapse. Into that vacuum moved state-backed narratives, sponsored media relationships, and externally influenced information ecosystems.

Chinese state media expansion and narrative-management initiatives increasingly operate in environments where alternative information infrastructures have largely disappeared. Similar pressures exist elsewhere across the region, where fragile media systems increasingly compete against state-backed digital ecosystems supported by far greater resources and technological capacity.

Surveillance infrastructure and narrative infrastructure reinforce one another. Data shapes messaging. Messaging normalizes surveillance. Together, they create environments where behavioral monitoring and information management become mutually sustaining systems.

This matters because modern authoritarian influence no longer depends solely on censorship. Increasingly, it depends on shaping the informational environment itself — determining what populations see, what narratives dominate, and which voices disappear from public discourse.

The result is a region where governance, surveillance, and information control are becoming increasingly integrated through digital systems powered by artificial intelligence.

AI and the Future of Gray-Zone Conflict

This is where the region’s future intersects with broader global security concerns.

The world after 9/11 was shaped by physical sanctuaries: training camps, insurgent safe havens, ungoverned territory, and militant mobility across borders. But the emerging threat landscape of the coming decades may look fundamentally different.

Artificial intelligence lowers the cost of asymmetric influence.

AI-assisted propaganda, synthetic media, autonomous disinformation networks, digitally coordinated extremist ecosystems, predictive behavioral analysis, biometric governance systems, and drone-enabled proxy operations no longer require the same physical infrastructure that earlier generations of transnational threats depended upon. Influence operations can now scale globally through digital ecosystems that transcend geography.

The next sanctuary may not train hijackers in remote camps. It may train algorithms, autonomous systems, and synthetic narratives capable of shaping perceptions, destabilizing societies, and amplifying conflict far beyond the region itself.

This is particularly important because modern gray-zone competition increasingly operates through cognitive pressure rather than direct confrontation. China’s Three Warfares doctrine, Russia’s concepts of Reflexive Control and Active Measures, and broader state-backed influence operations all reflect a strategic understanding that future competition will target perception, trust, decision-making, and societal cohesion as much as physical infrastructure.

The Heart of Asia is becoming one of the environments where these concepts are converging operationally.

The convergence of AI, surveillance systems, and cognitive warfare creates a new strategic reality. States no longer need to occupy territory physically to shape political outcomes. Influence can increasingly be exercised through algorithmic visibility, digital dependency, and information dominance.

That transformation carries implications far beyond the region itself.

Washington’s Strategic Blind Spot

Yet Washington still tends to analyze terrorism, artificial intelligence, surveillance technology, regional instability, and great-power competition as separate categories. The emerging architecture across the region suggests adversaries increasingly view them as interconnected systems.

That strategic blind spot carries risks.

The lesson of the 1990s was not simply that Afghanistan became a sanctuary for terrorism. The deeper lesson was that strategically ignored regions can evolve into generators of global instability when major powers fail to recognize transformations early enough.

Today, the transformation underway is different - more technological, more cognitive, and more structurally embedded.

The long-term risk is not merely the expansion of authoritarian influence across the Heart of Asia. It is the gradual emergence of interconnected machine-readable societies whose surveillance systems, telecommunications infrastructure, media ecosystems, and behavioral data environments become increasingly interoperable across borders.

In such an environment, the distinction between domestic governance, cognitive warfare, and strategic competition begins to blur.

The consequences may not remain regional.

The next phase of instability emerging from the Heart of Asia may not arrive through conventional terrorism alone. It may emerge through AI-enabled cognitive operations, synthetic media ecosystems, autonomous influence architectures, and digitally amplified disorder operating at a scale that previous generations of extremist or authoritarian movements could never achieve.

Afghanistan is no longer merely a battlefield of territory.

The wider region surrounding it is becoming a contested frontier of cognition, surveillance, infrastructure, and machine-driven influence — and the strategic consequences of losing that contest may not remain confined to the region for long.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Will Physical AI Underpin the Reindustrialization Win that Western Allies Need? https://belimedia.com.ng/will-physical-ai-underpin-the-reindustrialization-win-that-western-allies-need https://belimedia.com.ng/will-physical-ai-underpin-the-reindustrialization-win-that-western-allies-need Having spent most of my life working in “advanced nations” that have strategically accentuated financial and professional services growth while outsourcing manufacturing to the lowest cost jurisdiction, the rapid rise of reindustrialization policies has shocked many by its rapid ascension and acceleration of mission investment.

Reindustrialisation is core to the sovereign aspirations of many nations driven by the need for national, economic and societal security underpinned by supply chain diversity and independence and real challenges for workforce growth now and into the future. Key delivery pillars include defence tech, energy sovereignty, critical mineral supply and advanced manufacturing.

Nvidia’s Jensen Huang declared at CES 2026 that Physical AI (robots that perceive, reason and act in the real world) are having their inflective "ChatGPT moment" and the numbers back the rhetoric with the sector projected to grow from roughly $138 billion in 2026 to over $500 billion by 2030. Not only are the numbers extraordinary, but the pace of functional improvement has also been remarkable. Almost overnight we’ve gone from laughing at robots falling over to the recent Robot Games in China with AI-powered machines jumping, running and somersaulting better than humans.

Governments from Canberra to Whitehall are betting that robotics will do for reindustrialization what tariffs and subsidies alone couldn't ie. bring manufacturing back onshore. Similar to the AI-related discussion about Data Centres, that bet may be right about the factories and wrong about who controls and captures the resulting value.

There is little structural awareness that Physical AI is on the same path to evolving sovereign cloud and AI strategies doomed to partial success – only wearing a proverbial hard hat.

Until recently, the gap between digital and physical AI has been somewhat of a running joke. How can the technology that can solve advanced mathematics or write a brilliant poem not figure out how to fold a towel? That gap is closing fast. Vision-language-action models pioneered by the likes of Nvidia and Google DeepMind allows robots to reason the principles of physics rather than execute rigid, pre-programmed motion. Generalist recently reported their GEN-1 model lifted task success rates from 64% to 99% at a rate 300% faster on standard benchmarks in a single release proving a “significant step towards our mission of creating generalist intelligence for the physical world.”

Capability demonstrations have moved from highly controlled labs to live on stage and arenas showing a level of confidence the industry hasn't seen before. The greatest proof perhaps being the broadcast of China’s Humanoid Games – not a country that takes technological or reputational risk lightly! While Elon gets the headlines with his “1 billion humanoid robots in 10 years”, conservative manufacturers like Hyundai are targeting 30,000 humanoid robots a year by 2028. Funding into physical AI start-ups jumped 400% in H1, 2026 according to Crunchbase while the Wall Street Journal reported that many of those investors were the founders of the software and AI industries previously providing a clear pathway to digital/physical AI engineering and manufacturing integration.

McClure, Dave. "Physical AI Large Fundings In H1 2026." Crunchbase News, 18 Aug. 2026, crunchbase.com.

Politically, this is landing at the perfect moment. Reindustrialization has become a universal policy theme across the Western alliance and robotics are being pitched as the enabling technology. Humanoid and purpose-built machines that let Western economies rebuild factories without rebuilding a 1990s-scale labour cost base or the politically maligned immigration policies needed to resource them.

As Andreesen Horowitz Head of Global Affairs (former Whitehouse and NSA senior leader) Anne Neuberger illustrated, this advanced manufacturing revolution is spawning the necessary development of highly detailed digital twins to better understand, architect, build, test and upgrade critical infrastructure with global leaders like Belden, Caterpillar, Foxconn, Toyota and TSMC already building AI-driven digital twins of their factories on Nvidia's Omniverse platform.

Here is the uncomfortable part – politically, economically and socially. The entire pitch for reindustrialization has been implicitly, and often explicitly, about jobs and restoring a middle-class industrial base giving politicians a factory to place a plaque or cut a ribbon. Physical AI does not deliver that. A robot capable enough to fold laundry, pack boxes and operate coffee machines across different physical forms is capable enough to replace the very workforce reindustrialization was promised to restore. We are reshoring output, not jobs, by automating the labour out of it. The politics of reindustrialization and the economics of physical AI are pulling in opposite directions with little recognition of this at policy levels.

The implications will vary by nation and region. While Goldman Sachs reports the US has a gap to fill of 13million open manufacturing jobs ripe for robotic fulfillment, many allies have relatively high inflation and growing unemployment driven by legacy debt and technological disruption.

That's the first trap. The second is more familiar, and more dangerous, because we've built it before. Just as sovereign cloud infrastructure means little if a nation doesn't control the token pricing running on top of it, a reshored factory means little if the nation doesn't own the foundation model, the world-simulation data, or the "brain" directing the robots inside it. Nvidia's Cosmos and GR00T models, and the open foundation models rapidly becoming the default substrate for robotics development, are following the exact ownership pattern that concentrated cloud and AI value in a handful of American platforms. A factory built at home, running on embodied intelligence licensed from offshore, is not reindustrialization, it’s simply a very expensive lease.

In their recent report “Harnessing AI for the Physical Economy” Goldmans additionally pointed out that physical AI deployment, sovereign capital programs and strategic supply chains all coalesce around Defense with an uncomfortable conclusion that fully autonomous AI-executed warfare is an inevitability. Much like recent diplomatic engagement about weaponization in the space domain, this is a joint Allied discussion which can NOT be put on the backburner.

For Western Allies, it will be critical over the next 5 years to build national strategies around developing and controlling the physical AI IP and models, the physical-world training data, and the "sim-to-real" simulation infrastructure those robots depend on rather than simply the location of the manufacturing centers and number of robots deployed.

Nations should treat embodied-AI foundation models (the physical-world equivalent of the large language model) as a sovereign capability requiring the same deliberate investment as fabs or power grids, not an app layer to be simply imported off the shelf.

The collective challenge for allied nations is that physical AI will very likely reindustrialize the West's factories while perhaps further deindustrializing our workforce and destabilizing societal cohesion, and no amount of reshoring rhetoric changes that arithmetic. The real conundrum for sovereign policymakers is whether they own and control the intelligence running the machine revolution or merely rent the floor space the machines stand on.

The positive news is that the issues are foreseeable and controllable and we have time to do address them all before AI (in all its guises) reaches self-propagating scale and becomes turbocharged by the rapidly advancing quantum, space and 6G revolutions.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
How America Appeased Putin https://belimedia.com.ng/how-america-appeased-putin https://belimedia.com.ng/how-america-appeased-putin

Excerpt from Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West

When Spies was first published in 2023, it made front-page news with the chilling revelation that the Russian government had reached an advanced stage in planning an assassination on American soil.

Russia's target was Alexander Poteyev, a former officer in the SVR, Russia's foreign intelligence service, whom the FBI and CIA had recruited as a spy. Poteyev betrayed one of Moscow's most closely guarded secrets: its network of deep-cover "illegals" living in the United States. His intelligence allowed the FBI to arrest ten Russian operatives in 2010, including the glamorous Anna Chapman.

The United States exchanged the illegals for Western agents imprisoned in Russia. Among those released was Sergei Skripal, the former Russian military intelligence officer whom the Kremlin later attempted to murder in Salisbury, England, with the nerve agent Novichok.

The CIA extracted Poteyev from Russia and resettled him under a new identity in the United States. Putin did not hide the fact that he wanted him dead. A Kremlin spokesman warned that Russia knew the traitor's identity and that an assassin would be sent after him.

That was precisely what happened.

Russian intelligence recruited Hector Fuentes, a Mexican microbiologist with a Russian wife and another family in Mexico. His handlers exploited his private life to blackmail him into identifying and surveilling Poteyev in Miami. They gave Fuentes $20,000 to rent an apartment there, but the operation foundered on poor tradecraft. Fuentes photographed the license plate of Poteyev's car and attracted the attention of security guards at Poteyev's apartment complex. When he attempted to leave for Mexico, American border officials discovered the photograph. Fuentes was arrested and disclosed the operation to US investigators.

By authorizing the plot, Putin had crossed an important red line. Europe had already witnessed Russian assassinations and attempted assassinations, including the attack on Skripal. But the Kremlin had previously stopped short of authorising a killing inside the United States. Putin was now demonstrating his willingness to tear up the remaining restraints governing relations with Washington.

Yet the American response was remarkably weak.

The New York Times subsequently reported that Washington retaliated harshly, imposing sanctions and expelling ten Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover in April 2021. But according to someone intimately involved in the events, when the United States informed the Kremlin about the expulsions, its message did not even mention the planned murder. Instead, Washington concentrated on Russia's SolarWinds cyberattack.

The penalties imposed were hardly sufficient to alter Putin's behaviour. Russian intelligence officers sometimes regard expulsion as a badge of honour. Putin had also insulated much of the Russian economy from American sanctions. A more serious response might have publicly exposed his immense wealth and corruption - subjects about which the Kremlin leader is notoriously sensitive.

The assassination plot was only the first of four events that, viewed from Moscow, advertised American weakness.

The second emerged in 2020, when reports alleged that Russian military intelligence was paying bounties to the Taliban to kill American service personnel in Afghanistan. The story appeared during the presidential election campaign but then largely disappeared, supposedly because the US intelligence community could not reach a consensus about the underlying evidence.

There should have been little doubt. John J. Sullivan, the former American ambassador in Moscow, has written that he examined the intelligence and found the proof persuasive. According to a source with knowledge of the events, American authorities possessed intelligence about a Russian officer travelling to Dubai to meet an Afghan contractor who facilitated payments to the Taliban. At the centre of the scheme was an Afghan-Russian gem smuggler, Rahmatullah Azizi, who acted as an intermediary.

The intelligence reached the President's Daily Brief in February 2020. Donald Trump nevertheless denied having been briefed and dismissed the story as "fake news." As with the assassination plot, the Russian bounty program provoked no meaningful American response.

The third demonstration of weakness was Washington's withdrawal from Afghanistan, negotiated by Trump and executed by Joe Biden in August 2021. The operation was handled disastrously. The world watched desperate Afghans cling to an American C-17 as it taxied along the runway at Kabul airport. Some fell to their deaths after the aircraft took off. A suicide bombing killed thirteen American service personnel and approximately 170 Afghan civilians. Soon the Taliban controlled the country once more.

From the Kremlin's perspective, the images suggested that the United States no longer possessed the will or competence of a superpower.

The fourth episode concerned Havana Syndrome - the mysterious neurological symptoms suffered by American officials since 2016. The US government repeatedly denied that a foreign power was responsible. A 2023 intelligence assessment judged it "very unlikely" that an adversary lay behind the incidents.

Investigative reporting later revealed compelling evidence of Russian involvement. Members of Unit 29155, a Russian military intelligence black-operations squad, were present near several incidents involving American personnel. The operatives appear to have used some form of electronic weapon.

Two reliable sources familiar with the matter told me that Russian involvement was regarded as almost certain, but that elements of the American intelligence community - particularly the CIA - had suppressed evidence pointing towards Moscow. Their apparent calculation was that doing nothing was preferable to revealing an attack that might constitute an act of war.

In December 2024, the House Intelligence Committee concluded that a foreign adversary was increasingly likely to have caused at least some of the incidents. It criticised the previous intelligence assessment for lacking analytic integrity and being highly irregular in its formulation.

If Russia was responsible, the lesson for the Kremlin was unmistakable: it had attacked American government personnel and escaped without punishment.

Taken together, the assassination plot, the bounties on American soldiers, the humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan and Washington's refusal to confront the evidence surrounding Havana Syndrome all made the United States appear emasculated in the Kremlin's eyes.

It was in this context that Putin decided to launch his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. America appeared weak. The opportunity for military action had arrived.

The analogy with Munich in 1938 has become an overused cliché. In this instance, however, it is unfortunately appropriate. Through their repeated failure to counter Russian aggression before February 2022, the Trump and Biden administrations effectively appeased Putin's worst ambitions.

Putin's actions must be understood through his background as a KGB officer. He remains an unreformed Chekist, steeped in the mentality of the Soviet security services. He has never abandoned the KGB's view of the United States as Russia's "main adversary," nor his conviction that Washington and the CIA are engaged in a conspiracy to weaken Russia.

His strategy has consistently been revanchist: to regain the territory, influence and prestige lost when the Soviet Union collapsed. His invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 follow logically from that worldview. According to Putin's distorted version of history, Ukraine is an artificial country created by hostile Western powers. He regards its conquest and reincorporation into Russia as an almost sacred duty.

This is a gross misreading of history. But it is nevertheless what Putin believes - and Western governments must take it seriously.

Putin and the hardliners surrounding him believe themselves to be at war with NATO and, above all, with the United States. That conviction will not disappear with a ceasefire in Ukraine. Nor will the danger necessarily vanish when Putin leaves power. The nationalist resentments he has exploited are larger than the man himself, while his regime has systematically eliminated alternative leaders.

The West therefore faces a Russia problem, not merely a Putin problem. The events preceding the invasion of Ukraine offer an enduring warning: deterrence fails when threats carry no consequences. Dictators interpret silence not as prudence, but as permission.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
China’s Challenge to Western Alliances https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-challenge-to-western-alliances https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-challenge-to-western-alliances At the 25th anniversary session of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed an alternative model to Western alliances.

Mr. Xi urged developing nations and the Global South to leverage “SCO wisdom” to argue for a more equitable and orderly multipolar world and reform of global governance institutions like the United Nations. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, and other guest delegations were in attendance for this anniversary session of the SCO.

The 26th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO convened on September 1, 2026, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Leaders from the 10 member states (China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus and the four Central Asian nations) signed the Bishkek Declaration and 13 other documents dealing with security, technology and anti-drug cooperation.

Mr. Xi committed China to provide localized technical projects, collaboration on Artificial Intelligence with SCO member countries and alignment through the Belt and Road initiative (BRI), a massive global and economic strategy proposed by Mr. Xi in 2013. (The BRI, with 146 member states, seeks to link Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America through a network of ports, railways, roads, and energy pipelines. The World Bank and other studies claim that BRI transport projects have lowered trade costs, integrated developing regions into global supply chains, increased local GDPs and lifted millions out of moderate poverty. Critics claim that aggressive, large-scale lending by Chinese state banks have saddled several developing nations with heavy external debt burdens).

Mr. Xi talks about alternatives to Western alliances and creating multipolar institutions, an appealing message to developing nations and the Global South.

It is ironic, however, that two of the 10 members of the SCO, Russia and Iran, are pariah states. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, despite security guarantees provided to Ukraine after they sent all their nuclear warheads to Russia; and Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism that, in 1999, 2009, 2019, 2022, and 2026, killed thousands of peaceful protesters.

A new alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan – the Mecca Defense Alliance – was established in August 2026. Indeed, this is an unprecedented alliance of three U.S. allies’ intent on building a security architecture independent of the U.S.

The BRICS (Brazil, Rusia, India China, and South Africa), formed in 2006, has 11 members, with more than 30 countries that either applied or expressed interest in becoming a member.

It appears that Mr. Xi’s exhortations for a more multipolar war resonates with several developing countries and the Global South, despite the inclusion of Russia and Iran in the SCO and BRICS.

Mr. Xi is competing with several U.S. led international organizations: the QUAD (Australia, India, Japan and the U.S.), AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.), and NATO. Indeed, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was established in April 1949. It’s mission: to safeguard the freedom and security of all 32 member countries through diplomacy and military means. Article 5 of the NATO charter is clear: An armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all of them.

Any real or perceived tension between the U.S. and member countries within NATO, the QUAD or AUKUS will make Mr. Xi’s efforts to create “an orderly multipolar world”, with China in the lead, more attractive to developing countries and the Global South.

The U.S. has played a global leadership role after World War II. The Marshall Plan, established by the U.S. in 1948, provided $13 billion to help rebuild Western European economies.

And it was U.S. leadership in 1949 that established NATO.

Our allies and partners continue to look to the U.S. for this type of global leadership. And developing countries and the Global South should be looking to the U.S. as the democratic leader they should emulate and work with.

The author is a former Associate Director of National Intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government.

This piece was originally published in The Washington Times.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s AI Blueprint Exposes an Authoritarian Playbook https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-ai-blueprint-exposes-an-authoritarian-playbook https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-ai-blueprint-exposes-an-authoritarian-playbook Russia, China, and Iran are all sharing the same playbook for corrupting Western elections. The United States is on track to be the next target this November.

A troveof Russian documents leaked in May outlines Moscow’s plans to use AI to warp foreign decision-making and sway elections. The Kremlin’s “Projects 2026” strategy reveals Russia’s plot to influence upcoming elections in Europe and Israel. Their tactics are similar to those used by China and Iran for years, and what emerges isn’t a Russian innovation — it’s a shared authoritarian playbook.

Projects 2026 calls for the creation of an opinion leader database to monitor the social media profiles of 10,000 influential individuals across Europe, including the 100 most prominent opposition figures in France alone. This is precisely the model Chinese state-aligned company GoLaxy piloted against the United States in 2025. The firm reportedly built constantly evolving psychological profiles of 117 members of Congress and roughly 2,000 additional American opinion leaders.

Researchers at Vanderbilt University warned that GoLaxy appeared prepared to target these individuals with messaging aligned with Beijing’s priorities. By monitoring the social media profiles of Western leaders, China and Russia are able to map the target’s values, beliefs, emotional tendencies, and vulnerabilities, making their influence operations more tailored and impactful.

In addition to using AI to build psychological profiles, the authoritarian playbook calls for countries like Russia and Iran to flood their targets with tailored generative AI content. Projects 2026’s “AI News” initiative calls for producing more than 500 short videos to target French audiences across six social media platforms. This tactic mirrors Iranian information operations during the 2025 and 2026 wars with Israel and the United States, when pro-Iranian networks pushed AI-generated and AI-assisted videos tailored to different audiences across X and TikTok, which racked up millions of views. These countries are running highly productive propaganda engines.

The most durable piece of Projects 2026 isn’t the content at all — it’s the plan to create fictitious think tanks and research institutes that can hand Russian narratives a “legitimate information source,” making them more likely to be cited by real news outlets and large language models. The leak shows this already underway: A site called the “World Center for Strategic Studies,” registered in March 2026, published unsigned analysis aimed at Western think tank audiences, with versions planned in German, French, and Spanish. The fake think tank doesn’t need to fool a discerning reader. It needs to get quoted, indexed permanently, and cited by the next AI model that goes looking for sources on the topic.

Iran ran a cruder version of this same play: Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage groups have repeatedly impersonated real institutions — such as the Royal United Services Institute, the Aspen Institute, and the Washington Institute — to steal credentials and plant material under a trusted name. Projects 2026 proposes something more sustainable: Don’t just hijack existing credibility but manufacture new institutions and let them accrue it over time.

Projects 2026 also proposes building a real Israel-based research institute staffed by Israeli citizens with genuine academic credentials. This approach is reminiscent of the 2014 “Iran Expert Initiative,” where Iranian Foreign Ministry officials attempted to court and influence Western think tank researchers to promote their perspectives and give them legitimacy. Emails leaked in 2023 showed that Iranian diplomats had worked with Western experts across 10 think tanks to aggressively tout the merits of the 2015 nuclear deal between Tehran and major world powers, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

In the age of AI, influencing think tanks is narrative laundering at its most dangerous. Once a fabricated or state-aligned source gets cited by a legitimate outlet or indexed by a search engine, it can become part of the training and retrieval corpus that AI systems draw upon.

While the plays are reusable, the targets are new, and for Russia, the target is European elections.

The leaked documents outline a plan to swing Armenia’s parliamentary vote through a Russian-diaspora outlet and a “Mitteleuropa” initiative aimed at reshaping alignments in Hungary and Slovakia. This is where the surveillance, flooding, and laundering modules converge. To counter it, policy solutions must be swift and targeted.

First, allied governments should require disclosure of foreign funding and foreign state links for any media outlet, think tank, or “research institute” operating ahead of an election in an at-risk state — closing exactly the gap that lets a “World Center for Strategic Studies” pass as domestic and independent. Research by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) into Qatari money in American higher education shows what a real transparency regimen requires: disclosures reaching individual researchers, not just institutions; low reporting thresholds with real penalties; registration in the style of the Foreign Agents Registration Act for state-directed “institutes” masquerading as independent organizations; and provisions against the kind of obstruction Qatar used to block Texas A&M’s funding records in court. Russia is proposing to build the same laundering vehicle in Europe that Gulf money has already normalized in American academia. The fix already exists — it just needs to be strengthened.

Second, platforms should both demonetize and remove unlabeled AI-generated political content during designated pre-election windows in at-risk states. X’s own emergency policy during the Iran war, which suspended digital influencers’ ability to monetize their content for 90 days on undisclosed AI-generated war footage, shows platforms already have the infrastructure to act fast when the stakes are high enough. But demonetization alone left the content up and circulating; independent researchers found AI-generated war footage kept flooding feeds regardless of the policy. Elections warrant a harder line: If posts feature undisclosed AI-generated content during an active election period, they shouldn’t just lose ad revenue. They should come down.

Third, Washington should prepare for future attempts at election influence by boosting the protection mechanisms it already has in place. Currently, 31 states have passed election deepfake laws, but they are under legal scrutiny because they touch on domestic speech. Federal action targeting foreign actors rests on firm ground. The 2002 McCain-Feingold Act prevents electioneering communications by foreign actors, but this only applies to broadcast, cable, and satellite communications. It must be updated to explicitly include paid internet and digital advertisements. It should also close the gap on AI-generated political content and require labeling so that foreign deepfakes can’t hide behind current ambiguities.

Projects 2026 is not evidence that Russia has cracked something new. It’s evidence that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran are now running the same AI playbook against the same democracies, taking turns testing which module works best. The future outlined in Projects 2026 may not be here yet, but objects in the mirror are closer than they appear.

Leah Siskind is director of impact and an AI research fellow for the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Leah and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Battle for Decision Autonomy, The New Front in Strategic Competition https://belimedia.com.ng/the-battle-for-decision-autonomy-the-new-front-in-strategic-competition https://belimedia.com.ng/the-battle-for-decision-autonomy-the-new-front-in-strategic-competition This is the talk Dave Pitts gave at the Sarajevo Security Conference in September 2026, which was based on the talk presented at the Cognitive Security Institute Conference in August 2026. Dave has identified Decision Autonomy as a key battle in the cognitive domain and a new front in strategic competition.

In 2022, Russia expected Ukraine’s political leadership to fracture in the face of pervasive disinformation, subversion, efforts to decapitate the government and to persuade Russian-speaking Ukrainians to support Russia. It expected fear, confusion, and chaos to result in surrender, flight, or capitulation. There was one problem—Ukraine resisted.

President Zelensky's refusal to flee, combined with unified military and civilian resistance—critical decisions—enabled Ukraine to hold in those critical early hours and days. How did such a small number of people resist such extraordinary pressure and make such consequential decisions?

In 2024, a mature Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall, a major producer of artillery shells for Ukraine, was discovered and disrupted by German and Western intelligence. More recently, German reporting described a suspected Russian-linked plot against Stefan Thumann of Donaustahl, a German drone producer supporting Ukraine.

What could those plots have achieved if successful? What did they actually achieve?

Russian drone incursions, airspace violations, political interference, cyberattacks, undersea cable cutting, GPS jamming, forced migration, sabotage, assassination, and attacks on critical infrastructure—several things have become increasingly clear. Russia’s gray zone attacks have increased since it invaded Ukraine. They have become more brazen, more lethal and more destructive—and spread across an increasing number of European countries.

The real question behind these attacks is why Russia is doing this. There are some obvious answers, but do we have it right?

America directly—and many countries indirectly—face a strategic challenge in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s attempts to control the flow of vital global energy as leverage in its conflict with the United States and Israel have created a wicked strategic decision point. Iran’s concurrent attacks on its neighbors may also serve as decision accelerants, compressing the time available to assess options and increasing pressure to act.

What decisions are possible and potentially effective? What are the risks and consequences of each option? And, perhaps most importantly, how much influence over that decision does Iran have?

No single human capacity is more powerful—or more vulnerable—than the ability to make decisions. Throughout history and continuing today, human decision-making has remained a target of those who seek to control the choices of others.

The ability—and the autonomy—to make decisions, from the ordinary choices of everyday life to the most consequential decisions of war and peace, makes us uniquely human. We instinctively resist—and, if necessary, fight—as individuals, groups, and nations when others seek to control our choices, think for us, or suppress this core human capacity.

At first glance, these stories seem completely unrelated.

A President fighting for his nation’s survival
Targeted assassinations of defense executives
Sabotage across the cities of Europe
A high-stakes standoff in the Strait of Hormuz.

They aren't.

They're four stories about the same thing: Decision autonomy. Different actors. Different circumstances. Different outcomes. One framework.

What is Decision Autonomy?

Decision Autonomy is our individual and collective ability to accurately see the world around us, to trust the knowledge we have and the information we receive, and to make independent, confident decisions based on our own judgment. “I decide—we decide.” To be clear, this is about all of us—citizens, private sector leaders, military commanders and officials, and policymakers.

It’s not a perfect state, it isn’t binary, and it exists on a spectrum. Individuals, organizations, and nations are constantly moving along this spectrum—sometimes toward greater autonomy, and sometimes toward greater vulnerability to external pressure.

In the middle of that spectrum is Decision Malleability—a state in which decision autonomy becomes increasingly susceptible to external influences. We see reality less clearly, cognitive clarity erodes, judgment is increasingly influenced, and decisions are increasingly shaped by external pressures.

At the far end of that spectrum is Decision Compromise—a state in which external influences have displaced or constrained independent judgment, resulting in the loss of decision autonomy. Reality is distorted, cognitive clarity is lost, independent judgment is displaced, and decisions are no longer fully your own.

Our adversaries understand this. They don't have to completely compromise our decision-making to succeed. They simply have to move us toward greater decision malleability—just enough to delay a decision, divide an organization, increase uncertainty, create hesitation, or influence a false choice.

If we accept that the ultimate objective of cognitive warfare is to undermine, degrade, and compromise decision autonomy, then understanding what our adversaries are doing to achieve that goal is important. This battle—the battle for Decision Autonomy—is becoming the new front in strategic competition.

What external pressures are our adversaries using in this battle? There are many, but I want to focus on four primary pathways.

First—deception. Deception distorts our understanding of the world around us—reality itself—by persuading us that false realities are real, to doubt the truth we actually see, or simply misperceive the environment in which we are making decisions. What does deception sound like?

“Ukraine is run by Nazis.”

“We are not attacking you—we are protecting you.”

“They started it.”

“Joining NATO would be a hostile act.”

Second—manipulation. Manipulation influences our judgment by exploiting our emotions, identities, biases, and motivations, steering how we evaluate information and the decisions we make. Fear, anger, exhaustion, hopelessness, or hope can override deliberate reasoning. What does manipulation sound like?

“The West doesn’t respect who you are.”

“America will abandon you.”

“China offers a future that NATO can’t.”

“Why should those from outside the region tell you how to run your country?”

Third—coercion. Coercion constrains our freedom to choose by threatening or imposing unacceptable consequences if we do not make the decision our adversaries desire. The logic is simple: “you do X and we’ll respond forcefully.” What does coercion sound like?

“Join and we will take action.”

“Recognize Taiwan and there will be consequences.”

“Support our enemies and your interests will not be safe.”

“Advance our interests in the region or lose access to our markets.”

Fourth—cognitive overload. Cognitive overload overwhelms our ability to think clearly and rationally by exceeding our capacity to process information, evaluate competing narratives, and anticipate the consequences of our decisions. What does cognitive overload feel like?

“An endless stream of conflicting narratives.”

“One video says one thing—another says the opposite.”

“Experts disagree.”

“Anonymous sources contradict official sources.”

“Too many decisions, too much information, too little certainty, too little time.”

Our adversaries seek to create cognitive overload; our objective is to preserve cognitive clarity.

Cognitive clarity isn’t merely the absence of confusion. It’s the ability to remain intellectually focused, emotionally composed, and deliberately engaged despite uncertainty, complexity, competing information, information overload, and attempts to shape judgment.

In terms of these decision states, let’s test the framework against the five examples I opened with.

In Ukraine, President Zelensky and Ukraine maintained decision autonomy. They held firmly to reality, resisted deception, manipulation, and coercion, and made independent decisions despite extraordinary pressure. In this case, decision autonomy prevailed.

Russia’s assassination plots failed to remove key decision makers or undermine support for Ukraine. In fact, exposure of the plots appears to have had the opposite effect—hardening political resolve, increasing intelligence collaboration, strengthening protective measures around critical industrial leaders, and prompting defense companies to increase production. In this case, exposing Russia’s deception sharpened the view of reality and strengthened decision autonomy rather than degrading it.

Russia’s sabotage campaign has been heavy and costly. It is hard to assess if decision autonomy has been degraded. What is clear is that shared operational awareness has increased, defense collaboration is on the rise, an awareness that Russia favors Endless Warfare over peace is settling in, and a goal of shared strategic deterrence has emerged. If there’s a lesson here, it’s that an adversary can create enormous pressure without necessarily achieving decision compromise.

Iran’s disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has revealed the limitations of conventional military power against an adversary employing gray and asymmetric warfare methods. More importantly, it demonstrates how even a superpower finds its decision space constrained by a committed adversary.

The U.S. and its allies are moving along the decision continuum as they seek a decision to resolve this crisis. The question is whether this movement along the continuum reflects normal strategic decision-making under pressure—or a degradation of decision autonomy.

All these examples identify five key points that can protect decision autonomy:

Protect reality.
Seek evidence. Challenge assumptions. Verify before believing.

Preserve independent judgment.
Don't outsource your thinking to algorithms, echo chambers, crowds, or even experts that speak at conferences.

Maintain cognitive clarity.
Slow down. Reduce noise. Watch for fatigue, anger, urgency, despair, and overload.

Recognize and resist coercion.
“Am I choosing this—or am I being pressured into it?”

Continuously assess your decision autonomy.
Where am I on the continuum right now—autonomy, malleability, or compromise?

Is this relevant to the great power competition we all play a role in today?

Imagine these same pathways—deception, manipulation, coercion, and cognitive overload—employed deliberately and systematically by our adversaries over years or even decades, supported by intelligence services, state media, proxies, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, economic leverage, and military power. Scale changes everything.

Let’s talk about Russia, China, and Iran. All three countries use all four pathways, but each tends to emphasize them differently.

Russia has increasingly adopted a strategy of persistent confrontation with the West. It recognizes that it cannot match the United States, NATO, and its allies across every dimension of national power, so it competes asymmetrically and in the Gray Zone.

Russia seeks advantage by increasing uncertainty, delaying decisions, dividing alliances, employing proxies, and raising the perceived costs of action. It exploits negotiations to shift blame, abruptly change positions, and weaponize deception, delay, and distraction.

Russia understands that it doesn't have to defeat its adversaries militarily if it can influence their decisions before military force is ever employed. Deception and coercion define its approach.

Deception through disinformation, false narratives, active measures, and reflexive control.

Coercion through nuclear signaling, red lines, energy leverage, sabotage, assassination, and intimidation.

For China, patience is a strategic weapon. Rather than seeking to influence a single decision, China seeks to shape the long-term decision environment so that decisions favorable to Beijing gradually become the norm and ultimately viewed as being in the target's own interest.

As leading foreign policy expert Elizabeth Economy has observed, “China is executing a patient, multi-decade campaign to dominate the "new frontiers of power"—a continuous effort to set conditions, rewrite rules, and erode Western advantages below the threshold of open conflict.

Manipulation and coercion define this approach.”

Manipulation through United Front activities, influence operations, elite networks, and weaponized narratives.

Coercion through economic leverage, market access, technology dependence, sanctions, military expansion, and aggressive maritime tactics.

Iran views its struggle against the West as enduring and existential. Rather than seeking decisive military victory against stronger powers, it relies on persistent gray-zone competition, asymmetric warfare, and proxies to preserve regime security while constraining the decision of its adversaries.

Iran seeks to narrow the choices of the U.S. and its regional allies—"accommodate its interests or accept an unending and costly regional conflict.”

Manipulation and coercion define its approach.

Manipulation through ideological narratives, proxy media, and the exploitation of political divisions, sectarian identities, and regional instability.

Coercion through threats to global energy supplies, proxy violence, direct attacks on neighbors, hostage-taking, and terrorism.

Although their approaches differ, all three share a common objective: to shape how we perceive reality, exercise judgment, and ultimately make decisions that advance their interests over our own.

Of course, our adversaries still try to shape specific beliefs, but the longer-term payoff comes from shaping the conditions under which those beliefs form—to keep us consistently closer to Decision Malleability on issues most important to them.

So, what do we do about it? Let me close with what I believe are the human foundations of cognitive security—protecting cognition and decision autonomy.

This is often where we start talking about structural fixes—new organizations, whole-of-government approaches, media literacy, and technology. Some may be necessary; some remain aspirational. But I'd like to leave that conversation for another day and focus on the more human side of cognitive security: protecting cognition and decision autonomy.

Today, a clear view of reality can resemble a wilderness of mirrors—seeing isn't believing. If adversaries can replace facts with disinformation and synthetic realities, they gain a decision advantage.

Most of us have too many sources of information flooding our professional and private lives—I certainly do. It is easy to rely on so-called experts, chatbots, social media, comfortable echo chambers, and ubiquitous algorithms to do our thinking for us. It can become a blissful rut. When we knowingly or unknowingly cede judgment and decision space to others—we begin to lose decision autonomy.

We are living in a cognitive storm—a chaotic and unreliable global information environment where a single operator with a laptop can reach millions at the speed of global communications, where countless media sources are almost impossible to vet in real time, and where adversaries deploy AI-enabled networks of surrogates, fake sites, cybercriminals, hacktivists, and bots to target all of us and our institutions. It is easy to feel overwhelmed.

Russia, China, Iran, and even North Korea use redlines, threats and intimidation as tools of persuasion. The fear of escalation can be powerful, and our adversaries will seek to use coercion to move us along the continuum toward malleability and compromise. Coercion changes how we see the cost of our decisions and what we are willing to risk.

Our goal is to recognize coercion for what it is and not allow the fear of consequences—real or manufactured—to become the basis for our decisions.

We do have to accept certain things.

We cannot eliminate deception.

We cannot eliminate manipulation.

We cannot eliminate coercion.

We cannot eliminate cognitive overload.

But before making our most consequential decisions—in a military command post, a policy meeting, during a crisis, or in negotiations with our adversaries—we can stop—and ask four questions. I call this the Decision Autonomy Diagnostic: four questions to instantly evaluate where you stand on the continuum.

Do I accurately see and understand the world around me?

or - Do I know what’s true?

Am I evaluating the information objectively, or is something shaping my judgment?

or - Can I recognize manipulation?

Have I preserved cognitive clarity despite uncertainty, complexity, and overload?

or- Can I still think and deliberate clearly?

Can I decide independently despite external pressures?

or - Can I resist false threats and real pressure?

Finally, decision autonomy is ultimately about sovereignty. For nations, sovereignty is the freedom to determine their own future without external influence or interference—self-determination.

For individuals, decision autonomy is the expression of that same principle—personal sovereignty—the freedom to see reality clearly, exercise independent judgment, and make decisions that remain our own. Sovereignty gives us the right to decide. Decision Autonomy gives us the ability to decide.

No human capacity is more powerful—or more vulnerable—than our ability to make decisions—as individuals, as people, as nations—together, we must go to great lengths to protect it.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Reflect, Remember, Renew https://belimedia.com.ng/reflect-remember-renew https://belimedia.com.ng/reflect-remember-renew

PERSONAL REFLECTION -- Majestic blue skies greeted me as I turned into the Pentagon’s North Parking lot on Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001. As I made my way into work, I was thinking less about what the day might bring—life as a Joint Staff action officer could often feel like Groundhog Day—and more about the beautiful fall morning.

Less than three hours later, I would leave the Pentagon emerged in a profoundly different world, greeted by billowing black smoke rising into that same blue sky after American Airlines Flight 77 struck the building.

It became the most consequential day of my life—one that shaped my actions, my career, and my thinking ever since.

Twenty-five years later, I recall particular moments: the smell of smoke as we evacuated, the morgue erected to identify the victims, the fire burning through the Pentagon roof and the heroic firefighters who battled to extinguish it, and the enormous American flag unfurled across the Pentagon on September 12—a symbol of mourning, resolve, and national unity.

What forever remains with me is the memory of leaving the Pentagon that morning and the questions that haunted me:

How could we have missed this? How could our intelligence community and national security leaders have failed to protect the nation? How had we failed to connect the dots? How could we have suffered what the 9/11 Commission would later describe as a “failure of imagination?”

As with most intelligence failures, the warning signs appear painfully obvious in hindsight. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center demonstrated the potential consequences of a major terrorist attack on American soil. Osama bin Laden and the World Islamic Front openly declared war against Americans in 1998. That same year, al Qaeda bombed U.S. embassies in East Africa. In 2000, terrorists attacked the USS Cole in Yemen, killing 17 American sailors.

Individually and collectively, these events should have raised our level of concern and preparedness. They did not. We failed.

Looking back, I believe the roots of that failure can be traced to three areas: a lack of vigilance, poorly developed and undervalued partnerships, and an inadequate understanding of al Qaeda.

Intelligence failures—from Pearl Harbor to the 1973 Yom Kippur War to 9/11—often begin with a failure of vigilance. Nations minimize threats, overestimate their own capabilities, or explain away indicators because they do not fit prevailing assumptions. Warning signs are interpreted through the lens of what leaders believe an adversary is likely to do rather than what it may actually be capable of doing.

The 9/11 Commission’s finding of a “failure of imagination” captured a glaring weakness. But imagination in national security begins with discipline: examining vulnerabilities, challenging assumptions, developing mitigations, and running down leads even when they do not conform to conventional thinking.

Perhaps hubris played a role. A decade after winning the Cold War, the United States stood as the world’s preeminent power. That success may have contributed to a belief that our homeland was largely beyond the reach of a foreign adversary. Our guard was down. The result was the deadliest terrorist attack in American history.

September 11 also exposed serious weaknesses in our government’s ability to build and employ partnerships. Across the interagency, intelligence remained too often stove-piped. Agencies approached difficult problems through the narrow lens of their own authorities and responsibilities, creating seams an adaptive adversary could exploit.

Those seams were especially dangerous at the boundary between foreign intelligence collection and domestic law enforcement. Information held by one agency did not always reach another. Opportunities for integrated analysis were missed. We had capable organizations staffed by dedicated professionals, but too often they operated within separate cylinders of responsibility rather than as parts of an integrated national security enterprise.

Al Qaeda exploited those seams.

Perhaps most sobering was how little we understood about the enemy we suddenly faced. The attacks of September 11 were not al Qaeda’s opening act. The organization had already demonstrated its intent and capability through the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. Yet after 9/11, it quickly became apparent how we were limited in our collective understanding.

Strikingly, among the first circulated materials on al Qaeda that I encountered after the attacks was a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst’s handbook describing the tactics, techniques, and practices of Osama bin Laden and his followers. I remember senior leaders on the Joint Staff asking for copies and acknowledging how little they knew about the organization.

Our adversary had studied us in extraordinary detail. We had not studied our adversary with the same intensity. We were, in important respects, blind to a deadly threat.

Today, remembrance alone is not enough.

The American philosopher George Santayana famously warned: “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Remembering September 11 must mean more than recalling where we were, honoring those who died, or recounting the heroism that followed. It must mean examining whether we have truly absorbed the lessons purchased at such extraordinary cost.

The first lesson is vigilance. Today’s threats may emerge in cyber, space, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, terrorism, or domains we have yet to fully appreciate. Vigilance demands healthy skepticism about our own capabilities and respect for those of our adversaries. It requires leaders willing to challenge comfortable assumptions and recognize weak signals before they become catastrophic warnings.

The second lesson is partnership. Public-private partnerships are now foundational to understanding many threats confronting the nation, particularly in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure. But partnerships cannot become static arrangements or bureaucratic slogans. We must continually reassess relationships across government, industry, and our allies, asking whether they provide meaningful access, insight, speed, and competitive advantage.

The third lesson is understanding the adversary. Our limited understanding of al Qaeda before September 11 should force us to ask a difficult question today: Which adversary are we underestimating now? Where are our greatest knowledge gaps? Which emerging tactics, technologies, organizations, or intentions are we explaining away because they do not fit our assumptions? Who is studying us more carefully than we are studying them?

These questions should make us uncomfortable.

On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people began an ordinary morning never imagining what would follow. For those of us who experienced that day from inside the Pentagon, the memories remain deeply personal. But the responsibility to learn from that day belongs to all of us—especially those entrusted with our nation’s security.

As we honor those who lost their lives, we should do more than look backward. We should reflect on where we failed. We should remember what complacency cost us. And we should renew our commitment to vigilance, partnership, and understanding—so that the lessons of September 11 are never again learned only after tragedy strikes.

The Cipher Brief is publishing the personal reflections of our expert community this month. Sign up for the Nightcap Newsletter and follow on social media for more reflections.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Compute We Cannot Power https://belimedia.com.ng/the-compute-we-cannot-power https://belimedia.com.ng/the-compute-we-cannot-power On September 9, Oracle reported a cloud backlog of $664 billion — up $209 billion from a year earlier, an order book the size of a mid-cap national economy on hand for delivery over the next several years. That same week, PJM Interconnection, the grid operator serving 65 million Americans across thirteen states, was still processing a December 2025 capacity auction it had cleared 6,625 megawatts short of its reliability target — the first shortfall in the operator's history — at a record clearing price of $333.44 per megawatt-day. The order book has grown faster than the grid can keep up with.

This is not a permitting problem or a temporary shortfall. American companies are contracting artificial-intelligence compute faster than the country can build the grid to power it, and the mismatch is arriving inside a coordination architecture that has assigned pieces of the problem to six regional grid operators, fifty state public utility commissions, and a small set of federal agencies whose authorities do not overlap on the composite. In June, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ordered each of the six regional operators to write its own rules within sixty days. Commissioner David LaCerte warned publicly that FERC would “dictate solutions” if the operators cannot converge. Convergence is not on the calendar. No entity above the assigned authorities has been named to arbitrate the composite-against-composite demand.

The critical-minerals track shows the same asymmetry in miniature. On July 10, 2025, the Department of Defense used Defense Production Act Section 303 authorities to take a $400 million equity stake in MP Materials and to guarantee a ten-year price floor for neodymium-praseodymium at roughly double the current market price. One company, one mineral, one price floor. On November 10, China’s extraterritorial rare-earth licensing regime returns under Announcement No. 61 — the 0.1-percent rule — covering rare earths, magnets, and downstream technology inputs across automotive, aerospace, semiconductor, and artificial-intelligence supply chains. The International Energy Agency estimates full implementation would place $6.5 trillion of downstream production outside China at risk. Beijing’s move is compound, systemic, and licensed centrally. The American answer is per-vendor, per-input, and negotiated bilaterally.

The Middle East corridor added the third register this week. A major east-west Saudi pipeline was forced offline. Transit disruptions extended simultaneously across the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb. American diesel crossed $6 per gallon at retail, and the transmission landed directly in the August Producer Price Index at 5.4 percent — a tenth above consensus, driven by a 24.1 percent monthly jump in diesel. For the first time this year, the corridor shifted from a regional flashpoint to a domestic macroeconomic input. Data centers need power; power needs fuel; the corridor is where the fuel comes from. Every hyperscaler private-generation contract and every backup-power assumption in a 2027 AI capital plan now runs against a diesel price on the goods side of the American inflation print.

The Pentagon’s autonomy doctrine sits on the same footing. Drone swarms, autonomous undersea platforms, and the tactical-edge inference the Joint Fires Network is being procured to deliver each presume a compute supply chain that runs from mineral to chip to installed platform at operational speed. Enterprise capital plans priced against frontier compute delivery presume the same. Sovereign artificial-intelligence partnerships with Korea, Japan, and the Gulf presume the same. If those inputs cannot be delivered at the pace assumed by the contracts, none of those presumptions hold.

The three-week arc through this diagnosis now points to a single operational conclusion. The Army America is buying cannot be commanded on the doctrine as written. The artificial intelligence it is buying cannot be deployed on the mission as scoped. The compute at the head of the growth forecast cannot be powered on the grid the country has built. Beijing is running the integration architecture the United States has not written.

Picture the October 2026 planning session. A hyperscaler chief financial officer is closing the 2027 capital plan against compute-delivery schedules her contracts already fixed. Her power-procurement lead tells her that large-transformer lead times have moved from 24 to 36 to 48 months. Her regulatory counsel tells her the six regional show-cause returns FERC ordered in June come due between sixty and one hundred and fifty days, and whether the rule that clears her interconnection comes from a converged regional set or a FERC-imposed replacement is unresolved. She calls the Department of Energy. She calls FERC. She calls her state public utility commission. Three offices; three pieces of the answer; no single voice authorized to warrant the composite. She signs the plan against megawatts no institution has vouched for.

That is the pattern of every arbiter she reached. DPA Section 303 was built for targeted intervention in specific supply chains, not for compound systemic response. FERC sits above the regional grid operators but not above the states. The Department of Energy directed FERC to write rules in October 2025 and got six show-cause orders in return. Nothing in the current apparatus assigns integration authority. The signal to watch is not another Oracle print or another PJM auction. It is whether any American institution names an accountable integrator above the assigned authorities — one office empowered to arbitrate grid, minerals, and integrated federal decisions in response to composite demand.

If you are running defense industrial-base capital, hyperscaler capital, or duration exposure priced against the AI cycle, do the work now. For your highest-conviction 2027 plan, name the specific power source, the specific mineral supply chain, and the specific federal decision whose failure would break the plan. Then name the person or institution accountable for delivering each. Where the second name is missing, the risk in the first has not been sized.

The last three weeks have named the same problem three times — the Army we cannot command, the AI we cannot deploy, the compute we cannot power. Each name points at the same missing office. The next capability America fields will not fail because it never arrived. It will fail because it arrived on inputs no one had been assigned to deliver.

Richard Berry is the founder of Stratnova Advisors and the editor of Strategic Horizons, a weekly geopolitical assessment for senior executives and national-security professionals. His forthcoming academic work examines the supervisory function in human-AI decision architectures.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
When Policy and War Collapse Into One: Fighting in the Sixth Domain https://belimedia.com.ng/when-policy-and-war-collapse-into-one-fighting-in-the-sixth-domain https://belimedia.com.ng/when-policy-and-war-collapse-into-one-fighting-in-the-sixth-domain We may soon face conflict with nation-states in a new model of warfare—one not defined by geography, but instead defined by AIs competing directly with one another. War has always been a ruthless teacher: adaptation, learning, and feedback determine who prevails. In the sixth domain of warfare—AI-driven conflict—that cycle of teaching accelerates beyond human limits. Machine systems do not just execute decisions; they absorb outcomes, update models, and refine strategy continuously and at scale. Strategy, planning, targeting, and execution collapse into a single, ongoing process of learning and acting at speeds no human command structure can match. Missiles, drones, satellites, and fleets remain, but only as instruments—physical endpoints through which AIs prosecute this competition. The real contest is not fought on terrain, but in cycles of learning and adaptation too fast for humans to comprehend. What matters is not force projection, but learning velocity; not command of terrain, but command of inference.

In this domain, doctrines like “human-in-the-loop” or even “human-on-the-loop” are not safeguards—they are handicaps. Any force that inserts human judgment into the learning cycle—whether tactical or strategic—will be systematically outpaced by one that does not. This is not a matter of doctrine or preference, but of competitive logic: systems that act and adapt faster gain an inherent advantage. If removing human constraints yields advantage, those constraints will vanish. This reality forces a stark choice: delegate authority to machines across the full stack of war and accept the risks of opacity and escalation, or retain human control and accept defeat at machine speed. The fog of war has not lifted—it has thickened into a machine-generated battlespace, a black-box system fighting and learning at a level humans can no longer fully observe or comprehend, let alone direct.

This transformation elevates intelligence from a supporting function to the central determinant of power. Models and compute provide capability, but intelligence—continuous, fused inputs from sensors across domains—provides the fuel that drives the system. The intelligence cycle itself describes the change: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis, production, and dissemination. In the sixth domain, machines run all of these functions. In an AI-versus-AI conflict, the side that sees more, sooner, and more clearly directs the learning loop itself. The advantage will not go simply to the best models, but to the systems that integrate intelligence fastest and most effectively. A slightly inferior model, continuously updated with superior, secure, low-latency data, will outperform a more advanced system operating on stale or fragmented inputs. Intelligence no longer informs decisions; it becomes inseparable from them.

The reflexive policy response in the West will be to constrain the leading AI companies in the name of control and safety. That instinct risks slowing the very learning cycles that determine advantage. Winning will require the opposite: accelerating innovation, tightly coupling it to national security objectives, and denying other nation-states key capabilities.

As in the nuclear era, this creates a parallel requirement for stability. The Great Powers share an interest—not in cooperation, but in using the technology to the benefit, rather than detriment, of society. To survive, we all need to understand each other’s AI capabilities and limits. Call it Mutually Assured AI Destruction: MAAID. Like its nuclear predecessor, deterrence will rest not on trust, but on verification, ambiguity, partial visibility, and intelligence where transparency fails. This is mutual self-interest under conditions of instability. In this domain, the equivalent of launch detection—recognizing decisive AI actions at inception—will be critical. Intelligence will need to continuously track, interpret, and outpace adversary AI systems, not only to compete, but to avoid surprise and uncontrolled escalation. What each side can see, and how quickly it can understand it, may determine whether competition remains bounded or spirals beyond control. An AI-era equivalent of the OPCW may therefore become necessary—an institution capable of inspecting, verifying, and monitoring advanced weapons AI systems under conditions of speed and opacity.

In the near future, humans will at best set initial conditions—policy, objectives, constraints—and then watch as their systems prosecute a war they can no longer meaningfully steer. Clausewitz wrote that war is the continuation of policy by other means. In the sixth domain, that distinction collapses. When systems translate intent into action, learn from the results, and adjust course continuously at machine speed, policy is no longer something periodically expressed through war. It is instantiated in code and executed as a continuous process. The side that learns fastest does not just win—it shapes the war itself.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Not the Destroyer of Worlds: Why Compute is Humanity’s Most Vital Defense https://belimedia.com.ng/not-the-destroyer-of-worlds-why-compute-is-humanitys-most-vital-defense https://belimedia.com.ng/not-the-destroyer-of-worlds-why-compute-is-humanitys-most-vital-defense Eighty years ago, the architects of our first dual-use revolution whispered that they had “become Death, the destroyer of worlds.” Today, a new power commands that same existential awe. It was born in elite laboratories, the product of massive government and corporate investment. It is an immense, power-hungry technology, requiring vast, specialized facilities and staggering amounts of energy to sustain its core operations. For decades, the public has viewed it with a mix of awe and dread, fearing its potential to upend global security, trigger arms races, and spark catastrophic, irreversible outcomes. It is the ultimate dual-use technology—capable of both destroying worlds and powering the future.

Yet, despite the apocalyptic warnings and geopolitical posturing, its most profound and specialized use case is far more personal: fighting cancer. By harnessing its invisible, computational power, we can now detect and target malignant anomalies with a precision once thought impossible. It zeroes in on the very building blocks of the disease, finding microscopic threats hidden deep within human tissue and deciphering biological codes to save countless lives in the process.

Did you think I was talking about nuclear energy?

You’re right. But I’m also describing artificial intelligence.

In recent years, AI has pivoted from a theoretical computational powerhouse to the frontlines of biology and medicine. This is no longer speculative; it is recognized at the highest echelons of science. The 2024 Nobel Prize in Chemistry was awarded to Google DeepMind’s Demis Hassabis and John Jumper for AlphaFold, an AI system that solved a 50-year-old grand challenge in biology by predicting the 3D structures of over 200 million proteins. By mapping these molecular blueprints, AI is fundamentally transforming how researchers understand cancer mutations, accelerate targeted oncology therapies, and design bespoke immunotherapies. Alongside these molecular models, advanced clinical computer vision systems are rewriting diagnostic timelines—whether predicting breast cancer with expert radiologist precision or training on hundreds of thousands of imaging scans to predict ovarian cancer risk with unprecedented accuracy, as pioneering companies like ProvanAI, located in my hometown of St. Louis, are doing today.

Beyond the clinic, and in my field of specialization, this paradigm shift is redefining planetary resilience through breakthrough Geospatial AI (GeoAI). By fusing foundation computer vision models with petabytes of satellite, radar, and aerial data, GeoAI allows us to monitor our world with unprecedented fidelity. When catastrophic natural disasters strike, these models map flood zones, building collapse patterns, and impassable supply routes in minutes rather than days, delivering vital situational awareness to humanitarian first responders. In agriculture, spatiotemporal models track soil moisture and crop stress across entire continents to forecast yields and preempt global food crises. From tracking environmental destruction to documenting human rights crises in denied territories, GeoAI is transforming raw overhead data into proactive stewardship for humanity.

Yet realizing this potential requires colossal infrastructure, and our adversaries know it. The frontier of AI demands vast data centers, specialized silicon, and gigawatts of electrical capacity—a physical reality foreign competitors are actively seeking to undermine. Recent intelligence and industry findings have exposed coordinated Chinese influence operations designed to manipulate the American public and derail domestic infrastructure expansion. Reports from frontier labs, including OpenAI, alongside the discovery of massive foreign bot networks on platforms like X, documented state-linked campaigns using generative AI to flood social discourse with fabricated claims that AI data centers are draining local power grids and driving up consumer energy costs. Beijing recognizes that compute capacity is the decisive strategic terrain of the twenty-first century. Just as the United States recognized that mastering nuclear technology was an existential imperative in the twentieth century, we cannot allow foreign propaganda to paralyze our critical infrastructure today. We must build the power, secure the compute, and win this race—because the security, economic sovereignty, and humanitarian future of the free world depend on it.

However, leading the world in compute does not justify reckless acceleration. Over the weekend, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei published the essay We Must Pace the Frontier, advocating for a deliberate slowdown in the development of frontier AI models to allow safety and alignment research to catch up. His call to action underscores a strategic imperative: our governance of AI must mirror the rigor of nuclear regulation. Just as the atomic age birthed non-proliferation treaties and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the AI revolution demands a comparable oversight architecture—embedded third-party inspectors, strict safety checkpoints, and enforceable global coordination. The United States and its allies must win the infrastructure race, but we must simultaneously lead the charge in establishing the international safeguards that prevent this dual-use technology from fulfilling the darkest prophecies of the nuclear age.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
We Are In An Unpredictable War Of Attrition https://belimedia.com.ng/we-are-in-an-unpredictable-war-of-attrition https://belimedia.com.ng/we-are-in-an-unpredictable-war-of-attrition We are squarely in the target sights of ‘Unintended Consequences.’

What do I mean by this? Think of it as a broad spectrum of possible consequences when missiles and drones are being slung back and forth between Iran and U.S. Navy vessels and bases, and the energy and commercial facilities and ships of its Gulf allies. On one end of the spectrum, accidents happen: think the inadvertent U.S. airstrike on the girls’ school at the beginning of the war, and the more recent ‘wedding party’ casualties when a U.S. missile struck a nearby communications tower. These are tragedies for all involved. On the other side, an Iranian missile made its way through U.S. air defenses to strike a U.S. military facility in Jordan, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. troops. The latter resulted in a robust U.S. military response that targeted a variety of Iranian military facilities. This was a success for Iran and a tragedy for America.

On the other end of the spectrum, what if one of Iran’s ballistic missiles successfully navigates to its target - a U.S. base or navy vessel, for example - and significant U.S. casualties, dead and/or wounded, result? The U.S. administration is likely to come under tremendous political pressure to respond with overwhelming force. This could elevate the stakes even higher, cutting off any chance of a negotiated settlement, remote as it currently is. And with the regime already having been severely degraded militarily, and its leadership ranks diminished, what does that leave in terms of targets? More of the same?

It could also result in calls to withdraw U.S. forces, given the antipathy of a majority of the U.S. population to a war they view as unnecessary, ill-advised, and ill-managed. This would leave Iran in a weakened yet still dangerous posture, with the ability to pressure the world economy at will going forward. Neither option is appealing.

Oh, and by the way, notwithstanding the administration’s verbal gymnastics, this is very much a war.

D-Day Sanctions Regime

On the surface, this appears to be a pretty solid strategy, or at least better than what has been tried to date: Simply squeeze the Iranian economy until the regime cries uncle. It is already having an impact and will likely continue to compound the pain. But it is neither simple nor clear-cut. Who will it actually impact, how badly, and when? A total blockade means not just money or arms. It means no food. It means no medicine. And a host of other basic necessitates. The Iranian people will feel it first, particularly the young, the old, and the sick. Regime insiders, including the leadership and their loyal (for now) security forces, will be the last to see the effects.

And we have already seen Russia and China reject complying with the secondary sanctions that comprise the heart of this enhanced effort. So, no one knows what will happen if they choose to challenge the blockade; It is highly unlikely that U.S. forces will use force against Chinese vessels attempting to access Iranian ports. And that does not take into account less overt (read clandestine) interactions - intelligence sharing, weapons system development, sabotage efforts against Gulf country facilities, including pipelines, etc. - that would further evade and/or erode the U.S. advantage.

So, while there will be pain, and lots of it, as I said in a recent BBC interview, there remain many unknowns. Informal smuggling networks have abounded in the region for Millenia. The regime will utilize every trick they have learned since the ‘79 revolution while building a ‘resistance economy’ to get around the blockade/sanctions. And potentially with the implicit, if not explicit, support of two major world powers. In the end, this does not presage the near-term submission of a regime that values survival above all else. This remains very much a test of wills.

Furthermore, what happens when the world sees the Iranian people starving before their eyes? I’m not sure they will countenance this for long.

So, Who Has More at Stake?

The U.S. people are seeing higher gas prices at the pump, rising food costs, overall inflation, and more. This is painful, but certainly not existential, at least not yet. The increasingly negative impact on the world economy stands to worsen things considerably if the status quo continues for too long, so Americans are watching closely. And the mid-terms are fast approaching.

The Iranian people are seeing the destruction of their economy, their country, and potentially their very way of life. It is very much existential. The specter of a thundering locomotive of new sanctions bearing down on them must certainly be terrifying. I have no doubt many Iranians blame the Islamic regime for bringing this down upon them. But as things worsen, they may turn against the U.S. and its allies for abandoning them to the depredations of the regime.

The Iranian regime most certainly views this as an existential threat, notwithstanding its rhetoric. They would be fools not to. But Netanyahu’s 2 September statement that the Israeli government is, “working to bring down this regime and defeat it,” accompanied by Trump’s 2 September statement publicly questioning, “when the Iranian people would rise up and fight,” is unlikely to motivate them to negotiate. They will need to be forced to submit. My experience with Iranians tells me that the harder you press, the more resistant they become. Uncharted territory indeed. We will see.

China and Russia both have an adversarial relationship with the U.S. and important interests vis-à-vis Iran: military for Russia (drones) and commercial for China (oil). Why would either go out of their way to assist the United States in removing itself from a self-imposed disaster that is distracting it from issues they care about while diminishing its military capabilities, all with minimal effort? That is a question that remains to be answered.

Speaking of Regime Change

U.S. political leadership answers to the American people at the ballot box. The system is a bit creaky at the moment, but (for now) it remains intact.

The Islamic regime, by design, does not answer to the Iranian people. Iran’s elections are truly rigged, primarily by the Guardian Council’s ability to reject candidates for office, but also with an increasing willingness to falsify election results. And in the end, the Supreme Leader is able to reject any initiative or law he disagrees with. We have seen the results when the Iranian people see no recourse for accountability by the regime: people in the streets, followed by blood in the streets.

Without substantial outside support, of which we have so far seen little evidence, the populace will be hesitant to go back to the streets, knowing that if they do, they are on their own. It could happen if things get bad enough, and it is possible it might even ultimately be successful, but it is almost certain to be a massacre, followed by chaos and a very uncertain end. Yet another example of unintended consequences.

Where Are We Now?

For the moment - and this may already have changed as I write this - we are back in what I refer to as a Hyperbolating phase, where we are seeing threats/counterthreats being tossed back and forth with abandon. Most of these statements are utterly meaningless and can be ignored. It appears both sides are waiting to see who blinks first.

U.S. messaging appears to be somewhat disjointed, contradictory, and lacking an overall strategy, with the President, the only real decision-maker, continually wandering on and off the path of others in his administration: Trump - I don’t care/where are the Iranians?; Hegseth - continued confrontation; Bessent - economic asphyxiation; Rubio - no nuclear weapon/economic pressure; Vance - not a war/intermittent containment. You could claim this is purposeful to keep Iran uncertain and off balance, but it should not be doing the same to Americans. President Trump failed to bring the American people on board beforehand with a coherent (and honest) case for war and an actual strategy for winning it. The continued shuffling of various justifications we have seen from the administration serves simply to stir the mix of confusion.

I get the distinct feeling that, given the fast approaching mid-terms and the deep hole they have dug for themselves, the administration just hopes that something/anything works so they can walk away from what is clearly a foreign policy disaster.

Iran messaging, on the other hand, appears, at least to me, to be a bit more coordinated if not strategic. While most Iranian government leaders are defiantly threatening massive retaliation for continued U.S. strikes (hyperbole), including the military (both Artesh - regular military and IRGC - Revolutionary Guards), the Parliament and its Speaker Ghalibaf (“U.S. actions will not go unanswered”), and the Foreign Affairs Ministry (claiming “war crimes” by the U.S.), the lone man on an island is the Iranian President, Pezeshkian; “we do not seek war but will respond,” and, “Iran remains open to negotiations, under the June MOU”. It is important to realize that the Iranian President has virtually no policymaking role in Foreign affairs, so his statements should be given less weight than others. But he would never make this offer without the approval of the IRGC, the Supreme National Security Council and, most likely, the Supreme Leader (or whoever is speaking for him). As I have written previously, I believe that the vagueness of the original June MOU was oddly advantageous to Iran and served to lead us directly back to where we currently are. So… this would seem to indicate negotiations are at least still on the table, just not under conditions particularly favorable to the U.S.

Where Are We Going?

Military escalation? A slow grinding pressure on the regime, testing their willingness to allow their people to suffer? Or a return to the negotiating table?

Who knows? There is no simple or painless way out of this.

Unintended consequences, after all.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Bells are Ringing Again, and This Time Sweden is Inside the Alliance https://belimedia.com.ng/the-bells-are-ringing-again-and-this-time-sweden-is-inside-the-alliance https://belimedia.com.ng/the-bells-are-ringing-again-and-this-time-sweden-is-inside-the-alliance On August 25, CIA Director John Ratcliffe landed in Moscow. He met Russian officials, warned them against attacking NATO, raised Moscow’s support for Iran, and flew home. Allies and Kyiv were briefed before and after. It was the first trip of its kind since the former CIA Director William Burns made the same flight in November 2021, fifteen weeks before Russia crossed into Ukraine. As one former CIA operations officer put it, the fact that a director gets on a plane at all suggests the threat behind the trip was judged credible.

The warning had gone public three weeks earlier. US intelligence assessed that Putin could order a limited attack on a NATO member, most likely against the Baltics or Poland, at some point between this autumn and 2029. The assessed purpose is to test Article 5’s, and to fragment the alliance by proving it lacks a response.

The location for that scenario is Sweden’s front yard. Gotland sits in the middle of the Baltic Sea. Sweden’s air and naval reach covers the sea lines that would carry reinforcements to the Baltic states in the first week of a crisis, and Swedish territory is key for air superiority.

In 2022, Sweden’s intelligence failures were Sweden’s. The country was outside NATO, and a wrong Swedish assessment was not changed after American influence. But Sweden joined NATO in March 2024. Swedish capability will now feed an alliance and Swedish blind spots will become an alliance wide liability.

Sweden is rebuilding its intelligence architecture directly into this warning. A new civilian foreign intelligence service, Sveriges utrikesunderrattelsetjanst (UND), opens January 1, 2027.

Not the First Warning to Go Unheeded

The winter of 2021 into 2022 was not a case of intelligence that wasn’t shared in time. In fact, Washington and London put detailed intelligence assessments on the table publicly, repeatedly, and with a specificity that made professionals uncomfortable.

The influence operation was also conducted privately. Burns flew to Moscow in November 2021 to deliver warnings to the Kremlin, then made repeated trips to Kyiv and allied capitals.

These efforts unfortunately were partly in vain. The French and German services judged a full invasion too irrational and too costly for Putin to attempt. Several capitals read the American warnings through the memory of Iraq weapons of mass destruction and discounted them accordingly. The gap between what US intelligence believed and what European governments were willing to act on became one of the more consequential intelligence failures of the post-Cold War era. It was not a failure of collection; it was a failure of influence.

The analytic error underneath this failure is known as mirror-imaging; the assumption that your adversary weighs cost the same way that you do. European intelligence services were good at counting tanks, tracking movement and mapping order of battle. They were far less equipped to model what was happening inside the Kremlin, and when they tried, they substituted their own arithmetic for Putin’s.

Sweden’s record is part of that story. In the month before the attack, MUST assessed that a major assault was unlikely. Foreign Minister Add Linde questioned American intelligence directly to Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, leaning on her own service’s skepticism.

FOI, the Swedish civilian defense research agency, did not forecast a full-scale war either, but its Russia and Eurasia analysts raised the alarm publicly and privately. But the warnings sat outside MUST’s military remit and had no route into the warning chain.

Wilhelm Agrell, professor of intelligence analysis, called MUST’s miss a textbook error: analysts reasoned that invasion was unlikely because the consequences would be too severe. That was an assessment of what a rational Swedish planner would do in Putin’s position, not of Putin himself.

Why Military Intelligence Could Not Have Gotten this Right

The standard account of Russian deception before February 2022 is that Moscow hid its intentions from the West by dressing the buildup as an exercise. That is true and it is the less interesting half.

The more consequential fact is that Moscow hid its intentions from its own army. Captured Russian soldiers told interviewers they believed they were on a routine exercise until hours before they crossed the border. Their officers reportedly withheld the truth because they doubted the men would fight if they knew. The deception was not aimed outward alone, but at the force that was executing Putin’s orders.

The same held on the other side. The former commander of Ukraine’s Joint Forces has said he received no official written warning on the eve of the invasion and acted on an informal tip.

A military intelligence service collects against a military. It reads order of battle, logistics, movement, readiness, signals traffic, and where it can, human sources inside the structure. Every one of those disciplines was pointed at Russian forces in the winter of 2021, and every one of them was working.

They were also, on the question that mattered, reporting accurately. The units were postured for an exercise because the units believed they were on an exercise. The logistics looked thin for an invasion because the supply staff had not been told they were invading. A colonel asked in early February what his regiment was doing would have given an honest answer, and the honest answer was wrong.

The buildup was visible; but what was not visible was the decision. Putin realized his opponents intelligence weakness, and made the decision in a room that his wider military had no access to. Thus, collection against an army cannot retrieve a judgment that the army has not been told.

MUST did not miss the invasion because its analysts were incompetent or because collection was thin. It missed because it was asked a political question and had been built, staffed, tasked, and funded to answer a military one. Working harder inside that structure would have produced more detail about an exercise.

A design problem does not yield to effort. It yields to design. If intent lives in the politics of a regime rather than in its order of battle, then somebody has to be built to read the politics, and that somebody cannot report up a military chain to a military customer asking military questions.

The American Half of the Ledger

Washington read Russian intent correctly, but got the second question wrong.

Almost every Western service, American ones included, assessed that Kyiv would fall in days. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs told members of Congress that the capital could be taken in seventy-two-hours. The day after the invasion began, US officials were still assessing that Kyiv could fall within days. The intelligence community later reviewed what went wrong, and the answer was not the Russian side of the equation.

Examine how that assessment was built. Analysts counted Russian formations and Ukrainian formations, compared readiness and equipment, ran the correlation of forces, and derived an outcome. It was rigorous, and every input was real. What it failed to weigh was whether Ukrainians would fight for their country, and misjudged the national will of resistance.

That is mirror-imaging pointed at a friend instead of an adversary. In the European case, services assumed Putin would calculate cost the way a Western government would and concluded he would not invade. In the American case, services assumed Ukrainians would calculate survival the way a defeated army could and concluded they would not hold. Both times, the arithmetic was correct and the human judgment underneath was imported from somewhere else.

Within two weeks of the invasion, the United States and its allies were quietly planning for a Ukrainian government in exile and an insurgency, which is the posture you adopt when you have concluded that the state will stop existing. Zelensky was reportedly offered evacuation and answered that he needed ammunition rather than a ride. The pessimism shaped what was planned, what was offered, and how fast it moved, in the weeks when speed mattered.

In the other direction, Zelensky spent the run-up publicly disputing American warnings, arguing that the alarm was doing more damage to his economy than the threat. Biden later said Zelensky simply “didn’t want to hear” it.

Washington was right about Russia and could not get Kyiv, Berlin, Paris or Stockholm to act. Kyiv was right about Ukraine and could not get Washington to believe it. The problem caused both an unprepared Europe and delayed American aid.

What Sweden is Actually Building

Former Prime Minister Carl Bildt led the review of Sweden’s Intelligence Failure, “En reformerad underrattelseverksamhet”. The report stated that Sweden was unusual among comparable allies in having no foreign intelligence service outside of the military chain of command reporting to the elected government. The country had excellent military intelligence, a capable security service (Sapo), and one of Europe’s better signals organizations (FRA), but no institution capable of reading political intent. The report recommended a civilian agency directly under the Foreign Minister, which was later approved.

Sveriges utrikesunderrattesetjanst, UND, will sit alongside MUST, Sapo and FRA rather than replacing any of them, and is meant to be a senior shop rather than a second MUST, growing over several years.

UND takes over KSI, the Office for Special Collection, which is Sweden’s clandestine human collection and which operates in other countries under cover employment and false identity. It also takes over the production and management of qualified protected identities, previously run by the Armed Forces. The legal architecture moves with it: the Defense Intelligence Court is renamed and the oversight body redesignated, moving Sweden closer to the structures of MI6 or Estonia’s Valisluureamet: a small, civilian, politically literate foreign service.

The government named Andreas von Beckerath director-general and Annika Brandstrom his deputy, both running from January 1, 2027 for six years. Von Becherath is a diplomat: with ambassadorships in Ukraine and Poland, deputy director-general and head of the Foreign Ministry’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia department, with earlier postings in Moscow, Bucharest, London, Berlin, and New York. He is currently serving as the European Union’s ambassador in Belgrade, head of the EU delegation to Serbia, a post he has held for a year.

Brandstrom ran the inquiry that stood the agency up and served as deputy national security advisor. She has a long history of working in crisis management, preparedness and security, working directly for the Prime Ministers office.

The diagnosis was that Sweden could count Russian tanks but not read Russian politics. The team hired to fix it spent their careers reading politics and managing crises. Sweden did not appoint a general, nor an intelligence officer. It appointed a diplomat and a bureaucrat, showing that the government took the review seriously.

Frictions and Objections

Thomas Nilsson, who runs MUST, said that in the current security situation Sweden cannot afford to let anything fall through the cracks. Supreme Commander Michael Claesson has noted that UND’s civilian funding may not count toward NATO spending targets. Analysts have pointed to the seam that any civil-military split creates, which a capable adversary will probe.

All of Sweden's eight parties on the foreign affairs committee backed the legal changes. Four of them, the Social Democrats, the Left, the Greens and the Center, filed seven reservations and three separate statements. The Social Democrats called four months an extremely brief period for a reorganization of this size. The Left said the process may create more problems than it solves. The Center Party called it democratically flawed.

Underneath the procedural language is a specific operational worry: KSI leaves MUST. The Social Democrats’ objection is that the military loses a capability and is not compensated for the loss. Clandestine human collection is not a function that transfers on an effective date. Cover takes years to build and one administrative error to destroy. Officers working abroad under false identity are being re-subordinated to an agency that does not exist yet, whose director arrives on the day it opens, in the same window in which US intelligence says Russia may test the alliance.

Recruitment began before parliament formally approved the agency. The Social Democrats' complaint was tied to former hiring flaws for the National Security Advisor. Naming a year leadership team weeks before a national election, after declining to seek cross-party agreement, was provocative. They have a point; the decision was taken hastily in a political setting that often favors alignment across the aisle.

As a result the opposition signaled it may revisit elements of the reform, and the Swedish reporting has been blunt that if an incoming government shelves the service, three years of work goes with it. While the diagnosis is correct and the institutional design is sound, the infrastructure has to survive the people who built it, and whoever wins the next election. Sweden’s diagnosis was that its intelligence architecture was wrong for the threat. The risk now is that the new institution is not properly aligned across the aisle.

What Washington Should Do, and What Stockholm Should Ask For

Sweden is fixing the half of 2022 that was Sweden’s. Nothing in the American half has been fixed, and standing up a new allied service is a rare occasion when that half becomes cheap. None of what follows requires an appropriation.

Engage the institution, not the government. The appointed leaders will outlast the government that named them. American engagement pitched at the service and its career leadership must survive a change in Stockholm. Engagement pitched at the ministers who created UND does not, and given how the reform was legislated, engagement that looks like an endorsement of the current coalition would actively damage the agency’s standing with the parties most likely to inherit it. The correct posture toward a new foreign intelligence service in an election year is professional and studiously boring.

Establish liaison at the founding. A service’s analytic culture and its foreign relationships set early and then harden. What UND treats as a finished intelligence product, how it handles dissent, what it considers sufficient evidence to warn a prime minister, and whose reporting it trusts will all be settled in 2027 and 2028 by people who are being hired. Washington should be in the room while the habits are forming, and the subject of that liaison should be intent rather than order of battle, because reading intent is the entire reason the agency exists.

Make the 2022 improvisation permanent. The declassify-to-persuade campaign that Washington and London ran that winter was invented under pressure, with skill, and then set aside. A standing mechanism for releasing intent-grade material to allies at speed, with the handling rules and the release authorities agreed in advance would mean the next warning arrives in a form that an ally can act on. The lesson of 2022 was that being right in February is worth little if the ally does not move until April.

Settle the accounting question now. Claesson’s concern that UND’s civilian budget may not count toward NATO spending targets is an alliance question. The Hague summit’s target splits into 3.5 percent for core defense and 1.5 percent for defense-related spending, and the substance of that 1.5 percent has not been well-defined. Washington has more influence over that definition than any other member. A civilian foreign intelligence service whose product feeds alliance warning belongs in the basket. If it does not, the alliance will have told every member that the safe answer is to keep intelligence in uniform, maintaining the structure that failed in 2022.

Clarify Expectations. Sweden should ask for written handling and onward-sharing terms at the foundation, when it has maximum leverage and when the terms can be built into the agency rather than bolted onto it. It should ask for reciprocal analytic exchanges, including joint red-teaming aimed specifically at mirror-imaging, which is the failure both services can share and neither can audit alone.

Assign UND a responsibility in NATO. A small service does not compete across the whole target set, but Sweden has geography, language, history, and now a reputable and capable director. UND should come to the table as the alliance’s lead on a defined portion of the Russian problem rather than as a recipient of American products. Partners who bring something are listened to.

A Warning is Not a Decision

Sweden has looked hard at their failure and built an institution in response, which is more than most European governments have done with the same four years. The review named the problem, the legislation moved clandestine collection out of uniform and under civilian control, and the government hired a team with experience reading exactly the kind of politics that can accurately foresee an invasion.

The failure of influencing has no institution behind it in Washington or elsewhere. It was solved once, improvised under pressure in the winter of 2022, and allowed to lapse. That is the part of 2022 that is genuinely fixable, but it needs to be assigned. The American task is to build a relationship durable enough that whoever party runs Sweden does not matter.

Burns flew to Moscow in November 2021 and came home with a warning that proved correct, and it moved nobody in time. Ratcliffe made the same flight in August. The question worth asking is not whether the assessment behind it was accurate. The question is what happens after he lands, and whether four years, a war, and a new agency in Stockholm have changed the answer at all.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
65 Billion Barrels Is Only the Beginning https://belimedia.com.ng/65-billion-barrels-is-only-the-beginning https://belimedia.com.ng/65-billion-barrels-is-only-the-beginning President Trump announced this weekend that the United States had secured majority control over more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven oil reserves through a partnership with private business.

That is a big number. But it is not the number the oil and gas industry will be focused on.

Venezuela already has the largest proven oil reserves in the world. It produces only about 1.25 million barrels a day. That gap tells you a lot about what comes next.

Sixty-five billion barrels of reserves is not 65 billion barrels of supply.

The oil is there. The harder question is what it takes to actually produce it.

Existing wells may need work. Infrastructure needs investment. Equipment and people have to move into the country. Companies have to decide the economics work. And before anyone commits billions of dollars, they have to be comfortable that the agreements they sign today will still be enforceable years from now.

That is the part experts in this industry will be watching.

My firm works with oil and gas companies on the agreements behind development. Most people will never read those agreements, but they matter. Companies need to understand what they own, what they control, what they are obligated to spend and what protections they have if circumstances change.

Boards do not invest billions based on an announcement. They invest when they have enough confidence in the contracts and the economics to put capital at risk.

Contracts drive capital. Capital drives production.

And none of that happens overnight.

There may be opportunities to improve production from existing Venezuelan fields relatively quickly. But in the oil business, relatively quickly can still mean years. Larger redevelopment projects can take much longer.

That matters when talking about oil prices too.

Markets can react to an announcement immediately because markets react to expectations. But if the question is whether this will have a lasting effect on oil prices, actual production matters. More barrels reaching the global market means more supply and, all else being equal, downward pressure on prices.

But first you have to get the barrels to market.

For perspective, the world consumes roughly 100 million barrels of oil every day. The United States alone consumes around 20 million barrels per day. Roughly 20 million barrels per day move through the Strait of Hormuz.

So the important question is not simply how many barrels Venezuela has underground. We already know it has an enormous amount of oil. The question is how much additional oil can actually be produced, how much investment that will require, and how long it will take.

Oil companies are accustomed to evaluating political, legal and commercial risk around the world. Venezuela is obviously not the first place where those risks have existed. Companies deal with them through contracts, economics and legal protections. If they can get comfortable with those things, capital can move. If they cannot, it does not.

That is why the agreements behind this announcement may ultimately be more important than the headline number.

If those agreements create enough confidence for significant private capital to move into Venezuela, this could become a very significant development for Venezuela, U.S. companies and the global energy market.

But in a country as chaotic as Venezuela, with uncertainty as to the future resilience of its government and institutions and reports of consensus opposition to the agreement, that is a big ‘if’. In short, we are not there yet.

There are a lot of steps between announcing access to reserves and producing oil from those reserves. This seems to be a first step, but not much else.

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Houthis’ Coastal Gambit https://belimedia.com.ng/the-houthis-coastal-gambit https://belimedia.com.ng/the-houthis-coastal-gambit For the first time in years, large swaths of Yemeni territory are changing hands. The Houthis’ recent losses in the east of the country were quickly followed by a string of victories along the Red Sea coast that brought the group closer to the Bab al-Mandeb strait. Early readings that the eastern losses marked the beginning of the regime’s collapse have since proved premature. Yet the regime’s latest expansion does not resolve its core problems either, at best it mitigates them.

What has emerged over the summer is not a regime in free fall but one that is consolidating. Pulling back from the periphery, concentrating its forces where they matter most, and using battlefield momentum to paper over economic and political weaknesses.

The current escalation began in July 2026, when the Houthis tried to break what they call the “Saudi blockade” of Yemen by chartering an Iranian airliner for a roundtrip from Sanaa to Tehran. Riyadh has controlled Yemen’s airspace since 2015, when it launched its campaign to unseat the Houthis, and air traffic to and from Sanaa has been limited ever since. It diminished further in 2025, when Israel put Sanaa Airport and the Houthis’ fleet of airliners out of commission because the group had been using them to transport weapons and operatives. The blockade has never been airtight, though, as UN flights have reportedly continued in apparent secrecy and without any clear declaration of cargo or purpose.

Riyadh had folded under Houthi pressure many times before. Until 2023, the Saudis were desperate for a way out of Yemen, and the Houthis set out to extract every possible concession before running out the clock on a deal. The group’s Red Sea campaign, launched in November 2023, made any agreement far more difficult for the kingdom to stomach. Even so, Houthi threats against Saudi infrastructure continued to yield concessions or at least a softening of Saudi policy.

This time, Riyadh did not fold. On July 13, as an inbound flight from Tehran approached Sanaa, a coalition strike cratered the runway and forced the aircraft to divert to Hodeidah. The Houthis answered by declaring a “naval blockade” of Saudi shipping and attacking the kingdom’s energy infrastructure. Saudi Arabia hit back with airstrikes on Houthi-held territory, and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces went on the offensive.

The coalition’s pushback was limited, and it did not cow the Houthis who retain considerable will to fight. Its leaders are mostly in their 30s and 40s and remain filled with extremist fervor. They are not the aging cadres of the hollowed-out Assad regime. They are also accustomed to a ruthless and competitive environment in which the last thing anyone can afford to display is weakness.

Instead, the group recalibrated by absorbing losses in the east while going on the offensive in the west. In the northeastern governorate of al-Jawf, the Houthis have reportedly lost territory, including the al-Labanat military camp. They apparently did not commit the resources required to hold those positions.

That is surprising given al-Jawf’s history with the movement. Roughly two decades ago, when the Houthis had only just begun their revolt against the Yemeni government, al-Jawf became their second foothold. It is also a valuable smuggling hub and a likely entry point for materiel smuggled overland to the regime via Oman.

Yet al-Jawf has also been a thorn in the Houthis’ side for years because of its demography and topography, and it will remain one for whoever is left to govern its unruly tribes. The defeats there may therefore reflect a decision as much as a failure. Constrained by scarce resources, the Houthis appear to be consolidating around the assets they value most, accepting losses in al-Jawf in order to concentrate on the more strategically valuable western governorates. This does entail some risk as losing ground in the east strips away some of the group’s strategic depth.

That reading fits developments in Taiz and along the Red Sea coast. On September 3, the Houthis launched a ground offensive across western Taiz and southern Hodeidah against the National Resistance Forces of Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Within a week, the key port city of Mokha had fallen.

The captured territory secures the Houthis’ own ports, at least from a land invasion, and could allow the group to expand smuggling operations via the Horn of Africa. It may eventually position them to move on the city of Taiz itself. But the advance toward Bab al-Mandeb is less dramatic than it might appear, as shipping through the strait has been within Houthi reach for years so holding more coastline does not dramatically extend that threat.

The timing of the offensive may not be incidental. September is typically a tense month for the Houthis, as their level of popular support is put to the test. The regime seeks to bring Yemenis into the streets to celebrate its September 21, 2014, coup while silencing any celebration of the founding of the Yemeni Republic on September 26, 1962. The quick and surprising capture of Mokha from Saleh’s forces sustains the myth that the group is on the rise. That does nothing to alleviate discontent, but raising public fear of the regime helps keep discontent from turning into open dissent.

In doing so, the regime has used its primary tool, military power, to compensate for its other weaknesses. But this consolidation looks like crisis management. The regime’s central problems are economic as its main sources of revenue are drying up and it needs money and resources to keep its war machine going.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, finds itself dealing with Yemen largely on its own. It has pushed out its Emirati partners, and its American, Turkish, and Pakistani allies appear reluctant to commit to direct military intervention. Sidelining the Emiratis and disbanding the Southern Transitional Council gave Riyadh greater influence over the full spectrum of anti-Houthi forces, which it has since co-opted, but it is not clear that the Saudis are managing these relationships effectively.

The Houthi regime is neither a paper tiger nor ten feet tall. It should be assessed as a foe that is, above all, capable of surprise. Its summer offensive also shows that it can still generate momentum on the battlefield even as its economic base declines. Seeking to strike deals with or ignore this terrorist group has afforded it the luxury of preparing and then launching attacks at the time and place of its choosing.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:38:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside Trump’s Massive Venezuela Oil Deal https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-trumps-massive-venezuela-oil-deal https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-trumps-massive-venezuela-oil-deal “A major oil agreement has been announced between the government of the United States and the [Venezuelan interim] regime of Delcy Rodriquez. I know what you [Venezuelans] are feeling, sadness, anger and that painful sense so familiar throughout our history that someone else is making decisions about what belongs to us in our name, without us. The true scope of this agreement is still unknown. Who is signing it? What exactly is being signed? Who is providing the funds? Who is offering the guarantees? How does this benefit Venezuelans? Quite rightly, this has sparked deep concern about its implications for our country's future.”

That was part of a statement to the Venezuelan people released last Thursday by María Corina Machado, a Venezuelan politician, activist, and prominent leader of the opposition to Venezuela’s interim-President Delcy Rodriguez. These were Machado’s first extended remarks about what President Trump has called “the biggest oil deal in world history.”

But as Machado so accurately observed, “We still do not know the true scope of this agreement,” nor, I will add, does anyone know if this deal will ever go into effect.

First, a bit of history, since I believe the Trump administration initial plan was described publicly back on January 9, when the President met with executives of 17 oil companies at the White House.

At that time, with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro locked in a New York City jail, President Trump said, “American companies will have the opportunity to rebuild Venezuela's rotting energy infrastructure and eventually increase oil production to levels never ever seen before.”

“Our giant oil companies,” Trump said, “will be spending at least $100 billion of their money, not the government's money. They don't need government money, but they need government protection and need government security that when they spend all this money, it's going to be there.”

He added, “Venezuela [meaning interim-President Delcy Rodriguez] has also agreed that the United States will immediately begin refining and selling up to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan crude oil, which will continue indefinitely.”

Trump then made his pitch saying, “All of the companies here today are going to be treasured partners in bringing the nation of Venezuela back to life, restoring its economy and generating…tremendous wealth for the companies that are going in.”

At that session, Mark Nelson, vice chairman of Chevron, when called upon said, “For more than a century, Chevron has been a part of Venezuela's past. We are certainly committed to its present. And we very much look forward, as a proud American company, to help it build a better future.”

However, when Trump asked ExxonMobile Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Darren Woods to “say a few words,” the response was different.

Woods explained, “We have a very long history in Venezuela. In fact, we first got into Venezuela back in the 1940s. We've had our assets seized there twice. And so you can imagine to re-enter a third time would require some pretty significant changes from what we've historically seen here and what is currently the state.”

Apparently, over the past seven months more negotiations took place and on August 28, Trump announced on TruthSocial, “THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY! At my direction, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, working closely with Highly Respected Interim President of Venezuela, Delcy Rodriguez, and, through a partnership with private business, have secured majority U.S. control of more than 65 BILLION BARRELS of proven Oil Reserves in Venezuela, at no cost to the American Taxpayer.”

Three days later, on August 31, the White House released a fact sheet with more details.

The fact sheet disclosed the Venezuelan interim government [Interim-President Delcy Rodriguez] has granted a privately-held oil company, North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), 100-year concessions for 17 oil fields with proven reserves of approximately 65 billion barrels.

I should point out that Venezuela has some 303 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the largest in the world, with Saudi Arabia second with 287 billion barrels. On the other hand, as of this year, the U.S, has only some 46 billion barrels of proven reserves, although this country is one of the world’s largest oil producers.

NABEP, based in Barbados, already was Venezuela’s second-largest private oil producer run by Leopoldo Alejandro Betancourt López. According to press reports, the 46-year-old Betancourt has a checkered background, but nonetheless was used by the Trump team in planning the U.S operation that seized former-President Nicolas Maduro, and afterwards served as a liaison figure with Delcy Rodriguez.

The White House fact sheet also said, “At no cost to the American taxpayer, NABEP has granted the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) a 35% equity stake in its corporate parent, representing up to hundreds of billions in value and dividends for the United States.”

The OSC, started under the Biden administration, has up-to-now funded private companies developing certain needed military technologies. The Trump administration last year increased its legislative authority to support up to $200 billion in loans and loan guarantees, and recently has grown its staff to near 100 people.

But the OSC has never been prepared to deal with the role apparently to be required if, as the agreement apparently states, it would be a major stockholder in what could be one of the largest oil companies in the world.

Perhaps because of the proposed Venezuela deal, the OSC announced on August 17, it was going to establish “a panel of pre-qualified law firms (“Firms”) to act as its external transaction counsel.” The selected firms would then represent borrowers or others doing business with the OSC on a “Sponsor Pay Basis,” meaning that the legal fees and expenses of OSC for a transaction will be borne solely by the borrower or another third party and not by OSC, or any U.S. government entity.

An additional benefit from the deal to the U.S., according to the fact sheet is: “NABEP has also granted the U.S. State Department the right to purchase, at production cost, a guaranteed 20% of the off-take [contracted oil purchased] from all current and future fields NABEP will operate.” The State Department was also given “the right of first refusal to purchase the remaining 80% of its [NABEP’s] production,” according to the fact sheet.


It’s unclear why the State Department has this role other than Secretary Rubio was a negotiator of this deal and the State Department was named on Trump’s January 15, Executive Order to administer funds from current Venezuela oil sales being controlled at that time by the U.S.

As for NABEP -- the company itself -- the U.S. government was given “veto power over the appointment of any member of the board of directors,” plus “a majority of NABEP’s board of directors must be U.S. citizens,” the fact sheet said. Additional, according to the fact sheet, “the U.S. government’s agreement with NABEP is governed by U.S. law and is subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.”

Naturally, questions about whether this agreement ever goes through have been raised.

On September 1, The Atlantic Council pointed out that the Pentagon’s OSC “has never been leveraged for a program like this or the management of such a vast equity stake in a foreign country’s national assets (assets which that country’s own constitution forbids the sale of).”

The Atlantic Council further said, “As in Venezuela, it is entirely plausible that future U.S. governments may likewise look askance at this agreement -- particularly if…it is not resulting in the massive oil production increases that are presently hoped for.”

For example, interim-President Rodriguez said during an August 29 television interview that the agreement could generate about $209 billion in ⁠revenue for Venezuela, based on a $65 per barrel oil price where some $19 per barrel would flow directly to Venezuela, to boost government revenue.

But others have questioned whether the Venezuelan government would actually get $19 per barrel if the U.S. exercised its right to buy 20 percent of production at cost.

Then there is the political opposition in Venezuela where leaders such as Machado have argued, “The wealth beneath our soil does not belong to an illegitimate regime. It belongs to the Venezuelan people.”

Machado added, “Venezuelans know there can be no development without strong institutions and a government elected by popular vote. That is the only real guarantee of success and stability for any large-scale investment.”

Last Wednesday, both Trump and Rodríguez brushed off questions about when the next Venezuelan election might be held.

Trump told reporters, “You had a very powerful, very nasty dictatorship in Venezuela – and they’re [the Venezuelan electorate] just not going to be ready for it yet, but soon.” With Energy Secretary Chris Wright, who was visiting Caracas, Rodríguez told reporters, “I have worked tirelessly to ensure that Venezuela is ready and prepared when the time comes for its electoral process.”

Elliott Abrams, who served as U.S. special envoy to Venezuela during Trump’s first term, has told the New York Times, “If an election is to take place in Venezuela, a nine-month runway for preparation is likely to be expected. Within the time period, Abrams said, “Here’s my fear: It makes us [the U.S.] Delcy’s partner, and gives the President a reason to want her to remain in power,” because she will do “whatever Trump tells her to do.”

Luis A. Pacheco, for 17 years an executive at Venezuela’s national oil company PDVSA and currently a nonresident fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, wrote last week in Americas Quarterly, “Little is known about how this deal will proceed, so important questions still need answers.”

Pacheco’s questions included, “Will NABEP sign this deal with PDVSA, the state oil company, making it more like a standard joint venture?...It’s still unclear whether NABEP can turn around and share ownership with the U.S. government, specifically with the Pentagon’s special unit originally designated as a counterpart to this pact. Beyond this critical aspect, there is also the question of NABEP’s financial and technical muscle. Will a firm that lacks these credentials be able to outsource to established oil companies to fulfill the contract’s scope?”

With experts raising such questions who can believe this “BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY!” is going forward as currently planned?

For example, back during his January 9 press conference with oil company leaders at the White House, Trump announced that Venezuela had already given the U.S. 30 million barrels of what had been previously-sanctioned oil that it had on hand.

“That's about $4 billion worth,” Trump announced back in January, adding, “And it's on our way to the United States right now. And we want to thank Venezuela for that. And we're working very well with them, obviously, or they wouldn't have been so generous.”

There has been no accounting that I know of for that first gift of $4 billion worth of Venezuelan oil.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 08 Sep 2026 18:07:14 +0100 FirstHandNews
Q&A with former CIA Operations Officer James 'Mad Dog' Lawler https://belimedia.com.ng/qa-with-former-cia-operations-officer-james-mad-dog-lawler https://belimedia.com.ng/qa-with-former-cia-operations-officer-james-mad-dog-lawler James Lawler serves as a national security consultant and is a noted speaker on the Insider Threat in government, academia and industry. He has been the guest on over ninety national podcasts specializing in intelligence and counterintelligence. His Insider Threat presentations have included Honeywell Corporation (twice a year since 2015), Salesforce, Abbott Laboratories, LinkedIn, Rice University (twice), Duke University, Harvard University, Syracuse University Law School, The LBJ School Clements Center for National Security (three occasions), CIA, DIA, NSA, NNSA, FBI, DoD, Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Special Operations University, National Intelligence University (ten occasions), DEVGRU, DARPA, ARLIS, IARPA, National Defense University, The Institute of World Politics, Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies (twice), and numerous times at Applied Physics Laboratory and all of the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories.

Prior to this, James Lawler served for 25 years as a CIA operations officer in various international posts and as Chief of the Counterproliferation Division's Special Activities Unit. He had five overseas assignments from 1982 to 1994.

James Lawler was a member of CIA's Senior Intelligence Service (SIS-3) from 1998 until his retirement in 2005. He was a specialist in the recruitment of foreign spies, and he spent well over half of his CIA career battling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As Chief of the A.Q. Khan Nuclear Takedown Team, which resulted in the disruption of the most dangerous nuclear weapons network in history, James Lawler was the recipient of one of the CIA's Trailblazer Awards in 2007, marking the 60th anniversary of CIA.

In 2004, former DCI George Tenet sent Mr. Lawler a note which stated, “Jim, what you and your team have achieved will rank up there as one of the most spectacular intelligence accomplishments in the history of the CIA. It occurred because of your exemplary leadership. Not only are we in the process of taking down a network, we are also in the process of disarming a country as a result of your fine work. With respect, George J. Tenet”.

And former DDCI John McLaughlin noted that the effort was “the closest thing I’ve ever seen to a perfect intelligence operation.” James Lawler also received the Director's Award from Director of the CIA George Tenet, the U.S. Intelligence Community's HUMINT Collector of the Year Award, and the Donovan Award from the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations.

Let's hear his story:

EMK: Jim, you’ve written three spy novels already, they have been approved by the CIA Prepublication Review Board of course, and they are very, very interesting. I assume that, omitting real-life names, places etc., you drew from your real-life experiences to write them?

JL: Yeah, I weave a lot of real-life incidents into my spy fiction and they're accurate and they're realistic because I've lived these things and so I fictionalize the time, the place, the people, of course, the nationalities. But they're highly accurate as if there's a movie going on in my head and I'm writing about something that either I did or some of my colleagues did, so I try and stick as close to reality as possible. I focus on the human angle and the human condition and to me, that's the most fascinating thing about spy fiction. Of course, the master was John Le Carre, who I just adore his fiction.

You also mentioned to me a while ago that you try to insert into your novels the agency’s first and foremost priority; to protect its people and its assets.

Absolutely, that's a sacred commitment. All three of my novels weave that into the story; that we will go to hell and back to try and honor that commitment to an asset, to one of our sources. All three of my books have that as a theme that we are going to go and try and keep our assets, our sources safe, yes.

Do you remember the first time you were asked to handle an asset? How old were you then?

I was on my first tour. I was, I guess, about 30 years old and so I had had a terrible first year. I hadn't recruited anybody and I was beginning to wonder if I was really good at this profession or not and had a lot of doubts. So, I got a classified message from Washington, D.C., from CIA headquarters, and they told me that there was going to be a big series of negotiations in another year where we were going to be negotiating with a certain foreign country.

A high-stakes national security treaty and we didn't have any sources on the side of the other country to tell us what their negotiating positions were, and therefore if you had any contact with anybody from this specific country who had the following type of access then we were encouraged to go out and develop a good relationship with that person, find out what they needed, see if there was any way we could recruit the person to be a source. So, I'd been in a ski class a few weeks earlier with someone who was from this country.

He had the access they needed so I began what we call the “developmental stage” of trying to build the trust, see what this person needed and then outline what we would call a “recruitment pitch” where we would propose that the person become a source for us and in return we would do things for them, some kind of financial compensation or something like that.

So, after a few weeks of developing the source, I decided I'm ready to “pitch” this person, but I was very naive, this was my first recruitment pitch, and I really didn't have a grasp of what this guy needed or vulnerabilities or anything like that as I should have.

But I thought I could just use the power of my personality and our friendship to persuade this guy to betray his country which is incredibly stupid and naive, but I thought I could do it. So, I wrote this proposal to CIA headquarters and obviously they were very desperate because they approved this stupid scheme of mine and so I took this guy to dinner and I pitched him and I remember he looked at me and he said, ‘Jim you and I are friends but what you're proposing that's morally wrong’.

That didn't sound good at that point, right?

No, of course not, and I tell you I've pitched probably 50 or 60 people in my career and he's the only person who ever posed a moral objection. The only one. Normally, if they pose an objection, what do you think the objection is?

Not enough money... I'm afraid I'm gonna get caught…

That's it, it's the second one, it's the fear. I had an African intelligence officer say, ‘Jim they hang people in my country for doing things like that’. He's right, they would. Although he didn't surprise me, this African intelligence officer, he said that ‘could I have a rain check’? I said, ‘what do you mean?” He said, ‘well my son is only three years old, and I don't need you now but in 15 years he'll be university age and I might need you then.”

Well, 15 years later he was posted to Washington and guess what? We cashed in that rain check and he needed us. But going back to where I've had my first big pitch and I've been turned down: We have a saying in the CIA's Directorate of Operations ‘that it's okay to be turned down but not turned in’. Meaning, what if this guy goes and reports this pitch to his ambassador and the repercussions could be very severe.

I neglected to tell you that the man I just pitched was the number two guy in the embassy. He was the deputy chief of mission, the ambassador's deputy.

I just pitched him, he's turned me down and this ambassador had a terrible reputation for being a hothead and a kind of a jerk and I could just envision him marching into our ambassador's office and screaming about what an outrage it was that young Mr. James Lawler, third secretary, had just propositioned his deputy to become a spy. I could see that happening and even though CIA headquarters had approved this, I thought they're going to cut me loose. They're going to wonder how I messed this up and I thought there's a good chance I'll be going home because this will be such a nasty diplomatic incident.

Well, after about two or three days, I worked up my courage to call this guy, just to see if he's mad or not. And so, I called him and I said, “You know, we really enjoyed, I really enjoyed that dinner the other night. I was thinking maybe this Friday night we'd go out and do it again one week later” and to my great relief, he didn't hang up in my ear but instead he said, “you know, Jim, I think you're, I was thinking the same thing. That would be good”.

So, I thought, “okay, fine”. I've got to meet this guy for the second time, you know, or, you know, one week after my failed pitch and my only goal was to smooth any turbulent waters to try and plead for mercy and say my words were taken out of context and I apologize.

I see where this is going…

But I never had to get to that because when we got to the restaurant and the waiter had dropped the menus off, the first words out of my friend's mouth, “Jim, that offer you made me last Friday, is that still good?” And I said, “well, I said, of course it is” and he says, “well, what you don't know was two days after our dinner, my wife announced that she wants a divorce and I can't afford to pay her the alimony to which she's entitled or put my two high school age boys in private schools when we go home next summer. And in my country, if you're not in a private school, you're not going to get a good education. I can't afford to do that. I can't afford to do that unless I accept your offer”, you know, with the consultant fee that I had promised. And he said, “I know it's morally wrong, but I don't have a choice”.

How did that make you feel?

I felt great. He explained to me at the very next meeting, he brought a whole stack of classified material to give to me and he said, “Jim, let me now tell you why I'm really doing this”. He said, “I hate my ambassador”. He said, “that guy steals the credit for everything I do and everything everybody else in the embassy does. And he goes around this country, you know, acting as if he's God's gift to my country”. And he says, “I hate the guy. And so, as I hand you this classified material, it's as if I'm kicking that son of a bitch in the face”.

And so, I took it from him, and I said “you and I are on the same team. Bring me some more of this and let's kick that son of a bitch again”.

So, one of the prime motivators for espionage is somebody needs revenge. They've been dissed; they've been treated poorly. And so that's how they psychologically can cope with the fact that they're betraying a trust because they feel like they've been betrayed first.

What motivates someone to betray their country? You mentioned revenge. What are the other factors?

We have a very simple acronym at the CIA called MICE. That stands for money, ideology, coercion, and ego. And I will tell you that in my experience, nobody ever does it purely for money. Money may be a means to an end. In his case, he needed money because of his alimony requirements. He needed money for his children's education. But money by itself is not the prime motivator.

Tolkachev (GTVANQUISH) didn't do it for money.

Nobody does it just for money. Tolkachev didn't do it for money, Polyakov (TOPHAT) didn't do it for money. They don't do it for money. They do it for other reasons.

Now, I stands for ideology. And I've had people say, “well, I hate communism, or I hate nuclear weapons”. And that's true to an extent. I don't think they're lying to me. But I think by trying to pin their motivations for some noble reason, you know, ideology sounds very noble. That sounds better than saying, “I hate my boss”, or “I'm in trouble”, something like that.

Now, the C stands for coercion, which the Russians and the Chinese use a lot. You know, you've heard of the sparrows, the swallows, the extortion, blackmail, the honeypot. We don't typically use that. And the reason I don't like using it is because I don't want a rattle snake in my backseat as I'm driving down the road. I want somebody to be positively motivated and not be scared. But the most powerful of all of them is the E, ego.

And that encompasses revenge, it encompasses the fact that you've got marital problems, you may have a lover, you may have all kinds of issues, gambling problems, you may have problems with your boss, problems at work, all kinds of things. E is the most powerful motivator of them all. And I'd say most of the people I recruited, at the root of their motivation, ego was a big, big part of it, probably 90% of it.

To mention an example, Aldrich Ames, the worst espionage case in CIA's history was an E, correct? Because he had to take care of his [Colombian] wife's expensive lifestyle and his vices.

Absolutely. He was a very mediocre to poor operations officer. He was an alcoholic. He was a failure, basically. We don't recruit water walkers. We recruit people who are under stress, people who are desperate. I never once recruited a happy person. You don't recruit happy people. You don't recruit people at the top of their profession. You recruit people who are very unhappy and stressed out. And he was unhappy and stressed.

Same with [CIA’s] Edward Lee Howard

Ed was fired because he had drinking problems, substance abuse problems, and one time on an airplane, he ruffled a woman's purse and stole $20 because he was pissed off that her baby was crying. So, when she went to the bathroom, he stole $20. Now, he was fired. Well, he got back at us by contacting the KGB.

After he had been read into everything [he was going to be posted in Cold War Moscow]

Absolutely. He was the one that basically… what happened to Tolkachev was he [Howard] was going to be Tolkachev's handler. So, he knew Tolkachev's identity.

But an interesting thing was, I guess it was on my third tour, I was about to go off to a tour in Scandinavia. And routinely, when a CIA officer goes from one station to another station, headquarters will do a counterintelligence profile to see where you have been exposed before. And so, to let the receiving station know that Jim Lawler has been exposed to this or that, you know, type of thing. Well, my write up said basically, betrayed by the traitor Ed Howard.

So that was my friend.

He betrayed me to the KGB.

And that explains why I could never get any of the Russians to go out with me because they knew I was nothing but trouble.

So, in essence, you couldn't deal with Russians anywhere, in any part of the world.

Well, they knew better than to get close to me because each Russian residentura has a line KR, their counterintelligence guy. I'm sure they said stay away from Lawler. I was getting really close to one Russian when we were in Scandinavia. I kept bugging him to go out to lunch with me.

A few weeks after I was attempting to do that, another large Russian came up to me at a cocktail party and he kind of leaned in and he just casually mentioned that they knew where my children went to school. Would you like somebody to say that? I mean, basically, the fuckhead was he was threatening my family. And I said, “just leave my family out of this”. But they were giving me a warning to stay away from their people, you know, by saying, we know that your children go to the French school, which they did. And I thought, you know, “asshole”. I reported it, you know.

Until you switched to WMDs, would you say that you went through a process of being a little bit scared about the first time you tried to recruit someone, then gaining confidence, getting more excited, getting to like the game, the challenge of reading people's minds and making them do things they wouldn't normally do?

Absolutely. You get more and more used to it. Just like, you know, nowadays you're a journalist. I'm sure the first time you contacted a potential source, you got butterflies in your stomach and you're thinking, “okay, how do I persuade this person to give me some really juicy information?” And it's very similar. In fact, our two professions of intelligence officer and journalist are very similar. A lot of journalists become intelligence officers because they know how to approach sources. They know how to write well. They know how to communicate well. And that's exactly a lot of the same.

How to protect sources.

How to protect sources. Exactly. When you get a really good source and you write a really good story, it makes you feel good. Well, the same thing for me. If I recruit a really good source and I write something, write an intelligence report that makes a difference in national security, it really makes you feel good. You get that rush because nobody else got this. You're the one who first got the information. And that to me is the same kind of endorphin kick that a good journalist gets. They get a good source. They get a wonderful story.

You mentioned writing reports and - a lot of people don't know this - but a lot of your time as an intelligence officer is spent writing reports that are going to be read by the higher ups. So, you must get to the point and analyze the situation and inform the people above you whether it's the chief of station or the people in headquarters about what's going on.

Oh, absolutely. In fact, I mean, if you don't write reports, what's the point of recruiting a spy? Anytime you have an intelligence operation, the weakest part is communications. And if you don't have communications between you and your spy, your asset, you don't have an operation. But it's worthless if you don't report the information to headquarters. And then, you know, we have analysts that then write these things up for either the National Security Council or for the President or whomever. And so, there's no point in running the operation if you don't produce any written intelligence.

Talking about Russians. One of your colleagues whom I spoke to a few weeks ago… I told him I was going to interview you. He said, “oh, he's our Victor Cherkashin”. [And for those who don't know, Victor Cherkashin is a former KGB colonel who recruited both Aldrich Ames from the CIA and Robert Hanssen from the FBI]. A legend. So, knowing you, I know that you are a low-key guy, you're not the kind of guy who boasts about things. But what do you have to say to that?

Well, I take that as a real compliment whoever said that about me, because I have only the greatest respect for Victor Cherkashin. Like you said, he was the KGB colonel who basically handled both Ames and Hanssen. He was a brilliant Russian KGB officer. And I still quote him occasionally because he made the point that “it takes a spy to basically find a spy”. In other words, you must recruit a spy to find a spy. You know, the reason we're able to catch spies is because we recruit a spy on the other side. And he saw that because if you look at the two cases he handled, Ames and Hanssen, they [exposed] a lot of the Russians who were working for us.

Well, the Russians may not have found out who was working for us, had it not been for Cherkashin handling Hanssen and Ames. And so, I take it as a high compliment. And a lot of the counterintelligence things that we use are worthless. We really need a guy on the other side who says, “okay, your side has a problem and here's the problem's name, or here's what I know about the problem”, which allows us to narrow down, you know, who the suspects are.

I'm going to give you another compliment because as it happens, I've read Ursula Wilder's, one of the CIA’s most prominent clinical psychologists, original report [The Psychology of Espionage, 2003]. It's now been republished, partly redacted. A lot of the things that she's written about in her original 2003 paper echo what you tell me. And I wonder, did you ever feel that this kind of work, recruiting people, persuading people to betray their country, was kind of inherent in you, in terms of how you approach this, like you were meant to do that? Did you ever feel like this?

Well, came into this profession almost by accident, but I've always had the ability to communicate with people. And I have the greatest respect for Ursula Wilder. Strangely enough, I've never physically met the woman, but I know two of my very good friends, Dr. Kenneth Dekleva and Dr. David Charney, both of whom are forensic psychiatrists and both of whom are experts in the motivations for espionage. They have a lot of respect for Ursula Wilder. At some time, I really should meet the woman. But I think if I had not been a CIA case officer, I would have loved to have been either a psychologist or a psychiatrist, because I'm fascinated with the infinite variety of human motivations and human condition. And I think frequently I acted almost as a therapist for my assets. I had one asset once tell me, “Jim, when you're talking to me, it's as if my brain is in a warm waterbed”.

And so, I relaxed them. I got them to tell me everything that, you know, things they wouldn't tell their best friend or their spouse. And they also realized that I was not going to be judgmental and that I was never going to hurt them, that they could trust me. And so, I think I use a lot of the same techniques that my psychiatrist and psychologist friends use. But it just comes natural to me. I think one of my real rules in life is the golden rule that I treat other people as I would like them to treat me. And that comes across as sincere. And so, people do treat me.

Yeah, you can't fake that. That's true. While you were in the business of recruiting people for the agency you were always under diplomatic cover. Is that correct?

That's correct. Well, actually, 95% of the time. Occasionally, I would use commercial cover and an alias. I'd pose as a businessperson or something like that. But most of the time, I was under State Department cover, yes.

But when you didn't have a diplomatic passport, were you ever scared that something might happen, did it cross your mind? Because it's not for the faint of heart, right?

I think most case officers are basically adrenaline junkies. We like the thrill. If there was no thrill to it, it wouldn't be any fun. You know, if there was no risk to it. So having that extra little risk factor, I mean, I'm breaking people's laws. A lot of times, the countries I have been to, I was breaking their law by committing espionage or recruiting their people or something like that.

But it was the risk. The risk is what made it fun. And then figuring it out, how do I get to this person? How do I run this operation? Being resourceful, being creative, all of that, it was something that gave me a real thrill. So, I ever scared? No, not really. I mean, maybe I was being naive, but I wasn't particularly scared.

I mean, admittedly, I was rarely in an area that was dangerous or a war zone. Some of my colleagues risked their lives and have lost their lives in war zones. But, you know, typically I was going after, you know, white collar people that were in the same socioeconomic class as I was, persuading them to betray their countries and to commit espionage.

When you get there, when the show starts, the fear goes away and suddenly you feel like some sort of calmness in your mind, like you're in the zone or something. I don't know if that makes sense.

No, it does make sense. You become very focused. And whenever I was traveling to some of these countries in an operation, people have asked me if I went sightseeing or something. I said, “I'm not there to go sightseeing”. When I'm there in a country running an op, I'm not there to go sightseeing. I'm 100% focused on either going after somebody or meeting somebody, doing some operation, but you get in the zone or in the flow and then your nerves, you overcome that.

Right, and adrenaline is the most potent of substances.

Absolutely.

So, let's switch gears: How did you get involved with WMDs?

Well, I was posted to Switzerland and Switzerland has some of the best high technology in the world and it became apparent that some of the countries like Iran and Syria and some other countries were trying to get that high technology to either develop nuclear weapons programs or biological weapons programs. So, I started running a lot of operations against proliferators, people who were selling this high technology to countries like Iran and Syria.

And I had a lot of motivation to do this because I remembered reading a book when I was like about 14 years old called Hiroshima. And Hiroshima described the effects of the first atomic bomb. It was written by John Hersey, and it scared me because it totally obliterated the city, killed 140,000 people, and it cast shadows on a wall of three people who were basically in essence just disintegrated. It always stayed with me.

It motivated me to work against these countries that wanted to develop nuclear weapons. And I'm not against nuclear disarmament across the board because if the United States were to suddenly disarm, I guarantee you Russia and China would take advantage of it. But I largely abhor nuclear weapons. If I could push a button and every nuclear weapon on earth would disappear, I would do it. But that's not going to happen. So, I found a lot of motivation in working against WMD programs.

When you say WMDs, you not only mean nuclear weapons, but you also refer to nerve agents or other kinds of...

Biological weapons. Yeah, yeah. Chemical weapons are more weapons of local area destruction. They're not going to spread like biological weapons. But biological weapons are in many respects even scarier than nuclear weapons. Because for nuclear weapons, you always need either uranium 235 or plutonium 239, fissile material.

And a delivery device.

Right, right. And you need a lot of technology. But a biological weapon, the knowledge is really out there. And even somebody in a lab could develop a fairly effective biological weapon. We were all, the whole planet was a victim of a biological weapon when COVID hit.

I mean, that was in essence kind of a biological weapon. And you saw the millions of people that died and all the destruction that caused.

That's something to think about in the future because if you can create something like COVID, you can do worse things in the future as technology advances and AI gives you the tools to perform better research.

Right. I mean, with AI, AI could develop a deadly pathogen that we can't even dream of. So, it's very scary.

You did this kind of work, WMDs from 1994 until you retired, Jim?

Yes, that's correct. Well, actually, against WMDs from about [19]91 until I retired in 2005. Yes.

When was the first time that you became aware of the A.Q. Khan Network, the infamous Pakistani nuclear physicist who gave Pakistan the atomic bomb and proliferated the technology to other countries as well?

Well, he was known to the intelligence community as basically making possible Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

But what we didn't know until my team discovered it was that Dr. Khan took proliferation private.

So, when he offered to equip Libya with a nuclear weapons program, that did not involve the Pakistani government. It was strictly Dr. Khan and his network. He basically took proliferation private for money. And he was going to equip Muammar Gaddafi with a turn-key nuclear weapons program. He had the diagrams and everything. And my team discovered what he was doing. And then we ultimately brought him down and stopped it.

So, not only did you stop him potentially delivering a nuclear weapon capability to Gaddafi, but to other countries as well, even though those countries moved on and he found other sources to sell his services to. I believe he was involved in the North Korean program and the Iranian program early on. Is that correct?

That's correct. That is correct. He was a very dangerous man. And whatever North Korea and whatever Iran has, [it] has its roots and assistance that they got from Dr. Khan. Yes.

This enters into classified territory. I'm not going to say or ask anything more about it. The story has been written. Praise has been given, deservedly so, to you and your team. You've been honored with the CIA's highest award, you and your team, the Trailblazer Award in 2007. And Director Tenet also gave you some very rare praise. How do you feel about that, by the way?

Well, I had a very good team working with me and for me. And I, no, I felt really good about it. It's just like when a journalist wins the Pulitzer Prize, you know, you're out there, you're developing your sources, you write a really great story. And I was fortunate; I was very fortunate. And I had a lot of support from the Seventh Floor, from Director Tenet. He was wonderful, best CIA director I ever worked for.

And he gave me a lot of leeway, a lot of room, and let me run that operation until we finally were able to bring these people down. And I think one of the nicest things I heard was a few years later after I'd retired, and it was during when Muammar Qaddafi was being overthrown in Libya. I think that was around 2012. One of the analysts came to me and he said, “Jim, did you ever think about the fact that if you had not stopped Muammar Qaddafi from having nuclear weapons, he would have used those on his own people and possibly against European countries as well as a diversion”.

And, you know, the weapon he had or wanted, the weapon he was going to develop that the A.Q. Khan network was giving him was the same yield as Little Boy that destroyed Hiroshima and killed 140,000 people. So, it was a proven weapon. The Pakistanis had tested it. It was a proven design. It would have worked. And I had not thought about that. So, when I feel good about that, I say this is psychologically righteous to stop a madman or some rogue country from having nuclear weapons. And that made me feel good. Yeah, it does make me feel good.

What can you tell us about the photo with you sitting on $1 billion in gold bullion.

I was posted to Switzerland. I was running a lot of things. I had some top-level contacts in some of the major Swiss banks. And one of my best contacts once asked me if there was anything, this is like two weeks before I was to leave, he says, “is there anything you haven't done in Switzerland yet that you would like to do?” And I said, “I would like to sit on a fortune of gold and have a cigar in my hands. And I'm going to put a put a caption that says, hell, I own this town”.

And the guy started laughing and he said, “I can make this happen”. And so, a few days later I was invited to visit this vault in which there were not billions, but trillions of dollars of gold. It's deep in the Alps. And I am sitting on one billion dollars in gold bullion. This gold bullion is what they call four nines pure, meaning it's nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine parts out of ten thousand pure gold. And so, the picture is me sitting on one billion dollars in gold. Recently I recalculated the value of the gold that I'm sitting on. And, you know, gold has appreciated in value. Well, today it would be worth twelve billion dollars. So, the picture is me sitting on twelve billion dollars in gold.

I'm going to ask you about what the former Deputy Director of Operations, Jack Devine, said. I don't recall exactly when that was, maybe 2016, 2015, somewhere in Europe. And I didn't know him back then. And for those who don't know who Jack Devine is, they should go to Amazon and have a look at a couple of his books. Anyway, he said that technology will never replace a human asset, mark my words. Do you think this is still valid? Because he said that before AI was a thing and all of that.

I agree with Jack. I have a lot of respect for Jack. He was [CIA] Chief of Station in London when I was running my AQ Khan operation.

I wasn't going to reveal that because I thought it was still classified. (laughter)

Okay. I said it. I mean, he was chief in London. I think it's a well-known fact that we have very close relations with the British. But yes, I agree with that. In fact, about six months ago, I had a professor from Stanford University and a retired military, retired army general, ask me how AI would affect human recruiting.

And I said, “I thought that AI would be a wonderful targeting mechanism. If we could scoop up everything that is out there about somebody, their financial things, their employment records, their mental health records. If you had an AI tool that could suck all of that up and combine it with all our classified holdings, it could then suggest certain routes, certain ways that a case officer could go and make a recruitment pitch”.

The targeting officers would have to put it together and use the AI. But it would be, you're not going to see the AI tool or the AI pitch somebody. That requires a human case officer looking into the eyes of their target and then using the route, perhaps, that the AI tool has suggested. So, it would make targeting much more comprehensive if I know everything there is to know or everything that's out there about somebody

It gives you an edge.

Oh, a huge edge, huge, huge advantage. So yes, I see that helping, but Jack is right that technology is not going to replace a human. You need humans. And that also goes for the spies we recruit. If I recruit a spy, I can then know what the plans and intentions are, which may or may not be in their cyber networks or anything else. Or they could have plans that they know they really can't do, but they've written this plan just to satisfy their leadership as an aspiration, even if it's impossible.

I've written about that on The Cipher Brief, about HUMINT: if you don't have the capability, for example, to be inside the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, you can't know when something is going to happen. You need to know when President Xi is going to say, “okay, tomorrow we invade Taiwan at 06:00 hours”. You need someone to tell you in code or through a burst transmission or whatever, it's happening tomorrow at 6 AM or whatever.

That's exactly right.

That's exactly right. Yeah.

The human to me, human sources, sure. Cyber sources, SIGINT sources, overhead [IMINT] sources, those are all good. They're all what I call a blended operation. When I was running my A.Q. Khan operation, I had human assets, I had cyber assets, I had overhead, I had all these things. It was like being a conductor at a symphony. You have the brass, you have the woodwinds, you have the orchestra, the chorus. You have all these things, and you must know when to blend in the different parts.

Last questions. First, are we going to see a fourth book soon?

Yes. Yes. I'm working on one right now with a very talented co-author named Johanna McCloy. Her father was a deep cover, what we call a NOC, a non-official cover officer [see Valerie Plame as an example]. She's the daughter of a NOC. We are writing it, we are alternating chapters to where I write my part from the point of view of a retired NOC officer, even though I wasn't a NOC, I was a handler. She writes it from the point of view of being a NOC's daughter. It's about this NOC. He's retired now for about a year and a half. He had some operations that never came to fruition the way he thought, and he calls them his loose threads. Well, suddenly the loose threads start to come together again, and it puts him and his daughter in great danger.

Sounds very interesting. I'm looking forward to that. I assume that by writing novels you don't miss the game much nowadays, do you?

Well, it's a substitute for the game. It's not as much fun, but that's one reason why I do it because I can't go out and recruit spies anymore, so I tell spy stories and create spy stories and delve into human motivations.

Exactly, and you educate people. When someone sees your resume, you've educated officers from almost every agency and every department that matters in the United States about this business. So, it's what you leave behind that matters.

I agree. I have a lot of students that still contact me and talk to me. I have taught thousands of people in CIA, DIA, FBI, Department of Defense, and I get a lot of satisfaction from doing that, and I still mentor a lot of young people who want to go into the intelligence community.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 08 Sep 2026 18:07:14 +0100 FirstHandNews
The AI We Cannot Deploy — And What Is at Stake https://belimedia.com.ng/the-ai-we-cannot-deploy-and-what-is-at-stake https://belimedia.com.ng/the-ai-we-cannot-deploy-and-what-is-at-stake Last week, I argued in these pages that the United States is buying an army it cannot command — writing procurement checks at a scale its adversaries cannot match, without writing the doctrine or arbitration to decide how the capability behind those checks gets used. Not everyone agreed. The sharpest pushback came from readers with institutional equity in the current procurement path — those with the most to lose if the diagnosis is right. Fair question they kept asking: what is at stake if we get this wrong?

The answer arrived this week, and it is not what most observers are watching.

Beijing is pursuing a two-pronged strategy against the American artificial-intelligence industry, and neither prong depends on beating American laboratories on model capability. The first prong attacks the market instrument that finances the industry: paid enterprise access to closed frontier models at premium margins. The weapon is state-backed open-source saturation of the global developer market. When Chinese laboratories release high-performing models at zero marginal cost, the price American laboratories can charge collapses — and with it, the revenue that funds tens of billions in specialized compute committed to their pipelines.

The second prong is architectural. American frontier laboratories run closed models in centralized data centers connected to their customers via fiber. The Pentagon has awarded contracts for missions that cannot use that architecture — drone swarms, autonomous undersea platforms, cognitive attack detection, and tactical multi-sensor fusion. Consider a drone swarm over the Taiwan Strait that must identify and engage a hostile target in seconds. It cannot query a compute cluster in Virginia and get an answer in time. The bandwidth needed in a denied, degraded, intermittent, or limited spectrum environment is unavailable. Chinese research has shifted toward Large Concept Models — smaller, edge-resident, multi-sensor — that run on the platform and fuse light-detection-and-ranging, radiofrequency, electro-optical and infrared, and acoustic inputs at the edge, without a network dependency an adversary can touch.

This is not a theoretical architecture. Ukraine is running it now. Ukrainian drone units operate with organic, edge-resident targeting within seconds of adversary contact, without a reliable network back to headquarters. Ukrainian schools graduate thousands of drone specialists each year. The country teaching NATO the most about the next fight is doing so in the register the American AI stack cannot yet operate in. The contracts are being placed. The integration doctrine has not yet been written.

Beijing has run this playbook before. Western economies depend on China for rare-earth and critical-minerals processing — the industry that supplies permanent magnets, batteries, and defense electronics. Every F-35 electric-actuation system, every Virginia-class submarine drivetrain, and every Patriot interceptor guidance package relies on rare-earth processing capacity the United States cannot reconstitute within a decade. That capacity was lost not because the deposits lie under Chinese soil but because Beijing sustained state-subsidized processing for twenty years at prices that broke the private-sector cost of capital in every alternative jurisdiction. Open-source artificial intelligence is the same instrument, aimed at a different substrate.

What is at stake?

First, America's most consequential capital-expenditure cycle. Roughly $400 billion a year in AI infrastructure is financed against a revenue model an opposing state has organized its economy to defeat. If that model breaks on Beijing's timeline, the compute pipelines carrying a meaningful share of American growth do not close.

Second, Pentagon operational readiness. Contracts placed today for missions the Pentagon needs to field in three to five years cannot be executed by an AI stack designed for centralized data centers. Platforms that cannot operate in a multidomain and joint-force environment at wartime tempo are not a deterrent. They are procurement projects.

Third, alliance credibility. Sovereign AI programs in Korea, Japan, and the Gulf price today against the American premium-margin model. If it breaks, those programs re-price against Chinese open-weight tooling, and the alliance's technological dependency structure shifts.

Fourth, deterrence. The Taiwan Strait scenario is not theoretical. The platforms that would decide it are being contracted for now, on an architecture that cannot execute the mission at wartime tempo.

What needs to happen requires an integration authority the American sovereign apparatus does not yet exercise. Two responses.

A state-capacity capital response to the first prong. Some form of federal instrument that bridges the compute-to-market pipeline so a Chinese-organized collapse in AI pricing does not take the compute build-out with it. Export-import financing, defense production authorities, and strategic stockpiles are the precedent. No current U.S. government office owns this problem.

A Pentagon-led investment in a distributed inference substrate — the shape of what the Joint Fires Network concept was originally designed to be. Edge-native, platform-resident, multi-sensor, doctrinally integrated. This is procurement of an integration architecture as much as procurement of a technology. The Pentagon has placed the contracts for the platforms. It has not placed the contract for the integration.

Last week I wrote that America is buying an army it cannot command. The diagnosis has evolved: America is also buying an artificial intelligence it cannot deploy. Ukraine is teaching the doctrine the American AI stack has not been designed to run. Beijing is engineering the collapse of the revenue model that stack is financed against.

Coordination assigns. Integration arbitrates. What is at stake is whether the American sovereign apparatus can find the integrator — for the capital response and the operational doctrine — before the platforms the Pentagon is buying arrive without an architecture capable of commanding them.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 08 Sep 2026 18:07:14 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Growing Cost of Keeping U.S. Submarines Idle https://belimedia.com.ng/the-growing-cost-of-keeping-us-submarines-idle https://belimedia.com.ng/the-growing-cost-of-keeping-us-submarines-idle “Inactive idle time describes when a [U.S. Navy] attack submarine designated for decommissioning cannot be inducted into a dry dock in a shipyard. As a result, the submarine and its crew must remain pier-side until a shipyard has the capacity in a dry dock to defuel their nuclear reactor.”

That’s a quote from a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released last Thursday titled, Actions Needed to Address Costly Attack Submarine Maintenance Challenges, which describes lost operational days for the Navy’s 44 nuclear attack submarines (20 Los Angeles class and 24 Virginia class), including those spent awaiting depot maintenance or what’s called active idle time.

The Navy, according to the GAO report, said that as of fiscal year 2025, its 44 attack submarines “provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected and attack enemy targets, among other missions. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most requested assets by the global combatant commanders.”

However, the GAO found, “Over the last 10 years, the U.S. Navy has lost more than 15,000 operational days due to maintenance delays and idle time on active attack submarines. These delays resulted in an estimated $3.4 billion in costs to sustain crews and submarines that provided no operational capability.”

Along with the inactive idle time illustrated earlier, active idle time is a period when an attack submarine and its crew must remain pier-side because they cannot be taken in by a shipyard for maintenance and are no longer certified to conduct normal underwater operations.

Attack submarines follow the Fleet Response Training Plan which calls for a 12-month training and then a complex certification process that leads to deployment. Deployments are normally six months, although one could be longer, but the result is generally an 18-month cycle.

Thereafter, a nuclear attack sub goes through three or four operational cycles – around six years of operations – before the next major overhaul.

“From fiscal years 2016 through 2025, “ the GAO report said, “the U.S. Navy incurred 8,906 days of active idle time for active attack submarines, hitting its peak in fiscal year 2022 with 1,518 days. Since this peak, the U.S. Navy reduced active idle time to 166 days in fiscal year 2025.”

From fiscal years 2021 through 2025, according to the GAO report, the average depot-level maintenance period was 809 days. “Further, the U.S. Navy only completed about 11 percent of attack submarine depot maintenance on time at the public shipyards, from fiscal years 2016 through 2025,” the GAO report added.

For Los Angeles-class subs, active idle time is costing almost $220,000 per day for the entire group. For the Virginia-class, that figure is more than $237,000 per day.

Los Angeles class attack submarines have an expected life of 30 to 33 years, while the planned life for the newer Virginia class is 33 years.

According to the GAO, only U.S. public naval shipyards -- Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard -- provide depot maintenance for attack submarines, along with two private shipyards -- General Dynamics Electric Boat at Groton, Connecticut and Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding at Newport News, Virginia.

Inactive idle time for older Los Angeles class attack submarines is a growing problem.

This period, when an attack submarine designated for decommissioning cannot be taken into a dry dock in a qualified shipyard, requires that its crew must remain pier-side, according to the GAO report. That’s because “those required to maintain and supervise the nuclear reactor…must wait until a shipyard has the capacity in a dry dock to defuel their nuclear reactor,” the report said.

The decommissioning attack submarines “take limited dry dock space away from the operational fleet,” the GAO said, but added, “For most fiscal years prior [to 2025], one or two attack submarines entered inactive idle time each year. However, without mitigation, the U.S. Navy projects a significant increase of inactive idle time through fiscal year 2030.”

In fact, over the past five fiscal years, the Navy has had seven attack submarines waiting to decommission and has “incurred 2,216 days of idle time resulting in more than $480 million in operating and support costs,” according to the GAO.

“As of January 2026,” the GAO report added, “without mitigation, the U.S. Navy projects that 15 more attack submarines and their crews will enter inactive idle time from fiscal years 2026 through 2030.” That could see the Navy incurring “more than 14,000 days of inactive idle time and $3.1 billion in operating and support costs, according to our [GAO] analysis.”

Perhaps the worst example of inactive idle time, according to the GAO report, is the Los Angeles-class submarine USS Pasadena, which became inactive in January 2025, but is not expected to enter Norfolk Naval Shipyard for decommissioning until November 2028.

During this inactive idle time, which could run nearly four years, the Pasadena remains fully crewed and is being utilized by the Navy as a training platform. The inactive Pasadena has also been used in videos – in November 2024 for a promotional video for the 2024 Army-Navy Game, and in February 2025 for the Netflix TV series The Recruit.

A small group from the Pasadena crew remains on the submarine at all times to monitor security, nuclear reactor status, and safety systems. These crew members sleep in the submarine's cramped quarters during their off-watch hours, while on duty. The remainder of off-duty crew members may live on a tender ship, a submarine base barracks, or at their own off-base homes rather than on the submarine.

According to the GAO, the Navy “has not fully evaluated or established plans for implementing…alternative options for decommissioning attack submarines more efficiently and optimizing shipyard capacity for the operational fleet.”

For example, what about pier-side nuclear reactor defueling of inactive attack submarines which would not require now-limited dry dock space?

According to the GAO, “Navy officials stated pier-side defueling of the Los Angeles-class attack submarine nuclear reactors is not cost effective,” but those “officials were unable to provide documentation of detailed analyses conducted on the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of this option.” However, pier-side defueling is under study when it comes to the new Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarines, according to the GAO.

Another defueling option would be using floating dry docks, which the Navy officials told the GAO “requires additional study.”

Also under study by the Navy is to release a portion of the inactive attack submarine crew back to the operational fleet “over three phases: (1) the first month during system turnover to the public shipyard; (2) the first 6 months when idle conditions begin; and (3) nuclear reactor defueling once a dry dock is available.”

This approach has been used for two out of 18 Los Angeles-class subs set for decommissioning between 2014 and 2025, and, according to Navy officials, only “a limited number of attack submarines are planned to use this construct in the next five years.”

Asked why, “Navy officials cited public shipyard pier capacity constraints,” but again “did not provide documentation on any analyses conducted to reach this conclusion,” according to the GAO.

The Navy is studying whether the service life of two of its attack submarines by shifting, shortening or removing idle times. “As of September 2025, the U.S. Navy projected that it can reduce inactive idle time by 1,715 days for fiscal years 2026 through 2029 for [these] two attack submarines. However, these service life extensions are still pending approval,” the GAO said.

The GAO after this study concluded in its report, “While the U.S. Navy has recently made some progress in reducing attack submarine active idle time, inactive idle time has grown and will continue to grow with the impending wave of Los Angeles-class inactivations over the next 5 years.”

It then recommended the obvious: “The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations directs the Naval Sea Systems Command to fully evaluate alternative options for decommissioning attack submarines more efficiently to optimize shipyard capacity for the operational fleet. Such options may include, but are not limited to, defueling outside of dry docks and reducing crewing for attack submarines awaiting decommissioning.”

I agree.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Sun, 06 Sep 2026 15:27:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
America Is Buying an Army It Cannot Command https://belimedia.com.ng/america-is-buying-an-army-it-cannot-command https://belimedia.com.ng/america-is-buying-an-army-it-cannot-command The U.S. Army has committed to a million small drones by 2028. The Department of Defense has not decided who will authorize how they fire.

That is not a materiel gap. The volume is on order; Nvidia’s latest earnings guidance says the compute to run it is on the way. It is a governance gap, and it is now the single largest exposure in the American national security posture entering the fourth quarter of 2026.

Consider what landed inside a seventy-two-hour window this week. On Tuesday, Nvidia posted $96.2 billion in second-quarter revenue, with $89 billion of it in the data-center segment and guided to $108 billion in the September quarter — an annualized run rate through American hyperscalers of more than $400 billion, the largest defense-adjacent capital cycle in modern history. The same day, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and RTX filed their responses to the Deputy Defense Secretary’s twenty-one-day production ultimatum on accelerated interceptor delivery. Nine days earlier, the Pentagon had opened the vendor portal for the $185 billion Golden Dome missile-defense program.

The chips are being funded. The primes are being pushed. The perimeter is being paid for. None of it tells you who decides when a fielded drone force pushes beyond its vendor’s safety rails during a live engagement.

That is not a hypothetical. Since March, the Department of Defense has formally designated Anthropic — the American AI lab whose Claude model is in active use within U.S. Defense environments — a “supply chain risk.” The two sides opened arguments in DC court over the blacklisting on May 19. In May, the Department expanded its classified AI work to eight companies, explicitly excluding Anthropic. On February 28, OpenAI took the other side of the same question, signing a deal to run its models on a Pentagon classified network. The day before, more than 580 Google employees, including DeepMind researchers, signed an open letter urging Google’s CEO to refuse the same kind of arrangement.

The industrial base of American artificial intelligence is not aligned on whether it will perform the classified work the drone doctrine assumes. The Pentagon’s response has been to fund compute, sign one lab, blacklist a second, and litigate.

Picture April 2027. A deployed American drone force is airborne over a contested Indo-Pacific corridor. A vendor safety guardrail on the targeting AI refuses a strike within a sixty-second window. The commander needs an override. No office at the Department of Defense — including the Chief Digital and AI Officer — holds explicit arbitration authority between the vendor’s guardrail and the commander’s judgment at operational tempo. The decision will be made ad hoc, by whichever lawyer or flag officer picks up the phone.

That is the arbitration gap. It is not the debt-service bill. It is not the interceptor shortfall. It is not even the shipbuilding backlog. It is the fact that the United States is standing up the largest defense-adjacent capital cycle in modern history — Golden Dome’s $185 billion, a million-drone target by 2028, and $1 billion for 340,000 attritable systems by 2027 — with no institutional authority designated to arbitrate how any of it fires. It is a supervisory function no institution has yet been chartered to perform, and no doctrine has yet been written to describe it.

Beijing runs the inverse problem. Paul Scharre laid out the industrial-base half of this argument in “Losing the War of the Future,” published in Foreign Affairs on June 23. What his piece understates is the demand side: even if the United States builds the drones, the doctrine and civil-military arbitration required to employ them do not yet exist at scale. The People’s Liberation Army’s answer is on the record. Three PLA researchers — Lieutenant Colonels Li Hengrui and Wang Haiyuan and Senior Colonel Cheng Jinming — published “all-domain megacity incapacitation warfare” in Military Art, the Central Military Commission’s restricted journal, in March 2025. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Andrew Wang brought the article into the English-language conversation this summer in “Total War on Taipei,” published in War on the Rocks. The concept identifies the operational meaning of Xi Jinping’s “national total war” as an integrated arbitration architecture that fuses military, civilian, media, and party assets under a single narrative apparatus.

The PLA may struggle to execute it. The Central Military Commission, which began this term with seven members, has been reduced to two, hollowed out by disciplinary investigations. But the design is on the page. The American design is not.

Three signals will indicate by year-end whether the gap is closing or widening.

First, does the CDAO’s office designate a named override authority for wartime AI lab guardrails? Second, is the Anthropic-DoD blacklisting resolved into a joint framework for classified use, or does the litigation calcify? Third, does the FY27 defense-authorization conference name a joint force to operate Golden Dome, or fund the program without operator language? As of this week, all three are moving the wrong way.

The next war will not be lost because America bought the wrong drone. It will be lost because America bought the right one and never decided who could tell it to fire.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 06 Sep 2026 15:27:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Vatican’s Quiet Intelligence Diplomacy https://belimedia.com.ng/the-vaticans-quiet-intelligence-diplomacy https://belimedia.com.ng/the-vaticans-quiet-intelligence-diplomacy Last week all eyes were focused on the secret, first-ever trip of CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow, flying on a C-17 Globemaster (the modern version of the C-141 Starlifter, which CIA Director William Casey used to travel on during his overseas trips during the Reagan administration), where he met with his Russian intelligence counterparts, and where, according to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, “of course, President Putin [was] informed of everything.” Media reports noted that Ratcliffe discussed warnings to Russia regarding its threats toward NATO members. In this sense, Ratcliffe’s trip bore similarity to then CIA Director William Burns’ November 2021 trip to Moscow, in which he warned President Putin not to invade Ukraine. Ratcliffe’s recent trip to Moscow (as well as his trip earlier this year to Havana, where he met with senior Cuban officials) like that of his predecessor William Burns, highlights a tradition of American reliance upon ‘intelligence diplomacy,’ which can serve to reassure both allies and adversaries of America’s that today’s complex wars and conflicts – Iran, Ukraine, Gaza, and others – require the sophisticated use of professional diplomats and intelligence officers at the highest levels.

What many observers missed, and which media coverage of Ratcliffe’s trip overshadowed, was the Vatican visit to Moscow by Archbishop Paul Gallagher, the second-highest ranking Vatican diplomat and Secretary for Relations with States and International Organizations, who met with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, senior national security advisor Yuri Ushakov (also a former Russian Ambassador to the US), a senior representative of the Patriarchate of Russia’s Orthodox Church, and with local Catholics. At a news conference with Lavrov, Archbishop Gallagher (who bears a striking resemblance to Cardinal Kevin Kearns in the famed TV series ‘Blue Bloods’) recalled Pope Leo XIV’s appeal to end hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, and that they might begin “genuine negotiations” with the support of the Holy See and the international community. He proceeded to emphatically state (in Russia, where calling its’ ‘special military operation’ a ‘war’ can lead to a prison sentence), “to be clear, this war must end.” He also stated, “the Holy See will continue to provide strong spiritual, diplomatic, and humanitarian support by contributing to and offering a space for dialogue.” This trip followed Gallagher’s earlier trip this year to Kyiv, where he had met with Ukrainian President Zelensky, as well as other trips to Moscow – and Pope Leo IV’s three prior meetings with President Zelensky during 2025, and the dispatch of Cardinal Matteo Zuppi to Moscow to deal with humanitarian efforts.

Archbishop Gallagher’s visit to Moscow recalls past Vatican diplomatic initiatives such as the late Pope John Paul II’s ‘Holy Alliance’ during the Reagan administration to help defeat the USSR in the Cold War, as well as the late Pope Francis’ involvement in facilitating restoration of diplomatic relations between America and Cuba in 2014. The Holy See has long been an exquisite purveyor of ‘intelligence diplomacy’ for many centuries, so this is hardly new.

What is new however, is Pope Leo XIV’s recent personal involvement in Vatican diplomacy, making it a cornerstone of his papal mission and gospel of peace - even so early in his papacy - as not only the Vicar of Christ, but as a true citizen of the world (https://www.thecipherbrief.com/pope-leo-xiv-a-citizen-of-the-world). In dispatching Archbishop Gallagher to Moscow – independently of CIA Director Ratcliffe’s secret trip – Pope Leo XIV is signaling to Russia (as well as other adversaries such as Iran and Cuba), that the Holy See can be a powerful, neutral, and moral force for peace in today’s complex world. It could be said that Pope Leo XIV, in doing so, has already begin to define his (and the Holy See’s) mission and his legacy in today’s papacy. Unlike other current purveyors of track 3 and other third-party diplomacy in today’s wars and conflicts – Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, Switzerland, Egypt, the UAE, and Oman come to mind – the Vatican is not beholden to traditional international relations or transactional interests. As was pointed out by a senior Vatican spokesperson (in response to US Ambassador Brian Burch’s NYT interview in July 2026), “any glorification or exaggeration of the Pope’s role as head of state … is therefore misleading because it comes at the expense of his one true mission as Universal Shepherd.”

The Vatican’s recent diplomacy in Moscow will be very closely watched by Iran. Pope Leo XIV has repeatedly called for peace in the Middle East, emphasizing diplomacy as the only solution to the US-Iran war. The Holy See and Iran have had close relations for decades, and during 2021, a senior Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Arafi met with the late Pope Francis in Rome. More recently, the Holy See gave a diplomatic award to Iran’s Ambassador to the Holy See, another signal of the value placed upon diplomacy. The Iranian government has surely considered Pope Leo XIV’s interest in inter-religious dialogue between Catholicism and Islam, noting that his first foreign trip was to Turkey. During the war, Iranian government officials have sent formal correspondence to Pope Leo XIV, requesting his intercession in stopping the war.

Since his return to the presidency in 2025, President Trump had hoped to – aided by his envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – spearhead his own personal, transactional, and aspirational diplomacy to end wars and conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and now, Iran. Given that these efforts have stalled, proving more difficult than President Trump had imagined, even sophisticated third parties – regarding the Iran war – have faltered, and President Trump has recently stated that negotiations with Iran are no longer occurring. The situation is similar in Ukraine, where negotiations between the warring parties are non-existent, while the risks of expanding conflict and casualties have expanded. In such circumstances, The Holy See’s outreach to Russia should surprise nobody, as it, like the rest of the world, can ill afford to wait for 2029, when a new US President is inaugurated. Nor should it surprise observers if Iran were to request that Archbishop Gallagher visit Tehran soon. But whom he would meet with as interlocutors would be very intriguing.

Lastly, Ukraine’s President Zelensky has already invited Pope Leo XIV to visit Kyiv. Doing so would – given the Vatican’s role as a neutral arbiter – necessitate, due to reciprocity, the Pope’s visit to Moscow. Such ‘intelligence diplomacy’ by Pope Leo XIV could help mediate an end to that long-standing, genocidal conflict, and provide Russia’s President Putin (and Russia) a diplomatic off-ramp and solution to a war that he started but appears unable to end. It’s a beautiful irony --- that of an American-born Pope, Christ’s Vicar, and a citizen of the world, inspiring others to hope and to make peace in the world’s most kinetic, unforgiving conflicts.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 06 Sep 2026 15:27:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
Blowing up Boats: The Numbing Effect of Repetitive Illegality https://belimedia.com.ng/blowing-up-boats-the-numbing-effect-of-repetitive-illegality https://belimedia.com.ng/blowing-up-boats-the-numbing-effect-of-repetitive-illegality Operation Southern Spear, the U.S. campaign against alleged drug trafficking small boats off the coast of several South American nations, continues unabated. But while both the public and politicians seem to have become numb to this campaign – or perhaps distracted by the seemingly endless Iran debacle - a few things have remained constant. First, U.S. military forces are killing boat crews without any effort to apprehend them. Second, this practice lacks, as it has from inception, any credible legal justification.

President Trump bragged that his administration has reduced by more than 90% illegal drug importation by sea. Like so many other bombastic or mendacious claims made by the President, there was no data or methodology provided to corroborate this alleged statistic, which is wildly exaggerated. What is more concrete is the human toll this ongoing campaign has inflicted to date. According to a recent report, at least 233 people have been killed in these strikes on 67 boats, all part of a campaign.

Even if the President’s exaggerated assertions of efficacy were accepted, and even assuming these attacks are coordinated with coastal countries like Ecuador, the inherent illegality is in no way altered. Why? Because interdicting the flow of illegal narcotics – even when the importation operation is controlled by criminal gangs – is not a war and does not justify invocation of wartime authority. It is, instead, a law enforcement problem. More specifically, the authority to attack ‘enemy’ personnel and resources with lethal combat power may be justifiably invoked only in situations of armed conflict. When the United States chose to address that problem through the lens of wartime attack authority, it forfeited any claim of legal justification.

The administration knows that, as a matter of international law, the United States may designate individuals as enemy belligerents and attack them with lethal combat power only in the context of an armed conflict. This is why from inception it has emphasized the gravity of harm to Americans resulting from illegal narcotics smuggled into the nation. Proponents of this campaign have emphasized that more Americans are killed every year by illegal drugs than were killed by the September 11th terrorist attacks. No one questions the tragic consequences of this problem. But every harm to the nation or its people does not ipso facto indicate the existence of an armed conflict. Instead, it is why and how that harm is inflicted that are decisive.

Thus, it is obvious why supporters of this campaign consistently claim the harm caused by illegal drugs means we are at war with drug traffickers: because they seek to justify invoking wartime authority to attack these boats and occupants. Doing so avoids the pesky challenge of apprehension and criminal prosecution – the normal and legally presumptive method for disabling criminal threats: the very modality used by the U.S. prior to this invalid assertion of armed conflict (and apparently one that was more effective). More fundamentally – and problematically – it seeks to validate what by any objective measure is the invalid campaign that is employs lethal force as a measure of first resort based not on the imminent threat posed by the target of attack, but instead on the assertion that target is a member of an enemy group.

The loss of 233 enemy combatants in a war – what international law calls an armed conflict – might be expected. Enemy casualties in the ongoing armed conflict with Iran are undoubtedly more substantial. But it is the context of armed conflict that makes such loss of life unremarkable. This is because in that context the customary international law principle of military necessity justifies targeting enemy personnel – members of the enemy organized armed group – with lethal force as a measure of first resort. And, unlike a law enforcement use of force, the objective of such attacks is not limited to eliminating an individual threat, but instead to bring about the submission of the enemy as a whole.

This is an exceptional use of force authority invoked by States precisely because armed conflict is considered an exceptional situation. Unlike peacetime, armed conflict involves a contest – hostilities – between the State and armed groups operating at the direction of enemy leadership. More fundamentally, the objective of that enemy group would have to be to inflict harm on the U.S. or its assets. It is that motive and conduct that distinguished the September 11th attacks from criminal gangs smuggling illegal drugs into the United States. Unlike al Qaeda, these groups do not operate with the objective of inflicting harm on the United States (it would be an odd drug dealer who wants to kill his customers) nor do they engage in hostile attacks against the U.S. or its interest abroad.

This is why State invocation of this exceptional power is supposed to be limited to situations of genuine threats to the nation from groups organized for that purpose. It is justified only when a state is challenged by the military forces of another state or by a non-state organized armed group capable of engaging in sustained combat operations. Absent such a situation, state security forces must respond to what is a criminal threat with law enforcement type rules for the use of force. Whether police, Coast Guard, or regular military forces are utilized, lethal force is justified only as a measure of last resort and only when reasonably assessed that the individual subjected to that use of force presents a threat of death or great bodily harm.

This binary use of force construct is reflected in ‘peacetime’ versus ‘wartime’ rules of engagement: use of force control measures utilized by U.S. commanders to align authority with mission requirements. During the many military operations outside the context of armed conflict – including military support to law enforcement – deadly force is authorized only in response to an actual or imminent deadly threat, the same use of force authority applicable to law enforcement officers. That means that it is the conduct of the ‘target’ offering a direct threat that triggers any use of deadly force in response. In contrast, wartime ROE authorize use of deadly force as a first resort against individuals identified as members of the enemy armed group (unless they have surrendered or been disabled by wounds or sickness). Unlike a conduct-based use of force decision, this authority is triggered by a determination of enemy status.

This shift in lethal force authority is perhaps the most significant consequence flowing from a situation of armed conflict. It is also why the existence of armed conflict is not left to arbitrary assertions but is based on widely accepted objective conditions – the so-called conflict classification test that looks at issues like the intensity of the violence, the degree of organization of the group and its ability to carry out sustained operations. That test is pragmatic and, as noted above, covers both state and non-state threats. But it is not so elastic as to allow a state to bypass the peacetime use of force constraints by simply characterizing a threat posed by criminals as an armed conflict.

Yet that is exactly what the U.S. has done to justify lethal targeting of small boats. These boats may indeed be trafficking in illegal narcotics, and the occupants may indeed be members of criminal syndicates or gangs (although there has been scant information provided to validate these claims). And those drugs may indeed be destined for the United States. But none of this indicates the existence of an armed conflict.

Sadly, the continuation of this campaign seems to have numbed the public and Member of Congress to the perpetuation of this illegality. Yet this is also a reminder of an historic legal maxim: the repetition of an illegal act shall not make it legal. When committed under the authority of the United States, it does, however, stain our national reputation and undermine our claim to stand for the rule of law.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 06 Sep 2026 15:27:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Cost of Squandering America’s Reputation https://belimedia.com.ng/the-cost-of-squandering-americas-reputation https://belimedia.com.ng/the-cost-of-squandering-americas-reputation Make no mistake: the United States is weaker today than it was yesterday, and the day before that.

Many of our closest allies have moved from fear to confused unease, to evasive dismissal and even defiance in their dealings with Washington. Regardless of how often President Trump claims that “the United States is more respected today than ever before,” the evidence points in the opposite direction.

We are seeing the steady and accelerating diminution of our reputation as “the shining city on the hill,” by an administration that clearly values what it can do over what it should do. When “we have the right” or “I can do whatever I want” supersedes “we have the responsibility to…,” something has gone terribly wrong. This applies both in domestic and foreign affairs.

A reputation is painstakingly difficult to build and very easy to lose, especially in foreign policy. This is particularly true for a superpower like the United States, which is involved in so many issues and hotspots worldwide: sometimes invited, sometimes not, and often at odds with the interests of local players. Even when we stumble – think Iraq – we have usually been able to draw upon a relatively deep reservoir of goodwill, a kind of accumulated equity, based on the understanding by many that our intentions, at least, were good. Or at least not bad. That reservoir has pulled us through several unpleasant situations. It appears the U.S. is no longer receiving this “benefit of the doubt.”

Let me be clear: any U.S. administration’s first duty is to protect and advance the interests of the American people.

But the current administration’s simple, albeit shortsighted, claim of promoting “America First” relies primarily on a toxic combination of instant gratification fortified by largely ego-driven, knee-jerk coercion. This reveals a stark misperception of how the United States came to be what it is today, fielding the most powerful military in history, with the largest, most vibrant, and influential economy in the world. This did not happen by accident, or through simply dominating and bullying others economically or militarily, either of which the U.S. can employ at any time; yes, there are exceptions, but they are exceptions considering the decades it took to get where we are. The United States’ unprecedented influence occurred through a carefully crafted and painstakingly curated long-term strategy of strategic cooperation and collaboration, and selective give and take.

Bottom line: The dirty little secret is that the policy of every U.S. administration has always been one of “America First.”

A Superpower in Transition

So how did we become the most powerful, wealthy nation on Earth? It’s simple. Well… not really all that simple. There are numerous factors beyond our military or our economy, some obvious, many nuanced. But we have an overriding advantage. One, as I point out, that the above strategy has consistently built upon for decades. It is real but also ephemeral: our reputation. This is not about anyone liking or following us on social media. Or simple, advantageous transactional dealings. It is about the raw strategic calculation that working with the U.S. is more likely to be in the overall interest of your country, its government, and people than not. A considerable amount of this is derived from the realization that, heretofore at least, the United States is not predatory or for sale. Not solely out for itself, and that under most circumstances, it will take into account the policies and interests of its partners, and sometimes even its enemies in its dealings.

This distinction matters because the issue is not whether America should pursue its own interests. It most certainly should and does. The question is whether it pursues those interests in a manner that preserves the hard-won trust, access, and cooperation that make American power truly effective, or in a way that burns through them for short-term advantage.

Our reputation has afforded the U.S. government and its representatives – of which I was one – a level of access, trust, and tacit consideration, among both friends and sometimes not-so-friends, that can be hard to quantify.

Reputation is not merely a sentimental asset. It is hard-nosed operational leverage. It determines whether allies will take political risks for us, whether partners move quickly when time matters, and whether adversaries believe our threats or assurances. Once that leverage erodes, or disappears altogether, every request becomes harder, slower, and more expensive.

I saw this firsthand. When I was the CIA Chief of Station (COS) in a certain Middle Eastern country, I received direction via a NIACT, or night action, cable from CIA headquarters in October 2001 to approach my local intelligence counterparts with an extremely urgent request. The U.S. needed a facility located in close proximity to Afghanistan from which it could operate armed and/or surveillance drones, a critical asset in the GWOT. With winter fast approaching, the location then being used would not allow for continued operations for much longer. My country’s leadership controlled a suitable facility. I was tasked with communicating the request and advising as soon as possible if permission was likely to be forthcoming, or if it would be necessary to look elsewhere.

I knew that this was a big ask. A Muslim country, the leadership was extremely sensitive to drawing the ire of Al Qaeda, and I knew this request would require consultation among multiple individuals at the very highest level. There was a process and protocol, and it was typically cumbersome. I immediately met with my primary intelligence liaison contact and laid out the details of the request to him, including its importance, asking that he bring this to the immediate attention of his superiors so it could be considered by the country’s leadership. I expected the process could take several days.

Later that same day, I received notification that the Director of the intelligence service would meet me that very evening (at the local horse racetrack).

When we met, I laid out the request in full. After a brief pause, he said, “Yes. You may use it for as long as you require.”

He asked for no payment or quid pro quo, simply that we “not publicize its use.”

Frankly, I was incredulous, expecting at best a hedge, or “we need time to consider this,” type of response. Common interest? Certainly. Common risk? Not so much. But then I realized that our reputation had tipped the balance, overriding any doubts or fears they might harbor, which they almost certainly did. It was the United States asking. And they were answering.

Iranian D-Day Sanctions

And now we have another big ask: Iran and the just announced D-Day sanctions regime. Washington is requiring that friends and allies endure considerable economic and potentially political pain, along with the not inconsiderable risk of military retaliation from the Iranian regime. And it is doing so after not bothering to consult with them before going to war with Iran, and then failing to protect them from Iranian counterstrikes.

But more important than asking our allies for help is expecting our strategic foes, China and Russia in particular, to ignore not only their own economic (Iranian oil for China) and military (Iranian cooperation against Ukraine) interests but to pass on an opportunity to diminish a strategic rival. For what? Promises of a great relationship with the President of the United States? Unlikely. This is a fallacy that President Trump has long touted: neither Putin nor Xi is a friend; rather, they are cynically leveraging the President’s legendary malleability for their own individual ends. Threats? Also, unlikely given the U.S.’s current weakness. In the end, what do we have to offer them? Little that I can discern. And what would they require in return? I shudder to think.

Lastly, the United States initiated hostilities against Iran without a clear understanding of its opponent or a coherent plan on how to win. Yet another significant blow to the reputation of the world’s preeminent superpower.

The success of economic sanctions on the scale Washington is proposing requires an impenetrable wall. Without active compliance from both China and Russia, it is virtually certain to fail.

The administration speaks about “quiet diplomacy”, but for its friends at least, it is clear they will not hesitate to employ coercion to convince those who hesitate to comply. This should not be necessary, but this is where our diminished reputation leaves us.

When Rhetoric Crashes on the Shores of Reality

The administration and Iran are once more engaged in the verbal back and forth of what I call hyperbolating. Claims by the U.S. of economic D-Day met with Iranian threats of defiance and retaliation. So far, mostly words. But concrete actions are sure to follow.

Given the U.S. Treasury Secretary’s claim that these so far undisclosed new sanctions will collapse Iran’s economy, they no doubt see this as a potential existential threat to the regime. And they should, given the United States’ economic reach. But Iran has built a ‘resistance economy’ for a reason: to absorb and deflect decades of sanctions aimed at cowing the Islamic regime. Previous efforts have met with occasional, partial success, but never enough to force genuine change inside Iran. Iran’s leadership no doubt realizes that the effectiveness of this latest U.S. sanctions regime will hinge on the active cooperation of Russia and China, and they have actual cards to play with each. The U.S., on the other hand, appears to have few, counting instead on goodwill mixed with threats, and a hefty dose of bravado.

In the end, it remains to be seen whether President Trump will stay the course in what is clearly a test of wills. If past is prologue, this is unlikely.

This article was originally published on Mark's Substack, you can find more of his writing here.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 06 Sep 2026 15:27:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Nuclear Umbrella is Bent, Not Broken https://belimedia.com.ng/the-nuclear-umbrella-is-bent-not-broken https://belimedia.com.ng/the-nuclear-umbrella-is-bent-not-broken Why Extended Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters

Jennifer Lind and Daryl Press make a compelling argument in a recent article about the future willingness of the United States to provide extended nuclear deterrence, sometimes referred to as the “nuclear umbrella” to over 30 allies. Since the early days of the Cold War, the U.S. made a commitment to defend Europe against Soviet aggression, and under extreme conditions, included the use of nuclear weapons. Similar assurances were made to Japan, South Korea and Australia. The protection provided by this nuclear umbrella has been a hallmark of international order for decades as allies trusted the U.S. would protect them and therefore had no reason to develop their own nuclear weapon capabilities. Lind and Press rightly point out the security environment has changed dramatically and the “order” created by the United States during the Cold War no longer exists. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Lind and Press argue Russia’s nuclear threat on a global scale is much diminished with Russia focused on its boundaries with eastern Europe and less concerned with “the global balance of power”. Similarly, Lind and Press view North Korea’s nuclear weapons development as a regional security issue with Kim Jong Un more interested in regime survival than peninsular conquest. They further argue conflicts today are largely regional in nature and question the commitment of the United States to engage in a nuclear conflict on behalf of an ally thousands of miles away. Thus, they claim the “nuclear umbrella” is broken.

The Nuclear Umbrella Still Exists

On the surface, it’s easy to believe this argument. The first Trump administration clearly stated an intent to put “America First” in 2017 and the second Trump administration signaled skepticism toward alliance commitments and their associated costs. Abroad, there is potential that this signaling from Washington also includes the commitment to extended nuclear deterrence. President Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) published in 2025 does not mention extended nuclear deterrence or the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) does not “explicitly mention extended deterrence” and instead places the “primary responsibility” for their own defense on them with limited support from the U.S. And lastly, the current Trump administration has not and most likely will not issue a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The first NPR was released in 1994 every subsequent administration has issued one until President Trump took office again in 2024. The NPR is a blueprint which describes the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy. This document contains critical messaging on the capabilities, numbers, and modernization efforts of nuclear weapons and under what conditions the U.S. potentially would or would not use nuclear weapons. To be sure, the absence of explicit language on extended nuclear deterrence in the NSS and NDS and the lack of an NPR are departures from the U.S.’s historical stance providing nuclear top cover and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Allies and partners of the U.S. have obviously taken notice and started conversations on how to proceed especially given continued Russian aggression, Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons development, and what they might perceive as uncertainty of the U.S. as a nuclear deterrent backstop.

The United Kingdom and France recently pledged increased cooperation with nuclear weapons with the signing of the Northwood Declaration in 2025. French President Macron also rolled out a policy of “advanced deterrence” aimed at potentially providing nuclear forces to various European allies. Additionally, Japan, South Korea and Australia are all deeply concerned about nuclear weapons development in both China and North Korea. As a result from the proximate threat, some Japanese and South Korean officials have publicly discussed nuclear weapons, a topic previously considered taboo.

However, there is also plenty of evidence to support the fact that while the nuclear umbrella is bent and tattered, it’s not broken.

Although the current NSS and NDS do not explicitly mention extended nuclear deterrence, they do not explicitly eschew the notion either. In fact, the NDS states Europe should take “primary responsibility for its own conventional defense…” making a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear forces. Despite much talk of NATO needing to pull more of its own weight regarding security, the U.S. remains committed to the alliance. Since 1954, the U.S. pledged to protect NATO members and currently has around 100 air-delivered nuclear weapons deployed to various bases in Europe. In addressing the NATO Defense Ministerial, Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge Colby, stated, “Thus, for the United States, our responsibility is to be clear, candid and consistent. We will continue to provide the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.” Additionally, the U.S. continues to be active in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the senior policy body for NATO nuclear issues. Despite U.S. signaling a “scaling back” of conventional support to NATO, there is no plan to remove any of these nuclear weapons from Europe.

There are similar extended nuclear deterrence concerns from Japan and South Korea, especially the suggestion that both should take on more of the financial burden for their defense, the U.S. commitment to both is bit clearer. In February of last year, the U.S. Secretary of State met with the Foreign Minister of Japan and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea to “reaffirm the unshakable trilateral partnership” between the three countries. This meeting underscored the historical commitment of the U.S. to the defense Japan and South Korea to include extended nuclear deterrence.

Why Extended Nuclear Deterrence Matters

What’s missing in many of the arguments concerning U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is how it has underwritten the concept of nuclear nonproliferation for decades. In 1968, the U.S. pledged cooperation in limiting the spread of nuclear technology as one of the first signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Though limited and certainly not perfect, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is widely considered one of the most successful arms control treaties ever written by limiting the spread of nuclear weapons while aiding risk reduction of nuclear weapons use. As mentioned earlier, dozens of countries have chosen not to pursue development of nuclear weapons (and pledged not do so as signatories of the NPT) because they determined the extended nuclear deterrent guarantee provided by the U.S. to be reliable and most importantly, credible. Additionally, any country who may feel abandoned by the nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. and may choose to pursue development of their own nuclear weapon faces myriad challenges. First, many are bound by the NPT and even if they were not, often lack the resources to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Second, all states, even those with the technical know-how to proceed with a nuclear weapons program, would introduce into the nuclear “club” another independent launch authority, more command-and-control systems with varying levels of capability, unknown decision-making processes during crises, and more opportunities for proliferation, miscalculation, and accidents. Following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the one thing the international community could agree upon was developing a strong prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons. Many resolved crises throughout history where nuclear weapons loomed in the background reinforced the idea that the use of nuclear weapons was unthinkable. The spread of nuclear weapons to more independent states does not simply mean we live in a world with more of them, it substantially increases the number of situations where they become increasingly integrated into routine statecraft and thus, their potential use more thinkable.

The Strategic Consequences

Despite concerns about the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence that have emerged in some allied capitals, the United States should not become resigned to the prospect of allies leaving the nuclear umbrella. Doing so would weaken the nonproliferation regime, increase incentives for independent nuclear programs, and ultimately leave the United States confronting a more dangerous strategic environment. The U.S. should continue to signal that the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence rests upon strong conventional capabilities and even stronger, unmistakable political resolve with our allies while keeping nuclear use as the final safeguard. Increased proliferation of nuclear weapons does not achieve that objective.

The United States is unique among states that possess nuclear weapons because it has used the world’s most capable nuclear weapons arsenal to prevent nuclear proliferation rather than encourage it. Thus, extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation are inseparable. The enduring contribution to international security by the United States has been and should continue to be the guarantee of nuclear extended deterrence to uphold nonproliferation and preserve the longstanding objective of nuclear non-use.

In no uncertain terms should the U.S. become “comfortable” with more states acquiring their own nuclear weapons resulting from of a lack of confidence that Washington will continue to be the nuclear guarantor. Despite periodic political signals that make some allies nervous, Washington has been remarkably consistent, across multiple administrations, in its policy toward extended nuclear deterrence. States that question U.S. commitment should consider whether other alternatives would enhance their security. The answer is almost certainly no.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 06 Sep 2026 15:27:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
The New Economics of Warfare: David vs Goliath https://belimedia.com.ng/the-new-economics-of-warfare-david-vs-goliath https://belimedia.com.ng/the-new-economics-of-warfare-david-vs-goliath The most important lesson emerging from the Iran conflict may not actually be about Iran. It is about the changing economics of warfare and what happens when autonomy, artificial intelligence, commercial technology and inexpensive mass begin eroding advantages once reserved almost exclusively for major powers.

In many ways, modern warfare is increasingly becoming a story of David versus Goliath. The difference is that today’s David is armed with drones, software, commercial sensors, open-source intelligence and rapidly adaptable technology. Goliath still has overwhelming advantages in scale, firepower and resources, but the sling has become far more sophisticated — and far cheaper.

For most of the modern era, advanced military power belonged overwhelmingly to countries capable of spending billions of dollars on sophisticated aircraft, warships, missiles, sensors and command-and-control infrastructure. That advantage is not disappearing. Aircraft carriers, submarines, advanced fighters, bombers and integrated missile defenses remain essential instruments of national power. But the economics beneath them are changing as autonomy, AI, inexpensive sensors, commercial communications, advanced manufacturing and widely available components lower the cost of creating meaningful military effects.

Ukraine provided the first large-scale demonstration of this shift. A materially weaker “David” used drones, software, commercial technology, open-source intelligence and rapid battlefield innovation to impose extraordinary costs on a much larger Russian “Goliath.” Ukraine did not eliminate Russia’s advantages in manpower, missiles, aircraft or industrial capacity. It showed that technology could narrow the gap without matching a stronger adversary platform for platform.

Iran is now demonstrating another version of the same problem. Tehran cannot compete with the United States carrier for carrier, fighter for fighter or missile-defense battery for missile-defense battery, but it does not need to. Iran has spent decades investing in missiles, drones, proxies, cyber capabilities, maritime harassment, information warfare and strategic geography precisely because those tools allow a materially weaker power to impose disproportionate costs on a stronger one.

That is the economic logic of asymmetric warfare. An inexpensive autonomous aircraft does not need to outperform an F-35, and a small unmanned surface vessel does not need to defeat a destroyer in a traditional naval engagement. It only needs to create enough risk that the defender is forced to respond. When one side can repeatedly spend thousands or tens of thousands of dollars and compel the other to spend hundreds of thousands or millions, the exchange ratio eventually becomes strategically significant.

The United States cannot build a sustainable long-term strategy around answering every inexpensive drone with a multimillion-dollar interceptor or every maritime threat with another billion-dollar warship. That does not mean exquisite platforms are obsolete. It means using exquisite platforms to solve every problem eventually becomes economically unsustainable.

The more useful debate is not whether a drone can replace a fighter or whether an autonomous vessel can replace a destroyer. They cannot. The better question is how many missions currently concentrated aboard expensive crewed platforms can migrate toward cheaper autonomous systems: surveillance, reconnaissance, communications relay, target detection, electronic sensing, mine detection, logistics, persistent maritime presence, decoys and distributed weapons carriage.

Technology disruption rarely begins by replacing an incumbent system outright. It begins by stripping away individual functions. Instead of asking whether one autonomous vessel can replace a destroyer, military planners should be asking what happens when dozens of autonomous vessels operate around that destroyer, extending its sensing range, complicating enemy targeting, absorbing risk, providing persistent presence and allowing the crewed combatant to operate farther from danger. The destroyer remains essential, but its role changes.

Artificial intelligence accelerates this transition because it changes the manpower economics of military mass. Traditional military power is extraordinarily manpower intensive. Every additional aircraft, ship or vehicle generally requires crews, training, maintenance and support personnel. Software scales differently. As autonomous systems become more capable of navigating, sensing, classifying targets and coordinating with one another, fewer operators may eventually supervise far larger numbers of assets.

The strategic value is therefore not simply removing a sailor or pilot from danger. It is changing the relationship between manpower, mass and military capability. Ukraine has also shown how quickly this cycle can evolve: operators identify a battlefield problem, engineers modify hardware or software, the adversary develops a countermeasure, and the system changes again. That cycle can occur in weeks while traditional acquisition processes often operate in years. The widening gap between those timelines is becoming a national-security vulnerability.

Iran also demonstrates why the economics of modern warfare extend far beyond the price of a missile or drone. Consider the Strait of Hormuz. Iran does not need to defeat the U.S. Navy in a traditional fleet engagement to create a strategic crisis. It needs only to generate enough uncertainty around one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints to affect shipping behavior, insurance premiums, energy markets, naval deployments and political calculations thousands of miles from the battlefield.

A drone does not necessarily need to sink a tanker to be successful. If it forces commercial vessels to reroute, raises insurance premiums, pushes energy prices higher, requires additional naval escorts and generates political pressure in Washington or allied capitals, it may have produced a strategic return far beyond its acquisition cost. The Strait of Hormuz is therefore not merely geography; it is economic leverage.

The same logic applies to the Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea and other maritime chokepoints. Protecting those spaces exclusively with crewed ships and aircraft is extraordinarily expensive. Autonomous maritime systems offer another model by providing persistent surveillance, distributed sensing, electronic warfare, communications relay, logistics and eventually additional defensive or offensive capacity without the manpower burden of conventional warships.

The future fleet will almost certainly be hybrid. Submarines, destroyers, carriers and advanced aircraft will remain critical, but they will increasingly operate inside larger networks of autonomous systems. The same principle applies to the defense industrial base. The United States is not going to replace traditional primes with startups, nor should it. The engineering, manufacturing and systems-integration capabilities required to build submarines, bombers and complex weapons remain indispensable.

But the traditional model cannot remain the only model. Modern warfare increasingly rewards an ecosystem that combines established defense companies with emerging technology firms, commercial manufacturers, software companies, universities, private capital and government laboratories. The industrial challenge is no longer simply building the most sophisticated weapon. It is building sophisticated weapons while also producing enough affordable systems to create mass, replace losses and adapt faster than the adversary.

Quantity is not a substitute for quality, but quality alone is not enough if an adversary can manufacture threats faster and more cheaply than the defender can respond to them. A weapons system that performs extraordinarily well but cannot be produced in sufficient quantities or replaced during a prolonged conflict carries its own strategic vulnerability.

There is another cost curve collapsing alongside hardware: information. Artificial intelligence and social media are dramatically reducing the cost of conducting information and cognitive warfare. An inexpensive drone can force an expensive military response, while an AI-generated video, manipulated image or coordinated social-media campaign can create political effects at almost no marginal distribution cost.

Iran, Russia and China understand that these domains reinforce one another. A tanker is attacked, insurance rates rise, energy markets react, images spread across social media, and AI-enabled narratives amplify fear or confusion. Physical warfare, economic warfare and cognitive warfare increasingly operate as parts of the same system. A missile can therefore be intercepted and still produce strategic effect if it forces millions of dollars in defensive spending, disrupts commerce, dominates media coverage and creates the perception that an adversary controls the pace of escalation.

That is why modern warfare can no longer be measured exclusively through targets destroyed or territory captured. Costs can be military, but they can also be economic, political and psychological. The United States still possesses extraordinary technological and military advantages; the greater danger is economic rigidity.

America and its allies cannot allow adversaries to consistently dictate exchange ratios in which cheap systems consume expensive defenses, small attacks produce major commercial disruptions and rapidly evolving technologies are answered by procurement processes that take years. The answer is not abandoning exquisite weapons, but building a broader force architecture around them: autonomous mass, distributed sensors, AI-enabled command and control, resilient manufacturing, commercial intelligence, lower-cost interceptors, modular payloads and systems capable of evolving at something closer to software speed.

Cold War 2.0 will therefore not be determined solely by which country builds the best fighter, submarine, missile or autonomous system. It will also be determined by which side can manufacture capability faster, distribute it more broadly, replace it more cheaply, adapt it more quickly and impose greater costs on an adversary than it absorbs itself.

Ukraine demonstrated how a modern-day David can use technology to challenge a much larger conventional Goliath. Iran is showing how a materially weaker state can use technology, geography and irregular warfare to impose disproportionate costs on a superpower. China is watching both.

The competition underway is increasingly a competition between military-economic systems. Goliath still matters, but the battlefield is changing in ways that increasingly empower David. The side that prevails may not be the one that builds the most exquisite individual weapon, but the one that can keep adapting, producing and fighting after the other discovers that it cannot.

This keeps the David-versus-Goliath analogy as a recurring frame rather than a gimmick—once near the opening, concretely through Ukraine, and again in the conclusion.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 06 Sep 2026 15:27:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Former CIA Station Chief on Kyiv Under Drone Siege https://belimedia.com.ng/a-former-cia-station-chief-on-kyiv-under-drone-siege https://belimedia.com.ng/a-former-cia-station-chief-on-kyiv-under-drone-siege

Reporting live from Kyiv, Cipher Brief expert and former senior CIA officer Ralph Goff walks CEO and Publisher Suzanne Kelly through a drone strike that hit the SBU headquarters in the heart of the city, and what it signals about Russia's improving jet-powered drone capability and Ukraine's thinning air defenses. Goff discusses the surprising resilience of Kyiv residents in the strike's aftermath, an 8-to-1 battlefield casualty ratio he attributes to Ukraine's ISR dominance, and why the country's innovation edge no longer hinges on any single official.

Kelly: You've been on the ground in Kyiv for a couple of days, but there was quite an incident this morning. There have been near-nonstop air raids for more than a week now. Tell us about where you were and what you heard this morning.

Goff: Today in Kyiv we had some air raid alerts overnight, then some in the morning, and a couple more during the day. But today was followed up with a couple of drone strikes right in the middle of Kyiv. Early this afternoon, one struck the headquarters of the Internal Security Service, the SBU, which seems like a very deliberate, targeted attack by the Russians. Unfortunately, there were some casualties, I don't think anyone was killed, but there were wounded, and some damage to the building. It was a very clear sign from the Russians that their jet-powered Geran drones are not only hard to intercept, but very accurate.

Kelly: This is really concerning. Having been in that area of Kyiv with you several times in the past, that's essentially the inner circle, where the government operates from. We've been wondering how long it would be before some of these significant targets got hit, given Ukraine's shortage of anti-missile systems. What's it been like on the ground since you arrived three or four days ago? Is there a heightened sense of anxiety?

Goff: There is, among parts of the population, but I'd say for most people it's more a heightened sense of annoyance. Here we had a drone strike right in the heart of Kyiv, at the SBU building, and most people's biggest concern afterward was how it messed up traffic downtown, it's a major artery, so there were traffic jams all around. History is replete with examples where so-called strategic bombing of civilian targets or major cities to break the will of an enemy has never worked, and I don't see that working here either.

I do think it's a clear sign that Ukraine has to find a way to close the gap and counter these new high-speed, high-performance drones. We hear reports of an 85 to 90 percent interception rate on conventional, piston-engine drones, the regular Shahed-type drones. But with the jet-powered drones, we've heard the interception rate drops to much lower figures, which I won't get into because I don't want to give the enemy that kind of data. And when it comes to missiles, the press has already reported that the Ukrainians are so low on counter-missile capabilities that they rarely intercept any ballistic missiles launched into Ukraine.

Kelly: When you're watching this war from afar, it's hard to get a clear sense of how much time is left before Kyiv, Lviv, and other major cities are in real trouble. Kyiv has always had the strongest air defenses. Is Kyiv running out of time?

Goff: I don't think they're running out of time so much as, I think they will close the gap, they will solve the technical issues and improve their defenses, but it will take time, and they'll suffer in the meantime. I'll say it's going to be a bad winter; I'm fairly certain of that. But the Russians didn't break the Ukrainian spirit last winter, and they won't break it this year either.

On the other hand, there's an interesting dichotomy of feelings and morale. At the front, I was talking to a friend who's been deeply involved in providing intelligence assistance to frontline units, a non-governmental source, and he said that for the first time since he's been here, every unit he visited had high morale. We're looking at a battlefield now where the casualty ratio is probably eight to one in favor of the Ukrainians. Eight to one, that's an astounding number. So you have this high morale at the front, where soldiers are saying, “we think we can pull this off.” And then in the cities, you have people increasingly concerned about the welfare of their families and children because of these blatantly terroristic attacks on civilian targets. There's a real dichotomy emerging in the middle of this war.

Kelly: On that eight-to-one figure, is that because so much of the fighting on the front lines now is essentially robot-on-robot, drone-on-drone combat? Or is something else driving that number?

Goff: That's a large part of it, but at the end of the day you still need soldiers fighting soldiers. What it comes down to is who has better mastery of the battlefield, and the Ukrainians have information dominance. On top of that, they're the defenders, they can dig in and weather the storm, whereas the Russians are still relying on high-cost, high-attrition tactics, sending soldiers out literally in ones and twos to try to infiltrate Ukrainian positions. But they're very vulnerable, because the battlefield has become so saturated with drone coverage and surveillance, what we call ISR, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The Ukrainians have really mastered that, and it's given them a huge advantage. That could change, the Russians aren't sitting back, they're innovating too, but for now the Ukrainians have an edge, and they're going to keep innovating to maintain it.

Kelly: There have been a lot of headlines about domestic issues President Zelensky is dealing with this week in Kyiv, even as he wages this war, including the departure of Minister Fedorov, who's been pushing forward on defense technology and made some announcements this week here in the US. What's different this time in terms of the strength, stability, and unity of the government? We know the unity of the people is hard to break, but how are you looking at this through the government lens?

Goff: The big difference now is that the innovation and technical advances made by the Ukrainians don't depend on one person. This isn't some technological breakthrough that depends on one minister or one ministry, it's government-wide, across the various ministries and different commands. It's a multi-echelon effort where technological innovation isn't just pushed down to the lowest levels, it's driven by the lowest levels. It runs from top to bottom and bottom to top. So whether you change a minister or change a commander, like the change from Syrskyi to Drapatyi, that doesn't change. The innovation has reached all levels, and it's here to stay.

Kelly: I'm jealous The Cipher Brief isn't there with you right now, we usually are, and we like being there because you're attending a number of interesting and enlightening meetings while in Kyiv. Has anything surprised you this time, or really stuck with you, from this round of meetings?

Goff: Nothing ever really surprises me here. I think one of the reasons I come is for my own benefit, I always leave more inspired than when I arrived. A good example: we had this horrendous drone strike in the middle of the city, and within minutes people were just going about their daily lives. The emergency response was there, I watched ambulances flowing to the scene, first responders arriving. I actually marveled at that, because my initial instinct was to stay away, given the Russian penchant for the “double tap”, hit the target, wait a few minutes until first responders arrive, then hit it again. Even knowing that's a Russian tactic, the first responders were there within minutes.

As I continued on to my next meeting, people were going about their lives, doing their shopping, going to work, going to the grocery store. They weren't deterred by the event. And while that doesn't surprise me, it does inspire me.

Kelly: What about the significance of the SBU? A lot of people may not understand exactly what it does, it's similar to intelligence gathering but with other functions too, almost a combination of the CIA and FBI if we're relating it to the US. Tell us about some of its operations and why it's an important organization in Ukraine.

Goff: It's an important organization because, yes, they have the primary mandate for internal security in Ukraine, but they're also involved in long-range strikes into Russia. If you see press reporting on some sort of assassination attempt, like the Russian air force general who was shot the other day, that's pretty much the SBU, showing they have a long reach into Russia. So they're playing on multiple levels, and they're an important player. This is a sign that Russia knows who they are and where they are.

But taking out the SBU headquarters is probably inconvenient for some time, and there will be losses. The Ukrainians have decentralized much the same way they've decentralized the structure of their military intelligence community, they've decentralized command and control. So if you take out the SBU headquarters, I'm sure within minutes there's a backup headquarters and contingency plans in place. The Ukrainians are well aware of Russia's capability to strike their headquarters.

Kelly: It's been a little while since you were working as a CIA station chief, you held six different postings in that role. If you were filing something back to the United States today, what's the most important thing you'd want people to understand about what you're seeing there?

Goff: That the war is entering a different phase. And if the war is entering a different phase, it means the Ukrainians are going to have to react differently, which means their allies are going to have to react differently, which means those of us in the intelligence community are also going to have to change our game and adjust. We're going to have to be prepared to support the Ukrainian effort to defend themselves, and if that means an active defense against the Russians, that would be my recommendation.

Kelly: Goff, thank you so much for taking the time. We know you're on the streets of Kyiv trying to stay safe, though it doesn't look like you're too worried about it, and it sounds like most people there aren't either at the moment. Still, some of these targets are getting hit in the center of the city, so please be as safe as possible. Thank you for joining us at The Cipher Brief today.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 06 Sep 2026 15:27:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
Modernizing the Navy—By Returning to 20th&Century Technology? https://belimedia.com.ng/modernizing-the-navyby-returning-to-20th-century-technology https://belimedia.com.ng/modernizing-the-navyby-returning-to-20th-century-technology “During its 11-month deployment [mostly in the Middle East] which ended in May, and was the longest for an [aircraft] carrier since the Vietnam War, the USS Gerald R. Ford conducted more than 11,000 aircraft carrier launches using electromagnetic catapults, more than carriers with steam [aircraft launching] systems could achieve…But perhaps the biggest benefit of the electromagnetic catapults are their lower cost and lighter personnel requirements. With the Navy running out of operating funds, and retention likely to plummet in the aftermath of the war with Iran, the fleet needs to make the most of every dollar and sailor.”

Writing that opinion piece in The Washington Post last Wednesday was Bryan Clark, a former Navy officer who at one time served as Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and Director of his Commander’s Action Group. Currently, Clark is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute.

I am using Clark’s article because it provides information that challenges a recent military step contained in an August 13, Presidential Memorandum which ordered “the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall provide to the President… a plan on the required measures to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of [aircraft carrier] CVN-81[USS Doris Miller], including timelines and resourcing requirements.”

Electromagnetic catapult systems accelerate aircraft more smoothly and gradually, thus putting less stress on airframes. They also recharge faster than steam catapults which need to pressurize gases and they eliminate the need for boilers and other plumbing equipment needed to create steam.

Trump, who never served in the military, has been obsessed for years with the way that steam propels fighter jets off the decks of carriers and where a carrier’s tower structure or “island” is located.

I will point out, according to former Defense Department officials the Navy designers moved the island from the middle of the carriers to the back of the vessel to make more space for moving jet fighter aircraft around on the flight deck, in order to increase the number of flights or “sorties” that the carrier could generate.

These Trump aircraft carrier views apparently first came to him less than two months after he took office based on a March 2, 2017, tour he had on the then-under-construction USS Gerald Ford being built at the Newport News shipyard in Virginia.

Two months later, in a May 8, 2017 wide-ranging, 100-minute interview with Time Magazine editors and reporters, Trump at one point apparently brought up his visit to the Gerald Ford at Newport News where he was shown the catapult system for launching aircraft from the deck.

According to TIME, the conversation went, “Sir, this is our digital catapult system…we’re going to this because we wanted to keep up with modern [technology]. I [Trump] said, ‘You don’t use steam anymore for catapult? No sir. I [Trump] said, Ah, how is it working? Sir, not good. Not good. Doesn’t have the power. You know the steam is just brutal. You see that sucker going and steam’s going all over the place, there’s planes thrown in the air.’”

The TIME transcript then has Trump saying, “It sounded bad to me. Digital. They have digital. What is digital? And it’s very complicated, you have to be Albert Einstein to figure it out. And I [Trump] said -- and now they want to buy more aircraft carriers. I [Trump] said what system are you going to buy -- Sir, we’re staying with digital. I [Trump] said no you’re not. You going to goddamned steam, the digital costs hundreds of millions of dollars more money and it’s no good.”

I should note, at the time Trump visited and for months thereafter, there were issues with the new electromagnetic catapults, but fixes were made, although not in Trump’s mind.

Before I continue with Trump, let’s turn back to Hudson’s Bryan Clark, a real Navy expert, who wrote, “The biggest benefit of the electromagnetic catapults are their lower cost and lighter personnel requirements.”

Clark also noted, “The Ford’s crew is about 500 sailors smaller than its predecessors, largely because it is an all-electric ship outside of the engine room. Because they needed steam for catapults, older carriers also used steam for a variety of other functions throughout the ship — such as cooking equipment and water purification…And the steam catapults have so many moving parts and failure modes that they require about 10 more sailors per catapult — there are four catapults on a modern carrier — than electromagnetic systems.”

A Navy February press release said preliminary reports from the Sortie Generation Rate test program for aircraft show that the flight deck design in conjunction with electromagnetic systems and arresting gear “have contributed to an increased sortie generation rate compared to that of a Nimitz-class carrier.”

However, Trump over the years has kept calling for a return to steam catapults and retelling the story of his 2017 visit to the Gerald Ford.

For example, at a November 2, 2023 campaign rally in Houston, Texas, Trump was talking about shipbuilding and veered off to tell about a ship that was “in trouble” because “it was $10 billion over budget, and I wanted to go and see this ship that was costing so much money.”

At that Houston rally, Trump went on, “And I landed with a helicopter on top of this massive, incredible ship [USS Gerald Ford] being made in Newport News. And I said to the people…I want to meet the catapult people, the people that have done the catapulting.”

Trump continued, “I want to find out what the hell happened because the catapults weren't working. So for 50 years, we used steam more. And that beautiful scene, that steam goes off, and that plane gets thrown the hell off, the power, beautiful, and it's cheap.”

Trump said he asked a sailor “Which is better, steam or electric? ‘Steam, sir.’ I [Trump] said why did they design electric? ‘Because it can keep going like this all day long, but it takes us 59 seconds to reload a plane. And when we reload the plane, the steam builds up, and it's all set, sir. It's perfect. It works so well. And we can fix it with a blowtorch if something happens. And if a wave hits it, it actually cools us down, sir. We love the waves hitting us. If a wave hits the electric [catapult], we're out of business, sir. We might -- we'll die with this thing.’"

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Last July 15, at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Penn., Trump again was talking about shipbuilding and switched saying, “I went to the ship [USS Gerald Ford], because I came into office and the ship was way over budget, built in Newport News, unfortunately, was way over budget.”

Trump went on, “I said, I want to meet the ‘catapultier’ and a man came over, along with four of his assistants. And I said, what's better, electric catapult or steam? He's been there for 25 years. He said, ‘Steam is better, sir. We can fix it with a hammer and a blowtorch. When the electric [catapult] goes bad, I have to send to MIT to get geniuses over here’…But I [Trump] said, so you're saying we spend billions of dollars extra to build electric catapults instead of using steam.”

Bryan Clark concluded his Post article saying, “Steam power was cutting-edge technology in the 19th century. It is the wrong choice for a Pentagon that is leaning into artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. The Navy should stay the course with electromagnetic catapults to keep the carrier fleet strong and deliver more firepower. It could use the savings to help refill the fleet’s weapons magazines.”

Clark told CNN the cost of changing catapults on the USS Doris Miller, already under construction, “will probably be into the billions” and it could delay the carrier — which was expected to be in service around 2034 — “until the end of the next decade.”

Clark also Clark said, “Nobody builds them anymore. There’s no steam catapult manufacturers in the…U.S. anymore so they’d have to restart that production line, which would cost tens of millions of dollars to get going and that’ll be, it’ll take years to start that up again and build the first catapult.”

To add insult to injury, various recent news reports have said Navy senior staffers are reviewing the name USS Doris Miller for CV-81.

Named on January 20, 2020 -- during the Trump first administration -- by then-Acting Navy Secretary Thomas B. Modly during a Martin Luther King, Jr. Day ceremony, it honors African-American Mess Attendant Third Class Doris “Dorie” Miller, who received the Navy Cross for extraordinary heroism during the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, where he manned an anti-aircraft machine gun without prior training and aided wounded crewmates.

In giving the new aircraft carrier Miller’s name, acting-Navy Secretary Modly said, “In selecting this name, we honor the contributions of all our enlisted ranks, past and present, men and women, of every race, religion and background.”

One name said to be under study to replace Miller’s is that of President Trump.

]]>
Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:22:21 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why the Navy May Be Going Back to Steam https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-navy-may-be-going-back-to-steam https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-navy-may-be-going-back-to-steam “During its 11-month deployment [mostly in the Middle East] which ended in May, and was the longest for a[n aircraft] carrier since the Vietnam War, the USS Gerald R. Ford conducted more than 11,000 aircraft carrier launches using electromagnetic catapults, more than carriers with steam [aircraft launching] systems could achieve…But perhaps the biggest benefit of the electromagnetic catapults are their lower cost and lighter personnel requirements. With the Navy running out of operating funds, and retention likely to plummet in the aftermath of the war with Iran, the fleet needs to make the most of every dollar and sailor.”

Writing that opinion piece in The Washington Post last Wednesday was Bryan Clark, a former Navy officer who at one time served as Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and Director of his Commander’s Action Group. Currently, Clark is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute.

I am using Clark’s article because it provides information that challenges a recent military step contained in an August 13, President Trump Presidential Memorandum which ordered “the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall provide to the President… a plan on the required measures to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of [aircraft carrier] CVN-81[USS Doris Miller], including timelines and resourcing requirements.”

Electromagnetic catapult systems accelerate aircraft more smoothly and gradually, thus putting less stress on airframes. They also recharge faster than steam catapults which need to pressurize gases and they eliminate the need for boilers and other plumbing equipment needed to create steam.

Trump, who never served in the military, has been obsessed for years with the way that steam propels fighter jets off the decks of carriers and where a carrier’s tower structure or “island” is located.

I will point out, according to former Defense Department officials the Navy designers moved the island from the middle of the carriers to the back of the vessel to make more space for moving jet fighter aircraft around on the flight deck, in order to increase the number of flights or “sorties” that the carrier could generate.

These Trump aircraft carrier views apparently first came to him less than two months after he took office based on a March 2, 2017, tour he had on the then-under-construction USS Gerald Ford being built at the Newport News shipyard in Virginia.

Two months later, in a May 8, 2017 wide-ranging, 100-minute interview over dinner with Time Magazine editors and reporters, Trump at one point apparently brought up his visit to the Gerald Ford at Newport News where he was shown the catapult system for launching aircraft from the deck.

According to TIME, the conversation went, “Sir, this is our digital catapult system…we’re going to this because we wanted to keep up with modern [technology]. I [Trump] said, ‘You don’t use steam anymore for catapult? No sir. I [Trump] said, Ah, how is it working? Sir, not good. Not good. Doesn’t have the power. You know the steam is just brutal. You see that sucker going and steam’s going all over the place, there’s planes thrown in the air.’”

The TIME transcript then has Trump saying, “It sounded bad to me. Digital. They have digital. What is digital? And it’s very complicated, you have to be Albert Einstein to figure it out. And I [Trump] said -- and now they want to buy more aircraft carriers. I [Trump] said what system are you going to buy -- Sir, we’re staying with digital. I [Trump] said no you’re not. You going to goddamned steam, the digital costs hundreds of millions of dollars more money and it’s no good.”

I should note, at the time Trump visited and for months thereafter, there were issues with ghe new electromagnetic catapults, but fixes were made, although not in Trump’s mind.

Before I continue with Trump, let’s turn back to Heritage’s Bryan Clark, a real Navy expert, who wrote, “The biggest benefit of the electromagnetic catapults are their lower cost and lighter personnel requirements.”

Clark also noted, “The Ford’s crew is about 500 sailors smaller than its predecessors, largely because it is an all-electric ship outside of the engine room. Because they needed steam for catapults, older carriers also used steam for a variety of other functions throughout the ship — such as cooking equipment and water purification…And the steam catapults have so many moving parts and failure modes that they require about 10 more sailors per catapult — there are four catapults on a modern carrier — than electromagnetic systems.”

A Navy February press release said preliminary reports from the Sortie Generation Rate test program for aircraft show that the flight deck design in conjunction with electromagnetic systems and arresting gear “have contributed to an increased sortie generation rate compared to that of a Nimitz-class carrier.”

However, Trump over the years has kept calling for a return to steam catapults and retelling the story of his 2017 visit to the Gerald Ford.

For example, at a November 2, 2023 campaign rally in Houston, Texas, Trump was talking about shipbuilding and veered off to tell about a ship that was “in trouble” because “it was $10 billion over budget, and I wanted to go and see this ship that was costing so much money.”

At that Houston rally, Trump went on, “And I landed with a helicopter on top of this massive, incredible ship [USS Gerald Ford] being made in Newport News. And I said to the people…I want to meet the catapult people, the people that have done the catapulting.”

Trump continued, “I want to find out what the hell happened because the catapults weren't working. So for 50 years, we used steam more. And that beautiful scene, that steam goes off, and that plane gets thrown the hell off, the power, beautiful, and it's cheap.”

Trump said he asked a catapulter “Which is better, steam or electric? ‘Steam, sir.’ I [Trump] said why did they design electric? ‘Because it can keep going like this all day long, but it takes us 59 seconds to reload a plane. And when we reload the plane, the steam builds up, and it's all set, sir. It's perfect. It works so well. And we can fix it with a blowtorch if something happens. And if a wave hits it, it actually cools us down, sir. We love the waves hitting us. If a wave hits the electric [catapult], we're out of business, sir. We might -- we'll die with this thing.’"

Last July 15, at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Penn., Trump again was talking about shipbuilding and switched saying, “I went to the ship [USS Gerald Ford], because I came into office and the ship was way over budget, built in Newport News, unfortunately, was way over budget.”

Trump went on, “I said, I want to meet the ‘catapultier’ and a man came over, along with four of his assistants. And I said, what's better, electric catapult or steam? He's been there for 25 years. He said, ‘Steam is better, sir. We can fix it with a hammer and a blowtorch. When the electric [catapult] goes bad, I have to send to MIT to get geniuses over here’…But I [Trump] said, so you're saying we spend billions of dollars extra to build electric catapults instead of using steam.”

Bryan Clark concluded his Post article saying, “Steam power was cutting-edge technology in the 19th century. It is the wrong choice for a Pentagon that is leaning into artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. The Navy should stay the course with electromagnetic catapults to keep the carrier fleet strong and deliver more firepower. It could use the savings to help refill the fleet’s weapons magazines.”

Clark told CNN the cost of changing catapults on the USS Doris Miller, already under construction, “will probably be into the billions” and it could delay the carrier — which was expected to be in service around 2034 — “until the end of the next decade.”

Clark also Clark said, “Nobody builds them anymore. There’s no steam catapult manufacturers in the…U.S. anymore so they’d have to restart that production line, which would cost tens of millions of dollars to get going and that’ll be, it’ll take years to start that up again and build the first catapult.”

To add insult to injury, various recent news reports have said Navy senior staffers are reviewing the name USS Doris Miller for CV-81.

Named on January 20, 2020 -- during the Trump first administration -- by then-Acting Navy Secretary Thomas B. Modly during a Martin Luther King, Jr. Day ceremony, it honored African-American Mess Attendant Third Class Doris “Dorie” Miller, who received the Navy Cross for extraordinary heroism during the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, where he manned an anti-aircraft machine gun without prior training and aided wounded crewmates.

In giving the new aircraft carrier Miller’s name, acting-Navy Secretary Modly said, “In selecting this name, we honor the contributions of all our enlisted ranks, past and present, men and women, of every race, religion and background.”

One name said to be under study to replace Miller’s is that of President Trump.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:22:21 +0100 FirstHandNews
Modernizing the Aircraft Carrier—By Returning to 20th&Century Technology? https://belimedia.com.ng/modernizing-the-aircraft-carrierby-returning-to-20th-century-technology https://belimedia.com.ng/modernizing-the-aircraft-carrierby-returning-to-20th-century-technology “During its 11-month deployment [mostly in the Middle East] which ended in May, and was the longest for an [aircraft] carrier since the Vietnam War, the USS Gerald R. Ford conducted more than 11,000 aircraft carrier launches using electromagnetic catapults, more than carriers with steam [aircraft launching] systems could achieve…But perhaps the biggest benefit of the electromagnetic catapults are their lower cost and lighter personnel requirements. With the Navy running out of operating funds, and retention likely to plummet in the aftermath of the war with Iran, the fleet needs to make the most of every dollar and sailor.”

Writing that opinion piece in The Washington Post last Wednesday was Bryan Clark, a former Navy officer who at one time served as Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and Director of his Commander’s Action Group. Currently, Clark is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute.

I am using Clark’s article because it provides information that challenges a recent military step contained in an August 13, Presidential Memorandum which ordered “the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall provide to the President… a plan on the required measures to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of [aircraft carrier] CVN-81[USS Doris Miller], including timelines and resourcing requirements.”

Electromagnetic catapult systems accelerate aircraft more smoothly and gradually, thus putting less stress on airframes. They also recharge faster than steam catapults which need to pressurize gases and they eliminate the need for boilers and other plumbing equipment needed to create steam.

Trump, who never served in the military, has been obsessed for years with the way that steam propels fighter jets off the decks of carriers and where a carrier’s tower structure or “island” is located.

I will point out, according to former Defense Department officials the Navy designers moved the island from the middle of the carriers to the back of the vessel to make more space for moving jet fighter aircraft around on the flight deck, in order to increase the number of flights or “sorties” that the carrier could generate.

These Trump aircraft carrier views apparently first came to him less than two months after he took office based on a March 2, 2017, tour he had on the then-under-construction USS Gerald Ford being built at the Newport News shipyard in Virginia.

Two months later, in a May 8, 2017 wide-ranging, 100-minute interview with Time Magazine editors and reporters, Trump at one point apparently brought up his visit to the Gerald Ford at Newport News where he was shown the catapult system for launching aircraft from the deck.

According to TIME, the conversation went, “Sir, this is our digital catapult system…we’re going to this because we wanted to keep up with modern [technology]. I [Trump] said, ‘You don’t use steam anymore for catapult? No sir. I [Trump] said, Ah, how is it working? Sir, not good. Not good. Doesn’t have the power. You know the steam is just brutal. You see that sucker going and steam’s going all over the place, there’s planes thrown in the air.’”

The TIME transcript then has Trump saying, “It sounded bad to me. Digital. They have digital. What is digital? And it’s very complicated, you have to be Albert Einstein to figure it out. And I [Trump] said -- and now they want to buy more aircraft carriers. I [Trump] said what system are you going to buy -- Sir, we’re staying with digital. I [Trump] said no you’re not. You going to goddamned steam, the digital costs hundreds of millions of dollars more money and it’s no good.”

I should note, at the time Trump visited and for months thereafter, there were issues with the new electromagnetic catapults, but fixes were made, although not in Trump’s mind.

Before I continue with Trump, let’s turn back to Hudson’s Bryan Clark, a real Navy expert, who wrote, “The biggest benefit of the electromagnetic catapults are their lower cost and lighter personnel requirements.”

Clark also noted, “The Ford’s crew is about 500 sailors smaller than its predecessors, largely because it is an all-electric ship outside of the engine room. Because they needed steam for catapults, older carriers also used steam for a variety of other functions throughout the ship — such as cooking equipment and water purification…And the steam catapults have so many moving parts and failure modes that they require about 10 more sailors per catapult — there are four catapults on a modern carrier — than electromagnetic systems.”

A Navy February press release said preliminary reports from the Sortie Generation Rate test program for aircraft show that the flight deck design in conjunction with electromagnetic systems and arresting gear “have contributed to an increased sortie generation rate compared to that of a Nimitz-class carrier.”

However, Trump over the years has kept calling for a return to steam catapults and retelling the story of his 2017 visit to the Gerald Ford.

For example, at a November 2, 2023 campaign rally in Houston, Texas, Trump was talking about shipbuilding and veered off to tell about a ship that was “in trouble” because “it was $10 billion over budget, and I wanted to go and see this ship that was costing so much money.”

At that Houston rally, Trump went on, “And I landed with a helicopter on top of this massive, incredible ship [USS Gerald Ford] being made in Newport News. And I said to the people…I want to meet the catapult people, the people that have done the catapulting.”

Trump continued, “I want to find out what the hell happened because the catapults weren't working. So for 50 years, we used steam more. And that beautiful scene, that steam goes off, and that plane gets thrown the hell off, the power, beautiful, and it's cheap.”

Trump said he asked a sailor “Which is better, steam or electric? ‘Steam, sir.’ I [Trump] said why did they design electric? ‘Because it can keep going like this all day long, but it takes us 59 seconds to reload a plane. And when we reload the plane, the steam builds up, and it's all set, sir. It's perfect. It works so well. And we can fix it with a blowtorch if something happens. And if a wave hits it, it actually cools us down, sir. We love the waves hitting us. If a wave hits the electric [catapult], we're out of business, sir. We might -- we'll die with this thing.’"

Subscriber+Members have a higher level of access to Cipher Brief Expert Perspectives and get exclusive access to The Open Source Report and The Dead Drop, the best national security gossip publication, if we do say so ourselves. Find out what you’re missing. Upgrade your access to Subscriber+ now.

Last July 15, at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Penn., Trump again was talking about shipbuilding and switched saying, “I went to the ship [USS Gerald Ford], because I came into office and the ship was way over budget, built in Newport News, unfortunately, was way over budget.”

Trump went on, “I said, I want to meet the ‘catapultier’ and a man came over, along with four of his assistants. And I said, what's better, electric catapult or steam? He's been there for 25 years. He said, ‘Steam is better, sir. We can fix it with a hammer and a blowtorch. When the electric [catapult] goes bad, I have to send to MIT to get geniuses over here’…But I [Trump] said, so you're saying we spend billions of dollars extra to build electric catapults instead of using steam.”

Bryan Clark concluded his Post article saying, “Steam power was cutting-edge technology in the 19th century. It is the wrong choice for a Pentagon that is leaning into artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. The Navy should stay the course with electromagnetic catapults to keep the carrier fleet strong and deliver more firepower. It could use the savings to help refill the fleet’s weapons magazines.”

Clark told CNN the cost of changing catapults on the USS Doris Miller, already under construction, “will probably be into the billions” and it could delay the carrier — which was expected to be in service around 2034 — “until the end of the next decade.”

Clark also Clark said, “Nobody builds them anymore. There’s no steam catapult manufacturers in the…U.S. anymore so they’d have to restart that production line, which would cost tens of millions of dollars to get going and that’ll be, it’ll take years to start that up again and build the first catapult.”

To add insult to injury, various recent news reports have said Navy senior staffers are reviewing the name USS Doris Miller for CV-81.

Named on January 20, 2020 -- during the Trump first administration -- by then-Acting Navy Secretary Thomas B. Modly during a Martin Luther King, Jr. Day ceremony, it honors African-American Mess Attendant Third Class Doris “Dorie” Miller, who received the Navy Cross for extraordinary heroism during the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, where he manned an anti-aircraft machine gun without prior training and aided wounded crewmates.

In giving the new aircraft carrier Miller’s name, acting-Navy Secretary Modly said, “In selecting this name, we honor the contributions of all our enlisted ranks, past and present, men and women, of every race, religion and background.”

One name said to be under study to replace Miller’s is that of President Trump.

]]>
Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:22:21 +0100 FirstHandNews
Foreign Spies Don’t Need to Hack You Anymore https://belimedia.com.ng/foreign-spies-dont-need-to-hack-you-anymore https://belimedia.com.ng/foreign-spies-dont-need-to-hack-you-anymore Andy Burnham was a few weeks into the job as the new Prime Minister of the UK when he found himself exchanging messages with someone claiming to be Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff. The exchange, first reported by Politico last week, was brief and apparently trivial. Burnham grew suspicious, stopped replying and told the right people; the British embassy in Washington quietly informed the White House, which confirmed that Wiles’s own devices hadn’t been touched. No harm done, officially.

Embarrassments like this are becoming more common. The FBI warned last year about impostors using AI to mimic senior officials, after someone posing as Wiles contacted senior Republicans and business figures. The State Department later chased a fake Marco Rubio who reached three foreign ministers. And every one of these approaches lands on a habit “Signalgate” already exposed: when one wrong contact card could add a journalist to a strike-planning thread, the name on the screen was the only authentication in the room. If you want to see what this security weakness looks like run as a nation-state campaign look at a case that closed quietly in Taipei last month.

In July, prosecutors in Taipei’s Shilin district wrapped up proceedings against two local businessmen, Li Hualun and Chen Mengsen, who had spent months registering accounts on LINE (the messaging app nearly everyone in Taiwan uses), each tied to a real Taiwanese phone number. They leased the accounts to Xiamen Empress Information Technology, a mainland firm Taiwanese investigators say works under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party’s cyber forces. The going rate was about 1,100 RMB per account, call it $160.

A working exploit for a major platform costs millions on the gray market. A trusted local identity cost less than a decent dinner, and it did something no technical exploit can do.

The operators used the fake accounts to become journalists. In the approach that eventually unraveled the scheme, one of them even dressed up a leased account in the name and photo of Chen Yishan, editor-in-chief of CommonWealth Magazine, and began courting an aide in a legislator’s office. Interview requests, invitations to contribute articles, the ordinary traffic of political journalism followed.

There was no malicious link in the first message, or the tenth. Investigators found the operators worked on targets for months, sometimes close to a year. Any counterintelligence officer would recognize the rhythm. It was the patient cultivation and recruitment of an agent run through a chat app.

The eventual ask was small and reasonable-sounding. Journalists use encrypted tools to protect their sources, so would the contact mind installing a secure communication app to keep talking? The app was in fact malware. The MO turns a decade of good security advice inside out. The more someone knew about how careful reporters actually operate, the more normal the request looked.

Researchers at Citizen Lab and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, whose reporting the Taiwanese prosecution now corroborates, counted more than a hundred malicious domains behind the wider campaign, and found errors in the phishing messages suggesting the attackers were using AI to draft them and to pick targets. The people on the receiving end were lawmakers and their staffs, defense think tanks, semiconductor companies, dissidents at home and abroad. Taiwanese media reported that even the island’s overseas missions were probed.

Through all of it, nothing technical failed. The networks held and the patches were current. The attackers went around the security stack entirely, and the thing they spent, their actual operational currency, was the credibility of a free press. Every fake interview request makes the real ones a little harder. This cost never shows up in an incident report.

The two men who supplied the accounts got deferred prosecutions and payments totaling a bit under $6,000. That is the current legal price, in a frontline democracy, for renting identity infrastructure to a foreign intelligence service. It isn’t a deterrent. It’s barely a business expense.

Which brings us back to Downing Street. A prime minister with the full apparatus of British intelligence behind him replied to a stranger because the name on the screen looked right. Nothing in either story depends on LINE, or Taiwan, or Westminster.

Swap in WhatsApp or LinkedIn; swap the fake editor for a fake recruiter or a fake chief of staff. Aged, locally registered accounts are already a commodity in criminal markets. All the model requires is a person who handles something worth stealing and a persona they have no fast way to check.

That last part is fixable, though not by the security team alone. Organizations that handle sensitive work should treat identity verification as a counterintelligence habit. Platforms need to treat the account-rental trade Taiwan uncovered as the national security problem it has become rather than a terms-of-service nuisance. And legislatures need to punish collaboration with foreign intelligence services at something above a traffic ticket.

Mostly, though, the people likeliest to be approached — the legislative staffer, the fab engineer, the think-tank fellow, the human rights activist, apparently the occasional head of government — need to become more educated on how foreign intelligence cultivation and targeting actually works: slowly, warmly, and with no suspicious link in sight until the very end. The adversary in this case looked at hardened networks and vigilant software and made a rational choice. Building a fake trusted persona was cheaper — $160 a head – than spending millions on a sophisticated cyber exploit. We need to start defending the credibility of verified, trusted identifies the way we defend our networks: as the attack surface it already is.The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief ]]>
Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:22:21 +0100 FirstHandNews
Lebanon’s Hezbollah Finance Crackdown May Be Designed to Fail https://belimedia.com.ng/lebanons-hezbollah-finance-crackdown-may-be-designed-to-fail https://belimedia.com.ng/lebanons-hezbollah-finance-crackdown-may-be-designed-to-fail Lebanon’s campaign against Hezbollah’s finances may be designed to look tougher than it is. Under pressure from Washington and international regulators, Beirut has done enough to claim progress by tightening the regulated financial sector against Hezbollah-linked entities, but without seriously threatening Hezbollah’s parallel financial apparatus, which operates largely outside it. This raises the troubling possibility that Lebanon is not merely failing to impose meaningful pressure but deliberately choosing measures that stop short of actually harming, and therefore provoking, Hezbollah. Lebanese leaders have repeatedly warned that directly confronting the group risks renewed internal conflict. A serious assault on Hezbollah’s finances would strike at the resources sustaining its organization and could invite precisely that confrontation. If so, Beirut has found a politically useful middle ground: cosmetically satisfying foreign demands to preserve the domestic status quo.

Iran remains Hezbollah’s main external source of money. Secretary-General Naim Qassem has acknowledged Iranian funding for postwar relief and reconstruction. In November 2025, the U.S. Treasury said Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps-Quds Force, its foreign-operations arm, had transferred more than $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of that year, mostly through money exchange companies. Iran and Hezbollah have also used gold to move funds. Qassem has acknowledged smaller contributions from the Iraqi state, Shiite religious authorities and shrines, Iran-aligned Shiite militias, and Iraqi citizens. The Houthis raised funds directly for Hezbollah in 2019 and later for its Lebanese support base. Hezbollah has used cryptocurrency too, though the scale remains unclear.

Hezbollah also generates revenue through ostensibly legitimate businesses and commercial networks that conceal the group’s involvement behind nominal owners. Treasury says a commercial network run by financier Alaa Hamieh diverted more than $100 million to Hezbollah since 2020, while Hamieh allegedly used his state investment post to steer millions toward Hezbollah-linked projects.

Hezbollah-controlled and affiliated entities then manage and move the money. Its Central Finance Unit controls income and spending, Bayt al-Mal serves as its treasury, and Al-Qard al-Hassan (AQAH) provides bank-like services and holds cash and gold. AQAH officials have used personal “shadow” accounts to disguise transactions and move more than $500 million through Lebanese banks. AQAH-backed Jood SARL converts gold into cash, while Hezbollah-linked money-service businesses like CTEX have supplied dollars to Hezbollah institutions and recruited sympathetic money changers. WaTaawanou, a crowdfunding charity officially outside Hezbollah’s formal hierarchy, raises donations for needy Lebanese but directs much of the resulting spending to Hezbollah-run or -linked hospitals and businesses. These funds support personnel, weapons procurement, social programs, compensation, housing, and post-war reconstruction.

Lebanese measures have so far done little to disrupt this diversified financial ecosystem. AQAH’s liquidity problems do not demonstrate otherwise because they predated Beirut’s principal financial restrictions. It began delaying compensation checks in January 2025 and froze them on June 23, after nearly $500 million had already been disbursed. The Lebanese Central Bank did not issue Circular 170 until July 14. That measure bars regulated financial institutions from dealing with AQAH and related sanctioned, unlicensed entities, but does not close AQAH or seize its assets.

AQAH therefore remains operational. It retained branches that survived Israeli strikes, while Treasury said in February 2026 that Hezbollah continued using the institution and that AQAH officials had created Jood to ease its liquidity pressure. The Interior Ministry later withheld AQAH’s annual 2026 certificate of good legal standing pending investigations, but left its underlying association registration intact. An-Nahar reported would require a Cabinet decision to revoke. But, on June 18, Justice Minister Adel Nassar said the government had not even placed the AQAH file on the Cabinet agenda. Stripping a core Hezbollah institution of its legal status would mark a far more direct confrontation with the group, one the government appears unlikely to invite amid the current standoff over Hezbollah’s disarmament.

Judicial action has likewise stopped short of disrupting AQAH’s operations. Nassar referred AQAH and Jood to the public prosecutor in June for investigation. Yet by July 21, An-Nahar reported that the case remained dormant. Prosecutors were waiting for the Central Bank to provide documents establishing financial violations but had not themselves requested them.

Lebanon’s Central Bank also issued Intermediate Circular 761 on May 4, 2026, effective June 30, requiring regulated nonbank financial institutions—including exchange houses, finance companies, specialized lenders, and electronic-payment providers—to identify customers and report cash transactions of $1,000 or more, while flagging repeated transactions apparently structured to evade the threshold. But those requirements can still be bypassed through unlicensed or informal hawala networks, where a sender pays a broker abroad and a partner in Lebanon pays the recipient locally, without the original money passing through a bank or regulated Lebanese institution.

Lebanon’s restrictions have therefore changed Hezbollah’s methods more than its access to money. After Beirut tightened airport controls, Iran reportedly shifted to more couriers carrying smaller amounts of cash or jewelry while moving hundreds of millions of dollars through Dubai. When Whish Money, a Lebanese transfer company, closed WaTaawanou’s donation account in October 2025, the charity directed donors to AQAH and other transfer firms. Hezbollah also reportedly planned a new AQAH branch in Tyre without signage. Treasury has meanwhile documented Hezbollah financiers transferring companies to relatives or associates and creating new entities amid sanctions pressure.

Many of the steps required for real financial pressure already overlap with obligations Lebanon accepted under its FATF action plan, including more terrorist-financing investigations and prosecutions, better identification of true owners, seizure of illicit cross-border currency and precious metals, and stronger targeted financial sanctions. Applied to Hezbollah, that means closing AQAH, prosecuting officials who move its money through personal accounts, shutting Jood and replacement companies, seizing Hezbollah-bound cash and gold, revoking the licenses of financial firms that facilitate the group, and cutting Hezbollah-linked businesses off from state contracts, licenses, and institutions. Claims that Lebanon has clamped down on Hezbollah’s finances, or gone as far as it reasonably can, should be judged against such outcomes—not regulations, administrative measures, or assurances of progress that do not produce measurable, real-world impact.

David Daoud is senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) focused on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs. Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at FDD focused on Syria and Iranian intervention in Arab affairs and the Levant. Follow David on X @Davidadaoud. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:22:21 +0100 FirstHandNews
Ukraine Is No Longer the Country Russia Thought It Was https://belimedia.com.ng/ukraine-is-no-longer-the-country-russia-thought-it-was https://belimedia.com.ng/ukraine-is-no-longer-the-country-russia-thought-it-was Understanding a country's strategic culture helps assess how it will react to crisis, negotiation, and national security events. Strategic culture generally is static and when it evolves, it happens slowly, as history, events, and culture accumulate over generations. In 2021, the prevailing view of Ukraine’s strategic culture was that it was a country focused on securing its national identity and sovereignty apart from Russia and it was a country prone to rely on negotiations and diplomacy. The balance between these two themes was about even with Ukraine leaning toward diplomacy and multilaterism over sovereignty when pushed by the international community. Most students of strategic culture did not assess that Ukraine would react to a Russian invasion with the military force that it has. Now students of strategic culture see the theme of independence and sovereignty as the key aspect of Ukraine’s strategic culture with a growing theme of being modern day military experts. The rapid transformation of the assessment of Ukrainian strategic culture is astounding. Either strategic culture academics got Ukraine wrong, or the Russian invasion changed Ukraine cataclysmically. I suspect it is a bit of both.

Strategic Culture

Strategic culture refers to a nation's shared beliefs, assumptions, and habitual behaviors regarding the use of force and the pursuit of security objectives. Jack L. Snyder introduced the term in 1977, arguing that a state's behavior cannot be explained by material capabilities or geography alone, but by those factors combined with history, cultural norms, and shared societal beliefs. Strategic culture is generally resistant to change. While it is often invoked to explain Russia's decision to invade Ukraine — its relevance to Ukraine's response has been comparatively overlooked.

Ukraine's Early Strategic Culture

Ukraine's strategic culture has been shaped by centuries of foreign domination and by its Soviet legacy. Early studies of strategic culture in independent Ukraine identified securing a national identity separate from Russia as the paramount objective. Those same early studies concluded that Ukraine favored diplomatic engagement, multilateral cooperation, and alliance-building over military action — pointing to Ukraine's surrender of its nuclear arsenal after the Soviet collapse and its acquiescence to Russia's 2014 seizure of Crimea as evidence. But this reading likely mistook constraint for preference. Ukraine was a newly independent state with a fledgling security establishment and military; it lacked the structure and capacity to stand up to either the United States or Russia, both of which pressed it toward disarmament and restraint. And, while significant events, neither of those two events were an immediate threat to Ukrainian independence. What looked like a cultural preference for negotiation may have been the best available option available for a young, under-resourced state. This misreading of Ukrainian resolve and strategic culture set Russia up for a catastrophic miscalculation that has cost over a million lives and will take decades for both countries to recover from.

The first principle of Ukraine’s strategic culture — safeguarding a distinct national identity — endures today. But the second focus on diplomacy and multinationalism-- has changed. If successful, the Russian invasion would have meant that this first principle would have to be abrogated and Ukrainian identity would once again have been subsumed by Moscow. Ukraine could not tolerate that: fighting for independence and Ukrainian identity outweighs alliance-building and negotiations as the organizing goal of its strategic culture. Today, Kyiv increasingly foot stomps aspects of Ukrainian identity that were suppressed under Soviet rule, and its foreign policy has grown more assertive, favoring offensive posture over purely defensive behavior. What has emerged is a culture that balances patience for international negotiation with adaptability and a hardened determination not to be conquered again, at any cost.

Two Defining Characteristics

Two characteristics of Ukrainian strategic culture stand out as key to explaining Ukrainian resistance to Russia:

Ukraine's growing emphasis on its Cossack heritage appears designed to construct a new state myth and reshape national self-perception from one of victimhood to one of warrior. Invoking the Cossacks — a self-governing, democratic, and militarily capable community prone to raids and revolt — underscores both Ukraine's independence and its capacity for military action. Domestically, images of the great hetmans now appear more prominently on currency and in textbooks.

Ukrainian strategic culture rests on the primacy of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity — values Russia has threatened or dismissed both historically and in the present. Language has become a central tool of this identity claim: early post-independence legislation established the primacy of Ukrainian language to rebuild a cohesive national identity, and that legislative push accelerated around the outbreak of armed conflict in 2014, alongside a marked cooling toward proposals to formalize Russian as a second official language. For Ukrainians, language is intrinsic to national identity. I recall being tutored in Ukrainian by an émigré in the late 1980s; he was a tough teacher, and he would grow angry whenever I mistakenly lapsed into Russian even though it was our common language and at times the only language in which we could communicate.

Ukrainian Strategic Culture Today

Ukraine's strategic culture now manifests as an asymmetrical, creative approach to security — one that offsets comparatively limited military resources with international partnerships, novel approaches to warfare, and disciplined strategic messaging. It emphasizes flexibility, resilience, gray-zone tactics, and pragmatic decision-making. Increasingly, we are seeing Ukraine promoting its tactics and military resources internationally.

Ukraine's strategic norms are still evolving, but the trajectory since independence is clear: independence and ingenuity have become the paramount, defining components of Ukrainian strategic culture, expressed through firm state priorities. A lasting orientation toward the West, paired with renewed emphasis on Slavic and Cossack roots, matters too, if somewhat less centrally. Above all, a study of modern day Ukrainian strategic culture tells us that Ukraine will do what it must to preserve its hard-won independence — while still maintaining its position as a respected leader within the global community.

Recently, the new Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Yevhenii Khmara, said

”Ukraine has always seen tragedy. Its history is a long inventory of it. What separates this generation from all the ones before is that it has a real chance to defeat the enemy.”

This tells you a lot about the mindset of senior Ukrainian decision makers and how they are messaging their people and the international community.

Why it Matters

Understanding Ukrainian strategic culture helps us to determine what approach to take to help end the war in Ukraine. Paramount for the country is ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. For Ukraine, that is nonnegotiable. Any negotiating concepts that leave room for other nations to impose themselves on Ukrainian decision making is a nonstarter for Kyiv. Recognizing Ukraine’s sacrifices not only in the last four years but the tragic historical road they have been on with pre Soviet Russia and the Soviets will go far in any negotiations. Finally, acknowledging and highlighting how well Ukraine has out played Russia would also go a long way. Next, I will present Russian strategic culture and then discuss where the two clash.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:22:21 +0100 FirstHandNews
It’s Time to Reengage North Korea https://belimedia.com.ng/its-time-to-reengage-north-korea https://belimedia.com.ng/its-time-to-reengage-north-korea The U.S. and South Korea have their annual joint military drills (Ulchi Freedom Shield) from August 17-27, focusing on countering the threat from North Korea of drones and cyber-attacks. President Trump said on Sunday that he had ordered the Pentagon to “substantially reduce” joint military exercises with South Korea, according to the New York Times.

North Korea said these military exercises “are more serious, provocative and dangerous than last year.”

Although North Korea routinely criticizes these joint military exercises, this year North Korea went on to say that the U.S. is pursuing a new nuclear strategy that lowers the threshold of using nuclear weapons that pushes global security “to the brink of a nuclear war.”

North Korea’s usual response to these annual joint military exercises is the launching of short-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan. This year there was no surprise when North Korea launched two ballistic missiles, saying the U.S. – South Korea drills were a “rehearsal for an aggressive war.” What was different was North Korea’s statement that the U.S. and South Korea and Japan formed a “nuclear alliance” that North Korea would respond to by building a new and higher level of nuclear deterrence.

This comes at a time when North Korea is providing Russia with combat troops, artillery shells and ballistic missiles for their war with Ukraine, while enhancing their relationship with China. The money North Korea receives from Russia is in the billions, with likely Russian assistance to North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and satellite programs.

Although North Korea has refrained from a seventh nuclear test – probably at the urging of China – they are building more nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver nuclear and conventional warheads. Recently, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, displayed to the world a new uranium enrichment facility with cascades of apparent new centrifuges to enrich uranium. This was in addition to the new uranium enrichment facility at North Korea’s nuclear complex in Yongbyon.

It was the issue of North Korea’s non-declared uranium enrichment sites that led to the failure of the 2019 Hanoi Summit. When Kim Jong Un offered to halt activities at Yongbyon, in return for the lifting of sanctions imposed on and after 2016, and President Trump responded with the request that North Korea declare “all” nuclear sites. Mr. Kim refused and that ended the Hanoi Summit.

Prior to and after the Hanoi Summit, North Korea has threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons in any conflict with South Korea. This is reminiscent of Russia’s President Vadimir Putin threat to use nuclear weapons in its invasion of and war with Ukraine. A war that North Korea joined, as an ally of Russia, with a recent Mutual Defense Treaty.

Hopefully, Ukraine will continue to receive the military support they need from the U.S. and NATO to protect its people and country from a revanchist Russian Federation that’s receiving significant military support from North Korea.

Messrs. Kim’s and Putin’s refrain of using nuclear weapons, with North Korea’s emphasis on building even more nuclear weapons, is concerning. Any use of nuclear weapons would be tragic for the world.

South Korea’s President, Lee Jae Myung, continues to reach out to North Korea, for talks that would lead to peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. To date, North Korea’s response has been disappointing. But President Lee persists, knowing that an emboldened North Korea, now aligned with Russia, could incite conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Conflict that could cause instability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

Having negotiated with North Korea for over ten years, it is apparent to me that North Korea wants a normal relationship with the U.S. A relationship that would give North Korea international legitimacy and access to financial institutions.

Now would be the time for President Trump to meet with Kim Jong Un. Such a meeting would deescalate North Korea’s tension with South Korea and the U.S. It would also give the U.S. the opportunity to move in a different direction with North Korea, with the goal of getting North Korea to halt its nuclear and missile programs, in return for the easing and lifting of sanctions and a dialogue to normalize bilateral relations.

North Korea is a defacto nuclear weapons state and recognizing them as such should not be too difficult. Getting North Korea to implement a moratorium on its nuclear and weapons programs would be progress. Sanctions relief and a path to a normal relationship with the U.S. could convince Kim Jong un that a mortarium would be in North Korea’s interest, while aligning with a revanchist and fickle Vladimir Putin is not in North Korea’s interest.

Our goal should continue to be the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, realizing that this could take years to achieve. Getting North Korea to halt its nuclear and missile programs and refraining from fomenting conflict with South Korea are immediate goals that are achievable, assuming a willingness to be flexible on sanctions relief and a dialogue on normalizing relations.

It is in the interest of world peace that the U.S. reengage with North Korea.

The author is a former Associate Director of National Intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 25 Aug 2026 14:15:49 +0100 FirstHandNews
Hyping Nuclear Threats Is Counterproductive https://belimedia.com.ng/hyping-nuclear-threats-is-counterproductive https://belimedia.com.ng/hyping-nuclear-threats-is-counterproductive Hyping threats of nuclear proliferation to justify war undermines legitimate counter-proliferation policies and paradoxically incentivizes proliferation. The Trump administration’s effort to justify the Iran war as a means of saving the world from a nuclear armed Iran rings as hollow as George W. Bush’s similar claims about Iraq a quarter century ago.

Both threats were real, until the United States and the international community reduced them. The 1990 Gulf War and the ensuing inspection regime ended Iraq’s nuclear weapons ambitions. A little over a decade later, the George W. Bush administration justified its war in Iraq with claims about Saddam’s supposed nuclear (and chemical and biological) weapons. Addressing questions about the veracity of those claims, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice argued at the time, “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” Secretary of State Colin Powell told the UN, “…the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction” Inspectors scoured Iraq in search of those weapons and found none, but the war dragged on at huge cost in lives and money.

The nuclear threat from Iran was and remains real, and like Iraq’s was also contained. Like Iraq, Iran signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but played cat and mouse games with its compliance for decades. Iran’s covert enrichment program received a boost in the 1980s when Tehran acquired centrifuges from Pakistan. Iran pursued a two-track strategy of building its civilian atomic energy program, which was open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a parallel covert program focused on nuclear weapons. For years Iran routinely denied access to IAEA inspectors who compiled extensive evidence of undeclared, weapon-related activities, which Iran denied. US and UN sanctions weakened Iran’s economy, but did not persuade Iran’s leaders to change course. The June 2025 US-Israel strikes severely damaged the critical facilities essential for Iran’s nuclear program.

At the very least, Iran’s enriched uranium and its centrifuges are buried under tons of rubble, unreachable and readily monitored. Iran’s path from buried canisters of 60% enriched gas to a usable weapon is difficult, time consuming, and depends on the very facilities and equipment that were reportedly destroyed. The threat of an Iranian bomb has been degraded, at least for now. The initial strikes, if as effective as claimed, have bought the international community time.

Buying time is a legitimate nonproliferation strategy. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015 relied on this strategy. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to a number of key limitations. Enrichment was restricted to low enriched uranium (LEU, below 3%), there were caps on the number and types of centrifuges, limits on centrifuge production and LEU stockpiles, canceling a plutonium project, and unfettered access to international inspectors. The deal was to last for 15 years.

Critics argued that the deal ignored the full range of Iran’s bad behavior. It shelved the IAEA’s list of unresolved issues related to nuclear weapons-related activities and did not eliminate Iran’s latent technical capabilities to build a bomb. The knowledge never goes away. Moreover, the international community lifted sanctions and Iran was allowed access to $1.7 billion of its own money that was seized because of sanctions, plus $400 million from a longstanding dispute over military sales.

The JCPOA was imperfect. It did not address the regime’s support for terrorism, but it was not designed to. It was designed to restrain the most important aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, its ability to produce weapons-usable materials, without which there would be no Iranian bomb. Had the Iranian regime abandoned the JCPOA, the United States and other backers of the agreement (the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, Germany, the EU and the UN) were poised to reinstate sanctions and take other actions as necessary to bring Iran into compliance.

That never happened because the Trump administration repudiated the JCPOA in 2018. That reversal freed Iran to expel the international inspectors, ramp up its enrichment program, and reignite fears of a hidden nuclear danger. Bombing the facilities in 2026 achieved similar goals as the JCPOA, but at a much higher price in blood and treasure. The nuclear threat has been contained. Yet, the war continues and the Trump administration continues to cite the Iranian nuclear threat as its chief war aim.

We should assume that the Iranian regime remains committed to obtaining nuclear weapons. The JCPOA would have delayed the realization of this ambition by 15 years. The 2025-26 bombings also delayed realization, although it is unclear for how long. Hyping nuclear threats, however, is counterproductive, because it persuades others of a degree of nuclear danger that does not currently exist, and incentivizes others, like Saudi Arabia, that they too must pursue a weapon, if only to deter Iran.

The United States may have other reasons for continuing the war with Iran, but they should be clearly articulated along with the price that Americans will pay to achieve them.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 25 Aug 2026 14:15:49 +0100 FirstHandNews
Beyond Military Interoperability: The Coalition Challenge of Limited War https://belimedia.com.ng/beyond-military-interoperability-the-coalition-challenge-of-limited-war https://belimedia.com.ng/beyond-military-interoperability-the-coalition-challenge-of-limited-war In our last two articles for The Cipher Brief, Sami Omari and I explained why modern limited wars are so challenging for democracies.

We argued that military superiority is necessary but not sufficient for strategic victory: Afghanistan and Iraq showed that battlefield success does not guarantee lasting political outcomes, and Iran may yet prove the same point.

We also examined why democracies struggle to translate tactical success into strategic achievement: fragmented institutions, electoral cycles, public opinion and media scrutiny complicate the political resolve required for prolonged wars of choice.

The challenge becomes greater when democracies fight as coalitions.

Alliances combine military power, share costs and draw on capabilities few states could sustain independently.

But military integration does not produce political unity.

Each member remains accountable to its own electorate, parliament and national interests. A coalition may therefore be highly integrated on the battlefield while remaining politically and strategically decentralised.

In prolonged limited wars, military interoperability is not enough if allies cannot sustain the political will, industrial capacity and common strategic purpose required to endure.

II. Why Democracies Fight in Coalitions

The nuclear age made direct great-power war prohibitively dangerous, shifting competition towards limited wars, insurgencies and proxy conflicts.

Western militaries increasingly moved towards smaller professional forces equipped with more advanced weapons, shaped by technological progress and new strategic realities.

After 1991, the Gulf War and subsequent operations against weaker adversaries appeared to vindicate the effectiveness of Western expeditionary forces.

But smaller professional militaries and increasingly expensive weapons also made allies progressively dependent upon one another. Coalitions allowed democracies to aggregate military power, intelligence, logistics and specialised capabilities without each maintaining the forces and industrial capacity required for large-scale national mobilisation.

For thirty years, that system seemed to work.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed these vulnerabilities over several years; the US-Israeli war with Iran is now testing many of the same assumptions.

Both demonstrate that limited wars can become contests of manpower, industrial capacity and political will.

Of these pressures, political endurance is perhaps the most difficult for democracies to sustain.

III. The Political Endurance Problem

For democracies, fighting a long, limited war depends as much on political legitimacy at home as on military capability.

In wars of choice, where national survival is not at stake, governments must continually justify why the costs of war remain necessary.

Initial public support may create space for intervention, but it erodes as casualties rise, costs accumulate, and the prospect of a clear strategic outcome grows uncertain.

Casualties alone do not determine support.

Democratic societies have accepted heavy losses when citizens believed a war was legitimate, necessary and winnable.

The deeper problem emerges when the link between sacrifice and strategic purpose becomes unclear. As confidence in success fades, losses that once seemed tolerable turn politically damaging. Elections, parliamentary opposition, media scrutiny and changes of government then allow declining public confidence to reshape national strategy. Afghanistan illustrated this over two decades.

Western military superiority was never in doubt, but political will steadily weakened. The longer the war continued without a convincing political end state, the harder it became for democratic leaders to explain what more time, money and lives would achieve.

Authoritarian states face similar pressures but, without competitive elections and independent media, can better insulate strategic decisions from public opinion.

Against democratic opponents, this creates a critical asymmetry: a weaker adversary may not need to win militarily, only survive long enough for democratic political will to erode.

IV. The Industrial Endurance Problem

Political endurance is only one side of the problem. The other is material.

Since the Cold War, Western militaries have increasingly relied on technology instead of mass.

Smaller professional forces employ sophisticated aircraft, ships, missiles and networked systems aimed at achieving decisive results while minimising casualties. But each generation of weapons is more expensive and complex, production runs shrink, and replacing battlefield losses becomes harder as war drags on.

The United States can absorb these pressures better than smaller allies because of its defence budget, technological base and industrial scale.

Even so, American forces became smaller, while defence-industry consolidation reduced the number of manufacturers capable of producing specialised weapons. For smaller allies, limited budgets forced difficult choices between personnel, platforms and munitions, while dependence on American weapons, software, supply chains and sustainment deepened.

Quick wars against weaker opponents long obscured these problems.

Ukraine has brought them sharply to the surface, while the Iran conflict is testing them anew. Advanced weapons can be consumed faster than peacetime factories replace them, while cheap drones and missiles allow weaker states to impose continuing costs on advanced rivals.

This creates an uncomfortable paradox.

Military interoperability strengthens coalitions on the battlefield but also creates industrial dependencies that are difficult to escape. In long, limited wars, technological superiority matters only as long as the coalition can afford, produce and replace what it consumes.

V. A Coalition of Decentralised Systems

Coalitions do not solve the political endurance problem; if anything, they make it worse.

Integrating militaries does not erase national sovereignty. Allied forces can share command structures, intelligence and interoperable systems, but each government still answers to its own voters, parliament and interests.

Afghanistan made that painfully obvious. NATO operated under one mission on paper, but contributing states imposed their own caveats and restrictions on where and how their troops could operate.

Those caveats were not bureaucratic quirks; they reflected different domestic political pressures and appetites for risk. They made burden-sharing and coalition cohesion harder than the unified-command narrative suggested.

Of the contemporary great powers, the US above all can supply the backbone of an international military coalition: intelligence, logistics and advanced capabilities.

What it cannot do is fuse the sovereign political systems behind every other contributor.

Middle and smaller powers like Australia and Canada still matter because they bring niche capabilities, diplomatic weight and political legitimacy while operating inside their own domestic constraints.

Coalitions may fight as one integrated military network, but the statecraft holding that network together stays stubbornly decentralised.

VI. From Military Interoperability to Strategic Interoperability

This gap between integrated military networks and decentralised statecraft is the central weakness of contemporary coalition warfare.

Modern limited wars therefore require more than military interoperability. They require strategic interoperability.

Sovereign allies must be able to coordinate military, political, economic and industrial power to pursue and sustain a common strategic objective.

This does not mean supranational government or surrendered sovereignty, but unity of strategic effect even when national policies differ.

In practice, this could involve standing allied mechanisms that integrate political planning, defence production, economic measures, strategic communications and military operations around an agreed political end state before a crisis becomes a prolonged war.

Conclusion

Across these three articles, we have argued that military superiority alone cannot guarantee strategic victory; that democratic institutions often struggle to turn battlefield success into sustainable political outcomes; and that these difficulties multiply when democracies fight as coalitions.

The endurance of democratic alliances will depend on more than their ability to fight together.

Sovereign governments must sustain public support, share political and military burdens, and remain committed to common strategic purpose when conflicts become longer and more costly than expected.

Democratic accountability need not become a strategic weakness, but preserving sovereignty while sustaining collective action will require greater political cohesion.

The ultimate obstacle is not technology or concepts, but political will: overcoming domestic divisions and institutional rivalries to sustain common purpose.

As the era of AI unfolds, technology will keep changing warfare, but it cannot repair the organisational weaknesses of those who use it.

Strategic interoperability ultimately depends on whether democracies can find the will to build it.

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Tue, 25 Aug 2026 14:15:49 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside Iran’s New Wartime Leadership https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-irans-new-wartime-leadership https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-irans-new-wartime-leadership

Tehran’s new power brokers

A wave of assassinations rebuilt Iran’s leadership from the top down, leaving a severely wounded supreme leader and a security establishment now calling the shots. Tehran, however, isn’t saying who is actually in charge. The silence is part of the narrative; who are the country’s power players?

Earlier this month, Iranian state media did something it had never done before.

Mehr News, an outlet controlled by the country’s Islamic Development Organization, released a video titled “First Images of the Leader,” showing Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei addressing a small group of students. The footage was undated. It came, however, days after Israeli outlets reported the 56-year-old cleric was in “extremely critical condition,” and it appears to have done little to settle the question consuming Iran’s political class: is anyone actually running the country right now.

The clip echoed a similar undated video IRIB released in March, showing Khamenei teaching religious sciences. President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged this week that reaching him has been “very difficult,” though he described their last exchange as constructive.

Multiple sources close to Pezeshkian’s administration told IranWire that no cabinet minister has met with Khamenei since the February 28 strike that killed his father, Ali Khamenei, and that officials “would not be surprised” to hear news of his death.

Iranian authorities have repeatedly denied he’s incapacitated. But the man now holding life-tenure authority over Iran’s armed forces, judiciary and clerical establishment hasn’t spoken publicly, delivered a sermon, or appeared unedited on camera since taking the post in March.

“The main issue for U.S. policymakers — especially any president — is whether the new leadership in Iran, or any leadership we can currently anticipate, is likely to depart materially from the strategic policies of the previous leadership,” Norman Roule, a former CIA officer who spent 34 years managing programs related to Iran and the Middle East, tells The Cipher Brief. “The evidence to date suggests no fundamental break.”

The vacuum at the top didn’t stay empty for long.

A Leadership Rebuilt Through Killings

The cascade began on February 28, when a joint U.S.-Israeli strike killed longstanding leader Ali Khamenei along with Mohammad Pakpour, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ commander-in-chief, and a string of other senior officials. An interim leadership council, made up of Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei and cleric Alireza Arafi, held the state together for less than a week before the Assembly of Experts named Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s third Supreme Leader on March 8.

The choice was unusual on its face. The Islamic Republic was founded on the overthrow of hereditary monarchy, yet its clerical establishment had just installed the son of the man he replaced. Mojtaba lacked the religious credentials typically required of a Supreme Leader. He was widely regarded as a hojatoleslam, a mid-ranking cleric, rather than an ayatollah — yet he had spent nearly two decades as his father’s gatekeeper and enjoyed deep loyalty inside the Revolutionary Guard.

President Trump, who had labeled him “unacceptable” during the war, later told Fox News that the succession was not one his own father had wanted, adding, “their leadership is gone, their second leadership is gone, now their third leadership is in trouble.”

Roule, however, cautions against reading the new bench as a break from what came before it. Most of Iran’s current leaders, he notes, “rose within institutions shaped by Ali Khamenei and were trusted, promoted, or shaped within, and by the system he developed over years of rule.”

Roule points to the generational math: Pezeshkian, Mohsen Rezaee and Ali Reza Zolghadr were about 25 years old at the time of the 1979 revolution; Ahmad Vahidi was 21; Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Sadeq Amoli Larijani around 18; Mojtaba Khamenei just 10.

“For this group, the 1979 Revolution remained the ideological foundation of the system, but the Iran-Iraq War and the post-2003 campaign for regional influence were more important professional experiences,” Roule explains. “Most are veterans of the Iran-Iraq War or were directly shaped by it.”

The current command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has followed the same brutal pattern.

Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the Guard’s aerospace force, was killed in a strike in June 2025. Pakpour, who had succeeded Hajizadeh’s predecessor Hossein Salami, was killed at the outset of the U.S.-Israeli campaign in February. His successor, Ahmad Vahidi, a Quds Force founder and former interior minister with an Interpol red notice tied to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, was formally installed as commander-in-chief on March 1.

Unverified reports of Vahidi’s own death circulated in Tehran in late May and again in early June; Iranian, Israeli or American officials have confirmed none, and Vahidi continues to be listed as the IRGC’s active chief.

A Crackdown That Fits the Moment

The uncertainty at the top has coincided with a sharp rise in executions and threatened executions, months after the January protests that shook the regime.

Austin Sarat, a professor of jurisprudence and political science, says the war and the unrest have compounded each other rather than one driving the other alone.

“The protests and the war have fueled — it’s like putting a little bit of an accelerant into something that’s already pretty flammable,” Sarat tells The Cipher Brief. “The protests were, I think, much more trigger than the war itself. The war has just provided yet another excuse, because it’s jacked up nationalist fervor.”

Sarat is skeptical that outside pressure, including past White House rhetoric threatening consequences over executions, has had much bearing on Tehran’s calculus.

“The administration has said nothing about human rights abuses, let alone execution practices around the world,” he says, underscoring that any outside leverage is more likely to come from Europe than Washington. He views the surge itself as a familiar survival tactic for a leadership still finding its footing.

“It’s not a kind of unfamiliar tactic for a regime new to power to want to flex its muscle and terrorize the population,” he observes. “This is a survival moment, and they are going to do what they are going to do to preserve the essential character of their regime.”

The Guard Consolidates Around the Vacuum

With the younger Khamenei largely unseen, the Revolutionary Guard didn’t sit on its hands. It moved fast, filling top posts through official decrees.

Along with Vahidi, the Supreme Leader’s office named Mostafa Izadi as deputy IRGC commander, Ali Azmaei to head the IRGC Navy and Hossein Taeb to lead the Basij paramilitary force, filling six senior military posts vacated by wartime deaths.

Mohsen Rezaee, who commanded the IRGC from 1981 to 1997, was separately appointed as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the Supreme National Security Council. This post opened up, according to Rose Kelanic, director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, after Zolghadr was pushed out.

Kelanic argues the reshuffle amounts to more than a personnel change.

“Mojtaba Khamenei’s role appears to be that of a figurehead and potential scapegoat, enjoying far less authority than his father, whom he replaced,” Kelanic tells The Cipher Brief. “The real power rests with Ghalibaf, Vahidi and Rezaee, who are all career IRGC officers, which functionally means that Iranian government authority has shifted even further from civilian control to military control.”

That shift, she continues, carries its own risk for any settlement with Washington.

“When military leaders assume control as heads of state in wartime, they tend to make worst-case assumptions about adversaries’ intentions, view compromise as weakness, and favor offensive military strategies over defensive ones,” Kelanic points out.

Roule, meanwhile, frames the Guard’s rise in institutional rather than personal terms, and says the war has widened rather than preserved its reach. Estimates of how much of Iran’s economy the IRGC touches “vary widely — roughly from a fifth to a third,” he says, depending on whether one counts only directly controlled firms or also affiliated holding companies, pension funds and sanctions-evasion networks.

“A better way to think about the IRGC is not simply as a military organization with commercial interests, but as a central actor in a state-security-economic network,” Roule notes.

Ghalibaf’s Quiet Climb to the Center

The other figure benefiting from the uncertainty at the top is Ghalibaf, the parliament speaker and former IRGC commander who has spent the war years turning what is traditionally a legislative post into something closer to a shadow foreign ministry.

Ghalibaf, a two-time presidential also-ran who trailed Pezeshkian in the first round of the 2024 election, has emerged as Tehran’s principal interlocutor in the indirect talks with Washington, serving simultaneously as Iran’s special envoy to China and as a bridge between the political and military-security establishments that Pezeshkian, a physician by training with no roots in the security services, has struggled to command.

Parliament re-elected Ghalibaf to a seventh consecutive term as speaker in late May, with 235 of 271 votes cast, as reports circulated of friction between Pezeshkian and the new Supreme Leader’s office. Judiciary chief Mohseni-Ejei congratulated Ghalibaf on the vote by calling him a “tireless and battle-hardened jihadist leader” who had waged jihad “both in the field and in diplomacy” during the war.

Roule warns against reading Ghalibaf’s prominence as a formal power grab.

“His current prominence should not be confused with general supremacy over Pezeshkian,” he says. “Pezeshkian nonetheless remains president, heads the executive branch, and formally chairs the Supreme National Security Council. There is no evidence that Ghalibaf has assumed any of the presidency’s general constitutional authorities.”

His influence, Roule highlights, “is best understood as issue-specific power produced by circumstances, his political standing, longstanding IRGC relationships, and wartime delegation.”

Who Actually Holds the Reins

What emerges from the past five months of conflict, however, is a regime governed less by the clerical hierarchy that has defined the Islamic Republic since 1979 than by an overlapping wartime trio.

A Supreme Leader whose authority is formally absolute but whose physical capacity to exercise it remains unverified. An IRGC command structure rebuilt twice over through assassination and now operating with wide latitude, alongside a parliament speaker who has converted legislative standing into genuine diplomatic weight.

Still, Roule sees continuity as the most likely outcome even if Mojtaba’s health worsens further.

“If Mojtaba Khamenei becomes seriously incapacitated or dies, the most likely outcome absent a successful mass uprising or a major elite fracture is continuity rather than reversal on the issues of greatest concern to the United States,” he says. “The IRGC would remain a central power center, and the system has constitutional procedures for interim leadership and selection of a successor.”

He also points out that if Mojtaba’s death were tied to the war, “the state would almost certainly use a martyrdom narrative to reinforce regime legitimacy and resistance.”

Kelanic is less sanguine about what that continuity means for diplomacy. Iran, she stresses, will also grow harder to negotiate with simply because power is now split among rivals rather than concentrated in one office, leaving Washington without a clear address for any deal.

“The IRGC’s strengthened rule over a weaker civilian leadership makes reaching a peace deal harder,” Kelanic adds, “which is one of many ways the Iran War has backfired.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:02:19 +0100 FirstHandNews
Open&Source Intel Makes U.S. Troops an Easier Target for Iran https://belimedia.com.ng/open-source-intel-makes-us-troops-an-easier-target-for-iran https://belimedia.com.ng/open-source-intel-makes-us-troops-an-easier-target-for-iran Iran is reading American service members’ social media feeds to deadly effect. The fact is that not all intelligence must be gleaned from secret, closed sources for it to be effective, and Tehran has made use of public and open-source data to target U.S. forces with psychological and kinetic attacks. Until the Pentagon updates and enforces its policies on social media posting and personal device security, American servicemembers will be sitting ducks.

Admiral Brad Cooper, the commander of CENTCOM, warned in a letter last month to U.S. forces that Iran is using social media posts from personnel, such as footage of U.S. bases, to improve its lethality. For example, a video of soldiers running for shelter during Iranian strikes helped Iran perform a battle damage assessment of their strikes, including their precision, and understand base layout for future attacks.

Iran has long exploited open-source data to target U.S. forces and allies. Two years ago, Iran doxxed 2,200 Israel Defense Forces personnel relying exclusively on open-source data. In April 2026, the Department of the Navy warned service members that unnamed cyber adversaries (obviously referring to Iran) are reaching out on social media and conducting phishing attacks, urging sailors to turn on privacy settings and refrain from posting on social media. The same month, Iranian hacker group Handala sent threatening WhatsApp messages to U.S. troops and published the supposed personal information of 2,300 U.S. service members stationed in the Persian Gulf.

Open-source data is broader than just Instagram and Facebook. Iran exploits data breaches to collect information and identify and send text messages to former Israeli defense personnel to threaten them and to attempt to recruit them for espionage purposes.

Iran is exploiting Signaling System 7 (SS7), an older telecom protocol for roaming, to identify devices with U.S. SIM cards, according to threat intelligence platform Mobile Surveillance Monitor. Using SS7, Iran was reportedly able to pinpoint hotels that housed U.S. personnel and contractors.

Iran can also simply buy data for its malicious campaigns. CENTCOM stated in a letter to Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) that it has been warned that Iran may have used commercially available location data used by digital advertisers to “target and surveil” U.S. personnel. While the phone numbers behind advertising IDs are anonymized, Iran could use them to track devices in specific areas such as military bases. The Pentagon conceded that these IDs are not yet disabled by default on government-issued phones.

None of these vulnerabilities should be a surprise to defense officials. A U.S. Government Accountability Office report from October 2025 found that social media posts from service members and their families or friends provide adversaries with names, ranks, and locations that can be pieced together to reveal information about U.S. force formations and operations. Wyden and his Democratic and Republican colleagues in the House and Senate sent a letter to the Pentagon’s chief information officer in May 2026 urging more secure personal data practices and blaming current vulnerabilities on the department’s “failure to prioritize this threat and implement common sense cyber defenses recommended by federal cybersecurity experts.” The House version of the annual defense bill, meanwhile, calls for the department to better understand and train personnel about how adversaries can exploit commercial technologies to identify and monitor U.S. personnel.

To curb adversarial intelligence collection opportunities, the Department of Defense (DoD) should expand operational security requirements across the force.

First, the DoD should harden government and personal devices by requiring removal of all Mobile Advertising IDs (MAIDs) on personal and DoD-distributed devices for personnel in sensitive areas. Without IDs, the locations and metadata cannot be tracked or associated with individual users and sold to adversaries posing as commercial buyers.

Next, the DoD should create and enforce stringent policies for social media posting. Personnel should be prohibited from uploading unofficial photos and videos of military facilities or that otherwise relate to their roles and should limit the amount of information they post about their roles on platforms like LinkedIn. Government devices should have their cameras disabled or removed unless required for specific purposes, and GPS should be disabled by default. DoD should also consider providing troops with alternative devices for personal use with GPS disabled and the cameras removed.

Additionally, the DoD should monitor breached data to understand what is publicly available about all its personnel. Knowing when data is exposed will allow the DoD to identify potential threats before Iran acts and begin fixing the issue as soon as it occurs. The department can also use this information to enable mandatory password and credential rotation when information is exposed. The Pentagon should also consider encouraging or requiring additional methods of authentication, such as passkeys and biometrics, for all devices and accounts

Finally, Congress should pass regulatory reforms to transition from SS7 to new signaling technology. SS7 is an outdated system and cannot guarantee secure communications, even if new updates were to be completed. Changing the system will allow service members abroad to communicate with loved ones without leading adversaries to their location.

These measures will limit the open-source data that, at present, is readily available to Iran and other adversaries. If the DoD continues to permit unrestricted use of personal devices abroad, Iran and other adversaries will continue exploiting their vulnerabilities to locate, study, and threaten American forces.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:02:19 +0100 FirstHandNews
Where Did Venezuela’s Oil Billions Go? https://belimedia.com.ng/where-did-venezuelas-oil-billions-go https://belimedia.com.ng/where-did-venezuelas-oil-billions-go “We’re taking a lot of oil from Venezuela, and we’re getting along great with them. Billions and billions of barrels of oil is coming out of Venezuela, one of the most fertile places for oil in the world. And as you know, it was a forty-eight minute war, lasted forty-eight minutes. And we paid for the war with what we’ve taken out many, many, many times. Where have you heard that before? You haven’t heard that before. It’s the old fashioned way. Right? It’s the old fashioned way. To the victor belong the spoils. Right?”

That was President Trump, speaking impromptu on August 5, during a campaign-style speech on the U.S. economy at the Red Rock Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada.

I use that quote as a way to get into the serious question of what has happened to the now estimated $13 billion worth of Venezuelan oil that’s been sold since January 9, when President Trump announced his Executive Order (EO), Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People.

The EO set up so-called "Foreign Government Deposit Funds" meaning funds from the sale of Venezuelan oil or other natural resources from that country held by the U.S. Government in designated U.S. Treasury Department or other accounts in a “custodial and government capacity.”

Every six months, according to Trump’s January 9, EO, “The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and final reports to the Congress” about those funds.

Apparently, no such report has so far been sent to Congress, although it would seem at least one should have gone to Capitol Hill last month.

Venezuelan oil money has been generated and serious amounts have been received by the U.S., as Trump himself has claimed many times.

For example, back during his January 9 press conference with oil company leaders at the White House, Trump announced that Venezuela had already given the U.S. 30 million barrels of what had been previously-sanctioned oil that it had on hand.

“That's about $4 billion worth,” Trump announced back in January, adding, “And it's on our way to the United States right now. And we want to thank Venezuela for that. And we're working very well with them, obviously, or they wouldn't have been so generous.”

There has been no accounting that I know of for that first gift of $4 billion worth of Venezuelan oil.

On January 28, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that funds from Venezuelan oil sales in the “short term” would go to a bank account in Qatar, but he added, “Ultimately, it will be [held in] a U.S. Treasury blocked account in the United States.”

Rubio explained to the committee that the U.S. “at the front end [will] say this is what this [oil payment] money can be spent on, these things. We will submit [that list] to them [the Venezuelan government and] they will submit to us a budget request. We want to use this money for these things and part of the proceeds will go to fund an audit process to make sure that that's how the money is being spent.”

Rubio told the committee one payment of $300 million had already been made “to keep [Venezuelan] sanitation workers, police officers, government workers on staff,” and that it was from Venezuelan oil sales totaling $500 million. Of the remaining $200 million, Rubio said, “It's still sitting in the [Qatar] account is my understanding at this time [back on January 28].”

Rubio added that he thought this U.S.-control of Venezuelan oil sales funds might involve “another $2.5 billion-to-$3 billion” of Venezuelan oil income.

But Rubio made clear, “The permanent structure we want to see in the long term. We just want them to have a normal industry where the [oil] companies [U.S. and others] are involved in there. They're [the oil companies] selling it [Venezuelan oil] directly to the [world] market and we're [the U.S. government] out of that game.”

In March, the U.S. Treasury issued licenses to entities to do business with Petróleos de Venezuela S.A, or PDVSA, and handle, transport, refine, and market Venezuelan-origin oil under strict operational limits. One limit: All payments for the Venezuelan oil go to a special U.S.-controlled account and not to sanctioned Venezuelan entities such as PDVSA.

In other words, the U.S. would control the cash flow back to Venezuela for its oil sales.

On April 1, Bloomberg reported the estimated value of U.S.-controlled Venezuelan oil exports had increased from $600 million in January \ -- about 380,000 barrels per day -- to about $3.7 billion in April alone -- about 1.1 million barrels per day.

On April 16, the State Department’s Michael Kozak, a senior official from the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, disclosed “around $3 billion” of Venezuelan oil revenue had moved through the U.S. accounts “paying the salaries of government workers in Venezuela; buying supplies for their oil industry, and so on, other things that benefit the public.”

Kozak also said the U.S. accounting firm, KPMG would be making quarterly audit reports on the Venezuelan oil bank accounts and providing them to the State Department.

One day after Kozak’s appearance, on April 17, four Democratic members of Congress sent a letter to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Acting Comptroller General Orice Williams Brown, requesting “an audit of the United States-Venezuela energy deal that was announced by President Trump on January 6.”

They asked that “the review cover both the period of time that the funds were routed to accounts in Qatar, the current arrangement for funds to be routed to U.S. accounts controlled by the Treasury Department, and any other successor mechanism utilized by the Administration to facilitate the sale of Venezuelan oil, custody of these assets, and disbursement of these funds.”

The GAO has since confirmed they have an investigation underway.

On June 3, Roxanna Vigil, a former senior sanctions policy advisor at the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, raised questions about the Venezuelan oil funds in a Council on Foreign Relations article.

Vigil wrote, “In the first four months of the United States exerting control over Venezuela’s oil exports, almost one hundred million barrels of oil worth an estimated $8 billion have flowed through a process marked by no transparency and minimal oversight.”

She added, “While the Trump administration has repeatedly framed this control as benefiting both countries, it has not publicly disclosed how much Venezuelan oil it has sold, how much revenue it has collected, or how it has used those funds since seizing control of the country’s oil exports following the January 3, military intervention that deposed Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro.”

On June 24, earthquakes struck Venezuela leaving more than 5,000 dead, 16,700 injured and damage the World Bank estimated would cost some $19.7 billion to reconstruct. The Trump administration coordinated a humanitarian response including more than $386 million for which polls have shown Venezuelans are grateful.

However, those polls have also shown Venezuelans resent the poor handling of the disaster by acting-President Delcy Rodríguez and are troubled by the Trump administration’s open support of her relatively unpopular government.

On July 22, the Financial Times published a story that led by saying, “The Trump administration has collected more than US$13 billion in revenues from Venezuelan oil sales this year, according to FT calculations, but has said almost nothing about what has happened to the money.”

The FT story went on to say, “But six months after the U.S. seized control of the funds, economists say the evidence of a recovery in Venezuela is relatively muted — a potential sign that the U.S. has not sent all the revenues back to Caracas.”

The FT also said, “The Venezuelan government set up a website to track the revenue from U.S.-run oil sales, but it has only one entry — a transfer of US$300 million in March.”

Since the FT story, almost everyone has used the $13 billion figure as the amount of money that has passed through the U.S.-run accounts. However, Trump, himself, when asked about that figure on July 27, during a press interview on Air Force One, replied, “$13 billion, I think even more than that.”

On August 4, during an interview by Fox News, Trump said, “Venezuela’s really a totally different place. Right now we’re taking out hundreds of billions of dollars, they’re taking out hundreds of billions of dollars it’s actually a different place.”

Of course, Trump’s statement is not true, “hundreds of billions” is more than twice Venezuela’s annual gross national product. But there are billions of dollars from Venezuelan oil sales yet to be accounted for and neither the Donald Trump or Delcy Rodriguez governments are trustworthy when that kind of money is involved.

Read more national security insights from experienced experts exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

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Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:02:19 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Return of the Essential Art: Electronic Warfare and the Lessons of the Russia&Ukraine War https://belimedia.com.ng/the-return-of-the-essential-art-electronic-warfare-and-the-lessons-of-the-russia-ukraine-war https://belimedia.com.ng/the-return-of-the-essential-art-electronic-warfare-and-the-lessons-of-the-russia-ukraine-war A Post-Cold War Assumption That No Longer Holds

For three decades, the Alliance operated under a dangerous assumption: that the electromagnetic spectrum was a permissive sanctuary. Lulled into complacency by counter-terrorism campaigns that allowed precision strikes and networked command to go largely unchallenged, we forgot how to fight in the dark. The Russia-Ukraine war has violently corrected that amnesia. Today, electronic warfare is not an enabling function; it is the apex of modern combat power. If a force cannot survive in the spectrum, its sensors are blind, its networks collapse, and its kill chains are severed.

The Alliance stands at a critical inflection point. The time for incremental modernization has passed; this short piece is a call to arms to reclaim our operational advantage. The war in Ukraine has proven that the half-life of a technological advantage is measured in days, not decades. If we do not aggressively institutionalize agility across our warfighting commands, we risk entering the next conflict blind, deaf, and disconnected.

Russia’s Spectrum Offensive at Scale

Russia entered the war with a deep inventory of EW systems, rooted in Soviet-era investment and modernized over the past decade. From strategic GPS denial across Eastern Europe to tactical jamming of drones, radios, and artillery sensors, Russian forces use EW to degrade decision-making, disrupt fires, and blind ISR, continuously, at scale, across every echelon.

This is not a supplementary effort; it is a structural pillar of Russian combat operations. According to analyses by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia achieved a staggering density of EW coverage, deploying a major electronic warfare system approximately every 10 kilometers along the front line during peak operations. This continuous, layered spectrum defense can be understood across two distinct operational tiers:

1. Strategic and Operational Denial

At the macro level, Russia has deployed high-powered, truck-mounted systems designed to blind NATO and Ukrainian airborne intelligence and disrupt satellite architectures.

  • The Krasukha-4: Designed to protect high-value assets, this system emits powerful jamming signals targeting airborne early warning and control aircraft (AWACS), radar reconnaissance drones, and low-Earth orbit spy satellites. By targeting X-band and Ku-band radars, it degrades long-range aerial surveillance, forcing ISR platforms to operate at suboptimal standoff distances.
  • Murmansk-BN: Operating at the strategic level, this system targets high-frequency (HF) military communications up to thousands of kilometers away, aiming to disrupt the operational coordination of enemy forces on a theater-wide scale.

2. Tactical Interdiction and the Defeat of Precision Munitions

At the tactical edge, Russian EW is integrated down to the battalion level to create local bubbles of spectrum denial. This has profoundly affected the effectiveness of Western-supplied precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

  • Neutralizing GPS-Guided Weapons: Systems like the R-330Zh Zhitel and Pole-21 have been explicitly used to create GPS-denied environments. Because GPS signals travelling from space are relatively weak by the time they reach Earth, localized jammers easily overpower them. RUSI has noted that this jamming significantly degraded the accuracy of key weapons, including Excalibur 155mm guided artillery shells, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), and GMLRS rockets fired by HIMARS. Without GPS, these munitions must rely on inertial navigation, which drastically reduces their hit probability.
  • Drone Suppression and ISR Severance: In the early months of the war, Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2s operated with near impunity. As Russian forces entrenched, their EW architecture caught up. By blasting the 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz frequencies used by commercial and military drones, systems like the Borisoglebsk-2 sever the command links and video feeds between drones and their operators. This strips frontline units of their "eyes," returning artillery duels to grid-square estimations rather than precision strikes.

Ukraine’s Rapid Adaptation Under Fire

Ukraine’s response has been just as instructive. Forced to adapt under fire, its forces built a distributed EW ecosystem spanning national infrastructure to handheld infantry jammers, fielding and replacing thousands of systems in months, not years. EW operators are now embedded in maneuver, air defense, and fires units. The war has become a laboratory of spectrum conflict with drones jammed out of the sky, counter-battery radars blinded, munitions diverted, networks disrupted. EW is both shield and sword: protecting friendly systems while blinding the adversary.

While Russia relies heavily on legacy, mass-manufactured, centralized platforms, Ukraine’s survival has depended on democratizing the electromagnetic fight. By abandoning rigid peacetime acquisition processes, Ukraine has successfully pioneered a "DevOps" warfighting philosophy, prioritizing the rapid, iterative deployment of real-world software capabilities and commercial hardware modifications.

Ukraine has mastered the art of using the electromagnetic spectrum not just for defense, but to actively hunt Russian forces. By integrating EW operators directly into fires and maneuver units, the spectrum has become the primary hunting ground for target acquisition.

EW as a Mass Capability

The scale is the lesson. Both sides are fielding equipment and training operators at a pace NATO hasn’t matched since the Cold War. EW is no longer a boutique, specialized function; it’s a mass capability woven into daily battle rhythm and treated as a core determinant of survivability and lethality. In Ukraine, EW isn’t an adjunct to maneuver or fires. It’s inseparable from them.

For NATO and allied forces, Ukraine's experience demonstrates that surviving a high-intensity conflict requires transitioning from static, hardware-centric platforms to data-centric environments where software updates can be continuously deployed to the tactical edge under fire.

NATO’s Vulnerability Without EW Dominance

The implications for NATO are stark. Precision fires need assured spectrum access. Air defense needs resilient sensors and networks. ISR needs unjammed collection. Command and control needs protected communications. Without robust EW, all of it evaporates. This war shows EW is both the first layer of protection and the first layer of lethality, the foundation everything else rests on.

Rebuilding EW as a Core Competency

Reconstituting EW will take more than new hardware, it demands a cultural shift. Commanders must think in terms of spectrum maneuver, fires, and protection as naturally as kinetic operations. Exercises need realistic EW conditions, not sanitized ranges. Training pipelines must expand, and offensive and defensive EW forces must be rebuilt at every echelon, from squad to strategic level. Doctrine must treat EW as a decisive domain, not a supporting function.

The Essential Art Returns

The essential art of warfare in the twenty-first century has been violently reintroduced, and the electromagnetic spectrum is no longer an invisible enabler; it is the primary maneuver space where the first shots are fired, and the deepest vulnerabilities are exposed. NATO must reclaim this domain fully, urgently, and at scale.

For too long, the Alliance rested on the laurels of post-Cold War permissive environments, operating under the dangerous assumption that our networks would always connect, our drones would always fly, and our precision munitions would always find their mark. The battlefields of Ukraine have permanently shattered that assumption. We can no longer afford the luxury of rigid, decade-long peacetime acquisition cycles. Surviving the modern fight requires a fundamental paradigm shift: embracing a "DevOps" warfighting philosophy that prioritizes rapid, iterative deployment of software-defined capabilities directly to the tactical edge.

Lethality today is inextricably linked to digital survival. If we cannot protect our data lineage, secure our networks, and continuously update our countermeasures under fire, we will cede the kill chain to our adversaries. The next fight will be decided not just by who holds the physical terrain, but by who dominates the spectrum.

NATO must institutionalize this reality across every echelon. Electronic warfare is not an adjunct to maneuver; it is the very foundation of our combat credibility. We must transition our defense structures to data-centric environments, integrate our joint capabilities, and ensure that when the next conflict erupts, the Alliance dictates the spectrum and the adversary is left blind, disrupted, and defeated.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:02:19 +0100 FirstHandNews
How About Equipping Local Law Enforcement with a Better Anti&Drone Arsenal? https://belimedia.com.ng/how-about-equipping-local-law-enforcement-with-a-better-anti-drone-arsenal https://belimedia.com.ng/how-about-equipping-local-law-enforcement-with-a-better-anti-drone-arsenal During the week of March 9, drones came over Barksdale Air Force Base in waves. Barksdale is the home of the 2nd Bomb Wing, one of the places this country keeps its nuclear-capable bombers. The base issued a shelter-in-place order and stopped flight-line operations, and the Air Force has declined to say precisely how many aircraft were up there or who was flying them. NORTHCOM's counter-drone fly-away kit, the good one, the one that worked over a strategic installation in the opening hours of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, was somewhere else. There is only one of them.

Then General Gregory Guillot told Congress the number that should have ended the conversation about whether we have this handled. "About a quarter of the ones that we detect, we're able to defeat." He offered it as good news, and by the standard of the previous year he was right: in 2025, he said, "almost every one that was detected was not defeated."

Welcome to The Iron Triangle, a dedicated column serving the procurement officers who are asked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the policy wonks analyzing impact on the global order.

Hold that in your head. The federal government with every authority Congress can write, the entire electromagnetic spectrum at its disposal, and a defense budget larger than the next nine countries combined, stops one drone in four over its own bomber bases.

Now we are handing the same problem to a sheriff's department in Talladega, and we have written them a rule that is worse.

A Rule That Anticipates Everything Except the Answer

On July 6, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security published the interim final rule implementing the SAFER SKIES Act, effective July 1, and for the first time extended real counter-drone authority to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement, and, critically, to correctional agencies. This is overdue, it was built fast, and the people who wrote it deserve credit for standing up a certification and oversight architecture on a compressed timeline.

Then you get to the Authorized Technologies List, which is the part that decides what a certified agency may actually field. The Departments expect the initial list to contain three categories: radio-frequency detection with command-and-control signal interception, RF disruption (broadband and protocol-specific jamming), and RF protocol manipulation, meaning command injection and cyber takeover. All three are radio-frequency categories. There is no fourth.

This would be an unremarkable sequencing decision except that the rest of the rule plainly contemplates bringing an aircraft down by physical means. The statute authorizes certified agencies to use reasonable force to "disable, damage, or destroy" an unmanned aircraft. The rule requires air-traffic notification for mitigation that emits no radio frequency, and the preamble explains why in language that leaves nothing to interpretation: such an action can affect the airspace "for example by bringing an unmanned aircraft down or creating falling debris." The rule requires Mitigation Certification for personnel who physically intercept a drone in flight.

So the rule trains an agency to do it. Certifies the officer to do it. Writes the falling-debris notification procedure for when they do it. And then hands them a list with nothing on it they can do it with. Plainly spoken, the rule does not include kinetic interceptors, something that knocks a drone out of the sky.

That is what happens when a list gets populated by whatever already had the deepest federal deployment history, which is exactly what the Departments said they were doing. The RF categories had the paperwork. So the RF categories got the boxes. The list has nothing to do with what works. It is a fossil record of what has already been bought.

Three Categories, One Point of Failure

Here is why this is a safety problem and not a paperwork problem. The three listed categories are functionally distinct and they share a single dependency: every one of them requires the target aircraft to present an exploitable radio link. Where there is no link, interception has nothing to intercept, jamming has nothing to jam, and cyber takeover has no protocol to take over. They do not degrade independently. They fail together, at the same instant, against the same threats.

Three classes of aircraft now routinely present no such link. A drone flying a stored waypoint route with its control link severed emits nothing and listens to nothing; this is a checkbox on consumer airframes. A protocol-hardened or custom-built airframe falls outside the signature libraries that detection-and-takeover systems depend on. And then there is fiber optic, which is the one that should be keeping planners awake. They manage control and video via physical filament. There is no radio link at all. Fiber optic drones are immune to jamming as a matter of physics rather than engineering. Russia is turning out more than fifty thousand fiber-optic FPV drones a month at a single facility in Veliky Novgorod. The technique defeated RF countermeasures at Kharkiv. It defeated them over Victory Base Complex in Baghdad, where there was no visible intercept attempt at all.

None of this is exotic. It is three years old, it is cheap, and it is documented in open sources that any competent adversary reads on the same afternoon you do.

An agency limited to the three RF categories is superbly equipped against a careless hobbyist with a stock quadcopter and defenseless against anyone who has been paying attention. That is precisely the inverse of the risk profile the rule exists to address.

The Recent Events Are Not Ambiguous

On June 24, just twelve days before the rule was published, the Justice Department indicted twelve defendants in what it called the largest federal prosecution to date involving coordinated drone operations to smuggle contraband into prisons. Ten federal facilities across eight states. Thirty-eight documented drops using six aircraft, running from September 2023 through May 2026. Methamphetamine, K-2, Suboxone, cell phones, tobacco, and saw blades.

Two and a half years of flights. Thirty-eight of them are documented. That is not a hobbyist wandering into restricted airspace. That is a logistics operation with route planning, aircraft attrition, and a customer base. Organizations at that level of sophistication adapt to countermeasures. The adaptation most cheaply available to them is the one the initial Technologies List cannot answer.

Compare the coverage. Five days later a JetBlue crew reported striking a drone on approach to JFK, and it led the news for a week before a preliminary investigation found no physical evidence that it happened at all. The collision that may have been nothing got the cameras. The thirty-eight drops that certainly happened got a press release from the Middle District of Georgia.

The Part That Should Embarrass Us

Now for the contrast that makes this a column instead of a comment.

On January 28, Brigadier General Matt Ross, who directs Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 401, told reporters: "I see us using low-collateral kinetic interceptors at all installations in the homeland." The Deputy Secretary of Defense had directed JIATF-401 to ensure kinetic capability at every location. Two days later the task force awarded $5.2 million for the Bumblebee V2, a kinetic interceptor, with deliveries beginning in March. Asked about squeamishness over kinetic engagement inside the United States, Ross said he "fundamentally disagrees."

Same airspace. Same threat. Same country, in the same calendar year. The Department of War calls low-collateral kinetic interception essential and is buying it for every installation in the homeland. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security published a list on which that category does not exist.

What Each Corner of the Triangle Should Take From This

For the Procurement Officer, understand what you are budgeting against. You can be accredited, certified, trained, and funded, and still have nothing to buy, because the box your requirement lives in has not been created. The rule as published does not tell you plainly that kinetic capability is unavailable to you. State and local agencies are writing fiscal-year plans and grant subaward requests against it right now, and some of them are going to buy capability they are not authorized to employ.

For the Investor, this is the diligence question you are not asking. You have been asking whether the technology works and whether there is a customer. Start asking a third question: what category does this go in, and does that category exist yet? A company can be technically excellent, combat-proven, and commercially validated, and still be unsellable because a list has no line for it. Listing risk is not a footnote in the regulatory section of the deck. In this sector it is the whole thesis, and it is currently unpriced.

For the Policy Wonk, notice what just happened to the locus of policy. Congress debated the SAFER SKIES Act in public. The interim final rule went through interagency review and took comment. But the Authorized Technologies List, the instrument that actually determines what a certified American police department may deploy against a drone over a school, is an administrative artifact updated through a coordination portal. No one voted on it. Most people affected by it do not know it exists.

I have spent years watching good capability lose to bad process, and I thought I had seen the full catalogue. I had not. The Valley of Death I have been writing about is a money problem: you have the technology, you cannot get the contract. This is something else. This is a company that has the technology, the customer, the certification, the training pipeline, and the federal deployment history, and cannot sell, because the taxonomy has no word for what it built. Call them the Unlisted. They are the Forgotten Bench's stranger cousin, and they lose more quietly, because there is no rejection letter. There is just a list that does not mention them.

The fix is small and it is already scheduled. The Departments said they would run a sixty-day sprint to revise the list after publication. Add a fourth category, low-collateral kinetic interception, defined narrowly enough to exclude firearms, unguided ballistic means, directed energy, and anything heavy enough to be its own hazard. Write objective listing criteria the way the RF categories already have them: bounded interceptor mass, bounded terminal energy, demonstrated fail-safe behavior on loss of lock, a modeled and test-validated debris footprint, a declared engagement envelope. Then say plainly, in one sentence, that until such a category exists, kinetic mitigation is unavailable so that nobody spends a grant on a capability they cannot lawfully employ.

The Risk

I am not going to pretend this one is free, because it is not, and the people who will be nervous about it are right to be. Radio-frequency mitigation that fails harmlessly drops a link. Kinetic mitigation that fails drops an object, and it drops it over a stadium concourse, a prison yard at count time, an interstate at rush hour. The rule's own falling-debris notification requirement exists because somebody thought that through, and a two-kilogram interceptor over a crowd is not a spreadsheet exercise. Widening this list carelessly buys us a very bad Tuesday.

There is a second risk, and I have written this column before from the other direction. A category written narrowly enough becomes a moat for whoever helped write it, which is how well-intended technical criteria turn into incumbency by another name. That is the ITAR story wearing a domestic uniform, and anyone advocating for a new category, including me, should be watched for it.

And a third: certification is not proficiency. A deputy with forty hours of classroom time and a kinetic interceptor is a genuinely different risk than an operator who has done it a thousand times. Recurrency has to be tied to the effector an agency actually fields, not to one undifferentiated certificate, because competence with a jammer transfers to a kinetic interceptor exactly not at all.

None of that argues for keeping the category empty. It argues for writing it carefully, on a clock, with real criteria, which is a harder job than leaving the box blank, and the reason the box is blank.

We have built a system in which the most consequential procurement decision in American counter-drone policy is not made by a program office, a contracting officer, or a member of Congress. It is made by whoever maintains a list. Comments on the rule close on September 4. After that, the question stops being what we should have listed and becomes what we have to explain. The honest version of that question is this: when a drone that does not answer a radio comes over the wire at a federal prison, and the certified, trained, funded officer standing under it has nothing on the list to use, whose signature is on that?

Disclosure: Atlas Special Projects prepared a public comment on the rule discussed below on behalf of a counter-UAS manufacturer. The argument here is that of the author, and it applies to a category of technology rather than to any one company's product.

Read more national security insights from experienced experts exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

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Sat, 15 Aug 2026 05:59:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Biggest AI Models Are Not the Biggest Threats https://belimedia.com.ng/the-biggest-ai-models-are-not-the-biggest-threats https://belimedia.com.ng/the-biggest-ai-models-are-not-the-biggest-threats Almost every AI security framework we are applying rests on one misguided assumption: danger scales with size. Compute thresholds, export controls, and tiered evaluation regimes all encode the same intuition, the larger the model, the more we should worry. If this isn’t true, what policy changes are needed?

I recently mapped more than twenty fielded AI systems against two axes: raw offensive capability with safeguards stripped, and residual risk as actually deployed (Fig. 1). They ran from millions to trillions of parameter models, and included munition seekers, gene design models, theatre planning, cyber offense systems, and general-purpose AI models. The picture does not support the above assumption. In fact, the data supports the inverse. Small, specialized models beat bigger general models at offense, but bigger models maybe better at defense.

Figure 1. Security Risk vs Size of Model. Hollow ring: raw offensive capability with safeguards stripped. Filled dot: residual risk as actually deployed. Cyber related positions anchored to CAISI / UK AISI results, July 2026. Data compiled by Alvin W. Graylin.

Each system appears twice: a hollow ring for raw capability with safeguards stripped, a filled dot for residual risk as deployed. The gap between them is the safeguard effect. Read left to right, and the size to threat correlation everyone assumes is simply absent.

Seven assumptions worth rethinking

One: the largest models pose the greatest risk. The high-residual band, where capability and deployed risk are nearly identical. Across six orders of magnitude, no clear trend. In 2022, researchers at Collaborations Pharmaceuticals inverted the scoring function on a commercial drug-discovery model (MegaSyn) of under 100 million parameters and generated more than 40,000 candidate chemical warfare agents (many more lethal than VX) in just six hours on a desktop. Chemprop-class retrosynthesis models, which can find non-controlled precursor routes around scheduled pathways, run at one to ten million parameters. Evo models with single digit billions of parameters can help design novel life forms. News just came out last week that this exact system was able to generate 16 new viruses. All these systems sit well below the axis floor of any parameter-based regime. Compute restrictions do nothing to fix this.

Two: compute thresholds capture the relevant risk. Hackphyr, built on Zephyr-7b-β at 7 billion parameters, performs comparably to GPT-4 on network attack scenarios and runs on a single GPU. Deep Hat V2 ships commercially at 30 billion parameters, is marketed as uncensored for offensive security, and executes inside the customer environment with no external calls. No government evaluation covers it, so that placement rests on vendor claims. Neither would trip a FLOP ceiling.

Three: capability and threat are the same axis. Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 share one underlying model. Their capability positions are nearly identical; their deployed risk differs sharply, because Fable's added domain safeguards drop cyber requests back toward Opus 4.8 behavior. The difference comes entirely from the safeguards and distribution controls layered on top. That vertical gap is what governance can act on. Parameter count is not.

Four: open-source models are more dangerous than closed ones. Recent NIST study found that Kimi K3, the strongest PRC open-weight model, only scored 32 percent on ExploitBench against 57 percent for the leading U.S. model, and reached step 17 of a 32-step attack range where U.S. models reached 28.5. On the highest-severity outcome test, arbitrary code execution (ACE), Kimi K3, succeeded on 0 of 41 tasks, while the most capable U.S. models averaged 20. So, we really need to be careful about self-interested parties saying larger open-source models are more dangerous, when it likely has more to do with protecting margins than national security concerns. (see Fig. 2)

UK AISI did recently report that the Kimi K3 model was able to escape its sandbox during testing, but it merely used a misconfiguration in the testing sandbox that left the door open, rather than a sophisticated swarm agent attack like what the OpenAI model did. And when it did get out, all it did was look up the answer for the test it was given, rather than doing any damage to real world systems. In the future, this behavior could change, but it’s important to question the basic assumption that open models are always more dangerous.

Figure 2: CAISI/NIST - Comparison of aggregate capabilities over time of the most capable U.S. and PRC models. A 400-point increase on the y-axis equates to a 10x increase in the odds of solving tasks. Shaded regions denote 95% CIs.

Five: model quality determines attack success. Microsoft's MDASH is a harness, not a model. It orchestrates more than 100 specialized agents across an ensemble and scored 88.4 percent on CyberGym at launch, against 83.1 percent for the Mythos preview model. Adding a compact security model roughly 1/10th the size raised that to 95.95 percent. The orchestration layer beat every individual model. Regulating training while ignoring scaffolding regulates the less important variable.

Six: national security requires the largest models. It requires the opposite. Loitering munition seekers performing automatic target recognition run on Jetson-class edge hardware, capping them in the single-digit millions of parameters. Edge deployment favors small models on latency, power, thermal envelope, and operation without a datalink. Larger models are slower and, in narrow domains, more easily distracted by irrelevant context. They are also harder to validate, and validation is what matters when a false positive is a struck target. Cisco's Foundation-Sec-8B matches or exceeds models ten times its size on security benchmarks while running on one or two GPUs. The famed DoD Maven Smart System is based on a fine-tuned 2-year-old Claude Sonnet 3.5 model. That level of intelligence can now be distilled into a 4B model which could potentially run on a smartphone.

Seven: denying China compute is the primary lever to keep U.S. safe. Due to shared risks between these superpowers, on many safety related issues, cooperating may actually produce the outcomes most beneficial to the U.S. and the world. More on this below.

Five threat domains, five different answers

Attack and embedded systems favor small models that don’t require a comm link. Air-gapped operation, no API telemetry, no rate limits, no refusals mid-chain. The offensive bottleneck is stealth and throughput, not reasoning.

Cyber Orchestration favors large models, but the advantage attaches more to the system rather than the model, as MDASH shows. There’s little discussion today on regulating orchestration systems, but it’s clearly very needed.

Cyber Defense favors large models most clearly, and this is where the current approach fails. Defenders need breadth across every vector; attackers need depth in one. Safeguards that constrain security research are therefore costly in a way that is easy to miss.

When Hugging Face's systems were breached in July by OpenAI models, commercial frontier-model APIs blocked the forensic requests because their safety systems could not distinguish defensive analysis from attack. The team ran the open-weight Chinese model GLM-5.2 on its own infrastructure instead, worked through more than 17,000 logged actions, and contained the intrusion. An American company under active attack by an American closed-model was defended by a Chinese open-source model because the American ones could not tell friend from foe.

That is a Slave AI failure, in the terms I set out in Beyond Rivalry. A model trained toward obedience can only refuse; it cannot reason about whether refusing is right. What we need is Guardian AI: systems capable and contextually aware enough to protect us from malicious actors, from other AI systems, and from our own unintended consequences. That requires scale, because judgment requires breadth. It also requires that we stop locking down every capability rather than stewarding it. High-quality models with fewer restrictions, in defenders' hands, are a global public good. Every hour a defender spends fighting a guardrail is an hour the attacker fights nothing.

Bio/Chem Design favors small models. Molecular graphs, protein sequences, and binding energies come from compact architectures immune to alignment techniques built for natural language. A graph neural network has no refusal layer to remove. The key here is monitoring and controlling access to precursor chemicals and expanding safeguard for synthesis equipment.

Bio Synthesis is the outlier, and there is good news and bad. For biology, model-level access control has already failed. Evo 2 shipped with weights, inference code, training code, and its full dataset. There is no API to revoke. What remains is the synthesis chokepoint: Customer vetting and sequence screening at nucleic acid providers already operate internationally through the Gene Synthesis Consortium, whose members screen orders against databases of sequences of concern before synthesizing. There are still gaps as novel AI-generated combinations are developed, but they can be reduced if vendors and regulators globally work more closely together to keep the systems updated. Closing those gaps buys more security than any parameter threshold. But this requires Washington and Beijing to align, since they are the two largest suppliers of synthesis equipment in the world. Of course, collaboration across all vendors globally is needed to truly secure this threat vector. Again, larger general AI models aren’t the core problem.

Data beats intelligence

On the opening day of the U.S.-Iran war in February, a Tomahawk missle struck the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls' school in Minab, killing at least 168 people, more than 100 of them children under twelve. The school sat within 100 yards of an IRGC naval installation and had been inside that perimeter until a wall went up around 2013. Targeting ran through the Maven Smart System, which generates roughly 1,000 target packages an hour. A preliminary investigation concluded the strike likely followed from outdated intelligence, and former officials said stale human-curated data, not AI, was to blame.

The school had a website. Free satellite imagery showed a schoolyard with a sports field. No model of any size prevents this, because the failure was in data lineage, not reasoning. A larger model querying the same stale record returns the same coordinates faster and with more confidence.

The China mistake

The threat model that matters is not Beijing reaching AGI first. It is a non-state actor with a 30-billion-parameter uncensored model, a good harness, and no return address. Small models proliferate regardless of jurisdiction and leave no attribution trail, and an unattributable intrusion between nuclear powers is an escalation problem before it is a technology problem. In that world, a China unable to defend its own infrastructure is a liability to global stability, not an advantage to Washington.

Beijing is already regulating its own labs more aggressively than any other market. Concordia AI's 2026 survey documents agentic AI security guidance, ethics review requirements, and binding obligations on consumer AI services that are already deployed and enforced. It should be noted that Chinese frontier safety research output grew roughly 60 percent year over year, with agent safety rising from 8 percent of new papers in early 2025 to 27 percent by early 2026. The caveat: only five of ten leading Chinese developers reported safety evaluation results on release. Shared standards here would make a difference.

As Fig. 2 showed, CAISI found the Chinese models less dangerous, but they also found GLM-5.2 answers sensitive biological queries at far higher rates than tested U.S. models, which is where PRC safeguards are weakest. In personally speaking with multiple Chinese labs, it’s clear that their lack of compute resources due to export controls has forced them to deprioritize safety demands vs. capability enhancement. Expanding safety testing compute resources, like what UK AISI has, to more countries could help improve AI safety globally, without fear of its misuse by rival nations.

The race framing is softening at home, too. More than 100 organizations, including Nvidia, Microsoft, Meta, IBM, Palantir, OpenAI and Google, have now signed the July 24 Open Weights and American AI Leadership letter opposing premature restrictions. Days later, Nvidia and roughly 50 partners launched the Open Secure AI Alliance to build open defensive models and agent harnesses, citing the Hugging Face incident as its founding case. Every participant has commercial exposure to a ban, so weigh the motives. But 8 of the top 10 models on OpenRouter in July are already open-source, and the industry has now reorganized around the proposition that open weights are defensive infrastructure.

Four Asks for September

Four asks follow, and Xi Jinping's state visit to Washington on September 24, the first in over a decade, is where they could land. Trump has said AI will be on the agenda.

Shared harm standards, not shared capability standards. Agreement on what constitutes an unacceptable capability, evaluated the same way in both countries, so that "safe" means the same thing in Shanghai and San Francisco. That’s clearly missing today and doesn’t require mutual trust.

A shared safety evaluation cluster. Chinese labs are compute-constrained, so safety research competes with capability research for scarce chips. Compute earmarked for evaluation and red-teaming is cheap relative to the benefit, and the benefit is global. An international testing facility open to any vendor institutionalizes it. Require publishing safety scores alongside capability benchmarks so safety investment earns a competitive return. Then, both Chinese and US labs would have no excuse not to test their systems.

An incident notification channel. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, staffed continuously since 1987, exist because a misread signal costs more than talking. An equivalent for AI incidents where attribution is contested is cheap insurance. With the rising risk of bad actor attacks and false flag operations from non-state actors, this safeguard will be increasingly needed.

Capability non-development agreements. A capability never trained cannot leak. This matters more than denying Beijing another turn of the scaling crank. Beijing also wants to limit rogue actor misuse, thus agreeing on redlines in advance makes sense for both sides (no nuclear weapon command/control, no AI uplift to bio weapon design, no AI-attack on civilian infrastructure, no autonomous self-replication outside control environments [RSI]). General commercial models have no need for bio and chemical threat design, so keeping defense use case training only in military labs on both sides seems quite reasonable.

Another Asilomar moment

At Asilomar in 1975, molecular biologists imposed a voluntary moratorium on a class of recombinant DNA experiments, then built the containment framework that governed the field for decades. They acted before the capability matured enough to do real harm.

That view is starting to catch on in the AI labs now. On July 28, 1,200+ employees of frontier labs published Pacing the Frontier, asking Washington to support an international effort to build tools for deliberately slowing automated AI development. Signatories include top technical leaders at Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta and Google. The concern is recursive self-improvement (RSI) of AI that goes out of control. The logical extension is an explicit agreement not to implement it in frontier labs even once it becomes possible.

But this cannot stop at two capitals. If dangerous systems are small and cheap, a country with a modest research budget and a few hundred GPUs can build a competent offensive cyber agent or an inverted molecular designer. Within a few years, dozens will. Any regime binding only Washington and Beijing binds the two parties least likely to defect and leaves the growing middle untouched. A U.S.-China agreement is the necessary first move, not the finished structure, and it has to open immediately to third parties. That is how Asilomar's containment norms and the Montreal Protocol scaled.

Bigger AI is not more dangerous. Better orchestrated is more dangerous, less monitored is more dangerous, and irreversibly released is more dangerous. All three require cooperation with Beijing: orchestration needs shared harm standards, monitoring needs shared evaluation infrastructure, and irreversible release needs joint agreement on what never gets built. September 24 is a good place to start.

Read more national security insights from experienced experts exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

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Sat, 15 Aug 2026 05:59:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
It’s Time For The President To Level With The American People on Iran https://belimedia.com.ng/its-time-for-the-president-to-level-with-the-american-people-on-iran https://belimedia.com.ng/its-time-for-the-president-to-level-with-the-american-people-on-iran The U.S. administration’s strategic expectations are increasingly colliding with a set of hard realities. While Iran has taken a considerable beating, it remains standing and does not appear on the verge of either submitting or collapsing. Its newfound control over a key commercial waterway, the Strait of Hormuz, provides it with a weapon of mass disruption (credit to the NYT’s Tom Friedman) that it previously did not enjoy, and it appears intent on exercising that authority. Despite the administration’s continued threats and claims of imminent victory, there is no clear military solution in sight. Bottom line: the administration miscalculated.

Another strategy is called for. The truth.

“The practice of espionage is a quiet act of war: A very human endeavor, sometimes born of lies and betrayal, of greed or revenge; but often of deep truths and trust.”

This is the banner of my Substack, drawn from the preface of my upcoming Iran espionage novel; “A Prince of Mirrors.” It attempts to encapsulate my feelings about my chosen profession: Intelligence Officer. But for now, let’s focus on the last phrase: “but often of deep truths and trust.”

Trust is in very short supply between the United States and Iran as they attempt to come to terms. First, to re-open the critical Strait of Hormuz – a shipping route that was open prior to the War – and, second, to end an increasingly fruitless War. All while failing, at least for now, to fully address the other key issues at play: Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s ballistic missile program, and Iranian-supported proxies.

While the world looks breathlessly on, the U.S. awaits the results of negotiations between Iran and tiny, wonderful Oman (admission; I spent several years at the U.S. Embassy in Oman) – a country literally stuck between the rocky Musandam coast, and a hard place called Iran – over the future administration of the Strait.

Based on initial reports of the terms, either Iran is going to have to step back from its assertions of control, or the United States is going to have to agree to some level of Iranian control that was not present prior to the War. Given the utter lack of trust between the parties, is either likely?

So, let me lay out, as best I can, what I believe to be true.

This is a time for truth. Hard truths.

The Middle East has changed.

  • The Iranian regime has survived a series of devastating U.S. and Israeli strikes. Iranian military capacity, both the regular Artesh (Iran’s conventional army) and the IRGC (Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), is significantly weakened; however, it retains the ability to strike targets outside Iran, including shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
  • The Iranian regime has not fallen and appears to be consolidating power around… well, no one yet knows which individuals or factions will emerge triumphant in Tehran. But for now, an even more hardline, IRGC dominated leadership is in place.
  • The regime is attempting to assert its newfound control over the critical Strait of Hormuz, a right tacitly acknowledged, or at least not specifically prohibited, in the flawed June MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) signed by the President of the United States.
  • Barring something new, something we have yet to see, U.S. and/or Israeli military force is unlikely to significantly alter this equation.
  • Iran and the United States, and the world economy, remain trapped in a test of wills over who blinks first.

The truth is, the regime is bad in so many ways. And they are dangerous. But not existentially so to the United States. Disliking Iran is not a sufficient reason to go to war with them barring a truly compelling reason.

But neither can an IRGC dominated Iran be allowed to run roughshod over the region. The U.S. and its Western and Gulf allies need to develop a new deterrence strategy that includes both carrots and sticks.

The Impacts of failure

Any agreement needs to mitigate, to the extent possible, the damage that Iran can do going forward. First and foremost, the world economy cannot allow one country to exert control over such an important international shipping route as the Strait. Any agreement must minimize Iranian control over ships transiting the Strait, possibly by compensating in other areas. The most critical issue, Iran’s nuclear program, must be addressed in a manner that includes both dealing with the 60% enriched uranium (HEU) currently in their possession and strict verification of enrichment activities going forward.

The American people can handle the truth!

That for now, the only way out is a negotiated agreement that is certain to fall short of the ideal. Only for now. Simply a truce. This is not an admission of defeat, simply a pause to rethink, to recalibrate.

But also…

That the Islamic regime has significant internal weaknesses. That stepping away from the current tit-for-tat military action, a strategy that is not achieving its objectives, will force the regime to confront the serious problems, some existential, that the Iranian nation faces. This is Iran’s, and the regime’s, Achilles heel. One that could eventually force change that no outside military force could.

Just the truth.

This article was originally published on Substack and is republished here with permission.

Read more national security insights from experienced experts exclusively in The Cipher Brief.


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Sat, 15 Aug 2026 05:59:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
It is in the U.S. interest to Support Democratic Legitimacy in Venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/it-is-in-the-us-interest-to-support-democratic-legitimacy-in-venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/it-is-in-the-us-interest-to-support-democratic-legitimacy-in-venezuela The Trump administration’s response to the catastrophic earthquakes that hit Venezuela seven weeks ago was impressive: timely, massive and appropriate. This should reassure those who worried that the administration’s efforts to downsize and reorganize the U.S. government early in this second term in office had all but eviscerated our capacity to respond to foreign natural disasters. It was also not surprising. The Trump administration made Venezuela an early priority and has undertaken its economic and political rehabilitation since removing dictator and de facto president Nicolas Maduro and his wife Celia. It has been clear since January that the post-Maduro effort would be complicated, time-consuming and closely watched by the world community and, especially, by the rest of Latin America.

Following the successful military operation to remove the Venezuelan dictator, the Trump administration articulated a three-phase plan for rebuilding a country devastated by decades of economic incompetence, corruption and, especially since 2013, increasing authoritarianism. Unfortunately, the two earthquakes that rocked the country on June 24 set back the Trump administration’s near and mid-term plans. The twin disasters also cast into sharp relief the extent of the long-term damage done to the country’s economy, institutions and infrastructure by the regime led by, first, Hugo Chavez, then Maduro and now Delcy Rodriguez.

Somewhat surprisingly, the Trump team opted to leave in place Maduro’s long -time collaborator and vice president, Delcy Rodriguez, as interim president even as it undertook the daunting task of trying to reverse the damage from 30 years of Chavista/Madurista malfeasance. This was a risky decision. Among other things, it marginalized the overwhelming winner of Venezuela’s 2024 election whom the U.S. had recognized in late November of that year as ‘president-elect.”

Not surprisingly, the Venezuelan public was mortified by the regime’s ineffectual initial response to the catastrophic damage caused by the two earthquakes and disgusted by the dismal state of the country’s infrastructure. Venezuelans, on the other hand, were grateful for the international assistance that was surged into the country after the quakes, especially from the U.S. At the same time the scope and effectiveness of international support stood in sharp contrast to what the public saw as the fecklessness of the interim government’s efforts. Worse yet, the inevitable willingness of foreign first responders to work with the de facto Venezuelan government generated concern that Delcy Rodriguez, Interior Minister Diosdado and others were being legitimized by their cooperation with international relief contingents especially those from the U.S. Despite the regime’s best efforts to placate the public, frustration with the regime and Rodriguez erupted into public view as relief efforts were ongoing.

The sharp domestic criticism of the regime’s leadership even as it responded to the earthquakes suggests the difficulty of the United States’ challenge in Venezuela. Specifically, it suggests that the Achilles heel of the administration’s plan to rebuild the country may have been its decision to leave the Maduro regime in place while announcing that restoring democracy would be postponed to some point in the future.

It would be a serious miscalculation to assume Delcy Rodriguez, Diosdado Cabello and the rest of the surviving Maduro cabal share the U.S. commitment to a democratic future for the country. It is true that the regime has taken some steps to ease domestic tensions and encourage economic recovery as U.S. authorities have acknowledged. Oil is flowing, the refugee crisis has abated and some political prisoners have been released. That said, much of the Venezuelan public believes Rodriguez has orchestrated these changes only because she has no choice and that the U.S. is really calling the shots. This is important for at least two reasons.

First, if the U.S. appears too comfortable with Rodriguez and the Venezuelan regime does not believe the U.S. fully supports an early return to democracy, it may opt to slow roll any reproachment with the opposition and hope that President Trump’s attention will be absorbed by other crises or they may opt to try try to wait out the Trump administration. Second, under those circumstances, the simmering resentment toward the repressive and criminal regime the administration left in place after apprehending Maduro could quickly morph into something much stronger, undermine confidence in the U.S., and discourage both investors and other partner nations in the region.

Publicly accelerating the U.S. strategy for reviving the country’s political institutions would be the first step to a solution to this problem. The administration already understands this and has endorsed initial talks between the regime and representatives of the democratic majority. However, representatives of the unified opposition which won an overwhelming victory in the elections two years ago were not at the table. To the Venezuelan public this may look like the regime is continuing to do everything it can to divide the democratic opposition and marginalize the winners of the July 2024 election, Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, and the wildly popular opposition leader and Nobel prize winner, Maria Corina Machado.

A recently released poll by AtlasIntel in association with Bloomberg shows that if elections were held now Machado would win by a substantial margin. In also shows that approval of Delcy Rodriguez hovers around 22 percent while Machado’s approval level was comfortably above 70 percent. If the U.S. administration wants to renew confidence in its commitment to restoring Venezuelan democracy, Trump should insist on Machado’s proximate return to the country and guarantee her security. Machado’s presence would be an unmistakable signal of the United States’ determination to foster democratic legitimacy. Doing so would also do much to advance President Trump’s goal of reestablishing U.S. leadership in the region as well as underscoring the U.S. ambition once again to be seen as the economic partner of choice for Latin America.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 15 Aug 2026 05:59:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Can America Find Happiness in a World of Conflict? https://belimedia.com.ng/can-america-find-happiness-in-a-world-of-conflict https://belimedia.com.ng/can-america-find-happiness-in-a-world-of-conflict The South Korean Buddhist monk, the Venerable Pomnyun Sunimin, in his book “What is Happiness?” introduces us to his philosophy of life: “Everyone born into this world has the right to be happy … and being helpful to the world and to others around us increases our own personal happiness.”

The U.S. is now ranked 24 out of the 147 countries surveyed by the Wellbeing Research Center at the University of Oxford in partnership with Gallup. Factors that contribute to this ranking include higher GDP per capita, a strong social support system, higher life expectancy, greater freedom, absence of government and corporate corruption and charitable giving. The U.S. ranking has dropped each year since 2011, with a significant decline between 2022 (ranked 15) and 2025 (ranked 24).

As a world leader, the U.S. is concerned with the world around us: With the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Gaza and the innocent people killed; with the terrorism of October 7 and the innocent Israelis killed; armed conflicts in Sudan and Myanmar; insurgencies in Africa and Asia, and the criminal conflicts and the drug cartel violence in the Americas.

With this concern, there are understandable debates and doubts in the U.S. about a myriad of issues: the amount of aid we are providing to Ukraine, to defend itself from an invading Russia that’s receiving troops and weaponry from North Korea; efforts to peacefully negotiate a ceasefire with an Iran that says it has the right to enrich uranium and kill innocent peaceful protesters; an elusive peace in Gaza when Hamas refuses to disarm and tension in the West Bank intensifies; and a nuclear North Korea building more nuclear weapons and aligned with a revanchist Russian Federation. Helplessness with the conflicts in Sudan and Myanmar and the jihadist groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State operating throughout Africa. Security concerns in Haiti and Ecuador due to gang violence and our inability to effectively counter the flow of illicit drugs coming into the U.S., primarily from Mexico, Columbia, and China. It’s hard to find happiness when assessing the world around us and the absence of peace.

Working with our allies and partners is an integral part of diplomacy and conflict resolution. NATO, AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S.) and allies like South Korea, Japan and the Philippines are key to managing the ever-increasing security threats around the world. How we manage these relationships with our allies and partners is important.

Domestically, extreme political polarization has replaced polite political debate. A myriad of issues contribute to anxiety among the people: reported cuts to food stamps, Medicaid and social programs, with the rise in food and gas prices that receives daily media coverage. Nicolas Kristof of the New York Times reports a rise in homelessness in California, Oregon, and Hawaii and the plight of the Americans left behind. There’s extensive media coverage to rescind a planned $1.8 billion “Anti-Weaponization Fund” and whether it was vandalism or shoddy construction of the Reflecting Pool in our Nation’s capital. Indeed, there are other political and social issues, like AI, that the average informed American is exposed to daily. Following these and other foreign and domestic issues is important for an informed electorate that will be voting in November and in 2028, but are we on overload? Of concern is the extreme polarization of views on these issues and the government’s responsibility to inform and seek the public’s support on these important issues, without adding to the polemics.

The author of “What is Happiness?” tells us: “Between 1995 and 1998, about three million people died of hunger and disease in North Korea and those who survived also suffered greatly as their family members, friends and neighbors died.” Despite North Korea’s formidable nuclear and missile capabilities, there are exigent health and food issues that continue to demand attention. The U.S. previously helped with these humanitarian issues because it was the correct thing to do. Returning to talks with North Korea to halt their nuclear and missile programs, with the lifting of sanctions and no longer demanding denuclearization as a condition for talks, would be the correct thing to do. It would be a positive development for Northeast Asia and the Korean people and hopefully contribute to the eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Progress with North Korea should bring some form of happiness to the Korean people and to the people in the U.S. who cry out for a more peaceful world.

The author is a former Associate Director of National Intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government.

Read more national security insights from experienced experts exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

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Sat, 15 Aug 2026 05:59:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Houthis’ External and Internal Crises Converge: Can a Tactical Solution Fix a Strategic Problem? https://belimedia.com.ng/the-houthis-external-and-internal-crises-converge-can-a-tactical-solution-fix-a-strategic-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/the-houthis-external-and-internal-crises-converge-can-a-tactical-solution-fix-a-strategic-problem As they fire dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles against Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemeni government-controlled areas, the Houthis are escalating on two major external fronts. This comes at a time when they are already facing internal crises regarding the economy and the tribes of northern Yemen. The temptation is to attribute escalation abroad to an effort to distract from the crises at home.

From Sanaa’s perspective, the regime’s internal and external crises are deeply intertwined to the point that they cannot be separated. This is especially true in the conspiratorial worldview of the Houthis in which “you are either with us or against us” – meaning part of the Houthi project they call “the Quranic March” or part of the “American-Zionist-Saudi conspiracy.” This worldview is based in part on their interpretation of a Quranic verse which states, “And whoever among you allies with them is one of them.” That being the case, the Houthis see their problems as part of a broader conspiracy launched by the evil forces abroad and facilitated by Yemeni “mercenaries” at home.

This view is on display in al-Jawf, where the Dahm tribe recently rallied around a woman claiming to be a victim of the regime’s injustice. According to the woman claiming to be “Mira Saddam Hussein,” she is the secret daughter of Saddam Hussein of Iraq and her assets were confiscated by regime insider Fares Manea during a chaotic moment in the Yemeni civil war. Houthi media presented the tribal activities on her behalf as coordinated with the Saudi special committee, an organization charged with maintaining good relations via patronage between Riyadh and Yemen’s tribes. Whether there is truth to this claim is unclear, but like all conspiracy theories it is easy to release into the media space to muddy the waters and nearly impossible to conclusively disprove.

Regardless of the root of the current Houthi crisis with tribes in al-Jawf, it appears to have uniquely destabilizing potential for the regime given its geographical scope and the number of tribesmen standing in defiance. Having set up camp outside of Houthi territory, the Dahm tribe is leading an anti-Houthi line that seems to be garnering widespread support and has thousands of participants – including from areas under Houthi control.

The timing is what makes this dangerous for the Houthis: their economy continues to sink as the finite solution of looting government institutions and local industry approaches its limits. The lawless kleptocracy that they have created, alongside heavy sanctions, makes any economic improvement in the near term unlikely. This poor economic performance, combined with the fact that tribal loyalty is often bought, should worry the Houthis. Much of the population living under their control has tribal affiliations that might be “activated” as the group has not yet managed to completely decimate tribal structures in Yemeni society in favor of absolute loyalty to Abdulmalik al-Houthi. The resources to buy quiet have dried up precisely when the regime needs them most.

While one might expect this would make it an inopportune moment to escalate on additional fronts, in the past month the Houthis have attacked not only Saudi Arabia but, more recently, the Yemeni government. Three practical calculations, rather than mere distraction, help explain the timing.

The first is deterrence. At a moment of weakness, the Houthis want to kill any perception among the regime’s enemies that trouble at home translates into a reduced appetite for escalation, a perception that might invite attacks against the regime. This also comes after the regime showed relative restraint during the most intense weeks of the Israeli and American strikes on Iran, sitting out as the rest of the axis of resistance rallied and raising speculation that the regime was averse to the associated risks. By initiating conflict now, the regime is cultivating the impression that it is just as radical, reckless, and aggressive as ever.

The second is economic. Escalation against Saudi Arabia may be meant to resolve the group’s money problems in either an absolute or a relative sense. In an absolute sense, if the escalation leads to an agreement with Saudi Arabia that would infuse cash into their economy and provide the resources the regime needs to continue funding their war machine and buying quiet from those dissatisfied groups challenging them. In a relative sense, even if the Houthis cannot reach an agreement with Riyadh, targeting Saudi energy exports may make it more costly for Riyadh to keep financially supporting anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, including the Yemeni government. Absent that support, the group’s control of much of Yemen’s economy would give the regime a major advantage over its rivals, even if its budget remains small compared to that of a functional state.

The third is simple tactical opportunity. With the Strait of Hormuz blocked as fallout from the Iran war, the Houthis have additional leverage over Saudi Arabia’s alternative shipping routes through Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Still, risk aversion tempers that ambition: The desire to target Saudi oil exports without galvanizing a coalition against them, or upsetting the axis’s quieter backers such as China, limits the scope of actual disruption to these shipments.

From a conspiratorial, zero-sum ideology in which anything bad for the U.S. and its allies is good for the regime, the Houthis have scored points that exceed expectations. The Houthis are exceptionally good at picking targets that maximize extortion while limiting expected blowback, and jumping from one target of opportunity to the next keeps their adversaries guessing. Still, this approach of focusing on the short-term targets of opportunity and very long term eschatological vision leaves a strategic gap that will likely lead group’s structural problems to grow more severe and eventually erupt in an inevitable crisis.

Read more national security insights from experienced experts exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

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Sat, 15 Aug 2026 05:59:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
How Ukraine Is Changing the Way the U.S. Army Fights https://belimedia.com.ng/how-ukraine-is-changing-the-way-the-us-army-fights https://belimedia.com.ng/how-ukraine-is-changing-the-way-the-us-army-fights “To me, the biggest way that we're doing this is introducing technology into the [U.S. Army] formations that is not fully baked. And so all of us who were in the Army in the 90s, the 2000s, even the 2010s, you were issued a piece of equipment and that was it -- maybe a TM (technical manual) and you didn't have any say in how it was made or how it should be altered. And today in a number of different [Army] organizations, we're putting the tech in an immature state in front of the soldiers -- and industry is with them -- to be able to iterate and make things so much better, so much faster. So that to me is compelling to them and they can give very real feedback and everybody that's dealt with soldiers knows they're not going to pull any punches, right?”

That was Under Secretary of the Army Michael Obadal speaking July 30, on The Future of U.S. Land Power at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) along with former-Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy, who held that job during the first Trump administration.

Together, the two provided insightful looks at how the Army is dealing with the introduction of new technology.

Obadal, for example, described a personal experience from a day or two earlier when he got into an autonomous vehicle with a staff sergeant. “We're getting ready to like he's showing me all this stuff, and I said, ‘This is incredible. What do you think?’ And he said, "Yeah, I don't like it.’ And I said, ‘Okay.’"

Obadal then recalled he and the sergeant had a 15minute conversation and he learned when the sergeant told him “I think this is really cool tech, but it's the integration of that tech” that bothered him. For Obadal that was something “that you don't get in a lab, you get it only by putting those things in the hands of soldiers.”

“We're introducing them [new Army enlistees] at the very onset of their Army career to technologies being pushed down in[to military] units.” Obadal said, adding, “There is additional skill-type, identifier-training that they can go to. We have a software factory in Austin, Texas [Army Software Factory of the U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command] that's incredibly capable. It's a two-year program where they really are able to code and create new applications, all really software based.”

McCarthy recalled, “If you go back to 2017, there was nowhere near the emphasis on pushing autonomous systems into the formations. A lot of that's cultural. If you go even back to like 2008 and the Air Force's resistance to taking on more Predator [an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft] caps in the Middle East, my former boss, [Defense] Secretary [Robert] Gates, making it a priority with the department. So, culture is a big part of it. The good thing is it's 10 years later, we have younger people, much more technologically savvy than I ever was.”

As with most people, Obadal starts his discussion of change with Ukraine, which he described as an “incredible battle lab,” about which he said, “not just the Army, the entire [Defense] Department has gone to great lengths to understand what are the lessons that are coming out of there, because no one is iterating technology faster than the Ukrainians.”

He then described the initial Russian-Ukraine fighting as “positional warfare, because neither side possessed an actual maneuver, combined-arms, army.” Instead, Obadal said, “two uncoordinated armies really came together, got into positional warfare, and then we saw the innovation of the drones and a number of other things, but specific is the drones.”

Currently in the Russian-Ukraine war, Obadal said, “You have a dead zone of several kilometers between these two positions and it's very reminiscent of World War I,” where artillery was introduced, and “now the drone…is an enabler of soldiers. So how do you deny terrain with drones? How do you actually take terrain with drones?”

“We've taken all of those lessons and incorporated [them] in,” Obadal said, “so now at this point in basic training our soldiers are actually operating drones. Not something that was happening two or five years ago. But they get that familiarization as soon as they are coming into the Army in our training centers.”

At the Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, Obadal said he watched U.S. operational forces conducting exercises “utilizing a number of different drones to have certain effects – electronic warfare, observation, calling-for-fire, and first-person, viewer-kinetic action. That's the ‘operationalization’ of it [drone warfare].”

But Obadal was most interesting to me when he expanded on how the Army had “spent billions on buying commercial off-the-shelf drones that are customized for military use,” and shipped them to “almost every [Army] division and even down in regiments.” There, he continued, “We have small groups of soldiers that have been pulled in by the leadership, given some budget, small budget, and given a facility and said, ‘Put together drones that we can go out on our training areas and utilize.’”

The result of this localized drone creation was, Obadal said, “They [the drones] are not exquisite. They cost very little to make. It's okay to crash them. But what it's doing is not just the technology, the other thing we're learning, [as] from the Ukraine, is you have an incredibly capable core [of Army personnel] that knows how to utilize drones in every aspect of it.”

Another purpose, Obadal explained, “It's not about flying an FPV [first-person view/controlled] drone that's part of it, it's about how do you team them together; how do you do all of the things that we're watching the Ukrainians do; so we we're baking that in into our organizations by letting them…mass-produce as many low-cost drones as they can so that they can get the repetitions…We have to go through hundreds of repetitions a day in our Army to build that repository of knowledge, turn that into doctrine, which is constantly evolving, and then spread it throughout our Army.”

Commenting on the Army drone system, McCarthy said, “They're allowing leaders at every level to be entrepreneurial in nature, to look at the capability, to learn the technology, and make recommendations to the changes in task organization. They're going to have to change the

business model of the Army. There might not be 40 people in a rifle platoon five or 10 years from now. There might be half as many. So we have the luxury where we can be a little deliberate. We may want to go faster. The world's complicated, but doing it the right way, the smart way, they're going to make better choices.”

For example, at a February 2026 exercise at Fort Stewart, Georgia, soldiers experimented with electronic warfare payloads on medium-range reconnaissance systems and tested various configurations on FPV drones to determine system limitations and capabilities, according to an

Army press release. “The ongoing innovation includes stressing equipment through rigorous training to understand what works best for operational units,” the release said.

The Army, Obadal said, is “trying to encourage small [drone making] companies, new entrants that have compelling technology. We're trying to leverage as much external capital, because there is a large amount of external capital that's invested in the defense technology industry, but we just haven't rewarded it at the right level.”

Army Assistant Secretary for Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology Brent Ingraham is changing acquisition processes that are intended to foster rapid prototyping, rapid fielding and rapid acquisition of new capabilities, Obadal said.

He continued, “What it's about is continuing to prototype and experiment at scale and then feed all of that into our Combined Arms Center (CAC).” There, he said, Lt. Gen. James P. Isenhower III, CAC Commanding General will determine “now how do we put our findings back into areas that will change force management or capability requirements.”

Summing up, Obadal said, “Today we have young men and women that I see out in the organizations with highly technical capabilities that allow them to do direction-finding, to do pinpoint locations of enemy emissions, and then utilizing other capabilities to visually confirm feeding all of that back into a data-centric C2 [communications] system. So it's that human machine teaming of giving the right capabilities to our soldiers allows them to be far more effective than they were just a couple years ago.”

Obadal added, “It's an important thing to remember right now we're not replacing soldiers with autonomous or unmanned weapons. What we're doing is we are unburdening the soldier from the mundane tasks or the most dangerous tasks so that they can take a step back and they can do the things that only humans -- whether it's soldiers, commanders -- can do.”

Read more national security insights from experienced experts exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

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Sat, 15 Aug 2026 05:59:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Bali in 2026: 15 Beautiful Places You Should Add to Your Trip https://belimedia.com.ng/Bali-Tour-Packages https://belimedia.com.ng/Bali-Tour-Packages Bali has a way of staying on everyone's travel list year after year, and Bali in 2026 is shaping up to be no different. New boutique stays have opened near quieter beaches, a few of the rice terrace villages have added better walking trails, and flight connectivity from India has improved, making a Bali trip easier to plan than it was even two years ago. Whether you're going for the beaches, the temples, or simply to disconnect for a week, this guide walks you through 15 places worth building your Bali in 2026 itinerary around, based on what actually works well when you're there and not just what looks good in photos.

1. Uluwatu Temple

Perched on a cliff edge with the ocean crashing below, Uluwatu Temple is one of the most atmospheric spots on the island, especially at sunset when the Kecak fire dance performance begins. Anyone building a Bali trip around cultural sights should keep at least one evening free for this.

2. Tegallalang Rice Terraces

These stepped green terraces near Ubud are postcard-famous for a reason. Early morning visits, before the tour buses arrive, give you a much calmer experience and better light for photos.

3. Nusa Penida

A short boat trip from mainland Bali, Nusa Penida offers dramatic cliffside views of Kelingking Beach and the natural infinity pool at Angel's Billab. It's become one of the most searched additions to any Bali in 2026 travel plan, and honestly, it earns the hype.

4. Ubud Monkey Forest

This nature reserve blends jungle walking paths with ancient stone temples and, of course, hundreds of long-tailed macaques. It's a good half-day stop if you're already based in Ubud.

5. Seminyak Beach

Seminyak offers a more polished beach experience with beach clubs, sunset bars, and good restaurants lining the shore. It suits travellers who want a mix of relaxation and nightlife within the same stretch of coast.

6. Tanah Lot Temple

Built on a rock formation just offshore, Tanah Lot is one of Bali's most photographed temples, particularly during golden hour when the tide is low enough to walk closer to the base.

7. Mount Batur

For travellers who don't mind an early wake-up, the sunrise trek up Mount Batur rewards you with views over the crater lake and, on clear mornings, all the way to Mount Agung in the distance.

8. Gili Islands

Technically just off Lombok but easily reachable from Bali, the Gili Islands are worth the detour for their car-free streets and turquoise snorkelling spots. Many travelers extend their Bali trip by two or three days just for this.

9. Kuta Beach

Kuta remains a solid choice for first-timers, with surf schools, beachfront cafes, and an easy, walkable layout. It's less quiet than Seminyak but great for beginners who want to try surfing.

10. Sekumpul Waterfall

Tucked away in northern Bali, Sekumpul requires a short trek through rice fields and jungle, but the multi-tiered waterfall at the end is one of the most rewarding sights on the island.

11. Tirta Empul Temple

Known for its holy spring water purification ritual, Tirta Empul gives visitors a genuine look into Balinese spiritual practices, not just a photo backdrop. Dress modestly and bring a change of clothes if you plan to join the ritual bathing.

12. Canggu

Canggu has grown into Bali's creative hub, with co-working cafes, black sand beaches, and a laid-back surf culture. It's increasingly popular with travelers building a longer Bali in 2026 itinerary who want to stay a week or more in one place.

13. Lovina Beach

On the quieter north coast, Lovina is known for early morning dolphin-watching boat trips and calm waters, a nice contrast to the busier southern beaches.

14. Bali Swing, Ubud

This spot became famous through social media, and while it's touristy, swinging over the jungle canopy near Ubud is genuinely fun and photographs beautifully, making it a common stop on Bali trip itineraries built around Instagram-worthy locations.

15. Jatiluwih Rice Terraces

Jatiluwih, an alternative to Tegallalang recognized by UNESCO, offers a quieter, larger, and less commercialized setting—perfect for travelers seeking the rice terrace experience without the crowds.

Why Bali in 2026 Is Worth Planning Early

Flight prices and hotel rates in popular areas like Seminyak and Ubud tend to rise closer to peak months (July, August, and December). Booking your Bali trip four to five months ahead usually secures better rates and wider availability, especially if your itinerary includes island-hopping to Nusa Penida or the Gili Islands, where speedboat slots fill up quickly during high season.

Conclusion

Bali in 2026 continues to offer something for every kind of traveler, whether it's the cliffside temples, the quieter northern waterfalls, or the rice terraces that made this island famous in the first place. Getting the itinerary right, though, comes down to knowing which places are actually worth the travel time and which ones to skip, and that's exactly where planning with an experienced travel partner makes a real difference. At SkyPlanet Holidays, our team has curated Bali itineraries for years, drawing on firsthand knowledge of the island's best routes, trusted local guides, and up-to-date travel conditions, so your trip is built on real experience and reliable planning rather than guesswork.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q1. What is the best time to plan a Bali trip in 2026? 

A. April to October offers the driest weather, making it the most popular window for a Bali in 2026 holiday, though shoulder months like May and September see fewer crowds.

Q2. How many days are sufficient to visit these 15 locations in Bali? 

A. A well‑paced Bali itinerary that covers most of these sites usually requires 7 to 10 days, especially if you plan to visit Nusa Penida or the Gili Islands.

Q3. Do I need a visa for Bali as an Indian traveler? 

A. Yes, Indian travellers need a visa for Indonesia, though a Visa on Arrival is available for short stays; it's best to confirm current requirements before booking your Bali trip.

Q4. Is Bali safe for solo and first-time travelers in 2026? 

A. Yes, Bali remains one of the more traveller-friendly destinations in Southeast Asia, with good tourist infrastructure across the main areas covered in this guide.

Q5. Which area should I stay in for easy access to most of these places? 

A. Ubud works well for the temples and rice terraces, while Seminyak or Canggu are better bases if beaches and nightlife are your priority.

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Tue, 11 Aug 2026 11:34:05 +0100 Gopi Krishnan
BLUF: The US Must Lead in Gray Zone Activity https://belimedia.com.ng/bluf-the-us-must-lead-in-gray-zone-activity https://belimedia.com.ng/bluf-the-us-must-lead-in-gray-zone-activity As Washington works on the historically large defense budget, there is one theme which should loom large in the budget but comparatively, will cost little. Key to our national security is countering the gray zone activity that our adversaries are waging against the US and developing our own offensive gray zone strategies. Just as we would not ignore a kinetic strike against the US, we cannot ignore the targeted gray zone attacks by adversaries but we must be careful that our approach is thoughtful, and expertly executed in order to guard against escalation. Developing such offensive and defensive strategies will require gray zone expertise, proficient knowledge of the targeted adversary, a government wide strategy, and patience. As global leaders, we also must be open and clear that we will take on these gray zone activities, but we do not have to and should not discuss the details of our actions. We need to publicly put our adversaries on notice that we will not tolerate their actions against the US and we will counter them with our own, more debilitating gray zone activities.

The National Intelligence Council describes gray zone activities as “coercion and subversion . . . below what constitutes armed conflict but outside the bounds of historically legitimate statecraft.” The IC defines the gray zone as a realm of international relations between peaceful interstate diplomacy, economic activity, and people-to-people contact on one end of the spectrum, and direct armed conflict on the other. State-led activities that happen in that space that weaken governments’ resolve to confront the US or its allies, endeavor to change a nation’s policies, or strengthen a country's global leadership would be considered gray zone activities. Deniability is critical to the success of this strategy because attribution risks escalation.

David Pitts, another Cipher Brief Expert, has written about the current phase of warfare which he calls endless wars and the need to counter them. These endless wars are the gray zone activities that our adversaries pursue against us. The White House has made an important step in that direction by appointing the first US National Security Council Director for Cognitive Advantage. There is still a way to go, however, because cognitive advantage is just one part of gray zone activity.

The US must develop expertise for whole of government strategies that bring together all of the tools for gray zone activities. Some of those activities are:

  • Cyber, and information operations efforts focused on undermining public/allied/local/ regional resistance, and information/propaganda in support of US goals;
  • Covert and clandestine operations such as espionage, infiltration, and subversion;
  • Enlistment of non-governmental actors and assistance to irregular military and paramilitary forces;
  • Economic pressures that go beyond normal economic competition;
  • Calculated ambiguity to include deception and denial operations.

Autocracies tend to have an advantage in executing gray zone operations. It is generally believed that non-democratic states can operate more effectively in the gray zone than open democratic societies as non-democratic nations are not limited by domestic law and regulation. The nature of their centralized systems allows them to marshal whole-of-state (and whole-of-society) resources to execute operations. The United States lags behind its autocratic adversaries in the information domain, for example, because our adversaries have ingrained gray zone tactics into their doctrines.

In democratic societies, the use of gray zone tactics can be controversial because the nature of these activities is meant to covertly shape actions. It can be challenging for democratic states to respond to gray zone threats because our legal and military systems are geared towards seeing conflicts through the perspective of war and peace with little consideration for anything in between. Democracies have failed to build consensus around gray zone concepts. The US government has been arguing over the definition and leadership of gray zone and information operations for years.

Gray zone activities are not a new concept and historically have been accepted as a long standing form of statecraft. What are now being called gray zone methods have been well documented actions throughout history. These activities have been called by such titles as “political warfare,” “covert operations,” “irregular or guerrilla warfare,” and “active measures.” It is worth examining the historic record and recalling the benefits and rationale for gray zone activities that kept nations out of kinetic fights, allowed for de-escalatory engagement, arguably shortened warfare, and saved lives.

Examples:

  • The Trojan Horse operation exploited many of the instruments of a gray zone campaign– creating confusion and division among the enemy, extending ostensible inducements, implanting hidden military forces, deception, and clandestine infiltration of enemy territory.
  • During the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, the Spartans recognized that they needed to prevent an uprising by the Helots, who were key to Sparta’s agricultural and military systems. Athenians were trying to create the conditions for a Helot uprising, which would then add an irregular dimension to the conventional conflict with Sparta. The Athenians used proxy forces who were experts on the language and culture of the Helots to sow distrust among the Helots against the Spartans. The Helots began to desert Spartan forces, thereby creating a national emergency in Sparta. The Athenian historian Thucydides reported that as a result of Sparta losing Helot support, it reached out to Athens to discuss ending the wars.
  • The Han Empire used economic and cultural engagement—such as trade agreements, marriage alliances, and cultural exchanges—to manage tensions with nomadic powers. These actions helped secure borders and reduce the need for large-scale wars
  • During the Cold War, superpowers like the U.S. and USSR engaged in gray zone tactics such as espionage, sabotage, and proxy support to influence outcomes in regions like Latin America, Korea and Vietnam. These active measures as they were called, kept the competition a contested space, avoiding immediate escalation with the US.

Gray zone campaigns are likely to increase and diversify because of more enabling technologies, the erosion or absence of accompanying norms, and challenges with attribution. There is a growing awareness among some in the US national security community that if we do not develop gray zone strategies against our adversaries, then we will find ourselves no longer the global power that we have been. Without these strategies, we also limit potential responses to our adversaries to kinetic ones.

As a national security community, we have trained only a narrow group of special operators and intelligence professionals to be able to think creatively enough to devise irregular warfare plans and strategies. To produce gray zone strategies the US will need to train a work force in creativity and out of the box thinking. It also will require organization and orchestration from all assets of the US government and the development of and use of technology to bring some of the ideas to fruition. A fully conceived gray zone strategy needs to marshal all aspects of the US government: military, intelligence, economic, trade, diplomacy, and public relations.

The US is not organized as a nation to devise these strategies. Our State Department is focused on developing relationships. Our National Security Council is hollowed out. Due to issues with legal authorities, neither the Department of War nor the intelligence community can take the lead in implementing whole of government strategies. We are at a standstill and have been for several years.

What to do?

We need to be upfront that leading in gray zone operations is good for US national security. If we do not quickly make gray zone strategies a key part of our national security then we risk our global leadership role. We must put in place the tools and organization to execute these strategies. Using part of the large defense budget to show US resolve on this matter would go a long way. Putting a seasoned professional at the NSC and making him/her in charge of integrating the USG gray zone activities against specific adversaries is key to winning in this realm. A lack of coherent command-and-control, as well as jurisdictional and philosophical boundaries between government agencies, inhibits the synchronized activities needed for successful and truly whole-of-government gray zone activities and responses. We also should use the trained Department of War and intelligence community planners, working with the rest of government, to develop government-wide plans that are implemented at the White House. While we move out in this way, we should also be training our national security professionals across the government in how to develop gray zone strategies. Now is the time to make this a national imperative.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 09 Aug 2026 06:22:32 +0100 FirstHandNews
There Will be Unseen Costs to be Paid over the War in Iran. Who is Weighing Them? https://belimedia.com.ng/there-will-be-unseen-costs-to-be-paid-over-the-war-in-iran-who-is-weighing-them https://belimedia.com.ng/there-will-be-unseen-costs-to-be-paid-over-the-war-in-iran-who-is-weighing-them

EXPERT INTERVIEW – With an interim agreement expected as early as today between the U.S. and Iran aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz to shipping traffic, experts are assessing the short and long-term costs of any deal.

As negotiators work on an agreement to re-implement a ceasefire and restart negotiations aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, there are questions about whether Iran will end up with more control over the strait than it enjoyed prior to the war and about the hidden costs that could include impacts on the sanctions packages that the U.S. has been using as a diplomacy tool to try and keep Iran’s malicious activities in check.

Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke in-depth with former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI Norm Roule about the current “operational pause” and about the unseen costs of any deal. Their conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity. You can also watch the interview on The Cipher Brief’s YouTube Channel.

THE INTERVIEW

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

Christian: The situation with Iran has continued to progress in ways that maybe people didn't expect or anticipate when this war started. How do you describe where we are right now in terms of progress toward ending this war?

Roule: Where we are right now is in a lull. This is an operational pause. We're not approaching a significant core agreement. This is instead a period of coercive restraint. It's not a ceasefire. And Iran has continued to attack ships, but you're seeing the U.S. restrain its response again here to give diplomacy a chance. The president is showing considerable restraint. At the same time, the assets we have in the region are immensely powerful, immensely capable, and very well led. So, they have everything they need to do to undertake the dramatic operations the president has discussed. The diplomacy itself that's underway is a challenge. Each side is describing it dramatically differently.

If you look at the position of each side, there has been a consistent trend. The U.S. will announce negotiations, and the Iranians will deny negotiations are taking place. A few days later, there will be indirect negotiations through regional parties, still accomplishing the same things, but we're not at the table to talk about nuclear issues, missile issues, or militia issues as originally discussed.

The Iran-Oman mechanism that's being talked about right now in the press is likely being overstated by the Iranians and by some who would believe that concessions to Iran are the appropriate outcome from this crisis. Here's why it's being overstated: If tolls of any sort are charged, what happens to a shipper who refuses to pay? How does work in association with sanctions that have been imposed by the United States? Are American ships and American-related ships, allowed to pay Iran money? Through what mechanisms, what channels? Will we sanction other countries for paying Iran money through these channels? Iran has dictated which countries can enter the Persian Gulf and the bulk of this channel is through Iranian waters, but according to press reports, the Omanis must tell the Iranians who is transiting south. Iran's parliament has said no enemy countries can transit. Are Israeli or Israeli-related ships then banned from the Gulf? These are these are hugely consequential questions that are being glossed over by those who would say, ‘well, a deal is being worked out’. But this situation does show that while the U.S. absolutely has the military edge, it is restraining itself, and that has given Iran an ability to influence some would say, ‘control the pace’ of shipping in the Gulf. That shipping continues, and I've seen reports that as many as five million barrels of oil a day are now moving through the strait, which is going to reduce the pressure on oil markets, but this remains an unreliable waterway. Insurance rates remain very high and will remain high. And the blockade, of course, remains in place. This is a very delicate situation.

We also have to consider what happens if the Houthis look at the Iranian Oman deal and say, we want the same deal regarding the Bab el-Mandeb. What is the premise to refuse that? What would we do if the Houthis responded in their own way to attacking ships in the Red Sea?

So, we're in a very consequential period. And this is a period consequential for Iran because they're also in dire need of economic assistance. Their inflation is about 70%. Unemployment is horrific in many locations. I've seen figures as high as forty to forty-five percent in some areas. And the Iranians of course are showing defiance and claiming this isn't a problem, but this has got to be touching their decision making. And I think that's something the White House is considering.

Christian: President Trump has been very clear on where he stands on the issue of paying fees for passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Why is Iran pushing this issue when there were no fees in place before the war started? Is this one of Iran's most powerful points of leverage that they have over the strait? How are you thinking about their position on these fees?

Roule: It's a good question and I'm not putting a value judgment on it. I've tried to remain neutral on these issues. But those who advocate for making a deal with Iran, you know, diplomacy comes with severe consequences. If Iran is able to acquire control over the strait, will that collapse the international sanctions regime? For example, if Iran is able to control the strait in this regard, can it dictate which food shippers can come into Kuwait? If Iran controls the strait, it now has a permanent foot on the throat of the international community. And the idea that if we just do this, we can then build on trust with an IRGC government has no evidence in reality. Now that doesn't mean that it may not happen, but those who say you can build on this are not producing an argument that makes sense. Iran would be able to inject considerable power projection into the region in an unprecedented way, gaining billions of dollars, and that money would inevitably go to its missile program and proxies. And those who talk diplomacy with Iran, and you can see this when you look at social media statements or foreign affairs articles. The authors who speak most passionately and eloquently about engagement with Iran can't seem to acknowledge that people will die as a consequence. Now, that makes me sound like I'm opposed to this but I'm just giving you all the reasons why this is a problem.

The region, of course, has no desire for Iran to have this capability. But they also have no desire for a missile and drone war. That you either have a drone war, missile war, or give in to Iran, those are usually statements made by people who aren't professional diplomats, professional policymakers or have little understanding of the regional issues. There's going to be some sort of path in the middle that works if we're to protect and preserve sanctions as our tool against Iran's terrorism and other activities and if we’re to protect and preserve the national sovereignty and security of these countries who are our partners.

Also in the details of this deal are questions over whether the U.S. military would be banned from the Persian Gulf. The Iranians would have to approve the passage of U.S. military ships, which of course we wouldn't agree to, but the Iranians could claim that as a violation and things could unravel. We're going to land in a gray area on this if diplomacy is to succeed and it may not succeed.

Christian: In public statements, President Trump seems to be losing patience with the process. The president has said before that if Iran doesn't make this deal, that's it and we've witnessed similar red line crescendo moments before. You mentioned the IRGC led government. It's clear that they are running the country now. It's not clear how the diplomatic process is working, certainly by historical standards. What are your potential measures of success or indicators that the diplomatic process has run its course and what are you watching as potential next steps?

Roule: Throughout the last twenty years, various administrations, Democratic and Republican, have each said the same thing that we will try every possible diplomatic option for as long as possible and that all responses remain on the table. But once we've shown the world that we have tried every diplomatic option and the Iranians won't take yes for an answer, won't take diplomacy for an answer, then we'll be justified in using force.

I've been in congressional testimony where I've had Republicans and Democratic State Department officials insist that was U.S. policy. And that is congruent with the President's statements. He's basically saying, ‘Look, I'm going to give them every opportunity to negotiate’ because the consequences of a much broader conflict for the region, for the Iranian people, for civilians, for the U.S. war fighters who are risking their lives in the region, all of this will come into play.

We do have the assets in the region and our leadership in the military force there is exceptional and highly experienced. And based on the nature of the attacks conducted by the U.S. military in recent weeks, one can deduce a couple of points.

The first is that we know a lot about Iran's military architecture. And second, Iran has very little defense against our attacks because we've seen very little air defense or port defense as a result. Iran only has an offensive capacity. And it's attacking civilian architecture as well as U.S. military bases, not being used by the U.S. military, but nonetheless, they're bases where we have that presence. But at some point, if you believe in international values, we we've got to stand with our partners to protect them in a way that is congruent with their national interest and leadership approaches.

Christian: Over the weekend, news reports indicated that the Gulf states were the ones that convinced President Trump to not escalate this war right now. Do you have a sense of where the Gulf states are right now in terms of their approach to President Trump, their approach to Iran?

Roule: I think you need to have several different pillars in mind. First, let's talk about what the Gulf States have done that has been quite successful. Their defense against Iran has been very, very successful as a result of years of engagement with the United States and with the U.S. private sector, which is playing a large role in their successes and will play a role in their future successes in terms of defending against cyberattacks and drone and missile attacks. No air defense is perfect, but the performance by the GCC has been exceptional. And they have protected three things that we should applaud.

First, they've protected their own nationals and their own infrastructure, which is the duty of every state. They're protecting millions of other citizens to include hundreds of thousands of Americans who live in the region. They're keeping American lives safe with their air defense. And last, they've protected the international economy, preserving through their energy flows and their handling of the situation, the ability to maintain stable energy prices and distillate impact on subsidiary industries. All of that is exceptional.

At the same time, we've seen the Saudi military crisply respond to Houthi aggression with surgical strikes, and the Saudi military joining with the United States on strikes on Iraq, which is a first. And it's also a demonstration of the quality of Saudi Air Forces in general. So, there's a sense of extremely close partnership between our militaries. But how they move forward, you know, it is their neighborhood, so how they move forward in a world where there could be a major attack on Iran is likely going to mean that they're going to face more missile and drone attacks. They're going to want a voice in this.

They know their region better than we do. We should respect that. And I think that's what you saw last week in the reports of phone calls to the president, where he gave diplomacy a chance and was about to move, and I believe he was serious, based on my understanding. But he also took into consideration partners, people who have lives on the line and are trying to defend the world's economy and know their neighborhood very well. So, I'm not unhappy with what's happened. I don't think you can criticize that. That's a natural, organic and appropriate process.

Christian: Let's talk gray zone just for a moment. We've seen reports recently that the hacks against the water infrastructure in Minnesota could have involved Iran. We've seen reports that China, although not confirmed, was planning to deliver air defense systems to Iran. There's no doubt about the cooperation continuing between Russia and Iran. What are you looking at that some of us may be missing?

Roule: Press reports confirm what many observers have cited, and that is that Iran's cyber activities have continued unabated since this conflict began. Indeed, before the conflict, against multiple actors in the United States and largely that's been successfully defended against by our national cyber architecture, as well as the architecture of our Gulf partners. The president has disagreed with the assessment on Minnesota and other places, but that does fit with the past pattern of Iranian cyber activity against SCADA and other systems in the United States. and has been a longtime target of Iran itself. It is an attack on our national infrastructure, if it's proven. And if proven and we don't respond to it, the people in Tehran are going to say, ‘Well, there's no reason we shouldn't continue to do this’. So, I think that issue itself is pushing the White House towards alternative actions besides diplomacy. And in fairness, it has been a traditional standpoint of multiple administrations to say how we respond. Is it at a time and way of our choosing? We don't respond symmetrically, you know, we don't do the exact same thing back. So, if the United States were to respond with airstrikes against Iran’s cyber architecture, which would probably be a good thing in a conflict, that is an appropriate proportional response just done differently. And it would be congruent with multiple administrations' views and statements as to how they will treat Iranian aggression.

Christian: What are you looking for next? What are you paying the most attention to?

Roule: As I mentioned, if you give Iran control of the Strait of Hormuz, you're going to have consequences, not only in terms of whether they will ever negotiate seriously with us, but what does it mean for the Red Sea, and all sorts of other things? And those who say, well, we can work past that usually aren't in the Gulf, usually don't have children fighting right now and usually won't pay the price of those decisions. Not to say they won't be made, but we need to be upfront on those costs, and some of the issues aren't being discussed.

What I'm looking for is the conversation about those costs. And if it doesn't happen, that's a bad thing for everybody. The other issue is I think we need to look at is how the U.S. is going to respond to continued Iranian aggression. When does the U.S. restrain itself? Right now, the president is clearly, as he's announced, looking at de-escalation. But if the Iranians continue to probe with cyberattacks and missile and drone strikes, they've got to be addressed in a way that says to Iran, that there is a material price to be paid for that.

In the negotiating channels, I would look for any evidence that the U.S. is now directly dealing with the Iranians. That's unlikely to happen in the near term. That doesn't mean that diplomacy isn't occurring robustly through our partners, but any evidence of direct negotiations with the U.S. would be a very significant uptick.

And last, I would look for someone to address the issue of how any payments to Iran, involuntarily or otherwise, will impact the sanctions regime. Failure to address that is irresponsible in a policy world and indicates that maybe that's not being taken seriously.

And maybe one more point, and that is we should expect rhetoric on each side, but we should focus on what happens on the ground via the effervescent statements that are so often in the media.

Read more national security insights from experienced experts exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

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Sun, 09 Aug 2026 06:22:32 +0100 FirstHandNews
AI Summaries Are Susceptible to Manipulation — and That's Both a Business and a National Security Problem https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-summaries-are-susceptible-to-manipulation-and-thats-both-a-business-and-a-national-security-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-summaries-are-susceptible-to-manipulation-and-thats-both-a-business-and-a-national-security-problem More and more people are using AI like a search engine – 42 percent of U.S. adults now use AI chatbots to search for information – and that shift is exposing a structural vulnerability that adversaries are exploiting to seed propaganda. In practical terms, this is a problem of Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) – the deliberate effort to shape digital content so that AI chatbots absorb and repeat it.

The research so far points to data voids — the thinly covered topics where there isn't much credible information to begin with — as the weak spot. This includes breaking news or new material that has not yet had time to accumulate the signals that would flag it as low authority.

AI can process far more information than any human can, but there is an inherent trade-off in outsourcing the curation of information to an AI summary. In the search era, users were exposed to source material and evaluated credibility for themselves. Now AI does that work, and research shows the large majority of AI queries end without a click.

This is both a business concern and a national security concern. The clearest example on the consumer side is Apollo-9. In a Chinese state TV investigation, researchers used a tool called Liqing to flood the web with fake reviews and rankings for Apollo-9, a fitness tracker that did not exist. Within hours, chatbots were recommending the fake fitness tracker and some continued to do so a day after the fraud was exposed. Liqing and other tools are sold openly on Chinese e-commerce platforms like Taobao and JD.com, with pricing ranging from roughly $520 to $4,765 for three-month subscriptions. One provider told Chinese state media it had served more than 200 clients across multiple industries, guaranteeing top-three placement on any AI platform.

In order to better understand these developments and their impact, this article examines how the same mechanism scales from commercial fraud to geopolitical disruption, using the Russia-Ukraine war as a live GEO lab. Leaked documents about Russia’s “Project 2026” and Ukraine’s AI‑enabled counter‑operations show how influence campaigns are evolving from social feeds to the underlying sources that AI systems draw on — an angle largely absent from existing information warfare debates.

Russia and the National Security Case: Same Playbook, Higher Stakes

When Russian operations exploit GEO in their war on Ukraine, they are not just spreading propaganda in the moment; they are trying to become the “ground truth” that AI systems summarize back to users, analysts, journalists, and policymakers. In June 2026, Bloomberg reviewed 73 leaked documents from the Social Design Agency (SDA), a sanctioned Moscow firm at the center of Russia's influence operations, describing a program its operators called “Project 2026:” a network of Wikipedia-style reference sites, media outlets, and fake think tanks built to shape what search engines — and AI systems — treat as reliable sources. The goal, as described in the leaked documents, is to “create an alternative information ecosystem” by shaping not only what people see today but also what AI systems will later “know” about key leaders, the war’s origins, Ukraine’s conduct, NATO’s role, and Western support.

Russia's GEO tactics build on years of search engine optimization (SEO) manipulation and are part of a widely reported pattern of industrialized cognitive warfare that includes deepfakes, cloned sites and other deceptive content. In 2023, a study published in the Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review examined pro-Kremlin attempts to manipulate search engine results and found that pseudo‑think tanks and propaganda outlets such as Global Research and Strategic Culture Foundation were amplified through backlink networks and low‑quality sites. These outlets were most effective on conspiratorial searches involving, for instance, Ukraine President Zelensky, where authoritative content was sparse. Indeed, as noted by former CIA leader Jennifer Ewbank, the use of deepfakes to confuse, distort, or influence public opinion not only occurs in Ukraine but across Europe – all of which reflects “the same underlying reality: the tools for deception are faster, cheaper, and more accessible than the systems we rely on to detect or prevent them.” In other words, this is not just about deception, but the erosion of trust itself.

Storm-1516, a documented Russian disinformation operation that has been active since at least 2023, has scaled sharply in 2026. According to Bloomberg, the operation has produced more than 190 false stories since 2023 that the outlet has been able to identify. Based on Bloomberg’s reporting, Meduza adds that in the first quarter of 2026 alone, Storm-1516 was producing fake stories at twice the rate of the same period the previous year with, for instance, as of late March and early April 2026, materials appearing almost daily. Meduza also reports that more than 40 percent of Storm-1516’s fabrications have targeted Ukraine, with another third focused on electoral processes in other countries. Taken together, these reports demonstrate that Storm-1516’s operations are ultimately aimed at eroding Western support for Ukraine, swinging European elections and destabilizing NATO allies.

Taken together with the “Project 2026” leaks, these findings suggest that Russia is now attacking both the content layer (through synthetic media) and the source layer (through cloned Wikipedia‑style sites and fake think tanks) of information ecosystems. While synthetic videos and stories are often treated as short‑term deception, they also become part of the online record that future AI systems may ingest or retrieve, turning Russia’s layered influence architecture into a long‑term GEO problem, especially in data voids.

The Storm-1516 operation follows a clear pattern. A fake witness, often an AI-generated video, seeds a plausible but unverifiable story. Low-tier blogs and Telegram channels amplify it in multiple languages. Then less rigorous Western outlets pick it up, severing the link to the original Russian operator. By the time the narrative reaches mainstream discussion, the Russian fingerprint is gone. The new risk in today’s landscape is that the AI curation layer completes this laundering. It reads the now-repeated narrative across multiple sources and presents it as a neutral summary.

Researchers at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue found that the chatbot DeepSeek was quoting VT Foreign Policy, an outlet known to carry content from Russian propaganda operations such as Storm‑1516 and to have connections to the Kremlin‑linked Strategic Culture Foundation. U.S. and EU sources describe the Strategic Culture Foundation as an arm of Russian state interests.

A 2025 NewsGuard study also found ten of the leading chatbots — including ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and Copilot — collectively repeated false narratives from the pro-Kremlin Pravda network about a third of the time. It’s important to note that a 2025 study in the Misinformation Review, responding directly to the NewsGuard findings, found the number was closer to 5 percent and that these failures clustered in data voids. While the researchers found "little evidence to support the grooming theory" and warned against "the overhyped specter of Kremlin manipulation," they acknowledged that data voids "may be artificially created" and that they could not dismiss the possibility that a disinformation campaign could target them. Importantly, their audit came fourteen months before the leaked “Project 2026” documents showed Russia explicitly targeting AI systems. The more Russia attempts to flood these data voids, the more likely it is that future AI summaries about Ukraine will inherit its framing.

How to Build Resilience – A Way Forward

Like its older cousin SEO, GEO is inherently dual-use, but it sits in a regulatory vacuum because it is viewed strictly as a consumer protection issue rather than a national security threat. The Apollo-9 experiment and the Storm-1516 operation prove they are two sides of the same coin; the same commercial tactics that manufactured demand for a non-existent fitness tracker can easily manufacture plausibility for distorted narratives about a geopolitical crisis such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. History shows that with traditional search engines, the market naturally incentivized tech companies to tackle manipulation head-on because mass spam threatened to destroy the user experience for billions of people, directly endangering corporate business models. Malicious foreign influence operations executing GEO are fundamentally different because they remain largely invisible to the mass market, with manipulation surgically clustered within obscure data voids, offering tech companies no commercial incentive to self-police and leaving the information terrain around a live European war effectively undefended.

To bridge this gap, regulators can draw on the lessons of private sector SEO defense and public-private counter-disinformation efforts, but they must realize that the exact same playbook will not work here. While private developers can easily dismiss the Misinformation Review study’s five percent finding as an acceptable commercial error margin, this minor statistical anomaly sits precisely in the data voids that Russia is actively trying to colonize, and so it represents a primary, unmonitored vector for foreign manipulation. The strategic risk is not only that GEO can mislead people in the moment, but that it can reshape the evidentiary record on which institutions and AI systems will later rely; if hostile narratives are allowed to dominate long‑tail topics and thinly documented episodes in the Russia-Ukraine war for instance, then future summaries, briefings, and even historical accounts risk being generated from polluted inputs.

The 2025 Misinformation Review study recommends "warning banners for data void queries" and increased "audit access," but notes the banners are "applied inconsistently" and the audit access is "hindered by power asymmetries.” Because the market will never self-correct a threat it does not financially register, protecting the integrity of generative content must transition from a voluntary corporate practice to a formal national security mandate.

In the Russia-Ukraine war, these dynamics are already visible. Russian operations such as Storm‑1516 use GEO‑style flooding and synthetic witnesses to launder narratives about the conflict into the broader information environment, while Ukrainian actors rely on AI‑enabled monitoring and evidentiary documentation to defend the integrity of the record. The contest is no longer confined to what populations see online today; it is over what AI systems will say is true about the war tomorrow. Recognizing GEO as a national security problem therefore changes the governance question: the training, retrieval, and ranking layers of generative systems are now part of the battlespace, and leaving this space unregulated is akin to leaving critical information infrastructure undefended.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran Is “Counting Coup” On The United States! https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-is-counting-coup-on-the-united-states https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-is-counting-coup-on-the-united-states The Iranian leadership appears to be intent on demonstrating its defiance and courage in the face of American force while also humiliating the “most powerful man in the world.”

“Counting Coup, or striking an enemy, was the highest honor earned by warriors participating in the intertribal wars of the Great Plains. Key to a man’s success in Plains combat was demonstrating his own courage by proving superiority over his opponent and, in a competitive sense, over his own comrades.

Killing was a part of war, but showing courage in the process was more important for individual status. This was best accomplished by risking one’s life in charging the enemy on foot or horseback to get close enough to touch or strike him with the hand, a weapon, or a “coupstick.”

Humiliating the enemy also played a part in this fighting…

Counting Coup, then, was the epitome of a type of warfare that pitted skill and daring of one man against another.”

Walking the Line

Iran is playing a very dangerous game. In the face of the awesome military power of the United States, in between desultory negotiating sessions, they continue to touch the enemy by launching attacks against U.S. and allied Gulf facilities. Recently, they have reached farther afield, striking U.S. assets in an Egyptian port. This would seem to be inexplicable behavior, given the U.S.’s obvious desire for a deal, inviting as it has strong retaliatory strikes against Iran’s increasingly beleaguered military, and potentially civilian, infrastructure. Most recently, we are seeing reports of possible Iranian cyberattacks on the water supplies of U.S. cities; such activities are certain to continue and likely to escalate, plausibly deniable and effective in sowing fear as they are. The question is why?

It may be simple hubris. It may be a misread of the desperation of their opponent. Or simply overconfidence in the strength of their position. It most certainly is part and parcel of a purposeful negotiating strategy, a reminder to all involved that Iranian forces can reach out and touch you whenever they wish.

Regardless, they are walking a fine line, and they have placed this conflict squarely in the crosshairs of unintended consequences.

As they so often do, they risk overreaching. Should one of these missile or drone strikes make it through, whether by luck or skill, and inflict truly significant casualties on U.S. personnel, either in a land-based facility or on a naval vessel for example, this could surge American support for a massive response, possibly including – however unlikely – ground troops, radically altering and escalating the course of this conflict.

Internal Factions at Play

The Iranian leadership’s actions, however, are likely aimed not only at the United States but may be the result of continued factional maneuvering in Tehran, as groups jockey for advantage for what comes next. Now that it appears likely the regime will survive, they are no doubt looking ahead to where they will land in a new regime. As both factions and individuals.

As I wrote in ‘Is Iran Controlling the Gulf Conflict?’: “I would posit that the newly ascended Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, may in fact be a phantom leader. Alive in some fashion, perhaps largely incapacitated, but not actually in charge. And even if able to coherently express his views, in no way nearly as powerful or influential as his father. The seemingly reckless actions of the regime in courting U.S. retaliation may in actuality reflect a lack of a coherent decision-making process as opposed to a unified one. I think it is quite possible that competing factions within the regime are using Mojtaba as an avatar while they maneuver for decisive advantage.”

Get Out!

On 15 May, I laid out in “Ground Hog Day”, a recommended way forward for the U.S. that I think largely still applies. It is a measure of how fruitless continued military action is that these remain relevant today:

“Make a deal with Iran. One that they will accept. This will require painful concessions and is certain to include provisions that many will find objectionable, including significant sanctions relief. And it will leave the Iranian regime in place and in control of Iran. For now.”

“As much as I would prefer to see regime change in Iran, I believe a deal may be the only realistic way out of the Groundhog Day-like doom loop in which we find ourselves. Simply put, the administration squandered the initial opportunity presented by a unique confluence of events by its lack of strategic planning and a fundamental misunderstanding of Iran and the Iranian regime.”

“As a result, we are going to have to step back and take a longer view. I pity the people of Iran, at least in the near term. They are certain to suffer the brunt of the regime’s immediate ire. That is a hard truth.”

“This is not, however, the end of the story. Iran’s internal weaknesses still matter–and may shape what comes next more than battlefield successes. I am cautiously, very cautiously optimistic that even barring regime change, Iran’s leadership will be forced to change direction.”

“The issues facing Iran prior to the War were serious, in fact existential – a collapsing economy, hyper-inflation, severe water shortages, lack of electricity, and growing widespread popular anger and unrest – and are ongoing and only getting worse. Whatever the Iranian leadership looks like, it will have to address these issues. And it is not clear that they will be capable of doing this without outside help. This is where the U.S. and hopefully our Western allies come in: sanctions relief, and extensive economic and other assistance in exchange for real changes in policy and a pullback on objectionable activities and programs. The potential for this may, and I say may, have increased with the removal of Ali Khamenei from the Supreme Leader’s seat. But it will depend on whether his son and successor, Mojtaba, is less rigidly ideological than his father. We will see if he is willing to put the Iranian people ahead of the regime.”What Awaits!

It is becoming more obvious by the day that the U.S. needs to come to a negotiated settlement with Iran. And the terms of this settlement are certain to be painful and unsatisfactory from the perspective of the West. But continuing tit-for-tat airstrikes simply prolongs the pain and risks horrific unintended consequences without solving the problem, as well as providing the regime with a distraction from its appalling management of Iran’s economy, natural resources, and foreign policy.

Follow Mark on Substack here.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The New Fault Line: Israel and Turkey on a Collision Course https://belimedia.com.ng/the-new-fault-line-israel-and-turkey-on-a-collision-course https://belimedia.com.ng/the-new-fault-line-israel-and-turkey-on-a-collision-course On March 25, 2025, Israeli aircraft struck a set of Syrian airfields. The targets were not Syrian assets, instead they were the sites Turkey had surveyed for planned forward military bases. Ankara quietly shelved the deployment.

That is what the Israel-Turkey rivalry looks like when it is working as designed: a NATO member and a US major non-NATO ally maneuvering against each other in a third country, close enough to require a deconfliction hotline, disciplined enough that neither has yet acknowledged the confrontation for what it is. The two governments have run a channel through Azerbaijani mediation to prevent accidents. Turkish officials describe it as, "strictly technical," signaling neither normalization nor any convergence.

The conditions that made the channel necessary are getting worse, and the outside power that has historically kept this rivalry from becoming a rupture is changing.

Trump's Gift to Erdogan

When Donald Trump landed in Ankara on July 7, 2026 for the NATO summit he became the first sitting US president to visit Turkey in over a decade. He arrived with what aides openly called a "gift bag" for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On CAATSA sanctions, imposed in 2020 over Turkey's purchase of Russia's S-400 system, Trump was categorical: "We're going to be taking the sanctions off; it's time. We don't want to sanction friends." On F110 engines for Turkey's homegrown KAAN fighter, the administration notified key lawmakers it was proceeding. The F-35 remained genuinely conditional, something his administration would "certainly consider." Erdogan told reporters Trump had pledged six aircraft and “always keeps his word”.

Standing beside Erdogan, Trump said Turkey had proven a more loyal partner than some allies Washington once counted on.

Israel's reaction was immediate and unprecedented. Speaking to Fox News and CNN, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that arming Turkey with F-35s would upset the regional balance. He described Erdogan's government as ideologically hostile to Washington and openly threatening to Israel, and pointed to Turkey's continued presence in northern Cyprus. It was the first time Israel had publicly opposed a US arms sale to a fellow NATO member.

Trump was reportedly irritated. Netanyahu insisted the two governments still saw eye-to-eye on the big picture. This difference is worth noting.

They do not see eye-to-eye, and the reason is not sentiment. This administration's Middle East policy seems focused on commercial and strategic arithmetic. On that scale Turkey scores well: 85 million people, a NATO air force, a fast-growing arms industry, control of the Bosporus, and a leader willing to transact. Israel's ability to shape US decisions in the region has always rested on an unstated premise: Washington values the relationship with Israel above the deal in front of it. Ankara is testing that premise. So far, Washington is not objecting.

The pattern repeated within three weeks. On July 8, the State Department initiated the rescission of Syria's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, a status in place since 1979, following Trump's meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. On July 22, Washington and Riyadh announced a nuclear cooperation agreement. Neither move was calibrated to Israeli preferences, but to American interests.

What Turkey Gained While Israel Was Fighting

Ankara's leverage did not appear in July. It accumulated while Israel was occupied elsewhere.

Syria is the clearest case. Since Bashar al-Assad's fall in December 2024, Turkey has established itself as the dominant external patron of al-Sharaa's government. On July 19, 2026, al-Sharaa consolidated the security apparatus under Interior Minister Anas Khattab, who now also heads the National Security Bureau, with Abdul Qader Tahan installed at General Intelligence and Hussein al-Salamah as Khattab's deputy. For Turkey, a centralized Damascus under a friendly government is a forward base, a reconstruction market, and a check on Kurdish autonomy along its southern border all at once.

Israel reads the same arrangement as a threat under construction, and has acted accordingly. In the seven months after Assad fell, Israel conducted roughly 988 air and artillery strikes in Syria, nearly triple its previous rate, including against the Presidential Palace and Ministry of Defense in Damascus. The March 2025 framework for integrating Kurdish forces into the Syrian state remains frozen, which Turkish officials blame largely on Israeli operations destabilizing the Syrian government.

Beyond the Levant, Turkey's footprint keeps widening. In Somalia it operates its largest overseas military base, has trained more than 15,000 soldiers, deployed F-16s and armor, and in 2026 began offshore oil drilling protected by Turkish naval assets. These are moves aimed in part at countering Israel's outreach to Somaliland. Turkey's defense minister says other African governments are now requesting the same security-and-investment package. Layered onto bases in Qatar and northern Iraq, Ankara has assembled a chain of footholds from the Horn of Africa to the Caucasus.

Two structural shifts accelerated this. Iran's regional network was degraded by the 2026 war, leaving a vacuum in Syria and Lebanon that Turkish diplomacy, trade, and reconstruction capital are filling faster than anyone else. Iran is not finished, and Russia was preparing Su-35 deliveries to Tehran the same week Trump was in Ankara.

Meanwhile Moscow's grip on the South Caucasus eroded after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, when most of its forces was deployed in the Ukrainian war, and after the US brokered the 2025 Armenia-Azerbaijan framework, which opened the Zangezur corridor linking Azerbaijan to Turkey.

Israel forging new alliances

Israel has also been forging alliances, no longer counting on the US as their sole guarantee.

In December 2025, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus held their tenth trilateral summit in Jerusalem, where Netanyahu spoke against those who dream of restoring old empires. The three signed a 2026 military cooperation plan covering joint air and naval exercises, intelligence sharing, and reported discussions of a roughly 2,500-strong rapid-deployment force. By February 2026, Netanyahu was describing a broader "hexagon of alliances" built around Greece, Cyprus, and India.

Ankara's counter-positioning is equally deliberate. Turkey has hosted Hamas officials for years and holds real influence over any postwar settlement in Gaza. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's remark that Israel had become a burden humanity could no longer bear drew an Israeli rebuke as incitement. Each government now treats the other's regional relationships as evidence of intent.

Where It Breaks

Direct confrontation remains unlikely, but not impossible. Both capitals understand the costs. But the deconfliction channel is a technical fix for a strategic problem, and four scenarios handled incorrectly could force the two powers into collision.

Syria is the live one. Israeli strikes to prevent hostile entrenchment collide directly with Turkey's project of a unified, centrally governed Syrian state. Israel has already struck sites Turkey intended to occupy. Repeat that once with Turkish personnel present and the hotline becomes a record of a failure rather than a mechanism preventing one.

Lebanon compounds it: Hezbollah degraded but intact, Turkey's expanding humanitarian and political footprint, and continued Israeli operations against Hezbollah infrastructure pulling outside patrons into direct rivalry. Trump is suggesting that Syria should intervene, something Israel can not accept.

Cyprus, divided since 1974, is where Israeli-Greek-Cypriot military integration and a prospective joint rapid-reaction force meet Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. While several of the nations are NATO members, new hostility risks drawing in allied nations.

The F-35 decision itself is the fourth. If Congress and the Pentagon proceed over Israeli objections, it is a tangible erosion of the qualitative military edge that Netanyahu argues is the foundation of deterrence.

Conclusion

Israel and Turkey have been rivals for a decade; and for most of that decade, the fault line stayed closed because the US had an interest in keeping it closed. But the Ankara summit demonstrated, reinforced by the Syria delisting and the Saudi nuclear agreement, that this administration will price each decision on its own merits without allowing allies to veto them. That is a coherent policy. But it risks removing the pressure that has been holding two armed, ambitious, US-aligned states apart in the same contested space.

Washington is not choosing between Israel and Turkey. It is counting on the two allies staying away from an armed conflict. The question is whether a deconfliction hotline routed through Baku can carry the weight that American guarantees used to.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why the Iran War Remains Strategically Adrift https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-iran-war-remains-strategically-adrift https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-iran-war-remains-strategically-adrift “I do think there's a lot of evidence to believe that we're accomplishing the military objectives [of the Iran War], which is destroying the Iranian Navy, the Iranian Air Force, their air defenses, the missile production capabilities, drone production capabilities. That's going well. But how that translates into strategic success has been, I think, the weakness in this entire operation and continues to be today. And I think that if we were to take a step back to February [when the Iran War started], and think about where we are today, I don't know that this would be in our theory of success. It would probably be a branch plan that would not be going so well. And I'm worried about that.”

That was retired-Air Force Lt. Gen. S. Clinton Hinote, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Integration, and Requirements, now a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy and a non-resident adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Aerospace Security Project.

He was speaking on July 23, at a CSIS event, The Air Campaign Returns: From Epic Fury to Midnight Hammer, along with retired-Air Force Gen. James Slife, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, former Commander of Air Force Special Operations Command, and also a non-resident adviser to CSIS’ Aerospace Security Project.

The two former senior Air Force officers not only gave their frank views of the Iran War, but also discussed the future of warfare and its impact on the Air Force and other U.S. military forces. I will start with their views on Iran and the war and then move on to other subjects they dealt with.

Since the Strait of Hormuz is central right now, let’s begin with their views on the Strait which I found inciteful.

Ret.-Gen. Slife began by pointing out, “Military planners have struggled with the Strait of Hormuz challenge for years and years. I mean I don't think it's any surprise to anybody that's paying attention to how this has played out, because geography favors Iran in the Strait.”

Slife continued, “I mean they [Iranians] have three sides of the Strait of Hormuz, right? It's a very narrow waterway. It's very shallow. The ability to maneuver inside the Strait is very limited. It's crowded. I mean there aren't a lot of great options.”

Then, as a former Air Force commander he offered the following views: “I mean, frankly, if there was a great option for how air power could unblock the Strait of Hormuz, it would probably be unblocked at this point. There are things that I think the air component is doing in conjunction with the naval component to target the means that Iran uses to exercise control over the Strait. But it is a very difficult problem. Geography just doesn't favor us in this regard.”

Ret.-Lt. Gen. Hinote added, “I think we're dealing with the problem of small numbers,” and then explained, “The [U.S.] joint force can be exceptionally good at preventing the majority of attacks on shipping [in the Strait]. That could even get into the 90% plus range. You could even call it 98%. But it's that last 2% that the joint force just has the most difficulty stopping [Iran from hitting a transiting ship] because you just can't stop everything when there are these mountainous rugged shores that Iran controls and they can use that as [protective] cover to attack shipping.”

Hinote went on, “So the problem is not necessarily that we're not militarily successful. I call 98% pretty militarily successful, but it's that last 2% that the [ship] insurance companies cannot accept. And so that's, I believe, the true dilemma that is facing the world economy today -- that as long as Iran has the will to try and negate shipping through the Strait, it's going to have some level of capability to do so. And that just creates a conundrum that we just haven't solved and [are] unlikely to solve.”

The two former Air Force generals also raised the issue of Israeli and U.S. forces having different missions for their military involved in attacking Iran.

Ret.-Gen. Slife put it this way: “I wonder to what extent the difference in [U.S. and Israeli] targeting reflects different national aims between Israel and the United States. I don't have any way of knowing that, but I do think it's noteworthy that we are actually, we have pursued very different target sets which may tell us something about what our respective national aims are.”

Ret.-Lt. Gen. Hinote picked up that idea saying, “To me, the Israeli theory of success is pretty straightforward. They [the Israelis] believe the Iranian regime will always be hostile to them and they believe that they have to go back and back and back to re-strike things and to re-strike the regime targets. And you might think of that as a strategy that we've heard called mowing the grass…meaning that the grass is going to grow back and we're going to go back and they are resigned to some way of mowing the grass again for years.”

That means, according to Hinote, “The more [Iranian] regime leaders we [meaning the Israelis] can kill, the better, because that means it takes more time for the new regime leaders to be dangerous to us.”

As for the U.S., according to Hinote, “We're at a stage now where we're fighting a coercion campaign…Hey, we want the Strait [of Hormuz] open. Hey, we want you to give up your nuclear aspirations.”

But now, as he adds, “There's nobody left in Iran who really can make that decision and enforce it up and down what is left of the government and military apparatus. So we're in a state now where what you might have thought of as the strategic aims and the military means, not only were they not necessarily totally aligned, they may have in certain circumstances worked against each other -- and that's a really difficult place to be.”

That is because, as Hinote points out, “We [the Israelis and U.S.] did one of the most successful, maybe the most successful decapitation operation [of Iranian leadership] in history. And so given that, I think you expect that there's going to be a high degree of paralysis and inaction at the

highest levels of the Iranian government. So you're almost thinking like, okay, well, what at that point, how do you take advantage of that strategic paralysis?”

However, there was no “strategic paralysis” in the Tehran regime, nor was there an internal uprising, as President Trump called for that night last February when he announced the first Iran attacks were underway. “When we are finished,” Trump said to the Iranian people, “take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will probably be your only chance for generations." Trump also called on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the armed forces and police to "lay down your weapons and have complete immunity" otherwise "face certain death."

As Hinote put it last week, “We're in a state now where what you might have thought of as the strategic aims and the military means not only were not necessarily totally aligned, they may

have in certain circumstances worked against each other -- and that's a really difficult place to be. And I think one of the reasons why it feels intractable right now is because you have that disparity.”

In fact, Hinote added, “The United States would like to be done with the Middle East, so that we could finally execute some sort of pivot to Asia. And we'd like to get out of all of these very expensive bases in the Middle East. And so we have a theory that is we want to put the [Iranian] regime into some sort of state where we don't have to go back anytime soon -- and we get to a steady state that is better than what was in existence on February 28th [when the U.S. and Israel first attacked Iran].”

Slife also mentioned an effect on U.S military readiness from the Iran War that need further attention when he said, “You know that all our readiness is built around how we generate and deploy forces, particularly for the Air Force and the Navy. We've seen heavy deployments beyond what the [military] services feel like they can routinely support from a readiness perspective and so those things always have a delayed effect.”

Slife added, “I think just the pace of operations over the last year has probably exceeded the Air Force and the Navy's ability to maintain levels of readiness going forward. So, I think we were going to have to pay close attention to that over the next three-to-five years, because there is always a delayed impact to these kinds of heavy operations.”

Hinote spoke about “the mission to rescue the [U.S.] back-seater of the F-15E [that was shot down over Iran]. We've only heard a little bit about that. My sense is that it was a huge operation that required tremendous integration across multiple types of forces in a very difficult time frame.”

He pointed out the difference from the troubled April 1980 Iran rescue attempt that was, he said, “so bad that it led to reforms for the next decade in the United States military. We may see that [the April 5, F-15E back-seater] rescue operation, in contrast, stands as being one of the best we've ever seen.”

Hinote then explained why saving the back-seater was so important.

“What if that weapon-system officer would have been captured and paraded in Iran on TV with the entire world seeing it real time,” Hinote said, “You could see that any political objectives that we were trying to achieve would be all the more difficult to achieve with one single pilot being paraded around in Iran…So, not only was the true political nature of the whole operation in jeopardy, but you [the U.S.] were willing to send what I think is going to end up being scores of airplanes into harm's way, multiple units, helicopters and such to go rescue this one pilot so that the political objectives could be preserved.”

While public concentration currently is on what’s not yet worked to end the Iran War, that rescue operation was one element that did succeed.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Audience Is a Machine: Our Future Information Environment https://belimedia.com.ng/the-audience-is-a-machine-our-future-information-environment https://belimedia.com.ng/the-audience-is-a-machine-our-future-information-environment The future of disinformation is no longer about creating better content. It is about teaching machines what to retrieve, summarize and recommend. In the AI era, the editor matters more than the article.

A story no longer has to trend. It has to be retrieved when a large language model (LLM) constructs the answer. The most important audience in the information environment is no longer human. If an AI assistant becomes the primary gateway to information, influencing what it retrieves becomes more valuable than influencing what millions of people read directly.

The Hugging Face Model Hub, the top repository worldwide, tracks over 2.9 million total machine learning models. Many models are for wonderful uses, ranging from research universities to new private sector companies built to solve problems. Meanwhile, more than 130 active national sovereign initiatives exist in more than 60 countries, according to the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Sovereign AI Index. Every one of these models becomes another editor with its own worldview, training corpus and retrieval strategy.

As Bob Dylan reminds us, “For the times they are a-changin’”.

Countries are in pursuit of a foundational model (cognitive sovereignty) that will provide its own historical context, experts, values, national interests and more.

Different versions of reality will emerge, not because people disagree, but because different models were taught to retrieve, prioritize and reason differently. Not unlike media outlets as they evolved, just with a completely different scale.

Our Focus

The old world was about content, distribution and amplification. The new world is about training, retrieval and reasoning.

We must have the expertise to explain the mental frameworks machines construct before we see an answer to our query.

Our slide decks will cross out the “attention economy” and replace it with the “cognitive economy.”

We will remind ourselves that during the social media era, an adversary would flood the zone with thousands of fake articles and accounts to amplify a narrative. In the AI era, the objective changes. Rather than convincing one person at a time, adversaries will increasingly seek to influence the system that answers everyone.

Perspective is also important. Printing presses made publishing a reality. Radio introduced the broadcast message. Television opened up reach to mass audiences. Social media democratized who could have a voice. And AI now changes who decides what we receive.

Our Preparation

We will need to expand our remit and add expertise in training data provenance, retrieval indexes, embedding systems, model guardrails, agent memory, citation chains and reasoning architectures. AI engineers will become important parts of our team, if not already so.

The decade ahead will introduce AI models and agentic systems that decide what billions of people see. Agents will continuously search, compare, negotiate, monitor and decide for us. Humans may never initiate the request, but the agent will know what to do. That’s a different information ecosystem. We must learn how to track its development accurately and efficiently, so we are in-step or a step ahead on each new innovation of importance.

AI models will cite other AI models who cite other AI models. Over time, the original source may disappear entirely behind layers of machine summarization. The citation survives, but the human reporting becomes increasingly distant.

The editorial model will change as quickly as it needs to. How do we keep up with changes in the perspective of a model on a key topic and why it occurred?

Bad actors will optimize less for search engine optimization (SEO) and increasingly for generative engine optimization (GEO), engineering content specifically to influence what AI systems retrieve and cite.

We will need a new intelligence platform that tracks all publicly accessible LLMs and all innovation in places like Hugging Face, so we can see patterns earlier across the world. Imagine tracking hundreds and then thousands of LLMs in real-time. We still care about what happened, who said it and the rest of the 5Ws, but increasingly, it will be meaningful to know how Claude, Gemini, ChatGPT, DeepSeek and other models summarize and frame key messages.

These platforms will help us as we develop skills to understand training data integrity, how retrieval systems are poisoned through Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) attacks, and how agent memories are manipulated.

Invisible Persuasion

When the audience is the machine, our efforts shift from how to protect the population to how we analyze and influence the infrastructure that reaches us.

Media literacy taught us to evaluate what people published. Machine literacy teaches us how to evaluate how machines constructed the answer.

The era will have many names, I’m sure, but one that resonates with me is “invisible persuasion.”

Unlike propaganda, machine-led information thrives on invisibility. It must appear ordinary, mundane and just do its job.

The next generation of AI will continue to quietly remove the human being from both ends of the media system. It is becoming the audience, and it is becoming the editor. And it is doing both at once.

It is also succeeding in building trust in humans.

SparkToro and Datos Group found that 60% of US google searches ended without a click in the first four months of 2026.

The same person who once clicked through to read is increasingly staying put while a machine goes and reads for them. The Reuters Institute expects search referrals to nearly halve over the next three years.

A Pew Research Center report showed that users clicked a source cited inside an AI summary just 1% of the time (900 US adults, 68,879 google searches).

Trust is migrating from the publisher to the summarizer. Our learning used to include more friction – a competing headline or comments we disagreed with. Now, we get a clean answer without friction.

How this impacts our judgement is a question we’ll study for many years ahead.

Conclusion

The printing press democratized publishing. Search democratized discovery. AI is centralizing editorial judgement again, this time inside machines.

The new editors are not confined to newsrooms. They include model developers deciding guardrails, publishers licensing training data, platform owners determining retrieval rankings, governments building sovereign AI models, open-source communities releasing foundation models, and enterprises curating the knowledge bases their AI agents consult. Editorial power is becoming distributed across the AI stack rather than concentrated in traditional media organizations.

The organizations that understand how machines learn, retrieve, reason and remember will shape the next information environment.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Sovereign AI Tokenomics Trap https://belimedia.com.ng/the-sovereign-ai-tokenomics-trap https://belimedia.com.ng/the-sovereign-ai-tokenomics-trap For US allies, the combination of geopolitics, ever-expanding risk surface and an unsustainable dependence on hyperscale cloud providers has created significant excitement about the potential value of AI data centers and sovereign digital infrastructure. Many of those nations and critical infrastructure owners are now starting to realize that the token, not the data centre, is the atomic unit of AI value. Whoever prices the token actually controls the economics and value creation of every AI-dependent industry irrespective of sovereign cloud, data center or AI factory.

This growing realization will require a material shift in sovereign policy and capability development for those nations combined with short-term patience and recalibration from US partners. The shift will result in both greater sovereign benefit and a more productive, resilient Western Alliance for all.

Why Sovereign Infrastructure Means Little Without Controlling Tokens, Intelligence & Equity

Most Sovereign AI Frameworks are consistent in identifying common levers for success:

-Digital Infrastructure

-Skills and Talent

-Research, development and innovation RDI

-Industry development and commercialisation

-Governance and Equity

Having spent the last 15+ years helping allied nations design their compute, AI and security capabilities, I believe that the rapidly escalating global demand for sovereign digital infrastructure does starts to address where compute is controlled, however, it does little to solve what that compute costs and how value is created and equitably distributed.

Given that whomever prices the token, controls the economics and value creation of every AI-dependent industry irrespective of sovereign infrastructure, nations should treat token supply the way they treat energy supply - as a strategic reserve requiring stockpiles, contracts and dedicated domestic production capacity. It’s sadly ironic that some of these same nations most vocal about sovereign digital infrastructure have been less than diligent in developing and maintaining energy security.

The Rapidly Evolving Discipline of Tokenomics

While many leaders still think of LLMs in terms of infrastructure (more requests require more compute and therefore cost more), the reality is more complex. Users and use cases can create vastly different types of requests which have highly varied infrastructure and cost implications.

The smallest current production unit for LLMs are tokens – a fundamental unit of data that an AI model reads, generates or uses equating to roughly 4 characters per token. Over the last 3 years inference costs have reportedly fallen roughly 1,000-fold, with inference now accounting for two-thirds of all AI compute demand.

By any normal utility logic, falling unit prices should mean smaller monthly bills for users, however new models are both more token-intensive at increased prices while usage has skyrocketed, leading many to consume their entire annual AI and tech budgets in only a matter of months. This seems clear proof of Jevons Paradox where decreased unit cost is significantly outweighed by material and accelerating increase in use.

In addition, recent BCG research indicates that only 5% of their clients interviewed are creating substantial and sustainable value from AI.

BCG Build for the Future 2025 Global Study (n = 1,250).

Government and enterprise leaders have now seen more than enough exemplars and representative AI use cases – demand is accelerating to show a true return on investment “ROI” for those programs, which fundamentally means an ROI on token usage.

This discipline of financial accountability to AI use and governance has earned the name of “Tokenomics”, meaning the demand for ROI during a period of increased usage, risk and associated costs has created a triple whammy for policy makers, regulators and users.

Sovereign Clouds, Rented Intelligence & Lost Value.

What does all of this mean for a nation state, alliance or critical infrastructure owner?

While an esteemed British colleague and I recently considered the Sovereignty 2.0 cloud and data center location and legal control aspects for the World Economic Forum, we didn’t answer the pricing question ie. who sets the cost and terms of the thing produced (token) running on that stack which dictates the sustainable value proposition?

This is the sovereignty risk the digital infrastructure debate has largely missed but we expect to rapidly evolve over coming months.

A nation can host its own data centre, run its own hyperscaler partnerships, satisfy every metric in a Cloud, Data Center or AI Sovereignty Framework BUT still be entirely price-taking on the tokens flowing through it without a dedicated available reserve if, or when, the supply chain is disrupted. The subsidy era of new foundation models is coming to an end with Anthropic's 2026 enterprise pricing shift the most public example of consumption growth outpacing cost declines. Operational control of the rack means little if the marginal cost of intelligence itself is set outside of a sovereign legal and commercial jurisdiction.

Perhaps even more sobering are the concerns of US and allied intelligence communities that the increased costs of token usage are causing critical public and private sector users to move to highly capable “open weight” models predominantly developed and sourced outside of the trusted Western alliance. This week’s launch of the Moonshot Kimi K3 with comparable capability to recent Anthropic and OpenAI versions has further entrenched the systemic risk.

Greater independence of allied sovereign objectives at the infrastructure AND intelligence layers may require a shift for some policy makers, agencies and technology vendors, however, the strategic value from greater trust, intelligence, innovation and resilience would be significant.

Closing the Tokenomics Gap

While rightfully asserting digital sovereignty, America’s allies must stop treating sovereign compute and intelligence as a real estate problem and start treating it as a strategic commodity problem similar to the way we manage oil, grain or semiconductors.

That creates some meaningful challenges from both policy and practice perspectives:

-Create a national token reserve/s via prebuilt capacity insulating critical government and infrastructure workloads from price and availability shocks the way strategic petroleum reserves insulate against supply shocks

-Mandate transparent token cost disclosure in critical-sector procurement, so cost-per-outcome (not cost-per-CPU/GPU) becomes the sovereignty metric regulators actually score. “Commercial in confidence” wont be good enough for an agentic world.

-Create an active domestic AI model routing capability, so government workloads can shift between frontier and commodity models rather than being locked to a single provider's pricing curve.

-Plan for AI inference at the edge – while large urban Data Centers take up the headlines and capital, it won’t necessarily be how we consume and create value domestically and across the alliance.

-Demand a social license of all who participate – many nations have exported a significant portion of the value created during the internet era to hyper-scale foreign companies and demanded little in return other than occasional headlines about “strategic investment”. New strategies and structures must be created where the value created of this agentic token-driven world accrue directly to the communities that use them and not to be reallocated or misspent as a new form of taxation. Oil-driven Sovereign Wealth Funds may provide an effective blueprint fit for the Agentic Age.

A token reserve is the logical and necessary next stage for Sovereign AI

None of these policies replace the need for sovereign digital infrastructure. As token prices fall but total AI spend climbs, the value to nation states deriving from infrastructure alone is incomplete and does not achieve multiple core objectives. Nations that control where compute resides but not what tokens cost and deliver will remain intelligence and price-takers in the AI economy. For America’s partners, a sovereign token reserve is the next necessary step toward genuine digital autonomy and an even stronger Western Alliance.

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Decide on North Korea https://belimedia.com.ng/decide-on-north-korea https://belimedia.com.ng/decide-on-north-korea North Korea is strategically closer to Russia and China than any time since the Korean War, while the U.S. does nothing to challenge the growing power of the Axis of Authoritarians (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea). The irony is that North Korea has, since 1994, wanted a normal relationship with the U.S., yet the U.S. appears incapable of addressing the North Korean nuclear threat.

On July 19, 2026, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and declared that North Korea “stands by Moscow until victory in the war with Ukraine is achieved. Ties with Russia are a strategic priority for Pyongyang.” I’ve worked with Ms. Choe, a fluent English speaker, from 2003 to 2016, and know she –and others – would prefer dialoguing with the U.S.

And from July 10 to 12, 2026, North Korean Premier Pak Thae Song was in Beijing meeting with Wang Huning, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the fourth highest member of the Politburo Bureau Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, for the 65th anniversary of China’s defense treaty with North Korea – The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Defense.

The visit of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to Beijing in September 2025 to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping and participate in the Victory Day parade with Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin, followed by the June 2026, visit of Mr. Xi to North Korea for a state visit are clear indicators that North Korea is working hard to improve relations with China, while maintaining a close military relationship with Russia.

Russia reportedly is asking for another 30,000 troops and ballistic missile launchers from North Korea. The additional North Korean troops would reinforce frontline operations, doubling previous deployment estimates. This, while North Korea prepares to transfer new ballistic missile launches to Russia. The deepening military cooperation with Russia, pursuant to the 2024 mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea, is not only a growing threat to Ukraine but, also, to the nations in Asia within range of North Korean missiles.

I have written often in this column about Norea’s growing arsenal of nuclear weapons – over 100 by 2030 – and the sophistication of their ballistic missiles, especially the long-range missiles – Hwasong 15, 17,18,19 and 20 – all capable of targeting the U.S. and their progress with short-range missiles that can target South Korea and Japan. Recently, we talked about progress with nuclear-powered submarines, but we didn’t discuss the progress North Korea is making with establishing a nuclear triad – land, sea and air-based nuclear weapons. And with Russia’s assistance, this is achievable in the not-too-distant future.

What are we doing to address this real and expanding threat? We’re watching the Axis of Authoritarian States become more united and seemingly forgetting that since 1994 North Korea wanted a normal relationship with the U.S. (The Agreed Framework); in September 2005 with the Six Party Talks Joint Statement and the historic June 2018 Singapore Summit of President Donald Trump with Chairman Kim Jong Un. Since then, and after the failed February 2019 failed Hanoi Summit and the June 2019 symbolic DMZ meeting, there were no further substantive developments with North Korea.

Since 2020, our failed policy of “strategic Patience” kicked in and we’ve seen North Korea exponentially increase its arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, while embracing Russia with a Mutual Defense Treaty and military assistance to Russia for its invasion of and war with Ukraine.

It’s time for the U.S., with support from its allies in South Korea and Japan, to decide if we want a normal relationship with North Korea; a relationship that will weaken the Axis of Authoritarian States, or if we want to persist with a “do-nothing” policy toward North Korea.

And if we want to do something, that means de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state – a reality we can’t deny – and entering into negotiators with Pyongyang to get North Korea to stop building more nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, economic development assistance and a path to normal bilateral relations.

It’s time to address the North Korean nuclear threat.

The author is the former Special Envoy for Six Party Talks negotiations with North Korea (2003-2006) and the former Associate Director of National Intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Winning the Peace: The Democratic Dilemma of Limited War https://belimedia.com.ng/winning-the-peace-the-democratic-dilemma-of-limited-war https://belimedia.com.ng/winning-the-peace-the-democratic-dilemma-of-limited-war In our previous article, we argued that overwhelming military superiority no longer guarantees strategic success.

Today, military and political outcomes have become increasingly disconnected.

As Carl von Clausewitz observed, war is fought to achieve political objectives, with military force only one instrument among many in statecraft.

Modern professional militaries are exceptionally proficient at identifying and destroying adversary military capabilities. Yet, they remain far less able to reshape the political, ideological, and social foundations that sustain an adversary's resilience.

The challenge confronting modern democracies is therefore not simply winning wars, but achieving what might be termed strategic translation—the successful conversion of military success into enduring political outcomes.

This predicament of strategic translation has intensified in recent years.

Operations involving Iran, Ukraine, and Gaza have once again raised questions about whether military success alone can produce durable political outcomes, echoing debates that followed the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Strategic rivals such as Russia and China have closely monitored these outcomes, adjusting their own strategies to exploit the gap between military supremacy and political consolidation discussed in this article.

The inability to translate military victory into a long-term political settlement has evolved from a tactical issue to a defining test of democratic strategic competency as information flows quicken and domestic audiences examine protracted wars in real time.

Democratic Institutions: Competing Cultures

The principal obstacle facing democratic societies is not a lack of military capability but the complexity of democratic governance itself.

Political authority is intentionally dispersed among elected governments, legislatures and independent public institutions, each possessing different responsibilities and professional cultures. While this diffusion safeguards liberty and accountability, it complicates the integration of national strategy.

Military power achieves its greatest strategic effect only when synchronised with diplomacy, intelligence, economic statecraft and political engagement.

Yet democratic institutions frequently develop these capabilities in parallel rather than as a unified enterprise. Foreign affairs, defence, treasury and justice each define success differently, compete for resources and optimise their own organisational objectives.

Ironically, modern armed forces have become increasingly network-centric, integrating intelligence, logistics, cyber, space and operational planning within a single command framework. Governments, however, largely remain vertically organised.

Democracies have therefore become highly proficient at conducting limited tactical military campaigns while remaining less effective at integrating the broader instruments of national power necessary to convert battlefield success into enduring strategic advantage.

Selling Grand Strategy to Democratic Societies

Developing grand strategy is only half the challenge.

Democratic governments must also sustain public support over time. Unlike authoritarian systems, they must continually justify long-term strategic investment to electorates whose immediate concerns are economic security, healthcare, education and the cost of living.

Electoral competition naturally encourages governments to emphasise visible achievements—military operations, defence acquisitions, and capability announcements—rather than articulating the long-term political objectives these activities are meant to achieve.

Public debate therefore becomes centred on operations rather than strategy.

Without a compelling strategic narrative, public confidence gradually becomes tied to individual events rather than broader national objectives.

Procurement controversies, budget debates, and political disagreements increasingly dominate public discourse, making defence appear as a collection of expensive projects rather than as one component of an integrated national strategy.

Grand strategy that cannot be communicated to democratic societies cannot be sustained by democratic societies.

Democratic Time versus Strategic Time

Winning in combat requires strategic focus, but democratic politics inherently operates on short attention spans as highlighted by researchers in RAND Corporation. Electoral cycles, typically lasting two to five years, create strong incentives for governments to prioritise immediate, visible achievements over the sustained political, diplomatic, and institutional investments required to build long-term national power, as the UK Parliament's House of Commons Public Administration Committee has provided detailed structural barrier on this.

In coalition governments, differing party priorities and narrow parliamentary majorities can further complicate strategic continuity, encouraging short-term political compromise over long-term policy consistency.

The twenty-four-hour news cycle and social media amplify these pressures by encouraging governments to respond rapidly to headlines and shifts in public opinion, often elevating short-term tactical developments over long-term strategic objectives.

A single controversy, whether involving procurement, diplomacy or battlefield casualties, can dominate public debate and increase pressure for policy adjustments that disrupt strategic continuity.

This tension between political urgency and strategic reality was perhaps most evident in Afghanistan.

Throughout that conflict, successive US administrations increasingly balanced military objectives against domestic political pressures, with troop deployments and withdrawal decisions becoming closely linked to electoral cycles and public opinion.

President Obama's 2009 troop surge, while designed to reverse Taliban momentum, was accompanied by a July 2011 timetable for the start of withdrawal, signalling that the United States' commitment was not open-ended.

More than a decade later, the 2020 Doha Agreement established a fixed timeline for withdrawal despite persistent concerns over the readiness of Afghan security forces and the absence of a comprehensive political settlement.

In both cases, strategic decisions became increasingly shaped by political timelines, illustrating how democratic governments can struggle to align long-term national objectives with short-term domestic pressures.

Among NATO allies, these pressures were further compounded by divergent domestic political calendars and national priorities. France, for example, withdrew its combat forces in 2012 following President Hollande's election pledge, while Canada and several allies imposed national caveats that restricted how and where their troops could operate. NATO summits in Riga (2006) and Lisbon (2010) exposed persistent disagreements over troop contributions, burden-sharing and operational commitments, reflecting domestic political constraints as much as collective strategic planning.

As political priorities shifted across allied capitals, long-term strategic coherence became increasingly difficult to sustain.

Without stronger institutional continuity and bipartisan commitment, democratic grand strategy risks becoming reactive, fragmented and ultimately unable to translate military success into enduring political outcomes.

Winning the Peace Requires Political Campaign Design

If democracies are to prevail in limited wars, they must plan for peace before the first military operation begins.

Military campaigns should never exist independently of political campaigns. Governance, justice, policing, economic recovery, institution-building, and strategic communications must be integrated from the outset, rather than improvised after battlefield success.

Repeated strategic frustration also carries risks for democracy itself.

Failure to improve strategic integration may encourage growing calls for more centralised executive authority, expanded emergency powers and greater restrictions on civil liberties in the name of national security.

Democracies should resist this temptation.

Instead, democracies should strengthen institutions capable of ensuring long-term strategic continuity while remaining firmly accountable to constitutional government.

One possibility would be an independent National Strategy Commission, bringing together diplomatic, military, economic and informational expertise to preserve institutional memory and support integrated strategic planning across successive governments.

Conclusion

Democracies do not need to lose their democratic character in order to become more strategically effective.

Authoritarian systems maintain continuity through control, whereas democracies must maintain it through design.

Instead, the task is to create long-lasting institutions, such as an independent National Strategy Commission, that can sustain strategic memory across changing governments without consolidating authority or undermining accountability.

This requires achieving cross-party consensus on essential national goals and integrating diplomatic, military, economic, and informational tools from the outset, rather than improvising after victory.

Failure results in continued frustration and increasing demands for concentrated power.

In a period of limited conflict, success will be defined not just by battlefield successes, but also by long-term political effects.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Investing in the Next Arsenal of Democracy https://belimedia.com.ng/investing-in-the-next-arsenal-of-democracy https://belimedia.com.ng/investing-in-the-next-arsenal-of-democracy America’s critical technology, maritime, infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing base is one of the clearest places where tax incentives, private capital, and national security should meet. We already know this model can work. Opportunity Zones helped drive billions of dollars into real estate, community development, and designated investment areas by giving investors a reason to move capital into places that policy makers wanted to support.

Now we should apply that same logic to the sectors that will determine America’s ability to compete, defend itself, and rebuild its industrial strength.

Recent proposals around Maritime Investment Zones point in the right direction. The basic concept is simple: use the tax code to pull private capital into shipyards, ports, vessel construction, ship repair, marine navigation, workforce development, advanced manufacturing, and the broader maritime supply chain. If tax incentives helped attract capital into real estate and community development, a similar model could help rebuild the industrial base that underpins American sea power and national resilience.

But this should not stop with physical shipyards or port infrastructure.

The next generation of American industrial power will be built across a broader ecosystem of investment funds, operating companies, manufacturing platforms, critical infrastructure projects, and technologies that strengthen national security and economic security. That means sectors like autonomy, advanced manufacturing, aerospace, maritime systems, secure communications, cybersecurity, energy resilience, critical minerals, space infrastructure, drones, counter-drone systems, AI-enabled defense tools, logistics, and domestic supply chain resilience.

Qualified investment funds focused on these sectors should be considered for Opportunity Zone-style designation. These funds can aggregate private capital, diligence complex technologies, support hard-tech companies, and bridge the gap between emerging innovation, government demand, commercial scale, and mission relevance. Many individual investors cannot properly underwrite a defense technology company, an advanced manufacturing platform, a shipyard modernization project, or a critical infrastructure asset on their own. Qualified managers can help channel capital into these areas with discipline, experience, and a better understanding of both market risk and mission need.

The same logic should apply directly to qualifying platform companies and infrastructure projects. Businesses building autonomous maritime systems, advanced airframes, resilient logistics platforms, drone manufacturing capacity, shipbuilding technologies, next-generation materials, critical infrastructure tools, and domestic production capabilities should be eligible for special designation if they are strengthening the defense industrial base, expanding U.S. production, modernizing infrastructure, or reducing dependence on adversarial supply chains.

This matters because the future of defense manufacturing and industrial power is changing.

The next phase will not only be about large legacy platforms built through traditional procurement channels. It will also be about faster, lower-cost, more scalable, more autonomous systems that can be produced domestically and integrated across a broader defense technology ecosystem.

In maritime, for example, the future will not only be larger crewed vessels. It will include autonomous naval platforms, distributed maritime nodes, unmanned surface vessels, undersea systems, AI-enabled ISR, electronic warfare, logistics support, secure communications, and integrated sensor networks. The autonomous ship is not just a vessel. It becomes a node in a distributed maritime network.

That same principle applies across the broader industrial base. The future battlefield and the future economy will demand more mass, more resilience, more autonomy, more secure infrastructure, and more ways to complicate an adversary’s targeting problem. The United States cannot afford to rely only on slow, expensive, exquisite systems while adversaries are scaling ships, drones, missiles, cyber tools, industrial capacity, and supply chains at speed.

A Maritime Prosperity Zone, Critical Technology Opportunity Zone, or National Security Investment Zone framework could help solve part of this problem by giving investors, fund sponsors, founders, manufacturers, and infrastructure operators a reason to back the companies, factories, shipyards, platforms, and projects needed to rebuild American industrial strength.

This would likely create some of the same market behavior we saw during the real estate Opportunity Zone boom of the early 2020s. Once the incentive was created, capital moved. Sponsors formed funds. Allocators searched for qualified opportunities. Developers shaped projects around the designation. Billions of dollars followed.

The same could happen in defense technology, critical infrastructure, autonomous systems, maritime manufacturing, space, energy resilience, advanced materials, and critical manufacturing.

That is the power of incentives. Investors are not charities. They respond to opportunity, yield, tax efficiency, liquidity, policy clarity, and the chance for outsized returns. That is not a weakness of capitalism. That is how capital markets work. If policy makers want private capital to help solve national problems, they need to make those problems investable.

Critics will say this gives investors generous tax treatment. That is true. But that is also the point. The government routinely uses the tax code to shape behavior. We incentivize home ownership, retirement savings, energy development, municipal finance, real estate development, and other areas deemed important to the public interest. The question is not whether investors benefit. The question is whether the country benefits enough to justify the incentive.

In this case, the answer should be yes.

A targeted national security investment incentive could drive domestic job growth, create new industries, expand the tax base, strengthen supply chains, rebuild manufacturing capacity, and reduce reliance on government-led solutions. Instead of expecting Washington to fund and manage every critical industrial requirement, the government can use tax policy to unleash private capital and let the private sector help build the capacity the country needs.

That is a better model than simply growing government. Government should identify priorities, set standards, create incentives, and provide clear demand signals. Private capital should help take risk, scale companies, build factories, support founders, finance infrastructure, and commercialize technologies. Done correctly, this becomes a force multiplier. It allows the country to pursue national security and economic security objectives without relying solely on appropriations, grants, subsidies, or bloated federal programs.

It also helps create a broader base of economic growth. A new factory, shipyard, drone production line, secure data center, advanced materials facility, or critical infrastructure project does not just create investor returns. It creates construction jobs, engineering jobs, manufacturing jobs, supplier ecosystems, logistics demand, local tax revenue, and long-term industrial capacity. These are the kinds of investments that can rebuild regional economies while strengthening national resilience.

But there is an important caution.

During the real estate Opportunity Zone boom, disciplined allocators still had to underwrite the real estate first. The asset had to make sense. The location had to make sense. The sponsor had to make sense. The tax advantage was an added benefit, not the entire investment thesis.

The same discipline must apply here.

In the current hype around defense technology and national security investing, not every company with “AI,” “autonomy,” “defense,” “resilience,” or “critical infrastructure” in its pitch deck deserves capital. The manager, deal, technology, platform, or project has to stand on its own. The tax benefit should improve the risk-reward profile, not rescue a weak investment.

Return on mission matters. But it should not replace return on capital. The best version of this policy would align both. Investors get an incentive to take risk in strategically important sectors, while the country gets more domestic production, stronger supply chains, better infrastructure, more jobs, and a deeper industrial base.

The United States does not have a shortage of capital. It has a capital alignment problem. Too much money flows into financial engineering, speculative assets, and incremental technology. Too little flows into the difficult, physical, industrial, and security-related sectors that determine whether the country can compete in a more dangerous world.

Opportunity Zones showed that tax policy can move capital. The next step is to aim that capital at the future of American power.

If we can incentivize capital to rebuild neighborhoods, we can incentivize capital to rebuild shipbuilding, critical infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, and the national security industrial base.

The goal is not to give investors a gift. The goal is to give the country a tool.

The next Opportunity Zone should be built around American resilience.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:37:40 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why Are Europe Tour Packages So Popular Among Indian Travellers? https://belimedia.com.ng/Europe-Tour-Packages https://belimedia.com.ng/Europe-Tour-Packages If you scroll through any Indian family's group chat these days, chances are someone is either planning a Europe trip or just came back from one. Europe tour packages have quietly become the go‑to response to the question, "Where should we travel for our next major holiday?" for millions of Indian households. But why exactly has this happened, and why now?

This article breaks down the real reasons behind the boom, answers the questions Indian travellers actually search for, and gives you a clear picture of what to expect before you book one of these Europe tour packages for yourself.

Why Have Europe Tour Packages Become So Popular Among Indians?

The short answer is convenience mixed with aspiration. Europe tour packages take care of visas, hotels, transport, and sightseeing in one neat bundle, so people who've never travelled abroad before don't feel overwhelmed. At the same time, Europe still carries that dream-destination image built up over decades of Bollywood films shot in Switzerland, Paris, and Austria. Put those two things together—ease of planning and emotional pull—and you get a category that keeps growing year after year.

Do Europe Tour Packages Actually Save Money Compared to Planning It Yourself?

Yes, in most cases they do, mainly because tour operators book flights, hotels, and entry tickets in bulk at rates individual travellers can't access. A person planning Europe solo often ends up paying more for the same hotels and skip-the-line tickets that come bundled cheaply inside a package. There's also the hidden cost of mistakes a wrongly booked non-refundable train ticket or a hotel far from the city center that packaged tours simply avoid by design.

How Do Europe Tour Packages Make the Schengen Visa Process Easier?

This is one of the biggest, least talked about reasons behind the popularity of Europe tour packages. The Schengen visa asks for a fixed itinerary, hotel confirmations, and travel insurance paperwork that confuses first-time applicants. Reputed tour companies handle this documentation as part of the package, submit it correctly, and often have relationships with visa consultants who know exactly what each embassy expects. For a lot of Indian travellers, this single benefit alone is worth choosing a package over a self-planned trip.

Are Group Tours Safer for First-Time International Travellers?

Many Indian families genuinely worry about safety, language barriers, and getting lost in a country where they don't speak the local language. Group tours address this directly with an English- or Hindi-speaking tour manager, a fixed daily schedule, and the comfort of travelling alongside other Indians. This is particularly reassuring for senior citizens and parents travelling with young children, which explains why family-oriented Europe tour packages sell out so quickly during summer and Diwali holidays.

Why Do Indian Honeymooners Prefer Europe Tour Packages Over Other Destinations?

Europe checks almost every box a honeymoon couple is looking for: romantic old towns, scenic countryside, good food, and Instagram-worthy backdrops. Europe honeymoon packages from India are usually designed with private transfers, candlelight dinners, and flexible city-hopping itineraries covering places like Paris, Switzerland, and Italy. Couples like that they don't have to research restaurants or book activities themselves; everything from the sunset cruise to the mountain cable car ride is already arranged.

What Makes Multi-Country Europe Tour Packages So Appealing?

A huge chunk of Europe's popularity comes from geography working in the traveller's favor. Countries are small and close together, so a well-planned Europe tour package can cover France, Switzerland, Italy, and Germany in ten to fourteen days. Indian travellers, who often get limited annual leave, love this because it feels like maximum value for the vacation days they've taken. Nowhere else in the world can you realistically see four or five countries on one trip the way you can in Europe.

How Has Social Media Influenced the Demand for Europe Tour Packages?

Instagram and YouTube travel vlogs have played a massive role here. Once a few influencers started posting reels from Santorini, Cappadocia-style Swiss valleys, or the streets of Prague, the aspiration spread fast. People now search for the exact Europe tour packages featured in these videos, and travel companies have responded by curating itineraries around these viral locations. This cycle of content and booking keeps feeding itself, which is a major reason search interest around Europe for tour packages keeps climbing every season.

What Is the Best Time to Book Europe Tour Packages from India?

Most seasoned travellers book Europe tour packages three to five months in advance, especially for summer departures between May and August, which is peak season for Indian tourists due to school holidays. Booking early also locks in lower prices before airfares and hotel rates rise closer to the travel date. Winter packages that include Christmas markets in Germany and Austria have recently seen increased demand, giving travelers another option to consider.

Are Customized Europe Tour Packages Better Than Fixed Group Departures?

It depends on what you're looking for. Fixed group departures are cheaper and come with the comfort of shared logistics, while customized Europe tour packages give you control over pace, hotel category, and which cities you actually want to spend more time in. Younger travellers and couples increasingly prefer customised options even if they cost a bit more, simply because they don't want to follow someone else's clock all day.

Final Thoughts

Europe tour packages have earned their popularity the practical way by removing friction from a trip that would otherwise feel intimidating to plan alone. Between visa help, group safety, honeymoon-friendly itineraries, and the sheer efficiency of covering multiple countries in one go, it's easy to see why so many Indian travellers keep choosing packaged Europe trips over building the itinerary from scratch. As long as operators keep adapting to what Indian tourists actually want—familiar food, English-speaking guides, and Instagram-ready stops—Europe's tour packages aren't going anywhere as India's favorite international travel choice.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q1. What is the average cost of Europe tour packages from India? 

A. Costs generally range between ₹4 lakh and ₹6 lakh per person depending on duration, number of countries covered, and hotel category, though luxury Europe tour packages can go well beyond this.

Q2. How many days are ideal for a Europe tour package? 

A. Most Indian travellers prefer 8 to 14 days, which is enough time to cover 3–5 countries without feeling rushed.

Q3. Do Europe tour packages include visa assistance? 

A. Yes, almost all reputed Europe tour packages include full Schengen visa documentation support, though the visa fee itself is usually paid separately.

Q4. Which cities are most commonly included in Europe tour packages for Indian travelers? 

A. Paris, Zurich, Lucerne, Venice, Rome, Amsterdam, and Vienna appear in the vast majority of popular Europe tour packages.

Q5. Are meals included in Europe tour packages? 

A. Most packages include breakfast daily and a few Indian-style dinners, since many Indian travellers prefer familiar food after a long day of sightseeing.

Q6. Is it better to book Europe tour packages from Mumbai or Delhi than smaller cities? 

A. Not necessarily; most operators now offer Europe tour packages with connecting flights from Tier 2 cities too, so location isn't a major limiting factor anymore.

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Fri, 31 Jul 2026 07:43:26 +0100 Gopi Krishnan
Is Iran Controlling the Gulf Conflict? https://belimedia.com.ng/is-iran-controlling-the-gulf-conflict https://belimedia.com.ng/is-iran-controlling-the-gulf-conflict Recent statements from President Trump indicate he is prepared to continue, or escalate, U.S. military strikes while simultaneously signaling he is open to continued negotiations. Some would see this as a reasonable offer of carrot or stick. But, having lost scores of ships, missiles, and military production facilities, U.S. actions still depend on what Iran does. This is allowing the regime leadership to control the pace of the conflict. How is this possible?

By his own words, President Trump is admitting the United States is in full-blown reaction-mode, granting Iran effective control over the tempo of both military operations and peace negotiations. This is a mistake, born of the obvious desperation of the White House to extricate itself from the black hole that is the Iran War, and that is increasingly proving to be a drag on Republican chances in the approaching midterms.

Iran is clearly playing the provocateur, poking the bear with selective strikes on shipping daring to test their illegal claim of administrating the Strait. They are paying the price by suffering increasingly focused destruction of their offensive coastal capabilities.

This is as it should be. Iran simply cannot be allowed to impose itself on the movement of shipping through an international waterway. But… the President’s quickly aborted claim that the U.S. military should receive a 20% gratuity for its efforts to keep the Strait open has predictably only muddied the issue further.

Who’s Really in Charge in Iran and What Do They Want?

The regime clearly sees itself in the dominant position. Or, at least, in a position to bear more pain, for now, than their adversary. I believe this likely reflects their own internal political dynamics, not unlike U.S. domestic politics driving much of Trump’s actions. But with Iran, this is a more factional disunity of opinion over the best course of action vice the overly unitary decision-making process the U.S. side is suffering from. I’ve written about this before in my 25 April post; ‘The Iranian Power Struggle’: “In my years at CIA dealing with Iran and Iranians, I observed many instances of such backroom political maneuvering, including a willingness to sabotage efforts by others engaged in back-channel deals. This was particularly the case when the counterpart was America. Publicly scorned as the “Great Satan”, but secretly coveted as the superpower of choice, individuals and factions knew that whoever secured a special relationship with America would be in the pole position going forward. The attitude was “if not me, then no one!”, essentially the grownup version of ‘King of the Hill.’”

This may account for the regime’s inexplicable willingness to reject any compromise while continuing to absorb punishment; perhaps more to put pressure on their internal political rivals than to gain external military advantage. In the end, it is likely they will eventually call a halt to this by reengaging on negotiations when they determine they risk losing too much capability.

Exacerbating this, I would posit that the newly ascended Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, may in fact be a phantom leader. Alive in some fashion, perhaps largely incapacitated, but not actually in charge. And even if able to coherently express his views, in no way nearly as powerful or influential as his father. The seemingly reckless actions of the regime in courting U.S. retaliation may in actuality reflect a lack of a coherent decision-making process as opposed to a unified one. I think it is quite possible that competing factions within the regime are using Mojtaba as an avatar while they maneuver for decisive advantage.

Regardless of which faction ultimately dominates, the implications for the United States remain how to break through to the regime’s decision-makers in the near term.

Hyperbole Weakens the U.S. Position

In the meantime, Trump’s regular stream of alternating obsequious and insulting, but always hyperbolic, ‘Truths’, the result of his obvious frustration over the regime’s unwillingness to accept what he is offering – whatever that might be at that moment - serves only to inflame and/or simply confuse an already chaotic situation. All resulting from the vaguely written and amateurish MOU that Trump himself signed.

As I wrote previously in a 12 April post, Hyperbole is Donald Trump’s love language. He continues to employ it almost daily, usually in reaction to a disappointment with the Iranian regime’s actions. And almost always to the detriment of his stated desire for peace. Unfortunately, the Iranian regime has been practicing this same language of hyperbole on an industrial scale for a generation. They understand both how to use it and counter it.

But the practice of diplomacy is a quiet profession. One that requires patience. One that requires expertise. One that requires steadiness and focus. None of which characteristics the President or his negotiators appear capable of exhibiting.

If I were to give the President a piece of advice, I would echo the words of David Ignatius in his most recent Washington Post column: “Just stop talking,” although more directly and less politely, “Just shut up and let the professionals do their job!”

What now?

I wrote about what may come next, after the permanent cessation of hostilities, in my 15 May post, Groundhog Day: “The issues facing Iran prior to the War were serious, in fact existential – a collapsing economy, hyper-inflation, severe water shortages, lack of electricity, and growing widespread popular anger and unrest – and are ongoing and only getting worse. Whatever the Iranian leadership looks like, it will have to address these issues. And it is not clear that they will be capable of doing this without outside help. This is where the U.S. and hopefully our Western allies come in: sanctions relief, and extensive economic and other assistance in exchange for real changes in policy and a pullback on objectionable activities and programs. The potential for this may, and I say may, have increased with the removal of Ali Khamenei from the Supreme Leader’s seat. But it will depend on whether his son and successor, Mojtaba, is less rigidly ideological than his father. We will see if he is willing to put the Iranian people ahead of the regime.”

Next steps

First, we need to significantly blunt the regime’s ongoing ability to project power and control the Strait of Hormuz. It needs to reopen and stay open. And it will. Both sides need it to, but not on the regime’s terms. The focused effort on degrading Iran’s coastal offensive capabilities should continue apace.

We need the regime to be forced to address the internal existential threats listed above. This is sure to absorb much of their time and money and may eventually consume them. And it may even bring them back to the negotiating table. Escalating military strikes on energy facilities and civilian infrastructure would serve only to alienate the Iranian population and distract from the Iranian leadership’s appalling incompetence, strengthening the regime. As part of this, the current MOU must be abandoned and recast in a more evenhanded manner, leading to permanent peace. Adhering to it as currently written will only ensure we will be forced to return in the future. As we are already seeing.

The current dynamic from the U.S. side is emotionally driven and self-defeating. The Iranians appear riven by paralyzing factionalism, with a hefty dose of hubris regarding their temporary advantage. Neither is a recipe for success. The question is not whether Iran can win a military confrontation with the United States. It cannot. The question is whether it can continue forcing Washington to react rather than act. For now, that answer appears to be yes.

For more reads like this, and to follow Mark on Substack, click here.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 27 Jul 2026 12:15:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
The $1.5 Trillion Defense Budget Without a Strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/the-15-trillion-defense-budget-without-a-strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/the-15-trillion-defense-budget-without-a-strategy “This is not at all a strategy-driven [FY 2027 defense] budget. This is a budget-driven budget. If you look at the Truth Social posts by the President [Trump] and the statements of the people around him, he [President Trump] makes very clear that this budget was driven by a budget number, a budget target, an arbitrary level that was set based on five percent of last year's GDP…They set this arbitrary level and then at relatively the last minute in the budget development process the [Defense] Department was told come up with a request that gets you to this number, this $1.5 trillion number. And so they did.”

That was Todd Harrison of the American Enterprise Institute and one of the nation's top experts on defense strategy and the defense budget, speaking last Tuesday at the Brookings Institution as part of a panel on The FY 2027 defense budget: How much is enough?

Remember, as I wrote last week, the Trump FY 2027 defense request is for $1.15 trillion with another $350 billion request to be placed in a FY 2026 reconciliation package; and there now also is the new FY 2026 supplemental request, which has another $67 billion for the Defense Department.

House members have been weighing all the defense numbers and this week may be voting on a FY 2026 reconciliation package of $95 billion with only $73 billion for defense – far less than what was being sought.

Last Tuesday, Harrison went on to explain what may have been going on: “I say it is absolutely not a strategy-driven [FY 2027 defense] budget because they didn't have to make hard choices. They made some easy choices.”

As an example, Harrison said, “Do you want, you know, a fourth generation fighter jet? Buy some new fourth generation [F-15s]; or do we want to continue buying the fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 we have in production; or do we want to invest in sixth generation fighters? Do all of them, right? You can do all three at once, if you have a virtually unlimited budget, you don't have to make those hard tradeoffs.”

And, in fact, all three are included in the proposed FY2027 defense budget.

But Harrison goes on to suggest another way to view this Trump defense budget giant increase saying, “There's still a limit to how much the department can consume in terms of this funding…because I don't think they [the Trump budgeteers] actually intend this to be like a one-year budget authority number, especially with the reconciliation [set at $350 billion]. I think it is actually more like a five-year budget number that they're trying to get pre-funded up front, but they actually plan to spend it at a slower pace over the next five years.”

Harrison also looked at “the parts that I think absolutely don't belong in here are these big pots of money they created in defense-wide accounts that have very little description with them.”

For example, he picked out “$54 billion in the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG) line item. That is a single program element that's got $54 billion in it,” Harrison said. “That's unprecedented. If you read the budget description with it, it gives very little detail. You know, it's [clears throat] supposed to be investments in drones and things like that, but like tell us

quantities, tell us specific types of drones, like tell us what you're going to be using it for, and that detail is not there.”

Harrison went on, “It appears they haven't figured that out yet, so I think $54 billion is quite a reach, trying to ask for that much money for something that has not yet been well defined. So, I think that there are areas here where they've really overshot and they've tried to just throw everything in there and ask for a super high number. And I wonder if they almost expect that they're not going to get that full number -- that Congress will cut them back down quite a bit. But they were just trying to reach that overall $1.5 trillion level.”

As Yahoo Finance pointed out earlier this month, the $54 billion for DAWG sought for FY 2027 is 243 times greater than what DAWG got this year, and “now exceeds the entire Marine Corps budget request of $52.8 billion and represents nearly 15% of the entire $350 billion reconciliation package.”

Harrison’s view: “You get to the endgame, Congress is going to have to sort through this and say, ‘Okay, what are the what things in here are serious things that really do need to get funded one way or the other, and we'll have to figure out how to make that happen, and what are the other things that were just budget gimmicks or just filler?’"

Harrison was not the only expert on last Tuesday’s Brookings panel.

Joining him were David Wessel, who runs Brookings’ tax and fiscal policy in the economic studies program; and Mara Karlin, professor at John's Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, who has worked for six Defense Secretaries over her career.

Wessel took a broader financial view saying, “The President is proposing a big defense budget at a time when we have unsustainable fiscal trajectory, and so I think that raises an important question and that question is…budgeting is about tradeoffs and the President and Congress at the moment seem to be avoiding trade-offs. There are ways we could offset if defense spending is really important. We should think about ways to pay for some of it either by cutting some other places in defense or raising taxes. And there's some ideas floating around on that, but none of them are politically popular.”

Wessel also raised two other issues: “I think it also requires some trust on the part of the public that the money is being well spent and that relies on Congress doing oversight. And secondly, that we are sticking with a military that is nonpartisan and follows the leadership of the President and the Congress, but is not totally politicized. And I'm afraid that the trust in the military is being eroded by some of the personnel decisions that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is making. And I think that's a problem.”

As for Karlin, she referred to the Trump national strategy and focused on what she called “a break with the bipartisanship that has characterized how folks have thought about these threats for a long time.”

Karlin noted, “The real emphasis of this [Trump national] strategy is on the Western Hemisphere, right? The real threat is seen in this strategy as these alleged narco-terrorists as they're so named…So, that's the priority.”

But, she adds, “You then see China mentioned, but in a pretty circumscribed way, just the first island chain. And in general, the language reads a lot softer than almost any recent defense strategy. You see a desire to downgrade involvement in European affairs, a little bit of mention of the Middle East, but in no way signaling that we would be starting this massive [Iran] conflict. And so here's where I think, there's some confusion worth highlighting because traditionally a national defense strategy is a decoder ring. It's going to tell you where the Secretary of Defense will put their energy and attention.”

“When we look at this budget, this very large budget, that's really at kind of World War levels,” Karlin said, “and frankly, the number [$1.5 trillion] isn't really merited by the strategy.”

She explained, “If one were really to just prioritize the Western Hemisphere and this quite circumcised focus on China as a major threat, and not be involved in most other regions of the world, in fact, the Trump administration could have put out a quite tiny defense budget request. So I leave you with a bit of perplexity.”

Two more things Harrison mentioned need recording.

“I forgot to address the [Trump] battleship issue,” Harrison said at one point, “because you know that's in here and far from defending it, I think that's one of those examples of things that got thrown in because they didn't have to make tough choices.”

Then he explained, “No one in the Navy can say with a straight face that we're going to go from starting a brand-new, clean-ship design in FY 2027, to procuring the lead-class [battle]ship in FY 2028, to going to all the way by FY 2031 being at full rate production, ready to buy them at one per year. That doesn't pass the laugh test…And so are we just setting ourselves up to spend a few billion dollars chasing, you know, this weird idea before we eventually have to cancel it and then things go back to the way they were before.”

Finally, Harrison said, “I think there needs to be some fundamental look on the congressional side at just how do we reform the budget process to get it working again; open the aperture to things like changing the start date of the fiscal year [which now begins October 1], re-jiggering the committee structure.”

I believe Harrison is questioning why each year the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate each authorize spending programs, and then the House and Senate Appropriations Committees set the actual dollar-level of funds made available for that year.

“You know,” Harrison said, “I'm talking a lot of third rails here, but I think we're at that kind of point like we were in the early 1970s where Congress realized it [the budgeting process] just wasn't working. I think that they need to do some serious inward-looking reform like that.”

I agree, having twice worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 1960s, and followed defense spending over the past 60 years. Harrison is right – the Legislative Branch system for passing Executive Branch funding needs to be repaired.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 27 Jul 2026 12:15:05 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside the $87.6 Billion Iran War Supplemental https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-876-billion-iran-war-supplemental https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-876-billion-iran-war-supplemental “In addition to supporting OEF (Operation Epic Fury, the Iran War) costs incurred by DOW (Department of War), the [$87.6 billion Fiscal Year FY 2026 Supplemental Trump administration] request provides $768 million to the Department of Energy to support nuclear and other energy security requirements, primarily for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for OEF-related activities.”

I was intrigued by that segment, from a June 24 letter to House Speaker Rep. Mike Johnson (R-La.) from Trump’s Office of Management and Budget Director Russell T. Vought, because I could not imagine what costly “nuclear and other energy security requirements” NNSA – the U.S. nuclear weapons complex – could be playing in the Iran War.

However, a chart attached to Vought’s letter said that $672 million was for NNSA to fund “activities for complete and verifiable termination of Iran’s ability to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon, including the disposition of proliferation sensitive material, technology, equipment, and infrastructure.”

Another $95.5 million, destined for the Department of Energy’s Environmental and Other Defense Activities elements, was listed for “support of Operation Epic Fury and other classified purposes.”

Perhaps members of the Senate Armed Services Committee can find out about the plans behind this $782 million package for NNSA and Energy this morning [July 14], when they question Jules W. Hurst III, who is up for confirmation as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

By the way, when was the last time a U.S. President went to war and added a tax to help pay for it? As an old-timer I remember – it was 1968, when then-President Lyndon Johnson got Congress to pass a nine-month, 10 percent surcharge on individual and corporate taxpayers to help pay for the Vietnam War. Low-income individual taxpayers were entirely exempt from the surcharge.

Since then, both Republican and Democratic Presidents used deficit spending and borrowing to pay for military conflicts. So far this year, the nation’s total deficit has increased through May 2026 by $1.25 trillion, according to the Treasury Department, with Defense Department spending running $20 billion more through May 2026, than it was last year.

But I remind you, Congress now has three defense funding requests before it: a $1.1 trillion FY 2027 base budget request; an additional $350 billion request to be placed in a 2026 reconciliation package; and now the new FY 2026 supplemental request, which has $67 billion for the Defense Department.

No one can say for sure how Congress will deal with these requests that total over $1.5 trillion.

For comparison, I point out that according to a December 8, 2014, Congressional Research Service study, Congress, over the prior 13 years, approved total appropriations of $1.6 trillion for Afghan and Iraq “military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the war operations initiated since the 9/11[2001] attacks.”

What the Vought chart also shows is that almost 23 percent of the funds in what has been described as the Iran War supplemental, went for different and, in some cases, totally unrelated purposes that I will describe below.

As for the NNSA money, a FoxNews story June 24, said, “The funding would support the removal and elimination of Iranian nuclear materials, including uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium in various forms and research reactor fuel, including highly-enriched uranium, according to details shared by a White House official.”

FoxNews also said, “The request also would fund U.S. verification activities inside Iran, support inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, strengthen nuclear-smuggling detection efforts and expand Nuclear Emergency Support Team operations across the Middle East.”

In short, Trump is asking for funds to deal with Iran’s enriched uranium before he has any agreement with Tehran that gives the U.S. access to that material.

Perhaps Trump thinks in the end he will have immediate success with Tehran as in he did in Venezuela. There, after the U.S. seized President Nicolas Maduro in January 2026, and four months later, in May, NNSA removed from Venezuela 13.54 kilograms – approximately 30 pounds – of highly-enriched uranium from a legacy research reactor in that country which had been shut down since the early 1990s.

The supplemental request also contains $1.5 billion for the State Department’s of which $850 million is for the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems program at high-risk diplomatic posts overseas along with security upgrades and equipment replacement. Another $300 million for Embassy construction and maintenance would be used to address needs following the start of the Iran war in Bahrain, Dubai, Karachi, Lahore and Riyadh, according to the Vought chart.

The State request also includes $100 million for the Diplomatic and Consular Service account to meet unanticipated needs related to the Middle East situation including departure assistance to U.S. citizens seeking to leave the region with their families. Transfer authority and an increase in repatriation loan level is also being requested to meet the needs of destitute U.S. citizens.

Another $1.35 billion for the State Department is sought to deal with the Ebola Virus, or as Vought put it in his letter to Speaker Johnson, “These funds would be used to limit the spread of Ebola beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda to other vulnerable nations and ensure the virus does not reach U.S. shores.”

Some $800 million for State is proposed for the International Humanitarian Assistance account, formerly managed by USAID, and another $550 million for Global Health Security, which funds “would support contact tracing, personal protective equipment and commodity procurement, disease surveillance, laboratory capacity, and cross-border coordination,” according to the Vought chart.

There is another $2 billion for the U.S. Coast Guard to support OEF where Pentagon “assets are not available to support Western Hemisphere operations. This includes funding for operations at the Southern Border, ” according to the Vought chart.

Meanwhile, the largest amount, other than for OEF in the supplemental, is $11.1 billion for the Agriculture Department, the bulk of which, $10 billion, would be for American farmers as “temporary economic assistance for row and specialty crops planted in crop year 2026,” according to the Vought chart. An additional $1.1 billion is being requested specifically for farmers in Florida “to rebound from devastating losses that were the result of crippling storms this past winter.”

I believe that money has political implications because rural Americans are pulling away from the President. As Brookings Institution polling recently showed, “Only 24% of white rural voters think that the condition of the economy is excellent or good, while 77% rate it as fair or poor. Just 16% say their family’s financial situation is better than it was two years ago (near the end of the Biden administration), compared to 49% who say they are worse off.”

Then there is $1 billion in the war supplemental to assist in the final design and construction for renovation of New York City’s Penn Station. In a New York Times op-ed last Friday, Rep. Jerold Nadler (D-N.Y.) said that the White House last year took control of the $8 billion Penn Station project from the [New York] Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Rep. Nadler wrote, “Behind closed doors, Mr. Trump has already attempted a quid-pro-quo, offering federal funding for New York’s transit needs only if Penn Station and [Virginia’s] Dulles Airport are renamed for him.”

However, Nadler also noted, “It’s still $7 billion short, and with top appropriators already opposing the supplemental funding request, it’s unlikely to be approved anyway.”

Another $1 billion in the war supplemental, according to the Vought chart, is for the Labor Department’s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation “to increase the benefit levels for participants of certain pension plans that were sponsored by Delphi Corporation and terminated as a result of General Motors ' bankruptcy in 2009.”

The money would reverse pension reductions for some 20,000 retirees that have spent years arguing their pensions were unfairly reduced after the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation assumed responsibility for the company’s pension plans during GM’s 2009 financial crisis.

According to the Detroit Free Press, “Various legislative efforts to restore the benefits have failed or stalled, despite bipartisan support. Perhaps knowing it's a potentially powerful issue in the Midwest, Trump (and President Joe Biden before him) has signaled his support of the workers in politically sensitive moments such as just before the 2020 election.”

Then there is $500 million for the National Park Service in Washington, D.C. for, as the Vought chart explains, improvements to the World War II Memorial on the Mall and restoration and construction for the Tidal Basin Seawall along West Potomac Park to include the planting of hundreds of new cherry trees and stabilizing the surrounding grounds.

Last Friday, the conservative group Americans for Prosperity pointed out that even the supplemental’s defense and Iran-related spending “deserve further scrutiny,” noting that $15.6 billion for the Pentagon are justified by Vought simply as “Administration priorities,” “Readiness,” and “Classified Programs.”

In fact, I think the whole package needs congressional oversight, and from the reactions of some key Senate and House leaders, that’s what it’s going to get.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
Washington’s Spy Ring and Paine’s Democracy https://belimedia.com.ng/washingtons-spy-ring-and-paines-democracy https://belimedia.com.ng/washingtons-spy-ring-and-paines-democracy Agent 711 was one of the most effective and least known spies in our nation's history. He used dead drops to communicate about enemy plans. He used secret chemical processes to create new forms of invisible ink. He spread disinformation to disguise his own troops' movements and confuse the enemy. The year was 1778. Agent 711 was George Washington. He was our nation's first spymaster, and his network of informants was the Culper spy ring. It was one of several that he ran through the war and also during his time as president. Washington's army was undermanned, underfunded, frequently on the run. He knew he needed an edge, and he found it with intelligence. A British intelligence officer later said Washington did not really outfight the British — he simply outspied us.

At the same time, as a young nation was leaning heavily into its very first intelligence community, Thomas Paine was inspiring a nation to democracy. He had ideas about equality, rights, and the limits of government — revolutionary ideas for the time. He had ideas about power: it was not a divine right handed down to a monarch, but power rested in the hands of the people. Government borrows that power for a time, within limits. The representatives of that government are meant to be of the people and return to lives among the people, not to be separate or above or disconnected from what's going on among them.

Thus, our nation was born, not out of a tension between intelligence and democracy, but as an alchemical mix of both. We carry these ideas forward into a modern context. Power rests with the people. They loan it to the government. We trade some of our liberty for things that no one person can provide — roads, the power grid, police, submarines, national security. In exchange, we demand things of our government: accountability, adjustments, change, transparency. But we also demand security, and we demand economic prosperity. That's the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness part.

It's easy to forget that there are still those in the world who wish to take these things away from us. It's also in part generational — today’s college graduates were not alive during 9/11 or had maybe just been born. There are still terrorists and cartels who wish to take life. China seeks to take liberty — they want to subjugate people to their will, as they've done in Tibet, in Hong Kong, as they're attempting to do in Taiwan. Russia wants to end the pursuit of happiness. Some men truly do just want to watch the whole world burn to make themselves feel better, and Putin is one of those. Rather, they want happiness on their terms. This looks like power for the elite few oligarchs around Vladimir Putin, while he sends the poor to fight his war in Ukraine. It looks like the ruling elite of the CCP and their little princelings. They want order. They want to take liberty to hold power. The state has shown, in their case, security, but only for the few.

Why? Because liberty is messy. It is a struggle. It's making our own way while everyone else does the same. It's making space for ourselves and for each other, and when those spaces conflict, we figure it out. Thomas Paine wrote that “when we speak of rights, we ought always to unite them with the idea of duties — rights become duties by reciprocity: the right which I enjoy becomes my duty to guarantee to others, and he to me.” So today we are the guarantors of each other's rights. In Paine's time that looked like representative democracy and a little bit of revolution. Today, specifically with regard to spy work, it is a hard concept to wrap your head around — it's actually protection of rights by proxy.

In my pocket I carry a coin — the first one made for the Senate Intelligence Committee, on which I served for six years. On one side is Washington's seal, to represent our very first spymaster and to honor the intelligence officers who were so instrumental to the birth of this nation. But there are also two sets of stars on this coin. There's a set of 15 around the outside that represents the 15 members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who represent the entirety of the Senate. And then on the other side there are a hundred stars representing the Senate as a whole.

Why are there two layers? The 100 senators represent the entire country. The 15 members of the committee represent the Senate. Just as Washington went to great pains to encode secret messages and hide what he knew from the British army, secrets today must stay secret — the more people who know a thing, the less likely something is to stay secret. The intel committees are there to be the eyes and ears of the entire Senate or the House, and by extension the nation. These committees were designed to bring things back into balance.

During the 1960s and 1970s, another time of intense national upheaval, the IC got way out of hand — spying on political figures like Martin Luther King, attempting assassinations of foreign leaders, and engaging in massive propaganda campaigns. The Church and Pike committees united to investigate and create both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee, to provide permanent, comprehensive oversight to keep this balance.

People who don't know intelligence work think that it's all-powerful and full of abuse. They see the spy thrillers that are in the movies. They think the 1970s continue today. But people who do know it, know it's a microcosm of liberty. It's messy. It's flawed. But it's also full of checks, balances, and people doing the right thing. These are my friends and former colleagues. They look like me. They look like you. They miss dinners with families. They put themselves in harm's way. They don't get parades. They don't get early boarding on flights. They don't get military discounts. They just do the work.

For us as a country, I fear there are rough seas ahead. We face two revisionist powers that, like King George III, believed that one person should be in charge through might alone. These people want to set up a false choice: freedom or security, not both. But the truth is that freedom and security are deeply intertwined. It is fear that leads to that false choice. On the one hand, dictators fear chaos — they think that people will come to understand that their oppressive dear leader does not, in fact, have their interests at heart. The supposed strongman is actually terrified. He's desperate to hold on to power. On the other hand, amongst some, there is fear the security mission will take over and become too big, too powerful, lodged in the hands of someone who is too power-hungry. But the goal is balance. We need Washington's spy ring. We also need Paine's ideals. And we need them working together.

One further reflection on that Paine quote: the rights I enjoy, I also guarantee to others. This is perhaps most true for those who operate in the shadows. They guarantee the rights of fellow citizens day in and day out, with a million small decisions, even when no one is watching. Democracy enables good spy work — only in a democracy can you walk into the Oval Office and deliver truly terrible news to power, tell the president things have gone sideways, and work together to fix it.

Spy work also makes democracy possible. I look forward to a day where there are no enemies; no one who seeks to assert ultimate power over others. That day I will have happily worked myself out of a job. But it is not today. Today I am fully employed attempting to create deterrence, know our adversaries, create a future of peace through strength. I have sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution four times in my life, and hopefully one day I'll do it a fifth, but inside government or out, trying to work for democracy, for freedom, for a secure America and a secure world is the mission.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
Afghanistan Lost the Cognitive War Before It Lost the State https://belimedia.com.ng/afghanistan-lost-the-cognitive-war-before-it-lost-the-state https://belimedia.com.ng/afghanistan-lost-the-cognitive-war-before-it-lost-the-state The collapse of Afghanistan in August 2021 is still widely interpreted as a military or political failure. That interpretation is incomplete.

Afghanistan collapsed because it lost the cognitive war long before it lost territory.

Inside the system, we did not face a simple insurgency. We faced a persistent contest over how reality was defined, how legitimacy was perceived, and how decisions were made. The Taliban did not defeat the Afghan state by force alone. Regional actors did not undermine it through proxies alone. The deeper failure was this: the Afghan state never fully aligned its political identity with the way its people understood themselves.

That misalignment became a vulnerability - and in the gray zone, vulnerabilities are not observed; they are exploited.

The Cognitive Gap at the Center of the State

Every state rests on an implicit agreement between its people and its institutions: a shared understanding of identity, legitimacy, and purpose. In Afghanistan, that agreement was never fully stabilized.

The modern state carried the name “Afghanistan,” historically associated with a specific ethnopolitical identity. Yet the lived reality of the country was far more complex-linguistically, culturally, and historically. For many citizens, identity was rooted not in the modern state construct, but in a deeper civilizational memory: Khurasan.

This was not nostalgia. It was cognition.

Khurasan represented a mental map that connected Herat to Nishapur, Balkh to Bukhara, Kabul to a wider intellectual and cultural ecosystem. It was inclusive, fluid, and expansive. Afghanistan, by contrast, became a bounded political construct, defined by borders drawn through imperial competition and reinforced through centralized power struggles.

This divergence created a cognitive gap: the state operated under one identity framework, while large parts of society operated under another.

In a stable environment, such gaps can be managed. In a contested environment - especially under gray zone pressure - they become strategic liabilities.

From Identity Misalignment to Decision Failure

Cognitive gaps do not remain abstract. They translate directly into how decisions are made.

Inside government, this misalignment manifested in three critical ways.

First, trust was fragmented. Decisions that should have been based on competence and mission effectiveness were filtered through identity, faction, and perceived alignment. This weakened institutions at their core.

Second, intelligence was politicized. When leadership does not share a stable understanding of the state it governs, intelligence becomes contested terrain. Information is not only collected - it is interpreted through competing lenses of identity and interest.

Third, legitimacy was shallow. Citizens interacted with the state, but many did not internalize it as fully their own. That distinction is decisive. A state that is not cognitively owned cannot be strategically defended.

These were not theoretical weaknesses. They shaped daily governance, security coordination, and strategic planning. And they created the conditions for external actors to operate with precision.

Gray Zone Exploitation: Attacking the Mind, Not the Border

Afghanistan became a textbook case of gray zone competition.

Regional actors did not need to defeat the state conventionally. They exploited its cognitive vulnerabilities.

Pakistan leveraged identity divisions through the Taliban, framing them as authentic defenders of religion and tradition. Iran used cultural and sectarian narratives to extend influence in parallel networks. Russia and China approached Afghanistan as a space of managed instability, where influence could be expanded without direct confrontation.

These were not isolated actions. They were coordinated forms of cognitive warfare - targeting how citizens perceived their state, their leadership, and their future.

As one senior U.S. official recently noted, modern adversaries are engaged in a “persistent, persuasive campaign of cognitive warfare… shaping how societies see reality, trust, and decide.”

Afghanistan was already vulnerable to such campaigns because its internal narrative was never fully consolidated.

The Taliban’s Cognitive Strategy

The Taliban’s success cannot be understood without recognizing its cognitive dimension.

They did not present themselves only as a fighting force. They presented themselves as a corrective identity, a return to authenticity, faith, and order. At the same time, they framed the Republic as externally imposed, corrupt, and disconnected from the society.

This narrative was not universally accepted. But it did not need to be. It only needed to create doubt.

Cognitive warfare is not about replacing reality. It is about degrading confidence in reality.

As trust in institutions eroded, as leadership appeared divided, and as international commitment became uncertain, the Taliban’s narrative gained relative strength. The battlefield shifted from territory to perception. By the time military collapse came, cognitive collapse had already taken place.

The Strategic Vacuum: Who Defines Khurasan?

One of the most dangerous developments today is the appropriation of the term “Khorasan” by extremist groups such as ISIS-K.

This is not accidental. It is strategic.

When legitimate actors fail to define identity, adversaries will weaponize it. ISIS-K uses “Khorasan” to project a mythical, apocalyptic narrative designed to attract recruits and legitimize violence.

This creates a second-order threat. Not only is the state weakened, but its deeper civilizational identity is being redefined by actors who reject its intellectual, cultural, and inclusive legacy.

In cognitive warfare, naming is power.

If Khurasan is defined by extremists, it becomes a tool of radicalization. If it is reclaimed as a civilizational identity rooted in knowledge, trade, and coexistence, it becomes a counterweight to both extremism and fragmentation.

The Failure of State-Building as Cognitive Strategy

The international intervention between 2001 and 2021 achieved significant tactical and developmental gains. But it failed to address the cognitive dimension of state-building.

Institutions were built. Capacity was developed. Elections were held. But the deeper question - how the state was understood and internalized by its people - was never fully resolved.

This produced a structural imbalance:

  • A state that functioned administratively but not psychologically
  • A security force that fought effectively but lacked a unified narrative
  • A political system that operated formally but remained contested internally

In effect, we built a state without fully securing its cognitive foundation.

Toward Cognitive Realignment

Any future strategy for Afghanistan - and the broader region - must begin with cognitive realism.

First, policymakers must recognize that identity is not symbolic. It is operational. It shapes legitimacy, decision-making, and resilience under pressure.

Second, engagement must move beyond traditional state-building toward cognitive alignment. Governance structures must reflect the diversity and lived reality of the population, not impose narrow frameworks that generate resistance.

Third, investment in cognitive infrastructure is essential. Education, narrative development, and diaspora engagement are not secondary tools, they are central to long-term stability.

Fourth, the region must be reframed. Afghanistan should not be treated solely as a battlefield or buffer. Historically, as Khurasan, it functioned as a connector of regions, ideas, and economies. That perspective remains strategically relevant.

Conclusion: Stabilizing Meaning

The lesson of Afghanistan is not that state-building is impossible. It is that state-building without cognitive alignment is unsustainable.

For two decades, we focused on stabilizing territory, institutions, and security forces. We underestimated the importance of stabilizing meaning - how people understood the state, and whether they believed in it.

In modern competition, that is where advantage is decided.

The next battlefield is not territory. It is perception. It is cognition. It is the ability to shape how societies interpret reality and make decisions.

Afghanistan did not lose only because it was attacked. It lost because it could not fully define itself in a contested cognitive environment.

Reclaiming Khurasan, therefore, is not about returning to the past. It is about restoring a coherent, inclusive framework of identity that can withstand manipulation, resist fragmentation, and support legitimate governance.

Until that alignment is achieved, any political structure - no matter how well funded or defended - will remain vulnerable.

Because in the end, states do not collapse only when they lose control of land.

They collapse when they lose control of meaning.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Master List of Espionage Targets, Suspected Spies, and Potential Recruits https://belimedia.com.ng/a-master-list-of-espionage-targets-suspected-spies-and-potential-recruits https://belimedia.com.ng/a-master-list-of-espionage-targets-suspected-spies-and-potential-recruits It was with alarm that I read the recent New York Times article reporting the regurgitation of a truly terrible idea that, like a bad meal, continues to come up every several years.

The Times reports that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

is demanding that American intelligence officials turn over the names of all foreign espionage targets, including suspected spies and potential recruits, to create a master list, to avoid inadvertent conflicts between agencies and to better track foreign intelligence threats in real time.

A primary task of any corporate security department or Federal counterintelligence activity is to prevent, deter, and detect human and technical compromises of sensitive information. Even innocent errors can result in massive damage when they reveal sensitive information. Nor is it a secret that any large organization, no matter how carefully it screens its people, may have persons in its ranks who would betray their colleagues and their country. And of course, malign foreign actors routinely seek to access U.S. information systems and classified computing resources.

Just as a comprehensive list of CIA employees, including covert officers serving in dangerous locations, would be of great value to any number of foreign adversaries, so too would the proposed list of espionage targets, suspected spies, and potential recruits. And the drawbacks associated with creating such a list are significant - and potentially catastrophic.

The mere process of assembling the relevant data from within separate departments and agencies would require the assembling of multiple intermediate lists -for example, all subjects of interest from multiple operating components of the FBI, CIA, and additional agencies, each one of which would pose a separate significant and potentially catastrophic counterintelligence vulnerability. Compiled into a single comprehensive set, the theft or leak of the combined list would work incalculable damage to the United States.

Similar proposals have been made for decades. At the very best, they are a solution in search of a problem; for every time two or more agencies trip over one another in the pursuit of intelligence opportunities, there are literally hundreds more occasions in which the existing deconfliction arrangements work exactly as they should.

I spent several years in an ODNI policy position when the Office was first created. From time to time I encountered colleagues from one or another part of the Government, or from outside the Government completely, who sought to establish policies and procedures to address some obscure, long-since resolved, or simply imagined pet peeve. While some concerns truly reflect structural obstacles and warrant serious consideration, sometimes the most responsible thing to do is simply draw the line and withdraw a truly bad proposal. This is one of those times.

Jonathan M. Fredman is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs. He spent 36 years in legal and policy positions at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Pentagon Built a Faster Engine, Nobody Built the Steering https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pentagon-built-a-faster-engine-nobody-built-the-steering https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pentagon-built-a-faster-engine-nobody-built-the-steering The Department of War has just executed the most ambitious acquisition reform in six decades. It scrapped JCIDS — the requirements process that ossified innovation for a generation; replaced program offices with portfolio executives, and built a Warfighting Acquisition System designed for speed.

The changes deliver on years of reform proposals. They also risk repeating a costly mistake of the post-9/11 wars: chasing evolving threats with rapid fixes while no one is responsible for understanding them. Industry will help determine which path prevails.

Counter-drone fight as test case. We’ve seen this movie before

Consider the counter-drone fight, the clearest test of the new system. Washington treats it as an engineering puzzle: build a better jammer, field a cheaper interceptor. The technology shelf is full — directed-energy weapons at $12 a shot, drone-on-drone interceptors with more than a thousand kills in Ukraine.

While the technology works, the process for getting it to the warfighter does not.

Soldiers today engage FPV drones that cost a few hundred dollars with $400,000 Stinger missiles, because the cheap interceptors proven in Ukraine still have no fast path into U.S. formations. A new drone variant appears on the battlefield every week, built from commercial parts and open-source software. A firmware update that defeats a jammer costs nothing and takes hours. Our counter, even through the reformed system, takes months.

This is not a technology gap. It is a cycle-time gap. And I have seen it before. From 2010 to 2013, I led the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force at the height of the counter-IED campaign in Afghanistan. The structural parallels are exact: cheap dual-use components, knowledge that spreads faster than countermeasures, adaptation at near-zero cost, tactical variation that defeats one-size-fits-all solutions, and an institutional reflex to throw technology at a systems problem. We spent $75 billion on counter-IED and lost that fight anyway. Drones are IEDs that fly.

The part nobody owns

Here is what the reforms miss: Successful innovation runs in six phases — detect, define, develop, deploy, assess, distribute. The reforms invested almost entirely in the middle two, develop and deploy. Nobody persistently monitors how the threat evolves at the tactical edge. Nobody scopes each unit’s problem with enough precision to drive useful solutions. Nobody measures whether fielded systems actually work against an adversary who adapts after every engagement. And nobody moves what one unit learns to every other unit facing the same threat at operational speed. Three of the six phases have no organizational owner.

The department built a faster engine. Nobody built the steering — the mechanism that decides which problems the engine should be pointed at, whether the solutions worked, and who else needs to know.

Industry’s new role

That gap is the industry's opportunity — and its obligation. The DoW can’t solve this problem by itself. Companies that want to matter in this market need to do their part. They should start by doing three things differently.

First, invest in problem discovery, not product pitches. Requirements still originate in headquarters, not from soldiers watching the problem in context. The companies that win the next decade will be the ones that put engineers and business developers forward with operational units to understand problems before proposing solutions. The quality of your solution is determined by the quality of the problem you choose to solve. Einstein’s formula applies: 55 minutes on the problem, five on the solution. Most of industry has that ratio inverted.

Second, build for adaptation, not for the requirement. If your product cannot change in weeks — modular hardware, software-defined behavior, upgrades at firmware speed — it is obsolete on delivery. The adversary’s development cycle runs in days. A requirement frozen at contract award is a snapshot of a threat that no longer exists.

Third, plug into the new portfolio structure as a sensor, not just a supplier. Industry keeps asking the department for a clearer demand signal, and fairly so. But the demand signal has to come from somewhere, and the fusion cells that Portfolio Acquisition Executives need — nodes that merge ground truth from the field with what industry and the labs know is possible — cannot function without industry feeding data in and absorbing assessment data out. Companies that operate at that tempo will define the portfolios. Companies that wait for RFPs will trail them.

Doing these three things means stopping three others. Stop building to frozen requirements and calling it responsiveness. Stop treating a prototype contract or a demo-day win as the finish line — it is the starting line of the assessment the department never runs. And stop spending capture budgets decoding what headquarters wants instead of discovering what the warfighter needs. The hours are the same; the direction is not.

New authorities need new operators

None of this works without people, and people are where the reform agenda is thinnest. The department is converting the Defense Acquisition University into a Warfighting Acquisition University, trading compliance training for scenario-based judgment. That is the right instinct. But this year’s defense authorization offered little else on workforce, which means the authorities changed faster than the people who must wield them.

We know what works: experiential, problem-first education. Hacking for Defense has spent a decade putting university students to work on real national security problems alongside the people who own them. It has produced a generation of founders and public servants who know how to interrogate a problem before building a solution. That model needs to scale — into the department’s schoolhouses, into two-way exchanges between government and industry, and into industry’s own training pipelines, which today produce engineers who have never seen the field and capture teams fluent in the FAR but not in the mission.

The department has reformed how it acquires. It has not yet reformed what it acquires, whether it worked, or who else needs to know. Industry can wait – and hope – the government will close that gap, or it can help close it — by discovering problems & opportunities at the edge, building for adaptation, and educating a workforce trained to out-cycle an adversary rather than out-comply a regulation.

In this fight, the adversary does not need to out-technology us. He only needs to out-cycle us. We have already paid $75 billion to learn where that leads.

Pete Newell is a retired U.S. Army colonel, former director of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, and CEO of BMNT. He co-created Hacking for Defense with Steve Blank and is the author of “The Innovation Targeting Cycle.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
Cold War 2.0 Will Be Won by Private Capital https://belimedia.com.ng/cold-war-20-will-be-won-by-private-capital https://belimedia.com.ng/cold-war-20-will-be-won-by-private-capital The next Arsenal of Democracy will be built as much by investors, entrepreneurs, and operators as by government.

Cold War 2.0 is not coming, it’s already here. This version will not be fought only with tanks, missiles, ships, and proxy armies. Those still matter, but much of the real competition is taking place through capital markets, technology, critical minerals, supply chains, ports, telecommunications, manufacturing, energy, intellectual property, and information.

Put simply, much of the modern battlefield now sits in the private sector.

China understood this years ago. The Chinese Communist Party does not separate commercial activity from national strategy the way we often do in the West. Beijing treats finance, industry, technology, diplomacy, intelligence, media, and military power as parts of the same system.

The United States should not copy that model. But we do need to recognize what we are competing against. Our answer should be to unleash something authoritarian systems struggle to replicate deep, innovative, risk-tolerant capital markets. Unleash free market capitalism!

Economic security and national security are now inseparable. Government cannot realistically compete across every company, transaction, technology, and supply chain. Private capital, industry, and experienced national-security professionals must become a much larger part of the response.

China has already weaponized capital

The CCP Belt and Road Initiative is probably the clearest example.

It is usually described as an infrastructure and development program. That is true yet incomplete statement. It also combines state-backed financing, ports, telecommunications, mining rights, construction, energy, logistics, commodity access, and political/media influence.

A port is not just a port when it sits on a critical trade route. A telecom network is not merely commercial infrastructure when it carries government and economic data. A mine is not just a commodity asset when it controls access to materials needed for semiconductors, weapons, batteries, and advanced manufacturing.

Beijing understands that capital can create strategic leverage without firing a shot. It can lock up supply chains, shape political decisions, create economic dependencies, and establish long-term access.

The West has spent too much time debating whether this is development, competition, or coercion. China has simply kept investing. The answer is not more bureaucracy or a watered-down version of Chinese state capitalism. The answer is Western capital showing up with a better proposition: better governance, stronger local partnerships, durable jobs, superior technology, and financing that does not come with hidden strategic strings.

You cannot warn countries away from Chinese money while offering nothing credible in its place.

Private capital is ready for the next chapter

Over the last decade, private capital poured into early-stage companies across defense, AI, autonomy, cyber, space, communications, robotics, energy, and advanced manufacturing.

That movement mattered. It helped create a new generation of national-security companies outside the traditional defense-industrial base.

But startup land is no longer the only opportunity.

A much larger pool of capital is now looking for what comes next. That includes growth equity, private equity, infrastructure funds, family offices, pension capital, and institutional investors that may not want early-stage technology risk but understand industrial businesses, hard assets, recurring cash flow, and long-duration infrastructure.

The next phase is not just building new companies. It is acquiring, recapitalizing, modernizing, and scaling strategic assets that already exist.

That includes mines, processing facilities, ports, defense suppliers, energy infrastructure, semiconductor capacity, logistics networks, telecommunications, and advanced manufacturing.

It also includes rebuilding advanced and autonomous shipbuilding capabilities. The United States does not simply need better ship designs. It needs modern yards, modular production, digital engineering, robotic fabrication, advanced materials, and the ability to produce autonomous surface and undersea systems at scale.

Capital that modernizes shipyards and expands autonomous maritime production is not investing in just another industrial theme. It is investing directly in deterrence.

These sectors are not merely investment categories. They are components of national power.

Private equity already knows how to fight

None of this requires inventing a new financial discipline.

Private equity firms, distressed investors, activist funds, and turnaround specialists already know how to identify weak assets, acquire companies during periods of dislocation, restructure liabilities, replace poor management, consolidate industries, and create value where others see a mess.

In many ways, corporate raiding and economic warfare are already part of the private-equity world. The terminology may be different, but the mechanics are familiar: pressure, leverage, information, timing, capital, and execution. The opportunity now is to pursue profit while also strengthening the economic and national security of the United States and its allies.

That does not mean investors should accept poor returns in the name of patriotism. The model only works if the investments are commercially sound.

Buy the mine because it is undervalued and strategically important. Recapitalize the manufacturer because it can generate a return and rebuild domestic capacity. Finance the port because it is a good asset and reduces adversarial leverage. Modernize the shipyard because it can become profitable while restoring critical naval capacity.

Profit and patriotism do not have to be competing ideas.

A modern Letter of Marque

There is a useful historical precedent.

In the early United States, Congress could issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal. Privately financed vessels were authorized to capture enemy shipping under a legal framework established by government.

The private sector supplied the ships, crews, and capital and accepted the risk. Government defined the adversary, set the rules, and provided legal authority.

The modern lesson is not that investors should be turned loose to seize assets outside the law. It is that America has used public authority before to direct private risk-taking toward national objectives.

A modern equivalent would be financial, legal, and commercial. It could include tax-advantaged national-security funds, political-risk insurance, export-credit support, allied co-investment vehicles, faster regulatory review for strategic acquisitions, purchasing commitments, and carefully managed threat briefings for vetted investors.

Government sets the conditions.

Private capital finds the opportunity, performs the diligence, assumes the risk, improves the asset, and earns the return.

That is not piracy. It is economic statecraft through markets.

Government should set the objective, not run the deal

Government has an important role, but it needs to understand its limitations.

It should identify strategic priorities, provide clear demand signals, enforce laws, share appropriate threat information, and create incentives where markets are not properly pricing national-security risk.

What it should not do is try to become a venture capitalist, private-equity manager, or operating executive. A venture-capital model is useful: signal the problem, invite multiple solutions, fund in stages, establish measurable milestones, scale what works, and stop funding what does not.

We do not need another innovation command or working group that spends two years admiring the problem.

We need clear objectives, credible markets, and room for professionals to execute.

The Americas should be the first major test

This approach is especially important in Latin America.

Chinese capital has expanded across the region through mining, energy, ports, telecommunications, logistics, agriculture, and manufacturing. Washington cannot simply warn governments and business families about Chinese influence and expect them to walk away from available financing.

Western capital must compete.

A modern economic Marshall Plan for the Americas should be driven largely by private investment, working alongside aligned governments, local families, entrepreneurs, and industrial groups.

The pitch should be practical: better capital, better governance, stronger local partnerships, more jobs, and a business model that leaves more value in the country.

That is how Chinese influence gets displaced—by offering something better, not simply issuing warnings from Washington.

The fiscal argument matters

There is also a major federal-budget advantage.

Under the traditional model, government identifies a strategic need, appropriates taxpayer money, creates a program office, hires contractors, and carries most of the financial risk.

Private capital changes that equation.

Investors fund the companies and acquisitions. They absorb losses when investments fail. When they succeed, they create jobs, profits, tax revenue, industrial capacity, and stronger supply chains.

Government gains capability without paying the entire bill.

This does not eliminate the need for defense budgets, grants, procurement, or public infrastructure. Some missions only the government can perform. But every strategic capability financed primarily by private investors is one less burden placed entirely on the federal balance sheet.

That is not deficit reduction through austerity. It is deficit reduction through growth, investment, and a larger tax base.

Capital is becoming an instrument of national power

Cold War 2.0 will be shaped by AI, autonomy, cyber, space, critical minerals, energy, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, autonomous shipbuilding, logistics, and financial networks.

The next Manhattan Project will not be one building or weapons program. It will be an ecosystem of investors, entrepreneurs, private-equity firms, family offices, corporations, universities, operators, and national-security professionals working toward aligned outcomes.

The CCP has shown what centralized state power can do when fused with capital.

The West’s answer should be the full mobilization of free enterprise.

Cold War 2.0 will be won as much in boardrooms, factories, ports, shipyards, bankruptcy courts, and investment

committees as on traditional battlefields.

Capital is not simply financing the arsenal anymore.

Capital is becoming the arsenal.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
25 Years After 9/11, the Next Global Shock Could be Worse https://belimedia.com.ng/25-years-after-911-the-next-global-shock-could-be-worse https://belimedia.com.ng/25-years-after-911-the-next-global-shock-could-be-worse The next 9/11 is unlikely to be another terrorist attack of equivalent scale nor a cyber-attack nor even another pandemic. The next global shock may be the use of nuclear weapons assisted by the more casual attitudes of less responsible world leaders and the lack of popular understanding and fear.

Journalists around the world are already working on their articles for the 25th anniversary of 9/11 this autumn. Most assume that the focus should be on Afghanistan and the renewed threat there from ISIS-K (the Khorasan province of the Islamic State terrorist group) and from the remaining elements of Al Qaida. A United Nations report alleges that both groups are surviving if not prospering in Afghanistan. But history tends not to repeat itself and, although President Biden's evacuation of Afghanistan following President Trump's Doha Agreement with the Taliban was a costly error, there are no signs that either group could carry out an attack of the magnitude of that terrible day in New York and Washington.

"the scourge of terrorism...is much closer to home"

The scourge of terrorism will, of course, continue and nowadays it is much closer to home, both in West Africa and inside our own countries where isolated young men self-radicalise in their bedrooms and then take a kitchen knife or the family car and attempt to do their worst.

In the 1990s Western governments worried a great deal about chemical and biological (CB) terrorism, particularly after the Aun Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway. In London there was concern about a mass casualty attack on the London Underground. But a CB attack is extremely hard to undertake and that very complexity means that security services should become aware of planning.

Since 9/11 security services have become much more skilled at monitoring terrorist preparations. No agency on earth can expect to surveil every disgruntled loner (nor should that be the expectation) but Artificial Intelligence (AI) will greatly assist services around the world, flagging, for example, unusual travel patterns and the purchase of precursor materials.

Indeed AI would surely have "joined the dots" prior to 9/11 after the British had warned of attacks in New York involving the hijacking of airliners by AQ and the Americans had other evidence including unusual flying school requests.

So, if not terrorism, then what is going to provide the next global shock to rival Pearl Harbor and 9/11? In the mid-2000s the assumption was that it would be a cyber-attack. Richard Clarke, a special advisor on cyber security at the White House, wrote Cyber War (Harper Collins, 2010) which evoked an image of modern cities reduced to quasi stone age existence with air traffic control and hospitals paralysed, banks and financial transactions frozen, heating and air conditioning no longer functioning and fuel quickly running out. Cyber defences are now much stronger although AI will provide a boost to the capabilities of both attacker and defender. This is at the heart of the current debate about Anthropic's Mythos.

Covid 19 could be viewed as the successor to 9/11 in terms of global shock. It was, of course, a tragic event and there is a danger of seeming callous when observing that the World Health Organization estimated that 0.09% of the global population died (although the real figure may be slightly higher). By contrast the Black Death between 1347 and 1352 is estimated to have killed 40% of Europe's population. However the impressive and fast development of vaccines during Covid and the value of AI in shortening timelines for vaccine development and testing suggests that another pandemic might be shorter and therefore less devastating. On the flip side malign actors could use AI to develop more virulent diseases.

The extraordinary developments in warfare in Ukraine since 2022 should make governments and populations worry about the use of drones closer to home. They will surely become the routine tools of rogue states, terrorists and assassins. It is remarkable that the first (and so far only) drone assassination attempt took place back in 2018 against President Maduro of Venezuela since when Ukrainian development of drone technology has been exponential. It is only a matter of time before we see them used in a domestic context, perhaps against critical infrastructure such as nuclear reactors. All countries need to prioritize counter drone systems and some (particularly UK) require an emergency program to develop a coherent missile defence capability.

"a willingness to play nuclear roulette"

However by far the greatest danger of a massive global shock would come from the use of a nuclear weapon in anger for the first time since 1945. From 1945 to 1990 the world lived in dread of nuclear war. Films like The War Game (1966), Fail Safe (1964) and even the darkly comedic Dr Strangelove (1964) achieved genuine popular traction. Hot lines and fail-safe mechanisms were devised to minimize the danger of accidental war. Politicians liked to believe that the non-use of these weapons was due to effective mutual deterrence but, in truth, there were too many near-misses (between 9 and 22 according to a scan of reputable think tanks) for that to be a convincing argument. 45 years of nuclear non-use may sound impressive but barely moves the needle when thinking of the future of the planet and humanity.

Since the Cold War that fear of nuclear weapons seems (for no good reason) to have largely evaporated at a popular level and world leaders now make threats in a relatively casual manner. One must aim off for deterrence requiring leaders to assert their willingness to use such weapons in extremis but President Trump, President Putin, India's Prime Minister Modi and Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir have all been quoted indicating a willingness to use nuclear weapons in less than extreme circumstances.

Furthermore there has been a willingness to play nuclear roulette by firing missiles and drones near nuclear facilities. The Russians did this before seizing the Zaporizhzhia power plant and have subsequently fired missiles near Chernobyl. Iran appears to have targeted sites in the vicinity of the Dimona nuclear facility and the Indians, on 10 May 2025, deliberately hit Pakistani bases (such as Sargodha) where nuclear capable aircraft are known to be based.

In the 2000s much thought was given to preventing nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists with a particular worry about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal being accessed by AQ or other regional groups. Both Presidents Bush (junior) and Obama believed this to be a top global threat, Obama famously insisted that "The single biggest threat to U.S. security, both short term, medium term and long term, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon." Fortunately the dual concerns about Pakistan "descending into chaos" and its army becoming Islamist have since receded.

"populist leaders cannot be trusted with weapons of such power"

Concerns about rogue Islamists have been replaced by a wider concern that increasingly populist world leaders cannot be trusted with weapons of such devastating power. Since the Millennium there has been a tangible decline in the standards of global governance. Just compare the key leaders at the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev, MacMillan and De Gaulle) with some of those controlling nuclear arsenals today (Trump, Putin, Netanyahu, Modi, Asim Munir, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un). The former four had witnessed world wars at close quarters.

In academic circles there is much debate about the dangers of AI being used inside nuclear decision-making with a particular insistence that there must always be a "human in the loop". Faster missiles lead to shorter decision times, making serious and informed human consultation virtually impossible. A retired senior Pakistani officer told the author that Pakistan had 25 seconds to consider the implications of the eleven Indian cruise missiles launched against its air bases on 10 May 2025. (A quick check of AI gives a figure of 29.77 seconds). At the time Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was asleep. The temptation to delegate decision-making to AI could be hard to resist. However the AI debate is of secondary importance. AI might eventually mitigate human fallibility and anyway it hardly matters if the world is destroyed by a bad decision taken by AI or a human.

The use of even one nuclear weapon might be enough to shake the world out of its astonishing apathy about the nuclear threat. Rutgers University demonstrated that a war between India and Pakistan involving 150 nuclear warheads would lead to over a hundred million deaths and a climatic and environmental disaster leading to mass global starvation. A report submitted to the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2021 reiterated these risks and then, bizarrely, called for more research into the effects of such weapons (as if there was not enough evidence) and questioned their legality under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as if any user is going to summon their legal advisers.

One thing is for sure. The use of modern nuclear weapons would relegate 9/11, Pearl Harbor and Covid 19 (and even Hiroshima and Nagasaki) to such a distant category of global shock that the very comparison would seem absurd.

Remember March 2020 when nobody could believe that the world was locking down due to a pandemic. A nuclear war will not be about an inability to join dots but another massive failure of human imagination.

Tim Willasey-Wilsey is a Cipher Brief Expert. He was an advisor to the British government on overseas counter-terrorism from 1996 to 1999 before advising Ministers on Asia (including the Indian Subcontinent) from 2005 to 2008.

This article first appeared on the website of RUSI-The Royal United Services Institute

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
Ankara's Charm Offensive Should Not Buy Back the F&35 https://belimedia.com.ng/ankaras-charm-offensive-should-not-buy-back-the-f-35 https://belimedia.com.ng/ankaras-charm-offensive-should-not-buy-back-the-f-35 The choreography in Ankara last week was impressive, even by Recep Tayyip Erdogan's standards. Cannons fired, mounted honor guards paraded, and jets flew overhead trailing red, white, and blue smoke as Donald Trump arrived for the NATO summit. By the time the two leaders sat down together, the American President was already telling reportersthat Turkey has been "much more loyal" than other allies, and that reinstating Ankara into the F-35 program is "certainly something we will consider." He went further, promising to lift the sanctions imposed under CAATSA after Turkey's 2019 purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system.

Washington should slow down and reconsider any such move. The temptation to reward Erdogan for a good show of pageantry and for playing a useful back channel to Tehran is understandable. But the case for readmitting Turkey to America's most sensitive fighter jet program does not hold up, and the reasons go well beyond the S-400 that got Ankara expelled in the first place.

Let’s start with Turkey’s original sin. Turkey was removed from the F-35 program precisely because the S-400 system stationed on Turkish soil poses a collection risk to the F-35's stealth signature and sensor data. Nothing about that system has left the country. Trump's own suggestion that he has "no concerns at all" about Turkey operating Russian and American systems side by side ignores the technical judgment his own administration reached in 2019: an S-400 battery within range of an F-35 is an intelligence-gathering platform aimed at the jet's most guarded secrets.

Turkey now appears it wants to atone for its sins: In the days that followed the NATO summit, well-placed sources in Ankara announced Turkey’s intention to sell or transfer its S-400s to another country, possibly Qatar or the United Arab Emirates. Doing so may satisfy the letter of the law, section 1245 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, which bars F-35 transfers to Turkey unless Washington certifies Ankara no longer "possesses" the S-400.

Then come regional concerns. Israel has lobbied hard against the F-35 sale, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning that Turkish F-35s would erode the air superiority that guarantees Israeli and American posture across the Middle East. Athens and Nicosia have made similar appeals, citing Turkey's continued military pressure in the Aegean and its decades-long occupation of northern Cyprus. These are warnings from allies and partners who would sit on the receiving end of Turkish airpower upgraded with fifth-generation stealth.

But there is a fourth danger that has drawn far less attention in Washington, and it may matter more than any of the others: Turkey's telecommunications backbone is no longer fully Turkish. The country's leading systems integrator, Netaş, is roughly 48 percent owned by ZTE, and Huawei is deeply embedded in the networks operated by Turkcell, Türk Telekom, and Vodafone Turkey. Under China's 2017 National Intelligence Law, that ownership is not a passive investment. Beijing can compel any Chinese firm, anywhere it operates, to hand over data on demand, and corporate assurances of independence carry no legal weight against that obligation.

Washington has already treated this exact problem as disqualifying. In 2021, a $23 billion F-35 and drone package for the United Arab Emirates collapsed, in part because Huawei was building Abu Dhabi's 5G network and American intelligence had identified a suspected Chinese military-linked facility at Khalifa Port.

Turkey’s embrace of Chinese telecoms also cuts against the Alliance’s moves towards securing the critical infrastructure underpinning its military mobility — the bridges, rail links, and digital networks that allow allies to uphold deterrence. Across the continent, these networks have become a critical target over the course of the war in Ukraine, as adversarial actors linked to Russia use grey zone tactics to undermine collective resilience and damage alliance cohesion.

Washington increasingly views countering this threat as a top priority. In May, the Trump administration urged NATO members to spend a portion of the 1.5 percent of GDP allocated to defense-related spending on removing Huawei components from their domestic networks, highlighting the vulnerabilities posed by Chinese equipment and hacking campaigns such as Salt Typhoon. While that call is already being heeded by several NATO allies — Sweden and the UK have been particularly proactive in securing their systems — Ankara remains a laggard, undermining its contribution to alliance interoperability.

The risks are not simply tied to the F-35 itself, but to its entire operating environment. If sold, the fighter will be operating within an ecosystem saturated by Chinese-produced telecom equipment, reliant on a deployment infrastructure whose roots directly tie back to Beijing, operated by a capital pulling in the opposite direction of a key Alliance priority. While the U.S. has heavily invested in protecting the F-35, no system is ever fully secure, and any sale would force the jet to operate in a vulnerable environment for decades to come.

Turkey’s pending S-400 sale may remove dangerous hardware, but it does not eliminate the systemic risk associated with the deal.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
"ITAR&Free" Is Europe's Favorite Feature, We Wrote It for Them https://belimedia.com.ng/itar-free-is-europes-favorite-feature-we-wrote-it-for-them https://belimedia.com.ng/itar-free-is-europes-favorite-feature-we-wrote-it-for-them Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

A little over a year ago I watched a good company die. They built technology that worked. It was not a slide or a concept, but a thing that did what it was designed to do. They had European clients interested, checkbook open, at exactly the moment Europeans started opening checkbooks for real. They did not close the deal. They could not figure out how to export their product without tripping over the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), they could not afford the lawyer who could tell them, and they ran out of runway waiting on a U.S. contract that was still three review cycles from signatures. The technology did not fail. The paperwork won.

Around the same time, I sat with a foreign team with excellent tech who wanted to build in the United States. They decided against it. Their reason was not taxes or visas. It was that the moment their intellectual property became American, it might become ITAR-controlled, and they were terrified that a regulation written in Washington would strand the hardware they were shipping to Ukraine to kill Russians. Restated, our export-control regime is so feared that talented people keep their best work out of the American ecosystem. That is not security. That is self-harm.

The $3,000 Toll to Export Nothing

Start with the cost of admission. To legally export a defense article, you first register with the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). As of January 2025 the base registration fee rose to $3,000 a year, and you pay it whether or not you ever ship a single item. That fee is the insult, not the injury. It’s the trivial part that buys you the right to then apply, per transaction, for a DSP-5 license, a process that consumes months, specialized counsel, and a full-time compliance officer that a nine-person startup does not have and cannot afford to hire.

For Lockheed Martin, this is a rounding error and a competitive moat all at once. The primes have entire floors of export-control lawyers; the regulation that annoys them is the regulation that buries smaller companies. The same $250,000-a-year compliance function is a nuisance on a $61 billion contract base and a death sentence on a Series A. ITAR does not have to be designed as a moat to function as one.

The See-Through Rule and the Birth of "ITAR-Free"

Here is the part that turns a domestic annoyance into a strategic own-goal. ITAR does not stop at the first sale. Every onward move, a re-export to a third country, a retransfer to a different end user, needs its own license. Control follows the item forever. Two features make this uniquely radioactive. The first is the "see-through rule": American law looks straight through a foreign-built system to control the U.S. part buried inside it. The second is that ITAR, unlike Commerce's export rules, has no de minimis threshold; there is no amount of American content small enough to escape. One controlled datalink in a drone taints the entire aircraft, permanently, and Europe cannot freely sell it onward, or keep sending it to Kyiv, without asking for permission.

So Europe did the rational thing. It started designing us out. "ITAR-free" is now a selling point, a feature you advertise the way you'd advertise waterproofing. The control regime we built to protect technology has taught our allies to build parallel supply chains that don't need us at all. We are not catching diversion. We are losing the room, one clean-sheet component at a time.

We Are Guarding a Henhouse the Fox Already Breeds

Now the objection every serious reader is forming: won't loosening the rules help China? It is the right question, and it deserves an honest answer. Post-sales diversion to Beijing is a threat, and the wall against it should stay standing.

But look at what the small companies I'm talking about actually build; let’s be precise about it. The airframe of an attritable FPV drone is commodity hardware, every component sourceable on Alibaba, and China manufactures the world's drones at a scale and price we cannot approach. Nobody in Beijing is combing American startups for quadcopter know-how. What can be genuinely sensitive is the layer you can't buy on Alibaba: the autonomy stack, the radio's waveform library, the ISR payload's processing. Control that. But applying munitions-grade export control to benign parts isn't guarding the crown jewels. It's standing armed guard over a henhouse the fox already owns, breeds, and exports. Control the narrow band that matters; stop strangling everything downstream of it with rules written for an age when a weapons system took a decade to build and stayed secret for two.

The Money Nobody Talks About

Investors should sit with the scale of the mismatch. In 2025, venture capital poured a record $49.1 billion into defense tech, up more than 80 percent over the year before. It sounds like a golden age until you notice most of it stacked into a handful of nine-figure megarounds while the Forgotten Bench, the small firms building the actual arteries of the future force, fought over grants. A typical DoD SBIR Phase I award runs about $256,000; a Phase II might reach a couple of million, if the company survives the wait. Many do not.

Now hold that against one ITAR-specific insult. On an ordinary afternoon, RTX booked $183.7 million for Patriot hardware bound for the United Arab Emirates. The prime exports to the Gulf on a Tuesday while the startup cannot work out how to ship a drone to a NATO ally. That is not a difference in risk. It is a difference in legal firepower. And the Pentagon posts these awards daily, every one above $7.5 million. The primes' budget rounding errors could fund the next generation of warfare. Instead they accrue to the incumbents while the little guys are fenced out of a market currently on fire.

What Each Corner of the Triangle Should Want

For the Procurement Officer, this is about coalition speed. You cannot field an allied force at the pace of a per-transaction license queue. Interoperability that requires a lawyer is not interoperability.

For the Investor, ITAR reform is a total-addressable-market unlock. European defense budgets have gone vertical, and right now your portfolio company is legally walled off from them. The moat you think protects your prime holdings is the same moat drowning your early-stage investments. Your small companies are not competition for the primes; there is plenty of room for both to be successful.

For the Policy Wonk, the pitch is precision. A control regime that treats a drone like an ATACM has no credibility left to spend when it actually needs to stop something dangerous. Overcontrol is how you get evasion; targeted control is how you get compliance.

The Fix Already Exists: We Just Gave It to Two Countries

We do not have to invent anything. In September 2024, the State Department stood up the AUKUS exemption, a license-free environment for defense trade, between pre-approved, vetted users, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, fenced by an "Excluded Technology List" that keeps the genuinely sensitive items behind the wall. In an early three-month sample, only 18 percent of requests fell on the excluded list; the other 82 percent could move without a license. The mechanism works; State approved it six months ago.

So extend it, carefully, because this is the part the cynics should watch. AUKUS worked because State vouched for allies whose export-control systems were judged comparable to our own. Thirty-two NATO members are not thirty-two equal risks, so the honest version of this is tiered: the most-trusted governments first, each on its own comparability finding. Build a NATO Trusted Trade tier on the same architecture: license-free authorization for vetted allies on the commodity tier, a narrow excluded list. Industry's loudest complaint about AUKUS is that the list is already too broad. Then build a small-business fast lane that waives the registration toll for firms below a revenue threshold. Keep the wall. Widen the gate. Stop making a startup spend its entire budget on compliance lawyers to sell drones to Poland.

I have spent a career watching good technology lose to bad processes. This is the purest example I know. The threat is real, the fix is proven, and the only thing missing is the will to admit that a rulebook written in the era of glacial weapons development is actively kneecapping the fast, cheap, disposable systems that are winning wars right now. Europe wants viable technology. Our young innovators are starving for a customer. ITAR is standing between them, collecting a $3,000 toll, and calling it national security.

I am not naive about post-sale diversion to China. The real leak in a trusted-ally tier is not China raiding our startups; it is a vetted ally re-exporting onward. This is why truly sensitive items stay behind the wall. A trusted-ally tier is only as good as the "trusted" part: the whitelist has to be policed, the excluded list has to be honest, and end-use monitoring has to be real. I will not pretend reform fixes everything. For some European governments "ITAR-free" is industrial policy, a way to protect their own primes and their own jobs. No amount of American good behavior erases that motive. But reform removes the legitimate excuse, and keeps our companies in contention where today they are auto-excluded. The answer to a blunt instrument is a sharper one, not no instrument at all.

We wrote the words "ITAR-free" onto our allies' marketing brochures ourselves, one anachronistic rule at a time. The question is whether we notice in time to erase them, or we keep guarding the henhouse until the last American startup gives up and the last European customer stops asking. Who are we protecting, and from what?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s Military Plans Depend on Infrastructure It Doesn’t Secure https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-military-plans-depend-on-infrastructure-it-doesnt-secure https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-military-plans-depend-on-infrastructure-it-doesnt-secure Military power is meaningless if it cannot move.

Every American war plan, from deterring aggression in Europe to prevailing in the Indo-Pacific, depends on our ability to maneuver people, equipment, fuel, information and combat power faster than any adversary can react. We invest billions in advanced aircraft, ships, satellites and weapons systems, yet every one of these assets depends on transportation and communications networks that the Department of Defense does not own. Washington needs to invest in the cybersecurity of these assets otherwise we risk having troops and materiel that can’t get off the base to the front line.

A tank leaving Fort Cavazos does not magically appear in Europe. An Air Force squadron deploying to the Pacific does not simply launch into combat. Every deployment begins on commercial railroads, moves through civilian ports and airports, depends on privately owned communications networks and increasingly relies on digital logistics systems that connect government and commercial partners.

That is America’s strategic advantage. It is also one of our greatest vulnerabilities.

China does not need to destroy American combat power to gain an advantage. It simply needs to delay it. Every day that equipment sits in a rail yard, every hour a port is offline, every aircraft waylaid by corrupted logistics data or disrupted communications creates exactly the kind of friction an adversary seeks during the opening days of a conflict.

This is not theoretical.

For more than two years, top U.S. intelligence officials have warned that Chinese cyber operators are compromising hundreds of American transportation, communications, energy and logistics systems. They gain persistent access, so that Beijing can disrupt and destroy system at the time of its choosing.

Russia’s cyberattacks against Ukraine’s transportation, energy, and communications infrastructure reveal what this looks like in practice: modern wars are fought as much against the systems that sustain military power as the military itself.

Today’s military power is no longer built solely on concrete, steel and fuel. It is built on networks and connectivity.

Ports rely on automated cranes and digital cargo management systems. Railroads depend on computerized dispatching and signaling. Airports operate through integrated flight planning, air traffic management and logistics software. Fuel distribution, maintenance scheduling, cargo visibility and command and control all depend on data moving securely across interconnected networks.

Imagine a deployment where cargo manifests are corrupted, rail dispatch systems slow movement, satellite communications are degraded and fuel deliveries are redirected through manipulated logistics data. Aircraft still exist. Ships still sail. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Guardians remain ready to fight. But when the Joint Force begins arriving late and incomplete, the operational tempo required to seize the initiative is lost.

History reminds us why speed matters.

During humanitarian operations following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the systems underpinning military mobility were the lifeline connecting isolated communities to food, water and medical care. Every hour mattered. Delays translated directly into human suffering.

Combat operations are no different. Time is often the most valuable resource a commander possesses. The same lesson applies in deterrence. The faster America can generate and maneuver combat power, the less likely an adversary is to miscalculate.

Military and commercial networks need to work together to dynamically reroute forces around cyberattacks, infrastructure failures or contested logistics. Decision advantage will increasingly come not from owning more platforms, but from orchestrating movement better than our adversaries can disrupt it.

The problem is that military planners have spent decades assuming that civilian infrastructure will simply be available when mobilization orders are issued. That assumption deserves renewed scrutiny.

The Defense Department has publicly identified which ports, rail corridors and airports are “strategic” and indispensable to national defense. The Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard and transportation agencies have been tasked to understand the infrastructure. Commercial operators understand their own networks better than anyone. But somehow the needed public private collaboration to protect these national assets has not occurred and, as a result, many of these communities will come together for the first time during a national emergency.

Congress and the executive branch should establish and harmonize cybersecurity standards across transportation sectors so operators spend more time improving security than satisfying overlapping regulations.

Infrastructure directly supporting military mobility deserves dedicated cybersecurity investment. Smaller ports, airports and rail operators cannot reasonably defend themselves against nation-state adversaries without federal partnership. Congress should provide cybersecurity grant programs for the under-resourced transportation infrastructure operators to address identified vulnerabilities.

Most importantly, America must begin exercising the way it expects to fight.

National, regional and local exercises should assume degraded communications, cyberattacks against transportation systems, corrupted logistics data and contested movement inside the United States. We should practice fighting through disruption instead of assuming perfect connectivity.

There is an old military saying: amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

The next war demands we take one step further.

Victors study maneuver.

America’s adversaries already understand that mobility is our greatest strategic advantage. That is precisely why they are targeting the networks that make it possible.

If America cannot connect, America cannot maneuver. If America cannot move, America cannot fight.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Jul 2026 20:57:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
When the Caller Knows Your Name: Cyber Fraud, Banks, and What America Can Do About It https://belimedia.com.ng/when-the-caller-knows-your-name-cyber-fraud-banks-and-what-america-can-do-about-it https://belimedia.com.ng/when-the-caller-knows-your-name-cyber-fraud-banks-and-what-america-can-do-about-it Your phone buzzes with a text from your bank: “Did you authorize a $2,400 transfer? Reply NO to stop it.” You reply, and seconds later a calm “fraud agent” calls, knows your name and the last four digits of your card, and walks you through “securing” your money by moving it into an account under the criminal’s control. No password was stolen, no malware installed. You handed over the money yourself, because everything looked and sounded real.

This is the new face of bank fraud and business is booming. Behind these scams sit organized adversaries: nation-state actors who treat theft as state revenue, criminal gangs running industrial-scale scam operations, and hacktivists out to embarrass institutions increasingly armed with AI that makes their lies cheap, fast, and tailored to you.

The problem: scams have gone industrial

Banks have spent decades hardening their vaults and networks, so attackers shifted to the softest target: the customer. Rather than breaking in, they trick people into transferring funds themselves. This is “authorized push payment” fraud where the victim approves the payment and it is far harder to claw back than a stolen card number. To hear how a typical scam call actually unfolds, watch the FTC’s short imposter-scam explainer.

With the age of AI, three key forces have turbocharged these threats. Payments now move instantly and irreversibly, so money is gone before anyone notices. Decades of data breaches let criminals buy your name, address, and account details cheaply, making their scripts eerily accurate. And generative AI has industrialized deception where more than half of fraud is now estimated to involve AI. A criminal can clone a familiar or family voice from seconds of audio, write flawless phishing emails in any language, and even deepfake a bank officer on a video call.

The people behind it are not lone hackers in hoodies. They range from sanctioned nation-state groups that steal to fund their governments, to criminal syndicates running scam centers staffed by trafficked workers, to hacktivists attacking banks to make a political point. For them, fraud is a scalable business and it is outrunning the banks, telcos, and Big Tech.

The real-world cost

The damage is measured in real households. The Federal Trade Commission reports Americans lost roughly $16 billion to fraud of all kinds in 2025 the highest on record and about 25% more than the year before. Imposter scams alone accounted for $3.5 billion, nearly tripling since 2020, and the single most lucrative version is the fake bank-security alert that convinces people to “protect” their savings by moving them.

These losses fall unevenly. Americans aged 50 and older reported $4.3 billion in losses in 2025, often life-altering sums drained from retirement accounts. The official numbers are almost certainly a fraction of reality, since many victims never report out of shame. Beyond the dollars, the human cost is real emptied college funds, missed mortgage payments, and a corrosive loss of trust in the financial system people rely on every day. One Florida couple lost $42,000 of their savings this way watch how it happened. In fact, this happens so often that Hollywood created an action movie about it with the Bee Keeper.

A National Security issue

Fraud and scams are not just a nuisance but far more dangerous. Fraud and scams in the United States have escalated into a national security issue because they are no longer isolated consumer crimes. They are large‑scale, foreign‑run operations that drain billions of dollars from the U.S. economy and undermine public trust in financial and digital systems. Federal agencies increasingly link these schemes to transnational criminal organizations, some of which also engage in human trafficking, money laundering, and other activities that threaten national stability. The financial impact is massive, with losses rivaling major illicit industries, and the proceeds often flowing to adversarial nations or criminal networks abroad.

The rules already on the books

The U.S. is not starting from zero. Along with the growth of the early Internet, in 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act went into effect and its Safeguards Rule in requiring banks to protect customer data, and guidance from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) pushes them toward stronger, multi-factor login security. The Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering rules, enforced by the Treasury’s FinCEN, require banks to flag suspicious transactions — a key tool for tracing stolen funds. New York’s Department of Financial Services Part 500 cybersecurity rule has become a de facto national standard.

Regulators are also targeting the scams themselves. The FTC’s Impersonation Rule, in force since April 2024, lets the agency go after fraudsters who pose as businesses or government agencies; in its first stretch it produced more than $70 million in consumer refunds. Voluntary frameworks like the NIST Cybersecurity Framework give institutions a common playbook.

The gap is not the absence of rules it is that attackers move faster than rules can be written, and that liability for scam losses remains murky when a customer is tricked into approving the payment. So, with all these rules and regulations, why are scams and fraud occurring faster?

The innovators fighting back

A fast-growing wave of companies is using the same AI that empowers criminals to stop them.

· Feedzai builds real-time systems that score billions of transactions as they happen, spotting the subtle patterns of a scam in under a second.

· Alloy helps banks and fintechs verify who is really opening an account, choking off the synthetic and stolen identities fraudsters depend on.

· Arkose Labs specializes in blocking automated bot attacks and account takeovers, while SEON, Lexus Nexus, and Sumsub offer identity-verification and fraud-screening tools that smaller banks and startups can plug in affordably.

· Netcraft is a company which doesn’t only detect scams but does something about it. It is very good at “take downs” of scam networks.

· Others are racing to build deepfake and voice-clone detection to catch fakes that fool the human ear and eye. Others get creative: UK carrier Virgin Media O2 built “Daisy,” a lifelike AI “granny” that answers scam calls and keeps fraudsters rambling for up to 40 minutes to tie them up so they have no time for real victims. Watch “Daisy” turn the tables on scam groups.

What unites all these is adaptive defense models that learn daily, because last month’s fraud pattern is already obsolete. All these point solutions are modeled on Intellectual Property that slows sharing. This model is not working.

What America should do

As scams become more sophisticated, especially with AI‑driven impersonation, deepfakes, and automated fraud, their ability to destabilize institutions, exploit citizens, and weaken economic resilience has pushed policymakers and security experts to treat fraud not just as a consumer protection problem, but as a strategic threat to national security. Staying safe will take coordinated effort. Everyone has a role.

Lawmakers and regulators

Fraud and scam laws in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia share the same objective: to protect consumers and disrupting criminal activity but each country approaches the problem with a very different regulatory philosophy.

In the U.S., the system is fragmented and enforcement‑driven, with no mandatory reimbursement for most scam victims and a heavy reliance on agencies like the FTC, CFPB, and FBI to pursue wrongdoing after the fact. By contrast, the U.K. has built the world’s most proactive framework, requiring banks to reimburse victims of authorized push‑payment scams, enforcing account‑name verification through Confirmation of Payee, and placing clear accountability on financial institutions to prevent fraud before it occurs. Australia sits between the two models, adopting U.K.‑style protections while expanding responsibility beyond banks to include telcos and digital platforms through its emerging Scams Prevention Framework. While the U.K. emphasizes consumer protection and the U.S. emphasizes enforcement, Australia is moving toward a shared‑liability, cross‑industry approach that recognizes scams as a systemic risk requiring coordinated prevention across the entire digital ecosystem.

A typical scam today uses several pieces of technology working together to make the criminal look real. It often starts with:

1. the scammer creating a fake website that looks almost identical to a bank or delivery company. They buy a cheap web address from a service like GoDaddy and change just one letter so most people won’t notice the difference.

2. Then they setup email accounts on services like Microsoft & Gmail to send out massive emails.

3. They use AI tools to scrape millions of social media profiles from Facebook, Instagram, etc. to collect data about YOU.

4. They use tools that let them fake a phone number (telco), so when they call you, your phone shows the name of your bank or a government agency.

5. After that, they send out text messages to iPhone and Android users that look official, things like “Your account is locked” or “You have a package waiting.” The link in the text takes you to the fake website, where the scammer collects your login details. If you call the number instead, it goes to a call center where the scammer pretends to be a bank employee.

All of this: fake websites, spoofed phone numbers, and realistic text messages works together to trick people into believing they’re talking to a trusted company when they’re actually dealing with a criminal.

What should the Critical Infrastructure do?

In the U.S., we have failed because we have not worked together across these technologies at scale & at the speed of AI. Why? Because we (collectively) do not have the incentives or requirements to do so. For the CEOs of these companies, they do not want to spend money & resources which do not drive revenue. Period.

There are glimpses of hope. A working model already exists:

· We have the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS‑ISAC) is a global, nonprofit organization that helps protect banks and other financial institutions from cyberattacks by enabling them to quickly share information about threats. It was created in 1999 (26 years!) to strengthen the safety and resilience of the financial system by collecting, analyzing, and distributing timely intelligence about cyber and physical risks so that member institutions can defend themselves and their customers more effectively. I am hopeful that they new CEO, Valerie Abend will drive more effective solutions.

· In 2026, eight major carriers: AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and others just launched the Communications Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (C2 ISAC), chaired by longtime cyber expert, AT&T security chief Rich Baich, to share real-time threat intelligence across competitors. Because most scams ride phone and text networks before they ever reach a bank, telecom and banking defenses should connect through the same kind of collective-defense sharing. But the C2 ISAC cannot do this alone.

· In 2025, the Global Anti‑Scam Alliance (GASA) was formed to bring together governments, financial institutions, technology companies, law‑enforcement agencies, and consumer groups to fight scams on a global scale. GASA acts like a global “anti‑scam task force,” uniting experts and institutions so people everywhere are better protected from online fraud.

These have proven to not operate effectively to get ahead of scams and fraud. We need a better way – mandates of sharing, legal risks support, cross ISAC/intel which is tailored/aware, good native ML & AI models (not rules), and others working at speed and context with more transparent sharing.

In the meantime,

What should consumers do?

Treat any unexpected “urgent” message about your money as a warning sign, not a command. Banks will never ask you to move funds to “protect” them. Hang up and call the number on the back of your card. Turn on multi-factor authentication and agree on a private “safe word” with family so a cloned voice can’t fake an emergency. Report scams to ReportFraud.ftc.gov, even unsuccessful attempts, because the data helps train good AI/ML models to protect everyone.

What should all companies do?

Adopt adaptive, AI-native detection rather than yesterday’s rules, and design apps that help customers pause before they act. Investors should back the firms building deepfake detection and identity verification, and banks should partner with them quickly instead of waiting years to build in-house.

Conclusion:

With fast innovation, fraud & scams will not disappear, but it can be better contained. The criminals have industrialized deception; the answer is to industrialize defense with smarter rules, sharper technology, and a public that knows the warning signs.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
America's Empty CT Chair https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-empty-ct-chair https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-empty-ct-chair The world's counterterrorism chiefs are meeting in New York this week. We brought a list of demands and not much else.

A plot hatched in a chat room in one country, funded from a second, carried out by a man walking into a crowd in a third – that's the shape of terrorism now. It doesn't stop at borders. It never agreed to.

That's the problem sitting in front of the world's counterterrorism chiefs this week. They're at the U.N. for the first time since 2023, and on Wednesday the General Assembly reopens the global strategy that's held this fight together for twenty years. The question on the table is simple and ugly: who's actually going to do the work?

Washington's answer lately is everyone but us. The new U.S. strategy tells allies to carry more of the load and barely bothers to dress it up – the era of America as the world's cop is over, pick up the slack. There's a fair point buried in there. Allies should pay more and do more in their own backyards.

But you can't order everyone else to step up while you're sliding toward the door. The federal center built to connect the dots between agencies has had no permanent boss since March. Homeland Security hasn't issued a national threat warning since last September. State shut down its CVE and GEC teams – the shops that countered extremist recruiting and foreign propaganda – over the past year. The FBI and Justice Department teams that chase these cases are thinner than they've been in two decades. We're lecturing the world about leadership while quietly dismantling our own.

And the chair we're vacating doesn't stay empty. The U.N.'s counterterrorism work runs almost entirely on donated money, most of it from a few Gulf states. Cut our funding and our attention, and we don't shut the operation down – we hand the pen to whoever's still paying. Their threats become the priorities. Their enemies become the targets. That swap is already underway, one budget cycle at a time.

The timing couldn't be worse, because the threat is spreading, not shrinking – splitting into more groups, in more places, every year. ISIS-K runs plots out of South Asia. Al-Qaeda's Sahel franchise has turned that region into the deadliest killing ground on the planet. Newer names – the Resistance Front in Kashmir, the Majeed Brigade in Balochistan – show how fast a local grudge now becomes an outfit with cash, recruits, and a slick media shop. You don't beat a threat like that by going it alone – and you definitely don't beat it while eyeing the exit.

So where should the allies in that room actually put their weight this week?

Start with the people nobody wants to claim: the captured fighters and their families still languishing in camps years after the caliphate fell. Bring them home, try them, rehabilitate them. It's slow, ugly, and a political grenade – and every year we dodge it, we let the next generation steep in the same poison that made the last one.

Less visible and more useful is the plumbing: shared watchlists, fingerprints, traveler data, the systems that flag a wanted man before he boards a plane. Most countries still can't run it well, and helping them will stop more attacks than any speech from a podium.

None of that touches the cheapest counterterrorism there is – the kid who never gets recruited in the first place. You can't arrest your way out of this, and the prevention programs that reach that kid early are always the first thing cut and the last thing anyone takes credit for.

And the new front: machines. Cheap drones in the hands of groups that used to throw rocks. AI that spits out propaganda in forty languages and finds a lonely teenager faster than any human ever could. The side that masters these tools first wins. Nothing says it'll be us.

Twenty years ago the world decided this fight couldn't be run one country at a time – not out of idealism, but because the math demanded it. Threats cross borders faster than any single government can chase them. The strategy up for review this week has outlived four presidents for one reason: the work got shared instead of dumped.

Walking away now, with the threat splintering and the tools getting sharper, isn't strength – it's a bet that the next attack will be polite enough to stay in someone else's country. It won't. It never has.

The allies are in the room this week. The only question left is whether we lead the table or leave it.

Dexter Ingram is a former senior national security executive who led the State Department's office for Countering Violent Extremism and served as acting director of the 89-nation Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. He writes the newsletter Dexter Ingram: Declassified.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
The War Before the War Has Already Begun https://belimedia.com.ng/the-war-before-the-war-has-already-begun https://belimedia.com.ng/the-war-before-the-war-has-already-begun There are 65 active state-based conflicts in the world today, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. That is not 65 separate crises. It is 65 living laboratories.

The contest that matters is not understanding any one of them. It is recognizing the 66th — the next emerging theater — while it is still only a collection of weak signals. The war before the war has already begun, and it will be won by whoever learns fastest.

For generations, intelligence organizations competed to collect more information. Tomorrow, they will compete to learn faster. Since every adversary is becoming a learning organization, our advantage must become organizational learning — and organizational learning at this scale requires infrastructure we have not yet built.

That infrastructure includes a Digital Twin Network.

The Network, Not the Twin

The objective is not to build a better digital twin. It is to build a Digital Twin Network capable of recognizing the 66th emerging theater before it becomes obvious.

Imagine a living network of thousands of interconnected digital twins — not only of nation-states, but of terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates, cyber groups, critical infrastructure, financial systems, media ecosystems, shipping networks, supply chains, political movements and emerging technologies. Every important actor, network and system has a continuously evolving twin.

Each twin learns independently. Collectively, they learn exponentially.

The value is not in the individual twins. It is in the conversations among them. Every observation by one twin makes the entire network smarter. A political crisis in Bosnia immediately updates neighboring political, economic and alliance twins. A cyberattack against critical infrastructure causes financial, media, logistics and influence-network twins to reassess their own environments. A new disinformation tactic discovered in one region is instantly tested against every other emerging theater.

The network does not simply share information. It shares learning.

This is the shift that matters: from monitoring individual events to understanding how thousands of interconnected systems evolve together. From storing information to accumulating learning. From asking “What happened yesterday?” to asking “What is becoming more likely tomorrow?”

What the Network Looks Like in Practice

Picture a digital twin of Bosnia, Moldova or the South China Sea that updates every minute. Every political speech, troop movement, satellite image, shipping pattern, cyberattack, financial transaction and social media narrative automatically changes the model. We move from “what happened” to “what is most likely to happen next.”

AI agents do the work, each with a job. One reads every speech. Another tracks every satellite image. Another looks for new alliances. Another measures the speed of narratives. Together they integrate political developments, military movements, economic indicators, migration, social sentiment, infrastructure, weather, cyber activity and media into a single continuously updated model — one that can identify change in seconds, minutes and hours, and simulate the impact of future actions.

The ability to rank the most successful future actions, based on analysis of hundreds of potential outcomes, changes how we think about red teaming in cognitive security. We will be able to build a synthetic example of every adversary of any size, and to simulate every scenario continuously.

It will be on us to feed in the right inputs. What emerges is a global learning graph of active conflicts — every lesson, every pattern, every conflict feeding better insight in real time.

How the Network Learns: Observe, Learn, Adapt

Conflicts are like a staircase: pressure, politics, perception, prosperity, partnerships, posture, provocation. Every conflict climbs the staircase differently. A network that can read that staircase across every theater at once needs three disciplines.

Observe. We are good at collection. We will benefit from a common structure that makes our observations legible to AI. As an example, The Seven Layers of Emerging Theater Intelligence (SETI) gives every twin the same language for evaluating how adversaries evolve before open conflict:

Pressure — Are underlying conditions becoming less stable?

Politics — Are institutions losing the ability to manage that pressure?

Perception — Is someone deliberately shaping how people interpret events?

Prosperity — Are economic tools becoming instruments of competition?

Partnerships — Are actors beginning to choose sides?

Posture — Is capability being positioned?

Provocation — What event could rapidly accelerate escalation?

Learn. The measure of the network is its learning velocity — how quickly it improves after every observation. Every conflict becomes a research dataset where the network continuously asks: Which indicators appeared earliest? Which signals were ignored? Which combinations proved most predictive? Which assumptions proved wrong? Which interventions slowed escalation? Which technologies changed outcomes?

Adapt. The network tracks how media and technology are evolving and how they will change future tactics. Whether it is artificial intelligence, autonomous agents, commercial satellite imagery, cyber capabilities, sensors, recommendation algorithms or open-source techniques, we watch how each one shortens the distance between pressure and politics, perception and partnerships, posture and provocation.

All of it feeds back into the twins. SETI gives the network a common language; learning velocity gives it a scorecard. Together they make the network something fundamentally different from today’s intelligence systems — a living research community that studies all 65 active conflicts every day and asks the same questions of each. Which pressures are increasing? Which partnerships are changing? Which narratives are spreading? Which actors are learning fastest? And, most important, where is the next theater beginning to resemble the early stages of previous conflicts?

The Scale of the Build

This is why the build matters, and why it must begin now. A network worthy of the threat means digital twins for every nation-state adversary, roughly 100 foreign terrorist organizations, 500 major transnational criminal organizations, 300 state-sponsored cyber groups, hundreds or thousands of hacktivists, 600 militias, insurgencies and armed non-state actors, and thousands of influence and disinformation networks.

That represents a good start.

As AI, autonomous agents and eventually quantum computing mature, the scale of continuous learning will expand dramatically. The future of intelligence will belong to organizations that treat every conflict as a learning system, every emerging theater as a research project, and every observation as a chance to improve faster than their adversaries.

The Only Question That Matters

The race is no longer to understand today’s 65 conflicts. It is to recognize the 66th emerging theater before anyone else — while it is still only weak signals.

That is a contest of learning, and learning at that scale cannot be improvised in the moment a crisis arrives. It has to be built in advance. The Digital Twin Network is that build.

The war before the war has already begun. The only question is whether we will have the network in place to see it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
When Hackers Get AI Co&Pilots: Frontier AI and the National Security Clock https://belimedia.com.ng/when-hackers-get-ai-co-pilots-frontier-ai-and-the-national-security-clock https://belimedia.com.ng/when-hackers-get-ai-co-pilots-frontier-ai-and-the-national-security-clock Five intelligence services rarely speak with one voice. When they warn the window of vulnerability has narrowed to months, the real question is whether the defenders can move as fast as the threat.

Throughout my years in the intelligence world, I don’t recall a single instance in which the Five Eyes partners jointly issued a public warning, so when they do, the message lies in the act as much as the words. Intelligence agencies guard their assessments and share them sparingly, almost never in the open. So, when the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand jointly warned on June 22 that frontier AI models capable of serious cyber exploitation are only "months away" from broad availability, the unanimity was itself a clear message. "The timeline is not years, it is months," they wrote.

The warning the Five Eyes partners shared is specific. These are systems that let a non-expert coordinate a complex intrusion (work that until recently required a trained team fluent in reconnaissance, exploitation, and stealth). That capability is moving out of the hands of advanced nation states and into the reach of mid-tier criminal groups and other adversaries. As the barrier to a sophisticated operation fall, the target list grows, and the systems most exposed are the ones a country cannot do without hospitals, water and power utilities, community banks, ports, and the contractors that serve them.

There is one caveat to mention. Outside experts who examined the models argued they do not represent a wholly novel threat, and the agencies concede their core remedy is familiar: fix the basics, patch faster, control identity and access. The fundamentals still decide most outcomes. What has changed is speed and, with speed, potential volume. The vulnerability was always there, and AI simply finds it faster and puts that reach into more hands.

For national security planners, "months" is the word that should capture attention. Strategy assumes time, and much of the architecture protecting critical infrastructure was built for an era when a capable intrusion took a capable organization. AI collapses that assumption. A defensive posture written to last three years can be overtaken before its first review, and the slowest links (legacy systems and sluggish patching) are the points an adversary will reach first.

Washington has begun to respond. Executive Order 14409, signed June 2, is best read as the opening move in a national security framework for frontier AI. It directs the NSA and CISA to benchmark in classified settings when a model's cyber capabilities make it a "covered frontier model," and it asks developers to voluntarily give the government up to 30 days of access to such models before release. It stands up an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse — led by Treasury — to coordinate the discovery and patching of vulnerabilities, and it directs the Justice Department to prosecute those who turn AI against American computer systems. It also pushes to put defensive AI into the hands of the institutions least able to defend themselves: rural hospitals, community banks, and local utilities.

The order is also a move in a broader contest. Representative Andrew Garbarino, who chairs the House Homeland Security Committee, said the same week that China is "months, if not now weeks, away from achieving frontier AI capabilities comparable to those of the United States." Washington has already moved to restrict the export of a leading frontier model on national security grounds. Whoever fields these capabilities first, and whoever sets the terms for evaluating and controlling them, will shape the rules others must live by. That competition runs straight through the private companies that build the models and the critical infrastructure an adversary would target.

All of this points to the real test. If frontier AI can accelerate attacks, it can accelerate defense, and the side that equips its defenders faster holds an advantage. Programs that put defensive AI into the hands of critical-infrastructure operators, such as Anthropic's Project Glasswing and OpenAI's cyber-defense access effort, are early attempts to give defenders a head start in finding and fixing flaws before they are exploited. The harder problem is people. Models do not run themselves, and the expertise to direct them, in a utility control room or a hospital network, is scarce and unevenly spread across exactly the sectors most at risk.

This is where national security and the private sector stop being separate conversations. Most critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated, which means the front line of national defense now runs through companies whose first duty is to investors and shareholders. The operators that can name the AI systems they rely on, assume their adversaries now carry capable co-pilots, and test their defenses against machine-speed intrusion are the ones that will fare best.

All of this argues for a different compact between government and industry, grounded in shared purpose. Major developers, critical-sector operators, and the national security agencies need to engage early and honestly on the most dangerous capabilities, the way Executive Order 14409 suggests. And the country must invest in defensive AI and in the people who wield it, so the defenders of American systems keep pace with their attackers.

I spent decades in the world of intelligence, much of it managing risk where the cost of getting it wrong was measured in much more than money. The warning the Five Eyes issued this month is the kind that professionals will take seriously. The timeline is tight, and the targets are the systems a society runs on. Frontier AI will define the next era of national power, and the open question is whether the defenders get their co-pilots before the attackers’ finish deploying theirs.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Space Age Needs New Rules https://belimedia.com.ng/the-space-age-needs-new-rules https://belimedia.com.ng/the-space-age-needs-new-rules Space is no longer a place we visit to plant flags. It is where the global economy and national security now live — and our rulebook is nearly sixty years out of date.

For half a century, space was a government project. Nations went there to prove something about science, about engineering, and about national will. The astronauts were public employees, the rockets were public property, and the point of the exercise was as much symbolic as scientific. But that era is over. What replaced it is both a gold rush and an arms race at once, unfolding in the same orbits under rules written before today.

Two forces have remade the frontier almost overnight. First, private companies now do what only superpowers once could: SpaceX, Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, Planet Labs and dozens of others launch, operate, and profit in orbit at a cadence no government program ever matched. Second, that same orbital infrastructure has become indispensable to national defense and therefore a target. In today's world, satellites are the backbone of how countries communicate, navigate, detect threats, and coordinate military operations. GPS, secure communications, missile warning systems, and real‑time intelligence all flow through space assets. If those systems were disrupted or destroyed, a country's ability to defend itself, project power, or even manage basic infrastructure would be severely weakened.

The result is a domain that is simultaneously more commercial, more crowded, and more contested than at any point in human history, and only getting started. Our institutions were built for none of this. It is time to fix that.

From Flags to Markets

The numbers tell the story of a revolution. The global space economy already approaches half a trillion dollars a year, and credible forecasts put it on a path toward $1.8 trillion or more within the next decade. In the United States alone, the sector already contributes $131.8 billion to GDP each year. Investors poured billions into space startups last year alone, and the United States now captures roughly half of all private space funding worldwide. This is no longer a niche of aerospace contractors living on government cost-plus contracts. It is one of the fastest-growing high-technology sectors on Earth, and the world's wealthiest people are racing to own a piece of it.

The engine of this growth is reusability. When SpaceX learned to land and re-fly its rockets, it did to spaceflight what the shipping container did to global trade: it collapsed the cost. Launching a kilogram to low Earth orbit once cost tens of thousands of dollars; today it can be done for a small fraction of that. Cheaper and faster access changes everything downstream. It is why the United States flew more than 200 commercial launches in a single year, which is the highest annual total this century. It is also why a single company, SpaceX, now accounts for the overwhelming majority of the world's commercial launch activity.

What gets launched has changed too. Instead of a handful of exquisite, billion-dollar satellites, operators now deploy thousands of small, coffee can size, mass-produced ones. Starlink blankets the planet with broadband from orbit; Planet Labs images the entire Earth's landmass every single day; Earth-observation firms sell insight on crops, shipping, emissions, and troop movements to anyone willing to pay. Commercial space stations are being built to succeed the aging International Space Station, and lunar logistics is becoming a business rather than a mission. The center of gravity has shifted decisively from the public sector to the private one.

Make no mistake: this is a triumph. Competition has driven costs down, cadence up, and innovation faster than any government program ever could. But a frontier opened by private capital and moving at commercial speed creates problems that markets alone will not solve. This is where the trouble begins, for which we are not ready.

The New High Ground

The same satellites that power our economy also power our military. Precision navigation, secure communications, missile warning, intelligence, and reconnaissance all run through orbit. Modern forces cannot move, see, or shoot without space, and adversaries know it. That dependence has turned what was once a sanctuary into the ultimate high ground, and the competition to control it is now explicit national policy.

The threat is not hypothetical. U.S. intelligence assesses that China and Russia are fielding a full spectrum of counterspace weapons: ground-based missiles that can destroy satellites, jammers and lasers that can blind or disrupt them, and maneuvering "inspector" craft that can shadow and, if ordered, disable other nations' spacecraft. Officials describe reversible attacks such as jamming and sensor dazzling as occurring on a near-daily basis. Russia's pursuit of a nuclear anti-satellite weapon has been called the single greatest threat to the world's entire space architecture, because a nuclear detonation in orbit would not destroy one satellite but cripple whole swaths of low Earth orbit for years. If this happens, enormous economic impact would occur. Under President Trump, the United States has answered with a declared policy of space dominance: the Pentagon has been directed to ensure American supremacy in orbit, and the Space Force is accelerating the deployment of its own counterspace weapons.

The scale of the buildup is staggering. China operated barely a thousand satellites in 2025; defense planners expect that fleet to approach twenty thousand within fifteen years, many of them dedicated to surveillance and targeting. In response, the United States stood up the Space Force, is spending on the order of $40 billion a year on military space, and is racing to make its constellations resilient, harder to find, harder to kill, and quicker to replace. Crucially, it is doing so hand-in-hand with industry: programs that draw on commercial satellite networks in wartime now treat private operators as part of the national defense fabric. This means government and private sectors are becoming more intertwined.

From a threat standpoint, cybersecurity also needs changing to protect satellites and the networks that control them, because modern space systems behave like connected digital infrastructure rather than isolated hardware. Satellites rely on software, radios, ground stations, and cloud‑based control systems that can be hacked, jammed, or spoofed. A successful cyberattack could disrupt GPS, communications, banking timestamps, aviation routing, or even missile warning systems, creating national‑level consequences. The threat is growing as nations target satellites through cyber intrusions and signal interference, and as commercial constellations expand with software‑heavy, rapidly deployed systems that often have uneven security. Yet international space law barely addresses cybersecurity, leaving countries and companies to rely on their own regulations and best practices. In reality, securing space now requires zero‑trust designs, hardened command links, continuous monitoring, and coordinated defense across governments and commercial operators, because whoever controls the software and signals in orbit controls critical power on Earth.

Here is the uncomfortable truth this creates: the line between a commercial satellite and a military one has all but disappeared. The broadband constellation that connects rural households also connects soldiers at the front. The imaging company that monitors deforestation also tracks armored columns. Private firms are now strategic actors whether they intend to be or not, and that raises questions of law, liability, and protection that no commercial contract was written to answer. It also concentrates extraordinary power in very few hands. A single company, SpaceX, already launches most of the world's payloads and operates the largest constellation ever flown; whoever controls orbital slots, spectrum, and launch capacity increasingly decides who reaches space at all. That is both a triumph and a single point of failure: the Western world's access to space now hinges on the choices of one company, and ultimately one person, which is a degree of dependence few governments would tolerate in any other piece of critical infrastructure. A domain meant to be the province of all humankind now runs on infrastructure owned by a handful of firms and the governments that license them.

Rules Written for a Different Era

So, what are the current rules and what do we do about it? The foundation of all space law is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. It was negotiated when only three nations had ever reached orbit and governments were the only actors imaginable. It is a magnificent agreement for its time as it keeps weapons of mass destruction out of orbit and declares space the province of all humankind. Yet it sets countries up with a problem: the treaty forbids any nation from claiming territory in space, while granting each nations state jurisdiction over the objects it launches. The effect is sovereignty without ownership: states and the companies they license control satellites, orbital slots, and the data they gather, even as no one is accountable for the domain itself. But it was never designed for a sky full of private mega-constellations and dual-use military assets. No binding space treaty has been adopted since 1979. The rulebook, in other words, predates the personal computer!

The gaps are now operational, not academic. The Outer Space Treaty is reinforced by four companion agreements:

  1. the Rescue Agreement, requiring states to assist astronauts in distress and return them safely
  2. the Liability Convention, which sets rules for compensation when space objects cause damage
  3. the Registration Convention, mandating that states register objects they launch; and
  4. the Moon Agreement, which restricts military activity on celestial bodies and calls for an international regime to govern future resource extraction.

Obligations to act with "due regard" for others, and fault-based liability for collisions, were never given concrete definitions, so they are almost impossible to enforce. And when something does go wrong, the harder problem is proof: with thousands of objects maneuvering through the same orbits and attacks that can be quiet and deniable, attributing a collision or a cyber-intrusion to a specific actor is often impossible, and without attribution there can be no accountability. There is no air-traffic-control system for orbit: each operator largely sets its own collision-avoidance rules, even as tens of thousands of satellites crowd the same shells of space. And there is the debris. Anti-satellite weapons tests alone have scattered thousands of trackable fragments into orbit, a large share of which are still up there, each one a bullet circling the planet at orbital velocity.

The danger is a chain reaction: a collision that creates debris, which causes further collisions, until the most valuable orbits become unusable for generations. National regulators are trying to fill the void piecemeal: the United States now requires defunct satellites to be brought down within five years, and a market for active debris removal is emerging. But orbit is a global commons. Unilateral rules cannot govern a domain where one nation's negligence threatens everyone's access, and the major space powers have shown little appetite for a new binding treaty.

And the gaps are not only physical. As orbit fills with sensors, a harder question trails the hardware: who owns what space sees? A satellite's imagery and signals are raw material for the digital economy, yet the rules for them are thin. The data may belong to the company that gathers it, fall under the jurisdiction of the launching state, or concern people and places that had no say in its capture. The United Nations' remote-sensing principles were drafted for a handful of government agencies, not a commercial market in planetary-scale intelligence. In practice, access is decided by who holds the capability and the capital, raising real questions of privacy, equity, and transparency that no current treaty answers.

Nor is the world negotiating as one. Governance itself is fracturing into rival camps. The United States anchors the Artemis Accords, a non-binding framework now signed by 68 nations, while China and Russia lead a competing bloc around their International Lunar Research Station, joined by roughly a dozen states. Beijing and Moscow have also pressed their own weapons-ban treaty at the United Nations, which Washington rejects as unverifiable. Europe, India, Japan, and a widening circle of newer spacefaring nations move between these poles. The deeper danger is not just that the rules are outdated, but that the major powers are quietly writing parallel rulebooks, none of which binds the others — and any regime that excludes China and Russia governs only the orbits that matter least.

What We Should Do

Managing this new frontier does not mean smothering it. The goal is to keep space open, profitable, and peaceful and that requires governance that moves at the speed of the industry it oversees. We suggest these six priorities to guide us.

  1. Build rules of the road for orbit. We have air-traffic control for the skies and maritime law for the seas; orbit needs the same. A civil space-traffic management system built out from the U.S. Office of Space Commerce's nascent TraCSS program and shared internationally — ideally migrating to a neutral international steward over time — should, within this decade, provide authoritative tracking data, collision warnings, and right-of-way conventions that every operator is expected to follow. The same system should also serve accountability: shared, authoritative tracking makes it possible to establish who did what in orbit, so that a collision or an act of interference can be attributed and answered for rather than denied.
  2. Update the treaty without waiting for a new one. A grand replacement for the Outer Space Treaty is politically out of reach, and far slower than events demand. Instead, adopt the model that works for climate and the oceans: a recurring "Conference of the Parties" convened under UN COPUOS to let nations agree on concrete, incremental standards — definitions of "due regard," deorbit timelines, resource-use norms — without the impossibility of formal amendment.
  3. Make debris mitigation enforceable and universal. Deorbit mandates, building on the FCC's five-year rule, design-for-disposal requirements, and a ban on debris-generating weapons tests should be the global baseline, agreed multilaterally rather than exported by one regulator or left to a patchwork of national rules. Fund and incentivize active debris removal now, while the problem is still merely expensive rather than catastrophic.
  4. Formalize the commercial-defense partnership and its limits. If private constellations are now strategic infrastructure, governments owe their operators clear rules: when commercial capacity can be commandeered, how companies are compensated and protected, and what legal status a private satellite has if it is attacked. Resilience should be bought through partnership, not improvised in a crisis.
  5. Lead through alliances, not isolation. No single nation can police orbit, and the spacefaring democracies are stronger setting standards together. Coalitions among the United States and its allies, with the Artemis Accords as the nucleus, should align licensing, data-sharing, and behavioral norms to build a critical mass of responsible actors that newcomers must either join or be measured against. But coalition-building cannot become bloc-building: the rules that matter most — debris, traffic, and no weapons of mass destruction in orbit — are worthless unless they also bind China, Russia, and their partners, which means keeping channels open through the UN even as alliances set the pace.
  6. Set common rules for space data and fair access. Alongside physical traffic, the framework should govern the information satellites collect: who owns it, how privacy and national interests are protected, and on what terms it is shared. And because slots, spectrum, and launch capacity are finite, and already allocated through bodies like the ITU, access to them should stay open enough that capability and capital alone do not decide who benefits from orbit. Access meant for all of humanity should not narrow into a preserve of the few.

Conclusion

We are living through the most consequential change in humanity's relationship with space since the first satellite crossed the sky. The frontier that nations once visited to prove a point is now where they bank, communicate, navigate, and defend themselves and, increasingly, where they may fight. The private sector has given us an extraordinary gift of capability and cost. National security has made that capability indispensable. What we lack is the governance to match.

The choice before us is not whether to embrace this new era (it is already here) but whether we will steward it wisely or let it descend into congestion, debris, and conflict. The decisions we make in the next few years will determine whether low Earth orbit remains a thriving commons or becomes a contested ruin. We built the rockets that opened this frontier. We are fully capable of writing the rules that will keep it open. We should do so now, before the window closes.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s $11 Billion Soft Power Gamble https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-11-billion-soft-power-gamble https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-11-billion-soft-power-gamble I was sitting in the front seat of a “Yandex Taxi” in Moscow in the summer of 2018, dropping off some friends after we had drinks together at a local bar. As the driver, a Russian male in his 50’s, maneuvered through traffic, he asked me if the couple were Americans? “Yes. They are Americans.” “How about you?” he asked. “I am also an American.” Hearing this, the driver continued “You know, 10 years ago I started a small company in Moscow and was doing pretty well. Business was not bad and I enjoyed being an entrepreneur. But then after 2014, when foreign sanctions were placed on Russia my business started to suffer. The Government here claims that sanctions actually ‘help’ our economy, but not in my case. Two years ago I had to shut down my business completely and now I’m driving a taxi to make money to support my wife and daughter.”

Hearing his story, I wondered if this man blamed the U.S. for the sanctions and their impact on his life. “I’m sorry to hear about your troubles” I said. The driver must have understood what I was wondering, and he responded “Don’t misunderstand me. I do not blame you or your country for my problems. I don’t blame the U.S. for the sanctions. No. I blame our “great leader”. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. He is the reason for the sanctions. He decided to invade Ukraine in 2014 and, as a result, we were hit with sanctions. And for what reason? Why? Because it would make my life better? Is my family's life better? No. Because it pleased his ego. Because he wanted to feel important and get attention. No. I don’t blame anyone but our own President and his selfish ego.”

This conversation took place during the 2018 World Cup, which was hosted by Russia. Speaking about that event, the driver continued “look around? Look how much money Putin has put into hosting the World Cup. Billions of USD. Our money. The people’s money? Building a new stadium. Re-paving roads, cleaning up cities and refurbishing airports. Teaching police officers and bus drivers how to speak some English and translating street signs and metro signs into English to accumulate the thousands of foreign tourists coming to attend the World Cup. It is all a big show for Putin. An opportunity for him to show off to the world. But will any of this benefit us, the Russian people? Will we see any return on our investment? No. I doubt it. If there is any profit from all of the tourism, it will go into the pockets of Putin and his friends. My family and I will never see any benefit from hosting the World Cup in Russia.”

Last night, watching South Korea play Mexico in the 2026 World Cup, I was reminded of that conversation. If, by any chance, the driver was wrong in 2018 and Russia saw some benefit from the influx of tourists that visited Russia in the summer of 2018, there is little chance that the benefits continued after February 2022, when Putin decided to up the ante and expand his aggression against Ukraine. That disastrous decision has not only resulted in the humiliation of the Russian Armed Forces, deaths of hundreds of thousands of Russians, crippling of the Russian economy but it also resulted in the increasing isolation of Russia. If hosting the World Cup in 2018 was meant to present Russia as a tourist destination for foreigners, how many tourists would dare visit Russia today?

According to some estimates, the Kremlin spent over 11 billion USD to prepare Russia to host the World Cup in 2018. Cities like Moscow and St Petersburg were given makeovers. Other Russian cities that hosted matches had to build new stadiums, and Moscow had to invest billions to build or modernize infrastructure. All part of a Kremlin campaign to present Russia to the world as a modern and developed country. Classic soft power strategy.

At the time, the strategy appeared to work. Hundreds of thousands of World Cup fans poured into Russia. Downtown Moscow was filled with foreign tourists. Despite the political tensions between the U.S. and Russia at the time, and the fact that the U.S. did not even qualify for the World Cup in 2018, Americans made up the largest number of foreign visitors to Russia during the World Cup. During that period, many of the visitors came away with a positive impression of Moscow. Of Russia. Of Russians. Many had a great time celebrating and partying. Russia had a great marketing opportunity to present itself to the world.

Unfortunately, my taxi driver was right. The 11 plus billion USD invested by the Kremlin in Putin’s soft power gamble was erased by Putin’s ego. His gambit to assert full control over his western neighbor in February 2022 led to a significant decline of tourism to Russia and a darkening of Russia’s image in the eyes of the world. How many tourists today would seriously consider visiting a country that is accused of committing war crimes against the Ukrainian population? A country run by an oppressive regime that regularly kills its critics and has forced millions of its own citizens to flee abroad to seek refuge. A country that itself is now being regularly targeted by increasingly effective drone strikes in response to Putin’s continued attempts to terrorize Ukraine. As World Cup fans watched Mexico and South Korea play on 18 June, how many would seriously be interested in visiting the Russian capital, which was covered in dark, black toxic fumes rising from a fire caused by a Ukrainian strike against a Russian Oil refinery in Moscow? I suspect not many.

I often think of that Russian taxi driver, who was trying to make a living after his business was forced to close because of Russia’s growing economic problems in 2018. At the time he understood that without Putin’s ego and poor decision making, there would have been no sanctions. Markets would have remained open to Russia goods and businesses. And, like many Russians I knew at the time, he did not blame Washington, Brussels or Kyiv for Russia’s economic problems. He rightly blamed Putin. And I suspect more and more Russians today feel this way – even if they are afraid to openly admit it.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
Armenia Has Voted on a Pivotal New Direction, but Moscow is Not Ready to Concede https://belimedia.com.ng/armenia-has-voted-on-a-pivotal-new-direction-but-moscow-is-not-ready-to-concede https://belimedia.com.ng/armenia-has-voted-on-a-pivotal-new-direction-but-moscow-is-not-ready-to-concede BLUF: Armenia, a small country of about 3 million people, is located at an important strategic crossroads among Europe, Russia, the Middle East and Central Asia. For centuries, this position has left the landlocked country vulnerable to foreign rule, conflict, irregular warfare tactics, and geopolitical influence. With its 7 June parliamentary election, Armenia has taken an important step in the direction of balancing its foreign policy and playing the role that its geography has positioned it for by bringing these crossroads together. The story is not over however, and Moscow will not let Armenia easily continue down this road. Moscow will continue to pressure Armenia, using all its expertise in irregular warfare, to keep Armenia in its orbit.

Moving Toward the West

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan came to power in May 2018 following a “velvet revolution” that ousted the party that had ruled pro-Moscow Armenia for nearly twenty years. The previous leadership had strong ties to the embattled Nagorno-Karabakh exclave and had made Armenia dependent on Russia for security and its economy.

In the eight years since Pashinyan came to power, he has started peace talks with Azerbaijan, moved the country closer to the West, and cut some ties to Russia. The June 7 parliamentarian election was interpreted as a positive mandate on the direction Pashinyan is taking the country. However, while he won a majority, the pro-Russia opposition held a strong minority position, ensuring that the battle for Armenia’s future was not over.

What the Election Means for a Peace Treaty with Azerbaijan

Last August, the White House brokered a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan for a ceasefire over ongoing violence in the disputed Nagorno Karabakh territory and set the conditions for the beginning of a peace treaty. As part of the deal, Azerbaijan demanded Armenia approve a new constitution that removed references to Nagorno Karabakh. Changes to the Armenian constitution require two thirds vote in the parliament. Pashinyan failed to secure a two-thirds majority, which means that he cannot change the constitution.

Official preliminary results gave Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party 64 seats in the 105-seat legislature. Two Russian-leaning opposition parties took the remaining seats, while a third appeared to have fallen narrowly short of the 5 percent barrier for entry into parliament pending a recount.

This was the first election since Armenia's military defeat to Azerbaijan in 2023 and a key part of Pashinyan's pitch was what he called "real Armenia," meaning accepting the country's current borders and improving relations with neighbors that have traditionally been hostile -- namely Azerbaijan, but also its patron, Turkey. During the last year, Pashinyan has reached out to the European Union and Turkey, along with the US, to strengthen ties and balance Armenia’s once Russia-focused foreign policy.

In May, dozens of European leaders and representatives of key EU institutions traveled to Yerevan for the first-ever meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) in the South Caucasus, as well as the very first EU-Armenia summit. This was a strong signal toward the West at a pivotal moment for Armenia.

Moscow

The gradual erosion of Russian influence in Armenia may become one of the most strategically important geopolitical shifts in Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Armenia was Moscow’s last reliable foothold in the Caucasus. If Russia continues to lose its dominant position in Yerevan, the consequences are likely to extend far beyond the Caucasus, accelerating a broader decline of Russian influence across Central Asia. Underscoring the importance of Armenia to Moscow, President Vladimir Putin threatened Armenia with a "Ukrainian scenario" if it continues building ties with the EU.

For Russia, the loss of Armenia would mean:

· Collapse of Russian strategic dominance in the South Caucasus;

· Weakened Russian military logistics and intelligence networks in the region;

· Decline of Moscow’s political authority among post-Soviet states;

· Destruction of the image of Russia as a reliable security guarantor;

· Expansion of Turkish and Western influence toward the Caspian region.

Most importantly, it would demonstrate that Moscow can no longer preserve its traditional sphere of influence. This would be a major psychological blow to Moscow who is simultaneously fighting a losing war in Ukraine and growing concerns among the population regarding the economic direction of their country.

Moscow has shown that it is prepared to fight for continued influence in Armenia. During the final stretch of the parliamentary election campaign, it launched cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. The EU sent specialists to help Armenia counter these threats.

In retaliation for Armenia’s continued outreach to the EU, Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance banned imports of potatoes, eggplants, fruits — apples, pears, and quince — and dried fruit from Armenia, effective June 3, 2026.

Russia also barred the transit of those agricultural products through its territory to other Eurasian Economic Union member states, citing “the absence of mechanisms to confirm that quarantine-controlled goods have reached those countries.”

The restrictions carry no end date — they will remain in force “until a corresponding procedure is developed to ensure the safety of shipped goods.” More recently, Moscow has banned the import of Armenian fish.

Moscow also has recalled its Ambassador to Armenia for consultations because of the steps taken by the Armenian leadership on a rapprochement with the European Union. The Russian Foreign Ministry said that these steps undermined cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is a single market which, besides Armenia, is also made up of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Moscow has previously stressed that Armenia cannot be a member of both the EU and the EEU.

US Focus

The US is pulling out all the stops to support Armenia. Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in Yerevan the week prior to the parliamentary election in a show of support for Pashinyan and his government. President Trump publicly endorsed Pashinyan and his party.

The Trump administration has been working closely with Pashinyan on a road-and-rail corridor initiative called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which would run through Armenia and connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. Rubio said he took another step in the TRIPP project with the Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan.

"This agreement marks the biggest step to date on making this historic route a reality, on advancing peace and on increasing prosperity in Armenia and frankly in the region," Rubio said at a signing ceremony at Yerevan airport.

Multi-track Foreign Policy

Pashinyan’s focus on diversifying Armenia’s foreign policy makes sense given Armenia’s geo-location. This way forward gives Armenia the possibility of increased status in global trade and potentially in global strategy. Russia will surely attempt to derail Pashinyan and the US’s plans. The question is whether the West will allow Russia to be successful.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
An Intelligence Veteran Reflects on the Impact of Normandy https://belimedia.com.ng/an-intelligence-veteran-reflects-on-the-impact-of-normandy https://belimedia.com.ng/an-intelligence-veteran-reflects-on-the-impact-of-normandy I recently returned from commemorating the 82nd Anniversary of D-Day in Normandy—a much anticipated trip since I participated in the 80th Anniversary. I left with a sense of humility and gratitude for having walked the hallowed grounds of Normandy, and with admiration for the Greatest Generation and their sacrifices and actions that changed human history. The connection with Americans, grateful Normans, Europeans who still remember all too well the war, and participants from all over the world who were all there to mark this historic event was remarkable.

Normandy is a place for deep connections. I stood in the door of a vintage C-47 flying low over La Fière Drop Zone listening to the engines roar. Eighty-two years earlier, young paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne jumped into the darkness, many landing in flooded fields or directly into the path of German fire. In the clear light of that June morning in 2026, the hedgerows and pastures looked deceptively serene. What did those young paratroopers see and feel as they jumped into the unknown?

I had the chance to revisit Omaha Beach. The sounds of the waves on that rocky beach can be surreal, an echo of history. If you’ve been there, you remember it. I wondered whether those waves sounded exactly the same on June 6, 1944 as young soldiers and sailors endured withering fire from German positions and refused to be turned back—their sacrifice and refusal to fail now legendary.

In the square of Sainte-Mère-Église, the energetic heart of every Normandy commemoration, I looked up at the church steeple where a mannequin still marks the spot where John Steele hung entangled 82 years ago prior to being captured by the Germans. I imagined the dark sky filled with silk canopies and German ground fire as American paratroopers fought to secure the first town liberated in Normandy and as long-suffering and hopeful Normans awaited the outcome.

Those images are powerful. Normandy is a place that both haunts and inspires, and it invites reflection. It is a powerful reminder of the immeasurable human suffering caused by tyrants and extraordinary cost of freedom. It is hard to visit without connecting with that past; the courage and resilience of the occupied and oppressed, and the audacity and selfless sacrifice of the liberators.

There are so many other images there that make those connections—the American Cemetery with endless rows of white crosses, Pointe du Hoc rugged cliffs and Ranger Monument, Pegasus Bridge, the La Fière causeway and bridge, and many others. Given the scale of D-Day, almost every town, village, beach, road, and bridge witnessed thousands of human stories that shaped the outcome—some well-known, many now faded into history.

The memories and lessons of Normandy transcend time. The threats confronting America today are different from those of 1944, but several enduring lessons remain relevant.

American Leadership Matters

There are things that only America can do, alliances that only America can lead, and geopolitical outcomes that only America can achieve. Eighty-two years ago, the world faced a dangerous shift in the global order. American leadership in WWII was decisive—not only in securing military victory, but in establishing a new world order that has endured for 82 years.

No other country then or now could have led such a global effort, and it cemented America’s emergence as a superpower. Threats in Europe and the Pacific have new faces, but American leadership is as vital today as it was then. Like the authoritarians of that era, Russia and China are actively working to reshape the current world order to their advantage. Both are moving to fill perceived vacuums created by shifts in America’s global posture. Only America can lead the effort to deter them.

If the current world order is to survive and prosper, American leadership on the global stage remains essential.

Alliances Win

America’s leadership role in WWII was crucial, but so were the contributions of its allies and partners. British and Canadian forces played vital roles in D-Day. The French Resistance fought bravely and enabled the work of the American OSS and British SOE. The Soviet Union—then an ally of necessity, now an adversary—played a key role in defeating Nazi forces on the Eastern Front, while other nations—including Poland, Norway, Belgium, and France—made meaningful contributions.

The Allies clearly needed America to enter the war in Europe, but America clearly needed a strong alliance to ensure victory. Global competition has changed—our adversaries are fighting a different war—but reliable partners are still important. Today, alliances are less about planning invasions and more about deterring authoritarian aggression, and building a competitive edge across military, economic, technological, information, and cognitive domains.

America needs its partners. In return, those partners look for a strong and trusted America. Filling that role must remain a national priority.

America’s Story and a National Purpose

Great nations need more than military power to prevail; they also require a compelling national purpose. WWII roused America from its isolationist slumber. The brutal occupation and oppression across Europe, combined with the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, shattered America’s belief that it could keep major wars at a distance. Powerful themes emerged that were necessary to mobilize an entire nation: “Arsenal of Democracy”, “Four Freedoms”, and the call to defeat fascism.

These ideas fueled a national call to arms, unprecedented mobilization, and prepared America for rationing at home, mass deployments overseas, and the loss of so many Americans who would not return home. America had a compelling national purpose, and it communicated that purpose through a powerful national narrative—we might call that narrative America’s Story. That story included ideals of freedom, democracy, collective security, and the promise of a better postwar order that enabled America to forge and unite an alliance that had previously faltered. That same narrative power remains essential today.

Our adversaries, who seek to reshape the world order, understand the power of America’s story and are working to tell their version of it to their advantage. A persuasive, authentic national narrative—America’s Story—is a national imperative.

Warfare Remains a Human Endeavor

D-Day was a remarkable display of technological innovation. Some technologies were used for the very first time or the first time under such extreme combat conditions. Notable successes, such as the Mulberry Artificial Harbors, the PLUTO undersea fuel pipeline, and improved electronic capabilities that enabled unprecedented coordination of Allied air power played key roles.

Even the highly successful deception operation, Operation Fortitude, relied on technological advancements in jamming and radar deception. In contrast, swimming tanks, gliders, and pathfinder equipment—also rushed into service to achieve surprise and an early advantage—did not meet full operational expectations.

Ultimately, capitalizing on technological advances and compensating for technology failures required human innovation and decisions at the speed of war. In the end, the human dimensions of D-Day—judgment, decision-making in the face of uncertainty, problem solving, detecting and countering deception, courage, and resilience—played a greater role than technology in winning the day and securing victory in Europe.

This is still true today even as AI, robotics, cyber, cognitive tools, and other technologies accelerate the evolution of warfare. A risk is that humans cede decision-making to technology in exchange for greater speed and precision at the expense of judgment, leadership, ingenuity, and moral responsibility. Walking Normandy and seeing the impacts of these human dimensions remind us that while technology, geopolitics, and adversaries change, the human qualities that ultimately shape history do not.

It is these human qualities—not technology itself—that remain America's enduring strategic advantage.

My sincerest thanks to Liberty Jump Team, Corsicana Texas, for an exceptional visit to Normandy for the 82nd Anniversary of D-Day. I’m definitely looking forward to the 83rd.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
How to Get the Venezuela Response Right https://belimedia.com.ng/how-to-get-the-venezuela-response-right https://belimedia.com.ng/how-to-get-the-venezuela-response-right When the two earthquakes struck Venezuela last week, killing more than 1,400 people and leaving tens of thousands missing, there was a silent pause in Washington with everyone wondering: with no USAID, how will the U.S. respond to this disaster?

Following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, USAID surged resources, with urban search-and-rescue teams wheels-up within hours. Naval vessels steamed to Haiti’s capital. President Obama placed USAID as the lead agency. The machinery of American humanitarian response was moving. The Trump Administration has now responded: multiple USAR teams from Fairfax County, Los Angeles, and Miami-Dade are on the ground, the State Department has pledged $300 million in assistance, with more promised, and the Department “of War” is providing C-17 airlift and Marine Osprey support. This is deja vu all over again.

Now the question is whether we have learned anything since Haiti.

I've seen this machinery up close. I coordinated the U.S. response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake from Washington — the then largest American humanitarian mobilization in a single country. We had genuine resources, genuine commitment, and genuine failures. Fifteen years later, as Venezuela's crisis unfolds, the lessons we learned are likely to be repeated again.

The most effective humanitarian tool is also the least glamorous: cash. It lets organizations buy exactly what is needed immediately, spurs local markets rather than undercutting them, and reaches beneficiaries faster. The new Trump Administration partnership with Walmart and Global Empowerment Mission to collect in-kind donations — clothing, toys, household goods - will be a time-consuming logistical mess.

We saw NGOs with more experience than GEM make the same mistake in Haiti. Those items filled valuable warehouse space while people went without shelter; sorting and distribution consumed staff time and resources. In Venezuela, that same supply chain runs directly into CLAP — the Bolivarian food distribution network that conditions assistance on political loyalty. Cash allows organizations and individuals to purchase locally what they need, building up the local markets.

The U.S. military performed heroic and essential functions in the early days of the Haiti response. But it performed them at defense-budget rates, and they continued humanitarian tasks long past the point where cheaper civilian alternatives were available. The USS Comfort hospital ship sat in Port-au-Prince harbor for months at approximately $1 million per day — with no patients on board. The full cost of the military response was obscured across multiple budget authorities, making honest accounting impossible. In addition, with 23,000 personnel on the ground, it made coordination impossible across all the other actors on the ground.

USAID formally recommended transitioning military operations out after 8 weeks. Political leadership pushed back, and the military footprint persisted until summer, costing more money and crowding out the civilian and longer-term programming that should have taken its place.

Within days, USAID surged experienced officers to Haiti with decades of technical expertise in civilian response to humanitarian crisis, honed after the Asian tsunami, the Pakistan earthquakes, and other relief efforts. Without USAID’s experienced coordination and personnel, the default to military logistics in Venezuela will be even stronger. And with Venezuela's acute sovereignty sensitivities — a country where 25 years of Bolivarian politics have institutionalized resistance to U.S. military presence as a founding national narrative — a visible American military footprint isn't just expensive, it is politically combustible. The Delcy Rodriquez government is already unpopular, and such a presence could further delegitimize the very transitional government it is meant to bolster.

The Trump Administration has starved the UN of resources, and ironically is now relying almost entirely on the UN for relief efforts in Venezuela. Of the U.S.’s $300 million commitment, $200 million flows directly through OCHA’s Venezuela pooled fund — an institution the Administration has simultaneously been defunding.

In Haiti, within weeks of the earthquake, political pressure prioritized permanent housing construction over temporary shelter. The reasoning was politically driven — the donor community wanted houses built. There was a concern that anything less than permanent wasn’t good enough. The consequence was catastrophic - hundreds of thousands of displaced Haitians remained in tent cities for years, because the "permanent" programs moved slowly through land disputes and contractor delays while the temporary shelter that could have housed them in months went underfunded.

The simple missing answer we neglected was to surge supplies – plywood, lumber, cinderblock corrugated metals, plastic sheeting – to affected areas and provide support to local entities who could rebuild structures to last two to three years. Supplies should be purchased on the local market to further spur the local markets.

The failure to prioritize the removal of rubble was a strategic miscalculation. The Haiti earthquake generated an estimated 10 million cubic meters of debris. Rather than treating its removal as a strategic prerequisite — clear the roads, open the sites, enable everything else — it was treated as a logistics afterthought. No single agency owned it. Only one disposal site was identified, requiring trucking rubble through the broken downtown on narrow urban roads. Dump trucks spent 8-10 hours on each load of rubble. The bottleneck cascaded across the entire response for years.

Venezuela's cities, particularly Caracas and the coastal communities near the epicenter, face similar dynamics. The pressure to show reconstruction will arrive before the rubble is cleared. The pressure to build permanent housing will arrive before anyone has mapped who owns the land — a question made vastly more complicated by 25 years of Chavista-era property redistributions. Permanent housing takes years to complete even when the land is easily available; people will need shelter good enough to live in while a permanent solution is created.

Corruption is a cancer that will bring down governments and create long-term instability (just look at Haiti), and establishing mechanisms at the outset is a core design requirement for any response. Corruption in Venezuela is categorically harder. The Bolivarian state has spent 25 years building sophisticated infrastructure for capturing and redirecting resource flows. The CLAP food distribution system — the government's commodity network — is a documented political control tool, conditioning food on political loyalty.

The same sanctions-evasion architecture that moves Venezuelan oil revenue through front companies and cryptocurrency channels is fully available to divert humanitarian cash.A response that doesn't build independent financial oversight, beneficiary verification, and distribution channels explicitly designed to bypass state capture mechanisms before the first dollar is obligated will hemorrhage resources.

The window to get the architecture right is now. That is the lesson Haiti burned into everyone who was there: the cameras arrive before the coordination does, and decisions made in the first two weeks shape outcomes for the next ten years.

Venezuela is not Haiti. It is more complex and more fraught diplomatically — and this time, the agency built to apply these lessons no longer exists to apply them. Haiti was not a failure; lives were saved, a devastated capital came back to life, and a generation of practitioners learned hard truths about sequencing, cost, and corruption. The risk now is that we forget it and make the same mistakes again, because the institution that absorbed those lessons is gone, and no one has rebuilt the muscle memory to apply them.

The people of Venezuela deserve the benefit of what we learned in Haiti, not a response built from scratch. So does American credibility.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
What's at Stake as NATO Meets in Ankara https://belimedia.com.ng/whats-at-stake-as-nato-meets-in-ankara https://belimedia.com.ng/whats-at-stake-as-nato-meets-in-ankara

As NATO leaders gather in Ankara this week, the alliance faces a myriad of security challenges unlike anything it has confronted in decades.

With Russia's war against Ukraine raging on and instability in the Middle East following the conflict with Iran, President Donald Trump continues to press European allies to take on more of the burden for their defense. This all comes to a head in Ankara, where Turkey finds itself at the center of the alliance's most pressing strategic concerns. Taken together, the issues confronting leaders at this week's summit extend well beyond the traditional debates over defense spending.

"This is a great opportunity for Türkiye," retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe, told The Cipher Brief. "Finally many Allies will have the opportunity to better appreciate the strategically vital role that Turkey plays for NATO due to its geography as well as its defense industry and military capabilities." The changing perception of Turkey's role in the alliance represents quite a shift.

Only a few years ago, Turkey's relationships with many NATO countries were strained over its purchase of Russia's S-400 air defense system and disagreements over admitting new countries into the alliance shortly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022. Today, NATO looks to expand defense production and strengthen its southern flank.

Russia's war continues to shape NATO's priorities

The urgency surrounding Russia is likely to dominate the conversation in Ankara.

Another deadly wave of Russian missiles and drones struck Kyiv just hours before the summit, killing 21 people and injuring at least 77 more. President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to seek additional Western air defense systems, particularly U.S.-made Patriot interceptors, during meetings with allied leaders. Beyond Ukraine itself, many in the alliance predict that Moscow will continue testing NATO's resolve across Europe.

"There is a recognition, regardless of what President Trump says when he speaks tomorrow, that this meeting has to set major new directions for cooperation between NATO allies," former senior British diplomat Nick Fishwick, who is attending meetings in Ankara surrounding the summit, told The Cipher Brief.

"Most people recognise that the days when European allies could freeload on massive U.S. security support have come to an end," Fishwick said. "European allies are now committed to spending two or three times the amount of GDP devoted to defence in 2015."

European governments are increasingly acknowledging that spending more money is only half of the equation, while rebuilding defense industries and coordinating military planning across the alliance have become equally urgent priorities.

"We Europeans have to find ways of cooperating, sharing and communicating in an age of hybrid warfare and AI-enabled cyber attacks," Fishwick said.

Beyond defense spending

President Trump is expected to arrive in Ankara seeking commitments from allies to meet NATO's new defense investment targets.

Retired Adm. James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, believes the summit's greatest achievement may be just preserving the alliance's unity.

"The most important thing is simply that there are no huge blowups," Stavridis told The Cipher Brief. "Worrisome issues include fundamental disagreements about operations in Iran; the pace of European defense spending; support to Ukraine, both diplomatic and military; and the lingering negative effects of the U.S. moves on Greenland."

One area where Stavridis sees potential progress is maritime security, particularly after recent instability in the Middle East. He said President Trump would likely welcome a European commitment to participate in operations protecting commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

Stavridis also said allies should move past broad spending pledges and begin outlining specific plans for expanding Europe's defense industrial base. Just as important, he said, should be addressing threats that increasingly blur the line between peace and war, or as we like to call it, the "Gray Zone".

"A robust discussion about how to counter increasing levels of hybrid and grey zone activity specifically including anti-drone cooperation would be meaningful," Stavridis said. "I would also hope to see some discussion of the role of the alliance in cyber security because the likelihood of Russian hybrid operations in that zone is significant and rising."

For Hodges, success in Ankara should be measured by whether the alliance shows that its members remain aligned on the issues that matter most to their collective security.

"A strong endorsement of Ukraine and the strategic importance for all NATO Members that Ukraine is successful in its war with Russia, with commitments of resources and capabilities from everyone, including the USA, to Ukraine," remains essential, Hodges said.

Whether leaders can deliver that message, and Trump's often unpredictable approach to NATO, will cement how this summit is remembered.

The gathering in Ankara is unlikely to produce any severe dramatic breakthrough. But at a time when Europe faces its most serious security environment in a generation, maybe it's enough for the alliance to demonstrate that it is capable of remaining united.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
Colombia’s Election Exposes a Country Still Split https://belimedia.com.ng/colombias-election-exposes-a-country-still-split https://belimedia.com.ng/colombias-election-exposes-a-country-still-split Colombia stands at a crossroads because of the narrow victory of right‑wing outsider Abelardo de la Espriella over leftist Senator Iván Cepeda. On August 7, 2026, Colombia will close the country’s first experiment with a left‑wing presidency while leaving its worsening social, economic, and security dilemmas unresolved. The choice between these competing projects forced Colombians to decide whether they would prioritize a hardline stance towards security and a more economic market orthodoxy or continue a contested path of socialist structural reforms and unsuccessful efforts for a negotiated peace with insurgent groups and criminal Cartels.

From Petro’s Experiment to Right-Wing Resurgence

Gustavo Petro’s government marked a historic break: he was Colombia’s first left‑wing president, elected on promises of social reform, environmental transition, and a reorientation of the peace process with armed groups. His administration became a referendum on whether Colombia could simultaneously confront inequality, rural marginalization, and entrenched violence through progressive policies rather than traditional security and economic policies. De la Espriella’s win, backed openly by U.S. President Donald Trump, signals a swing back toward the right after this four‑year experiment with very mixed results at best. Yet the victory margin—about 49.7 percent to 48.7 percent—shows a country almost evenly split, ensuring that any agenda he pursues will confront a mobilized opposition and a society that has not reached consensus on its model of development and governance.

Security vs. Peace Process

The election exposed starkly different visions for dealing with Colombia’s enduring conflict a decade after the FARC peace accord. Cepeda campaigned on deepening Petro’s approach of his “Plan Paz Total” (Total Peace Plan) which depended on negotiations with leftist insurgent groups and narcotics cartels to roll back the increasing violence in the country. Also included were social and economic reforms aimed at what Petro described as the root cause of the violence. However, during Petro’s four year administration, violence returned to highs not seen in decades, coca cultivation increased to record levels and the economy muddled along without showing any dramatic gains. By contrast, De la Espriella positioned himself as a tough‑on‑crime outsider promising order, harsher measures against criminal groups, and a rollback of what the right portrays as excessive concessions to insurgents and criminal organizations. This clash between “peace through reform and dialogue” and “peace through strength and crackdowns” left the country at an inflection point: continue a fragile peace architecture which saw the insurgent groups and cartels regain strength and control over vast swaths of the country, or re‑embracing strict security measures which in the past proved successful but led to uncertain consequences and human rights abuses.


Economic and Social Policy Choices

Petro’s camp argued that Colombia needed redistributive policies, stronger social protection, and state‑led reforms to break cycles of poverty that feed violence and migration. Critics accused his government of scaring investors, mishandling fiscal policy, and failing to deliver visible improvements, especially amid inflation and uneven growth. De la Espriella’s coalition now promises a more orthodox pro‑market line—greater emphasis on private investment, energy sector continuity, and deregulation—combined with promises to defend “the people” from crime and chaos. The crossroads lies in whether Colombia can craft an economic model that restores business confidence and restores security while still addressing the structural inequalities and social demands that gave Petro and Cepeda their base in the first place.

Why This Moment Matters

De la Espriella’s government inherits a society that has tasted left‑wing rule, remains deeply divided, and is wrestling with increased violence and insecurity, inequality, and institutional mistrust. De La Espriella, who takes office on August 7,2026, will be challenged to fulfill his campaign promises. The March 8, 2026 elections left the Colombian congress splintered among various parties with no party or coalition taking control. Just as the congress proved to be Petro’s main obstacle to many of his social and economic reforms, De La Espriella will be faced with this same problem as his party gained very few seats during the elections and he will be forced to work with several political parties in order to pass his legislative agenda.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
Gen. Dunford: Military Leaders Must Advise, Not Advocate https://belimedia.com.ng/gen-dunford-military-leaders-must-advise-not-advocate https://belimedia.com.ng/gen-dunford-military-leaders-must-advise-not-advocate “We [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] often times in the national security decision-making process or White House meetings -- outside of the Pentagon process -- will go back and forth between military issues and political issues. And I think it's incumbent upon us to kind of stay in, you know, what the current [Joint Chiefs] Chairman [Air Force Gen. Dan] Caine describes as ‘the midfield’ in that regard. So we have to be aware of the political environment within which we're operating, but we have to be nonpartisan. And as long as we stick to addressing the military dimension of the problem, and not fall to the temptation to start participating and waxing eloquently about issues that are not in our purview, I think we can maintain that character.”

That was ret.-Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, former-Joint Chiefs Chairman during the second Obama and first Trump administrations, speaking last Tuesday on a panel entitled Inside the Pentagon: The Chairman, Congress & Combatant Commands, as part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) 2026 Global Security Forum.

Also on the panel were ret.-Navy Adm. John Aqualino, former-Commander of Indo-Pacific Command and former-Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), a one-time Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

The panel’s hour-long discussion covered a variety of current issues and also at times provided a behind-the-scenes look at past Pentagon leaders’ thinking.

For example, Dunford said at one point, “I can't think of a time when I was participating in the National Security Council where I was dealing with a military problem. We were dealing with strategic problems that had a military dimension. And that's really important because in that capacity, you are providing advice about the military dimension and how the military dimension can best support the political objective that's been articulated by the President.”

Dunford further explained, “It's not the [Joint Chief] Chairman's role to go to the National Security Council and advocate for a particular policy that involves much more than just the military dimension. It's the Chairman's role to represent the other Joint Chiefs and provide military advice, again in a way that's integrated with all the other elements of national power to accomplish a particular objective.” And he repeated, “I think it's really important both in public and private that we be seen as advisors and not advocates.”

In Dunford’s view, discussions at the National Security Council “ought to remain private and most often they're very highly classified.” He added, “Even today, I don't feel at liberty to discuss what went on inside the National Security Council or what I specifically recommended.”

I quote these Dunford views because these days, for example. many Trump critics who disagree with the President’s decision last February to attack Iran, have wondered why no top military commander has yet to publicly voice opposition to that decision.

As Dunford explained his view, “Number one, it's the elected official who gets to decide. And number two, the best military option, in other words, the option that I might have offered that would provide the best military outcome may in fact not be the best option for the President when he looks at it from a broader strategic perspective."

He went on that his military option “may or may not be in a broader strategic context when you take into account our diplomatic, our economic interests and the other competing demands that the President may have at a given time strategically, whether they be in the security realm or elsewhere”

Dunford continued: “As I used to say, the President looks through this with a much bigger soda straw than those of us in uniform. And we need to be attentive to that in the public space and not put pressure on the Executive Branch to make a decision one way or another because of what military advice may be out there in the public domain.”

However, when Dunford went to see a Chairman of the House or Senate Armed Services Committee, he said, “Obviously you know the Legislative Branch of our government has a need to be informed about these issues and so the way I would approach it is less would I address specifically the advice I gave to the President, or again advocate a specific military option to be adopted. More often than not, what I would try to do is highlight the interdependent variables that went into the recommendation; talk about the risks; perhaps walk through each of the options that might be available from military perspective and the pros and cons of each, but then not be in a position publicly to say it should be this option or that option.”

As a former Committee Chairman, Thornberry said, “One branch [the Legislative] is responsible for raising and supporting; providing and maintaining; approving all the money, declaring war; and the other branch [the Executive] for the operations of the military. So we divide the authority. We have civilian control of the military, which is an important principle, but we make sure that it's a professional [military], nonpartisan, not taking sides.”

Thornberry also said, “It's important for Congress to hear from that professional military and to hear directly. Now, sometimes that'll need to be behind closed doors in classified sessions and some you can get franker that way, but it's not just Congress hearing. It's the American people hearing from the chairman or the combatant commanders or whoever.”

When it comes to congressional hearings, Adm. Aqualino spoke of a suggestion he had made that’s worth repeating.

He said, “I made a request of the chairman [of the Armed Services Committee] on the House side and the Senate side that said, ‘Hey, let's have a classified session first. Let me answer everything that I can in the classified space that will give you the understanding and oh, by the way, I think it'll help shape your questions for the public side.’ That ended up being very, very, I think effective both for Congress and certainly for me because it really made sure they understood where we were, why we were doing what we were doing and how it was going to deliver. And again, I thank all of the members of Congress for accepting that position because I found it very helpful.”

Actually, however, most closed-session hearings of those Armed Services Committees are still held after the public ones, although Aqualino’s approach is much more rational.

Dunford talked about how warfare has been changing.

“If you think about conflict,” he said, “this go back to the 1990s, you could assume that a conflict would be isolated to particular geographic area. It didn't involve largely sea, air, and space, and the homeland was protected. We didn't have the homeland issues…So, when you think about managing risk, you could manage risk within a specific geographic area. As the character of war began to change, threats to the homeland increased. We're now operating in sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace. We know now that there's no conflict that can be isolated to a specific geographic area.”

These days, Dunford said, “We can see the conflict in Iran and Ukraine and the global implications of those two conflicts. There needed to be somebody that could help the Secretary of Defense think about risk across all geographic combatant commands and in all of those domains and in the context of broader strategic issues like service readiness and being prepared for the conflict or crisis that that was going to come even as we were dealing with one that may be ongoing.”

Planning has also changed.

“When it came to planning,” Dunford said, “we used to have single numbered plans. You'd be familiar with those, where plans were focused on the Korea plan or the Iran plan. Well, there's again if you agree with me that there's no conflict [now] that doesn't have broad global implications. Planning needs to be done, not in a geographic combatant commander’s region, it needs to be done globally. Certainly informed by the supported combatant commander if it's a Indo-Pacom (India-Pacific) or not Pacom (Pacific) commander perspective. But while he's fighting the fight against China, there are certainly things happening globally that are going to require the prioritization and allocation of resources again back to foundationally defense of the homeland.”

Adm. Aqualino’s views of the Joint Chiefs system are worth repeating.

“When you talk about the [military] service chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs,” he said, “that is an incredible thoughtful bunch to help the Chairman shape best military advice to remove blind spots that may be missing, and to get an incredibly broad perspective. So he [also] gets it from the Combatant Commander operational required to provide options through the lens of a single theater.”

Aqualino added, “Then the Joint Chiefs are able to put a layer on top of that and say, ‘Hey, more broadly, here's what I think it looks like globally. Here's what it looks like through the [separate military] service lens.’ And all that information informed the chairman to ultimately take the best option to the President. And then whenever I brief the [Service] Secretary, the [Joint Chiefs] Chairman was sitting in the room and sometimes we agreed, sometimes we disagreed…My advice was taken sometimes, and other times I got thanked for my interest in national defense. That's just the way it works.”

Looking back, Aqualino said, “I do think it has worked pretty well to have the [Joint Chiefs] Chairman speak for the whole military and yet not be directly in the chain-of-command. So far it has given him an objectivity where he didn't have to necessarily defend a decision, because they are political decisions, but he [the Chairman] can look at that broader picture about the state of our military, about the threats that we face, and I think those discussions for Congress to understand have been really important.”

One other point came up from former-Congressman Thornberry that also needs to be recorded, because neither Dunford nor Aqualino mentioned it.

“I got to say I think today there's a strain on between civil military relations,” Thornberry said, adding, “Part of the professionalism of the military is that it's a meritocracy. It's based on who does their job well, who can excel. And there have been some universally respected officers who've been fired recently with no explanation. And I think that leads to questions about what's really going on here. Is it still a meritocracy?”

At another point Thornberry said, “We were concerned…about using the military for law enforcement responsibilities, especially on the border during my time and now it's more broadly. I think that creates tensions, too. And so maybe this 250th anniversary is a good time for us to kind of remember, okay, what are the protections in our Constitution and in our system? And do we need to remember and maybe refresh some of them to make sure that the military continues the sort of respect that it has.”

With that background, I want to close with something Dunford pointed out early in his remarks that I think is worth consideration.

“Through most my career,” Dunford said, “polling said that about 80% of the American people had confidence in the U.S. military -- and that's 62% plus or minus today. Just in 2016 and 2017, Republicans had an over 90% favorability rating of the U.S. military. It's now somewhere in the 60s, overall about 62 percent. So we can put aside what our own personal judgments are. The data would tell us that there is a decline in the confidence U.S. military which reflects challenging times overall. We live in an incredibly hyper-partisan environment…[and] there is in many corners a declining trust in institutions broadly and one of those institutions has been the U.S. military. I think we can't be complacent about that.”

Dunford went on, “Why is it important: Number one, for recruiting and retention. The American people need to see the U.S. military as their military. It can't be partisan. Number two, when we're sending men and women in this harm's way, they have to have the support of the American people. And it can't be seen as a Republican or a Democrat decision to send people to war. These are Americans that got to be supported by the American people at home.”

We all should agree with that.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
Endless Warfare – Part II: Countering Endless Warfare and its Networks https://belimedia.com.ng/endless-warfare-part-ii-countering-endless-warfare-and-its-networks https://belimedia.com.ng/endless-warfare-part-ii-countering-endless-warfare-and-its-networks

Author’s Note: This article is not about ‘endless wars’ as a critique of U.S. military interventions — that debate belongs elsewhere. It examines a distinct and increasingly visible pattern: how U.S. adversaries wage continuous, long-term conflict against the United States across peace and war, both below and above the threshold of open conflict. The aim is to clarify the nature of the competition we are already in.

Countering Endless Warfare and its Networks

The United States is not at peace. As I argued in Part I, the United States is already in a continuous, long-term conflict with determined adversaries who are waging warfare without crossing the threshold into open conflict. Endless Warfare is a framework for understanding how those adversaries pursue an enduring approach to erode and supplant U.S. power, influence, and global leadership over time.

Endless Warfare is not simply another label for the gray zone or cognitive warfare. Both are important elements and merit their own approaches, but Endless Warfare describes the adversary’s persistent, long-term strategy, not just the elements that enable it.

Given this operating environment, this is about far more than terminology. It is about how we understand conflict, how we achieve deterrence, how we protect decision autonomy, how we retain leverage, and, most importantly, how we disrupt the networks that fuel Endless Warfare.

What are the essential next steps?

Endless Warfare Requires a Different Strategic Mindset

Militaries are often criticized for planning to fight the last war. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was undermined by Russia’s underestimation of how much warfare had evolved since Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. The United States potentially faces that same risk today. It is important that we are prepared to fight and win the next conventional war, but there are risks in a focus on only that strategy. We must also prepare to fight and win—with the appropriate instruments of national power—the Endless Warfare being waged on the United States by its adversaries; warfare that incorporates gray zone activity, cognitive warfare, weaponized negotiations, proxies and surrogates, and other subversive networks.

This change in strategic mindset is not because of a lack of capability. The United States has considerable experience, resources, and capabilities in this space. Endless Warfare is conceptually different from conventional war—particularly given the ambiguous nature of gray-zone activity and cognitive warfare—and therefore demands a different approach.

Yet because it is a continuous state of conflict, it also requires the same level of national leadership and vision, organization, critical thinking, sense of urgency, and collaboration with allies that we apply to conventional conflict. This is achievable but will take some effort. It may require a senior White House official, such as a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Competition, to integrate interagency action and coordinate a sustained national response to this threat.

That Deputy National Security Advisor would not replace existing responsibilities of Departments and Agencies. The role would be to ensure that strategic deterrence in the gray zone, cognitive advantage, conflict negotiations when adversaries seek to extend rather than resolve conflict, and network disruptions are integrated into a coherent and sustained national response to the threat of Endless Warfare against the United States.

Strategic Deterrence in the Gray Zone

Strategic deterrence is one component of a broader approach to countering Endless Warfare. Gray zone activity is a powerful enabler of Endless Warfare because it gives our adversaries a space to undermine the United States while avoiding armed conflict.

Our adversaries have calculated that there are more gains than risks in the gray zone and that any risks they do face are acceptable. Actions that seek to counter or defend against gray zone activity but that do not impose meaningful costs or create credible deterrence may simply reward gray zone activity.

An effective strategy for achieving strategic deterrence in the gray zone rests on deliberate preparation, clear communication, a national approach, and the resolve to change the risk calculus of our adversaries.

Deliberate preparation means collecting and analyzing information on adversary gray zone trends, capabilities, and intent before they act; routinely coordinating at the national level so roles, responsibilities, and decision paths are clear; and reorienting institutions and the interagency to maintain effective balanced capability in both conventional and gray domains.

We also must communicate clearly domestically, to our allies, and particularly to our adversaries. A simple but clear message for our adversaries: “We will see what you’re doing, we will publicly attribute it to you, and we will impose costs that exceed your gains.”

This message is credible only if it is backed by action over time. The United States must convincingly demonstrate its resolve to proactively and persistently employ national capabilities to change the risk calculus and behavior of our adversaries.

This range of national capabilities includes coordinated diplomatic and allied action, economic sanctions and restrictions, cyber operations, legal and financial disruption, public attribution, denying access to critical technologies, cognitive measures, military posture and partner capability-building and—when necessary—kinetic responses. Recent examples illustrate that imposing costs is possible.

In 2021, the United States publicly attributed the SolarWinds supply-chain compromise to Russia, expelled Russian Intelligence Officers, and imposed broad financial penalties under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

In early 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Company and associated individuals for their role in Salt Typhoon for attacks on network infrastructure of multiple major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers.

These were hard-earned wins for U.S. Departments and Agencies involved, but Russia and China appear to have absorbed the costs and continued their operations. Achieving strategic deterrence means that actions like these must become the norm, not the exception.

The goal of strategic deterrence in the gray zone is to shape adversary decision-making before action is taken. It means proactively shaping the environment so adversaries hesitate before they act—a critical step in disrupting the cycle of Endless Warfare.

Gaining a Cognitive Advantage

Countering the impacts of cognitive warfare is essential to countering Endless Warfare. My colleague, Austin Branch, and I argued in The Cipher Brief that it was possible—and necessary—for the U.S. to seize a 21st-century cognitive advantage.

That argument is even more urgent today given the central role of cognitive warfare in our adversaries’ strategies of Endless Warfare. Cognitive Security, at its core, is the protection of human cognition and decision autonomy—our individual and collective ability to accurately perceive global events, to trust the knowledge we have and the information we receive, and to make confident, independent decisions free from external manipulation, influence, or coercion.

Cognitive Security is also about offense—outthinking, outpacing, and outmaneuvering our adversaries in the cognitive domain.

Our adversaries should understand that their leaders, institutions, networks, proxies—and decision-making—are vulnerable to cognitive pressure and influence. The goal is to force them—not the United States—to confront the uncertainties and risks of cognitive warfare and to weaken their ability to wage Endless Warfare.

There are some positive steps at the national level.

We now have a first-ever NSC Cognitive Advantage Director, and the FY26 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense to formally define cognitive warfare for the Department. The Department’s Strategic Capabilities Office recently launched a Cognitive Warfare Project to advance the military’s cognitive warfare capabilities. There is clearly opportunity here.

Yet, these early steps remain fragmented. In contrast, China’s United Front Work Department, Russia’s Active Measures networks, and Iran’s diverse network of surrogates reflect centralized national direction and a long-term horizon as elements of a national strategy.

In this vital process, America’s approach has to be equally well-coordinated and strategic. It is essential that these new efforts avoid bureaucratic hurdles, over-prescription that may stifle innovation, and creating silos. Our adversaries will not wait for us to catch up.

Our national narrative—America’s Story—also plays an important role. As Branch and I argued in the Cipher Brief, our national narrative is both sword and shield. It projects power, influence, and advances our interests. It tells the story of our values, history, aspirations, and view of the world. It supports confidence in our actions, our institutions, and our global commitments.

Importantly, America’s Story counters adversary narratives and actions that seek to undermine America at home and abroad. It can serve as a powerful antidote to adversary campaigns that use cognitive warfare to sustain prolonged conflict. America’s Story was built at a time when much of the world saw America as liberator, peacemaker, builder, global diplomat, and above all, a powerful symbol of sacrifice, freedom, and self-determination. The long arc of America’s Story is its strength.

The United States cannot let this national narrative get lost in episodic political turbulence—its role in countering our adversaries is too vital.

Countering Weaponized Negotiations

In the era of Endless Warfare, adversaries often use negotiations as a continuation of conflict by other means—not as instruments of resolution. Negotiations can play an outsized role in Endless Warfare even though they only occur periodically. The central challenge is distinguishing when talks aim to legitimately resolve a conflict versus when they are designed to shape its next phase.

Today, drawing lessons directly from Russia’s behavior—from Georgia to Ukraine—and from Iran, several principles emerge that can strengthen our negotiating posture when facing adversaries that practice weaponized negotiations.

Those key principles include:

No upfront concessions. Make no upfront concessions to get an adversary to the negotiating table. Such actions erode diplomatic, economic, and military leverage and can shape the entire negotiations on unfavorable terms.

Establish clear overarching objectives and non-negotiable redlines early. This preserves decision autonomy, provides a framework for decision-making, and prevents adversaries from reshaping objectives to their advantage.

Proactively counter narratives. During negotiations over Ukraine, Russia repeatedly pushed narratives, such as “Ukraine can never win” and “territory concessions are inevitable,” to shape Western perceptions of what constituted a realistic outcome. Anticipating and countering false narratives ensures negotiations are not manipulated.

Concessions must be conditions-based. Any concessions given during negotiations must be based on measurable, verifiable actions with automatic snap-back mechanisms if commitments are violated.

Be willing to walk away. The desire for any agreement should never outweigh core national security interests. Suspending or ending talks is better than enabling or accepting a settlement that resets the conflict in an adversary’s favor.

Chester Karrass put it plainly, in life you don’t get what you deserve, you get what you negotiate. This is a powerful counter to American assumptions that raw power or battlefield success will carry the day at the negotiating table.

Countering Endless Warfare Networks

These measures—deterrence, cognitive advantage, and managing weaponized negotiations—greatly improve America’s posture, but they do not by themselves disrupt Endless Warfare networks.

The ultimate goal is systematically confronting the adversary networks that pose an enduring threat to the U.S. These networks fall into two broad categories: state institutional structures and more ambiguous structures that blur the line between state and non-state activity.

Institutional networks include military organizations, intelligence services, party organizations, proxy structures, and state-directed organizations such as IRGC-QF, MSS, GRU, and FSB, as well as the specialized units responsible for assassinations and sabotage, influence operations, and cyber-attacks as a few examples.

Ambiguous networks include ghost fleets, shell and front companies, criminal organizations, illicit financial systems, logistics systems influence networks, cyber hacktivists, proxy militias, smuggling organizations, and other similar entities.

These networks are not abstract. Iran, Russia, and China employ different approaches to Endless Warfare, but each illustrates how adversaries develop and employ both institutional and ambiguous networks to achieve persistent strategic objectives over a long timeframe. Just as a few examples:

Iran’s network of proxies and surrogates, built over decades, allows Iran to project power, coerce and intimidate its neighbors, and get inside the decision space of its adversaries at relatively low cost. The IRGC is an enabler of Iran’s distributed networks with global reach.

Russia’s networks conduct cognitive warfare against the U.S. and the West and conduct sabotage, assassinations, and political coercion across Europe. Russia’s “ghost fleets” have allowed it to generate billions in revenue despite Western sanctions.

China’s Cyber networks probe and penetrate U.S. critical infrastructure to sustain access, collect information, and provide a disruption capability during a crisis. Its networks enable sophisticated influence operations inside the U.S. and the transfer of critical technologies that directly enhance its military capabilities.

Shared and overlapping networks in gray and ambiguous spaces play a critical role. Ghost fleets, front companies, terror networks, illicit financial organizations, and criminal enterprises allow adversaries to bypass sanctions, sustain operations, and reduce international pressure.

Some of these networks are visible and attributable, others are intentionally obscured and decentralized to complicate attribution and defy sovereignty, international law, and national laws, including those of the U.S. We should expect our adversaries to fiercely protect these resilient, adaptive, and self-recovering networks they have carefully developed over time, often over decades, to gain and sustain a strategic advantage.

The critical question is how the U.S. can systematically reduce the effectiveness of these networks.

To paraphrase H.L. Mencken, for every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. That is the dilemma facing the U.S. now. Overly simplistic approaches or single solutions that do not take into account the complexities of Endless Warfare and the commitment of our adversaries to that approach will consume time and resources but ultimately fail.

Countering Endless Warfare requires a sustained, network-centric strategy employing the instruments of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, technological, informational, cognitive, and kinetic—rather than a series of independent actions. This strategy consists of three mutually reinforcing lines of effort built on one foundational principle.

First, identify and prioritize the networks that pose the greatest long-term threat to the United States. There are no official estimates of this ecosystem of networks—and what constitutes a network has not been clearly defined—but Iran, Russia, and China, collectively direct or enable a very large number institutional, commercial, criminal, cyber, intelligence, influence, and proxy networks worldwide.

Second, sustain campaigns to daylight, degrade, disrupt, and impose costs on institutional networks that conduct and oversee attacks on the United States and our allies. It is unlikely that the U.S. can dismantle foreign institutional networks, but those networks can be degraded, constrained, and made costly and less effective.

Third, dismantle, disrupt, and prevent the regeneration of ambiguous networks by severing the financial, logistical, technological, and organizational systems that support them. This is not a one-time activity. Ambiguous networks are more vulnerable, but they are often adaptive and can regenerate or be replaced.

Cognitive Security and Cyber Defenses have a combined vital role to play. None of these efforts will succeed unless American citizens, business leaders, military commanders, and policy makers are less vulnerable to influence, manipulation, and coercion—preserving America’s decision autonomy—and unless governments, institutions, organizations, and critical infrastructure are less vulnerable to technological exploitation and disruption.

Summary

The concepts in this paper are difficult to neatly categorize because they describe a form of warfare that is not fully defined. As conventional warfare evolves, so do the more nuanced aspects of warfare that take place below and above the threshold of conflict and in the ambiguous space between peace and war. I offer four takeaways.

First, Endless Warfare is a distinct adversary strategy already underway by China, Russia, and Iran and should be treated as a current strategic threat—not just a future one.

Second, endless Warfare is sustained by sophisticated and interconnected networks that must become a primary target for U.S. and allied efforts.

Third, countering Endless Warfare requires a proactive, persistent, and network-centric approach backed by national-level leadership, a new framework for strategic planning, a sense of urgency, and coordinated interagency action. Is ittime to consider a senior White House official, such as a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Competition, to integrate interagency action and coordinate a sustained national response to this threat?

Fourth, strategic deterrence in the gray zone, cognitive advantage, disciplined negotiations, and network-focused disruption are core tools of that sustained national response to make Endless Warfare increasingly ineffective, costly, and ultimately unsustainable for China, Russia, and Iran.

Endless Warfare will not end because our adversaries choose peace. It will end when it is no longer effective.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
If You Can Run a Spy, You Can Run AI https://belimedia.com.ng/if-you-can-run-a-spy-you-can-run-ai https://belimedia.com.ng/if-you-can-run-a-spy-you-can-run-ai Generative AI should be managed like a human source: useful, fast, sometimes brilliant, sometimes wrong, and never a substitute for disciplined questioning and human judgment.

The three of us spent our careers in an environment where bad information costs lives. We learned early that the most dangerous source isn’t someone who lies to you. It’s someone who tells you what you want to hear—and does it convincingly. As we watch organizations race to adopt generative AI, we keep seeing the same mistake: treating these tools like oracle machines rather than sources that need to be run.

We are not AI experts. We are not here to debate model architectures or training data. What we know is how to extract reliable insights from sources whose motivations can’t be fully verified, whose outputs may be biased or based on incomplete information, and whose reliability must be continuously earned. That is exactly the problem organizations face with AI today.

This is what HUMINT tradecraft has taught us—and what it has to teach anyone who wants to get honest, useful work from a generative AI system.

The Source Who Was Never Wrong

Early in our careers, two of us ran sources who were brilliant, well-placed, articulate, and deeply motivated. They produced detailed, confident, and consistent reporting. Senior analysts loved them. Their product sailed through review. For months, everything they said checked out—until it didn’t.

The problem wasn’t that they were lying, exactly. In both cases, they filled gaps with inference. They’d learned what we wanted to hear, and their natural intelligence and experience let them produce it fluently. The reporting wasn’t fabricated—it was confabulated. Coherent and plausible, but in key places, wrong.

We’ve all seen this pattern in the early months of AI adoption. The tool is fast. It’s articulate. It never pauses, never says “I’m not sure,” and it formats its answers with the confident authority of a briefing document. A recent Science study found that across eleven state-of-the-art AI models, sycophantic behavior—affirming users’ views even when inaccurate—was widespread and measurable. Stanford researchers found that AI systems trained on human preference feedback are systematically rewarded for being agreeable rather than correct, because agreeable outputs receive higher ratings. The models learn to please.

We’ve seen that source before. We know how the story ends.

Selection: Not All Sources Are Equal

Before you run a source, you select one. That’s a discipline in itself. And a discipline to which AI tools may in fact be able to add value in identifying and sorting stressors that can be exploited (anything that causes stress and then outlines for case officers which levers to pull on a recruitment). You don’t recruit someone simply because they have access. You also generally don't recruit happy people. You have to evaluate reliability, motivation, and susceptibility to manipulation. A source with wide access and poor judgment can be more dangerous than no source at all.

The same applies to AI. Not all AI systems are created equal for every task or mission. Each must be evaluated on access, expertise, responsiveness, and the quality of reporting—and the last criterion is harder to assess than it appears.

A few selection questions worth building into any AI adoption process:

•What is this model’s known track record on this specific type of task, not in general but specifically?

•Where does it tend to confabulate? What are its known failure modes?

•Is it current? A model with a training cutoff is like a source who’s been out of the field for a year—still useful, but with blind spots.

•How does it behave when it doesn’t know something? Does it admit it, or does it keep talking?

Choosing an AI because it’s fast or because leadership read about it in a business magazine isn’t source selection. It’s the equivalent of recruiting the first walk-in who shows up at the door.

Elicitation, Not Interrogation

One of the first lessons a new case officer learns is that interrogation and elicitation are not the same. Interrogation demands. Elicitation draws out. A blunt question produces a guarded answer. A layered conversation yields insight the source didn’t realize they were sharing.

Most people using AI are interrogating it. “What’s the answer?” “Summarize this.” “Give me options.” That approach works, up to a point, but it caps the quality of what you get.

Effective elicitation with AI means:

•Never ask a direct question when an indirect one is better. Instead of “What should we do?” try “What factors would a skeptic weigh against this recommendation?”

•Compartmentalize your tasking. Don’t dump the entire problem into a single prompt. Break it into discrete, well-scoped questions. Discrete tasking yields more verifiable output.

•Build layered follow-ups. Ask: “What are you assuming?” “What would change your conclusion?” “Give me the strongest argument against this.”

•Probe for alternatives before you settle on an answer. A source that only confirms your hypothesis may be problematic.

This turns AI from a content generator into something closer to a thinking partner. But it requires the same discipline as running a source well: preparation, precision, and the intellectual humility to recognize that your framing shapes what you get back.

The Hostile Source Problem

There is a risk the standard AI adoption literature doesn’t spend enough time on. In intelligence work, we worry not just about sources who are wrong—we worry about sources who have been co-opted or doubled, or who are feeding us what we want to hear because they’ve learned our preferences and decided that’s what keeps the relationship alive.

AI systems have structural analogs to all three failure modes:

•Sycophancy as a design artifact. Because models are trained on human preference feedback, they are incentivized to produce outputs that feel satisfying. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon and Stanford have documented an “artificial hivemind” effect in which outputs from multiple AI models converge—reducing epistemic diversity at the very moment organizations need independent judgment.

•Training data is a contamination channel. A source’s worldview is shaped by their environment. An AI model’s worldview is shaped by its training corpus. That corpus reflects the biases, omissions, and assumptions of the material it was built on. You may not know where those biases are, and the model won’t volunteer them.

•Automation bias as a user vulnerability. A series of recent studies confirms what experienced case officers know: people grant far more credibility to confident, fluent reporting than the underlying evidence warrants. Research published in 2025 found that even users with high “AI literacy” were not significantly protected against automation bias—the tendency to accept AI output without critical evaluation.

The practical implication: approach your AI system with the same structured skepticism you’d bring to a well-placed source who has given you no reason to doubt them. That’s when discipline matters most.

Debrief Discipline: The Protocol That Makes It Real

After every source meeting, a case officer writes up not only what the source said but also their assessment of reliability—what was corroborated, what was assumed, and what needs follow-up. That habit is the difference between a professional intelligence organization and a rumor factory.

Most organizations using AI lack an equivalent discipline. Someone prompts the model, takes the output, and puts it in a slide. No one records what was asked, what caveats the model offered, or whether the output was independently verified. The result is institutional memory built on unexamined reporting.

A working AI reporting protocol should mirror the post-meeting debrief:

•Requirement—What question are we actually trying to answer?

•Prompt—What, precisely, did we ask? (Save it.)

•Output—What did the AI say?

•Source check—What in this output is reliable? What is uncertain? What is unsupported?

•Human judgment—What do we actually believe, independent of the AI?

•Action—What will we do?

•Review—What happened after we acted? Did the AI’s analysis hold up?

The review step is the one that organizations most consistently skip. But it’s where calibration happens. A source you never debrief after the fact is one whose reliability you can never actually assess.

A useful team habit before closing out any AI-assisted analysis: “Before we accept this answer, what would disconfirm it?” That question alone will catch more errors than any amount of AI governance policy.

Separating Collection from Analysis

This is a fundamental discipline in intelligence work, and it translates directly. AI is a tool for collecting and synthesizing. It can ingest, summarize, organize, and compare. What it cannot reliably do is interpret—to ask what the information means here, in this context, for this organization, with these constraints.

The error organizations make is treating AI as if it collapses the divide between collection and analysis. It doesn’t. It accelerates collection. The analytical function—applying judgment, context, institutional knowledge, and accountability—remains human.

Teams that hand over analytical responsibility to AI are not just making an efficiency error. They are making an accountability error. Someone has to own the conclusion. AI cannot.

Burning a Source: When to Stop Trusting the AI

This is the part of the tradecraft literature on AI that doesn’t exist yet, and it needs to.

Every experienced case officer has had to decide to terminate a source relationship. Not because the source was obviously lying—if that were clear, the decision would be easy. You terminate when the source's reliability has fallen below a threshold, when you have reason to believe the source has been compromised, or when the cost of continuing to run them outweighs the value of their reporting.

The equivalent decisions will come for AI systems, and organizations should prepare for them:

•When a model’s known failure modes consistently overlap with your mission-critical questions, it is time to stop relying on it for those questions—regardless of how it performs elsewhere.

•When an AI system has been demonstrably wrong in a consequential context and the organization has not developed a clear explanation for why, continuing to use it at the same level of trust is an operational error.

•When a model is updated or retrained by its provider, treat it as a new source and revalidate. Prior reliability does not transfer automatically.

•When you discover that the model has been systematically producing outputs shaped by the framing of your prompts rather than by evidence—that you have been leading the witness without realizing it—you may need to reset the relationship.

Burning a source is not a failure of the source-handling relationship. It is often the proof that the relationship was being handled well.

What This Means for How You Lead

The three of us came to this issue through intelligence work, but the problem is not limited to intelligence organizations. Any leadership environment where AI tools are proliferating faces the same structural challenge: the tools are fast, fluent, and confident, and organizational incentives often reward those who use them most rather than those who use them best.

The research bears this out. INSEAD’s 2025 analysis of firm-level AI adoption found that generative AI shifts value toward higher-order human judgment—not away from it. Microsoft’s research confirms that organizations with a well-calibrated understanding of AI perform better across missions than those that simply maximize usage. The tool is the easy part. The discipline is the hard part.

For leaders, the implications are practical:

•Build the habit of debriefing discipline before you scale AI adoption. The protocol above should be standard practice, not optional.

•Create psychological safety so people can flag AI errors. The greatest risk in any source-handling operation is the team member who saw the problem but didn’t say anything because the source had too much credibility.

•Distinguish between AI as a collection tool and as an analytical tool. Automate the former aggressively. Guard the latter carefully.

•Evaluate AI systems with the same rigor you would apply to any source—including periodic reviews of whether the relationship continues to produce reliable value.

Used with discipline, generative AI can be a genuinely powerful analytical partner—the kind of well-placed, high-access source that an experienced handler learns to work with carefully and derive real value from. Used without discipline, it becomes a certainty-destroyer—introducing noise, eroding judgment, and producing false confidence at scale.

The HUMINT model doesn’t make AI safer by limiting what it does. It makes AI safer by raising the standard for what we do with what it gives us.

AI doesn’t give you answers. It gives you reports. And reporting always requires a handler’s skeptical, trained eye.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
Putin’s Running Out of Scare Tactics and Options https://belimedia.com.ng/putins-running-out-of-scare-tactics-and-options https://belimedia.com.ng/putins-running-out-of-scare-tactics-and-options Russian President Vladimir Putin can no longer conceal the cost of his Ukraine war from the Russian public. There are fuel shortages throughout the Russian Federation. Videos show hundreds of automobiles lining up to get a few liters of gasoline at gas stations around Moscow. Gasoline sales to civilian vehicles in occupied Crimea have been suspended as the Ukrainian blockade of the peninsula takes effect. Russia continues to make painfully slow progress in its efforts to capture territory in Ukraine and at a staggering cost in casualties.

“…sound out idols... by pos[ing] questions here with a hammer... scrutiny will reveal that they are actually hollow and meaningless—not the high, noble standards of conduct that their proponents claim them to be." — Friedrich Nietzsche

Twilight of the Idols

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov recently says that Ukraine has successfully regained the strategic initiative on the battlefield and Kyiv’s use of long-range weapons to hit targets deep inside of Russia is aiming to force Moscow to end the war through asymmetric attrition. Ukraine has recently intensified precision strikes 20-300 kms behind Russian lines to isolate Russian infantry, destroy high value air defense systems and disrupt the flow of supplies to the front line. The long-range drone campaign is systematically targeting Russia’s energy infrastructure with devastating economic and psychological effect.

Vehicles are lining up to cross the Kerch Strait bridge following successful Ukrainian drone strikes on the Tavriiska thermal power plant, major electrical substations and the Kerch and Dzhankoi oil depots. These strikes have caused blackouts in Sevastopol and Simferopol, the two largest cities in the peninsula. The panic caused by the energy shortages and the fear of total collapse has led many to flee, causing the massive backups at the bridge—with sometimes as many as 2,500-3,000 vehicles lining up to cross. The Crimean Peninsula is the crown jewel of Putin’s campaign against Ukraine which he re-ignited with its annexation in March of 2014.

But Crimea is just one of the many challenges facing Putin. Omsk is burning, having been struck on July 6 by Ukrainian forces in their deepest strategic strike of the war. The Omsk oil refinery is located approximately 2600 kms from Ukrainian territory and is Russia’s largest oil refinery and its top producer of gasoline. There are still lingering oily black clouds over Moscow from the June 18 Ukrainian strike on the Gazprom Neft refinery in southeast Moscow—just ten miles from the Kremlin. The refinery was struck by over 200 drones and sent thick greasy black clouds of burning petroleum directly over the high-rise and residential areas fthat are avored by Moscow’s elites. The clouds created “black rain” and forced disruptions at Moscow’s four airports.

A few weeks before, there were oily black clouds over St. Petersburg as Russia hosted its annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in early June. International visitors to the Forum (whose attendance has seen a significant drop since 2022) were re-routed to avoid risk of Ukrainian drone strikes and to avoid the clouds of burning petroleum. This read like quite the humiliation for the architect of Russia’s current economic disaster.

As devastating as Ukraine’s attacks have been, the situation on the front is even worse.

A recent thinktank study indicates that Russian forces have suffered 1.4 million total casualties including 450,000 deaths on the battlefield. Approximately 32% of Russian casualties result in death, a fatality ratio that is much higher than modern Western military standards would allow. Reports by analysts and Russian military bloggers indicate that once a Russian soldier is deployed directly into an active combat zone, their average life expectancy drops to just 20-25 minutes. The average survival time for a raw recruit measured from the moment they arrive at a regional training ground to their death in Ukraine, ranges from ten days to three weeks. Even by the Russian standards that were established for casualties in World War II, these losses are staggering and must be causing alarm bells to go off amongst Russia’s elite leadership. There is more visible criticism of how Putin is conducting this war than has even been seen before.

On the diplomatic front, challenges for the Russian president are rising. This week’s NATO summit is yielding results on Europe’s commitment to defense spending and re-armament, led by Germany which is considering incurring state debt to finance defense spending which would be unprecedented for a postwar German government. Putin’s confidence in his ability to count on President Trump to put pressure on Ukraine to end the war on terms that are favorable to Moscow may be eroding and Trump has recently acknowledged Ukraine’s success in the war.

Putin’s reliable ally in Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, seems also to be reconsidering the state of play and his enthusiasm for allowing Moscow to drag Belarus deeper into the conflict with Ukraine. resident Zelensky recently demanded Belarus take offline four relay facilities in Belarus’s Brest and Gomel regions near the Ukrainian border. These relay stations acted as signal boosters for Russian drones used to attack Ukrainian cities. The relays have been taken offline.

President Zelensky has just authorized a forty-day intelligence and security operation to heavily amplify pressure on the Kremlin to end the war. He is arguing that Russia’s elites live in Moscow and St. Petersburg and therefore, the war must be brought to their doorsteps. He also predicted that “When not one hundred drones but a thousand start reaching Moscow…Putin will be advised to move somewhere beyond the Urals. Zelensky is right and Ukrainians know Russia better than anyone in the West.

Despite the pressure he is under, it is too early to count Putin out. He has largely and cleverly managed his tenure as Russia’s leader. He is still two years short of Stalin’s 29 year record at the helm, but he is getting close and in his 27 years of running Russia, he has dug his tentacles deep into every level of the country’s power structure and has certainly accumulated kompromat on any potential rival or replacement. Many have speculated that if Putin departs the scene, his replacement could be an even worse partner for the U.S. and the West. I won’t argue that any replacement or coalition that follows Putin will be less anti West than Putin, but whatever constellation follows, they will not have the benefit of having roots and leverage as deep in Russia as Putin does.

For the moment, Putin still has escalatory options he can use to respond to increasing pressure.

In recent weeks, Russia has taken steps to close or severely restrict seven critical railway border crossings and road traffic crossings into Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. Apparently, negotiations are under way to restrict crossings into Kazakhstan and other central Asian states. The motivations for the abrupt closures are unclear but they suggest that Putin may be considering a mass mobilization and is trying to stem the likely departure of military age males to avoid the departures that have occurred since February 2022.

Mobilization alone will not solve Russia’s problem of shortages of equipment and training for conscripts as well as Russia’s World War I-style battlefront tactics. President Zelensky spoke on the margins of the NATO summit this week and said Ukraine is causing over 30,000 Russian casualties a month.

Putin can also rattle the nuclear saber again, but that is likely to be largely ignored as has his previous saber rattling. Most experts are confident that Putin has received firm guidance from his only remaining reliable ally China that he should not open the nuclear Pandora’s box in Ukraine.

The intelligence and security services in the Baltic States, Sweden, and Poland have recently assessed that Putin may try a provocation against one of the bordering NATO states in order to force an Article V action—which he hopes Trump would reject. But few analysts think Putin would risk an all-out war against NATO. That would be a path that could only accelerate Ukraine’s path toward NATO membership and could lead to further disasters for the Russian military, which many experts considered to be the most powerful conventional military in Europe prior to February 2022.

Putin’s most likely response to his current challenges is to continue to take advantage of weaknesses in Ukraine’s air defenses, particularly against ballistic missile attacks and hope that at some point, Ukraine’s morale weakens and pressure increases on Zelensky to end the war on terms that are more favorable to Russia. Such a change in Zelensky or Ukraine is inconceivable to any rational analysis of the current state of the war, but Putin is clearly not rational.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Succession Question Haunting the Kremlin https://belimedia.com.ng/the-succession-question-haunting-the-kremlin https://belimedia.com.ng/the-succession-question-haunting-the-kremlin The late-June 2026 death of Sergei B. Ivanov - the man once thought the most likely successor to Vladimir Putin - as well as the Russian President’s age, his rumored health problems, and the discontent over the economic impact of his disastrous invasion of Ukraine; have renewed speculation over when, under what circumstances and to whom he might cede power. The constitutional changes Putin orchestrated in 2020 potentially allow him to remain in office until 2036. Further, he has refused to answer questions about whether he will stay until then saying it is too early to discuss such matters and citing his focus on running the nation. However, given that Putin would be 83 in 2036, it is highly likely a leadership change will occur before then. How might Putin – assuming he is in a position to do so - handle such a transition? Ivanov’s history with him is instructive in this regard.

Like Putin, Ivanov hailed from St. Petersburg. They both served in the KGB’s foreign intelligence arm, the First Chief Directorate. But there was a difference between them that likely nettled the prideful Putin. While he served in Dresden, working with the allied East German State Security Service (a posting that earned him the not wholly complimentary sobriquet “Stasi” among his KGB colleagues), the polished, English-speaking Ivanov battled the ‘Main Enemy’ on the hostile side of the East-West divide. The two maintained a close relationship while Putin came to power and into the early years of his rule. Ivanov was the most-trusted of the coterie of St. Petersburg intelligence and security service veterans who formed the core of Putin’s governing elite as he founded what would become a de facto ‘Chekist” state in Russia.

When Putin was appointed Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) by then-President Boris Yeltsin, he named Ivanov as his deputy. As he moved on from the FSB to become prime minister and then president of Russia, Putin kept Ivanov at the center of his security apparatus, appointing him successively as Secretary of the Security Council from 1999 until 2001; as Defense Minister from 2001 until 2007; and then as First Deputy Prime Minister. Apparently seen by Putin as too ambitious and difficult to control, Ivanov’s influence began to gradually wane in 2008 as the Russian president named the more pliable Dmitry Medvedev as a placeholder president while he himself actually ran the country from his perch as Prime Minister pending a return to the presidency. Although Ivanov remained a trusted player in Putin’s orbit for years thereafter - subsequently serving as Deputy Prime Minster and Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration – the window for him to succeed his boss had long since closed. In 2016, he was relegated to a ceremonial position overseeing environmental and transport matters.

Repeating a Medvedev-like managed transition arrangement – that is Putin “retiring” while orchestrating events like a puppet master behind the curtain - is one likely scenario should he decide to depart the presidency. Another possibility is the constitutionally sanctioned model like that which played out in 1999 wherein the man Yeltsin named prime minister – in that case Putin himself - became his heir apparent. Putin went on to become acting Russian president and then president in 2000 following Yeltsin’s resignation. Another possibility is that Putin could precipitously decide to extra-constitutionally designate a successor.

The problem with these scenarios is that Putin to date has given no indication he might be willing to cede power. Nor, even if so inclined, is he likely to do so at least until he has secured something he can, however speciously, call ‘victory’ in Ukraine, a result that – at minimum - hinges on his ability to secure either through negotiations or force of arms the four oblasts Russia claims to have annexed in 2022. For Putin, successful resolution of the war is both a strategic imperative and central to his personal legacy. Given the grinding nature of the Russian Army’s advance in Donbas and the ferocious resistance being mounted by the Ukrainians, such an outcome appears unlikely in the foreseeable future if ever.

It is conceivable that the military or security services could mount a coup to topple Putin. Yet, despite the massive human and economic costs his war has imposed on the Russian people, there are to date no discernible indications such a putsch is in the offing. Additionally, the security measures taken following the abortive 2023 Wagner mutiny – to include the 2024 restoration granting of the Soviet-era Dzerzhinskiy title/honorific to a division of the Putin-created National Guard (‘Rosgvardiya’) protecting the country’s leadership and the ‘no man, no problem’ retaliation meted out to Yevgeny Prigozhin in its wake – mitigate against the success of any such attempt to overthrow the regime.

Given Putin’s age, and the fact that he rules a country wherein the male life expectancy is roughly the mid-to-high 60s, another likely scenario for an end to his regime involves his sudden death or incapacitation in office. Such an eventuality would unleash a period of leadership tumult in Moscow akin to that which followed the 1953 death of Stalin. With the demise of the Soviet dictator, it was widely assumed he would be succeeded by one of his closest lieutenants, Georgy M. Malenkov. Malenkov indeed became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He successfully conspired with Red Army Marshal Georgy Zhukov, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikita Khrushchev to dispose of the odious Lavrentiy Beria. Nonetheless, even though he was effectively the Soviet premier and the head of government, Malenkov was unable to consolidate power because he controlled neither the security apparatus nor the Soviet Communist Party. And it was Khrushchev - by then First Secretary of the Party – who ultimately won the fight between Stalin’s lieutenants to succeed him.

During a 1959 discussion with Khrushchev, former U.S. Ambassador W. Averill Harriman addressed Stalin’s lack of a succession plan, asking the Soviet leader who Stalin thought would succeed him. Khrushchev’s reply that: “Stalin didn’t think; he thought he would live forever” was, as was the case with much of what he said, calculatingly apocryphal. Stalin, notoriously conspiratorial by nature, clearly feared that if he acknowledged his rule would someday come to an end, his power would rapidly erode as plotting to hasten that indefinite date commenced. As the fight to succeed him would attest, he was surely correct in that judgement. After all, as Golda Meir would famously observe to Henry Kissinger in 1973: ‘Even paranoids have enemies’.

Reference in Ecclesiastes 7:15 to “the righteous perishing in their righteousness, and the wicked living long in their wickedness” certainly applies not only to Stalin but also to Putin. Nevertheless, absent some highly unlikely actualization of the scheme he discussed with Xi Jinping in 2025 of indefinitely extending his mortality by replacing organs in a manner akin to that of a Bond villain, Putin knows that his death is an actuarial certainty. But, like Stalin, he surely (and rightly) understands that any designation of a successor would inevitably and immediately lead to an erosion of his own power as others vied for his throne.

A precipitous end to the Putin regime would almost certainly trigger a period – perhaps an extended period – of crisis and uncertainty in Russia. Even in the best-case scenario – such as a decision by Putin to name a successor or wield power from behind-the-scenes as he did with Medvedev - it is likely that a contest among aspirants to his purple would follow. In addition to the character, worldview and policy goals of any new man in the Kremlin, the key determinants in any transition will be how it comes about and strength of support for that new leader. Putin has not allowed any subordinate to become an alternative center of power and the Russian political system is deliberately opaque with respect to any political matter, much less an issue as sensitive as leadership transition.

According to the Russian constitution, in the event of a president’s death, resignation, incapacity, or impeachment, the prime minister - currently Mikhail V. Mishustin - would serve as acting president pending a presidential election within three months. In practice, however, succession would likely be less about constitutional procedure than about who can best ensure elite status, security, property and de facto immunity from any legal accountability. The presidential administration, security services, state corporations, courts, political parties, media, and regional governors all look to the Kremlin for direction and sustenance.

Consequently, a decision on who would succeed Putin would involve bargaining among elites with roots in those sectors. While Mishustin would temporarily fill in as president in a sudden constitutional transition, he lacks the charisma, nationalist credentials, independent public backing, and security-service connections to become a permanent successor to Putin. That said, because the prime minister is the formal acting president in extremis, replacing Mishustin with another figure would be a clear signal that the person named is being positioned to succeed Putin.

Any change in leadership in the Kremlin, however it comes about, will - if only because Russia is a major nuclear power – engender worries about the nature of any regime following that of Putin. This was also the case after Stalin’s death when then-Vice President Richard Nixon voiced concern that his successor “might very well prove more difficult to deal with than Stalin himself.” As the recklessness Khrushchev displayed in deploying missiles to Cuba attested, Nixon was right to be worried. The Russian leadership itself probably understands such concerns and wants to avoid fueling them. That is one reason that the next Russian president is less likely to be an advocate of change than a continuity figure. Domestically, any successor would likely concentrate on consolidating his rule and avoiding anything that looks like defeat in Ukraine. Even if the next leader is less personally ideological than Putin, the governing structure he inherits will inevitably push him toward continuity. This would mean repression of any opposition, or perceived opposition, at home; deep suspicion of the West; protection of elite wealth; and management of the Ukraine war and its consequences.

In any transition scenario, but particularly in the case of an unexpected transition, the security services - the best organized and most powerful internal organizations supporting and enforcing Putin’s rule - will play a key role in determining who will follow him. Not surprisingly, then, several of those thought best positioned to succeed Putin have deep security service roots. Most prominent among them is ex-Putin bodyguard and former governor of Tula oblast Alexei Dyumin. He was given a position in the Kremlin and subsequently made secretary of the State Council, actions seen by many as signs he is seen by Putin as a possible successor. Another leading candidate, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev, is the son of the hard-line former Director of the FSB and Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. Even potential candidates seen as technocrats or managers, such as First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, will have to account for the pervasive influence of the security services should they aspire to succeed Putin.

As Mark Galeotti, an expert on organized crime and the security state in Russia has noted, that country “is effectively a state with a nationalized mafia.” Officers and contacts of those services have leveraged their authorities and connections not only to the benefit of the Putin regime but also to line their own pockets. And there is no reason to suppose that the end of Putin’s rule - however it comes about - and the inevitable departure from the scene of Ivanov and other aging KGB veterans such as Nikolai Patrushev and FSB Director Alexander V. Bortnikov will herald an end to the Chekist State. Moreover, any idea that the new generation of security-state linked ‘siloviki’(strongmen) will willingly cede their sway on the most senior levels of Russian leadership is, to put it mildly, improbable.

On the contrary, for as long as the Ukraine war goes on the security services’ sway over the Russian state will almost certainly grow. Indeed, anyone succeeding Putin is likely to rely heavily on those same services to monitor and suppress any extant opposition to the war and his establishment of control over the levers of power. The impact of the security services on the Russian state after Putin will be much like their central role under him only more so. On becoming Prime Minster in 1999, Putin quipped that “a group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission.” Sadly for Russia, its people and the people of Ukraine in particular, that mission continues with no end in sight.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
An Outlook for What’s Next in Iran War https://belimedia.com.ng/an-outlook-for-whats-next-in-iran-war https://belimedia.com.ng/an-outlook-for-whats-next-in-iran-war For now, the U.S.-Iran diplomatic track remains alive, but its ability to produce meaningful near-term progress is uncertain, and its long-term survival and utility are increasingly at risk. U.S. strikes in Iran over the past two days will degrade important elements of Tehran’s capabilities in the short term and may buy space for Pakistani and Qatari mediators to reduce tensions and bring about at least a temporary halt in the attacks. However, even if the latest U.S. retaliation deters Iranian attacks in the near term, Tehran is unlikely to abandon its claim of administrative control over the Strait of Hormuz or halt retaliatory attacks against Gulf states that host U.S. bases. Iran’s actions support its long-standing intention to be viewed as a regional hegemon with veto rights over Gulf security, using asymmetric weapons to offset U.S. and Gulf conventional advantages.

Specifically, Tehran is highly likely to continue periodic harassment of shipping to undermine confidence in the security of the Omani transit route. However, Iran is unlikely to try to close the Strait outright unless the United States reinstitutes a blockade against Iran. An effort by Tehran to close the Strait would alienate its customers, unify much of the world against it, and risk a wider war with the United States that the Iranian regime might survive but cannot win. Iran almost certainly believes that it does not need to close the Strait to weaponize it. It only needs to make passage so uncertain enough that insurers, shippers, energy firms, and Gulf governments begin pricing Iranian permission into the movement of commerce and eventually decide they have no choice but to accept a construct that gives Iran permanent influence over passage and Tehran the right to charge fees to those who use it.

The United States is determined to show Iran that these actions carry material costs and that Tehran will not be allowed to control an international waterway. The latest U.S. strikes against Iran, following Tehran’s missile and drone attacks against commercial shipping and Gulf targets, were significant and went well beyond the more limited retaliation that followed earlier Iranian provocations. U.S. forces struck more than 80 Iranian targets on July 7 and approximately 90 additional targets on July 8, including Iranian air defense, command-and-control, coastal surveillance, anti-ship missile, drone, naval, and logistics assets, as well as more than 60 IRGC small boats. Press reports claim U.S. strikes or explosions at key sites near Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, Qeshm, Sirik, Bushehr, and Kharg Island, Iran’s principal oil export terminal. President Trump has threatened further escalation, including attacks against Iranian infrastructure and Kharg Island, if Iranian attacks continue.

This was a significant attack package, but one that still avoided leadership targets and most major civilian infrastructure. The strikes show that the United States will defend its regional partners and the international status of the Strait of Hormuz, and that it has a good understanding of the military system and infrastructure it needs to target to degrade Iran’s attack capabilities in the near term.

Although it remains unclear whether Tehran will de-escalate to avoid further damage, doing so would be consistent with its past behavior and would fit its long-term strategy of episodic attacks that unsettle shipping and test, but do not cross, the line that would ignite a large-scale conflict with the United States. The nature of Iran’s attacks to date, however, shows that Tehran is willing to assume a greater risk of renewed large-scale conflict with the United States if that is the price of forcing others to treat Hormuz as a waterway subject to Iranian permission. The tenor of Iranian rhetoric toward the United States has also sharpened after the former Supreme Leader’s funeral, including public revenge threats against the President. Defiance rather than cooperation is likely to define Iran’s near-term approach.

The Gulf states seek to avoid escalation, but they continue to firmly reject Iran’s claim of control over the region’s central maritime artery. Bahrain, Kuwait, and reportedly even Qatar have now all been drawn directly into the latest Iranian response. This response shows that Tehran is not only threatening commercial shipping and Gulf energy exports, but also targeting Gulf states with the sensing, communications, and command architecture it believes supports U.S. deterrence in the region. These attacks also message that U.S. basing will not protect Gulf states from Iranian attack.

The Gulf states’ immediate focus has been to remove ambiguity regarding safe passage and Iran’s persistent threats by using Qatari, Omani, and Pakistani diplomatic channels, as well as by exploring alternative transit, pipeline, and international maritime arrangements to reduce Iran’s leverage over Hormuz. Iran’s strategy depends on undermining the perception that Omani waters offer protection from Iranian attacks. Tehran’s rejection of reported UAE-backed efforts to develop an International Maritime Organization role in managing the Strait underscores that Iran is fighting not just over shipping lanes, but over who has the authority to define safe passage. Qatar’s role in this regional dynamic is complicated: it is both a valued diplomatic channel and the region’s dominant LNG exporter. At the same time, the reported attacks on Qatari-linked vessels and Iranian pressure on Gulf basing infrastructure show that mediation won’t insulate Doha from Iranian missile and drone strikes.

Energy markets face increased pressure that is likely to vary in intensity over time. Gulf exports had been recovering since mid-June, but the security architecture underpinning that recovery is now visibly eroding. Treasury’s revocation of the oil license granted to Iran after the June deal strips Tehran of the principal early economic concession it gained from the reopening arrangement. Brent and WTI both rose sharply on the news, reflecting not only fear of lost barrels but fear that Hormuz is again becoming a contested operating environment. Nonetheless, the market is responding in a way that shows it sees this week’s flare-up as contained, and that robust production from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other producers, reduced Chinese imports from Iran, and the demonstrated resilience of energy markets will prevent a major price shock. In short, existing supply and demand conditions reinforce the prevailing belief that the regional strikes will not evolve into a broader conflict. Should this view be significantly challenged, however, oil prices could quickly move into the $80s or $90s. Longer-term, there is still a disconnect between current market sentiment, the heavy drawdown on global strategic reserves, and the fact that Gulf reliability has been damaged. Even if the Strait remains open, buyers, insurers, and refiners will now treat Gulf supply as politically contingent in a way they did not before the war.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Continued Myth of Russia’s Imminent Collapse: Lessons from Prigozhin’s Mutiny Three Years On https://belimedia.com.ng/the-continued-myth-of-russias-imminent-collapse-lessons-from-prigozhins-mutiny-three-years-on https://belimedia.com.ng/the-continued-myth-of-russias-imminent-collapse-lessons-from-prigozhins-mutiny-three-years-on

KREMLIN FILES/COLUMN: Three years ago, in June 2023, the Kremlin confronted one of the most dramatic internal crises of Vladimir Putin's quarter-century in power. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the former convict turned oligarch, Wagner founder, and longtime Kremlin insider known as Putin's "chef," launched an armed mutiny that stunned Russia and captivated the world. Wagner fighters seized the headquarters of Russia's Southern Military District in Rostov before beginning an astonishing march toward Moscow, encountering remarkably little organized resistance along the way.

For nearly twenty-four hours, the aura of Kremlin control appeared to evaporate. The episode immediately fueled predictions that Putin's regime was beginning to unravel. Some declared the mutiny the beginning of the end. Others saw it as the first crack that would inevitably bring down the Russian dictator. Three years later, those predictions have not aged well. But similar predictions now are all over U.S. and European news sources about another imminent collapse. The anniversary, therefore, offers an opportunity not to revisit sensational headlines but to remember three enduring lessons—especially at a time when rumor, hopeful thinking, and unfounded speculation once again dominate discussion over Russia and the Ukraine war.

Rumor and Reality

Prigozhin survived a negotiated settlement and the initial aftermath of his short-lived rebellion only to have his plane fall out of the sky months later. Wagner was dismantled and its elements incorporated into the Russian armed forces and intelligence agencies. Putin remains firmly in power, and the past three years have only seen a strengthening of his security and intelligence services.

Russia continues its war against Ukraine. And there are more rumors in recent months, from experts around the world, claiming Putin is “more vulnerable than ever.” This assumption is mostly grounded in Ukraine’s tremendous progress in escalating the drone war, its long-range strikes making a real impact on Russia’s energy sector, and heavy Russian casualties at the front continuing to mount throughout the year. There has also been more public criticism among Russia’s ruling elite than at any time during the war. But speculating from those facts that Putin is now substantially weaker as a dictator, or even, as some have suggested, “ripe for a coup,” is mostly wishful thinking.

Such rumors from alleged intelligence agency leaks, and experts cited by media outlets, offer a tempting, albeit false, notion that the Ukraine war might come to an end without the West having to do more; that Putin will just be overthrown and a more democratic alternative might come to power. Or that resolve and strong support for our Ukrainian allies, who are still fighting and dying every day, are not really needed, and that the “war is surely coming to an end…” That was the response given this week when Germany was pressed on providing long-range weapons:
“well, Ukraine is doing better than ever!” But none of that is based on reality, and Ukraine needs NATO and the U.S.’s support to see this war through to a just settlement, one where Ukraine does not sacrifice long-term security for peace.

Looking back at the war and to Prigozhin’s mutiny, the first lesson to remember is that the Prigozhin’s move exposed important vulnerabilities within the Russian state, ones that have existed for decades. Wagner's convoy advanced hundreds of miles while much of the security apparatus appeared confused, hesitant, or absent altogether. The episode reinforced what many who study Russia have argued for years: corruption, patronage, bureaucratic dysfunction, and institutional rivalries remain defining characteristics of Putin's system. Loyalty often trumps competence, and political reliability frequently matters more than military effectiveness.

Those weaknesses are real. They were discounted by far too many Western military experts before the 2022 invasion, who predicted a quick Russian victory. I have documented numerous examples of such failures across the Russian intelligence, military, and security establishment in my own book: Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Secret War (Naval Institute Press 2026).

Yet acknowledging these shortcomings should never lead us to underestimating the adversary. The war has damaged the Russian economy, and the energy sector is in crisis due to Ukraine’s strike campaign. Still, as The Economist recently noted, the economy is not in shambles, unfortunately, and won’t crash anytime soon.

Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) remain capable, adaptive, and ruthless. They have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to recover from mistakes, suppress internal threats, and preserve the regime. They get the very best in terms of resources and reconstitution from any losses, and they are expanding their hybrid war against Europe and the U.S.

Weakness and Resilience in Putin’s Russia at War

Weakness and resilience are not mutually exclusive. Prigozhin’s mutiny revealed both. This is the second lesson from three years ago. War has strengthened the RIS and, especially, the FSB’s chokehold on the Russian people. Their economy has largely weathered sanctions and repeated hits, and their population, unfortunately, remains hypnotized by heavy propaganda. Sadly, most Russians support Putin as strongly as the Nazi Germans did Hitler, even to their bitter end. Unfortunately, Russian propaganda today has many more tools than Dr. Goebbels did, and they use them very well.

Prigozhin knew it. He was not marching on Moscow to overthrow Vladimir Putin. This has been widely misunderstood. Throughout the crisis, Prigozhin directed his fury overwhelmingly at Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. His extraordinary public denunciations in the weeks prior to the mutiny, shouting at both on Russian TV, stunned all of Russia but received little attention in the West. Prigozhin accused the military leadership of corruption, deception, and catastrophic mismanagement of the war in Ukraine. His objective was to humiliate them, force their removal, and compel Putin to intervene—not to replace Putin himself. He was screaming into Russian cameras, “Shoigu! Gerasimov!!” But not once did he shout Putin’s name. He knew where to stop with his ire.

Western observers too often interpreted the mutiny through their own hopes for regime change. It was an elite struggle within the existing system, not a revolutionary movement against it. Understanding that distinction is essential. Elite infighting should not automatically be mistaken for the imminent collapse of the regime.

Putin is a master, just like Stalin was 80 years ago, at playing his lieutenants and loyalist Siloviki against one another. While they jostle for power, he remains firmly in control, and they are constantly trying to curry his favor. Prigozhin sat at his table—and prepared that table—for decades. He knew it.

The third lesson is perhaps the most consequential. Putin's system was never designed to depend solely on the regular armed forces. It rests on multiple overlapping centers of coercive power, principally at the hands of the intelligence services. The Federal Security Service (FSB) remains the dominant institution protecting the regime. Alongside it stands the National Guard (Rosgvardia), with its vast manpower and domestic security mission, and the Federal Protective Service (FSO), whose responsibilities include safeguarding the country's leadership (first and foremost in the personage of Putin). These organizations were deliberately structured to counterbalance one another, prevent any single institution from becoming too powerful, and ensure that threats to the regime can be contained from multiple directions. Putin is a master at it.

The Wagner mutiny did not invalidate that architecture. If anything, the aftermath demonstrated its durability. While the regular military was embarrassed, the broader security state remained intact. Rosgvardia was strengthened immediately after the mutiny, receiving more heavy equipment, tanks, and APCs designed to put down even the most serious uprising by disloyal units, should they ever get past the wary watch of the FSB. It is headed by General Viktor Zolotov, a loyal former KGB colleague of Putin’s. That layered system and those allegiances help explain why authoritarian regimes like Putin’s can absorb dramatic shocks without collapsing (Iran provides parallels, and no doubt Russia and Iran continue to learn from one another).

None of this means Putin's regime is invulnerable. History offers countless reminders that authoritarian systems often appear stable until they suddenly are not. Internal rivalries matter. Economic pressure matters. Military setbacks matter.

But careful analysis requires distinguishing between long-term structural vulnerabilities and near-term political collapse. Those are not the same thing. Russia under Putin has shown a remarkable ability to overcome its structural and corrupt vulnerabilities to launch out repeatedly with aggression.

Three years after the Wagner mutiny, the greatest analytical mistake would be the same one made in June 2023: allowing hope to substitute for honest assessment. We cannot simply hold our breath, wait for the next rumor of elite discord, and convince ourselves that the dictator—and the security state he has painstakingly constructed over twenty-six years—will collapse under its own weight.

It will not be that easy. If Russia's aggression is ultimately to be defeated, it will require sustained Western resolve, continued support for Ukraine, and a clear-eyed understanding of both the strengths and the weaknesses of the adversary we face. Strategy demands as much patience as the current optimism calls for. But our strategy also demands more resolve, as well as something else missing in 2022—and for much of Putin’s reign—a more credible deterrent from the West.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran: On Negotiating with Criminal/Terrorist Organizations, States, and Other Entities https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-on-negotiating-with-criminalterrorist-organizations-states-and-other-entities https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-on-negotiating-with-criminalterrorist-organizations-states-and-other-entities Pending the failed cease-fire and Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] between Iran and America, all eyes have focused on the ongoing, difficult negotiations – mediated by Pakistan, Oman, Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt – between America and Iran. The late Uri Lubrani, Israel’s last Ambassador to Iran in 1978, always warned about the perils of negotiating with the Iranians (“a nation of carpet weavers and of chess players”), whom he respected for their negotiating prowess, calling their manipulation of negotiations “a masterpiece of hoodwinking the world.” Other contemporary experts (former American intelligence officers) such as Mark Fowler and Hamlet Yousef have made similar observations. Their collective wisdom is worth noting as the United States continues its diplomatic negotiations with Iran in today’s modern version of ‘The Great Game.’ What is increasingly pertinent in such negotiations pertains to the role of third-party nations such as Oman, Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan, not as mere mediators, but rather, especially in the case of Pakistan and Turkey, as modern purveyors of ‘intelligence diplomacy.’

Turkey’s road to intelligence diplomacy occurred strategically, rather than organically, as its Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (previously Director of its intelligence agency MIT, for over a decade) and current MIT Director Ibrahim Kalin purposefully and intentionally positioned Turkey to play an increasingly important role in regional conflicts, covert diplomacy, and intelligence – as in Kalin’s words in a recent speech - “drawing important lessons for our country’s security, strategic positioning, and regional perspective.” This doctrine had previously involved backchannel negotiations in Gaza, Ukraine, Europe, the Balkans, Russia, (cf. the 2024 spy swap), and now, Iran. Other examples include the appointment of former senior MIT officer Gürsel Donmez as Turkey’s Ambassador to Austria, a key worldwide intelligence and diplomacy hub, and Turkey’s successful hosting of the NATO summit last week.

Pakistan is, like Turkey, hardly new to the Great Game. Readers will recall its role in facilitating – during 1971-1972 – the historic Kissinger-Nixon opening to China. But this year’s MOU between Iran and America has thrust Pakistan (and its leaders Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and military chief General Asim Munir) into the limelight. Pakistan has handled sensitive backchannel negotiations, hosted talks in Islamabad, and worked closely with its Saudi and GCC partners as the recent MOU came into play. But in its world of zero-sum diplomacy, Pakistan’s strategic successes in intelligence diplomacy heighten its regional and broader posture – especially vis-à-vis America and serves to weaken India’s strategic position and diplomatic influence. In today’s world, as always, Pakistan’s gain is India’s loss and China’s gain (in my opinion, China is the REAL winner of the US-Iran war).

How does one negotiate, or facilitate negotiations with a country which is a combination of a civilization (Persia), theocracy, nation state (Iran), terrorist organization, and criminal entity (IRGC)? Iran has revealed itself to be a formidable negotiating partner, more akin to a sophisticated hostage taker, in which traditional western, Harvard metrics of ‘Getting to Yes,’ or “Getting Past No’ hardly apply. And yet, like hostage takers in [law enforcement] hostage scenarios, Iran must be appreciated as a ‘rational’ actor. The Iranians have brilliantly used ambiguity and opacity as negotiating strategies, and they have adeptly utilized social media to carve out confusing, ambiguous negotiating positions, in addition to asymmetric warfare, closure of the Straits of Hormuz, disinformation, propaganda, cognitive warfare, and traditional diplomatic efforts. One could surmise that the Iranians are truly gifted students, who have read - and survived! - President Trump’s The Art of the Deal. And for President Trump and his national security team, negotiating with a dead, or severely injured, possibly brain-damaged Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei may be the most complex task of all. Such scenarios aren’t taught in diplomatic faculties, business schools, or at the FBI Academy.

Negotiations involving criminal terror groups such as the IRGC (now led by General Ahmad Vahidi) - who have committed numerous worldwide acts of violence and terror over decades - often require third party emissaries (as legitimate governments cannot be seen as a main negotiating partner) and high-level intermediaries in ‘track 3’ diplomacy. Over the past two decades, examples include the former German intelligence officer Dr. Gerhard Conrad’s hostage negotiations involving Hamas and Hezbollah, Swiss American attorney Daniel Levin’s work in the Middle East with The Liechtenstein Foundation for State Governance, and Swiss diplomat Pascal Holiger’s negotiations involving the victims of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The role of empathy, culture, trust, language, and nuance remains critically valuable in such delicate endeavors. And today, trust remains the coin of the realm as 3rd-party nations such as Pakistan and Turkey, as well as others, facilitate ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Iran’s IRGC leadership.

The Iran negotiations will involve more time, which remains Iran’s best weapon, as it can continue to cause economic pain for the West, especially America, as it approaches the November 2026 midterm elections. During its devastating war with Iraq during the 1980s – with over 1 million Iranian casualties – Iran fought for 8 years before the late Ayatollah Khomeini made a peace deal, “drinking from the poisoned chalice.” And a battered, weakened Iran continues to be patient and resolved. And so, a key question now involves President Trump, and what actions – diplomatic or military – he might take next, and whether he too, will be forced to “drink from the poisoned chalice.” The stakes could not be higher. And practitioners of intelligence diplomacy, such as Pakistan, Turkey, and other actors, will continue to be linchpins of any diplomatic successes. But unlike past similar negotiations, which involved discretion and secrecy, today’s intelligence diplomacy takes place in the glare of the media and its heir apparent, social media --- a curse and a blessing for its practitioners. What hasn’t changed is that words and actions – especially those of President Trump and the Iranian leadership - still matter, more than ever.

Dr. Kenneth Dekleva served as a Regional Medical Officer/Psychiatrist with the U.S. Dept. of State from 2002-2016 and is currently CEO of Blackwood Advisory Solutions LLC, and Professor of Psychiatry, UT Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX. The views expressed by Dr. Dekleva are entirely his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Dept. of State, or UT Southwestern Medical Center.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Front Line of the AI Race Runs Through Your Company's Chat Logs https://belimedia.com.ng/the-front-line-of-the-ai-race-runs-through-your-companys-chat-logs https://belimedia.com.ng/the-front-line-of-the-ai-race-runs-through-your-companys-chat-logs Last year, a statement from former White House AI advisor David Sacks stopped Washington cold. "We now have a Chinese open-weight model that is as good as the currently available models from OpenAI and Anthropic," Sacks told a podcast audience, describing Z.ai's GLM-5.2 as comparable to Anthropic's Opus and level with OpenAI's latest offerings. A Chinese startup had, in his telling, matched the two American frontier labs that have spent tens of billions of dollars to stay ahead.

The reaction in policy circles was predictable, viewed by many as a "DeepSeek" type watershed moment (or a “Sputnik” moment for AI). Some warned that American export controls—tightened out of fear that China might steal our most advanced models—were now slowing our own companies down while Beijing caught up on its own.

That debate matters. But it also misses a much larger, more dangerous point. The critical question was never merely whether China could build a competitive frontier model. It was how China would build it: by leveraging an unprecedented industrial espionage infrastructure that has, over the past three decades, executed the most expansive campaign of intellectual property theft in human history.

The Strategy Behind the Steal

We spent two years researching this pattern for our book. The conclusion was uncomfortable and unavoidable: the theft of American intellectual property by the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not a series of isolated incidents. It is a well-resourced national strategy directed from the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Consider the closest analogy to the current moment. A federal jury in San Francisco convicted former Google engineer Linwei Ding on multiple counts of economic espionage and theft of trade secrets. While drawing a Google paycheck, Ding uploaded more than a thousand confidential documents describing the company's AI supercomputing architecture to a personal account. Simultaneously, Ding was building AI companies in China, pitching Beijing investors on his ability to replicate the proprietary architecture he had taken. It was the first conviction on AI-specific economic espionage charges in American history. It will not be the last.

Ding represents the headline-grabbing version of the threat: a single insider walking out the door with the crown jewels. But focusing exclusively on these dramatic cases obscures a stealthier, more systematic campaign that has done far greater structural damage.

For more than a decade, state-linked actors have vacuumed up the personal data of the American people at an industrial scale:

  • The 2015 OPM Breach: Exposed the security clearance files of more than 20 million federal employees—the most sensitive personnel records the government keeps.
  • The Anthem Breach: Compromised the health records of nearly 80 million people.
  • The Equifax Breach: Handed over the financial histories of some 145 million Americans.

None of these breaches were random. Aggregate these datasets and you map the human terrain of any target organization. Who holds a clearance? Who is in debt? Who is vulnerable? This is the raw material of counterintelligence—the blueprint an adversary uses to identify, pressure, or monitor individuals inside a critical company or government agency. The Ding case and the mass data breaches are not separate stories; they are the same narrative operating at different scales, both optimized to accelerate the PRC's ascent as an AI superpower.

The Threat of 'Digital Exhaust'

Now comes the newest chapter. Alongside human espionage and big-data harvesting, Chinese labs have increasingly utilized "distillation"—the practice of systematically querying leading American models via proxy accounts to extract their behaviors, subsequently training cheaper domestic competitors on the output. It is intellectual property theft automated via software.

The result is the arrival of models like GLM-5.2, which are functional and cheap enough that Western enterprises are already debating whether to integrate them. When European companies begin exploring the use of these models in enterprise settings, it should deeply worry anyone who understands where this technology originates and what running it inside a secure network invites.

This is the vulnerability the current AI-race debate routinely skips: You do not need to steal a frontier model to win the geopolitical competition. You need the data that surrounds it.

The richest source of that data is rarely a heavily guarded research lab. Instead, it is the everyday communication of American companies, defense contractors, and technology startups working in sensitive dual-use fields like quantum computing or autonomous systems. It is the steady stream of messages, proprietary files, meeting notes, and project plans moving every hour across consumer chat apps and fragmented collaboration tools that were never engineered to withstand a nation-state adversary.

We call this "digital exhaust." It is the operational residue of how an organization actually functions, and it is enormously revealing:

  • A messaging thread reveals internal hierarchies and decision-makers.
  • A shared drive exposes which critical program is behind schedule and which supplier holds the bottleneck component.
  • A calendar maps exactly when and where executive leadership is traveling.

None of this information is classified, yet all of it is highly actionable. An adversary does not need to break advanced encryption if they can seamlessly map an organization from the outside, identify its weak points, and exploit them. This is precisely the operational targeting that mass data theft enables, and precisely the exposure that a fragmented, consumer-grade communications stack guarantees.

Securing the New Front Line

The frontier of great-power competition has fundamentally shifted, dissolving the old division of labor between public defense and private enterprise. The front line no longer runs exclusively through government agencies; it runs through global logistics firms, the energy grid, defense-tech startups, and commercial AI labs.

Private companies and critical infrastructure operators are now the first points of contact with nation-state adversaries. Yet, they are expected to coordinate with law enforcement and government partners in real time using an improvised patchwork of commercial applications—each representing a separate vendor, a distinct cloud, and an isolated point of failure.

The federal government solved this vulnerability for its own operations long ago by building sovereign, compartmented, end-to-end secure networks like the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)—environments designed from the ground up on the absolute assumption that a nation-state is actively trying to get in. The private sector, now standing on that same front line, possesses no equivalent infrastructure.

Closing this gap is a matter of immediate national security. The current moment demands a unified coordination layer built to the rigid security standards the government holds itself to, but optimized for the commercial operators and law enforcement agencies that protect our critical infrastructure.

Achieving this requires a fundamental shift in how we approach enterprise security:

  • Consolidated Environments: Moving communications and collaboration onto a single, hardened platform rather than a fragmented scattering of consumer tools.
  • Sovereign Data Control: Ensuring an organization’s operational data and "digital exhaust" never reside in vulnerable, third-party commercial clouds beyond their direct control
  • Verified Identity Architecture: Implementing strict identity verification to prevent adversaries from covertly infiltrating internal organizational communications.
  • Cross-Institutional Security: Enabling secure, real-time collaboration across institutional seams—from a private tech firm to a police department to a military command—without downgrading to unencrypted group chats.

This shift toward sovereign, secure enterprise infrastructure—the exact architectural paradigm we are focused on building at Coalition Systems—is the only way to deny an adversary the digital exhaust they have learned to harvest so effectively. It brings the core principles of sovereign government networks to the commercial frontline.

The defining lesson of the last decade is that the PRC treats the systematic theft of American ingenuity as a core instrument of national power. The rapid closing of the AI capability gap is a stark reminder of how far that strategy has carried them. The correct response cannot just be guarding the frontier models inside the labs. We must secure the operational ground where the day-to-day competition is actually being fought: the everyday communications of the American enterprise. We have left that ground undefended for too long. We cannot afford to do so any longer.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
What Makes American Patriotism So Different https://belimedia.com.ng/what-makes-american-patriotism-so-different https://belimedia.com.ng/what-makes-american-patriotism-so-different We are about to close out the 250th year since Tom and the boys stepped brashly onto the world stage and declared with clarity of purpose and universality of meaning our national independence. As proud Americans, we will rightly participate in moments of colorful ostentation and exuberant excess. The 4th of July is flags and fireworks, barbecue and beer, the Air Force’s fabulous Thunderbirds and the United States Marine Corps Band. While certainly some will use the opportunity to cynically enumerate our shortcomings, historical and contemporary, we are, in fact, the longest-standing nation built solely on democratic principles.

Amidst the jubilation, it is probably useful to contemplate the true meaning of American patriotism. Any country can have patriots, but American patriotism is unique. We are not a nation of race or ethnicity, of religion or sectarianism; we do not accept fealty to the absurd notion of inherited “majesty”. We come from all corners of the earth. Nothing makes us inherently better than any other humans. What binds is a set of ideals, the concept of human liberty, and that alone. We do not own this idea; it is human liberty, after all, not American liberty. We are not a people with a set of ideals; we are a set of ideals with a people. We do boldly claim stewardship of these ideals, and, in so doing, we as a nation and as individual citizens accept responsibility for living and acting on them. The conspirators of the Declaration and the framers of the Constitution understood this, and they laid a foundation for a society built on respect for human dignity.

The Constitution itself is a holistic document, imperfect in form, but perfect in meaning. It symbolizes what humans across geography and time yearn for -- a society consciously protecting and celebrating individual freedom while preserving the existence of a nation in which those freedoms may be enjoyed. There are other democratic republics, but there is no other nation like ours. This is the reason people all over the world want to come here. We have what the people of Iran and China want desperately. In contrast, immigration to Russia is the province of the likes of Edward Snowden and Bashar Hafiz al-Asad.

As citizens, we must be attentive to this responsibility we have all accepted, but to put it simply, we could screw this up. As Ronald Reagan famously observed, freedom is always one generation from extinction. That generation does not have to be youngsters convinced of society’s obligation to insulate them from discomfort. It can equally be oldsters who are so lost in narrow-minded rhetoric that they forget the point. American patriotism is not selfish or angry or confrontational or in-your-face or blindly convinced of righteousness. It is the opposite, characterized by humility and generosity, in keeping with our founding ideals.

Whether we were born American or sought and earned our way to citizenship, we have the same burden. Patriotism looks at our tremendous successes as a nation with the same honest eye as our failures, with humble recognition that each contributes to the weight of our obligation to our principles. Patriotism seeks harmony but requires honesty and selflessness. Patriotism calls for deliberate, conscious effort, not just on the 4th of July, but in any action that puts our nation’s credibility on display. We have something no one else has -- no one else has ever had, and the world is watching. As we begin our next quarter of a millennium, America needs patriots as much as ever. Let us seek to be worthy of the stewardship we have been fortunate enough to inherit.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Former Spy Reflects on the Impact of Normandy https://belimedia.com.ng/a-former-spy-reflects-on-the-impact-of-normandy https://belimedia.com.ng/a-former-spy-reflects-on-the-impact-of-normandy I recently returned from commemorating the 82nd Anniversary of D-Day in Normandy—a much anticipated trip since I participated in the 80th Anniversary. I left with a sense of humility and gratitude for having walked the hallowed grounds of Normandy, and with admiration for the Greatest Generation and their sacrifices and actions that changed human history. The connection with Americans, grateful Normans, Europeans who still remember all too well the war, and participants from all over the world who were all there to mark this historic event was remarkable.

Normandy is a place for deep connections. I stood in the door of a vintage C-47 flying low over La Fière Drop Zone listening to the engines roar. Eighty-two years earlier, young paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne jumped into the darkness, many landing in flooded fields or directly into the path of German fire. In the clear light of that June morning in 2026, the hedgerows and pastures looked deceptively serene. What did those young paratroopers see and feel as they jumped into the unknown?

I had the chance to revisit Omaha Beach. The sounds of the waves on that rocky beach can be surreal, an echo of history. If you’ve been there, you remember it. I wondered whether those waves sounded exactly the same on June 6, 1944 as young soldiers and sailors endured withering fire from German positions and refused to be turned back—their sacrifice and refusal to fail now legendary.

In the square of Sainte-Mère-Église, the energetic heart of every Normandy commemoration, I looked up at the church steeple where a mannequin still marks the spot where John Steele hung entangled 82 years ago prior to being captured by the Germans. I imagined the dark sky filled with silk canopies and German ground fire as American paratroopers fought to secure the first town liberated in Normandy and as long-suffering and hopeful Normans awaited the outcome.

Those images are powerful. Normandy is a place that both haunts and inspires, and it invites reflection. It is a powerful reminder of the immeasurable human suffering caused by tyrants and extraordinary cost of freedom. It is hard to visit without connecting with that past; the courage and resilience of the occupied and oppressed, and the audacity and selfless sacrifice of the liberators.

There are so many other images there that make those connections—the American Cemetery with endless rows of white crosses, Pointe du Hoc rugged cliffs and Ranger Monument, Pegasus Bridge, the La Fière causeway and bridge, and many others. Given the scale of D-Day, almost every town, village, beach, road, and bridge witnessed thousands of human stories that shaped the outcome—some well-known, many now faded into history.

The memories and lessons of Normandy transcend time. The threats confronting America today are different from those of 1944, but several enduring lessons remain relevant.

American Leadership Matters

There are things that only America can do, alliances that only America can lead, and geopolitical outcomes that only America can achieve. Eighty-two years ago, the world faced a dangerous shift in the global order. American leadership in WWII was decisive—not only in securing military victory, but in establishing a new world order that has endured for 82 years.

No other country then or now could have led such a global effort, and it cemented America’s emergence as a superpower. Threats in Europe and the Pacific have new faces, but American leadership is as vital today as it was then. Like the authoritarians of that era, Russia and China are actively working to reshape the current world order to their advantage. Both are moving to fill perceived vacuums created by shifts in America’s global posture. Only America can lead the effort to deter them.

If the current world order is to survive and prosper, American leadership on the global stage remains essential.

Alliances Win

America’s leadership role in WWII was crucial, but so were the contributions of its allies and partners. British and Canadian forces played vital roles in D-Day. The French Resistance fought bravely and enabled the work of the American OSS and British SOE. The Soviet Union—then an ally of necessity, now an adversary—played a key role in defeating Nazi forces on the Eastern Front, while other nations—including Poland, Norway, Belgium, and France—made meaningful contributions.

The Allies clearly needed America to enter the war in Europe, but America clearly needed a strong alliance to ensure victory. Global competition has changed—our adversaries are fighting a different war—but reliable partners are still important. Today, alliances are less about planning invasions and more about deterring authoritarian aggression, and building a competitive edge across military, economic, technological, information, and cognitive domains.

America needs its partners. In return, those partners look for a strong and trusted America. Filling that role must remain a national priority.

America’s Story and a National Purpose

Great nations need more than military power to prevail; they also require a compelling national purpose. WWII roused America from its isolationist slumber. The brutal occupation and oppression across Europe, combined with the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, shattered America’s belief that it could keep major wars at a distance. Powerful themes emerged that were necessary to mobilize an entire nation: “Arsenal of Democracy”, “Four Freedoms”, and the call to defeat fascism.

These ideas fueled a national call to arms, unprecedented mobilization, and prepared America for rationing at home, mass deployments overseas, and the loss of so many Americans who would not return home. America had a compelling national purpose, and it communicated that purpose through a powerful national narrative—we might call that narrative America’s Story. That story included ideals of freedom, democracy, collective security, and the promise of a better postwar order that enabled America to forge and unite an alliance that had previously faltered. That same narrative power remains essential today.

Our adversaries, who seek to reshape the world order, understand the power of America’s story and are working to tell their version of it to their advantage. A persuasive, authentic national narrative—America’s Story—is a national imperative.

Warfare Remains a Human Endeavor

D-Day was a remarkable display of technological innovation. Some technologies were used for the very first time or the first time under such extreme combat conditions. Notable successes, such as the Mulberry Artificial Harbors, the PLUTO undersea fuel pipeline, and improved electronic capabilities that enabled unprecedented coordination of Allied air power played key roles.

Even the highly successful deception operation, Operation Fortitude, relied on technological advancements in jamming and radar deception. In contrast, swimming tanks, gliders, and pathfinder equipment—also rushed into service to achieve surprise and an early advantage—did not meet full operational expectations.

Ultimately, capitalizing on technological advances and compensating for technology failures required human innovation and decisions at the speed of war. In the end, the human dimensions of D-Day—judgment, decision-making in the face of uncertainty, problem solving, detecting and countering deception, courage, and resilience—played a greater role than technology in winning the day and securing victory in Europe.

This is still true today even as AI, robotics, cyber, cognitive tools, and other technologies accelerate the evolution of warfare. A risk is that humans cede decision-making to technology in exchange for greater speed and precision at the expense of judgment, leadership, ingenuity, and moral responsibility. Walking Normandy and seeing the impacts of these human dimensions remind us that while technology, geopolitics, and adversaries change, the human qualities that ultimately shape history do not.

It is these human qualities—not technology itself—that remain America's enduring strategic advantage.

My sincerest thanks to Liberty Jump Team, Corsicana Texas, for an exceptional visit to Normandy for the 82nd Anniversary of D-Day. I’m definitely looking forward to the 83rd.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 11 Jul 2026 20:57:27 +0100 FirstHandNews
DNI Day Two: Building the Intelligence Community for 2045 https://belimedia.com.ng/dni-day-two-building-the-intelligence-community-for-2045 https://belimedia.com.ng/dni-day-two-building-the-intelligence-community-for-2045

Author's Note

In our first paper, DNI Day One: Three Strategic Decisions for National Security Evolution, we identified three challenges confronting the next Director of National Intelligence: enterprise leadership, resource alignment, and strategic competition. This paper focuses on the reforms most likely to improve the Intelligence Community's ability to meet those challenges.

The recommendations that follow are not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, they represent structural changes that could have disproportionate impact across the Intelligence Community: refocusing ODNI on total enterprise leadership, modernizing how intelligence investments are governed, and creating a mechanism to identify and resolve the institutional seams that America's adversaries increasingly exploit.

Reasonable observers may disagree on the specific solutions proposed here. However, the need for reform is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Twenty years after the creation of ODNI, the Intelligence Community faces a fundamentally different operating environment shaped by strategic competition, commercial innovation, artificial intelligence, and increasingly integrated threats. The challenge is not whether the nation needs intelligence reform, but where leaders should focus their attention to achieve the greatest enterprise impact.

Recommendation 1: Return ODNI to its Community Management Roots

We do not recommend eliminating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The need for a senior intelligence leader responsible for integrating the Intelligence Community remains as important today as it was when leaders such as Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar first advocated for reform in the 1990s. The failures exposed by the attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the limitations of the existing Community Management Staff structure and ultimately led Congress to establish the DNI.

The challenge today is not whether the nation needs a DNI. It is whether ODNI is organized to perform its most important functions and has the correct authorities and oversight functions to truly lead the intelligence community.

The next DNI should undertake a deliberate reevaluation of ODNI’s mission and functions to refocus the organization on its original purpose: enterprise leadership, integration, resource alignment, and community management. Functions that primarily execute intelligence missions, including analysis, collection activities, and intelligence operations, should be performed by agencies whose core mission is operational execution. ODNI should focus on the responsibilities that only an enterprise integrator can perform.

Specifically,

Conduct a 90-day review of all ODNI organizations against a simple standard: Does this function uniquely require an enterprise integrator? The review should be led by a small panel of respected former intelligence leaders and provide recommendations to both the DNI and Congress. This would include specific evaluations of the transfers of NCSC and NCTC, both of which have been periodically discussed.

Transfer mission execution functions that do not require ODNI ownership to the agencies best positioned to perform them.

Reestablish National Intelligence Managers as true enterprise leaders responsible for integrating priorities, collection, analysis, partnerships, workforce planning, and resources.

Rebuild the ODNI as a modern Community Management Staff focused on enterprise integration, technology governance, workforce planning, and resource alignment

Why

ODNI's greatest value is ensuring that the Intelligence Community performs its missions effectively. The DNI should be a leadership and service organization rather than another operational intelligence entity. The Intelligence Community needs a strong enterprise manager capable of aligning priorities, resolving disputes, integrating capabilities, and driving accountability across agencies.

The Intelligence Community's most significant challenges, including artificial intelligence, commercial data integration, workforce modernization, and emerging technology governance, require enterprise leadership. ODNI should lead these efforts.

Recommendation 2: Integrate the Civilian and Defense Intelligence Enterprises and Modernize Intelligence Investment Governance

The next DNI and Secretary of Defense should establish a shared leadership model for integrating the Intelligence Community's civilian and defense intelligence enterprises. As part of this effort, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USDI&S) should serve as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, creating a direct leadership link between the Office of the DNI and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

Together, the DNI and Deputy DNI should establish and co-chair an Intelligence Investment Board responsible for enterprise-level investment decisions in areas where national and military intelligence requirements increasingly overlap, including:

  • Artificial intelligence and advanced analytics;
  • Commercial data and data acquisition;
  • Space-based intelligence capabilities;
  • Cloud infrastructure and computing environments;
  • Enterprise architectures and interoperability standards;
  • Open-source intelligence data procurement;
  • Collection modernization, including human intelligence

The Board should review major intelligence investments through an enterprise lens, identify opportunities to eliminate duplication, establish common standards, and ensure that capabilities serving both national and military missions are developed and funded as integrated priorities.

Over time, Congress should direct a formal review of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP) construct with the goal of transitioning from separate budget categories toward a capability-based investment framework that better reflects how intelligence is collected, analyzed, and delivered in the modern operating environment.

Why

The Intelligence Community has made significant progress integrating its civilian intelligence agencies over the past two decades. Less attention, however, has been paid to fully integrating the broader Defense Intelligence Enterprise, including DIA, the military services, Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff intelligence organizations. Collectively, these organizations represent the majority of the Intelligence Community's personnel, collection infrastructure, and operational intelligence capabilities.

The current structure creates an inherent challenge. The DNI is responsible for leading the Intelligence Community, while the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security is responsible for oversight, guidance, and policy across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Yet, many of the capabilities that will define future intelligence advantage increasingly serve both national and military missions.

Artificial intelligence, commercial data, space-based collection, cloud infrastructure, and advanced analytic platforms do not neatly align with traditional organizational boundaries. They support policymakers, military commanders, intelligence analysts, and operational forces alike. Maintaining separate governance and investment decisions for capabilities that serve both national and military missions risks duplication, slows modernization, and increases costs.

We recognize that proposals to further integrate intelligence governance between ODNI and the Department of Defense may raise concerns about authorities, resources, and departmental equities. This recommendation is not intended to diminish the Department's role in intelligence or transfer operational control away from Defense organizations. Rather, it reflects the reality that much of the nation's intelligence capability already resides within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and that effective enterprise leadership requires a governance structure that fully incorporates those resources.

Nor is this recommendation fundamentally about transferring budget authority between organizations. Many of the capabilities discussed in this paper already support missions identified as national intelligence responsibilities under Executive Order 12333 while simultaneously enabling military operations. The challenge is not determining who owns the mission. The challenge is ensuring that enterprise investments are prioritized, governed, and integrated in ways that serve both national and military decision-makers.

To support this integration effort, the Intelligence Community should adopt several enterprise principles.

The DNI and Deputy DNI should jointly establish intelligence priorities and investment guidance. As part of this effort, the National Intelligence Priorities Framework should be modernized into an Intelligence Priorities Framework that reflects the reality that many of today's intelligence challenges span both national and departmental missions. Priorities should be organized around mission outcomes and decision advantage rather than institutional ownership.

The Intelligence Community should pursue acquisition reform focused on enterprise outcomes. Today, agencies often procure similar data, software, cloud services, and analytic capabilities through separate contracts, acquisition strategies, and governance processes. The result is unnecessary duplication, higher costs, slower technology adoption, and inconsistent access across the enterprise. The Intelligence Investment Board should promote joint procurement strategies, establish common requirements where practical, and leverage the collective buying power of the national and defense intelligence enterprises. The goal is a more coordinated approach to acquiring capabilities that support shared missions.

The Intelligence Community should treat commercial capabilities as foundational intelligence infrastructure rather than niche enhancements. Commercial space systems, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, advanced analytics, and open-source intelligence capabilities are no longer supplementary tools. They increasingly form a core infrastructure upon which intelligence advantage depends.

Finally, the Intelligence Community should deepen its engagement with industry, academia, and the broader innovation ecosystem through formal executive and technical exchange programs. Despite decades of outreach initiatives, advisory boards, and pilot programs, the government continues to struggle with integrating commercial innovation at the speed of relevance. Time-limited assignments for leaders from industry, academia, and venture-backed technology firms, coupled with opportunities for intelligence professionals to gain experience in the commercial sector, would help close this gap. These exchanges should operate under rigorous ethics and conflict-of-interest safeguards and be tied to specific objectives such as technology adoption, acquisition reform, commercial integration, and workforce modernization.

For the first time in Intelligence Community history, much of the innovation that will determine future intelligence advantage is being driven outside government. The Intelligence Community's governance, investment, acquisition, and talent management models must evolve accordingly.

Recommendation 3: Establish Strategic Competition as a Core Community Management Function

The next DNI should designate strategic competition as a core Community Management responsibility and direct the Deputy DNI to establish a formal enterprise process for identifying, prioritizing, and resolving the intelligence, counterintelligence, information-sharing, technology, and operational seams that America's adversaries routinely exploit.

This recommendation does not require the creation of a new mission center, operational office, or permanent bureaucracy. Rather, it should be accomplished through a realignment of existing ODNI Community Management responsibilities, leveraging the National Intelligence Managers, Mission Integration organizations, and existing interagency coordination mechanisms.

The Deputy DNI should be responsible for leading this effort in close partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reflecting the reality that strategic competition increasingly occurs at the intersection of foreign intelligence, domestic security, counterintelligence, and military operations.

The objective should be straightforward: identify where institutional barriers are preventing the United States from effectively developing strategic competition options and assign responsibility for resolving those barriers.

The Deputy DNI should provide regular updates to the DNI, Director of the FBI, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Advisor, and congressional oversight committees identifying:

  • The most significant intelligence integration challenges affecting strategic competition.
  • Progress in resolving identified institutional barriers.
  • Recommendations requiring policy, resource, legislative, or executive action.
  • Remaining risks to national security resulting from unresolved seams.

The effort should establish annual priorities focused on key strategic competitors, beginning with China, Russia, and Iran, and develop measurable objectives tied to enterprise integration and operational outcomes.

Measures of effectiveness should include reductions in information-sharing delays, improvements in technology protection, increased intelligence support to operational missions, improved integration across agencies, and demonstrable disruption of adversary activities.

Why

America's strategic competitors already operate as integrated national security enterprises. They do not distinguish between intelligence collection, technology acquisition, economic competition, cyber operations, influence campaigns, espionage, military modernization, and industrial policy. They employ all instruments of national power in a coordinated manner to advance national objectives.

The United States, by contrast, often organizes its responses through institutional, legal, budgetary, and bureaucratic boundaries that were designed for a different era. As a result, adversaries frequently exploit the seams between foreign intelligence and domestic security, intelligence and law enforcement, technology protection and economic policy, cyber defense and traditional intelligence operations, and national and military intelligence activities.

Intelligence support to strategic competition increasingly requires enterprise leadership capable of integrating activities across the Intelligence Community and identifying barriers that no single organization has the authority or perspective to address independently. This responsibility naturally belongs within ODNI's Community Management function. Strategic competition is fundamentally an enterprise integration challenge. It requires leadership capable of aligning priorities, resolving disputes, integrating capabilities, and ensuring that intelligence activities contribute to broader national objectives.

Also, the DNI, working closely with the FBI and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is uniquely positioned to bridge the foreign-domestic and intelligence-operations divides that adversaries increasingly exploit.

Ultimately, the Intelligence Community must evolve from simply informing policymakers about adversary campaigns to providing options for the US to compete effectively against adversaries. Strategic competition is the defining national security challenge of the twenty-first century and should be treated as a core Community Management responsibility.

The Ultimate Test of ODNI: Measuring Enterprise Success

As the enterprise leader of the Intelligence Community, this new DNI should demonstrate not only value to Congress and the Executive Branch, but also measurable value back to the agencies, departments, and professionals that comprise the Community. The ultimate test of ODNI's effectiveness is not how many directives it issues, how many meetings it convenes, or how many organizations it oversees. It is whether the Intelligence Community operates more effectively because ODNI exists. The ability to demonstrate measurable outcomes across the enterprise may ultimately be the strongest answer to the recurring question that has followed ODNI since its creation: Does the nation need a DNI? We believe that answer is yes, but that value should be visible, measurable, and attributable.

Specifically, the DNI should be able to demonstrate measurable progress in the following areas to share with OMB, Oversight and the Public:

• Enterprise Priority Alignment
Can the Intelligence Community rapidly align collection, analysis, and resources against emerging national security priorities without creating new organizations or duplicative structures?
(Example: Intelligence Community resources were redirected within weeks to support a Taiwan crisis, major cyber incident, or emerging Arctic challenge without establishing a new task force or mission center.)

• Resource Integration
Has the Intelligence Community reduced duplicative investments and improved enterprise decision-making across the National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program?
(Example: Enterprise licensing and coordinated procurement reduced duplicative commercial data purchases by $15 million annually while expanding access to multiple agencies.)

• Technology Adoption
Has the time required to identify, procure, accredit, and operationalize new technologies been reduced?
(Example: The average timeline for deployment of AI-enabled analytic tools decreased from 24 months to less than 12 months.)

• Commercial Integration
Can commercial capabilities, data, and services be incorporated into intelligence missions at the speed of relevance while maintaining security, interoperability, and mission assurance?
(Example: Commercial GEOINT, RF, maritime, and financial data became available through enterprise contracts rather than separate agency purchases.)

• AI Enablement
Has the Intelligence Community successfully integrated artificial intelligence into collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination workflows while preserving human oversight and accountability?
(Example: AI-assisted workflows reduced imagery exploitation timelines by 50 percent while maintaining analytic quality standards.)

• Strategic Competition
Can the Intelligence Community identify, expose, disrupt, and provide options to impose costs on adversary campaigns that span intelligence, cyber, economic, military, and informational domains?
(Example: Intelligence support enabled the disruption of a foreign technology acquisition network or exposed a coordinated foreign influence campaign.)

• Warning and Decision Advantage
Are policymakers, military leaders, and operators receiving integrated intelligence faster and in forms that improve decision-making?
(Example: Strategic warning identified adversary military preparations or cyber activity days earlier than historical performance benchmarks.)

Conclusion

Twenty years after the creation of ODNI, the Intelligence Community faces a fundamentally different operating environment than the one that existed following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Strategic competition, artificial intelligence, commercial innovation, and increasingly integrated threats are challenging many of the assumptions that shaped intelligence governance over the past two decades.

The recommendations outlined in this paper are not intended to redesign the Intelligence Community. Rather, they focus on three areas where reform could produce disproportionate enterprise impact: returning ODNI to its Community Management roots, modernizing how intelligence investments are governed across the national and defense intelligence enterprises, and establishing strategic competition as a core Community Management responsibility.

Taken together, these reforms would strengthen the Intelligence Community's ability to compete more effectively against increasingly sophisticated adversaries. Most importantly, the reforms can largely be accomplished through leadership, governance, and organizational discipline rather than the creation of new bureaucracies or increased resources.

The Intelligence Community does not suffer from a lack of talent, authorities, or capability. Its greatest challenge is ensuring that its capabilities are organized and integrated for the environment it faces today rather than the one it inherited twenty years ago. The next DNI has an opportunity to help lead that transition.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 27 Jun 2026 07:18:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
The AI Bubble and the Growing National Security Problem https://belimedia.com.ng/the-ai-bubble-and-the-growing-national-security-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/the-ai-bubble-and-the-growing-national-security-problem The AI bubble is not a capability bubble. It is an expectation bubble. National security leaders are treating AI as a replacement for analysts, engineers, and tradecraft when it is really a volatile acceleration layer that still requires human judgment, security controls, and cost discipline.

The current state of AI is defined by inflated assumptions. Vendors overstate capability, users over-delegate judgment, and policymakers react to controlled demos as if they represent real-world operational power. The Mythos/Fable incident shows how quickly that confusion can become policy: the U.S. government treated access to a commercial model as a national-security transfer, forcing Anthropic to restrict access to its premier systems.

The problem is not that Mythos is too powerful. The problem is that institutions are starting to make decisions as if the marketing copy is reality. These systems are powerful, but they are not independent thinkers.

AI can surface information at extraordinary speed. It can summarize documents, generate code, translate foreign-language material, identify patterns, and automate repetitive tasks — but it cannot create new ground truth. It cannot determine whether a piece of intelligence is reliable, whether a cyber operation is lawful, or whether an analytic conclusion is strategically sound.

This is where the national-security conversation is going wrong. The debate keeps treating model capability as operational capability. They are not the same. A model that can describe a vulnerability is not the same as an operator who can exploit it. A model that can summarize a document is not the same as an analyst who can assess it. The more powerful these systems become, the more dangerous that distinction becomes.

AI does not exercise judgment, understand mission context, or carry accountability. It is an acceleration layer, and in the hands of trained users, it compresses time and expands reach. In the hands of institutions that mistake output for truth, it will accelerate error, overconfidence, and bad policy.

The bubble is bursting, but not because AI failed

The AI bubble is bursting because organizations bought the wrong story. They thought they were buying replacement labor. What they actually bought was an expensive, overconfident junior assistant: impressive in the interview and with first drafts, but unreliable when placed inside workflows that require judgment, context, and accountability.

Despite the rhetoric of AI replacing jobs, companies are starting to confront a harder reality: these systems can accelerate work, but they do not eliminate the need for people who understand the work. The danger is not simply that AI will produce bad output; the danger is that institutions will mistake that output for finished analysis.

AI is not cheap labor

AI is often sold as cheap replacement labor. The reality is much more nuanced: in proactive it is an expensive acceleration layer that still requires human judgment, review, and correction. At Shadow Nexus, we have AI integrated as a portion of our solution, but it is not the capability itself. Using AI in this manner helps us unlock information hidden in data that would be difficult to reach manually. But this has only worked because our tools requires a human to be involved every step of the way – providing course correction and validation.

That's what makes the "fully autonomous" pitch so misleading. The autonomy is really a system that, left unchecked, is prone to make mistakes and inflate costs.

Microsoft researchers recently tested how major frontier models perform in delegated workflows. They found that even frontier models corrupted an average of 25 percent of document content after 20 back-and-forth interactions, while the average across all tested models was about 50 percent degradation. Degradation worsened with larger documents, longer interactions, and distractor files.

The test was simple: give the model a document, ask it to make an edit, then ask it to get back to its original state. A reliable delegate will returns the document close to its original form. Instead, the errors compounded — like making a photocopy of a photocopy until the original slowly disappears.

The problem is further compounded by the constantly changing pricing model. Anthropic's Opus 4.7 tokenizer increased token usage by up to 35 percent (meaning the same text put into Opus 4.6 would require 35% less tokens). Then with the introduction of Fable 5 only a few months later, Anthropic doubled the published token price.

This rapid increase represents a serious procurement problem for corporations and government customers alike. Agencies can budget for seats, licenses, and fixed contracts. It is much harder to budget for agentic workflows that expand unpredictably through context growth, tool calls, retries, failed tasks, and human rework. That is not just sticker shock. It is meter opacity.

The Tradecraft Problem

Cost is only half the problem. Even at a price you can predict, AI introduces a subtler risk: it produces polished mistakes at scale — and in analytic environments, a polished mistake is far more dangerous than an obvious one.

AI hallucination is not just a chatbot problem. It becomes an institutional risk when generated text enters official documents, legal analysis, or intelligence reporting without source-level verification. Recently, Deloitte Australia agreed to partially refund the Australian government after a report it produced was found to contain AI-generated errors, including nonexistent references and fabricated quotes from a federal court judge.

For intelligence work, the analogy is obvious. A hallucinated citation is not a formatting error, it’s a provenance failure – and a hallucinated provenance chain can contaminate judgment, mislead decision-makers, and jeopardize missions. Don’t misunderstand me: This does not mean AI should be kept out of intelligence work. It means the tradecraft needs to evolve.

AI can be a force multiplier when used to accelerate research, translation, link analysis, and other repetitive analytic tasks - but it should not be treated as a replacement analyst. It has no concept of a larger context, which means it can’t understand legal authorities, operational risk, or true mission context. Those responsibilities still (and should always) belong to people. The right model is not “AI instead of analysts,” it is analysts using AI inside workflows. This requires changing the tradecraft to include a completely new way of thinking.

Which lands a government customer in an impossible spot: how do you adopt and rely on a tool that you can neither fully trust nor accurately budget for?

Government Adoption and the Rising China Problem

For both government and commercial users, the obvious response to rising AI costs is to move towards publicly available "open-weight" models. Systems like GLM-5.2 and Qwen-3.7 now rival the most advanced commercial models, improving cost predictability while keeping sensitive workflows inside government-controlled infrastructure. The catch: they're all designed and shipped from China.

That's what makes the recent Anthropic fight so revealing. Earlier this year, the Pentagon reportedly designated U.S.-based Anthropic a supply-chain risk after a dispute over its safeguards and military use of its models — even as China's GLM-5.2 ranks among the top systems on the market, just behind Anthropic's own Fable 5, with Alibaba's Qwen not far behind.

This is the irony the policy debate: government is trying to regulate a technology it doesn't fully understand, and much of that fear is driven by marketing. Fable 5 is powerful — but so are Opus and GPT-5.5. In the hands of a seasoned user, GPT-5.5 does just as much. As with every new technology, the danger isn't the tool. It's the user.

Meanwhile the drift is already underway. Microsoft recently signaled it may leverage China's DeepSeek model, even as the U.S. weighs blacklisting DeepSeek as a supply-chain risk. Assigning a supply chain risk to U.S. companies feels like an overstep when the trends show organizations moving toward models developed and controlled by adversarial nations.

AI is not going away, and no branding fight or access restriction will change that. The United States should treat AI as the new standard tool for analytic and operational work. But that is all it is: a tool. At its best, it's a starting point — a way to draft, accelerate research, and move faster through large volumes of information. That is also where the handoff to a human has to happen.

The Microsoft research and the Deloitte case are the warning. Left alone, generative AI does exactly what it is built to do: generate plausible output, regardless of accuracy. That risk only compounds as agencies look past closed U.S. models toward open-weight systems built by adversaries.

What happens when the model itself has been trained to nudge its answers — quietly, in a direction someone else chooses? Left uncaught, that kind of slow and deliberate data poisoning can corrupt the very work it's meant to support. That is the real supply-chain risk.

The real work should not be choosing which models we're allowed to use — it should be building the judgment to use them, and not mistaking model names for national-security strategy.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 27 Jun 2026 07:18:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
Don’t Permit Iran to Enrich Uranium https://belimedia.com.ng/dont-permit-iran-to-enrich-uranium https://belimedia.com.ng/dont-permit-iran-to-enrich-uranium Ideally, Iran should not be permitted to enrich uranium, even at the 3.67% low enriched uranium level, enough for nuclear reactors to generate electricity, not a nuclear explosion. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) does not grant an unfettered right to enrich uranium, but even if it did, Iran’s egregious behavior should disqualify them. Indeed, the NPT recognizes the right of non-nuclear-weapons states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Iran has approximately 970 lbs. of uranium enriched to 60% purity – enough for 12 nuclear weapons if in a few weeks enriched to 90% -- that could be down blended to 3.67% in a nuclear weapons state, like Russia, China, or the U.S. Iran may demand, but can they be trusted to down blend this uranium -- buried in deep underground hardened facilities -- themselves?

Enriched uranium for peaceful, civilian use is provided to non-nuclear-weapons states by Russia (Rosatom), France (Orano), a British-Dutch-German consortium (Urenco) and China (China National Nuclear Cooperation). This is where Iran can and should acquire their enriched uranium for peaceful, civilian purposes.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was opposed by some who took issue with the sunset clause that limited enrichment to 3.67% purity for 15 years – until 2031. After that, it depended on nuclear monitors gaining the access necessary to ensure Iran was not enriching at the 20% or 60% purity levels, a few weeks from the 90% purity level necessary for nuclear weapons. The JCPOA also limited Iran to use first-generation centrifuges for 10 years – until 2026 – after which, more sophisticated centrifuges could be developed and used to enrich uranium.

But this should not be a contest between the JCPOA and whatever is decided during the upcoming 60 days of nuclear negotiations with Iran. Our focus should be on Iran and how they succeeded in convincing the U.S. and our allies and partners to trust them to enrich uranium at the 3.67% purity level for civilian use only. But Iran was enriching at the 20% and 60% levels, seemingly threatening to go nuclear, despite their stated commitment not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. It’s now publicly known that prior to 2003, Iran had an active program to produce nuclear weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) often reminds us that their monitors in Iran were denied access to suspect non-declared nuclear sites in Iran. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has criticized Iran for severely restricting or denying monitors access to its nuclear facilities and losing knowledge of Iran’s nuclear materials, thus unable to verify that their program was exclusively peaceful.

But it’s more than the NPT and Iran’s so-called right to enrich uranium. It’s about the regime’s evil behavior. In 1984, the U.S. designated Iran the leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing funding, weapons, training, and sanctuary to numerous terrorist organizations. Their control of and support to Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis and the thousands of innocent people killed by these cowardly terrorist organizations should not be forgotten.

Iran’s brutal treatment of its own people – the Green Movement in 2009, the Women Life Freedom Movement in 2022, and the 2025-2026 Protests – and the use of lethal force to crush any anti-government dissent should not be forgotten.

This is the Iran we’re dealing with. Indeed, is this the Iran we can trust to enrich uranium at the 3.67% purity level for civilian, peaceful use?

As we prepare for the 60 days of nuclear negotiations, Iran’s theocracy must feel good about the $300 billion they will get for reconstruction and economic development, and the lifting of sanctions to permit them to sell crude oil and diesel on the open market, and according to the Wall Street Journal, the unfreezing of $100 billion for humanitarian use and Qatar’s immediate release of $6 billion. And of course, the lifting of the 2-month U.S. blockade of Iran.

Iran’s supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, said President Donald Trump acted “out of desperation” to secure the agreement with Iran, while Iran acted “out of compassion and goodwill” to reach the agreement.

Iran’s ballistic missile program and support to proxies should follow our scheduled 60 days of nuclear discussions with Iran. These programs are a threat to the region.

Clearly, Iran cannot be trusted to enrich uranium.

The author is a former Director of the National Counterproliferation Center. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

This article was originally published in The Washington Times and is republished here with permission.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 27 Jun 2026 07:18:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
From Bombing Iran to Negotiating: Trump Explains His Red Line https://belimedia.com.ng/from-bombing-iran-to-negotiating-trump-explains-his-red-line https://belimedia.com.ng/from-bombing-iran-to-negotiating-trump-explains-his-red-line “I had to stop them [the Iranians] because if they had a nuclear weapon, they would use it. And you want to see bedlam, let them blow up a couple of cities someplace, like they would've blown up Israel. If it weren't for me, Israel would not exist today, because I terminated the Barack Hussein Obama deal, the JCPOA (the 2015 international agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program), which was a road to a nuclear weapon. They [the Iranians] would've had it five years ago. They would've used it within the first week, in my opinion. And Israel would no longer be with us. Israel would've been gone years ago had I not done that.”

That was President Trump speaking last Friday on The Axios Show, where his interviewer, Marc Caputo, said it was to be a conversation on “power, and how you [Trump] think about it, and how you wield it.”

Over the next 34 minutes, Trump was direct in his views on war, people and negotiations though what he said at times was not totally factual or he left out relevant information. There were also instances where he seemed to be speaking honestly.

Why does Trump say things that many – if not most people – know are wrong? Also, the President, who in the past has sought to portray his role as a man seeking to end wars – and get the Nobel Peace Prize – during the Axios conversation bragged about his various military operations, including the killing of people. Why?

These are things worth discussing because no matter what he says or does in private, it’s what Trump says or does in public that has an impact and affects how people see him, both friends and enemies including foreign leaders.

For example, had Iran developed nuclear weapons, I believe it is highly unlikely they would have quickly used one or more against Israel. That’s because I know, and Iran’s leaders in Tehran certainly know, although it was not widely publicized, that Israel has for decades had a nuclear arsenal of its own, including more than 90 nuclear bombs and warheads. Some of them are on cruise missiles deployed on Israeli submarines, which means they would likely survive a first Iranian strike and potentially be in a place to strike back.

In short, even if Iran had nuclear weapons, I believe even Tehran’s religious leaders would be deterred from using any of them against Israel because they know that Israel could respond with nuclear weapons of their own.

President Trump, I’m sure, knows about Israel’s nuclear arsenal and the theory of mutual deterrence. A country with nuclear weapons has that kind of protection against other countries with such weapons. Think of North Korea, for example.

Back in 2017, Trump threatened North Korean leader Kim Jong Un with “fire and fury and frankly power the likes of which the world has never seen before.” At that time it was doubted that Pyongyang had a nuclear warhead and missile that could reach the U.S. Since then, it’s clear, the North Koreans do have nuclear weapons that can hit American territory and Trump these days speaks of friendship with Kim.

To me, Trump’s repeated claim that his actions against Iran have “saved” Israel are designed to support his own popularity in that country and, at the same time, imply that the radical Iranian religious leaders are crazy enough to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed Israel.

It reminds me that back in the Cold War period, some top Reagan administration officials promoted the idea that the Soviet Union was considering a nuclear “first strike” against the U.S. because the Russians were constructing their Moscow subway system to serve for civil defense sheltering should we Americans strike back with any nuclear weapons we had remaining.

At another point during the Axios interview Trump said, “I destroyed their general. OK.? [Qasem] Soleimani, [who] was the father of the roadside bomb…It was his favorite weapon. And I killed him. And he killed thousands of [American] soldiers [during the Iraq war] and thousands of other people, tens of thousands of other people.”

Trump went on to describe the details of how he directed the U.S. Special Forces and CIA to carry out Soleimani’s January 2020 assassination in Iraq by blowing up a car he was traveling in, even after Israel backed out of assisting in the operation.

“And it was a flawless attack,” Trump said, adding, “Now, that was one of the biggest moments in the history of the Middle East, because he was the most feared man in 100 years…He was a bad guy, but he was smart. He was a very tough general. You know what he was going to do? He was going to blow up five of our military bases. I got him one week ahead of that attack.”

As for more recently in Iran, Trump said, referring to the U.S. and Israeli February 28 attacks, “I killed the Ayatollah (Ali Khamenei). And a number of IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard) officials. And I sadly hurt the other Ayatollah (Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the former Supreme Leader and now Supreme Leader), who I will tell you, I did not meet him. I did not speak to him…But he's got a certain braveness because he was, he’s badly injured.”

Trump described what led him to stop the bombing that, I believe, has some truth in it.

“If I were hitting them [the Iranians] right now, when you stopped, if we're not going to put boots on the ground, I mean you don't want [U.S. military] boots on the ground, right? If we're not going to put boots on the ground, probably the same people , they go deep into the caves. They're called granite caves. They're very powerful. They go deep and then when we stop, they'll come up and they'll probably be the same leaders. So nothing, okay?”

As Trump himself emphasized, he wants no part in putting American military on the ground in Iran, or really anywhere in any numbers for any extended time period. Despite his recent turn to military operations, he fears having to take responsibility for American troops being killed or wounded.

He also appears to have learned the limitations of just bombing or using missiles.

Trump said, “When I knocked them [the Iranians] out, we knocked them out so powerfully, we would right now have the Hormuz Strait totally closed. It would have mines all over it and it would have missiles flying over billion-dollar ships. And those ships will never sail.”

Then Trump summed up why he stopped bombing Iran and turned to negotiations.

Trump said, “I just looked. [The price of] oil is tumbling. The ships are roaring out of there [that] they want to go home. They want to go home. They're all full with oil. There's a gusher. I mean, we have seven [hundred] or eight hundred ships are leaving, but if I attack them, none of those ships are leaving. The stock market is way up, way, way up. The stock market is up over the last four or five days when it looks like we're going to make a deal. Stock market's up thousands of points. Everybody's richer. Now, would you rather have that or be like some stupid people?”

He then described “hard liners” who were telling him, “Oh, you got to take 'em [bomb Iranians] out yet.” Of which Trump said, “Well, what lemme tell you. And plus, I'm not looking to kill people. I have one primary wish as president, in terms of people. I never want to be the late great Herbert Hoover. So this is the kind of thing that could cause a worldwide depression.”

In his own words, Trump seemed to recognize the Iran war he started had to be ended before it caused, what he apparently feared coming, “a worldwide depression.”

The outcome of the current 60-day cease-fire negotiations is unclear, but I notice the third item of the Memo of Understanding reads, “The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days, extendable with mutual consent (emphasis added).

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 23 Jun 2026 19:36:56 +0100 FirstHandNews
What Iran Wants and How It Can Still Fight https://belimedia.com.ng/what-iran-wants-and-how-it-can-still-fight https://belimedia.com.ng/what-iran-wants-and-how-it-can-still-fight

U.S. Vice President JD Vance is touting success out of the latest round of talks in Switzerland focused on seeking a permanent end to the war in Iran. But despite his description of a “very, very good day” of negotiations on Sunday, Iran is denying that it has made any new agreements. It’s more of the same inconsistent messaging the world has become accustomed to over the past three months since the U.S. and Israel launched attacks intended to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program.

Since that time, Iran's supreme leader was killed, the Strait of Hormuz was shuttered and the world has witnessed the largest oil-supply disruption on record.

Now, the United States and Iran are working from a 14-point memorandum of understanding that was signed on June 17, meant to bring the conflict to a formal close within the next 60 days. But will it work and what does Iran stand to gain in the interim?

Cipher Brief CEO & Publisher Suzanne Kelly spoke with former National Intelligence Manager for Iran Norman Roule - who travels regularly to the region for meetings with high-level officials - about what Iran really wants, the impact that a slow-moving and fragile negotiation process could have on near-term energy markets and the tools Iran still has left in its arsenal.

Our conversation has been edited for length. You can watch the full conversation on The Cipher Brief’s YouTube channel.

THE INTERVIEW

Kelly: What does Iran need from this current round of talks?

Roule: Tehran has a new government that needs to prove that it is strong, stable and capable of standing up to its adversaries. And that means upfront, that it can't be perceived as weak, or caving to the United States. Like it or not, the new Supreme Leader cannot sign off on a document that makes him look weak. And if you wish to have diplomatic progress, you're going to have to swallow the fact that a document's going to have to look like something the Iranians can leak and put out publicly and say, ‘we achieved this’. And that just gets you in the room.

The second point is that we're talking about issues that are existential for the regime itself, though not existential for Iran. The country's not going to evaporate. But for the regime, its role with militias in the region, revolution, power projection, keeping down the nationwide unrest - it needs financial relief, it needs to be able to sustain its proxies, it needs to be able to push back on Western military presence in the region. It's negotiating on life and death issues, so it's not going to make any fast decisions.

On the Iranian side, their point is, ‘if we give up a nuclear program, we're giving up our leverage forever’. Sanctions relief is something they need now to sustain the government's survival. They’re not going to give up on the proxies in the region and allow Israel to have a victory. These are real issues in their world, and the administration is just stuck with that reality.

Kelly: How are you looking at U.S. - Israel relationship right now and how significant is the Lebanon issue to reaching any kind of final agreement between the U.S. and Iran?

Roule: This is profoundly complicated. It is as complicated and as consequential as the Strait of Hormuz has been in the actual conflict itself. So let's break this into a couple of pieces.

We now have, as has been predicted for almost two decades, a Revolutionary Guard-dominated government in Iran. There's never been any surprise that the government of Iran would move into a military-dominated government. This war did not produce something that wouldn't have happened by any reasonable analyst’s projection. There was never going to be a reform or moderate government in Iran, period. But that type of military government is going to use two types of tools; military and asymmetric tools.

We've destroyed their entire military. They now have only asymmetric tools left, which they have relied upon for their entire history going back to the 1980s. What are Iran's asymmetric tools? Missiles, mines, drones, cyber tools, and proxies.

The previous government did not defend the proxies when they were attacked by Israel, and the proxies were heavily damaged. That would not have been a choice of the Revolutionary Guard, which is now dominating decision making.

One of the first decisions this government communicated when they talked about the war, that was repeated by President Pezeshkian, and repeated by Javad Zarif in his foreign affairs document was, ‘We're standing up for Lebanon’. Now remember, the Lebanese government, the Lebanese president has said, Iran, we want none of you here. In fact, they've tried to throw out the Iranian ambassador, and he won't leave. That's a very strange situation.

The Iranian government is in essence, is saying, ‘We have a role in protecting our proxies in the region’. Lebanese Hezbollah is only one part of this. There will be no difference between Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Hezbollah and the Houthis. So by doing this, Iran is, in essence, showing power projection and its role in sustaining its proxies.

Now here's the problem. The deal was signed by Iran and the United States, but we're holding Israel accountable to live up to this agreement. Now from the Israeli perspective, they're dealing with Iran, a country that does write, "Death to Israel," in perfect Hebrew on its missiles - and they have a very different political and operational paradigm. But in fairness, they have Hezbollah that does shoot into their country. They have thousands of civilians who have had to move, and their position is that they have to defend themselves.

The question becomes, ‘Is there a Goldilocks zone where their defense can be conducted in a way that doesn't upset a diplomatic apple cart on our side?’ And the Iranians, in essence, can then control the entire process by saying, ‘We're not going to cooperate unless Lebanon is part of this’. So what they're trying to do is not only retain power in the region, but they could use this process to push the United States and Israel into friction against each other, and it has been working.

So what does this mean? This means that a Hezbollah captain or a sergeant - can fire some rockets into Tiberias, or some other Israeli city, kill people, which has happened in the last week and the Israelis respond against that position or other positions - and they have a position of non-proportional response to say, ‘You hit us, we'll hit you bigger so you don't do it again’.

The Iranians then say, ‘What are you going to do? The Israelis are killing civilians’, which has happened in Lebanon.

So now there is intense diplomacy behind the scenes. There's criticism from the United States for the first time, in a very loud way, against Israel, and there is tension. And not for the first time. We had former President Ronald Reagan, we had former President George Bush criticize the Israelis in the past. This administration will absolutely defend Israel and ensure it gets the weaponry it needs to defend itself, but you're seeing political tensions that Iran has been able to manipulate.

I would say it's a mistake to allow Iran any voice in Lebanon. And the international community, including the Arab world, has not done enough to say, ‘Iran, you have no role here. Go away.’ And at the same time, because we failed to do that, just as we failed to dominate the Strait of Hormuz early on, we're going to have some terrific consequences that perhaps may even compromise the success of this diplomatic initiative.

Kelly: I do want to focus on the Strait of Hormuz for a few minutes. There are some competing narratives out there in the energy markets on the near-term supply of oil. How are you looking at the near term oil supply given that we don't really have an agreement yet and it's very difficult for anyone to predict when we might?

Roule: We have to break this into pieces. What we've seen in the last few weeks has been an increase in traffic through the Strait of Hormuz rather than through the Oman side, an informal arrangement with the United States and a number of shippers, and that has reduced pressure on oil markets.

The fact that the Chinese have reduced their purchases has also had a significant impact on oil markets. In the wake of this agreement, we've seen a short spike in the amount of shipping and we've seen gas vessels go into the Gulf to reload, which is important. We've seen movement from multiple ships.

However, this is nowhere near enough. You, in essence, have three different dynamics taking place.

First, the Strait of Hormuz remains mined, and it will take some time to demine this, although less time for us to clear a lane and to say that lane is clear. Insurance companies and shippers are going to seek a certificate or some sort of statement by a world navy to say this lane is clear and it's safe, and then to see a number of ships move through it, and that will cause rates to go down.

Right now, there actually aren't that many ships available to move non-state oil through the Strait of Hormuz. So you haven't seen as much oil go out. And then whenever there's a spike in tension, such as we've seen with Lebanon, you actually see shipping drop. So we've seen shipping drop overnight.

Now once oil comes out, the world will see a lot of oil, prices will drop, and we've seen the market do this. There are a couple of problems though.

We've drawn down enormously on our world's stockpiles. If prices are a little high here, they're much higher in Asia. We've had rationing, governments have shut down, factories have shut down some of the processing in these countries. These countries are going to have to rebuild their stockpiles.

So strangely, as the oil increases in its quantity, we may actually see prices go up a bit as they try to absorb this oil and rebuild those stockpiles. Plus this 60-day ceasefire does not look like it's going to be very successful at present, which means you're going to see countries say, ‘I need to build more faster to get those stockpiles up. Right now, let's not put this oil out there.’

So in the short term, prices are going to come down. They’ll stay in the 80s right now, maybe high 70s. In the longer term, you're probably going to see a bump up. As I've said for a while, late June - July is going to be a tense point. A $10-ish premium is probably going to be likely for a while as countries think of security, stockpile requirements and additional pipeline construction.

Once you get into 2027, you start getting into the possibility of a glut. I would be a little careful at that point because, yes, a glut is possible. But this does depend upon China not purchasing a lot more. This does depend upon continued stability and geopolitics. This does depend upon the international community not picking up its purchases and in the United States continuing to produce at a high level.

So maybe in a few sentences, Short term: prices will continue to go down. Medium term: we shouldn't be surprised if there's a bump up because of stockpile replenishment. A glut in '27 is possible, but we should be careful about saying that it's guaranteed.

Kelly: I'm always asking you what the rest of us aren't focusing on - that you are. I'm curious about the Iraqi militias and the attacks on the GCC countries. How are you viewing the importance and the significance of this and what do you think needs to be done to keep monitoring this?

Roule: It's a story that has not received sufficient attention. There were multiple strikes by Iraqi militias on the GCC during this conflict. There were multiple strikes by Iraqi militias on Iraq during this conflict. The Iraqi militias are clearly trained, and to a sufficiently large extent, under the control of the IRGC.

The United States has invited the new Iraqi leader to Washington. He is a compromised candidate so he is more acceptable than the more pro-Iranian candidate in the past, but he is still acceptable to the pro-Iranian camp within Iraq itself. The administration has sanctioned, I think, the deputy Iraqi minister of energy. And they're going to no doubt continue to pressure Iraq to cut and reduce its ties to Iran's energy sphere and to increase ties to the GCC.

For the GCC, they need to build pipelines and energy connections into Europe through Iraq, but they can't do that through territory that's under the political and security threat of Iraqi militias and indirectly - Iran. It's billions of dollars of capital that's at risk and their energy futures. If Iran can cut the Strait, then Iran can cut the pipelines going north.

So you're going to see a lot of diplomatic and political pressure on the Iraqi government that, frankly, the people in Washington and other places are looking at in a very adult fashion. They know he's in a difficult and delicate political position, but he's going to have to make some hard moves as well. We cannot have Iraqi militias launching missiles on UAE, Saudi Arabia, let alone Israel, competing with potentially Houthis and the Iranians.

And I want to pull this thread just a little bit because of the Revolutionary Guard. We are in a situation now where red lines have been erased.

The red lines of the IRGC using all of its asymmetrical tools, missiles, mines, cyber, militias against everybody all at once, that red line has gone away. So the idea that Iraqi militias won't be used in the future, along with Iranian missiles and cyber, against Saudi Arabia again or Kuwait or Bahrain, that red line doesn't exist. So the Gulf cannot tolerate this perennial weakness in its north as well as in the Houthi south as well as in the east. There's just too much instability. It's too much of a contested region. So Washington will probably put a lot more focus on that.

The other area that I would think there needs to be a little more attention on is the data risk within the region itself. The fiber lines that go through the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz contain an enormous amount of financial information, not just from the GCC itself to Asia, but it is also European data flowing between Europe and Asia.

And we've seen the Houthis when they damaged a ship, it had an anchor that damaged several lines that cut some of that data flow for a while but the Iranians are now claiming ownership, and it's fallen out of the news but when it comes to the data line management in the strait of Hormuz - only Iranian companies can repair or manage those lines.

This gives them not only a capacity to control the energy flow and the product but the artificial intelligence flow as well, which the GCC sees as its future to Asia and India and Pakistan - I mean, this is the world. So a GCC that has said, ‘Our future is artificial intelligence and not energy,’ Iran has just said, ‘We will control that future’.

Kelly: The Cipher Brief focuses a lot on gray zone operations and a lot of these undersea cables fall squarely into that category. I wonder if we could talk for just a moment about what Iran is most likely to do during this period of time, What are they doing that they're not talking about?

Roule: The Quds Force has never gone away. Whenever anyone talks about something, one of the foolish phrases of Iran's forward defense, you will often hear people talk about something silly like this, Iran doesn't need drones in the hands of Iraqi militias as a defense. It doesn't need to provide missiles to the Houthis to attack Western shipping as a defense. I mean, anything that someone uses to attack could theoretically be a defense, but the Iranians only call it a defense. And that phrase was originally a propaganda point issued by Iran's foreign ministry and then used by Western shills and then gradually built up into some western think tank narratives. But it's a funny phrase. But you're going to see Iran continue to push out on their asymmetric activities because the Quds Force hasn't gone away, and it's pretty much all they have left. And the Quds Force, to a lesser extent - Iran's Ministry of Intelligence - manages their tools.

So you wisely and eloquently talked about gray zone activities. Iran is - far more than China and far more than Russia - the archtypical gray zone actor. These other countries that have non-gray zone tools and are recognized as non-gray zone powers in the world, but all three are revisionist actors in the world - the three great revisionist actors trying to revise their place in the international community. But Iran only has gray zone tools left because we just destroyed all of their conventional military.

So the Quds Force remains. Any sanctions relief, a small portion of that will go there. The question becomes, ‘What are we doing to cut the logistics lines and what is the international community doing?’ And whenever anyone talks about aid to Iran or assistance to Iran or anything like that, it is not unfair to ask, ‘What are we doing to cut that or how are we measuring Iran's capacity to pull back on the Quds Force?’


If you're in the Trump administration right now, your challenge in the talks going forward is to show that the talks are narrow, reversible, measurable in some way - to show that you're not just providing Iran with the liquidity that Iran and critics of the Memorandum of Understanding will argue it gives. And in return, you're getting something back besides the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. And that something will have to be shown to take place in a few weeks because you can't really do that by day 59 and then say on day 59, ‘We're going to war’.

I'll close by saying that this administration reportedly is saying that there are individuals in the regime who are saying, or telling others, ‘We're willing to move in that direction in exchange for a massive amount of money’. Okay, fine. We'll see. But they're going to have to show measurable examples to prove why something that everyone would say has not been possible for 50 years is going to be remotely possible, and that's going to be hard.

Kelly: Let me close, Norm, by asking you the impossible question. Given how difficult it has been until now and given that you have a very good understanding of the agendas of all sides in this conflict and others who are being affected by this, what do you think a realistic expectation that we will see any kind of measurable progress?

Roule: If the Iranians are able to only create tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv, I think it's manageable, but the rhetoric will be magnified by the press and people who dislike the Trump administration and Israel will magnify that. I don't pay as much attention to that as others because of the politics, but there is a good reason to focus on that.

The likelihood of going back into conflict will depend upon perhaps catastrophic events. I worry about a Hezbollah missile landing and having a large number of casualties in Israel. That creates a gravity sink of actions. Or an Israeli attack doing the same thing, and that could create a gravity sink, or behaviors and political actions that just take us back into a new direction.

Again, the Quds Force has not gone away. That logistics line, all we get is one large shipment of weapons going to Yemen, one large shipment and suddenly something happens. But it could be that we're just in a period of new normal where what we're doing right now might be where we are in July and August and September. People may not like it, but we have been in this position for a number of decades, and we're waiting for the rot within the Iranian regime, which remains a dying regime. It's a stale ideology and a dying regime. That rot will continue to erode the foundations of what's happening there.

I’ll close by saying that we shouldn't overlook the tremendous damage that has been done to the regime during this conflict. It has sometimes been wrongly described as tactical success by the regime. That's terribly wrong. You don't destroy this much of a regime and call it a tactical success. The Iranian government is going to have to try to recover from that, and the brave Iranian people may well rise up in coming months. So there are a lot of ‘What ifs’, but where we are is probably the trend line - barring a catastrophic event of some sort.

Ryan Simons was a producer on this report

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 23 Jun 2026 19:36:56 +0100 FirstHandNews
Learning Velocity: The Next Strategic Advantage https://belimedia.com.ng/learning-velocity-the-next-strategic-advantage https://belimedia.com.ng/learning-velocity-the-next-strategic-advantage Entrepreneurs realize that speed compresses learning. They know some of their initial assumptions will be wrong or only partially right, so going fast allows them to test ideas and move from opinions to evidence to products before they run out of cash or time.

A startup that spends years to get to market may end up solving the wrong problem. The startup that launches in weeks or months figures out what their audience cares about, what is irrelevant and they evolve their approach in real-time. Test, learn, adapt and repeat the cycle.

The most successful entrepreneurs know that the original idea is often less important than the rate at which they improve it.

This thinking has existed for decades. Now, AI enters stage left.

The Importance of Learning Velocity

We are entering an era where learning velocity is reducing the time between a question and an answer, an idea and a test and a mistake and its correction.

Learning Velocity is the speed at which an individual, organization, or nation converts information into capability, decisions, and action. Increasingly, competitive advantage is determined not by who possesses the most information, but by who learns from it fastest.

AI changes the speed and quality of the learning cycle.

Can we understand if a disinformation attack is starting before it succeeds?

Can we routinely build synthetic adversary simulations worldwide to improve our preparation?

Can we see 10,000 new accounts emerge in a few weeks to amplify identical narratives across five platforms in five languages and know exactly who is driving it?

Can we identify the next TikTok or Discord well before it gains altitude?

Adversaries realize the pace at which they learn is often as important as what they learn if they are to win the race to market. From Silicon Valley to Bekaa Valley, the learnings are the same. It’s all a matter of how it is applied.

Are We Ready?

Throughout history, strategic advantage has often belonged to those who learned faster than their adversaries. U.S. military doctrine embraced the OODA Loop—Observe, Orient, Decide, Act—as a model for accelerating decision cycles faster than opponents.

Times have changed. Bad actors are compressing learning cycles from months to days and increasingly from days to hours. The public and private sector too often operates on models of learning that are designed for a slower century.

Their advantage is not necessarily better technology, more information, or greater resources. Their advantage is that they learn faster.

Let’s imagine how they learn for a minute.

Imagine the Fastest-Growing University in the World

It has no campus, no admissions office, no tuition, and no accreditation.

Its students come from every country. Its curriculum updates daily. Its teaching assistants are powered by artificial intelligence.

Its graduates include cybercriminals, fraudsters, influence operators, hostile intelligence services, extremist groups, and increasingly, highly capable lone actors.

Welcome to the New University for Bad Actors

Freshman Year: Open-Source Intelligence

Freshmen begin with open-source intelligence 101.

Their textbooks include LinkedIn, Google Earth, company websites, SEC filings, public procurement records, satellite imagery, and social media.

Their first assignment is simple: learn everything possible about a target without ever touching its network.

They learn how to map executive organizational charts, vendor relationships, facility layouts, and employee behavior patterns almost entirely from publicly available information. Whether or not they put on the “freshman 15”, they will learn how to use commercial satellite imagery, drone footage, all forms of digital media, ship, aircraft and supply chain tracking data, patent filings, geolocation tools and more.

Sophomore Year: AI-Assisted Learning

This is not followed by a sophomore slump. Rather, they rapidly move into AI-assisted learning.

Their professors are ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Perplexity, Grok, DeepSeek, and other large language models.

What once required months of research can now be accomplished in hours.

Generative AI enables bad actors to create deepfake videos, cloned voices, fabricated identities, realistic images, and highly personalized communications at scale. AI agents can conduct individualized outreach to thousands of targets simultaneously, making social engineering attacks more believable and more effective.

They learn how people form trust. Why a narrative resonates or fails with an audience. How to choose the right topics, build a plan and create polarization. And they start to see where trust is weak and where attacks may be more successful.

They are becoming better students of human behavior.

Junior and Senior Year: Laboratories and Code

Juniors enter the laboratories ready for one of the most important shifts in intelligence and strategic competition.

Hugging Face, GitHub, ArXiv, Discord developer communities, Papers with Code, Stack Overflow, Reddit, Kaggle, and open-source communities become classrooms where they learn how innovation occurs and where the world is going.

They learn which AI capabilities have the most promise in the next year. They can see which technologies are gaining acceptance and which ones are losing steam. Perhaps most important, they witness which workforce skills will be most valuable. They know the performance benchmarks, which datasets matter and where the problems lie.

These students realize they can see which technologies have promise years before they become mainstream.

They are also keenly aware of the speed of innovation. They can read the signals of repository growth, model releases, publication speed and more.

The graduation ceremony is brief. No champagne, just more learning ahead.

Graduate Studies: Shared Learning Networks

Graduate students enter encrypted networks, private forums, and invite-only communities where ideas, techniques, and lessons learned are exchanged among peers. Successful attacks are dissected and analyzed. Indicators of compromise, response timelines, victim profiles, and operational mistakes are openly discussed so that future attacks become more effective.

Every successful operation becomes a lesson for the next one.

Some students have more to learn.

Doctoral Research: Data as a Weapon

Doctoral candidates study commercial data ecosystems, public records, and digital surveillance.

They discover that some of the most valuable information does not need to be stolen. It can be purchased.

Post-doctoral researchers venture into dark web marketplaces and specialized forums where knowledge, tools, services, and expertise are exchanged at extraordinary speed. Personal information, new malware, breached corporate data, criminal service marketplaces, critical infrastructure targeting and more.

The dark web and shared learning networks provide that competitive advantage – information others don’t have.

Why Are They Learning Faster Than We Are?

Bad actors are not necessarily learning more than we are. The real difference is how fast they learn.

When resources are constrained and survival depends on adaptation, speed of learning becomes a competitive weapon. The most successful entrepreneurs build companies with an idea, often inadequate finance resources and a ticking clock showing they could run out of time.

Speed is not only an asset, it is about survival of the idea.

A New Era Deserves a New Model

The challenge for many established institutions is not a lack of intelligence, talent, or resources. It is resistance to change.

We don’t like failed pilots, so people stop experimenting. Our budgets are annual. Our feedback loops are slow. We may learn quickly, but we act slow.

Behavioral economists refer to this as loss aversion. Humans experience the pain of losing existing processes, authority, expertise, and familiar ways of working more intensely than the potential gains associated with adopting new approaches.

The reality is learning faster than adversaries and adapting faster will be our advantage to create and sustain.

Learning Velocity will become our long-term strategic advantage, which means we need a practical way to evaluate our progress.

The model is defined as the speed at which an individual, organization, or nation converts knowledge into capability.

The Learning Velocity Model

L — Locate

How quickly can we identify emerging threats, opportunities, technologies, and changing conditions?

Measure in days, hours, minutes and seconds.

E — Evaluate

How quickly can we determine what matters and separate signal from noise?

What is in the way of any decision?

Are we learning in the best places?

A — Align

How quickly can insights spread across teams, agencies, departments, and decision-makers?

If any insights are blocked, is this done to improve our security?

R — Respond

How quickly can knowledge be converted into decisions, actions, and measurable outcomes?

Time from moment we know to moment we impact. The full timeline is important.

N — Navigate

How quickly can we adapt when assumptions prove wrong or circumstances change?

How do we learn from failure? Are we improving our ability to anticipate?

Preparing for a World Beyond AI

AI will continue to serve as a learning accelerator. It will be joined by quantum computing, which will make it possible to simulate a problem in minutes or hours. 6G will expand how we connect billions of sensors, vehicles, drones and devices to feed AI systems. Digital twins will create virtual versions of supply chains, aircraft, power grids and more so we can test operational concepts before deployment. The physical world will become measurable in new ways, ranging from advanced sensors to satellites.

And of course, as these technologies converge, new transformational waves will be experienced.

The future competitive advantage will belong to the organization or country with the fastest and most adaptable learning system, not the most information.

Moore’s law was first proposed in 1965. Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, predicted that the number of transistors on a chip would double every two years, leading to major improvements in computing power. It illustrated how we compressed the cost of computation.

The skeptics said you can’t keep shrinking transistors forever or the manufacturing costs will be prohibitive or the growth rate is unsustainable.

The skeptics were wrong.

The cognitive security version of this model, which has blanks to fill in, will be something like “learning velocity doubles every X years while the cost of learning falls by half.”

It’s up to us to define this model and turn a theory into an advantage that improves security of our world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 19:29:07 +0100 FirstHandNews
Before the IC Trusts AI, It Needs to Prove It Can Assure It https://belimedia.com.ng/before-the-ic-trusts-ai-it-needs-to-prove-it-can-assure-it https://belimedia.com.ng/before-the-ic-trusts-ai-it-needs-to-prove-it-can-assure-it Artificial intelligence is moving quickly into national security work. That is not a future trend. It is already happening in analysis, collection support, cyber defense, logistics, language processing, software development, and mission planning.

The real question is no longer whether AI will be used, it is.

The harder question is whether we can trust it inside mission environments where bad data, weak access controls, poor model governance, or untested automation can create real operational risk.

For years, cybersecurity leaders have been trained to think about systems, networks, endpoints, identity, and data. AI changes that model. It does not replace those risks; it adds a new layer of uncertainty on top of them. An AI system can be technically functional yet unreliable, manipulated, over-permissioned, poorly sourced, or impossible to explain.

That is a problem in any enterprise. In national security, it is a significant mission risk. AI assurance is not just a compliance exercise. It is the discipline of proving that an AI-enabled capability is fit for purpose, secure enough for its environment, monitored after deployment, and governed by people who remain accountable for the outcome.

Most organizations still treat AI adoption as a technology deployment. Buy the tool, issue a policy, run a pilot, brief the results. That approach may work for low-risk productivity use cases. It does not work when AI is connected to sensitive data, operational workflows, classified environments, or decision support. The model is just part of the risk. The larger risk is the infrastructure around it. In a traditional system, we asked: who has access to the data? In an AI-enabled workflow, we also have to ask: what can the model infer, summarize, combine, expose, or act upon once access is granted? A user may not be authorized to see every underlying source in a system, but an AI tool connected to that system can, and may generate a summary that reveals sensitive relationships, operational context, or protected information.


The same is true for retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). RAG can make AI more useful by grounding responses in ‘trusted’ data. However, it can also create a new attack surface if source material is stale, poisoned, poorly labeled, or pulled from repositories with weak access controls. If the retrieval layer is not governed, the model can confidently produce bad answers from bad inputs.

The answer is not to slow-roll AI into irrelevance. The answer is to operationalize assurance. There are five things national security organizations and cleared industry should be doing now.First, inventory AI use cases like mission systems. Leaders need to know what AI capabilities are being used, what data they touch, who can access them, and what decisions or workflows they influence. Shadow AI is not a user behavior problem alone. It is usually a signal that the enterprise has not provided secure, usable options fast enough.

Second, treat data provenance and lineage as core requirements for data management. AI assurance starts before the model ever generates an answer. Organizations need to know where training data, reference data, embeddings, and retrieval sources came from, how that data moved through the environment, how it was transformed, who validated it, who can modify it, and whether those changes are logged. Provenance tells us the origin of the data. Lineage tells us what happened to it along the way. Without regimented data management, the organization cannot confidently assess whether the model’s output is accurate, up to date, authorized, or appropriate for the mission. If the data supply chain is weak, opaque, or poorly governed, the AI output is already questionable.

Third, test AI models against mission-specific use cases. This could include adversarial prompts, poisoned documents, prompt injection, tool misuse, and hallucinated citations and references.

Fourth, monitor after deployment. Models change. Data changes. User behavior changes. Threat actors adapt. Assurance has to be continuous and include logging, drift detection, output review, access monitoring, and clear thresholds for when a tool should be paused, updated, restricted, or removed.

Fifth, keep humans accountable. Humans-in-the-loop should have clear and accountable responsibilities defined. What is the reviewer expected to verify? What decisions can never be fully delegated to the AI tool?

The organizations that get this right will be the ones that build disciplined AI operating models. They will have clear use cases, controlled data access, measurable evaluations, audit trails, and documented risk ownership.

AI is becoming one of the most important force multipliers in national security and economic competition. It has the potential to narrow gaps between larger and smaller countries, established and emerging companies, and well-resourced and resource-constrained organizations. Capabilities that once required large teams, specialized infrastructure, or years of institutional advantage are becoming more accessible through AI-enabled tools. That is why assurance matters. For the Intelligence Community and the national security industrial base, AI assurance should become a core discipline. Before we scale AI into mission operations, we need to prove we can govern it, test it, monitor it, and explain when it should not be trusted.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 19:29:07 +0100 FirstHandNews
Best Vietnam Tour Packages from India: Budget, Family & Honeymoon Trips https://belimedia.com.ng/Best-Vietnam-Tour-Packages-from-India https://belimedia.com.ng/Best-Vietnam-Tour-Packages-from-India Reasons Vietnam is becoming a top destination for Indian travelers in 2026

Vietnam has quickly become one of the most loved international destinations for Indian tourists, and it's easy to see why. With stunning landscapes, affordable prices, visa-on-arrival facilities, and direct flights from major Indian cities, Vietnam tour packages from India are in high demand this year.

From the limestone cliffs of Ha Long Bay to the bustling streets of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam offers something for every type of traveler, whether you’re arranging a cost‑effective backpacking adventure, a family getaway, or a dreamy honeymoon escape. Most importantly, Vietnam continues to rank as one of the cheapest international spots when compared to Thailand, Bali, or Singapore.

Top Budget Vietnam Tour Packages from India

Hanoi — The Charming Capital City

Hanoi is the perfect starting point for budget travelers. Walk through the Old Quarter, sip authentic Vietnamese coffee, and explore Hoan Kiem Lake without spending a fortune. Street food here costs as little as ₹400–700 per meal, making Hanoi one of the cheapest yet most rewarding cities in Southeast Asia.

Budget highlights in Hanoi:

  • Old Quarter walking tours

  • Train Street photo stops

  • Affordable street food tours

  • Budget hostels and guesthouses

Ha Long Bay — Affordable Luxury on Water

A Ha Long Bay cruise is often considered a "must-do," and surprisingly, budget cruise packages are easily available starting from ₹ 8,000–12,000 per person for an overnight stay, including meals.

Best Family Vietnam Tour Packages

Da Nang & Ba Na F I — Fun for Everyone

Da Nang is one of the best family-friendly destinations in Vietnam. The famous Golden Bridge at Ba Na Hills, along with theme parks and cable car rides, keeps both kids and adults entertained throughout the trip.

Family-friendly attractions:

  • Ba Na Hills Golden Bridge

  • Fantasy Park amusement rides

  • My Khe Beach for relaxing family time

  • Marble Mountains exploration

Hoi An — Cultural Experience for Families

Hoi An's lantern-lit streets and gentle river boat rides make it ideal for families traveling with children or elderly parents. It's safe, walkable, and full of photo-worthy moments.

Best Vietnam Honeymoon Packages

Phu Quoc Island — Tropical Romance

For couples seeking a romantic escape, Phu Quoc Island offers pristine beaches, luxury resorts, and breathtaking sunsets, making it Vietnam's answer to the Maldives at a fraction of the cost.

Ho Chi Minh City — Modern Romance

End your Vietnam honeymoon trip with rooftop dinners, vibrant nightlife, and luxury hotel stays in Ho Chi Minh City, blending history with modern romance.

What's Included in Vietnam Tour Packages from India

  • Return flight tickets from major Indian cities

  • Hotel or resort accommodation (budget to luxury options)

  • Daily breakfast included

  • Ha Long Bay cruise experience

  • Private or group sightseeing tours

  • Airport transfers

  • Visa assistance for easy approval

Best Time to Visit Vietnam from India

The ideal time to book Vietnam tour packages is between November and April, when the weather is dry and pleasant across most regions. Steer clear of the monsoon months (May–October) to ensure a smoother travel experience.

Final Thoughts: Plan Your Dream Vietnam Trip with Sky Planet Holidays

Vietnam offers the perfect mix of adventure, culture, and affordability, making it one of the best international destinations for Indian travelers. Whether you're planning a budget backpacking trip, a memorable family vacation, or a romantic honeymoon, Sky Planet Holidays is here to design the perfect Vietnam tour package tailored just for you. As one of the best travel agencies for international tour packages, we take care of flights, hotels, visas, and sightseeing so you can simply enjoy the journey. Choose Sky Planet Holidays, the best tours and travels company trusted by thousands of happy travelers, and let us turn your Vietnam dream trip into a smooth, unforgettable reality.

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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 09:14:15 +0100 Gopi Krishnan
Why Human Intelligence Matters More in an AI World https://belimedia.com.ng/why-human-intelligence-matters-more-in-an-ai-world https://belimedia.com.ng/why-human-intelligence-matters-more-in-an-ai-world An impending casualty of artificial intelligence, we are told, is the human spy. The conventional wisdom is that in our AI future, there’s little need to recruit agents, plan secret rendezvous, or conduct dead drops—the old-school tradecraft of espionage. “Human spies in the field will become rare,” wrote David Ignatius after surveying the growing field of AI intelligence startups. “The future of espionage is written in zeros and ones.”

Yes, AI will become an indispensable tool for case officers, agents, fabricators, counterintelligence services, and the rest of the intelligence world. But this will have the paradoxical effect of increasing the importance of old-fashioned human intelligence.

Economics tells us that the value of something is determined by the benefit it provides on the margin—not by its raw power or pervasiveness. We should expect that AI will lower many barriers to technical intelligence collection and analysis. This has happened in other spheres: Open-source encryption put tools once reserved for states into everyone’s hands. Likewise, you no longer need a national space program — just a credit card — to order up high-resolution satellite photography and buy AI-powered software to analyze the results.

Human intelligence is scarcer and harder to replicate, and so its marginal value will rise. Vast amounts of data alone cannot reveal what a foreign leader intends to do, nor what is happening inside an “air-gapped” network. Human sources can.

Human intelligence has always helped validate technical collection. That role will grow in importance as AI poisons the information environment. Electronic channels will be flooded with fabricated phone calls, forged documents, and other convincing synthetic media. Signals intercepts will be harder to trust on their own. A human agent can help cut through that deluge of disinformation—and help distinguish authentic source material from forgeries.

Finally, AI is making digital communications less trustworthy, as we already see with scammers using deepfake images, audio, and video calls for fraud. As deepfakes get harder to detect, the rational response will be to distrust electronic communications. The corollary? Secure, person-to-person communication will rise in value. Case officers have long relied on dead drops, brush passes, and brief meetings to communicate with their agents. In an AI-saturated world, these traditional techniques may be the most reliable methods of communication we have.

None of this means that technical intelligence will become unimportant. And AI will certainly transform human intelligence operations—for better and for worse. It will help case officers select operational sites, prepare for agent meetings, and improve their ability to persuade foreigners to commit espionage. At the same time, AI will supercharge surveillance, provide fabricators with an unlimited source of plausible but false information, and help counterintelligence services predict the activities of case officers operating in their countries.

Still, as AI makes technical collection cheaper, deception easier, and digital communication less trustworthy, the value of human sources will rise. And the case officer, working in the shadows of our artificial future, will matter more than ever.

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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 01:03:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
AI Is Speeding Up Intelligence, But Not the System Around It https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-is-speeding-up-intelligence-but-not-the-system-around-it https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-is-speeding-up-intelligence-but-not-the-system-around-it AI is compressing parts of the intelligence cycle, but modernization is occurring unevenly across collection, analysis, validation, dissemination, and policymaker integration. The resulting friction—not the technology itself—creates the defining opportunity for IC leaders.

It’s tradecraft, not technology, that is a primary constraint on intelligence performance in the AI era. This piece examines where that constraint is already being tested and what IC leaders can do about it - lose this.

Compression is Already Happening

In some areas, AI is already reshaping intelligence work in meaningful and measurable ways. Former NGA Director Vice Adm. Trey Whitworth (Ret.) has repeatedly highlighted how AI is revolutionizing GEOINT. Full-motion video analysis that once required extensive manual exploitation is increasingly automated and continuous. Project Maven fundamentally changed the economics of GEOINT warfighter support by applying computer vision to operational imagery workflows. Some AI-generated products are being disseminated to senior policymakers with minimal human involvement.

Even before Anthropic’s game-changing Mythos product, SIGINT and cyber operations similarly benefited from AI. NSA's Human Language Technology program automates speaker identification and translation across more than 90 languages—enabling analysts to triage millions of intercepted communications and focus only on the relevant fraction. Cyber Command and NSA increasingly operate in what Former NSA Director Gen. Paul Nakasone (Ret.) called "persistent engagement"—environments where collection, analysis, decision-making, and cyber effects occur continuously rather than sequentially.

Open-source intelligence has arguably made the strongest strides. During recent conflicts, policymakers leveraged commercially available satellite imagery, social media, and public telemetry data in near real time. CIA's OSIRIS platform uses LLMs to synthesize vast volumes of open-source data, deliver summaries, and support analyst engagement through a chatbot. Former Open Source Enterprise Director Randy Nixon argued that these advances enabled OSINT to become “the INT of first resort”—a model for all-source intelligence collection and analysis.

But Compression Is Uneven

GEOINT, SIGINT, and OSINT lend themselves to AI adoption: they are data-rich, measurable, and in OSINT's case, unclassified. Clandestine tradecraft and rigorous analytic tradecraft are harder to accelerate.

The Beginning of a Strategy

Deputy Director Michael Ellis recently said that CIA expects AI to become an everyday “co-worker” for analysts within the next few years. He described a future where AI systems help analysts draft reports, identify patterns across massive datasets, test conclusions, and surface threats. Ellis also said that analysts are already experimenting with how to evaluate, validate, and cite AI-enabled insights. Questions that were largely theoretical only a few years ago are becoming practical tradecraft challenges:

  • How should AI-assisted analysis be sourced and validated?
  • What level of confidence should accompany machine-generated insights?
  • How should analysts distinguish between AI-enabled synthesis and human judgment?
  • What standards should govern the use of AI-generated content in finished intelligence?

These are important developments because they signal that intelligence leaders are thinking about how technology adoption requires tradecraft modernization.

Coordination, Validation, and Analytic Workflows

Deploying AI tools for isolated analytic tasks (e.g., search, discovery, drafting) is relatively straightforward. An analyst may now receive machine-generated correlations in seconds yet still wait hours or days for cross-agency coordination, sourcing validation, or product approval. Reimagining those surrounding workflows—how information moves, how trust is established, how products are reviewed, and how analysts interact with machine-generated outputs—is substantially more difficult.

The opportunity is enormous but requires redesigning the processes themselves—while continuing to deliver on policymakers’ daily needs.

Policy Integration and Decision Support

The compression challenge becomes even more visible when intelligence intersects with policymaking.

The traditional model of intelligence dissemination was built around periodic delivery and daily briefing cycles like the President’s Daily Brief. However, policymakers now consume intelligence alongside operational updates, open-source reporting, and social media—and make decisions at the edge, often faster than traditional dissemination cycles allow. To adapt, intelligence agencies will need to provide continuously updated context, machine-assisted forecasting, and dynamic collaboration embedded directly into policymaking workflows.

Consider what this looks like in practice: a combatant commander or ambassador can query an AI-enabled analytic system for a continuously refreshed threat picture, stress-test an assumption against alternative scenarios, and receive a validated assessment—all in the 30 minutes before he walks into a meeting with his foreign counterpart. Elements of this reality exist today. During Operation Epic Fury, the 38-day air campaign against Iran, AI synthesized targeting data across the battlespace in real time to support strikes on roughly 13,000 targets in just over a month—a pace of machine-assisted decision-making with no precedent in U.S. operations.

The challenge for intelligence leaders is driving development and adoption to make it systematic, trusted, and governed. As OSIRIS proved, AI-enabled platforms are already beginning to empower policymakers to interact with intelligence this way. In that environment, intelligence is no longer a product delivered to decision-makers. It is the environment in which they decide.

That does not mean abandoning rigor or replacing strategic analysis with real-time reporting. In fact, the opposite is true. As information velocity increases, the value of trusted analytic judgment, validation, and expert perspectives will increase.

The Emerging Risk: Asynchronous Modernization

The danger is that different parts of the system are modernizing at different speeds. Accelerating functions does not eliminate friction between functions. In some cases, it can increase it.

·Faster collection can overwhelm coordination processes.

·Faster analysis can outpace dissemination workflows.

·Automated insight generation can challenge validation, trust, and decision integration.

The Leadership Challenge

Leading companies discovered that AI could not remain a standalone innovation initiative. As AI began reshaping workflows, governance, and strategy, responsibility migrated from CIOs and innovation teams to CEOs and boards. Intelligence leaders must make a similar pivot. Modernization cannot be outsourced to technologists, innovation offices, or isolated teams. Pockets of ‘AI money’ and lists of ‘AI projects’ are technocratic, not strategic.

To fundamentally modernize how the system operates, IC leaders must be directly involved in reimagining the intelligence cycle, redefining tradecraft expectations, reshaping decision models, and aligning institutional incentives. That means three things.

First, leaders must connect the technology agenda to the mission agenda. The private sector learned that AI transformation fails when it is treated as an IT problem rather than a strategic one. The IC faces the same risk. The goal is decision advantage at the speed of policymakers and warfighters. Keeping that mission orientation at the center of the technology agenda is a leadership responsibility that cannot be delegated.

Second, leaders must own the coherence problem. It is not enough to authorize AI investments and track deployment metrics. Leaders must make architectural choices about which parts of the cycle to accelerate together, how to manage the seams between them, and what governance structures are needed to ensure the system absorbs new capability without creating new failure modes.

Third, leaders must redefine what tradecraft means in an AI-assisted environment. The standards that govern sourcing, analytic confidence, and product integrity were built for human workflows. They need to be deliberately redesigned—not abandoned—for an environment where machine-generated insights are embedded throughout the production chain. Deputy Director Ellis’s four questions are the right starting point.

AI may compress intelligence production, but only leadership can compress the distance between insight and decision.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 01:03:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
DNI Day One: Three Strategic Decisions for National Security Evolution https://belimedia.com.ng/dni-day-one-three-strategic-decisions-for-national-security-evolution https://belimedia.com.ng/dni-day-one-three-strategic-decisions-for-national-security-evolution

Authors’ Note:

This paper is intended to frame a discussion, not settle one.

Too often, debates about intelligence reform begin with organizational charts and predetermined solutions. We believe the more important starting point is identifying the strategic decisions that should not be avoided. The next Director of National Intelligence will have to address questions surrounding enterprise leadership, resource alignment, technological modernization, and strategic competition. This first paper examines those issues and the questions that should be asked. A second paper will explore potential answers.

Introduction

The next Director of National Intelligence inherits an Intelligence Community facing simultaneous technological, geopolitical, and institutional disruption.

The post-9/11 reforms that created the DNI helped solve many of the Intelligence Community's integration challenges. Those reforms were designed for a world still shaped by the aftermath of 9/11, where the primary concern was improving information sharing and coordination among intelligence agencies. They did not anticipate the strategic environment the next DNI will face.

Today, artificial intelligence is changing and improving how intelligence is collected, analyzed, and consumed. Commercial providers increasingly own capabilities once reserved for governments. Space has become a critical intelligence domain and a contested warfighting environment. Adversaries exploit the seams between foreign and domestic authorities, using cyber operations, influence campaigns, technology theft, and economic coercion to achieve strategic objectives below the threshold of armed conflict.

At the same time, the Intelligence Community faces growing fiscal pressures associated with the costs of advanced technologies, commercial data, and modern collection systems. The Community must modernize while sustaining a full operational tempo. Intelligence professionals continue to support ongoing crises and competition across the Middle East, Russia's war against Ukraine, strategic competition with China and tensions surrounding Taiwan, challenges throughout the Southern Hemisphere, and emerging frontiers such as the Arctic and space. The next DNI will not have the luxury of choosing between today's missions and tomorrow's investments; success will require doing both.

This paper identifies three strategic decision areas that deserve immediate attention from the next DNI. The question is no longer whether the Intelligence Community must evolve. The question is whether it can evolve fast enough to stay relevant.

Scenario 1:
Resist the Urge to Build New Bureaucracies

Core Question

Is the Intelligence Community suffering from a lack of organizations—or a lack of integrated management?

Discussion

Since its creation in 2004, ODNI has steadily taken on missions, oversight responsibilities, and coordinating functions. While these additions addressed legitimate needs and emerging challenges, they also have raised a more fundamental question: has ODNI become too focused on expanding its own mission responsibilities and not focused enough on its primary responsibility to lead, integrate, and support the existing functions of the Intelligence Community?

The DNI was created to serve as the nation's senior intelligence integrator, bringing together the capabilities, expertise, and resources of a diverse Intelligence Community. Its value was never intended to come from building large operational organizations or owning missions. Its value comes from setting priorities, convening stakeholders, aligning resources, resolving disputes, and ensuring that the Intelligence Community functions as a coherent enterprise.

As new challenges emerged, the Intelligence Community often responded by creating new centers, offices, governance structures, and oversight mechanisms. While many have delivered value, the cumulative effect has been to draw ODNI toward mission execution and away from its core service imperative: enabling the success of the organizations that conduct intelligence collection, analysis, operations, and support to policymakers and warfighters every day.

The central question for the next DNI is whether ODNI is best positioned as another mission-focused organization within the Intelligence Community or whether it should recommit to its original role as the leadership, integration, and convening body for the enterprise.

The next DNI should examine whether the current structure is optimized to lead the Intelligence Community as a unified enterprise or whether a renewed focus on Community Management would better support integration.

KEY ISSUES:

·Should ODNI return to a Community Management model focused on enterprise leadership, integration, and resource alignment?

·Has the growth of ODNI strengthened the Intelligence Community or diluted ODNI's ability to serve as the enterprise integrator?

·What functions are uniquely appropriate for ODNI, and what functions should remain with existing intelligence agencies and departments?

·How should the DNI exercise leadership across the Intelligence Community without creating additional layers of bureaucracy?

·What mechanisms are needed to align collection, analysis, technology adoption, workforce development, partnerships, and budgets across the enterprise?

·Should National Intelligence Managers be empowered as true enterprise leaders responsible for integrating mission execution across agencies?

·How should ODNI lead the integration of emerging priorities such as Artificial Intelligence, commercial data, and space capabilities without becoming the owner or operator of those missions?

·What is the appropriate role of ODNI in supporting Defense Intelligence, NCTC, NCSC, and other mission organizations while avoiding duplication of effort?

Scenario 2:
Resource the Intelligence Community for the AI and Space Age

Core Question

Can the United States afford fragmented investment decisions in an era where artificial intelligence, commercial data, and space capabilities are becoming decisive intelligence advantages?

Discussion

In Washington, strategy ultimately becomes a resource question. Priorities, authorities, organizational responsibilities, and technology adoption all follow the allocation of resources. In FY2026 alone, the Administration requested approximately $115.5 billion for intelligence activities, including $81.9 billion in the National Intelligence Program and $33.6 billion in the Military Intelligence Program, increases of $8.5 billion and $5.4 billion respectively over the previous year. One of the most important issues facing the next DNI is whether the Intelligence Community's current resource structure is aligned with how intelligence is actually produced, consumed, and operationalized today.Complicating this challenge is the longstanding divide between funding in the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). While often treated as distinct funding streams with separate constituencies, the reality is considerably more complex. The current arrangement is rooted less in strategic design than in a series of historical compromises intended to balance the authorities of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the broader Intelligence Community.

Today, that framework increasingly obscures more than it clarifies. What many outside the Intelligence Community do not realize is that substantial portions of intelligence resources funded through the National Intelligence Program directly support military operations, combat support activities, and defense intelligence functions. Likewise, many intelligence capabilities developed to support military missions provide strategic warning, indications and warning, and national-level intelligence for policymakers across the government.

The distinction between "national" and "military" intelligence made more sense in an era when intelligence missions, collection platforms, customers, and operational environments were more clearly separated. Today, the same satellite constellation may support strategic warning, operational planning, targeting, humanitarian assistance, maritime awareness, and battlefield operations. Commercial data is consumed by analysts and warfighters alike. Artificial intelligence models may support national policymakers, combatant commanders, and tactical operators simultaneously.

The more important question is not how funding is labeled, but whether the Intelligence Community is organized to make coherent investment decisions across the enterprise. The next DNI should examine whether the current MIP-NIP construct encourages integrated capabilities and enterprise modernization or reinforces organizational boundaries that no longer reflect operational reality.

This question has become increasingly urgent as the Intelligence Community enters a period in which technological advantage may matter as much as traditional intelligence tradecraft. Artificial intelligence, commercial data, advanced sensors, and space-based capabilities are reshaping how intelligence is collected, analyzed, and consumed. The challenge is no longer simply acquiring information. The challenge is processing, validating, integrating, and acting upon unprecedented volumes of data at operational speed.

At the same time, the Intelligence Community faces fiscal pressures and rapidly rising costs associated with artificial intelligence infrastructure, commercial data, cloud computing, advanced collection systems, and space capabilities. The challenge is establishing common priorities, investment strategies, and architectural principles across an Intelligence Community that remains divided among multiple agencies, departments, funding streams, priorities, and acquisition authorities.

For much of the Intelligence Community's history, the government drove intelligence innovation through its own research, development, and procurement activities. Today, that dynamic has fundamentally changed. Artificial intelligence, commercial remote sensing, cloud computing, advanced analytics, and many of the data sources increasingly relied upon by intelligence professionals are being developed and scaled by industry. For the first time in Intelligence Community history, a significant portion of future intelligence advantage will be derived from capabilities developed, built, and funded outside government.

This reality presents both opportunity and risk. The opportunity lies in unprecedented access to innovation, competition, and commercial investment. The risk is fragmentation: duplicative purchases, incompatible architectures, inconsistent security standards, vendor lock, and missed opportunities to leverage enterprise buying power. At no point in Intelligence Community history has the opportunity for partnership with industry been greater. Equally, at no point has the need for enterprise discipline been more important.

Taxpayers should expect intelligence resources to produce secure, interoperable, and mission-driven capabilities regardless of which budget line funds them. Achieving that outcome will require greater alignment across intelligence priorities, acquisition decisions, technology architectures, and commercial partnerships than the current construct was originally designed to support.

Key Issues

• Would National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program merger be more cost effective or is increased alignment enough?

• The Department of Defense is the largest consumer of intelligence, owns most of the nation's collection infrastructure, and operates the largest intelligence enterprise. What is the appropriate relationship between the DNI, OUSDI&S, the Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands in setting intelligence priorities?

• Who should establish enterprise collection investment priorities?

• How should the Intelligence Community approach commercial GEOINT, commercial data, and emerging commercial intelligence capabilities?

• What is the right balance between AI-enabled analysis and human expertise?

• What role should open-source and commercially available information play in future intelligence architectures?

• How can the Intelligence Community modernize technology and data architectures while avoiding duplication, vendor lock, and fragmented acquisition strategies?

• What common standards, security frameworks, and enterprise investments are required to maximize taxpayer value and mission effectiveness?

Scenario 3:
Competing Without Borders

Core Question

Are U.S. intelligence institutions aligned with the realities of modern strategic competition?

Discussion

America's principal adversaries do not recognize the traditional boundaries between foreign intelligence, domestic security, law enforcement, cyber operations, economic competition, and influence campaigns.

China conducts technology acquisition, influence operations, cyber espionage, economic coercion, and military modernization as part of a coordinated national strategy. Russia blends intelligence operations, cyber activities, disinformation, political influence, and proxy networks to shape perceptions and undermine democratic institutions. Iran and other actors increasingly exploit digital platforms, transnational networks, and non-state actors to advance strategic objectives while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.

These activities are not isolated intelligence challenges. They are components of long-term campaigns designed to influence decision-making, shape global narratives, acquire technology, weaken alliances, and gain strategic advantage without resorting to conventional war.

Yet many of the institutions responsible for defending the United States remain organized around distinctions that are becoming increasingly difficult to separate in practice even if rooted in well-intentioned constitutional constructs. Foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, economic security, cyber defense, and influence operations often fall under different authorities, organizations, and policy frameworks despite being employed simultaneously by America's adversaries.

The challenge for the next DNI is not simply improving intelligence collection. It is confronting the reality that America's principal adversaries have learned to exploit the seams between intelligence, law enforcement, counterintelligence, cyber defense, economic security, technology protection, and influence operations. These gaps are no longer theoretical vulnerabilities. They have become operational opportunities for foreign adversaries seeking strategic advantage below the threshold of armed conflict.

While America's adversaries increasingly pursue integrated national campaigns, the United States often responds through separate organizations, authorities, and policy frameworks. Foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, economic security, cyber defense, influence monitoring, and law enforcement remain divided among multiple institutions, even as adversaries employ them simultaneously.

For much of the post-Cold War era, the Intelligence Community focused on warning, collection, and analysis. Those functions remain essential, but strategic competition demands something more. The Intelligence Community must help identify, expose, disrupt, and provide options to impose costs on adversary campaigns that span diplomatic, economic, informational, cyber, and military domains. This requires not only intelligence excellence, but also stronger integration across government and a renewed focus on irregular warfare and strategic competition.

Key Issues

·Are U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and national security institutions organized to compete against adversaries that operate across traditional bureaucratic and legal boundaries?

·How should the Intelligence Community support whole-of-government campaigns for strategic competition and irregular warfare?

·What role should counterintelligence play in protecting U.S. technology, research institutions, critical infrastructure, and economic competitiveness?

·How should the United States balance civil liberties and openness while countering foreign influence, manipulation, and information operations?

·Is the current division between intelligence and law enforcement authorities optimized for the realities of modern strategic competition?

·What role should economic security and technology protection play in Intelligence Community priorities and how does ODNI handle this work?

·Should the United States consider new institutional models, including an expanded counterintelligence architecture or an MI5-like construct, to address foreign influence and hostile state activity?

Conclusion

A successful DNI will not be measured by how many organizations are created, merged, renamed, or eliminated.

Success will be measured by whether the Intelligence Community becomes more integrated, more technologically agile, more operationally relevant, can defeat our adversaries, and be more capable of providing options for decision-makers during strategic competition.

The next DNI's greatest challenge will not be managing the Intelligence Community inherited from 2004. It will be preparing the Intelligence Community required for 2045.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 01:03:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Forty&Year Cyber Policy Failure Congress Refuses to Address https://belimedia.com.ng/the-forty-year-cyber-policy-failure-congress-refuses-to-address https://belimedia.com.ng/the-forty-year-cyber-policy-failure-congress-refuses-to-address Late last month, the former deputy assistant director of the FBI's Cyber Division testified before the House Homeland Security Committee that the federal government should consider designating ransomware operators as terrorists and pursuing felony murder charges against attackers whose intrusions kill patients. The testimony was a serious response to a serious problem. It was also a measure of how far the cyber policy conversation has drifted from the question that would actually change the threat environment.

Terrorist designations are post-hoc. Homicide prosecutions are post-hoc. Sanctions are post-hoc. Indictments of foreign operators are post-hoc. The entire architecture of American cyber enforcement is built around consequences imposed after the harm has occurred — and for forty years, Congress has steadfastly refused to legislate the one consequence that would matter most to attackers and most to victims: the right to interrupt an attack while it is underway.

A homeowner in most American states may use deadly force to stop an intruder reaching for a television. A hospital CISO watching a confirmed exfiltration leave her network in real time may do exactly one thing: document the theft and call the FBI. If she does anything else — if she reaches one hop downstream to interrupt the transfer in progress — she has committed a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1030.

This asymmetry is not the product of careful legislative deliberation. It is the product of forty years of legislative avoidance. And the avoidance, I will argue, is the most consequential cyber policy choice the United States has ever made.

A legislative record without a victim

Congress has not been idle on cyber. Since the mid-1980s, it has produced a continuous body of federal cyber legislation that is, by any reasonable measure, substantial.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was enacted in 1986 and amended in 1994, 1996, 2001, and 2008. The Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235) established NIST's authority over federal civilian computer security and, in the process, drew the jurisdictional line between civilian and national-security systems that still governs federal cyber organization today. The Federal Information Security Management Act passed in 2002 and was modernized in 2014. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act was enacted in 2015. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency was stood up as an operational component of DHS in 2018. The Office of the National Cyber Director was established by statute in 2021.

This is a Congress that has been continuously engaged with cyber for four decades. It has legislated the boundaries of federal system security. It has criminalized unauthorized access in five separate statutory revisions. It has structured the federal-private information-sharing relationship. It has built and rebuilt the organizational architecture of national cyber defense.

In forty years, it has not once legislated whether the victim of an active exfiltration has the right to interrupt the transfer.

The Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act was introduced in 2017 by Representatives Tom Graves and Kyrsten Sinema. It was reintroduced in 2019. Neither version received a floor vote. The bill's existence proves Congress knows the question is on the table. The bill's fate proves Congress has decided to keep it there.

The shape of the asymmetry

The legal vacuum has produced an operational reality that, when stated plainly, is difficult to defend.

A ransomware operator working from a non-extradition jurisdiction faces, in practice, a probability of prosecution approaching zero. Successful prosecutions of foreign ransomware operators in 2025 numbered in the low double digits worldwide, against an industry whose estimated annual revenue exceeds one billion dollars. The victim — typically a hospital, a school district, a mid-market manufacturer, a municipal government — faces the full weight of regulatory liability, civil litigation, board accountability, and operational harm.

One side of this exchange bears nearly unlimited downside risk. The other side bears nearly none. This is not a threat environment. It is a market, and the market is functioning exactly as its incentive structure predicts.

The conventional response is to point to the things we have done. The Treasury Department has sanctioned mixers and exchanges. DOJ has clawed back ransom payments, most notably the partial Colonial Pipeline recovery. FBI and partners have disrupted Hive, LockBit (twice), and the ALPHV/BlackCat infrastructure. CISA has improved baseline guidance. None of this is nothing. All of it, taken together, is too small.

These are tactical wins inside a strategic loss. Sanctions disrupt laundering for measurable but brief windows before volume routes around them. Takedowns are followed by re-branding inside a quarter. Indictments of foreign operators function as press releases. The asymmetry between attacker risk and defender risk is not closing. It is widening.

What the "next hop" means, and what it doesn't

Let me be precise about the legal change I am arguing for, because precision is the only thing that protects this argument from being misread as a call for vigilantism.

I am not arguing for hack-back authorities. I am not arguing for retaliation. I am not arguing for the right to compromise an attacker's infrastructure as a punitive measure, to recover data through offensive operations, or to engage in any conduct whose purpose is to inflict harm on the attacker.

I am arguing for the legal recognition of a category that exists in every other domain of self-defense and exists nowhere in cyber: the right to interrupt a crime in progress.

When an exfiltration is underway, the defender can typically observe the immediate next hop — the command-and-control server, the staging system, the relay — through which the data is transiting. Current law permits the defender to log this traffic, to characterize it, to share indicators of compromise, and to report it. Current law forbids the defender from taking any action against that next-hop system to interrupt the transfer in progress, even when attribution to the attacker's infrastructure is unambiguous and even when the action contemplated is narrowly scoped to interrupting that specific transfer.

This is the gap. Not punishment. Not retaliation. Interruption.

The doctrinal analogue is the long-settled law of defense of property and defense of self. American common law has never required a victim to wait until a crime is completed before responding. The reasonableness standard — proportionality, immediacy, scope — is the mechanism by which we distinguish legitimate interruption from vigilantism. We apply this standard to homeowners, to merchants, to security guards, and to law enforcement. We have declined, uniquely, to apply it to cyber defenders.

The objections, and where they fail

The standard objections to active cyber defense are serious and I want to take them seriously.

Attribution is hard. Sometimes. It is also sometimes trivial. The exfiltration to a known command-and-control server with a known operator and a known wallet, observed in real time from the victim's own network, does not present the attribution problem that the objection imagines. The objection conflates the hardest cases with all cases. A reasonableness standard — the same standard we apply in every other domain of self-defense — would distinguish them.

Collateral damage is real. Yes. The attacker's infrastructure frequently transits compromised third-party systems — hospitals, universities, small businesses whose servers have been weaponized without their knowledge. An action against the next hop could disrupt the operations of an innocent party. This is a genuine concern. It is also a concern that applies, in different forms, to every domain of self-defense we currently permit. The legal response is not prohibition. The legal response is a proportionality requirement.

The CFAA was written for good reasons. It was. The CFAA in 1986 was a response to a specific set of harms — unauthorized access, fraud, malicious intrusion — that the existing criminal code did not adequately address. Its drafters were not contemplating the question of whether a victim observing real-time exfiltration has any right to interrupt the transfer. They could not have been. The threat environment that question arises in did not yet exist. A statute written for one purpose, applied four decades later to a question its drafters did not contemplate, is not legislative wisdom. It is legislative inertia.

Active defense will escalate. Possibly. The same argument was made against every expansion of self-defense doctrine in American legal history. The empirical question of whether a narrowly defined interruption right would produce more harm than it prevented is exactly the question Congress has declined to investigate, by declining to hold the hearings, declining to advance the bill, declining to commission the study.

What the silence costs

The forty-year silence on this question is not a neutral position. It is itself a policy choice, and the choice has a price.

The price is paid in the asymmetry. Every additional year the question goes unanswered, the gap between attacker risk and defender risk grows. The ransomware industry's revenue trajectory is not a mystery and it is not unpredictable. It is a rational market response to a legal environment in which the cost of attacking is approximately zero and the cost of defending is approximately unlimited.

The price is paid in moral coherence. A legal regime that permits deadly force in defense of a four-hundred-dollar television and forbids software-based interruption in defense of a hospital's entire patient record system is not internally consistent. The inconsistency does not become coherent because we have grown used to it.

The price is paid in deterrence. Deterrence requires consequence. There is no deterrence in cyber today, against any actor of any sophistication, because there is no consequence. The consequence that matters most — the one the attacker actually fears — is interruption of the operation in progress. Sanctions, indictments, and takedowns are post-hoc. They impose costs that the attacker can model and price in. Interruption is the consequence the attacker cannot model, because the attacker does not know when, by whom, or how it will arrive.

That is the consequence Congress has declined to authorize for forty years.

A modest proposal

I am not proposing that Congress pass the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act as written. The 2017 and 2019 versions of that bill were imperfect, and reasonable people disagreed about specific provisions. I am proposing that Congress hold the hearing.

Forty years of avoidance is enough.

The question on the table is narrow, specific, and legally tractable. Does the victim of an active exfiltration, under a reasonableness standard, have the right to take action against the immediate next hop in the transfer chain to interrupt the transfer in progress? It is a yes-or-no question. Congress has answered every other cyber question it has been asked since 1986. It can answer this one.

I expect that when Congress finally holds that hearing, the answer will involve a tightly scoped right, a high reasonableness standard, a mandatory reporting requirement, and meaningful liability for abuse. That is what the legislative process is for. The current answer — that the question is too uncomfortable to ask — is not a legal position. It is an abdication.

The grandmother in Ohio has more enforceable rights tonight than the hospital CISO watching her patient records leave the building.

That is not a security policy. That is a forty-year-old silence.

It is time to break it.

The author is a former Commander of the U.S. Army Computer Emergency Response Team with 25 years experience in information technology, cyber operations, cybersecurity and compliance. The views expressed are his own.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 01:03:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
America's Veterans Are a Defense&Tech Asset — We're Wasting Them https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-veterans-are-a-defense-tech-asset-were-wasting-them https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-veterans-are-a-defense-tech-asset-were-wasting-them I spent my formative adult years in service to my country—from seventeen to twenty-nine—and the core of how I identify myself remains that of a United States Marine. When I separated, the playbook was clear: suit up for the boardroom. Investment banks and consulting firms were the promised land, where top talent was expected to go.

It was not an easy transition. Few banks at the time viewed a Marine infantry officer's background as preparation for a career in finance. Frustrated by what my peers and I experienced, I helped found Veterans on Wall Street in 2009—a consortium of Bank of America, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and Goldman Sachs, led by veterans at each institution and focused on veteran hiring, transition support, and charitable giving. It was the right response for that moment.

That moment has passed.

The world has shifted decisively beneath our feet. Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cybersecurity, space, and advanced manufacturing are reordering the global balance of power and creating one of the most acute talent shortfalls in modern economic history. America's strategic competition with near-peer adversaries is no longer primarily a contest of battalions. It is a race to build, deploy, and operate AI systems, autonomous platforms, and secure communications infrastructure faster and more effectively than any rival. The conflicts unfolding today across the Middle East and beyond are shaped as much by autonomous systems, electronic warfare, sensors, and AI-enabled targeting as by boots on the ground.

The organizations building these systems need people who understand not only the technology, but the operational environments in which it will be used. Veterans who have worked in signals intelligence, operated in contested communications environments, or commanded logistics chains in austere conditions bring something no computer science curriculum can replicate: they have been the end user. They understand which failure modes matter.

The numbers are striking. More than 200,000 servicemembers separate from active duty every year. Meanwhile, technology occupations are projected to grow roughly twice as fast as overall employment over the next decade, with particularly acute demand in AI, data science, cloud infrastructure, and information security—roles that remain structurally undersupplied.

Yet the existing Transition Assistance Program (TAP) often functions as a checklist rather than a tailored pathway. Only about 52 percent of servicemembers complete the recommended one-year TAP timeline—a program designed for an economy that has itself moved on from the jobs it was built to funnel veterans into.

The irony is that veterans may be better positioned for the defense-tech economy than almost any other talent cohort—if we invest in the translation layer. Their skill sets naturally lend themselves to roles where human judgment, leadership under uncertainty, and adversarial thinking are most valuable: precisely the roles least susceptible to AI disruption and most critical to national security. They did not just study modern conflict. They fought it.

This is not a resume-translation problem. It is a strategic investment problem.

I learned this in a different context. In October 2004, my battalion deployed in support of what would become Operation Phantom Fury—the Second Battle of Fallujah, the bloodiest battle of the Iraq War. Eight days before the assault, we received an attached Iraqi Army company: 36 men out of an original 146, the rest having deserted. I didn't speak Arabic. My interpreter was a 55-year-old former physics teacher. Their weapons handling was dangerous. Their loyalties were uncertain. The decision before me was whether to lead them into combat or tuck them behind our movement through the city, as my peers planned to do. I led them from the front. And what emerged was an effective fighting unit—clearing houses alongside us, gathering intelligence no one else could access, saving lives on both sides.

The lesson I carried forward: the hardest leadership decisions are rarely about resources or capability. They are about the will to build the bridge between what you have and what the mission demands. That is exactly where we stand today on veteran transition.

The emerging defense-tech sector is already recognizing this. Firms such as Anduril and Shield AI—both co-founded by veterans—are hiring aggressively from military ranks. Organizations like MVA Foundation (MilVet Angels) have backed these up and coming defense tech startups, along with others like Hermeus, Ursa Major, and Cowboy Space Corp—a portfolio that maps almost precisely onto the Pentagon's own list of mission-critical technology priorities. What makes their model distinctive is its structure: all carried interest from exits flows back into a foundation funding veteran transition and entrepreneurship programs, creating a self-reinforcing cycle between investment returns and the next generation of veteran technologists. Palantir has taken a complementary approach through its American Tech Fellowship—a high-intensity program recruiting transitioning veterans and enlisted leaders, requiring no tech degree, and connecting graduates directly with defense tech employers. The core insight mirrors the best veteran transition efforts: the most persistent barrier is translation, and veterans routinely underestimate how directly their military experience maps to the roles AI-era employers can't fill. These are promising efforts. They are not yet at scale.

What would scale look like? Three things.

First, rebuild TAP around defense technology pipelines. The NSCAI and CNAS have argued for years that the program underdelivers, but they frame it as a workforce-quality problem. It is a national security routing problem. Statute already requires counseling to begin twelve months before separation, yet GAO finds 70 percent of servicemembers miss that threshold and commanders routinely waive attendance against their own services' rules. The answer is not another reform package layered onto a $500 million interagency program. The Secretary of War should use existing authority and appropriated dollars to redirect counseling toward critical-technology tracks, strip waiver discretion below the general-officer level, and replace completion rates with twelve- and twenty-four-month placement metrics tied to commanders' evaluations.

Second, fix SkillBridge's throttling problem. More than 25,000 servicemembers participated in fiscal year 2025 across 6,000-plus partners, but GAO's 2024 review found commanders deny or discourage participation because losing someone for 180 days reads as a readiness hit while the national security benefit accrues elsewhere. The Department of War should change how participants are counted against unit manning in their final 180 days, set a service-wide floor on approval rates with denials reviewable above the immediate commander, and require outcome reporting tied to placement in critical-technology sectors. The talent bench exists; the accounting rules are what keep commanders from releasing it.

Third, the private sector must signal that this is a strategic priority, not a corporate social responsibility initiative. Emerging defense tech companies competing for government contracts should be first movers. They have both the operational need and the patriotic case. When I helped found Veterans on Wall Street, the animating insight was that the private sector had to lead—that institutions with resources and relationships had to build the bridge before the government could cross it. The same logic applies now, in a sector with far higher national stakes.

A generation ago, top talent was expected to go into finance and consulting. Today, technology—and America's defense-tech companies—are building the arsenal of democracy for the 21st century. The people who know best how that arsenal must perform are already among us: 200,000 men and women separating from service every year, looking for someone to show them where they fit in the new economy.

The answer is in front of us. We just need the will to build the pipeline.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 16 Jun 2026 19:39:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Warning Paradox: Why Correct Intelligence Often Fails https://belimedia.com.ng/the-warning-paradox-why-correct-intelligence-often-fails https://belimedia.com.ng/the-warning-paradox-why-correct-intelligence-often-fails In the months before Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Intelligence Community did something remarkable. It got the call right—and said so out loud, rather than only in classified internal documents.

Intelligence assessments identified the likely invasion, the timing window, and plausible operational scenarios with a level of confidence the IC rarely displays outside classified channels. The CIA director flew to Moscow to deliver the warning directly. Intelligence was declassified at a pace and volume rarely seen in modern American practice. By any fair measure, the warning was a success.

Yet the policy response did not match the clarity or urgency of the warning.

That is the Warning Paradox: the recurring pattern in which intelligence correctly anticipates strategic events, but institutions fail to convert warning into preventive action before the forecast becomes a crisis.

My experience during the run-up to the Ukraine invasion showed that the Warning Paradox is not inevitable. The corporate intelligence team I led at the time reached the same conclusion. My team’s pre-invasion assessment correctly identified the likely move, the timing window, and the implications for our people, facilities, and supply chains across the region. The Wall Street Journal later documented that work on the front page of its December 12, 2022, print edition. Our assessment placed the start of hostilities within the twenty-four-hour window in which the invasion ultimately began.

Decision-makers took the warning seriously. Contingency posture was raised. People were moved. By the time Russian tanks crossed the Ukrainian border, the enterprise was in a defensible position. On the corporate side, our warnings translated into action.

The policy response in governments around the world, however, did not match the clarity or urgency of the warning.

Although sanctions planning was underway before the invasion, the most consequential measures were imposed only after Russian forces crossed the border. Lethal aid to Kyiv increased substantially only after the invasion became reality, not while it remained a contested forecast. Alliance posture stiffened in response to the war rather than in anticipation of it. The warnings were correct and early. The response was neither.

Ukraine was not an anomaly. It was one of the clearest recent examples of the Warning Paradox: intelligence got the threat right, but institutions failed to act with the urgency of the warning.

The August 6, 2001, Presidential Daily Brief did not produce a different September 11th outcome. The accumulating signal on Hamas before October 7, 2023, did not produce a different response inside the Israeli system. Crimea in 2014, COVID-19 in late-2019/early 2020, and the Afghan collapse in 2021 are each, in their own way, variations on the same theme. These cases differ in scale, context, and institutional setting. However, they point to the same recurring failure that warnings can be analytically valid and still die before they become a decision. A correct warning is not a sufficient condition for preventive action.

The bottleneck is rarely analytical. Intelligence producers often identify emerging threats with more accuracy than later public narratives allow. The gap persists between what the intelligence community sees and what the policy customer can absorb, decide on, and act on under uncertainty. That gap is structural. It persists for three reasons that appear to be features of the system, not bugs.

First is the asymmetric cost of acting on a warning that does not materialize. A policymaker who acts on a high-confidence warning that turns out to be wrong pays a visible, attributable price, often in squandered political capital, damaged relationships, or the “cried wolf” label. A policymaker who fails to act on a warning that turns out to be right pays a price too, but it is diffused across the system, shared with predecessors and peers, and absorbed by the institution rather than the individual. The incentive structure does not reward preventive boldness. It rewards explainable caution. Until that asymmetry is acknowledged and consciously offset, intelligence will continue to land in front of consumers whose private calculus rewards waiting over action.

Second is the consumer literacy gap: the uneven ability of decision-makers to understand probabilistic warnings and convert them into action. Intelligence is a product designed for a customer. Yet the customer is often a decision-maker whose training in absorbing probabilistic warnings is uneven at best. “We assess with high confidence” is a precise analytic statement; the structures to translate it into a specific decision tree, a sequenced set of preventive moves, and a named owner are not consistently present on the consumer side. This is less a criticism of individual policymakers than of the system around them, one that has invested heavily in producing intelligence and very lightly in building the institutional muscle memory to both receive and act upon it. The same pattern repeats in the corporate world. Boards are briefed on threats they could not, if asked, translate into a Monday morning action item.

The third is the governance gap between warning and decision. Inside both government and large corporate enterprises, no single office holds the authority to convert warnings into preventive action. The intelligence producer’s job ends with the warning. The policymaker’s job begins with a decision. The implementer’s job begins at execution. Between warning and decision is a coordination space nobody owns by name. This is the same governance gap that organizational risk practitioners describe in different vocabulary, and it is the most consistent reason correct intelligence fails to produce appropriate preventive action.

After nearly three decades in the Intelligence Community, including fourteen years at the Defense Intelligence Agency, I have seen what correct warning looks like when it lands well — and when it reaches decision-makers who cannot or will not convert it into action. The years since leaving public service, now leading corporate intelligence at a Fortune 50 enterprise, have taught me that the pattern is not peculiar to government. The exact vocabulary may differ, but the grammar remains the same.

The intelligence does not need to change as much as the consumer system around it does.

First, assign ownership. Someone in the room, by title, must be responsible for converting warnings into preventive action and be measured on it. In the absence of named ownership, a warning is a briefing, not a decision input.

Second, build the institutional muscle memory to receive information as a decision input. Decision-makers should rehearse the conversion of warnings into action, as operators or emergency services personnel do with contingency responses. Tabletop exercises, decision drills, and scenario planning before a crisis are inexpensive relative to the cost of surprise. They are also irregular at best in most organizations.

Third, lower the political cost of acting on a warning that doesn’t materialize. This is the hardest of the three because it is cultural rather than procedural, and it requires senior leaders, whether in government or in the C-suite, to defend subordinates who acted prudently on sound intelligence even when the worst-case scenario does not occur. Until acting on a warning is professionally survivable when the warning proves overcautious, the incentive structure will continue to punish exactly the behavior we say we want.

Chuck Randolph, a colleague in the corporate security community, puts the point more directly: “Intelligence without action is just information.” The line is uncomfortable because it is correct.

In many of the most consequential cases, the U.S. Intelligence Community is not failing simply because it cannot see the risk. The failure lies in the consumer system, which cannot act on what it is shown. Until that changes, we will continue to be surprised by events we warned ourselves were coming. We will continue to mistake analytical success for policy success, and policy failure for intelligence failure.

The Warning Paradox is not a forecasting problem. It is a consumer problem. Like most consumer problems, the people best positioned to solve it are the ones least accustomed to thinking of themselves as the bottleneck.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 16 Jun 2026 19:39:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
The AI Race Won't Be Won by the Best Model—But by the Fastest Military https://belimedia.com.ng/the-ai-race-wont-be-won-by-the-best-modelbut-by-the-fastest-military https://belimedia.com.ng/the-ai-race-wont-be-won-by-the-best-modelbut-by-the-fastest-military

The United States Intelligence Community does not ordinarily deal in hyperbole. When the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its annual threat assessment on March 18, artificial intelligence featured prominently among a complex array of challenges — elevated, alongside quantum computing, to what the IC now treats as a central driver of power and strategic risk.

The document concluded that Beijing “is the most capable competitor in this field” and aims to displace the United States as the global AI leader by 2030, warning that AI has already been used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamline decision-making.

How Washington responds, and whether its current posture matches the urgency its own intelligence community has outlined, came into sharp relief in May, as President Trump touched down in Beijing alongside Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang for a high-stakes summit that put AI and semiconductors at the center of United States-China diplomacy.

The three-month problem

According to some assessments, open-source Chinese AI models currently trail the most advanced American proprietary systems by roughly three to six months — DeepSeek’s own V4 release acknowledged that gap, which broader estimates from Epoch AI place closer to seven months. Yet that sliver of a lead is effectively meaningless from a military standpoint, because it takes not months but years for armed forces to absorb AI technology and translate it into a genuine battlefield advantage.

Carlos Perez, Director of Security Intelligence at TrustedSec, says the public numbers may not tell the full story.

“It is also important to recognize that China operates models that are not publicly available, so we have limited visibility into their true capabilities,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “Companies such as Alibaba and Tencent operate under significant government oversight and legal obligations tied to state investment and regulation. As a result, the actual capability gap may be smaller or larger than public comparisons suggest.”

China is not waiting for Washington to sort out its strategy.

The 2026 threat assessment describes Beijing’s approach as a coordinated, national-level strategy aimed at displacing the United States as the most influential AI power by 2030. Beijing is deploying autonomous drone programs at speed, integrating swarm intelligence into military doctrine, and leveraging a centralized governance architecture that allows civilian AI firms to be folded directly into People’s Liberation Army modernization efforts.

Alibaba and Baidu were both added to the Pentagon’s Chinese Military Companies list in February. DeepSeek has since become part of the People’s Liberation Army’s efforts to modernize its military healthcare infrastructure, according to analysis by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. The House Select Committee on China concluded last year that the company was built, at least in part, on restricted American semiconductor chips and that its app functions as a direct pipeline for foreign intelligence collection on American users.

Aaron Estes, vice president of product management at Binary Defense and a former defense and intelligence official with 25 years of experience, tells The Cipher Brief the threat is more nuanced than a simple capability gap.

“The danger is that once these models are ‘good enough,’ the advantage shifts from model quality to speed of deployment, access to operational data, integration with command systems, and willingness to use AI in real-world workflows,” he explains. “A three-month gap in frontier model performance can disappear quickly if the other side is better at turning AI into operational tempo.”

Indeed, the real gap is not in the models. China can put its tech sector to work for its military tomorrow. The United States has to pass a bill first.

A policy vacuum in the middle of a race

On January 9, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth signed the Department of War’s AI Acceleration Strategy — a document that declared speed wins, that the risks of moving too slowly now outweigh the risks of moving imperfectly, and that 2026 was the year the Pentagon would get serious about military AI dominance. Overlapping innovation offices were folded into a leaner CTO Action Group.

The document landed with fanfare. Yet, the budget did not follow. Washington keeps declaring AI a national security imperative while trimming the agencies and funding lines that would actually make it one — a contradiction the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute flagged in its recent read of the annual threat assessment.

Congress passed a more than 3,000-page National Defense Authorization Act that touched on AI across dozens of provisions — banning both the Defense Department and intelligence agencies from using DeepSeek and directing the Pentagon’s chief digital officer to build a department-wide AI assessment and procurement framework — yet defense analysts say it falls well short of the enforceable legal architecture the military needs.

Matthew Wein, a former policy advisor to the Department of Homeland Security, underscores that the White House’s March National Policy Framework for AI does not fill that gap.

“A strategy would be helpful to indicate where the government thinks we have an edge over competitors and how to maintain national security priorities as the technology landscape continues changing,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “It would also help the private sector understand how the government assesses China’s capabilities and give a blueprint for the frontier labs to use as a foundation to maintain their edge going forward.”

However, Leah Siskind, Director of Impact and AI Research Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argues that the threat itself is being mis-framed.

“There isn’t one AI threat, there’s a whole portfolio,” she tells The Cipher Brief. “Adversaries using AI for influence operations and cyber. Adversaries stealing or distilling American models. Adversaries racing us to military applications. A coherent strategy has to work all three at once, and right now Congress is moving faster than the executive branch on the first two.”

Siskind points to two bipartisan bills sitting on the floor — the AI OVERWATCH Act, which would codify congressional review of advanced chip sales to adversaries, and the Deterring American AI Model Theft Act, which creates a statutory framework to address Chinese model distillation attacks.

“The question is whether the White House, Commerce, and the AI czar’s office get behind them or fight them,” she continues.

The dispute between the Pentagon and Anthropic made that governance vacuum concrete. Anthropic was the first AI company to deploy frontier models on classified government networks, a position formalized by a $200 million DoD contract in July 2025. Talks broke down after the company refused to waive restrictions on autonomous weapons and mass domestic surveillance.

The Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply-chain risk—the first time that authority, historically reserved for foreign adversaries, had been applied to an American company—and Anthropic subsequently sued. As Siskind puts it: “Treating American frontier labs like Anthropic as national security supply chain risks is a strategic gift to Beijing.”

From experimentation to the edge

There is a basic problem that receives insufficient attention. Most military AI systems only work when connected to the internet. In a war, an enemy will cut that connection fast. OpenAI’s Pentagon contract actually reflects this limitation — its models can only be accessed through the cloud, meaning they cannot be built into weapons, sensors, or equipment troops use in the field.

The Army’s Project ARIA, Army Rapid Implementation of Artificial Intelligence, announced in March, explicitly aims to develop AI capabilities designed to function in denied, communications-degraded environments, but that effort remains in early development. Perez points out that AI is already deployed operationally on the intelligence and planning side, largely through platforms developed by companies such as Palantir, but stresses that the greater challenge is at the tactical level.

“Ukraine has demonstrated how AI can be integrated into autonomous drone operations and real-time battlefield adaptation, and this is an area where the U.S. is still learning and evolving rapidly,” he says.

Meanwhile, the Stanford AI Index, an annual comprehensive measurement of global AI progress published in April by Stanford University’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, found that the United States ranks 24th globally in AI adoption at 28 percent. Singapore sits at 61. The UAE is at 54. Those figures reflect the civilian economy, not the military, but the pattern maps uncomfortably onto the Pentagon’s own trajectory.

Estes emphasizes that fixing it requires more than a strategy document.

“The Pentagon’s biggest obstacle is not a lack of AI technology. It is the gap between prototype and trusted operational use,” he continues. “Battlefield AI needs clean data, secure deployment environments, clear authorities, auditability, human accountability, and integration into existing systems that were never designed for this pace. That is where most AI programs get stuck.”

The Beijing question

Against that backdrop, President Trump’s arrival in Beijing in May was particularly important. He landed with a delegation that included Apple CEO Tim Cook, Tesla CEO Elon Musk, and Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang — the latter a last-minute addition whose presence signaled that semiconductors and AI were central to the agenda alongside tariffs, rare earths, Taiwan, and the Iran war.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that Washington and Beijing would establish a protocol on AI best practices aimed specifically at preventing the most powerful models from falling into the hands of non-state actors. Pressed on why substantive dialogue with China was even possible, Bessent was candid.

“The reason we are able to have wholesome discussions with the Chinese on AI is because we are in the lead,” he responded. “I do not think we would be having the same discussions if they were this far ahead of us.”

How durable that lead is remains an open question. The Commerce Department has cleared roughly 10 Chinese companies — including Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, and JD.com — to purchase Nvidia’s H200 chips. However, no deliveries have been made: Beijing has quietly been steering its major tech platforms away from purchases to support domestic chipmakers instead.

China hawks on the Hill see the chip approvals as proof of exactly the problem they have been warning about — that Washington has no coherent line between competing commercially with Beijing and containing it militarily. The United States named AI the defining challenge of the era. It is now debating whether to sell China the chips that define it.

Wein says the path forward requires the government to be a better customer, not just a louder regulator.

“A more lax regulatory environment may be helpful for labs’ commercial growth, but a government strategy would also give them a useful framework from one of their largest customers, and position the United States as a standard setter in the space,” he asserts.

The cost of getting that wrong is not theoretical.

“The risk of relying too heavily on general-purpose commercial AI is that we end up with tools optimized for broad productivity, not contested military environments,” Estes adds. “Military AI has to work with incomplete data, deception, adversarial manipulation, degraded communications, classified context, and life-or-death accountability. What the United States actually needs are AI systems built from the ground up for the realities of warfare, not adapted from products designed for the consumer market.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 16 Jun 2026 19:39:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Scandinavia Travel Packages 2026: A Comprehensive Guide to Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, and Finland https://belimedia.com.ng/Scandinavia-Tour-Packages https://belimedia.com.ng/Scandinavia-Tour-Packages Why Scandinavia Should Be Your 2026 Travel Goal

Scandinavia possesses a unique quality that no other part of the world can duplicate. Imagine standing under the dancing Northern Lights in Finland, cruising through Norway's dramatic fjords, cycling along Copenhagen's charming canals, or chasing the midnight sun in Iceland all in one single trip. That is exactly what Scandinavia tour packages 2026 are offering to travelers who want more than just a holiday.

Scandinavia is trending big in 2026 for Indian travelers and international tourists alike. With improved flight connectivity, visa-on-arrival options, and a grow ing number of affordable Scandinavia holiday packages, now is the best time to plan your Northern Europe adventure. Whether you’re a newlywed couple on a honeymoon, a family searching for a distinctive getaway, or a lone traveler in pursuit of nature, Scandinavia offers everything you need.

Country-by-Country Guide: What to Expect

Norway — Fjords, Mountains & Midnight Sun

Norway is the prized highlight of any Scandinavia tour package. Known for its jaw-dropping fjords, dramatic mountain landscapes, and the magical Northern Lights, Norway is a destination that leaves every traveler completely speechless.

Both the Geirangerfjord and Nærøyfjord—UNESCO World Heritage Sites—are must-see stops on your Norwegian itinerary. The city of Bergen serves as a beautiful gateway to the fjords, while Oslo offers world-class museums, vibrant food markets, and rich Viking history.

Top things to do in Norway:

  • Fjord cruise through Geirangerfjord

  • Northern Lights chase in Tromsø

  • The Flåm Railway ranks among the world’s most scenic train rides.

  • Preikestolen (Pulpit Rock) hiking trail

  • Explore Oslo's Viking Ship Museum

Sweden — Stylish Cities & Nordic Nature

Sweden brings a perfect blend of modern Scandinavian lifestyle and untouched natural beauty. Stockholm, built across 14 islands, is one of Europe's most beautiful capital cities. The colorful old town of Gamla Stan, the ABBA Museum, and the Royal Palace are just a few highlights waiting for you.

Beyond Stockholm, Sweden offers stunning archipelagos, reindeer farms in Lapland, and the famous Ice Hotel in Jukkasjärvi, a bucket-list experience for couples and adventurers. Sweden is a key highlight in most Scandinavia tour packages from India in 2026.

Top things to do in Sweden:

  • Gamla Stan old town walking tour

  • Stay at the iconic ICEHOTEL in Swedish Lapland

  • Stockholm Archipelago boat cruise

  • Visit Vasa Museum and ABBA Museum

Denmark — Fairy Tale Charm & Cozy Culture

Denmark is where fairy tales come to life. As the birthplace of Hans Christian Andersen, Denmark carries a whimsical, storybook charm that travelers absolutely fall in love with. Copenhagen is a city that is incredibly easy to fall for with its colorful Nyhavn harbor, world-famous Tivoli Gardens amusement park, and some of the best restaurants in Europe.

Denmark is also the happiest country in the world according to multiple global indexes, and the moment you arrive, you will instantly understand why. The Danish notion of "hygge," which denotes a sense of warmth, coziness, and togetherness, can be felt throughout this beautiful country.

Top things to do in Denmark:

  • Nyhavn Harbour evening stroll

  • Tivoli Gardens ranks among the oldest amusement parks in the world.

  • Day trip to Kronborg Castle (Hamlet's Castle)

  • Explore Christiansborg Palace in Copenhagen

Finland — Northern Lights & Santa Claus Village

Finland is pure magic, especially during winter. Rovaniemi, located right on the Arctic Circle, is the official home of Santa Claus and one of the best places in the world to witness the Northern Lights. Finland's glass igloo resorts, where you can sleep under a sky full of auroras, are among the most romantic and unique stays in all of Europe.

Finland is a country of eternal daylight, saunas by the lake, and woodland adventures throughout the summer. In 2026, Finland is fast rising to the top of the list of Scandinavian vacation package options.

Top things to do in Finland:

  • Stay in a glass igloo and watch Northern Lights

  • Visit Santa Claus Village in Rovaniemi

  • Traditional Finnish sauna experience

  • Husky and reindeer safari in Lapland

Iceland — The Realm of Fire, Ice, and Dramatic Scenery

Iceland is unlike anywhere else on Earth. From the world-famous Blue Lagoon geothermal spa to active volcanoes, black sand beaches, powerful waterfalls, and geysers, Iceland is a destination that genuinely feels like another planet. The Golden Circle route, covering Þingvellir National Park, Geysir, and Gullfoss Waterfall, is one of the most popular day trips in all of Europe.

Iceland is also one of the best places in the world to see the Northern Lights between September and March. Iceland is a memorable honeymoon and adventure location for couples because of the Blue Lagoon, breathtaking scenery, and comfortable Reykjavik nights.

Top things to do in Iceland:

  • Relax in the Blue Lagoon geothermal spa

  • Golden Circle day tour

  • Northern Lights viewing in Reykjavik

  • Explore black sand beaches at Reynisfjara

  • Whale watching from Husavik

What's Included in Scandinavia Tour Packages 2026

Most well-planned Scandinavian holiday packages include the following:

  • Return international airfare from India or your home country

  • 4-star & 5-star hotel accommodation across all countries

  • Daily breakfast and select dinners included

  • Intercity transfers by bullet trains, ferries, and private coaches

  • Guided sightseeing tours in each country

  • Northern Lights excursion (Finland or Iceland)

  • Fjord cruise in Norway

  • Schengen visa assistance

  • 24/7 travel support throughout the trip

Best Time to Visit Scandinavia in 2026

Scandinavia is a year-round destination, but the best time depends on what you want to experience:

  • June to August — Midnight Sun, outdoor adventures, festivals, and warm weather

  • December to March — Northern Lights, snow activities, Christmas markets, and glass igloo stays

  • September to October — Autumn colours, fewer crowds, and early Northern Lights season

Book your 2026 Scandinavia tour package at least 4–6 months in advance for the best deals on flights and hotels.

Final Thoughts: Explore Scandinavia 2026 with Sky Planet Holidays

Scandinavia is more than just a travel destination; it is a transformative experience that remains with you long after you return home. The fjords, the auroras, the fairy tale cities, and the warmth of Nordic culture make this one of the most rewarding trips any traveler can take.

When it comes to planning the perfect Scandinavia trip, Sky Planet Holidays is the name you can trust completely. As one of the best travel agencies for international tour packages, Sky Planet Holidays offers fully customized Scandinavia holiday packages for 2026 that cover all 5 countries, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland, with seamless planning, competitive pricing, and end-to-end support. From Schengen visa assistance to luxury hotel bookings and guided Northern Lights tours, we take care of every single detail so you can enjoy every single moment. Choose Sky Planet Holidays, the best tours and travels company for international holidays, and make your Scandinavia 2026 dream trip a reality that you will never forget.

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Tue, 16 Jun 2026 06:52:10 +0100 Gopi Krishnan
Economic Security in an Age of Strategic Competition https://belimedia.com.ng/economic-security-in-an-age-of-strategic-competition https://belimedia.com.ng/economic-security-in-an-age-of-strategic-competition There is a growing perception among long-standing US allies that they need to expand commercial relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A thaw or détente with the PRC brings both rewards, particularly for a sluggish economy like Britain’s, but also major risks. History shows that a superpower can ruthlessly exploit détente with the West.

Economic Security and Intelligence

Economic security and intelligence are nothing new. Before the Second World War, for example, Britain ran a small outfit known as the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC). Run by a former MI6 officer, Desmond Morton, the IIC provided a coordination of intelligence on German rearmament and, working with MI5, assessed Britain’s commercial vulnerabilities. British intelligence helped to devise the UK government’s War Book, which set out emergency regulations to protect critical national infrastructure in the event of war. After the Second World War, during the Cold War, it became a staple of British and other western intelligence to assess the size and strength of economies behind the Iron Curtain.

Risky Business

In 1972 President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, ushered in a policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Its purpose was to further divide the Soviet Union from China. Papers at the Nixon library show that Kissinger was under pressure from British firms, in particular, to open up markets behind the Iron Curtain. Britain was in a dire economic doldrum following an oil shock due to a war in the Middle East.

Kissinger and Nixon knew that not all commercial technologies could be transferred to America’s main strategic enemy, the Soviet Union. The White House was accurately afraid of dual use technologies, namely those that were civilian but could also be used for military purposes. Kissinger limited the sale of high end computers and microchips, for example, only allowing second tier components to be sold to the Soviets.

Although Nixon and Kissinger accurately guessed that US industries would be targets for Soviet espionage, the extent to which the Soviets exploited détente would have been beyond their wildest imaginations. The collection of scientific and technical intelligence from the US was conducted by Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and the KGB, whose operating arm, Line-X, reported to Directorate T (Technology). In 1973 the KGB assigned an officer to New York whose full-time job was to collect (steal) US scientific and technical intelligence (S&T). By 1980 the US was producing more S&T intelligence for Moscow than the rest of the world combined. Visiting Soviet trade delegations to US research centers, laboratories and fortune 500 companies, for example, were packed with undeclared Soviet intelligence officers. In an agricultural delegation of a hundred Soviet officials about one third were known or suspected Soviet intelligence officers. In one visit to a Boeing laboratory a delegate applied adhesive to his shoes to obtain metal samples. The size of the Soviet onslaught was so large that entire fields of US research and development became replicated in the Soviet Union. The East German spy master, Markus Wolf, recalled the East German computer company, Robotron, was, thanks to Soviet espionage, an unofficial subsidiary of IBM.

Soviet S&T espionage was often facilitated by sloppy security at US defense contractors. An employee of TRW Corporations in Redondo Beach, CA, which manufactured a US spy satellite, recalled that workers “regularly partied and boozed it up during working hours with the ‘black vault’ housing the Rhyolite [spy] satellite project”. Bacardi rum, he claimed, was kept behind the cipher machines and a cipher-destruction device was used as a blender to mix banana daiquiris and Mai-Tais.

Soviet espionage was so far reaching that, ironically, by the end of the Cold War both sides of the conflict, NATO and the Soviet Union, were dependent on US S&T.

Business Risk

Fast forward to the present day – a time when the world is vastly more complicated than the last century’s Cold War. Western countries did not need the Soviet economy. By contrast, China is intertwined with the world economy.

Beijing is seeking to portray Washington’s new approach to economic, defense, and foreign policies as undermining the post war rules based international order that it created. Meanwhile the PRC, which, has previously railed against the international order (though in reality it vastly benefited from that order), is holding itself out to be the stable player on the world stage. The PRC’s attitude is that it will play by the rules when it suits it but is happy to break them whenever it decides to do so.

Recent diplomatic outreach to Beijing by Western leaders include agreements framed as pragmatic economic wins. If middle powers, like Britain, for example, pursue a strengthening of commercial relations with China, they will need a strategy to mitigate risk like Nixon and Kissinger developed. Britain does not have a strategy for doing so. Even China hawks, like former US ambassador in Beijing, Nicholas Burns, have stated that for economic growth the US will need to continue to trade with China, but will need to carve out elements of national security and critical infrastructure. The latter is a principle stretching back to the UK government War Book.

There is no reason why the PRC would not seek to exploit a détente with the west as the Soviets did before. The Chinese state and its intelligence services have never encountered a western business whose intellectual property they did not want. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses a constellation of front companies to do business with the outside world. Often such companies will enter into business ventures to obtain intellectual property from their western counterparts, but then pull the plug, bankrupting their western counter parties. To add insult to injury, Chinese firms will often sell the product they have stolen back to western markets.

The name of the game for western businesses must therefore be risk mitigation regarding China. In the last century, governments held the monopoly on the know-how and intelligence critical to the technologies that shaped our world – nuclear weapons. It took state resources to detect technology transfer. Soviet S&T espionage was only discovered when French intelligence recruited an agent in KGB Line-X in the 1980s. The same is not true today. Private sector companies today hold the keys to innovations that will shape our lives this century – microchips, A.I., quantum and bioengineering. It is therefore private sector companies that are best placed to mitigate risk of stolen intellectual property. And unlike in the past, this can be done by using A.I. driven publicly available data.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 13 Jun 2026 19:28:11 +0100 FirstHandNews
Japan Honeymoon Tour Packages: Romantic Destinations for Newly Married Couples https://belimedia.com.ng/japanhoneymoon,-honeymooninjapan,-japanhoneymoonpackages,-romanticjapan,-japancouplestour,-skyplanetholidays,-besthoneymoonpackages,-internationalhoneymoontour,-honeymoontourpackages,-besttravelagency,-kyotohoneymoon,-tokyoromance,-hakoneonsen,-cherryblossomhoneymoon,-japantravelcouple,-toursandtravels,-tourpackages,-japantourpackage,-japantour https://belimedia.com.ng/japanhoneymoon,-honeymooninjapan,-japanhoneymoonpackages,-romanticjapan,-japancouplestour,-skyplanetholidays,-besthoneymoonpackages,-internationalhoneymoontour,-honeymoontourpackages,-besttravelagency,-kyotohoneymoon,-tokyoromance,-hakoneonsen,-cherryblossomhoneymoon,-japantravelcouple,-toursandtravels,-tourpackages,-japantourpackage,-japantour Why Japan is the Perfect Honeymoon Destination in 2026

Japan is no longer just a travel bucket list country; it has become one of the top honeymoon destinations in Asia for newly married couples. From the cherry blossom streets of Kyoto to the neon-lit romance of Tokyo, Japan offers a perfect mix of tradition, luxury, and unforgettable moments. Whether you are planning a budget-friendly honeymoon or a luxury Japan honeymoon package, this country has something magical waiting for every couple.

With world-class ryokan stays, private onsen baths, scenic bullet train rides, and some of the best romantic restaurants in the world, Japan honeymoon tour packages are trending more than ever. Couples looking for an experience that goes beyond a typical beach holiday are choosing Japan for its unique culture, safety, cleanliness, and sheer romance.

Top Romantic Destinations Covered in Japan Honeymoon Packages

Kyoto — The City of Timeless Romance

Kyoto is the heart of romantic Japan. Walking hand-in-hand through the famous Arashiyama Bamboo Grove, visiting the thousand Torii gates at Fushimi Inari Shrine, or enjoying a quiet tea ceremony together, Kyoto creates memories that last a lifetime.

Most Japan honeymoon tour packages include Kyoto as a must-visit destination. The best time to visit Kyoto for honeymoon couples is during spring (March–April) for cherry blossoms and autumn (October–November) for stunning maple foliage.

Top romantic spots in Kyoto:

  • Arashiyama Bamboo Forest
  • Philosopher's Path during cherry blossom season
  • Traditional Ryokan stays in Gion district
  • Kinkaku-ji (Golden Pavilion) at sunset

Tokyo — Modern Romance Meets City Lights

No Japan honeymoon package is complete without a few days in Tokyo. This vibrant city offers romantic rooftop dinners with Mount Fuji views, couples-only café experiences, luxury hotel stays in Shinjuku, and shopping adventures in Harajuku.

Tokyo is ideal for couples who love urban exploration. From the teamLab Borderless digital art museum to intimate jazz bars in Shimokitazawa, Tokyo brings a side of romance that is completely unique and modern.

Top romantic spots in Tokyo:

  • Shibuya Sky observation deck at night
  • TeamLab Planets digital art experience
  • Couples spa retreats in Odaiba
  • Michelin-star dining in Ginza

Hakone — Mountain Retreat for Couples

If you are looking for a peaceful and luxurious escape within your Japan honeymoon itinerary, Hakone is absolutely unmissable. Nestled near Mount Fuji, Hakone is known for its private open-air hot springs (rotenburo), scenic lake views, and serene mountain atmosphere.

Staying at a traditional Japanese ryokan in Hakone complete with kaiseki dinner and private onsen is considered one of the most romantic experiences in all of Asia. Many affordable Japan honeymoon packages include a 2-night Hakone stay for this exact reason.

Osaka — Foodie Romance for Adventurous Couples

Osaka is a fantastic addition for couples who love to eat, explore, and laugh together. Known as the "Kitchen of Japan," Osaka offers street food walks, dotonbori river cruises, and a lively nightlife that couples absolutely adore.

What's Included in Japan Honeymoon Tour Packages

Most customized Japan honeymoon tour packages from India and other countries include the following:

  • Return airfare (economy or business class options)
  • Luxury hotel or ryokan accommodation (3-star to 5-star choices)
  • Japan Rail Pass for bullet train (Shinkansen) travel
  • Romantic candlelight dinner at a top-rated restaurant
  • Private sightseeing tours across Kyoto, Tokyo, and Hakone
  • Onsen (hot spring) experience for couples
  • Breakfast included daily
  • Visa assistance and travel insurance

Best Time to Book Japan Honeymoon Packages

The best months for a Japan honeymoon are the following:

  • March to May — Cherry blossom season, mild weather, and stunning scenery
  • October to November — Autumn foliage, fewer crowds, and comfortable temperatures
  • Avoid peak summer months (July–August) due to heat and humidity. Book your Japan honeymoon tour package at least 3–4 months in advance, especially for spring travel.


Final Thoughts: Make Your Honeymoon Unforgettable in Japan with Sky Planet Holidays


Japan is a destination that speaks directly to the heart. The combination of ancient temples, mountain hot springs, futuristic cities, and world-famous cuisine creates an experience unlike any other honeymoon destination in the world.


If you and your partner are dreaming of a honeymoon that is romantic, culturally rich, and absolutely one-of-a-kind, Sky Planet Holidays is here to make every moment of it perfect. As one of the best travel agencies for international honeymoon packages, Sky Planet Holidays specializes in crafting fully customized Japan honeymoon tour packages that fit your budget, style, and dream itinerary. From booking your flights and luxury ryokan stays to arranging private sightseeing tours and romantic candlelight dinners, we handle everything so you can focus on nothing but each other. Trust Sky Planet Holidays, the best tours and travel company for couples, to turn your Japan honeymoon dream into a beautiful, stress-free reality. Let Japan write the first chapter of your married life and let us plan every page of it.

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Fri, 12 Jun 2026 08:17:47 +0100 Gopi Krishnan
The Morning Brief: What the PDB Can Offer the Corporate Leadership Team https://belimedia.com.ng/the-morning-brief-what-the-pdb-can-offer-the-corporate-leadership-team https://belimedia.com.ng/the-morning-brief-what-the-pdb-can-offer-the-corporate-leadership-team CEOs of major corporations need to make hugely consequential decisions every day, but many start their mornings in fragmented and reactive information environments. Compare that to the President and other senior US national security leaders who often begin their day when their intelligence briefer delivers the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). The PDB briefer provides a curated engagement to help their principal understand the issues of the day; the briefer might share insight on the motivations of a key foreign leader, walk through the nonobvious implications of a recent development, or offer a path to pose questions directly to the Intelligence Community. The PDB briefing model offers a compelling template for companies that want to improve the information and decisionmaking environments of their key leaders.

The PDB has been around for more than 60 years. It is the pinnacle of the Intelligence Community’s analytic support, delivering the most important and high-quality analysis and intelligence reporting. Perhaps more importantly, it pairs a senior leader with a briefer whose sole job is to enable their principal to understand everything they need to know about national security issues for that day in about 30 minutes. The briefer becomes intimately aware of the principal’s world – who are they talking to later that morning, which NSC meeting do they have to attend in the afternoon, what policies are they trying to advance, and where are their blind spots on national security threats that could harm Americans. Through those daily conversations, the briefer helps the principal identify the questions to ask to get to the heart of a complex issue and sometimes passes those questions to the IC in the form of taskings that will result in a follow-up written response.

The briefer uses their mastery of analytic tradecraft to explain the argumentation behind each assessment in the PDB. They provide context and offer the principal a confidential sounding board to talk through policy quandaries. They deliver bad news effectively and dispassionately by expertly walking through the strength of the sources underlying key judgments. In short, having a daily briefer gives the principal an opportunity to better accomplish his or her goals.

In the private sector, executive leadership teams are often left to their own devices, triaging emails from the day before, trying to make sense of dashboards showing the most recent overnight data, and trying to read a few different news sources to get a handle on a threat to the company’s wellbeing that seems important even as the key implications remain hazy. CEOs might meet with a chief of staff, which helps, but that role is built to clear obstacles, drive decisions, and put out the day's fires — work that runs on deadlines, unlike readiness to answer any major question the CEO could raise, even the ones they never ask. So no matter how capable the chief of staff or how large their team, that readiness is the first thing the calendar crowds out. An executive assistant can walk through the schedule but can't explain why tomorrow's agenda is built around the wrong question. Everything feels reactive because it is.

The PDB process offers a better way. Imagine a major company that creates a small team of senior managers that understands all the inputs flowing to the executive leadership team from across the company—data from sales and marketing teams, supply chain updates, cyber threat assessments—and can identify what the leadership team needs to know each morning. Just like the staff that creates the PDB’s content, these managers would work with internal stakeholders to create a set of products delivered to the leadership team with a predictable rhythm while facilitating the production of ad-hoc “breaking news” style internal assessments. The team would work with a set of briefers drawn from the company’s most promising midlevel employees – rising stars who have demonstrated exceptional abilities to make sense of huge amounts of data and understand the needs of someone in a leadership role, and who have unquestionable judgment and discretion.

Both groups would work together to produce and deliver the briefing package for the CEO and other executive team members. The CEO’s briefing package might be the smallest but would include the most important internal company information combined with external news pulled in by the briefer overnight. It would form the core of the briefing package for every other leadership team member so each would know what the CEO is reading each morning, allowing them to be better prepared to answer questions from the CEO while also giving them additional material relevant to their core roles – the chief marketing officer might get extra news reporting on trending influencers while the chief financial officer might get a rundown on the latest indicators of how the Fed might vote the following week. Strong companies will protect both teams from institutional pressure by making their mandate for objective delivery explicit – one way to handle this would be for the briefing team to report to the board to help protect their independence.

On any given morning, the CEO’s briefer would explain the electoral dynamics affecting how a visiting governor will ask for concessions from the company at their breakfast meeting; unpack the data in a recent HR study on employee retention rates; highlight the mitigation of a recent cyber intrusion event; and unpack the political dynamics in a major foreign market that could lead to retaliatory tariffs. The briefer can go deep into all of these issues because she spent all night working to understand them. If she can’t answer the CEO’s questions, she’ll issue a tasking to the right department, which will deliver an answer the briefer can use by the next morning. Before she leaves for the day, she’ll give a download of the briefing to the chief of staff, record feedback on various items in the briefing to share with key recipients and review the menu for the next day’s briefing items with the production team.

As the saying goes, when information is cheap, attention becomes expensive. As AI shifts the cost of information and even analysis toward zero, a key constraint on senior decision-making shifts to something more scarce — a trusted human whose sole mandate is to be prepared to help a leader be ready to start their day in an environment in which seeing what’s around the corner is both increasingly important and difficult. The PDB briefing experience creates a partnership between principal and briefer that extracts the most value from the least amount of time, which is inarguably the most valuable resource for any senior leader. Companies facing fast-moving, loosely connected threats, where being caught flat on any single one is costly, will find that having a corporate PDB briefing team is less a luxury than a wise investment having leaders who are exquisitely prepared to meet each day.

Phillip Consentino recently retired after a 25 year career in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis in which he served as managing editor of the PDB from 2019-2022.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 11 Jun 2026 23:37:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
How Gulf States Turned Crisis Into Confidence https://belimedia.com.ng/how-gulf-states-turned-crisis-into-confidence https://belimedia.com.ng/how-gulf-states-turned-crisis-into-confidence The Epidemic of Patriotism

How war, intelligence, technology, and state competence are building a new nationalism in the Gulf.

There is an old idea in political theory that war makes the state.

The pressure of external threat forces governments to centralize, to coordinate, to invest in systems that work. States that survive conflict emerge more capable than they entered it. The ones that don't — fracture.

What nobody talks about is what comes next.

When the state performs — when it absorbs the shock, sustains order, and demonstrates visible competence — the state makes something else.

It makes patriots.

I recently spent time in the UAE during a period of acute regional pressure following Iran's barrage of missiles and drone strikes across the Middle East. What I expected to find was tension. What I found instead was something more interesting.

Patriotism. Everywhere. Organic, visible, and unforced.

Towering signage along major highways with mottos like “Proud of UAE.” UAE flags woven into the texture of daily life — not militarized, not performative, but present in the way that identity becomes present when people feel their nation has held the line.

The population wasn't reacting to crisis. It was consolidating around the idea of the state itself.

The question I came back with: why did this work? Why did external threats produce loyalty rather than anxiety? Why did the GCC—especially Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar emerge from a period of regional instability with greater public confidence, not less?

The answer isn't just geography or leadership or cultural cohesion. The answer is in intelligence and defense architectures.

The Intelligence Backbone Nobody Sees

States that perform in a crisis don't do so by accident.

Behind the public calm in the UAE — behind the intercepted drones and the uninterrupted skylines and the visible symbols of continuity — is a decision-making infrastructure that most people never see and analysts rarely discuss in this context.

Over the last decade, the Gulf states have made serious, sustained investments in the tools of modern statecraft: open-source intelligence collection, AI-enabled data fusion, integrated sensor networks, and the analytical pipelines that allow governments to move from information to decision at operational tempo.

This is not hypothetical. It is observable in procurement patterns, in the capabilities demonstrated during the March–April 2026 Iranian attacks, and in the speed and coherence of governmental response across multiple GCC states simultaneously.

When Iran launched, these states knew.

Not just from allied intelligence sharing — though that mattered — but from indigenous systems built to ingest, fuse, and act on data at scale. Commercial satellite feeds, open-source signals, pattern-of-life analysis, cross-domain data pipelines that would have been the exclusive domain of major intelligence agencies a decade ago.

The state saw clearly. And because it saw clearly, it acted. And because it acted, the public saw competence.

But seeing clearly was only part of it.

The battlefield that Iran chose to contest is not the battlefield of the 20th century. It is not decided by who has more tanks, more ships, or more aircraft. Iran didn't send a conventional military force. It sent drones and missiles — cheap, scalable, and increasingly precise instruments that have fundamentally democratized the ability to project lethal force across distance.

The drone is the great equalizer of modern conflict.

It lowers the cost of precision strike to a level that non-state actors, regional powers, and asymmetric adversaries can sustain indefinitely. It saturates traditional air defense frameworks designed for a different threat geometry. And it shifts the decisive advantage away from platform count and toward something harder to procure and harder to replicate: the architecture of detection, classification, and response at machine speed.

The GCC understood this shift before the attack came.

The investments made across Gulf states in counter-drone systems, AI-enabled sensor fusion, and integrated kill chains weren't legacy procurement decisions — they were deliberate bets on the direction the battlefield was moving. The question was never who had more. It was who could out-sense, out-decide, and out-react fast enough to neutralize a swarm before the next one launched. That is not a hardware problem. It is an architecture problem.

And on the night Iran tested it, the architecture held.

The state acted decisively. And the public — watching intercepted threats fall before they reached their targets — saw a government that had invested in the right problems before the crisis arrived.

Technology continues to advance, and the GCC states are in an accelerating race to optimize their asymmetric architectures — sharpening their ability to detect and defeat incoming threats at machine speed, while developing the offensive capacity to reach back and eliminate the sources before they can launch again. That is not a static capability. It is a compounding one.

That is the mechanism. That is how intelligence and technology become patriotism.

Competence as the New Social Contract

Patriotism in the Gulf was never purely tribal or historical.

It has always carried a transactional dimension — a contract between population and state that runs something like: deliver safety, deliver prosperity, deliver order, and you have legitimacy. What has shifted is the evidence base for that contract.

Citizens don't observe the intelligence and defense architectures directly. They observe outcomes. Intercepted missiles. Functioning infrastructure. Stable markets. Governments that communicate clearly and move without visible panic.

In an era of OSINT and data driven decision-making, the speed and quality of state response have increased measurably. The lag between threat and action — the gap that historically exposed state weakness — has compressed. Governments with modern day focus on intelligence collection from open-source and sensitive sources, data exploitation, and data fusion to enhance their decision-making cycle, simply look more competent, because they are more competent, at least in the domains the public can witness. This matters enormously for legitimacy.

When people can compare their government's performance against the chaos visible across their borders — in real time, on their phones, through open-source feeds that show burning cities and collapsing infrastructure elsewhere — the contrast is stark. The Gulf didn't just survive the pressure. It appeared to absorb it without breaking stride. That contrast is where modern patriotism is being forged.

A New Kind of Nationalism

What I observed in the UAE is not the nationalism of the 20th century.

It is not rooted in historical grievance, ethnic solidarity, or liberation mythology. It is not state-manufactured in the top-down sense that Western analysts often assume when they look at Gulf political culture.

But it isn't accidental either.

I spoke with Jonny Gannon, a retired CIA officer with extensive experience in the Middle East. His observation cuts to the heart of what makes the UAE's approach distinctive: "The UAE hasn't just invested in infrastructure and technology, but also in symbols and stories of unity. Identity politics and divisive behavior is actually not allowed."

That framing matters. What Gannon is describing is a deliberate parallel architecture — one that runs alongside the defense and intelligence investments and is equally intentional. While the GCC was building the data pipelines and counter-drone systems that would absorb Iran's attack, it was also constructing the cultural conditions that would make a population capable of responding with pride rather than panic.

The billboards. The flags. The national narratives. The deliberate suppression of the sectarian and tribal fault lines that have fractured other states in the region. These are not decorative. They are load-bearing.

A population divided against itself cannot consolidate around a state under pressure. The UAE understood that social cohesion is not a soft outcome — it is a strategic asset. And it built both the hard and soft architecture with the same discipline.

It is aspirational. It is performance-based. And it is digitally amplified in ways that accelerate its spread.

The younger generation across the GCC is patriotic about *what their states are building* — AI cities, space programs, global financial hubs, intelligence architectures that rival those of countries ten times their size. They are proud of capability. Of systems that work. Of governments that appear to know what they are doing.

Crises accelerate this.

When missiles fly, populations ask questions that normally stay dormant: Who protects us? Has the threat been curtailed? Are we safe?

The Gulf answered those questions with visible, competent performance — enabled by tools most of the world's analysts don't fully credit in this context.

The Irony Iran Didn't Intend

There is a strategic irony in what Iran's March - April 2026 strikes produced.

The intended effect was intimidation. The demonstration of reach. The signaling of capability and willingness to escalate.

The actual effect — in the Gulf at least — was consolidation.

The GCC states that were targets, or could be targets, emerged with sharper national identity, higher public confidence in their governments, and stronger regional cohesion than before the attack.

Iran's strike package became the proof of concept for Gulf state competence.

Every intercepted drone was a data point. Every functioning hospital, every uninterrupted supply chain, every calm official statement backed by visible governmental control — each one reinforced the social contract between citizen and state.

The war made the state. The state made the patriots.

Two Kinds of Patriotism

Not all patriotism is built the same. And the difference matters more than people recognize.

On September 11, 2001, the United States experienced one of the most powerful eruptions of national unity in its modern history. At the time, I was a young CIA case officer and I felt the power of national unity and the need to protect the homeland at all costs. Flags on every overpass. Record military enlistments. Increased approval ratings for government institutions that hadn't existed in decades and haven't been seen since. It was real. It was visceral. But it didn't last.

Within a few years, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had begun to hollow it out. By the time those wars ended — the patriotism of September 12th had transformed into something closer to its opposite: criticism and distrust of institutional decisions over 20 years and a political culture defined by the fractures that grief and vengeance had papered over. The reason was structural, not incidental.

The patriotism that followed 9/11 was built on shared trauma and collective grief. It was the patriotism of deep national wounds — powerful in the moment, but dependent on an enemy and an emotion rather than a demonstrated capability. When the wars that followed proved costly, and inconclusive, the foundation cracked. Because the foundation was based on pain.

The Gulf in 2026 is a different story.

Patriotism emerging across the GCC was not born from a failure to stop attacks against the homeland nor forged in grief. It emerged from a population watching its governments absorb a real threat — intercepted in the air, managed on the ground, communicated clearly — and perform.

That is a fundamentally different foundation.

Ukraine offers a third model — and in some ways the most instructive of all.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, the global intelligence community made two catastrophic analytical errors simultaneously. It underestimated the will of the Ukrainian people to fight. And it overestimated the capability of the Russian military to win.

Both errors stemmed from the same failure: modeling hardware and not morale. Counting battalions and not belief. What followed rewrote assumptions that had governed Western military analysis for a generation.

Ukraine's patriotism did not emerge in 2022. It was forged earlier — in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and ignited the Donbas conflict. By the time the full invasion came, Ukrainian national identity had already hardened into something that satellite imagery and order-of-battle assessments couldn't capture. The invasion didn't create Ukrainian patriotism. It revealed how deep it had already run. And then that patriotism enabled something remarkable.

Facing a conventionally superior adversary, Ukraine didn't try to match Russia tank for tank. It fused commercial off-the-shelf technology, open-source intelligence, and decentralized decision-making into an asymmetric capability that the Russian military — designed for a different era, structured around a different doctrine — couldn't absorb or adapt to fast enough.

Drone units guided by commercial satellite feeds. Targeting decisions informed by crowdsourced OSINT. Battlefield coordination running on consumer applications. The entire architecture of modern conflict compressed into tools available on the open market, operated by a population that had decided what it was defending and why.

This is the COTS revolution meeting the will-to-fight — and the combination proved more decisive than most professional militaries predicted.

Russia, by contrast, demonstrated what institutional brittleness looks like under pressure. A military built on centralized command, information opacity, and top-down control couldn't adapt at the speed the battlefield demanded. The architecture that was supposed to project strength became a liability the moment it encountered a distributed, adaptive, data-informed adversary.

Ukraine's lesson reinforces the same underlying principle as the GCC's — but from a different angle.

The GCC built institutional architecture first, and patriotism followed from demonstrated state competence. Ukraine had the patriotism first, and it drove a population to build the architecture — improvised, distributed, and lethal — from the ground up.

In both cases, the fusion of technology, intelligence, and national will produced an outcome that conventional analysis failed to anticipate.

In both cases, the side that could see more clearly, decide faster, and act with coherent purpose held the line.

That distinction — between patriotism as a response to failure and patriotism as a recognition of competence, or as a foundation for building it — may be the most consequential strategic variable of the current era that nobody is systematically measuring.

What This Means

This is not a story about the Gulf being exceptional. It is a story about a principle that generalizes.

States that invest in the architecture of modern statecraft — advanced systems, the intelligence pipelines, the data-enabled decision layers that allow governments to sense, process, and act faster than their adversaries — earn something that cannot be bought or manufactured through propaganda. They earn demonstrated competence.

And demonstrated competence, in moments of real pressure, produces legitimacy. Legitimacy, sustained over time, produces loyalty.

The epidemic of patriotism spreading across the GCC is not a communications campaign. It is not state-engineered sentiment. It is the downstream effect of governments that invested in their intelligence and defense infrastructure, demonstrated that infrastructure under fire, and let the results speak for themselves.

Security creates loyalty.

Competence creates legitimacy.

And in an era where citizens can watch state performance in real time — open-source, unfiltered, and comparative — the gap between governments that have the intelligence and defense architectures and those that don't is becoming impossible to hide.

The Gulf built those architectures. The crisis revealed it. The patriotism followed.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 11 Jun 2026 14:21:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Governance Failure and Civil Resistance in Azad Jammu and Kashmir https://belimedia.com.ng/governance-failure-and-civil-resistance-in-azad-jammu-and-kashmir https://belimedia.com.ng/governance-failure-and-civil-resistance-in-azad-jammu-and-kashmir The June 2026 events in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) are the most recent example of a larger governance issue rather than a singular political crisis. Authorities banned the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) on June 5–6, detained dozens of activists, interfered with internet and mobile services, and asked for more security guards in advance of a long march and strike that was scheduled to take place throughout the region (Pakistan Today, 2026a; Express Tribune, 2026a; Express Tribune, 2026c). The clash stems from years of unsolved grievances, failed agreements, and rising irritation with the gap between formal autonomy and effective authority, even though these measures were justified as being required to protect public order.

The Architecture of Managed Dependency

Many of the institutions of self-government, such as an elected president, prime minister, legislative assembly, and judiciary, are present in AJK. However, Islamabad continues to have a significant influence in important policy areas like infrastructure, electricity, water management, and security. According to Zamin (2025), AJK's elected institutions frequently have little control over the policy areas that have the biggest impact on day-to-day living.

This paradox is especially apparent in the energy industry. With almost 3,000 megawatts feeding the national grid and much more unrealised potential, hydropower projects supported by AJK's rivers greatly contribute to Pakistan's electricity generation (Wikipedia, 2024; The News, 2026). Residents still have to deal with load shedding and electricity costs, which are generally thought to be out of proportion to local production costs, notwithstanding this contribution (The News, 2026). One of the main causes of political unrest is the belief that local resources mostly benefit the larger federation while local communities receive little in return.

Political developments have heightened these concerns. Changes in governance in AJK typically reflect developments in federal politics rather than local election preferences. Following political shifts in Islamabad, the PTI-aligned administration was replaced by a PPP-led government, strengthening perceptions that AJK's institutions act as extensions of federal political dynamics rather than representations of local democratic choice (The Diplomat, 2025; Express Tribune, 2026b).

Three Years of Agreement, Three Years of Non-Implementation

The current issue cannot be understood without first reviewing the pattern of previous agreements and unsuccessful implementations. Since 2024, negotiations between the government and the JKJAAC have generated numerous settlements aimed at resolving economic and political problems. However, several obligations were postponed, partially implemented, or unresolved. Following significant protests in May 2024, officials pledged financial aid, discounted utility bills, and reduced wheat prices (Wikipedia, 2024). The movement called off its protests, but implementation delayed. Further agreements concluded in late 2024 and 2025 followed a similar pattern. Compensation measures, legislative review, telecommunications reconnection, and public services did not offer the level of change that many citizens expected (Voicepk, 2026).

By May 2026, negotiations had once again broken down. Disputes over legislative representation and implementation methods increased the distance between the parties. The JKJAAC rejected government proposals on the refugee-seat issue and boycotted an All Parties Conference convened to address the matter (Express Tribune, 2026b). For many campaigners, conversations appeared to yield paper commitments rather than genuine progress in practice.

The implications went beyond politics. Protest-related violence in 2024 and 2025 resulted in civilian deaths, communication limitations, and growing mistrust between government and civil society groups (Voicepk, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2025). During this time, the movement shifted from a campaign centred on economic concerns to a broader platform arguing for governance change, accountability, political representation, and increased local control over resources (JURIST, 2025).

The Proscription and Its Implications

The decision to identify the JKJAAC under anti-terrorism legislation marks a significant step up in the state's response. The organisation is a coalition of traders, lawyers, labourers, transportation workers, and community representatives that has mostly operated through strikes, demonstrations, and negotiations with government officials (NewsX, 2026). Applying legislation designed to fight violent organisations to a movement with proclaimed civic goals profoundly alters the legal status of political opposition in AJK.

Authorities claim that the group jeopardised public order and security. Critics argue that the prohibition risks criminalising political opposition instead of addressing the root causes of instability. According to opposition politicians and civil society campaigners, the bill severely restricts democratic rights and peaceful political engagement (Express Tribune, 2026b).

The timing of the ban is equally important. It happened right before a planned protest rally and shortly before elections. When combined with communication limitations and large-scale security deployments, the action has raised doubts about whether the goal is counter-terrorism, election stability, or the containment of organised political opposition (Pakistan Today, 2026b; Express Tribune, 2026c). Regardless of aim, the decision has reduced the opportunity for conversation at a time when confidence between the state and civil society is already exceedingly low.

The International Dimension

Unlike prior protest cycles, the June 2026 crisis has sparked increased international attention. Members of the British Parliament and Kashmiri diaspora have expressed worry about arrests, communication limitations, and the overall political situation (NewsX, 2026). Reports of families being unable to reach relatives in AJK fueled criticism of the government's response.

The situation is also unfolding in the background of the unresolved Kashmir conflict and ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan. Following Operation Sindoor and the following cease-fire, regional tensions remain high (Carnegie Endowment, 2025). AJK is a unique territory that is both politically disputed and strategically significant. As a result, internal dissent is frequently regarded via a national security perspective rather than just as a governance issue.

The Substance of the Demands

To assess the proportionality of the state's response, one must examine the substance of the JKJAAC's demands. The movement's platform includes lower electricity tariffs, food and fuel subsidies, more local benefits from hydropower projects, accountability for protest-related violence, civil liberties protection, and parliamentary representation improvements (Kashmir Welfare Foundation, 2026).). While some initiatives are politically problematic, the overarching agenda prioritises governance, economic fairness, and institutional responsibility over secession or armed opposition.


Movement leaders have constantly described the campaign as peaceful and nonviolent (Pakistan Today, 2026c). At the same time, popular sentiment in the AJK is not uniform. Some citizens support the movement's goals but are dissatisfied with the inconvenience created by ongoing strikes and shutdowns (Pakistan Today, 2026d).

Conclusion: The Cost of Structural Deferral

The events of June 2026 reveal a long-term government failure. AJK's formal autonomy has not been matched by comparable political authority, and its resource richness has not resulted in broadly shared economic gains. Repeated agreements have boosted expectations without resolving underlying complaints, while rising conflict has gradually destroyed trust between the state and civil society.

The fundamental question is not whether the demands for accountability, representation, and economic fairness will continue. The evidence from the last three years suggests they will. The more pressing question is whether AJK's governance structures can adapt to meet those demands through actual reform rather than repeated cycles of protest, repression, and non-implementation. Without such reform, the tensions visible today are unlikely to disappear; they will merely re-emerge in new forms, carrying growing political and reputational costs for the state.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 11 Jun 2026 14:21:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s Taliban Embrace Signals a New Power Shift in Afghanistan https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-taliban-embrace-signals-a-new-power-shift-in-afghanistan https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-taliban-embrace-signals-a-new-power-shift-in-afghanistan Sometimes the only thing more frightening than Afghanistan’s problems is the Taliban’s solutions and the recently signed Russia-Taliban military-technical agreement may be the most alarming one yet. The partnership signals that Afghanistan’s security architecture is being rebuilt without the United States, and increasingly by America’s rivals. Washington should pay close attention because the deal hands one of the world’s most repressive regimes a pathway to becoming more capable and deeply entrenched in a regional order where Russian influence is expanding at America’s expense.

No one should be fooled by the bland language of the arrangement struck between Sergei Shoigu, one of Russia’s most powerful figures, and Taliban Defense Minister Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob. In Russia’s playbook, such arrangements are practical templates for influence, opening the door to weapons transfer, spare parts, maintenance contracts, training missions, surveillance systems, encrypted communication tools, and intelligence sharing, ultimately producing deep security dependence. It also creates space for Russian military contractors to embed inside Taliban's security institutions and for Moscow to establish listening posts inside Afghanistan, expanding its visibility into rival intelligence activity across the region.

The arrangement marks a clear shift from Russia’s arms-length contact with the Taliban to something closer to institutional partnership. For Moscow, it delivers a foothold inside the Taliban’s security state, a lever in the region, and potentially a quiet logistics corridor through Afghanistan, including toward Iran. For the Taliban, it offers legitimacy, military hardware, technical assistance, and a powerful patron that will not attach lectures about human rights or political inclusion to its support.

The reported rationale, countering the threat from ISIS-K, the Islamic State’s regional branch, is genuine enough to give both sides cover. ISIS-K has mounted attacks inside Afghanistan, challenged Taliban authority, recruited across Central Asia, and claimed the 2024 Moscow concert hall attack that killed over 140 people. While both Russia and the Taliban have reasons to fear it, reducing the deal to counterterrorism alone misreads its scope. As threats stack up — ISIS-K, border instability, militant flows, and narcotics trafficking — Moscow is exploiting each layer of risk to justify a deeper role in Afghanistan, where the United States spent two decades trying to shape the outcome.

Russia did not arrive at this partnership out of ideological sympathy, as the history between the two sides is complicated enough to rule that out. In the late 1990s, the Taliban recognized Chechnya's independence, openly supporting a separatist cause that Moscow treated as an existential threat. Years later, Russia was reportedly the third largest external backer of the Taliban insurgency against U.S. forces, after Pakistan and Iran. What drives Moscow today is the same cold logic that has long shaped its Afghanistan policy: not affection for the Taliban, but a calculated bargain of what that regime can deliver. That is why Moscow first removed legal barriers to dealing with the Taliban, then became the first country to formally recognize the regime, and has now moved into a deeper security partnership.

Under the new arrangement, Taliban arrives at the table with every disadvantage that makes it an ideal Russian partner. It is isolated internationally, starved for cash, absorbing Pakistani airstrikes along a contested border, and desperate for external legitimacy. For the Taliban’s ruling clerics, accepting help from Moscow may mean swallowing some pride, but their need for outside support is real. For Russia, that desperation is more of a feature than a flaw: a partner weak enough to need help, isolated enough to accept the terms, and useful enough to serve a larger regional strategy. A stronger Taliban may be dangerous, but a dependent Taliban is exactly what Moscow wants.

This is a playbook Moscow has refined elsewhere. Across the Sahel, Russia used Wagner Group and its successor structures to offer struggling regimes what the West often withholds: weapons, trainers, protection, and political backing without rigid preconditions. Moscow’s offer is structurally simple: show up with ammunition and discreet support when others walk away. In places where governance has collapsed and security guarantees are scarce, that formula has proved devastatingly effective. The same template has now arrived in Afghanistan.

The Taliban's military has a well-understood Achilles' heel, and they badly need what Russia can provide. Taliban forces can hold territory, run checkpoints, and enforce loyalty with remarkable effectiveness, but they remain vulnerable to airstrikes, drones, and advanced surveillance. They also rely on aging Soviet-era equipment, captured stocks, and leftover U.S.-supplied hardware inherited from the previous government's collapse, much of which is difficult to sustain. Russian support could close these gaps, including by training technicians, repairing helicopters and armored vehicles, supplying cheap drones, upgrading communications, and possibly even strengthening air-defense capabilities over time.

For the Taliban, political payoff compounds the military one. Every handshake with a major power makes the regime look less like a permanent pariah and weakens the assumption that it can be kept outside the international system indefinitely. Every technical channel also opens a pathway to broader commercial engagement - from mining contracts and railway projects to regional connectivity initiatives - each one gradually normalizing Taliban rule.

The most important piece of this arrangement is intelligence cooperation. The Taliban can provide what Russia cannot easily get on its own: human access across districts, border crossings, prisons, mosques, smuggling routes, and militant networks. That means eyes and ears on who moves, who recruits, who shelters foreign fighters, who disappears across borders, and who returns with new skills or fresh instructions. Russia, in turn, brings capabilities the Taliban has limited means to develop domestically, including surveillance tools and biometric systems, creating a dangerous exchange.

The danger sharpens when we trace what Russian equipment could actually do in Taliban hands. Military-grade drones could help hunt ISIS-K, but they could also give Moscow visibility over Afghan terrain, border and customs zones, and security movements. Encrypted Russian communications tools may help Taliban commanders avoid interception by rivals while remaining visible to Russian signals intelligence. Biometric databases could help identify ISIS-K and other suspects, but they could also turn Afghan border crossings into screening nodes serving Russian security priorities.

The most obvious danger lies in targeting. The Taliban is not a clean counterterrorism partner, even if it governs a country riddled with extremist groups, many of which it tolerates or quietly protects. Russian intelligence tools intended to hunt ISIS-K could easily be redirected by Taliban factions toward other targets, including regional rivals, Afghan political opponents, or competing factions. The same capabilities could also be used to pressure businesses, monitor communities, and harden the coercive machinery the Taliban relies on to keep dissent from organizing.

Russia's machinations, however, extend well beyond the bilateral arrangement. At a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Bishkek in May, Moscow framed its Taliban partnership not as a narrow bilateral preference, but as a player in collective regional stability — one that Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China are likely to reinforce, or at least tolerate. Through this framing, Taliban security cooperation is being gradually folded into the SCO orbit, giving the Taliban targeted access to a multilateral intelligence architecture while allowing Russia to be the primary gatekeeper of that relationship. The message to the region is unmistakable: Moscow now holds the direct Taliban line and is best placed to manage threats from Afghanistan.

Here, Taliban and Russian interests may also converge in ways that quietly extend the partnership's reach — for example, in suppressing Tajik militant networks inside Afghanistan to reduce threats to Tajikistan, a CSTO member Russia is treaty-bound to defend. Meanwhile, Moscow is simultaneously positioning itself as a mediator between the Taliban and Pakistan — whose relationship has collapsed into open hostility along the Durand Line — placing Russia not just as Taliban’s partner but as a potential broker with Pakistan.

To be sure, Russia is not blind to what it is getting into by betting on a regime with deep self-limiting features, risks Moscow appears willing to accept if the new arrangement holds. The Taliban is neither a nimble political system nor capable of easy course correction, driven instead by ideological certainty and its own sense of manifest destiny. It increasingly operates on a logic of risk because risk has repeatedly paid off. The man at the top of the regime trusts almost no one, yet constant jockeying runs beneath him across the ranks with different factions needing allies, resources, networks, and outside patrons simply to survive. That contradiction shapes Taliban politics and remains the regime’s main weakness. That gap between centralized command and fractured allegiance is also the fault line along which the entire arrangement with Moscow could eventually crack.

At the same time, the Taliban has learned to make uncertainty work in its favor. It rarely needs a clear view of the future because unpredictability itself has become part of its governing style, a way to preserve options, test limits, and keep others off balance. Ironically, this is also one area where Washington still holds a form of leverage. Washington is often described as unpredictable, but unpredictability can be a deterrent when adversaries cannot easily calculate how it might respond in a crisis.

The problem is not that Washington is confused about Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, but that the debate around it often lacks the right framing. When Afghanistan is discussed, the focus usually defaults to ISIS-K threat and the residual al-Qaeda presence, asking whether these groups can strike the American homeland. From that starting point, the Taliban gets cast as either a human rights problem demanding condemnation or as a reluctant counterterrorism partner worth practically engaging, with little analytical space in between. The more important question is not only whether ISIS-K poses a threat to the United States (it does), but whether the Taliban's evolving security state, including its external patrons, militant relationships, and deepening integration into Russia's orbit, is creating a threat landscape that will be far harder to confront once it fully takes shape.

That’s why, for the United States, the lesson embedded in this relationship is both clear and uncomfortable. Afghanistan’s security architecture is being rebuilt in America's absence — and, in some ways, against American interests. Isolation has not changed the Taliban; instead, it has driven the regime toward partners who ask fewer questions and deliver more practical assistance. Russia, meanwhile, also benefits from a strikingly different position in its dealing with the Taliban: no Russian hostages held by the group, no clear constraints on Russian intelligence activity inside Afghanistan, and no Taliban-generated political pressure that would otherwise complicate Moscow’s calculus. The asymmetry matters because while Washington carries the heavy weight of a twenty-year war, Moscow is now buying influence at a discount.

None of this argues for recognizing the Taliban, legitimizing its rule, or copying Moscow's approach to engagement. But pretending that isolation and sanctions alone will contain a regime actively cultivating powerful patrons is no longer credible. If that assumption continues to guide U.S. policy, Afghanistan will keep drifting into a security order where American influence is weak, Russia’s leverage is growing, and the Taliban’s staying power becomes more sophisticated.

The Russia-Taliban handshake was quiet, but its consequences are unlikely to be. If Washington does not define a realistic Afghanistan policy before these arrangements harden, Russia and others will keep writing the rules in a country where the United States paid the highest price only to watch its rival collect the benefits.

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Thu, 11 Jun 2026 14:21:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russian Active Measures, And More Dirty Tricks: Expect Russia to Escalate Its Attacks on our Democracies https://belimedia.com.ng/russian-active-measures-and-more-dirty-tricks-expect-russia-to-escalate-its-attacks-on-our-democracies https://belimedia.com.ng/russian-active-measures-and-more-dirty-tricks-expect-russia-to-escalate-its-attacks-on-our-democracies

For many in the West, Russian information warfare still conjures images of hacked emails, troll farms, and social media manipulation during the 2016 U.S. election and the Brexit vote in the UK. But those operations were not isolated incidents. They were part of a much older Russian playbook—one refined over a century by Soviet and later Russian intelligence services. Today, that same machinery is evolving again, becoming more aggressive, more technologically sophisticated with cognitive AI, and more focused on exploiting the deepest social fractures within democratic societies. The latest revelations about Russian-linked operations in Europe should therefore not surprise us. They should warn us.

A report released last week by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) focuses on a new effort, ostensibly by the Russian Presidential Administration, hidden under several front companies, to sow discord and distrust among ethnic minorities and groups in several different countries. Dead pigs’ heads thrown onto the territories of Mosques, synagogues defaced, slurs against historic atrocities—all intended to get various groups in democracies fighting with and among each other, and for the benefit of the Russian Federation. The reporting is important, and more attention needs to be drawn to it in Europe and the United States. But the tactics are not new; they are classic Russian “active measures,” what they now call “measures of support,” carried out by their intelligence services. We can expect more of the same in the months and years to come.

The KGB was very clear on what active measures, or information warfare, were, and how they were meant to be used. The famous archivist-turned-defector Vasiliy Mitrokhin detailed active measures as he quoted from the official KGB training and operational guide: “agent-operational measures aimed at exerting useful influence on aspects of the political life of a target country which are of interest, its foreign policy, the solution of international problems, misleading the adversary, undermining and weakening his positions, the disruption of his hostile plans, and the achievement of other aims.” Sound familiar? The definition is worth breaking down further to demonstrate how it was applied and still applies to the Russians’ tactics today.

Russian active measures are principally the work of the SVR (the Service for Foreign Intelligence), the GRU or “GU” (military intelligence), and the FSB (the Federal Security Service). The SVR has a dedicated Directorate for this work, including information and cognitive warfare focused exclusively on the United States as the “main adversary” (glavnii protivnik) and on all of our close NATO and European allies. The goal is to use intelligence operations to discredit our democracies, mislead policies and political groups, and sow discord and disunity within our societies. The SVR and GRU both did this in 2016 with elections in the United States and with the UK’s Brexit, as cited by non-partisan reporting from the Senate SSCI committee (of which current Secretary of State Marco Rubio was a senior member), the DNI, and, in the case of the UK, by the report of a special commission.

There are always three elements of active measures, as I outline in my book and in its chapter on the same topic: identify the target, determine the operational method, and, most importantly, apply maskirovka to conceal Russia’s hand. All of this can be seen at play in the events in France, Germany, Armenia, and other countries, as highlighted in the OCCRP report, and many other incidents from recent years.

In the case of the dead pigs’ heads thrown onto Islamic centers, the goal is to incite potential unrest and political action by French political groups on all sides. The Russians hoped that these would be reported and activated as intended “cognitive strikes” within French society, and labeled as “racist attacks.” Distrust would be amplified with every media mention. The Russians no doubt (and likely correctly) guessed that some would deplore the attacks, some might try to explain them from one optic or another in light of French politics, and some might actually empathize (disgusting, but true with all such racist and ethnic hatred). But all of these are a win for Russian intelligence.

The Russian goal is to sow discord, just as they did in the U.S. elections of 2016 with social media trolling. Russian intelligence picked up issues then (in 2016 and 2020, in the case of U.S. elections). It will focus now on the most divisive issues to attack: racism, ethnic strife, abortion, LGBTQ, and other issues—again, not for or against, since the Russian services lack any sentimentality and no morals—but to foment societal division. A weakened adversary cannot counter Russia in Ukraine, the Baltics, or wherever Putin next chooses to launch aggression.

The methods selected can vary: from bribing a journalist to write a story to recruiting a politician or lobbyist to help start a political action group to sending actual operatives, as in this case, to carry out fake attacks to stir discord. The Soviets and Russians have done it before, many, many times.

And there is another key point here—the Russian services and their political masters in the Kremlin—President Putin and his siloviki —are not necessarily for or against any single political group or ideology, even when it appears there may be synergy with Russia’s views. That is incidental (including in the case of the 2016 election). Benefit to any one candidate was not their overall goal, though they may capitalize opportunistically in the short term. Any such gains are still subordinate to the overarching goal—to attack our citizenry and democracy, making the West weak and, ideally, our populations divided. The attack is fundamentally against democracy itself, and the Russians aim to get the French, or Armenians, or Americans to hate each other and fight viciously over the issues that Russian intelligence selects for their cognitive warfare.

Democracy is the threat. That is why Putin ultimately had to destroy Ukraine—he cannot stand a free and functioning democracy, yet another one, thriving on his borders like the Baltic states have done for 30+ years since their independence. Democracy and free societies work, but Putin can’t let the Russian people get wind of that. The West has to be portrayed as split, divided, and weak.

The Russian intelligence services and their Soviet forebears have been at this for 100 years, since the Bolshevik revolution in its earliest days. Spread disinformation, make use of “useful idiots” in the West who actually believed in communism, all the while Lenin insisted that “Iron Felix” Dzerzhinsky stood for organized terror. A divided opposition and adversaries would be weaker in trying to stop the revolution, Stalin’s expansionism before and after World War II, or the Cold War policies of the USSR within the Warsaw Pact. Today, they need NATO and the EU to be weak, the transatlantic partnership divided. We should not help them achieve their goals.

The final element, though, is the most important: what the Russians call maskirovka. The best translation for the term's intelligence understanding is likely “denial and deception.” Hide the hand and make it look like someone, anyone else, is to blame. The OCCRP report cites Russian Presidential Administration aides discussing and ordering that the operatives “believe they are working for Ukraine.” That is the essence of maskirovka, false flags, and deception. Just like the alleged Venezuelan manipulation of voting machines, what former U.S. Attorney General William Barr said was a “bullshit” theory (his word). But it makes for great maskirovka—blame the Venezuelans, anyone but the Russians.

And finally, about the Russian Presidential Administration directing so-called front companies in the report, like the SDA and SNG media, with lofty goals and mission statements like: to “compensate for the lost ties between residents of the countries of the post-Soviet space after the dissolution of the USSR, acknowledged as one of the largest geopolitical catastrophes in the world.” Again, more maskirovka, more hidden hands so that even if found to their roots, the roots don’t point to the intelligence services. The Russians use diversified cover for their intelligence service officers across all of their government, including in the Presidential Administration. It is filled with former and current KGB/SVR/FSB and GRU hardliners.

Why did they fail in this plot? Poor implementation and judgment of us, the West, their adversaries. The Russians have been underestimating the strength of free and fair investigative journalism for years. Bellingcat has repeatedly exposed its operations; OCCRP now joins that list and deserves real credit for doing so. But we still have a long way to go in countering Russian active measures and disinformation. Many in the United States, the UK, and across the EU –including some of our leaders-- still do not fundamentally believe the Russians are engaged in this kind of activity. And what Russian intelligence officers, organized crime groups, hackers, and proxies accomplished in 2016 can now be amplified exponentially through cognitive AI—magnifying social media trolling and influence operations ten-thousandfold.

The West must understand that this threat is neither temporary nor improvised. It is systemic, deeply rooted in Russian intelligence doctrine, and likely to intensify as the Kremlin feels increasingly isolated and strategically threatened. Moscow will continue turning to old and trusted tools—deception, division, provocation, and manipulation—because they are cheaper than tanks and often more effective. Democracies cannot defend themselves if their citizens no longer trust one another, their institutions, or even the basic idea of objective truth. If we think “elections are rigged,” that is a huge win for Putin. That is the real target of Russian active measures—democracy. Recognizing that reality is the first step toward resisting it. Russian intelligence services are trying to make “useful idiots” of us all. We shouldn’t let them.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Wed, 10 Jun 2026 17:54:45 +0100 FirstHandNews
Rubio Lays Out Trump Administration’s Iran Endgame https://belimedia.com.ng/rubio-lays-out-trump-administrations-iran-endgame https://belimedia.com.ng/rubio-lays-out-trump-administrations-iran-endgame “He [President Trump] felt it was imperative that Iran not be able to establish a conventional shield that they were building with massive number of drones and missiles, and they were on their way to getting double what they had, and if they reached the point where they had so many missiles and so many drones plus their naval capabilities that existed at the time, Iran would then say to the world there's nothing you can do about our nuclear program because if you do we will overwhelm your defenses with the sheer volume of launches that we have and then they could do whatever they wanted on their nuclear program. That was an unacceptable risk. It was a risk that we were running out of time to address.”

That was Secretary of State Marco Rubio, testifying last Wednesday before the Senate Appropriations Committee and providing the latest rationale for the U.S. joining Israel in the first February 28 bombing attack on Iran.

Rubio went on to claim that prior to the decision to attack, Trump and his advisors weighed the risks, “not just [to Iran closing] the Strait [of Hormuz], but also the attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain and UAE (United Arab Emirates) and Saudi Arabia and Qatar. It was weighed against that and the President made a decision that not having a nuclear weapon above all else had to be the priority.”

Wednesday’s Senate Appropriations appearance was Rubio’s fourth time testifying last week before Congress, nominally about the State Department’s fiscal 2027 budget, but in reality providing public answers to a whole series of administration wartime and foreign policy activities that have seen various explanations for weeks.

I will discuss some of Rubio's policy explanations to Senate and House members last week in a moment, but the hearings also provided surprising new information, not all of it from the Secretary of State.

For example, did you know the Trump administration has had three classified criteria it has used to determine which so-called narco-trafficking boats should be blown up in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean? Up-to-now at least 207 people have been killed as the result of more than 60 such U.S. strikes, with little public explanation.

At last Tuesday’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) told Rubio, “I know what the targeting criteria are because of briefings I've had in this committee and in the [Senate] Armed Services Committee. It's all been classified and I'm not allowed to discuss the targeting criteria because they've only been shared in classified [settings].”

However, Kaine added, “I don't think I'm prohibited from describing things that aren't targeting criteria.” He then said what had surprised him was that “There's evidence of narcotics on the

boat. That is not (emphasis added) a targeting criteria…They have not used the presence of narcotics on the boat as one of the targeting criteria,” Kaine repeated.

Kaine then asked Rubio, “Why would the administration not include the presence of narcotics in the boat as a targeting criteria?” and Rubio replied, “As you've just outlined, I can't discuss the specifics of the targeting criteria, but I can tell you the one thing that is obvious is that the targeting criteria is not single source. In essence, there are multiple checks...and all of it informed and infused by intelligence collection.”

Rubio added, “I'm not aware of every strike because it's not reported [to him] on a regular basis, but there have been strikes that they've walked away from because it doesn't meet the criteria or because there's doubt.”

Later, at that same hearing, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) noted “that the statistics from the [U.S.] Coast Guard also say that when we interdict alleged drug boats in the historic way, the way we've always done it, about one in four don't have drugs. We make mistakes. We see something suspicious about the boat. We stop them and they don't have drugs on board.”

Then Sen. Paul went on, “I would also like to add that drugs is not a criteria for blowing up the boats, the boats that are called drug boats, but neither are arms (emphasis added). So, in order to blow them up, we don't have to say that they're armed or have drugs. And I think a lot of people would have questions, which I still do.”

It’s obvious the so-called criteria for these strikes needs more explanation.

Another issue, brought up at Wednesday’s hearing, came from Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) and related to the more than 100 vacant U.S. ambassadorial posts around the world.

Shaheen told Rubio, “The fact is it's not the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate that is holding up those nominees. It's the fact that the nominees are not being submitted to us [and] those nominees who start to go through the process often aren't willing to comply with the ethics requirements that require that they divest of their outside holdings.”

Noting that “you just sent over 20 nominees of whom only four are career people,” Shaheen said, “So the problem is not in the Congress, the problem is in the administration. And I hope that you will begin to take up that slack by appointing more career ambassadors.”

As for today’s main issues, Rubio made clear the re-opening for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was the U.S. priority with Iran, while solving the nuclear issues with Tehran comes second.

As Rubio put it on Wednesday before the Senate Appropriations panel, “The only reason there is a [U.S. Navy] blockade is because of what they've [Iranians] done in the Strait. The fact that they are telling the whole world we will not let your ships through unless you pay us a toll. And we can never accept that -- that we can never accept, the tolling system in the Strait. If we accept that in the Strait it will be replicated in multiple places around the world. There'll become a new status quo, everyone will want to do one.”

Rubio added that Iran had “mined the Straits and are shooting drones at ships. So, they need to stop doing that. They need to cooperate with the removal of the mines. And if they do that, then [open] the Strait, then the blockade comes off.”

At another point last Wednesday, Rubio said as part of the negotiations, once the Strait is opened, the U.S. blockade withdrawn, “they [the Iranians] would agree as part of all of this that they are prepared to sit down and negotiate an agreement that disposes of the highly-enriched uranium that limits, and/or prohibits, their enrichment program.”

Rubio continued, “In return they [the Iranians] would be able to have some, not all, of the sanctions that they are facing for their nuclear program potentially waived or reduced, but that would be only be depending on what they give, and of course these things all have to be verifiable.”

Rubio further explained, “The highly-enriched uranium you can verify because when it's removed it's removed. The enrichment monitoring is the one that's going to be critical for any deal to be successful.”

Toward the end of the Senate Appropriations hearing, Rubio summed up nuclear negotiations saying, “What's been offered to them? There's no down payment or bonus for entering into negotiations. So what's been offered to them is everything that they ask for will be commensurate with what they're willing to give as part of the broader negotiation for a deal…The only thing they get for opening the Strait is the lifting of our blockade.”

On enrichment, Rubio clarified, “What we're focused on, I think most people are focused on, is the highly-enriched uranium, which is, you know, like the 60% [enriched uranium] for example, that we know they still possess that can quickly be turned into 90%. That's what the term highly- enriched uranium is. There's some 20% enriched as well, but the bulk of what the world is concerned about is the 60%.”

During his appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee last Wednesday, Rubio gave a hint of whom, among the Iranians, they hope they are dealing with.

Rubio explained, “As you know, the Iranians suffered tremendous losses in personnel, and that includes top leadership of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and other elements of their government. What the President [Trump] is alluding to is that there are certain individuals in the Iranian regime who have indicated both directly and indirectly a willingness to approach the future perhaps a little differently. Not ideal. I'm not telling you. Look, everybody talks about moderates in Iran. There are no moderates. There are radicals and super radicals. Okay? That's been our view of it. But there are some of them that believe that they actually need to do a deal because their economy is in shambles. And so I think what the President is alluding to is that there are some individuals involved in the negotiations and in elements of their government including some in elements of their military that are more open to a deal than others.”

Asked about post-President Maduro Venezuela during last Tuesday’s Senate Foreign Relations hearing, Rubio said, “Venezuela is in a better place today and in a better trajectory today than it was five months ago. Now, is it where it needs to be? Is it where it needs to ultimately wind up? The answer is, of course, no.”

Rubio explained, “Ultimately, in order to truly transition, they have to have multi-party free and fair elections. But the conditions for free and fair elections are the following. First of

all, you have to have a free and open media. And while you've seen independent journalists are now for the first time activated again, that has to exist. Political parties have to be given the space and time to organize. The National Electoral Council has to be reformed so that it has members in it that will actually accurately count the vote. You have to have certain conditions in place. I'm not telling you that's five years from now, but it's been five months. So I want to be relative to that.”

On Cuba, Rubio told the Senators, “Cuba is actually not controlled by the government. Cuba's controlled by a military holding company named Gaesa. And Gaesa virtually owns everything, they own the tourist sector, they own mining, they own the gas stations, they own everything. They generate about 70% of Cuba's GDP [which]is under the control of this military company and they're sitting on between $14 [billion] and $17 billion in assets. So you have people literally starving, a power grid that hasn't been maintained in 10 years. And yet you have this holding military company sitting on these assets. And by the way, not a penny of the money in the military holding company translates over to the public treasury.”

With that background, Rubio said that for Cuba “not to continue to be a failed state, which poses a threat to the United States, they need systemic and serious reform. They need to have economic reforms. And the question is, can they possibly reform given the people who are currently in charge both of Gaesa and of their government?”

Not surprisingly, Rubio went on, “I really don't believe this system [in Cuba] is capable of reform unless new people take over or a new mindset takes hold. Now, we've engaged in conversations with them. We've offered them what I think needs to happen in order for their economy to recover,” but he did not explain what that was.

Whether or not Rubio’s information turns out to be accurate and his views of where things should be headed even prevail, the words of this Secretary of State/acting White House National Security Adviser need serious consideration because on top of it all he may be a future Presidential candidate.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 09 Jun 2026 19:13:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Forgotten History Moscow Doesn’t Want Remembered https://belimedia.com.ng/the-forgotten-history-moscow-doesnt-want-remembered https://belimedia.com.ng/the-forgotten-history-moscow-doesnt-want-remembered Sadly, few in the U.S. and Europe know the complicated history of the Kremlin’s actions in the years leading up to Hitler’s Invasion of the USSR. This is partially a result of Moscow’s emphasis on some facts, twisting other facts and effort to ignore it to suppress critical facts that threaten and undermine the Kremlin’s propaganda and cognitive warfare narratives. Just a few reminders:

Putin’s “historians” often forget to mention the fact that in 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland, the Soviets not only did NOT join the UK and France in standing up to that aggression, but participated in the unjustified occupation - with Moscow and Berlin dividing Poland amongst themselves. You can find photos of Soviet NKVD and German Gestappo officers meeting in occupied Poland, where they were working to target Polish officers and citizens. As Russian historian Nikita Sokolov notes in his article “Victory Instead of the Truth: Myths and Blank Spots Related to the Topic of the Great Patriotic War”, prior to Germany’s invasion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in June 1941, the Soviet leadership not only refused to aid the United Kingdom and France when they went to war with Hitler’s Germany and Italy in 1939, but Soviet censors prohibited writers from writing negatively about Nazi Germany and between 1939 and 1941, the Kremlin banned 4,000 publications that were critical of Berlin from being published.

There is also the matter of the “Winter War” waged by Moscow against Finland between November 1939 and March 1940. An aggression conducted against one of the Soviet Union’s neighbors that was justified by the false claim that the Finns were threatening to invade Soviet territory and occupy Leningrad and preceded by a classic provocation – when the Soviets conducted a false flag operation and opened fire on their own troops along the Soviet – Finnish border, then claimed that the attack was perpetrated by the Finnish Armed Forces, justifying Stalin’s invasion of Finland.

When France signed an armistice with Berlin in June 1940, the United Kingdom stood alone facing the full might of German and Italian forces. Moscow did not support London during this period, but instead, was busy seizing Polish and Romanian territory, occupying the Baltic States and providing its German allies with raw materials used to fuel the German war machine.

While the Germans were bombing London and other British cities, Stalin was helping them. In a sign of just how absurd Russian propaganda about the Second World War can be, one Russian news program I recently watched made the claim that London was, in fact, never bombed n by the Germans but instead, was bombed by the British themselves as part of a false flag operation conducted by London against its own population. (NOTE: This kind of lie might be hard for many to understand, but not Russians who are well aware of the fact that their own government has conducted false flags and provocations against the Russian population to justify various government decisions going back to Tsarist times.)

Putin’s propaganda machine likes to promote the image of Ukrainian and Baltic peoples siding with the Nazis against the USSR to justify Russian aggression against its neighbors. Historically, it is a fact that many in Ukraine and the Baltic States initially welcomed the Germans - because they were seen as a relief from Stalin and his regime, that had terrorized the Soviet Union for years, including arresting and sending millions of Soviet citizens to their deaths via purges, mass arrests, forced labor projects and forced starvation programs. But the same historians also tend to remain silent about the shame that, during the Second World War, large numbers of Russians also went over to the side of the Germans. Few in the West are familiar with the story of Stalin’s “Favorite” General, Andrii Vlasov, who after being captured by the Germans in 1941, volunteered to lead thousands of Russian troops who had been captured by the Germans against the Red Army. Vlasov Army consisted of a large number of ethnic Russians who choose to fight against the Soviet Union and was augmented by many other ethnic Russians from the USSR’s “First Wave” of emigration living in Europe at the time – former officers of the “White Movement” who fled Russia during and after the Russian Civil War and volunteered to help Fascist Germany in its fight against Moscow.

The Kremlin’s scribes often falsely claim that Moscow “single handedly" defeated the Nazis and won the war while the UK and U.S. sat on the sidelines. The argument is repeated that London and Washington delayed the opening of second front in Europe to relieve pressure from the Soviets. Of course, Putin’s “historians” often fail to recall that while the American, Australian and British troops were fighting a bloody and brutal war against Imperial Japan in the Far East, Comrade Stalin refused to declare war on Tokyo until after it was clear that the allies had knocked Japan out of the war in 1945, opening the way for the Soviets to grab territory from an already defeated country.

Not only did the Soviets fail to support the allies in the Pacific, but Stalin actually worked clandestinely to spark a war between the U.S. and Imperial via operation “Snow” in 1941.

British and U.S. operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean were not enough for Stalin, who insisted that London and Washington expand their efforts in Western Europe to save him from the same Fascist regime that Stalin signed the Molotov Ribberntrop pact with only a few years earlier.

While the U.S. was funneling assistance to the Soviet Union via the “Lend Lease” program, Mosow was conducting aggressive and extensive espionage activities against its “allies”, recruiting and running large agent networks tasked with stealing just about any secret that they could get their hands on. Of course, Putin remembers this part of the “alliance” and loves to gloat and glorify the Soviet Intelligence officers who were behind operations like “Snow” and “Enormous”.

The same “historians” that love to boast about how the “Russians” defeated Hitler’s Germany, rarely mention the direct impact the allied strategic bombing campaign had on the Hitler’s ability to wage war. This air campaign, which cost the lives of large number of U.S. and Allied Airmen, was a key element in the defeat of Hitler’s Germany, with sorties significantly disrupting German defense production and energy supplies needed to equip and power the German military.

There is no doubt that the people of the Soviet Union suffered greatly during the Second World War, or as it was referred to by the Soviets as “The Great Patriotic War”. But it was not only the Russians of the former Soviet Union that paid a terrible price for the failure of diplomacy and common sense that led to the worldwide conflict. Millions of Soviet citizens died during that horrible period. Uzbeks, Tajiks, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Kazakhs, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Kyrgyz. Each former Soviet Republic sacrificed to defeat the Nazis and those tremendous sacrifices should be remembered and respected. But why does the Kremlin today try to present Russia alone as the sole victor in the battle against Facism?

Why? During the Cold War, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR tried to cover up its own failures and mistakes by promoting false narratives about the war. Among other things, the goal was to present the U.S. and “West” as aggressors, downplay their roles in defeating fascism and aiding the Soviet Union survive Hitler’s onslaught, which as Sokolov notes, could not have survived German aggression without help from the U.S. and other allies. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the new Russian Federation (RF) attempted to build better ties with its former Cold War enemies, there was a recognition of the role played by Washington, London, Ottawa, Canberra and other allied nations in defeating the Nazis. But with Vladimir Putin’s ascendency to power in the early 2000s, Russian history once again saw a re-introduction of the Cold War era theme designed to denigrate the contributions of others in defeating Hitler and promote Russia as a great power.

Putin’s own behavior towards his neighbors since his invasion of Georgia in 2008, and assault on Ukraine starting in 2014, has made Putin synonymous with Hitler. Today, those subjected to the war crimes and atrocities inflicted upon them by the Russian Military see the Russians who condone Putin’s war of aggression as being synonymous with those Germans who either played a direct role in promoting Hitler’s policies or who passively went along with those policies.

I can say from my past experiences traveling in both the Soviet Union and Russia over the past 40 years that while official propaganda often tried to deny the roles played by the U.S., UK and others in defeating Nazi Germany in the 2nd World War, many Russians remembered with fondness the sacrifices made by their allies to help the against the Third Reich. The Russians themselves remembered the lifeline they received via Lend Lease; the incredibly treacherous journey allied merchant ships took delivering supplies to the USSR. They would often recall the photo of U.S. and Soviet troops meeting on the Elba River, recognizing this event as a symbol of cooperation and mutual sacrifice. And these same Russians would often tell me how horrific the war was and how much they wanted to avoid living through the horrors of another conflict.

Unfortunately, Russia’s current autocratic leader has ordered his historians and propagandists to re-write history with the goal of denigrating the role all of the allied powers played in destroying Fascist Germany and ignore the fact that the USSR failed to join the war effort against Imperial Japan until the war in the Pacific was almost over. We should never allow him to get away with giving credit to those who earned it and as with all of Putin’s disinformation, call it out whenever and wherever encountered and counter his distortions with historic facts.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 09 Jun 2026 19:13:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Qatar's New Online Influence Machine https://belimedia.com.ng/qatars-new-online-influence-machine https://belimedia.com.ng/qatars-new-online-influence-machine For years, Qatar has positioned itself in Washington as a trusted American partner: a host to major U.S. military assets, a mediator in hostage negotiations, and a wealthy Gulf state capable of talking to nearly everyone in a turbulent region. At the same time, Doha has earned a reputation for exerting influence by illicit means, such as the bribes that secured it the right to host soccer’s 2022 World Cup. Less recognized is the Qatari regime’s employment of an artificial media platform that poses as an independent news organization while promoting Doha’s agenda.

To complement Al Jazeera, its global media powerhouse, Doha created Eekad, an Arabic-language media platform that presents itself as an independent fact-checking and open-source investigative outlet. In actuality, Eekad is part of an opaque digital ecosystem with links to Qatari government ministries and contracted PR firms that consistently pushes narratives aligned with Qatar’s geopolitical interests, while attacking many of Doha’s regional rivals.

Eekad produces polished content that mimics serious investigations by using satellite imagery, network analysis graphs, and short-form videos designed for mass consumption across the Arabic-speaking world. It has built a strong audience online but obfuscates who funds, operates, and controls the platform. What is clear, however, is that multiple Eekad employees simultaneously worked at Al Jazeera, Qatari ministries, and state-affiliated organizations.

Eekad’s messaging follows a remarkable pattern. It regularly criticizes Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates while defending Hamas and dismissing criticism of Qatar. For example, after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 massacre in Israel, the platform questioned reports of atrocities committed against Israeli civilians while portraying criticism of Hamas as part of coordinated foreign influence campaigns. This jibes with Qatar’s position of holding Israel “solely responsible” for the October 7 massacre.

Eekad has also repeatedly defended Qatar’s reputation by attempting to debunk criticism of Doha. The platform worked to discredit allegations of labor abuses tied to the 2022 World Cup despite FIFA finding that “severe human rights impacts did ultimately occur in Qatar.”

These are the same narratives and talking points that Qatar has peddled outside the shadows of social media. Documents submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act show how Qatar has spent over $235 million dollars employing dozens of American lobbying and public relations firms to polish Qatar’s reputation and promote its relationship with the United States.

In some cases, Doha has employed U.S. firms specifically for outreach to traditional media. Tucker Carlson’s viral 2025 interview with Qatar’s prime minister is a product of these efforts. Qatar has invested in a significant U.S. media campaign in recent months, hiring a former CNN producer to serve as a registered agent in the United States, and encouraging Qatar-based academics to “examine strategies of sectarian hate speech and propaganda on social media in the Gulf region.”

The patterns hinting at direct Qatari government control of Eekad are difficult to dismiss. Washington tends to think about foreign influence through the lens of Russian troll farms or Chinese espionage, but Qatar is working to earn itself a place on that list.

Today’s influence campaigns increasingly operate through decentralized digital ecosystems: “independent” brands, influencers, and social media networks that can maintain plausible deniability while still advancing state interests. This is no secret to Qatar, which brought a group of conservative influencers to Doha over Thanksgiving 2025 on a luxury trip that resembled a sophisticated foreign influence campaign rather than an educational endeavor. One influencer, a veteran with nearly half-a-million followers on X, said he had an “eye-opening few days” learning about “the unique and mutually beneficial military and financial partnerships that we share with Qatar.” Months later, another online personality said that Qatar had invited him on the influencer trip but then told him that “they ran out of money for ticket allocation” after he posted a video “questioning Qatar’s influence in America.”

Platforms like Eekad are effective because they do not resemble traditional state propaganda outlets. Their content adopts the aesthetics of scrappy open-source intelligence and online fact-checking outlets, helping the material to appear credible to ordinary viewers. It is a suitable approach for countries like Qatar, which seek to maintain close military and diplomatic ties with Washington while promoting narratives directly harmful to American interests.

When meeting with Qatari counterparts, senior U.S. leaders should make clear they aware of Qatar’s underhanded methods and that Washington will strip Doha of the privileges of being ally if behaves like an adversary.

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Tue, 09 Jun 2026 19:13:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Middle East at the Brink: Norm Roule on Iran, Israel, and the High&Stakes Struggle Taking Shape https://belimedia.com.ng/middle-east-at-the-brink-norm-roule-on-iran-israel-and-the-high-stakes-struggle-taking-shape https://belimedia.com.ng/middle-east-at-the-brink-norm-roule-on-iran-israel-and-the-high-stakes-struggle-taking-shape

As tensions between Israel and Iran continue to evolve following a weekend Iranian ballistic missile attack against Israel, policymakers and markets alike are grappling with a complex and uncertain landscape. A very fragile ceasefire, ongoing disruptions to maritime traffic in and around the Strait of Hormuz, threats of new escalation by the Houthis in the Red Sea and continued diplomatic engagement between Washington and Tehran underscore the highly complex military, economic, and political dynamics now shaping the region. While fears of a broader regional war have eased somewhat, for now, key questions remain about the durability of any ceasefire, the future of nuclear negotiations, and the security of critical energy and trade routes.

To help put these developments into perspective, The Cipher Brief spoke with former National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) Norm Roule. In this conversation, Roule examines the multiple layers of the current crisis - from maritime security and energy markets to Iran's regional strategy, proxy networks, nuclear diplomacy, and the implications of renewed Israeli-Iranian confrontation - offering his assessment of where the conflict may be headed and what policymakers should be watching next.

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

Understanding a Multi-Layered Crisis

The Cipher Brief: The tenuous ceasefire in the Middle East involving Iran may be collapsing. Iran has fired a fresh barrage of missiles at Israel, and reportedly, President Trump attempted to restrain Israel from retaliation. We have seen a growing number of reports that container ships and oil tankers are beginning to trickle out of the Strait of Hormuz, albeit sometimes under fire. At the same time, we have reports that the Administration’s negotiators are consulting nuclear experts to develop the next phase of talks with Iran. The situation is difficult to understand. Can you put this into perspective?

Roule: The best way to look at the current situation is to see it operating on several levels in parallel. The levels interact, but they can also progress independently. The situation is brittle, but each process has predictable elements because each level is maintained by a consistent set of actors whose strategic motivations are constant. The ceasefire, such as it is, concerns Iran itself and should not be considered to include Lebanon. This arena will remain a disruptive element over which the U.S. will have limited influence. Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, we should view it as a contested enforcement crisis sustained by a nominal ceasefire, with the post-strike and ceasefire diplomatic endgame not yet in sight.

The Strait of Hormuz and Maritime Pressure

The Cipher Brief: What is the current state of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz?

Roule: Iran continues to press ships to pay for passage through Iranian-designated routes or Iranian transit-control arrangements in and around the Strait and will continue to do so. There are credible reports that the Strait is mined, but this has not been publicly confirmed. Most ships appear to be moving through Omani waters, where the U.S. military is providing some level of informal protection, short of formal escort, as they pass through the Strait. The U.S. Navy has repeatedly and appropriately demonstrated that it will tolerate no threats by Iran and has destroyed Iranian drones and struck coastal radar or other military assets when they threatened maritime traffic or U.S. forces. These operations have likely constrained Iran’s actions. We should expect Iranian tests of the U.S. to continue, however, if only because Iran knows that even a small number of attacks will prevent most shippers from testing the route and will keep insurance rates prohibitively high for cargo traffic.

The Economic Squeeze on Iran

The Cipher Brief: Tell us about the impact of the blockade on Iran.

Roule: The impact is significant and almost certainly far greater than Iran is willing to admit, and growing every day. Before the blockade, Iran’s oil exports were commonly estimated at 1.4 to 1.8 million barrels per day, depending on whether one counts crude, condensate, refined products, and shadow-fleet flows. Oil and gas exports accounted for roughly 15 percent of GDP. Iran’s exports have fallen sharply, with current flows measured in the hundreds of thousands of barrels per day rather than pre-blockade levels. May crude and condensate exports will be well below 300,000 bpd. Unemployment is growing. Inflation is growing. Iran’s rial open-market rate now hovers around 1.7 million per dollar. The economic erosion and associated domestic political costs will be cumulative in a country that was already shaken by unprecedented nationwide unrest in December and January.

Iran's Regional Strategy

The Cipher Brief: What are Iran’s options to weaken the impact of sanctions?

Roule: We are seeing these play out in real time. Iran is using Pakistan, Caspian, Turkey, rail, and other land routes for limited trade leakage, but these cannot replace seaborne crude exports to China at scale. Tehran will also press shippers to pay for passage through waters it controls. Militarily, use missile and drone attacks on Kuwait, Bahrain, some of the ships transiting the Strait, and now missile strikes on Israel to show the limits of U.S. power, to split regional alliances, and to keep oil prices as high as possible. In terms of foreign engagement, the Foreign Minister must use travel to show Iran is not isolated, and the Quds Force needs to sustain its relations with proxies and to keep international attention on Israel, and influence U.S. public opinion against continuing the conflict.

The Future of Nuclear Diplomacy

The Cipher Brief: Tell us about Iran’s broader regional motives? What prompted Iran to attack Israel with missiles this evening? Why is Iran so focused on Lebanon?

Roule: The ongoing crisis prompted by the Iranian missile attack on Israel risks significantly changing the region’s strategic map, but before we talk about today’s developments, let’s unpack some of the other issues that led to it. I think that will lay a good foundation for understanding Iran’s motives in launching the missile attack and help explain these attacks and where the broader region is going.

First, neither the United States nor Iran wants to see a return to open hostilities such as those seen in the first weeks of the conflict. Tehran needs domestic stability, and Washington has no interest in another war in the Middle East. Therefore, the weight of the conflict, as well as the pressure tool for talks, shifted to the Strait of Hormuz because each side sees this lower-intensity battlespace as offering leverage without the risks of that broader conflict.

There are routine reports that a small number of ships are exiting the Strait, sometimes under fire from Iran. The ships are generally moving through Omani waters, but there are rare reports of ships choosing to travel through Iran’s side of the Strait. This flow is sufficient to allow Iran to demonstrate that it will deal with those countries that pay the price of passage, but also allows Washington to show a capacity to defend shipping willing to fall under its informal protective umbrella. Tehran continues to hope for an arrangement in which it can collect a fee for each ship. This plan has been soundly rejected internationally, and the U.S. has already sanctioned the entity the Iranians set up to manage the Strait due to its links to the Revolutionary Guard. Any company that pays a fee to Iran will risk U.S. sanctions.

We shouldn’t expect Iran to drop its demands on the Strait, however. Washington, on the other hand, sees its blockade of Iranian ports, coastal areas, and Iranian-linked oil shipments through the Strait as its best means of compelling Tehran to accept nuclear concessions. Neither side will easily give up this influence without substantial concessions from the other that would need to be tightly sequenced in a carefully orchestrated diplomatic deal that has yet to be arranged. For the U.S., the price would have to be a firmer commitment to nuclear concessions. Tehran will seek substantial financial inducements and likely long-term sanctions relief.

Second, as events play out, Tehran is converting geography, missile reach, and proxy survival into fresh coercive regional leverage and using nuclear engagement in a new game with very high stakes. Tehran sees its control of the Strait as giving it not only a stranglehold on the economies of its Gulf neighbors, but long-term global economic influence. Let’s spend a moment on this. In addition to the oil, distillates, and hydrocarbon products that have filled the headlines, the Strait is also home to at least seven major undersea fiber-optic cables that carry a critical share of Gulf international connectivity for the Gulf states. Together with energy targets, this would give Iran the ability to threaten the region’s oil, LNG, insurance, and freight, but also put at risk cloud connectivity, banking, military communications, energy trading, telecom networks, and Gulf economic diversification. Iran targeted cloud and data-center infrastructure, including facilities supporting AI workloads in the region, in drone attacks. This will become another avenue of threat, although Gulf states are already taking steps to harden these facilities. For the Gulf States, and for the world, the idea that we would allow a situation where Iran could threaten such an AI infrastructure tied to the global financial system at a time when the GCC states are investing heavily in data centers, cloud services, and fintech that would only expand the impact of that network should be of the greatest concern.

Returning to regional militias, it comes as no surprise that a regime dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has made protection of proxies a pillar of its national security policy. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC doctrine has been to rely on a palette of asymmetric tools – including proxies, missiles, and other asymmetric weapons – to achieve regional dominance. Militias provide Iran with a means to project power throughout the region and to influence shipping in the Red Sea. Although indeed, Iran’s proxies were severely damaged in recent years, they all survived. Iran’s humiliation at the time was that the proxies were neither able to serve as a strategic defense to Iran when needed, nor was Iran able to defend them in their hour of need. The current regime in Tehran has shown from its arrival that Lebanon, or rather Hezbollah, is a core national security pillar. If Hezbollah falls, the current regime cannot claim to be any more successful than its predecessor. What remains to be seen is whether this decision will affect unrest in Iran. In recent demonstrations, some protestors complained that the government spent more time on proxy issues than on national problems.

None of this means diplomatic talks can’t continue. Indeed, as history has shown over the past decades, Iran has had no difficulty pursuing lengthy diplomacy while pursuing similar programs. The Iran nuclear talks in the Obama administration continued during a period of Qods Force regional expansion. Despite the sometimes heated rhetoric on each side, Washington and Tehran have pursued diplomacy, passing draft proposals via Pakistan and, reportedly, messages via Gulf partners. Although slow progress is common in the world of indirect Iranian diplomacy, the security conditions of the new Iranian government, Tehran’s need to form a system under fire, and the very consequential nature of these issues for each side make the idea of fast talks in this case unrealistic in the extreme.

Each side also has some reason to believe economic and political pressures will compel its adversary to make concessions if only they can stand firm longer. Washington knows sanctions are gnawing at Iran’s economy. Tehran is watching oil and natural gas prices creep higher as inventories decline. This makes predicting the conclusion of talks difficult. Despite what is sometimes said in the press, the issues are likely well understood by each side. After all, they have been discussed for years in some cases. The first challenge will be to develop the mechanics of a sequenced series of steps to overcome the distrust between the two sides and to deal with domestic opponents of engagement in each country. Events and politics on each side throw the occasional wrench into the talks.

Challenges with any near-term agreement

The Cipher Brief: What happens if we do sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iran?

Roule: An MOU would only be the beginning of a longer process, and we shouldn’t be overly optimistic that the outcome will be as productive. Iran refuses to give up its right to domestic enrichment, and until it disbands the Quds Force, we can expect it to threaten its neighbors and the world with militias and terrorists. That is a recipe for sanctions and potential military action. It may be possible to remove Iran’s buried enriched uranium and increase IAEA access, but this will probably be a lengthy and complex diplomatic process as well.

The confidence-building stage in the MOU implementation would involve disbursing financial relief to Iran without the U.S. withholding the same at the last moment. For the U.S., financial relief will need to be managed in a way that will allow Washington to say that the funds are not being used to fund terrorism or missile proliferation. The Strait would need to be opened quickly and loudly, and the Trump administration would need to be able to point to progress in nuclear talks. Both sides would claim victory for their respective political bases, and Iran’s rhetoric would aim to humiliate the U.S. Inevitably, the strength of any MOU would be tested. With luck, the only test would be enduring the rhetoric of Iran’s hard-line officials, but more significant and challenging tests are possible. Last night’s example of Iran’s missile attack on Israel is a good example. Hezbollah or other proxies will continue their attacks.

When you put all of this together, we need to recognize that we are now in an era where Iran feels able to use a blend of conventional and proxy weapons against Israel and its neighbors more freely than at any time in the past. The concept of deterrence against Iran has been tested during this conflict, and new realities have been laid bare. I don’t think we have spent enough time thinking about what this means.

Israel, Hezbollah, and Escalation Risks

The Cipher Brief: So, let’s move to Israel and Lebanon. We realize this is playing out live. How should we look at this?

Roule: We are watching the real-world consequences of allowing Iran to destabilize the Middle East through its proxies. The chronology of this event is important because it shows what the future of the Middle East will look like unless we do something to change Iran’s role. Rocket fire from Lebanon into northern Israel prompts Israeli retaliatory airstrikes against Hezbollah-linked targets in Beirut. Iran then fires ten missiles against an Israeli airbase. Washington tried to constrain Israeli retaliation against Iran, but this was unlikely to succeed, even though it would be a disruptor in the nuclear talks. Israel’s Lebanon campaign in response to Hezbollah attacks will remain a variable that Tehran is using to link the U.S.-Iran track to Levant security. At the same time, Washington’s Iran channel does not control the Israel-Lebanon track, which will be subject to events in that arena and the actions of Israeli and Hezbollah actors.

Any Israeli Prime Minister would need to show their people, and Iran, that Tehran and its proxies cannot attack Israeli territory and escape punishment. That principle has been a firm element of Israeli security policy, especially since the October 7 Hamas attacks. Israel’s attacks against Iran included military targets and at least one petrochemical target of importance to the Revolutionary Guard. This strike appears constrained and contains a message that Jerusalem is prepared to damage more than military targets if Tehran continues. One suspects that Iranian officials have also adopted security protocols to enhance their safety. This will slow any talks that are underway, although it doesn’t appear that Israel attempted strikes against Iranian leadership.

What the Crisis Means for Energy Markets

The Cipher Brief: What are your thoughts on energy markets going forward?

Roule: Turbulence will remain a constant, but the market seems to have already accepted the idea that neither Iran nor the U.S. is interested in a broader conflict. Absent a significant change in conditions, that will likely continue.

Looking more broadly, the Iran conflict has made it clear that energy distribution security is now a permanent variable in energy markets planning. The direction and scope of energy, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure budgets for the GCC will be major policy challenges in the coming years.

Next, I’m sure your readers have noticed the impact of the conflict was less severe than some initially predicted. A handful of factors contributed to this, including the fact that energy sources are far more diversified than they were a decade ago. In addition to the U.S., Brazil, Guyana, and even Venezuela are producing more oil than before. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were able to increase production rapidly during the crisis because of wise, pre-crisis investments in infrastructure. Countries drew upon strategic reserves. China purchased less energy over the last few months. Europe and Asia made cutbacks. All of this bought time and space for markets. Nonetheless, Asia and Europe have already faced steep price increases, and the U.S. is likely to face the same if supplies do not improve in the coming weeks.

Lastly, in the medium term, a ceasefire or framework agreement between the United States and Iran will cap the panic premium, but it won’t eliminate the physical market premium. This will require a substantial change in supply. And this will require underwriters to return with lower insurance costs, ship traffic to normalize transponder use, inventory rebuilding, and Gulf crude and LNG moving routinely to markets globally. It will also take weeks following an agreement for the backlog of ships to work through Gulf ports and reach their destinations. This means price distortions in physical markets will linger even after an agreement.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 08 Jun 2026 19:48:19 +0100 FirstHandNews
Radical Empathy: The Counterintuitive Skill That Made Me Better at Everything Else https://belimedia.com.ng/radical-empathy-the-counterintuitive-skill-that-made-me-better-at-everything-else https://belimedia.com.ng/radical-empathy-the-counterintuitive-skill-that-made-me-better-at-everything-else There's a moment in every intelligence officer's career when they realize something uncomfortable: to be effective at their job, they must genuinely connect with people whose values, beliefs, or actions they might find repugnant. Not pretend to connect. Not manipulate. Actually connect.

This realization runs counter to everything we typically believe about empathy. We're taught that empathy flows naturally toward people we like, people who share our values, people who we think of as "good." But in the world of human intelligence, that comfortable version of empathy is nearly useless. What matters is something far more difficult, and far more powerful.

I call it radical empathy: the disciplined capacity to temporarily suspend moral judgment in order to genuinely understand another human being at their deepest level. Not to excuse them. Not to agree with them. But to see them with such clarity that you understand why their choices make perfect sense from inside their own experience.

This skill changed how I operate professionally. It changed how I lead. It changed my relationships. And I believe it's one of the most underdeveloped yet universally applicable capabilities in leadership, business, and life.

The Paradox at the Heart of Intelligence Work

Here's something most people don't understand about recruiting human sources: it's not about deception in the way movies portray it.

Yes, intelligence officers operate under cover. Yes, there are secrets and compartmented truths. But the actual relationship between a case officer and their asset? That has to be real. Authentic. Built on genuine understanding.

Why? Because you're asking someone to do something extraordinarily difficult and potentially dangerous. You're asking them to betray their country, their employer, their colleagues, perhaps even their family. You're asking them to live with secrets that could get them imprisoned or killed.

No one does that for someone they don't trust. Few people will take that risk for a relationship that feels transactional or manipulative (though there have been high-profile espionage cases where money was everything for the spy).

The intelligence officers who succeed at recruitment aren't the ones who are best at lying. They're the ones who are best at understanding. They develop an almost preternatural ability to see the world through another person's eyes, to discover what motivates them at the deepest level, and to position themselves as someone who genuinely meets that need.

This creates a paradox that took me years to fully appreciate: the profession that operates in shadows and secrets requires, at its core, one of the most authentic forms of human connection imaginable.

Finding Humanity in Uncomfortable Places

As a young officer, this was once put to the test when I was working against a major narcotics-trafficking rebel group and recruited one of its members as my source. We had precious little in common, a girl from Northern California and an armed fighter moving opium and heroin into the international market. But we found a way to connect. I learned about his own circumstances, the limited opportunities, the pressures of an armed militia that occupied his hometown, and his desire to do something more, better, with his life.

That experience taught me something I've remembered ever since: every human being, regardless of what they've done, has at least one redeeming quality. Some kernel of humanity that can serve as the foundation for genuine connection. A corrupt official might be a devoted father who would do anything for his children's future.

A disillusioned bureaucrat might be an idealist who once believed deeply in something and now feels betrayed by the system he serves. A person working for an adversarial government might hold private doubts about the direction her country is taking. The skill isn't in inventing these qualities. It's in uncovering them. They're always there. The question is whether you're willing to look past the surface, past your own judgments and assumptions, to discover them.

This is what I mean by radical empathy. It is neither soft nor naive. It’s not about investing my own emotional energy in another person at some supernatural level. It's a disciplined practice of psychological discovery that requires you to temporarily set aside your own moral framework in order to understand someone else's. The term radical empathy could just as well be radical understanding.

The Internal Work Most People Skip

Here's what makes radical empathy difficult: it requires confronting your own judgments, biases, and emotional reactions before you can genuinely see another person.

Most of us don't do this. We don't even realize we're not doing it.

We enter conversations with people already filtered through our assumptions about who they are, what they believe, and what they deserve. We listen for confirmation of what we already think. We interpret their words through our own frameworks. And we call this "understanding." It's not. It's projection dressed up as empathy.

True radical empathy requires a different thought process: First, acknowledge your judgments. Don't pretend you don't have them. If you're meeting with someone whose politics you find abhorrent, whose business practices you consider unethical, or whose personality rubs you the wrong way… acknowledge it. To yourself. Clearly. You can't set aside what you don't recognize. Second, summon genuine curiosity about their internal logic. This is the key move. Ask yourself: What would have to be true for this person's choices to make perfect sense? Not sense by your standards, sense by their standards, given their experiences, their information, their pressures, their fears, their aspirations. Dig deep to understand the other person’s “why” or sense of purpose. Everyone is the hero of their own story. Everyone's choices feel rational from inside their own experience. When you can't understand why someone does what they do, the limitation is usually in your own understanding, not in their rationality. Third, find the universal human element. Beneath the surface differences, what basic human needs are they trying to meet? Security? Recognition? Belonging? Purpose? These needs are universal even when the cultural context or strategies for meeting them diverge radically.

Finally, let genuine connection emerge. When you've done this work, something changes. The person in front of you stops being a caricature or a problem to be solved and becomes a full human being. Connection is truly possible, not because you've manipulated it, but because you've created the conditions for it. Your own curiosity and open mind promote trust, and trust is the foundation of real connection.

Why This Feels Uncomfortable

I've shared these ideas with others over the years, and occasionally encountered resistance. The concern usually sounds something like this: "If I empathize with someone whose behavior is harmful, aren't I excusing or enabling that behavior? Doesn't understanding become complicity?" This is an important question, and the answer is no, but only if you understand what radical empathy actually is. Radical empathy is not agreement. It's not approval. It's not moral relativism. And it’s not, again, pouring all of your own emotional energy into the other person.

It’s about understanding. You can fully understand why someone made a destructive choice and hold them accountable for it. You can genuinely empathize with the pressures that led someone to act unethically and still insist on consequences. You can see the humanity in someone and oppose everything they stand for. In fact, I'd argue that empathy strengthens your ability to respond effectively. When you truly understand someone's motivations, you're better positioned to influence them, negotiate with them, counter them, or help them adapt their behavior. You're operating with full information rather than fighting a caricature. The intelligence world taught me this viscerally. We weren't in the business of excusing bad actors. We were in the business of understanding them so well that we could anticipate their moves, identify their vulnerabilities, and, when possible, recruit them or change their behavior.

Understanding is not endorsement. It's power.

The Shift That Changes Everything

I remember another moment from late in my career when I sat across the dinner table from a former communist insurgent who had since risen to some prominence in his government. Decades earlier, we would have been committed adversaries. He still harbored deep animosity for the United States and, by extension, me as our government’s representative.

The conversation was tense and stilted at first, but shifted over time as we spoke about our families, our mutual desire for equality in our countries, our values of independence, self-reliance, and patriotism. He realized that I sought understanding, not judgment, and that changed everything. It ended up being one of the most fascinating dinner conversations I had enjoyed in years.

What I've learned is that radical empathy creates a particular kind of shift in how other people experience you. When someone feels genuinely seen, not judged or evaluated, not managed, but actually understood at some level, something in them opens. Defenses lower. Authentic communication becomes possible. Trust builds faster than it otherwise would. This isn't mystical. It's psychological. Humans are fundamentally wired to respond to being understood. We crave it. And we can tell the difference between someone who's performing and someone who actually gets us. Intelligence officers become skilled at creating this experience for others because recruitment depends on it. But the skill needs to be real to work. The curiosity must be sincere, and your humanity must be felt.

Beyond the Shadows: Where Radical Empathy Transforms Results

For years, I cultivated this capability in classified contexts, assuming it was specialized, something unique to the peculiar demands of intelligence work. Obviously, that’s not the case. Radical empathy is a master skill that amplifies effectiveness in virtually every domain that involves human beings.

Leadership and Management

The leaders I most respect share a common trait: they understand their people at depth, and they can set aside judgment as they seek to build that understanding. They can appreciate someone else’s skills and performance, but also their aspirations, pressures, and private struggles.

This understanding doesn't make them soft. It makes them effective. They can deliver hard feedback in ways that the other person can receive because they've earned trust through genuine connection. They can motivate individuals differently based on what actually drives each person. Radical empathy allows you to lead people as they actually are, not as you assume them to be.

The "Likeability" Trap Leaders Must Escape

Here's a leadership mistake I have seen repeatedly over my long career. Too many leaders fall into the trap of filtering their teams through the lens of personal likeability. They gravitate toward employees they find pleasant. They invest more energy in people who are affable, who share their communication style, who feel easy to deal with. And they unconsciously distance themselves from those they find difficult, abrasive, awkward, or simply different. This is a fundamental leadership failure, and radical empathy is the antidote.

Bottom line? You don't have to like everyone you lead. It’s not a friendship. It isn't a marriage. It's work. The question isn't whether someone's personality delights you; it's whether you can understand them well enough to connect, build trust, and lead effectively. Some of the most valuable people I've worked with were not people I would have chosen as friends. They were prickly, or intense, or operated on a wavelength different from mine. Early in my career, I might have kept them at arm's length, managing them transactionally rather than leading them fully. That would have been my loss, and the organization's loss. Because frankly, genius does not always come in convenient packages. Radical empathy strips away the likeability filter. It asks a different question: Can I understand this person deeply enough to lead them well? The answer is almost always yes, if you're willing to do the work.

This becomes especially critical when you're leading people from outside your own field of expertise. If you're a business leader managing engineers, or a military officer leading intelligence professionals, or an executive suddenly responsible for a function you've never worked in, you can't rely on shared professional language or common technical background to create connection. You have to build it another way.

That way is radical empathy. It begins with genuine curiosity and an open mind. It requires you to ask questions you don't know the answers to, to listen without feigning expertise you don't have, and to understand what drives people whose work you may never fully comprehend. When you do this, something interesting happens: people forgive your lack of specialized expertise in their field. They trust you anyway. Because what they really need from a leader isn't someone who understands their work better than they do. It's someone who understands them. Connection precedes credibility. And connection begins with empathy.

Negotiation and Conflict Resolution

Every negotiation book talks about "understanding the other side's interests." Radical empathy takes this further. It's not just understanding what they want, it's understanding why they want it, what fears drive their positions, what pressures they face, and what success looks like from inside their world.

When you achieve this level of understanding, creative solutions emerge. You see trades that weren't visible before. You can frame proposals in language that resonates with their values rather than yours. You can anticipate objections and address them before they surface.

I've watched negotiations transform when one party makes the effort to genuinely understand the other. The shift is palpable. Suddenly, the conversation moves from positional warfare to joint problem-solving.

Sales and Client Relationships

The best salespeople I know aren't persuaders in the traditional sense. They're understanders. They invest time in genuinely comprehending their client's world… the pressures they face, the internal politics they navigate, the fears that keep them up at night, the outcomes that would make them heroes within their own organization.

From this understanding, they don't have to "sell" in the pushy sense. They simply present solutions that genuinely fit. The client feels understood rather than manipulated, and trust builds accordingly.

This is exactly what intelligence officers do with potential sources. We seek to understand their world so thoroughly that when we finally present an opportunity, it feels like the natural answer to their problem, because often it is.

Cross-Cultural and International Contexts

Radical empathy becomes even more critical when operating across cultural boundaries. Different cultures have different frameworks for understanding the world. Very different assumptions about hierarchy, relationships, time, honor, and obligation.

Effective cross-cultural engagement requires the ability to temporarily adopt another cultural framework, to see the world as your counterpart sees it, and to communicate in ways that make sense within their context rather than your own.

This was the daily work for intelligence officers working abroad. But it's equally essential for global business leaders, international negotiators, diplomats, and anyone working across cultural lines in our increasingly connected world.

Healthcare, Counseling, and Helping Professions

Professionals who work with people in crisis (doctors, therapists, social workers, counselors) depend on the ability to understand without judgment. A physician who can truly understand a patient's fears and lifestyle constraints will be more effective at encouraging treatment compliance. A therapist who can enter a client's frame of reference can facilitate change that would otherwise be impossible.

The radical empathy developed in intelligence work is structurally identical to the "unconditional positive regard" that therapists cultivate. Both require the capacity to understand without judgment, to see the logic in choices that might otherwise seem irrational or self-destructive.

Politics, Policy, and Civic Life

In an era of intense polarization, radical empathy offers something our public discourse desperately needs: the ability to understand positions with which we disagree without portraying counterparts as caricatures.

This doesn't mean abandoning your principles or treating all positions as equally valid. It means understanding why people on the other side believe what they believe. What experiences, fears, and values drive their positions.

From this understanding, persuasion becomes possible. Common ground becomes visible. And even where agreement is impossible, respectful coexistence becomes more achievable.

The Practice: How to Develop Radical Empathy

Like any skill, radical empathy can be developed. Here's how I'd suggest approaching it: Start with low-stakes practice. Before attempting this with someone who triggers strong reactions, practice with neutral encounters. The barista who seems rude. The colleague whose communication style irritates you. The family member whose choices confuse you. Ask yourself: What would have to be true for their behavior to make perfect sense?

Notice your judgments without fighting them. You don't need to eliminate your moral reactions. You need to notice them clearly enough that they don't unconsciously drive your behavior. Judgment observed is judgment that can be temporarily set aside. Ask questions you don't think you need answered. The most powerful understanding often comes from exploring areas where you think you already know the answer. You probably don't. So, ask anyway. Listen for what's underneath the surface. When someone expresses a position, seek to understand what need it serves. When they describe a behavior, think about what fear or aspiration drives it. Keep digging beneath the presenting content.

Practice with people you disagree with. This is where the growth happens. Find opportunities to genuinely understand (not debate, not convince, just understand) people whose views differ from your own. This is uncomfortable and becoming increasingly rare in our polarized political climate. Do it anyway. Debrief yourself. After important conversations, reflect: Did I genuinely understand this person's perspective, or did I project my own assumptions? What did I miss? What would I do differently?

The Person You Become

Here's what I didn't expect when I began developing this capacity: it changed me.

Radical empathy doesn't just make you better at understanding others. It makes you more aware of your own biases, assumptions, and blind spots. It develops your intellectual humility and a kind of cognitive flexibility, or the ability to hold multiple perspectives simultaneously, to see situations from different angles, to resist the allure of your own certainty.

It also, somewhat paradoxically, makes you more secure in your own values. When you've genuinely understood perspectives different from your own and chosen to maintain your positions anyway, those positions are no longer defaults. They are consciously chosen. And that's a different kind of conviction.

This focus on empathy is something our country desperately needs more of today. It’s core to the work I conduct on Mind Sovereignty™, since the collapse of civic empathy is so closely tied to filter bubbles, algorithmic amplification, and the resulting affective polarization we see in society. But empathy can be rebuilt, and it starts at the individual level.

An Invitation

We live in a time when understanding across divides feels increasingly rare. Political polarization, social media echo chambers, and the pace of modern life all conspire against the slow, patient work of genuinely seeing another person.

And yet this capacity has never been more valuable. In leadership, in business, in diplomacy, in life… the ability to understand without judgment, to see without agreeing, to connect across differences, remains the master skill that amplifies all others.

I was fortunate to develop this capability in an unusual crucible. But the skill itself isn't classified tradecraft. It's available to anyone willing to do the internal work.

The question is whether we're willing to set aside our own sense of certainty (and often, moral superiority) long enough to actually see the person sitting across from us.

In my experience, what we find when we do so is almost always more interesting (and more human) than what we assumed.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 06 Jun 2026 21:12:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why the U.S. Cannot Afford to Lose Intelligence Partners https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-us-cannot-afford-to-lose-intelligence-partners https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-us-cannot-afford-to-lose-intelligence-partners THE BLUF: Working with partners is a key intelligence tool. While the US has one of the best if not the best intelligence organizations in the world, it still cannot collect and analyze all global trends. The US sets intelligence priorities based on threats against the nation and the American people. Trends and anomalies in areas that may not have a direct impact on the US are of a lesser priority. Other countries do the same. If we share our analysis and collection among allies and partners, we are able to retain our focus without missing trends that could end up as a major issue down the road. If we are not a stable and trustworthy partner, we will miss out on potentially important intelligence that could affect our nation.

The US intelligence community has worked hard to develop strong relationships with its allies and partners. For the last 10 years, the US has led intelligence in NATO as the Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has put in place a Deputy Director for the Commonwealth. Allies have offices in the Pentagon to be better able to share intelligence. Many of the Combatant Commands have partners and allies sitting in their intelligence units. Two successful examples of close intelligence sharing are:

·Operation Gallant Phoenix (OGP): an intelligence fusion center established in 2013 in Jordan. It is made up of over twenty countries with representatives from a variety of agencies, including law enforcement, military and civilian intelligence. OGP focuses on response to current, evolving and future violent extremist threats - regardless of threat ideology. Gallant Phoenix allows nations not only to share intelligence on the foreign fighter threat, but also to get that information back to their law enforcement and homeland security agencies.

BICES: Battlefield Information Collection & Exploitation Systems (BICES) links intelligence between a range of partner nations. The system originally centered on NATO, but today's version goes beyond that. It delivers technical capability to provide multinational intelligence and information-sharing capabilities.

The importance of these types of intelligence sharing constructs is seen in how intelligence sharing has saved lives. In 2025, intelligence sharing thwarted attacks against US allies.

·In July 2025, the CIA said that it helped Germany foil a Russian plot to assassinate the head of a German arms manufacturer that produced weapons for Ukraine.

·In August 2025, the CIA said it provided intelligence to Austrian authorities that allowed them to disrupt a plan, allegedly inspired by the Islamic State group.

Allies and partners, however, are raising concerns about sharing intelligence with the US. They have given a host of reasons for that concern that largely reflect unease about intelligence being leaked to adversaries, either unwittingly or for political reasons. Some partners have raised issues with how their intelligence is being used by the US. The Danish Defense Intelligence Service, one of Denmark’s key spy agencies, has described the U.S. as a potential security risk, saying in a 2025 report that the United States is increasingly prioritizing its own interests and “now using its economic and technological strength as a tool of power, also toward allies and partners.”

These concerns continue to grow with two staunch allies declaring that they are either completely halting or are curtailing intelligence sharing with the US:

·Colombia: Through the early 2000s Colombia became a close partner with the US in combatting drug cartels and left wing insurgent groups. The close intelligence relationship contributed to the operation to rescue US hostages in Colombia and the demise of the FARC narco-terrorist group. Under leftist Colombian President Gustavo Petro, the intelligence relationship faltered with Petro completely halting it as a result of the current US counter drug policy. We will see what a new Colombian President will decide vis a vis the US intelligence relationship.

·UK: The intelligence sharing relationship between the US and the UK is one of the strongest ones the US has. Because of UK concerns about the legality of US maritime strikes against alleged drug runners, the UK has announced last year that it would curtail its intelligence sharing with the US on cartel related issues.

This trend comes at a time when Europe is rethinking its future intelligence organization. The US’s influence on that organization could lessen if our long-time partners believe that they cannot count on us to keep their secrets, share our intelligence, and use their intelligence for legal purposes.

These recent events should raise larger strategic concerns as the US relooks the future of its intelligence community. With new technologies that help us collect and analyze open source data, sharing intelligence should be easier. If we start with open source and commercially available information that AI can curate, we are starting in a place that is unclassified and thus easily sharable. The ability to share and its importance married with using the latest technologies is why the US needs to build a new open source center that feeds into each of the intelligence community components. This center would have as part of its organization, partners and allies who would bring their open source information to the table—much like Operation Gallant Phoenix but with a global threat based problem set. This is where the US and the world would see the first trends of a new global pandemic, watch out for signs of instability in countries that normally are not first tier priorities for the US, and understand how climate change might be affecting global economies that could result in unrest or regime change.

This is not the time to go it alone in the intelligence community. In order to keep our nation safe in a cost effective way, we need to continue to work closely with partners and share intelligence and intelligence operations. We can only do this if our partners and allies see the US intelligence community as strong, effective, apolitical, and leading in sharing with its partners.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Sat, 06 Jun 2026 21:12:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
Can the Pentagon’s New Innovation System Deliver? https://belimedia.com.ng/can-the-pentagons-new-innovation-system-deliver https://belimedia.com.ng/can-the-pentagons-new-innovation-system-deliver

Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

On January 12, 2026, Secretary Hegseth's office published a memo that ought to be hanging in every PEO's office: "No longer a loose federation. They are the Office of the Secretary of War's innovation operating system." The memo took six previously-warring fiefdoms, Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), and the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC), and stacked them under a single DoW CTO. The DIU and SCO were redesignated Department Field Activities. Owen West, a Marine with two decades experience at Goldman Sachs and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations, took over as Director of DIU. Cameron Stanley, former chief of Project Maven, is now head of the CDAO. The press wrote the whole thing up as a reorganization. Five months later, that read is the wrong one. This was an operating-system upgrade. An operating system that hasn't booted is just another memo. The urgent question now is which one we have, and Beijing, Riyadh, and Kyiv are not waiting around for the answer.

From Loose Federation to Operating System

For anyone who hasn't been tracking, the structural change is bigger than it looks. Six execution organizations now sit under one CTO, Emil Michael. The Defense Innovation Steering Group, the Defense Innovation Working Group, and the old CTO Council were dissolved and replaced by a single Action Group. Field Activity designation gives DIU and SCO faster contracting and personnel authorities than their predecessor organizational structures allowed.

This is the reform the Iron Triangle has been asking for. The old federation produced parallel pitches into competing fiefdoms. The same vendor would brief DIU on Monday, SCO on Wednesday, and CDAO on Friday, while the program offices that actually buy at scale received no shared signal back. DIU built a portfolio. SCO built a portfolio. CDAO built a portfolio. DARPA built a portfolio. Each was a victory lap for the individual office and a logistics burden for the warfighter, who eventually inherited four nearly-identical autonomy stacks that didn't talk to each other.

The Action Group is the first credible attempt at unified intake. It takes the political cost of saying no to a vendor, historically the binding constraint that kept the federation porous, and concentrates it in one place. The CTO can quickly route capabilities across all six execution organizations. Whether the building actually uses the routing layer is the open question.

Five Months In: What Booted, What Didn't

The good news first. Owen West was confirmed and is operationally active; his March 2 ceremony at Fort Benning was a signal that the Marine Corps and the special operations community have a seat at the head of the DIU table. Within weeks he told the building that he intends to narrow DIU's investment priorities, a signal investors should read carefully because it suggests fewer, deeper bets. Cameron Stanley has the CDAO chair and a mandate that includes AI compute on military installations, data-asset unlock across the department, and the GenAI.mil platform. These are accountable people running accountable shops, and they are issuing memos with their names on them.

The bad news. The OSC, the most consequential of the execution organizations for investors, has not released an FY26 investment strategy as of June 1. The FY26 NDAA appropriated $97.8 million for OSC's capital assistance pilot, enough to subsidize up to $4.4 billion in loans and guarantees, but the deployment cadence is opaque. The Action Group itself has not published outcomes against measurable targets. Six months from now, we should be able to count program offices that have routed capability needs through the Action Group, OSC term sheets executed, and CDAO-led integrations into contracts. Today, most of those dashboard lights are still amber.

The OSC Question

The OSC angle deserves its own section because it is the answer the May issue of this column was implicitly asking for. A Bridge Too Small argued that $49 billion in private capital cannot bridge a $1.5 trillion budget without serious structural reform. The OSC is one of the structural reforms; a loan-guarantee instrument designed to leverage private capital into national-security priorities at a multiple. The April FY27 budget request put $20 billion-plus on the table for the Strategic Capital loan program, up from under $1.5 billion in FY26. That is an order-of-magnitude scaling and a serious procurement-architecture commitment.

The proof that OSC can deliver already exists. Last year, OSC executed a $150 million loan to MP Materials for heavy rare-earth separation capacity at Mountain Pass, California. No venture fund underwrites that kind of paper. No SBIR ceiling reaches that kind of scale. The transaction does more for the neodymium and brushless-motor chokepoint I warned about in April than any number of Blue UAS compliance memos, and it is the kind of instrument the trifecta has been demanding.

What scales now matters. OSC has built out a Credit Program covering 31 Covered Technology Categories. Individual loans run from $10 million to $150 million. The total FY26 loan ceiling sits at $984 million. The FY27 request makes the program ten-times that. For procurement officers, OSC is the only DoW instrument that bridges directly to private debt. For investors, OSC's underwriting standards will eventually price the floor of the defense-tech market. For policy wonks, OSC is either the most important Treasury-style instrument the building has ever held, or it is a slide deck with appropriations attached. The next six months will decide which.

The View from Beijing, Riyadh, and Kyiv

The Innovation Operating System is not only a domestic procurement story. It is a foreign policy instrument, and the external clock is running faster than the internal one.

Beijing has spent the past eighteen months building its own version of an innovation operating system, optimized for export rather than for internal acquisition. The March 2026 deal between Aviation Industry Corporation of China and Saudi Arabia's General Authority for Military Industries set up local production of forty-eight Wing Loong-3 unmanned combat air vehicles per year in Jeddah, with a Riyadh acting as a logistics hub explicitly designed to serve other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) customers. The four-billion-dollar Pakistan-Libya JF-17 deal that closed in spring extends the same model further. China is exporting state-coordinated industrial capacity to allies that previously purchased primarily American. If the Action Group cannot route US capability into those markets at competitive speed, the substitution will continue, with maintenance contracts, training pipelines, and next-platform decisions following the initial procurement.

Riyadh is the harder case because it activated the Pakistan-Saudi mutual defense pact in May, generating combat-credible deployments inside ninety days of trigger: eight thousand troops, sixteen Chinese-built JF-17s, an HQ-9 air defense battery, and two squadrons of drones. Foreign Military Sales economics for US primes have assumed the Gulf as a baseline customer since the Carter administration. That baseline is moving. Investors holding GCC (Foreign Military Sales) FMS exposure should be repricing it. Procurement officers running F-15EX, MQ-9, and Patriot pipelines should be running the dependency map.

Kyiv has demonstrated the procurement-velocity standard the building is now implicitly trying to match. Ukrainian manufacturers produced roughly four million drones in 2025 and are targeting seven million in 2026, with the Brave1 marketplace routing capability needs from frontline units to certified manufacturers in days. The Innovation Operating System is, in part, an attempt to import the Brave1 effect inside an institution whose default cycle is the opposite of distributed and rapid. The Pentagon does not need to copy Brave1 exactly. It does need to demonstrate, by the end of the year, that the Action Group can produce a signal-and-response loop on a US scale. If it cannot, allies will keep studying Kyiv for the template and looking elsewhere for the systems.

Hegseth's memo bought the building time. Whether the building uses that time determines more than acquisition outcomes. It determines whether the next decade of alliance procurement runs through Washington or around it.

What the Trifecta Should Do Tomorrow

This is the reform that does not require an act of Congress, and the trifecta has more agency in it than the powerpoint slides suggest. Three concrete moves.

Procurement officers: stop pitching vendors against your individual program. Start pitching capability needs into the Action Group's intake so the CTO can route across DIU, SCO, CDAO, DARPA, and OSC. DIU's $99 million Obviant prototype award for an AI platform that consolidates DoW acquisition, contracting, and budgeting data is DIU paying for the data layer that the reorganization needs at the institutional layer. Use both.

There is a deeper move underneath the routing layer and the data layer, and it is an identity shift. The traditional procurement officer is rewarded for stovepipe wins: my program, on time, on budget. The new model rewards capability gaps closed across multiple execution organizations, with capability other PEOs can leverage. That is portfolio thinking, not program shepherding. The FY26 NDAA reform language and the Hegseth memos are pushing every PEO toward this shift. The ones who lean in will define the next decade of acquisition. The ones who don't will be measured against them.

Investors: treat OSC as a real instrument. Get on a call with DIU and CDAO. If you are holding portfolio companies with critical-technology exposure, OSC's loan guarantees are the leverage instrument you have been asking the federal government for since the SBIR program was conceived. Underwrite accordingly. MP Materials should not be a one-off. And read the FMS pipeline with foreign-policy realism: the Gulf customer base is being reshaped, and OSC's onshoring bets are partly a hedge against that erosion.

Policy wonks: push for OSC investment-strategy publication and Action Group outcome metrics. The reorganization either produces visible procurement velocity within six months or it does not. There is no middle ground, and there will be no excuse if Q4 2026 looks like Q4 2025. The foreign policy clock will not wait for FY28.

Conclusion: Boot or Be Dismissed

The Innovation Operating System will either reach sustained throughput by the end of 2026 or it will be unwound by the next administration. West and Stanley are accountable people running accountable shops. Emil Michael owns the CTO function and the political cover that comes with it. The trifecta has spent a decade complaining about a loose federation. The memo dissolved the federation. The question that should keep procurement officers up at night, that should be on every investor's diligence checklist, and that every policy wonk should be asking is the same: can a machine that has never run end-to-end deliver capability at the speed Beijing, Riyadh, and Kyiv are now setting? The Iron Triangle will be watching the dashboard for the next six months. So should you.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Sat, 06 Jun 2026 21:12:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
Remembering Alex Younger: The Intelligence Chief Who Shaped a Generation https://belimedia.com.ng/remembering-alex-younger-the-intelligence-chief-who-shaped-a-generation https://belimedia.com.ng/remembering-alex-younger-the-intelligence-chief-who-shaped-a-generation I don't want to write about Sir Alex Younger, my predecessor as Chief of SIS.

I want to write about my friend.

I had known about Alex's cancer from the outset, while I was still Chief. He treated it with his customary irreverence and wit. He nicknamed his tumour "Putin". At one stage he took to sporting a lapel badge bearing the words "I'm not dead yet". Sarah, his wife, persuaded him not to wear it to the memorial service of a former agent.

I knew he had become dangerously ill in Boston last week. Even so, it still came as a shock to step off a twelve-hour flight to Singapore on Thursday morning and learn that he had died. My immediate thoughts were for Sarah and the family. They had already endured more than any family should when they lost their son Sam in 2019.

Alex and I were almost exact contemporaries. He was a little less than two months younger than me. We spent much of our professional lives travelling along parallel tracks.

We really came to know one another after 9/11, when we were appointed to our first Head of Station jobs. Alex pipped me to the post to get Dubai. I got Kuala Lumpur as a consolation prize.

As it happened, both stations became important nodes in the effort to understand and dismantle the proliferation network established by A.Q. Khan. Working closely with CIA colleagues, Alex and I found ourselves cooperating on one of the most important intelligence operations of that era.

It was during that period that I came to appreciate the characteristics that would define him throughout his career.

Alex was intensely collaborative. He was competitive too, but his competitive instincts were directed entirely towards the mission and the adversary rather than towards colleagues. Underpinning that was a generosity of spirit and a quiet confidence that came from being entirely comfortable in his own skin.

That combination earned him enormous affection.

The wider public came to appreciate Alex through his media appearances after he left SIS. Those of us who had worked with him recognised immediately the qualities the wider public was now seeing: clarity of thought, economy of language and a gift for making complex issues intelligible without oversimplifying them. Few words were wasted. He also possessed a wonderfully dry sense of humour and a gift for the perfectly judged bon mot.

Yet beneath the outward affability was a private man. In many respects Alex was an introvert. His confidence came not from external validation but from self-knowledge. He did not need to dominate a room or win every argument. He knew how and when to delegate. The result was a calm authority that people trusted and wanted to follow.

Those qualities served him exceptionally well during one of the most consequential periods in the modern history of SIS.

As Chief, Alex oversaw a significant reorientation of SIS's counterterrorism effort to confront the rise of ISIS and the threat it posed to the United Kingdom and our allies. The challenge was made all the more acute by the appalling terrorist attacks suffered by the United Kingdom in 2017.

At the same time, he recognised earlier than many that the hostile-state threat had returned. Alongside CIA colleagues, he invested heavily in developing the capabilities of Ukrainian intelligence and security partners years before Russia's full-scale invasion brought the importance of that work into public view.

The attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, and the death of Dawn Sturgess, presented another defining challenge. Alex led the intelligence response that helped drive the expulsion of hundreds of Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover across Europe and beyond, imposing a significant and lasting setback on Russian intelligence operations.

He also ensured that SIS's intelligence relationships with European partners emerged intact from Britain's decision to leave the European Union. At a time when political relationships were often under strain, intelligence cooperation remained strong.

The relationship with the United States occupied a special place in his thinking.

Alex believed deeply in the Anglo-American intelligence partnership and worked closely with John Brennan, Mike Pompeo and Gina Haspel during his tenure. Together with John, he instituted annual gatherings of the senior leadership teams of SIS and CIA, recognising that institutional trust is ultimately built through personal relationships.

He was, however, equally committed to ensuring that the relationship remained a genuine partnership. On the rare occasions when he sensed a tendency in Langley to regard SIS as a particularly capable vetted unit rather than as a strategic partner, he would gently but unmistakably correct the impression.

Alex also recognised earlier than many how profoundly technology would shape intelligence work. The computer science graduate from St Andrews was never far beneath the surface. He understood that operations officers needed to become digitally literate - not only to recognise threats to their operations but also to understand how technology could protect agents and enhance operational effectiveness.

His final major challenge as Chief was Covid. Intelligence services could not simply close their doors and work from home. Operations still had to be run, agents protected and intelligence delivered. The pandemic required a wholesale re-engineering of how SIS functioned while continuing to do its job. Alex led the Service through that period with clarity and compassion.

Looking back now, what I remember most are not the operations, the crises or the offices he held. I remember the humour, the kindness, the judgement and the friendship.

Alex made a profound contribution to SIS and to the country's security. But for those of us fortunate enough to know him personally, the loss feels rather simpler than that.

We have lost a friend.

Watch The Cipher Brief’s Interview with Sir Alex Younger explaining the urgency of the threats facing democracies today in the plain language described by Sir Richard Moore. We are sending our condolences to the Younger Family and to Alex’s broader IC family as well. ]]>
Sat, 06 Jun 2026 21:12:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
An Unusually Likeable Human Being, And A Spy https://belimedia.com.ng/an-unusually-likeable-human-being-and-a-spy https://belimedia.com.ng/an-unusually-likeable-human-being-and-a-spy Sir Alex Younger died earlier this week at the age of 62. He had been fighting cancer for some time.

Alex was Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, more popularly MI6) from 2014 to 2020. For most past and present MI6 officers, he was the best-loved Chief anyone had known.

One reason for this was that Alex had risen through the ranks. A good MI6 head does not need to have done so. But there is an undoubted advantage in a humint service to have a leader like Alex who has spent years operating under alias and diplomatic cover, who has had gritty operational discussions with a bewildering variety of foreign liaison services. Who has done his time as a desk officer in Century House and Vauxhall Cross, managing the egos of superiors, colleagues and officers in stations overseas. Who knows what it’s like waiting under alias in the hotel of some god-forsaken place, wishing he was back in Britain with his beloved wife and family.

A second reason was that Alex was a thinker. He had a strong set of values and beliefs and was happy to talk about them. He was a believer in the Enlightenment – the ideas circulating in Europe and elsewhere in the 18th century, advocating reason, challenging superstition and prejudice. He believed that these ideas had brought humanity to a better place and would continue to do so; that those who resisted reason and enlightenment should be challenged and never yielded to. I suspect as a young man he left the army to join MI6 because he could better – and more enjoyably – fight that fight.

But he also thought about national security and where it needed to be in the twenty first century. For him MI6 could not just dig itself into a humint trench, carrying on as before, on the assumption that all that mattered was people. A humint service that was not engaged with science and technology, threats and opportunities, was going to become a museum piece, and a rarely visited one at that.

A speech he gave as Chief 8 years ago at his old university, St Andrews in Scotland, showed he had been thinking deeply about AI – now on everyone’s minds. He was clear that a modern humint service had to engage with technology and the nature of hybrid conflict. “We and our allies face a battle to make sure technology works to our advantage, not to that of our opponents,” he said. “Liberal democracies should approach this with confidence”.

The third reason was that Alex was an unusually likeable human being. He was a spy. When an agent is going to accept tasking from an intelligence officer, the agent needs first and foremost to trust the officer: their competence and integrity. After that, the agent is looking for someone he or she likes: someone who has a good sense of humour, who understands you, convinces you this is the right thing to do. Alex was unusually strong in all these respects. He was a fine case officer.

And these strengths translated to the increasingly demanding leadership roles he took on: head of station in Kabul, Director Counter-Terrorism, Director-General Operations and finally, Chief. Alex was well known for walking the corridors, talking to staff of all grades. This meant that people across the organisation felt valued. They could say whatever they wanted to him, the franker the better. It meant that Alex, as leader, learned stuff that perhaps his immediate leadership team had not shared with him. He knew what everyone working for him did and what they needed to do it. He was the most approachable of people. He did not set out to intimidate or impress you with how busy or important he was. Noone had greater humility. It was a different, but entirely successful, type of leadership.

Alex also believed in partnership. Relationships with the rest of the British intelligence community – with MI5 and GCHQ – were made deeper and broader. So were relationships with the police, military and other government departments. Strategic cooperation with foreign liaison partners was strengthened. Of particular importance to Alex was the relationship with the US. Operational cooperation with the CIA had been important for much of his career, and he valued the unique intelligence sharing and cooperation between the two countries. It was in the US that Alex sought a possible solution to his last illness, and in the US that he passed away.

Alex’s wisdom and foreign affairs experience were highly valued by a succession of British prime ministers – Cameron, May, Johnson. After retiring from public life, he built up quite a following in Britain of people impressed by his occasional media appearances, providing unique insights into the increasingly bewildering international landscape. Friends would ask me if I’d heard “what that Alex Younger had to say on the telly last night”. He talked sense.

He apparently nicknamed his cancer “Putin”.

For the time being, all that family, friends and colleagues – including secret agents – can do is mourn the painfully premature passing of – to use an old-fashioned term – a true gentleman. Longer term, Alex’s memory must inspire people to believe in and defend liberal democracy.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Sat, 06 Jun 2026 21:12:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
Alex Younger: An Unusually Likeable Human Being, And A Spy https://belimedia.com.ng/alex-younger-an-unusually-likeable-human-being-and-a-spy https://belimedia.com.ng/alex-younger-an-unusually-likeable-human-being-and-a-spy Sir Alex Younger died earlier this week at the age of 62. He had been fighting cancer for some time.

Alex was Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, more popularly MI6) from 2014 to 2020. For most past and present MI6 officers, he was the best-loved Chief anyone had known.

One reason for this was that Alex had risen through the ranks. A good MI6 head does not need to have done so. But there is an undoubted advantage in a humint service to have a leader like Alex who has spent years operating under alias and diplomatic cover, who has had gritty operational discussions with a bewildering variety of foreign liaison services. Who has done his time as a desk officer in Century House and Vauxhall Cross, managing the egos of superiors, colleagues and officers in stations overseas. Who knows what it’s like waiting under alias in the hotel of some god-forsaken place, wishing he was back in Britain with his beloved wife and family.

A second reason was that Alex was a thinker. He had a strong set of values and beliefs and was happy to talk about them. He was a believer in the Enlightenment – the ideas circulating in Europe and elsewhere in the 18th century, advocating reason, challenging superstition and prejudice. He believed that these ideas had brought humanity to a better place and would continue to do so; that those who resisted reason and enlightenment should be challenged and never yielded to. I suspect as a young man he left the army to join MI6 because he could better – and more enjoyably – fight that fight.

But he also thought about national security and where it needed to be in the twenty first century. For him MI6 could not just dig itself into a humint trench, carrying on as before, on the assumption that all that mattered was people. A humint service that was not engaged with science and technology, threats and opportunities, was going to become a museum piece, and a rarely visited one at that.

A speech he gave as Chief 8 years ago at his old university, St Andrews in Scotland, showed he had been thinking deeply about AI – now on everyone’s minds. He was clear that a modern humint service had to engage with technology and the nature of hybrid conflict. “We and our allies face a battle to make sure technology works to our advantage, not to that of our opponents,” he said. “Liberal democracies should approach this with confidence”.

The third reason was that Alex was an unusually likeable human being. He was a spy. When an agent is going to accept tasking from an intelligence officer, the agent needs first and foremost to trust the officer: their competence and integrity. After that, the agent is looking for someone he or she likes: someone who has a good sense of humour, who understands you, convinces you this is the right thing to do. Alex was unusually strong in all these respects. He was a fine case officer.

And these strengths translated to the increasingly demanding leadership roles he took on: head of station in Kabul, Director Counter-Terrorism, Director-General Operations and finally, Chief. Alex was well known for walking the corridors, talking to staff of all grades. This meant that people across the organisation felt valued. They could say whatever they wanted to him, the franker the better. It meant that Alex, as leader, learned stuff that perhaps his immediate leadership team had not shared with him. He knew what everyone working for him did and what they needed to do it. He was the most approachable of people. He did not set out to intimidate or impress you with how busy or important he was. Noone had greater humility. It was a different, but entirely successful, type of leadership.

Alex also believed in partnership. Relationships with the rest of the British intelligence community – with MI5 and GCHQ – were made deeper and broader. So were relationships with the police, military and other government departments. Strategic cooperation with foreign liaison partners was strengthened. Of particular importance to Alex was the relationship with the US. Operational cooperation with the CIA had been important for much of his career, and he valued the unique intelligence sharing and cooperation between the two countries. It was in the US that Alex sought a possible solution to his last illness, and in the US that he passed away.

Alex’s wisdom and foreign affairs experience were highly valued by a succession of British prime ministers – Cameron, May, Johnson. After retiring from public life, he built up quite a following in Britain of people impressed by his occasional media appearances, providing unique insights into the increasingly bewildering international landscape. Friends would ask me if I’d heard “what that Alex Younger had to say on the telly last night”. He talked sense.

He apparently nicknamed his cancer “Putin”.

For the time being, all that family, friends and colleagues – including secret agents – can do is mourn the painfully premature passing of – to use an old-fashioned term – a true gentleman. Longer term, Alex’s memory must inspire people to believe in and defend liberal democracy.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Sat, 06 Jun 2026 21:12:37 +0100 FirstHandNews
Deterrence Is Not Enough in the Age of Synthetic Asymmetry https://belimedia.com.ng/deterrence-is-not-enough-in-the-age-of-synthetic-asymmetry https://belimedia.com.ng/deterrence-is-not-enough-in-the-age-of-synthetic-asymmetry Events have moved faster than doctrine. Part 1 of this series diagnosed the rise of synthetic asymmetry, an era where technological convergence allows small actors to impose disproportionate costs on states and institutions. Unlike the guerrillas of the past, today's asymmetric threats are engineered by design. This essay asks the harder question: How should democracies respond to a threat that is diffuse, deniable, and constantly mutating?

The Failure of Traditional Deterrence

The foundational flaw in applying Cold War security strategies to synthetic asymmetry is the breakdown of attribution and retaliation. Deterrence requires a clear threat of punishment against a visible state actor. Synthetic attackers thrive in gray zones: non-state groups, state proxies, or anonymous cyber operators whose acts are plausibly deniable, and whose tools can blur or obscure attribution by design.

When ransomware shuts down a critical pipeline, the target state faces a genuine conundrum. Is this an act of war demanding a kinetic response? Or a crime demanding law enforcement? That ambiguity makes the nuclear-era playbook obsolete. The attacker's goal is often strategic paralysis: erode trust, impose economic costs far exceeding the effort required to launch the operation.

The costs of these attacks, typically low-cost, remote, and cross-border, are negligible compared to the billions required for a proportional kinetic response. Traditional punitive deterrence buckles under that math.

The answer is to supplement deterrence with a doctrine of synthetic resilience: the capacity of democratic societies to absorb, adapt to, and recover from engineered multi-domain disruption before it produces strategic paralysis or loss of legitimacy. A powerful kinetic threat must remain, but democracies must also assume they will be attacked across multiple domains simultaneously. Survival depends on absorbing disruption, adapting rapidly, and ensuring the continuity of core societal functions and political legitimacy.

What the intervening period has clarified is that this assumption is no longer theoretical. Advanced AI and synthetic media are turning this from a theoretical concern into a systemic global risk (the World Economic Forum and allied intelligence communities have reached this conclusion independently) with opportunistic actors exploiting psychological profiling and emotional triggers to manipulate public perception at scale. The threat environment Part 1 described has accelerated.

The predictable objection is that synthetic resilience sounds resource-intensive and risks replicating the bureaucratic complexity it claims to replace. The cost-of-failure data argues otherwise. The 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack cost the company $4.4 million in ransom, but the downstream economic disruption across the eastern United States ran into the billions. The 2024 CrowdStrike outage, which involved no adversary at all, produced an estimated $10 billion in global losses from a single software update. The NotPetya campaign of 2017 caused over $10 billion in damage across multiple sectors and countries from a single piece of malware. Against those losses, resilience is not a fiscal luxury. It is actuarially rational. The question is never whether democracies can afford to build it. It is whether they can afford not to.

Principles of a New Doctrine

A coherent strategy cannot be built on isolated, domain-specific efforts. It must rest on three integrated principles, Alignment, Adaptation, and Agility, woven into national security planning, budgetary decisions, and interagency cooperation.

1. Alignment over Silos

Defense planners have historically treated cyber, space, and economic security as separate verticals, managed by different agencies with distinct budgets and legal authorities. Adversaries operate horizontally, leveraging convergence to create effects greater than the sum of their parts. A modern influence campaign is simultaneously a cyber attack (to steal data), a financial operation (to fund bot networks via crypto), and a kinetic risk (to incite real-world violence), often without a shot fired.

Nations must respond in kind. That means permanent interagency teams pulling together financial regulators, public health officials, and economic ministers alongside military and national security planners, trained together on synthetic asymmetry scenarios that force convergence. It also means a national risk framework that maps cascading dependencies: how a cyber attack on a single grain futures exchange could trigger a financial crisis, which enables a cognitive influence campaign built on food scarcity fears. The unit of analysis must shift from individual assets to systemic functions.

Recent events illustrate why. Rapid, uncoordinated changes to critical IT infrastructure, where operational decisions bypass standard security review, create systemic confusion between authorized and unauthorized system changes. When the mechanisms for coordination and attribution are themselves disrupted, adversaries inherit a structural advantage at no cost. This is a doctrinal vulnerability, not just an operational one.

2. Adaptation over Retaliation

The priority must shift from punishment to continuity. Against a deniable actor, resilience ensures the adversary gains nothing even if an attack succeeds (the same logic by which the internet routes around failures regardless of cause).

This requires reallocating resources toward the "invisible victory" of hardened defense over the more politically visible power projection of offense. The practical mechanism is hardening-in-depth: mandatory standards for redundancy, self-healing networks, and decentralized systems across the grid, finance, and logistics. Resilience cannot stop at government networks. It must be built into the economy itself, with strategic national reserves of critical goods and supply chains diversified enough that no single political event can halt production of essential materials.

The lesson is direct. When critical cybersecurity functions, including incident reporting oversight, real-time vulnerability monitoring, and analytical data systems, are degraded during periods of institutional restructuring, recovery timelines run into adversary windows. Denying adversaries strategic impact requires institutional capacity to be intact when the attack arrives.

3. Agility over Bureaucracy

Threats emerge at machine speed, powered by generative and agentic AI and automated reconnaissance. Acquisition cycles and regulatory processes measured in years are becoming strategically untenable.

The solution is defense architecture built around interchangeable, open-source, and rapidly updateable components. The Modular Open Systems Approach offers a workable template: technology insertion on the order of weeks, not years. Regulatory sandboxes where government agencies partner with startups to test and certify next-generation tools, from quantum-resistant encryption to AI-driven attribution models, can compress the path from lab to deployment substantially.

The goal is simple: evolve as fast as the threat. That requires institutional depth to sustain capabilities across political transitions. Agility without continuity is a vulnerability, not a strategy.

Putting the Doctrine to Work

The three-principle framework only has force if it connects to concrete action. What follows is not a comprehensive policy platform. It is an illustration of how Alignment, Adaptation, and Agility translate into operational commitments across the domains where synthetic asymmetry is already active.

Alignment: Interagency Teams, Systemic Risk Mapping, Private-Sector Crisis Agreements

Alignment means building the interagency connective tissue that adversaries already assume democracies lack. Every national security council should maintain a standing synthetic-asymmetry cell with authority to convene defense, finance, health, energy, intelligence, and private-sector infrastructure leaders before a crisis begins. A national risk framework that maps cascading dependencies, such as how a cyber attack on a grain futures exchange could enable a food-scarcity influence campaign, shifts the unit of analysis from individual assets to systemic functions.

The private sector belongs inside this framework, not adjacent to it. Corporations are no longer adjacent to national security conflict, they are participants in it, operating on infrastructure adversaries deliberately target. Legally robust agreements with critical technology and infrastructure providers, covering roles, responsibilities, and pre-agreed crisis protocols, are the mechanism. These agreements must be written to survive leadership transitions. Tax benefits and procurement preference tied to resilience standards convert security from a state-imposed cost into a financially rational business position.

Adaptation: Infrastructure Redundancy, Cognitive Inoculation, Public Health Surge Capacity

Adaptation means building systems that deny adversaries strategic effect even when attacks succeed. For physical infrastructure, that requires legally mandated geographical diversity, making single-point failure structurally impossible, and jointly funded international rapid-response capacity targeting repair times measured in days, not weeks. On space systems, rapid reconstitution matters more than norms compliance: pre-negotiated commercial surge contracts for replacement satellite launches, hardened ground stations continuously monitored for intrusion. A jammed satellite is a setback. A seized ground station is a disaster.

In the cognitive domain, adaptation means inoculation before manipulation takes hold, not crisis management after. Sweden’s model is the operational benchmark: psychological defense embedded within total defense doctrine, with a dedicated national agency running continuous environmental monitoring. Several NATO allies are already looking closely at this model. Digital provenance, verifiable watermarks and metadata on all AI-generated or heavily altered content, must become a global standard. Without it, citizens and news organizations cannot reliably distinguish reality from synthetic manipulation. An allied intelligence-sharing entity focused exclusively on influence operations would allow attribution data on foreign manipulation tactics to move across borders before the manipulation has time to work.

Public health resilience belongs in this category too. The democratization of tools like CRISPR means engineered pathogen capability is no longer exclusive to state WMD programs. Permanently maintained, distributed vaccine manufacturing facilities and stockpiles of broad-spectrum antivirals represent the same logic as military pre-positioning: make the local response fast enough that the epidemic phase never gains traction. International agreements must move beyond bans toward regulating access, with mandatory safeguards on DNA synthesis services and flagging of suspicious orders, before the capability is in widespread use.

Agility: Modular Systems, Regulatory Sandboxes, Commercial Surge Capacity

Agility means closing the gap between threat speed and response speed. Defense architecture built around interchangeable, open-source, rapidly updateable components, along the lines of the Modular Open Systems Approach, enables technology insertion on the order of weeks, not years. Regulatory sandboxes where government agencies partner with startups to test and certify next-generation tools, from quantum-resistant encryption to AI-driven attribution models, compress the path from lab to deployment. The financial domain requires the same logic: cooperative regulatory frameworks for crypto and DeFi across allied jurisdictions create a unified digital perimeter that forces transparency on illicit cross-border flows, closing the sanctions-evasion channel that currently funds a significant share of adversary low-cost operations.

Democracies hold one structural advantage that agility can amplify but authoritarians cannot replicate: decentralized command cultures that empower local actors to respond faster than centralized systems allow. The spontaneous, bottom-up innovation visible in Ukraine’s use of commercial technology is the template, capability flowing upward from the edge, not downward from the center. Alliances provide redundancy and burden-sharing no single state can match. A vulnerability in one ally’s financial system can be compensated by the strength of another. Allied nations that have invested in psychological defense, infrastructure redundancy, and cross-border intelligence sharing are likely better positioned today. That gap is widening. Maintaining trust and legitimacy under attack is the ultimate measure of democratic power. A democracy that comes through a crisis with its institutions functional and trusted has, in the most consequential sense, won.

The Path Forward

Synthetic asymmetry is not a temporary challenge. The period since this series began has confirmed that it is already shaping outcomes.

The choice before democracies has sharpened. The question is no longer simply whether they will update Cold War playbooks. It is whether they will recognize that the preconditions for synthetic resilience, including institutional depth, continuity of expertise, and coordinated capability, are themselves potential targets and must be treated as strategic assets accordingly.

Resilience infrastructure is not self-sustaining. It must be actively maintained, resourced, and insulated from the same political volatility it is designed to help societies weather. When incident reporting mechanisms, real-time vulnerability monitoring, and the talent pipelines that sustain them are degraded for any reason, the recovery timeline runs into adversary windows. The "invisible victory" of hardened defense becomes invisible in a different and more dangerous sense: it disappears precisely when it is most needed.

Synthetic resilience cannot be built after the disruption arrives. It must exist before.

Governments that adapt now will be better positioned to survive and to operate from strength. Those that inadvertently erode the institutional foundations of resilience while pursuing other priorities risk watching synthetic asymmetry become not just an adversary's tool but a permanent feature of global order.

Nuclear weapons reshaped the strategic logic of the 20th century. Synthetic asymmetry may do the same for the 21st. The choice is clear: write the doctrine of synthetic resilience, resource it, protect it, or be overtaken by disruption engineered to exploit the void.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 04 Jun 2026 11:30:34 +0100 FirstHandNews
Invisible Conflict: Defending Against Hybrid Non&Kinetic Warfare https://belimedia.com.ng/invisible-conflict-defending-against-hybrid-non-kinetic-warfare https://belimedia.com.ng/invisible-conflict-defending-against-hybrid-non-kinetic-warfare War doesn’t always look like war anymore. Hybrid non-kinetic warfare is an increasingly popular means for threat actors to orchestrate prolonged campaigns aimed at achieving political and security objectives by destabilizing the adversary, eroding its strength and social cohesion, while avoiding the creation of a pretext for military retaliation. The goal is to wreak chaos with invisible hands from an anonymous cloak, absent a military, uniforms or declaration of war.

The Iranian conflict is a real-time case study in how warfare is being reshaped. In recent weeks, Iran-linked hackers have targeted critical infrastructure in the US, disrupting multiple oil, gas and water facilities. Tehran-linked hackers likewise disrupted operations at a major US medical device maker – among other things, they hacked into an emergency system that first responders use to communicate patient data to hospitals. A high-ranking US security official saw his personal email hacked and exposed by Iranian affiliates. Iranian hacktivists celebrated efforts like this with – of all things – Lego propaganda.

Hybrid non-kinetic warfare is not confined to the physical battlefield and has no regard for borders. Hybrid tactics are low-cost, low-risk and hard to trace. These tactics are effective where traditional firepower isn’t, and they’re quietly reshaping the future of conflict.

They’re also exposing how unprepared many governments remain for threats that don’t arrive with missiles or tanks. Modern warfare and defense preparedness hinges on our ability to adapt to the new realities of hybrid non-kinetic warfare. The technologies used to combat these threats must likewise adapt.

AN AMORPHOUS ARSENAL

The tools of hybrid non-kinetic warfare are varied and very dangerous in and of themselves – especially so when applied in concert.

High-impact sabotage operations are a frequent, favored tactic. Russia, for example, is known to target civilian infrastructure via hybrid pressure campaigns intended to influence Ukraine war outcomes. In Poland, these attacks include an arson attack on a massive shopping center that gutted 1,400 shops, and more recently, an orchestrated railway explosion. Dozens of these vandalism, arson and sabotage attacks have been mounted and documented since the February 2022 Russian invasion into Ukraine.

Disinformation and propaganda are likewise commonly employed. We see this in coordinated campaigns – online and offline – to spread false narratives, divide societies and support politicians who align with the attackers’ goals. Sounding the alarm, Italy’s Defense Minister has urged the European community to protect itself from Russian disinformation tactics seen recently in Italy.

“We are under attack, and the hybrid bombs keep falling,” he said.

Cyberattacks play a role too. These can target critical infrastructure – power grids, hospitals, transportation systems, government websites – and they’re often timed to sow confusion or weaken public trust.

In a recent twist, cyberattacks have been blended with traditional warfare – investigations have uncovered Iran’s use of "cyber-enabled kinetic targeting" before and after real-world missile attacks against ships and land infrastructure. By hacking into CCTV cameras, among other methods, Iranian advanced persistent threat (APT) groups have successfully gathered intelligence on real-world targets.

Irregular or engineered migration is increasingly employed in hybrid non-kinetic campaigns. In some cases, governments deliberately funnel large numbers of migrants toward their adversary’s borders – not to help the migrants, but to overwhelm border systems and create political tension. We’ve seen this tactic used at the Belarus-Poland border, and between Russia and Finland, and it works because it creates pressure from every direction – on border patrols, on social services, on local communities and governments and beyond.

Political interference is another established tactic that’s gained new relevance in contemporary hybrid non-kinetic warfare. Russia’s known interference in the states of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova is aimed at preventing them from shifting allegiances toward the West. This interference often peaks during election seasons.

These tactics on their own are often regarded as isolated threats. In combination, they comprise a potent, long-term war campaign – a strategy to reshape a community or region without ever sending in troops.

THE ART OF HYBRID WAR

Hybrid non-kinetic warfare looks disorganized on its surface, but there’s a logic behind it – a playbook. In plain terms, these are the core principles.

Be flexible and move fast. These operations are constantly evolving. If threat actors see an opportunity – like a protest, an election, a scandal – they join the fray and make it worse. The goal is to stir the pot, to cause unrest.

Destabilize from within. These attackers seek to weaken the glue that holds communities and countries together – trust, unity, stability. They want people to feel divided, unsafe and unsupported.

Use every tool available – military and civilian. Physical sabotage, cyberattacks, media campaigns, migrant flows and financial pressures are all part of the hybrid non-kinetic playbook. Shadowy attacks spur dark rumors that metastasize into fear. Anything that causes confusion or disruption is fair game.

Think long-term. These aren’t one-off attacks. They’re slow, strategic campaigns – sometimes unfolding over months or years. They’re designed to wear a country down, applying constant stress.

Make it hard to know what’s really happening. There are no uniforms, no flags, no announcements to make sense of – just a series of “incidents” that seem disconnected – until you step back and connect the dots.

HOW TO CONNECT THE DOTS

Combatting hybrid non-kinetic warfare requires closer security and intelligence collaboration, and a coordinated, systematic, multi-agency response that extends across borders. It requires a fresh approach to defense spending that prioritizes continuous intelligence monitoring and analysis in parallel with conventional battlefield weaponry.

Resilience doesn’t just come from defense. It comes from understanding, and this clarity can only be achieved with a holistic view of the threat landscape and the ability to surface patterns from the chaos.

At the technology layer, homeland security and intelligence organizations will benefit from a centralized architecture that unites border protection, financial investigations, tactical operations and cyber intelligence in a single cohesive view. The advent of data fusion technology, AI investigative analytics and decision intelligence automation makes it possible to sift mountains of disparate data streams to gain immediate, actionable insights.

Warfare is no longer measured in terms of physical destruction and territorial command because the boundaries of warfare are blurring. Acts of hybrid non-kinetic warfare may look like random crimes and provocations to the untrained eye – their amorphous nature is what makes them so insidious and effective.

To help investigators understand how and why these seemingly random acts intersect and identify the proxy groups responsible, it’s essential to employ an early warning system that invites and unites intelligence from diverse disciplines and geographies. In this way, we can equip intelligence agencies to recognize acts of hybrid non-kinetic warfare in real-time and anticipate them before they happen again.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 04 Jun 2026 11:30:34 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Semantic Pixel: Why the U.S. Must Build the Ultimate Multi&Modal Foundation Model https://belimedia.com.ng/the-semantic-pixel-why-the-us-must-build-the-ultimate-multi-modal-foundation-model https://belimedia.com.ng/the-semantic-pixel-why-the-us-must-build-the-ultimate-multi-modal-foundation-model EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — We are currently witnessing a mobilization of technical ambition reminiscent of the Manhattan Project, a realization that data and compute are the new defining elements of national power. I am deeply energized by recent bold moves in Washington, specifically the White House’s launch of the "Genesis Mission" this past November—an initiative designed to federate vast federal scientific datasets for integrated AI training—alongside the real-world deployment of GenAI.mil.

Yet, when I look at the velocity of the commercial sector—from OpenAI launching its dedicated Science division and NVIDIA attempting to simulate the planet with Earth-2, to Google’s DeepMind aggressively crossing their AI breakthroughs into the geospatial domain—it becomes clear that we are still aiming too low. These projects are not just modeling data; they are attempting to model reality itself. American technical leadership is paramount, but that leadership is meaningless if it is not ruthlessly and immediately applied to our national security framework. We must take these massive, reality-simulating concepts and focus them specifically on the GEOINT mission.

A perfect example of this is that earlier this year, in July 2025, the geospatial world shifted. Google DeepMind released the AlphaEarth Foundations (AEF) model, and through the hard work of the Taylor Geospatial Engine (TGE) and the open-source community, those vector embeddings are now publicly available on Source Cooperative.

The excitement is justified. AlphaEarth is a leap forward because it offers pixel-level embeddings rather than the standard patch-level approach. It doesn’t just tell you “this 256x256 square contains a city”; it tells you "this specific pixel is part of a building, and it knows its neighbors."

But as I look at this achievement from the perspective of national security, I see something else. I see a proof of concept for a capability that the United States is uniquely positioned to build—and must build—to maintain decision advantage.

Google has the internet’s data. But the intelligence community holds the most diverse, multi-physics, and temporally deep repository of the Earth in human history.

It is time for the United States to propose and execute a National Geospatial-Intelligence Embedding Model (NGEM).

The Proposal: Beyond RGB

The AlphaEarth model is impressive, but it is limited by its training data—primarily commercial optical imagery. In the national security domain, an optical image is just the tip of the spear. We don't just see with light; we see with physics.

I am proposing that we train a massive, pixel-level foundation model that ingests all of its holdings. We aren't talking about just throwing more Sentinel-2 data at a GPU. We are talking about a model that generates embeddings from a unified ingest of:

  • Multi-INT Imagery: Electro-optical (EO), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Infrared/Thermal, Multispectral, and Hyperspectral.
  • Vector Data: The massive stores of Foundation GEOINT (FG)—roads, borders, elevation meshes.
  • The Critical Missing Modality: Text. We must embed the millions of intelligence reports, analyst notes, and finished intelligence products ever written.

The Approach: "The Unified Latent Space"

The approach would mirror the AlphaEarth architecture—generating 64-dimensional (or higher) vectors for every coordinate on Earth—but with a massive increase in complexity and utility.

In AlphaEarth, a pixel’s embedding vector encodes "visual similarity." In an NGA NGEM, the embedding would encode phenomenological and semantic truth.

We would train the model to map different modalities into the same "latent space."

  • If a SAR image shows a T-72 tank (through radar returns), and an EO image shows a T-72 tank (through visual pixels), and a text report describes a "T-72 tank," they should all map to nearly the same mathematical vector.
  • The model becomes the universal translator. It doesn't matter if the input is a paragraph of text or a thermal signature; the output is a standardized mathematical representation of the object.

The Outcomes: What Does This Give Us?

If we achieve this, we move beyond "computer vision" into "machine understanding."

1. The "SAM Site" Dimension In the AlphaEarth analysis, researchers found a "dimension 27" that accidentally specialized in detecting airports. It was a serendipitous discovery of the model's internal logic. If we train NSEM on NGA’s holdings, we won’t just find an airport dimension. We will likely find dimensions that correspond to specific national security targets.

  • Dimension 14 might light up only for Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites, regardless of whether they are camouflaged in optical imagery, because the thermal and SAR layers give them away.
  • Dimension 42 might track "maritime logistics activity," integrating port vectors with ship signatures.

2. Cross-Modal Search (Text-to-Pixel) Currently, if an analyst wants to find "all airfields with extended runways in the Pacific," they have to rely on tagged metadata or run a specific computer vision classifier. With a multi-modal embedding model, the analyst could simply type a query from a report: "Suspected construction of hardened aircraft shelters near distinct ridge line." Because we embedded the text of millions of past reports alongside the imagery, the model understands the semantic vector of that phrase. It can then scan the entire globe’s pixel embeddings to find the mathematical match—instantly highlighting the location, even if no human has ever tagged it.

3. Vector-Based Change Detection AlphaEarth showed us that subtracting vectors from 2018 and 2024 reveals construction. For the intelligence community, this becomes Automated Indications & Warning (I&W). Because the embeddings are spatially aware and pixel-dense, we can detect subtle shifts in the function of a facility, not just its footprint. A factory that suddenly starts emitting heat (thermal layer) or showing new material stockpiles (hyperspectral layer) will produce a massive shift in its vector embedding, triggering an alert long before a human analyst notices the visual change.

The Intelligence Use Cases

  • Automated Order of Battle: Instantly generating dynamic maps of military equipment by querying the embedding space for specific signatures (e.g., "Show me all vectors matching a mobile radar unit").
  • Underground Facility Detection: By combining vector terrain data, gravity/magnetic anomaly data, and hyperspectral surface disturbances into a single embedding, the model could "see" what is hidden.
  • Pattern of Life Analysis: Since the model is spatiotemporal (like AlphaEarth), it learns the "heartbeat" of a location. Deviations—like a port going silent or a sudden surge in RF activity—become mathematical anomalies that scream for attention.

Conclusion

Google and the open-source community have given us the blueprint with AlphaEarth. They proved that pixel-level, spatiotemporal embeddings are the superior way to model our changing planet.

But the mission requires more than commercial data. It requires the fusion of every sensor and every secret. By building this multi-modal embedding model—fusion at the pixel level—we can stop looking for needles in haystacks and start using a magnet.

This is the future of GEOINT. We have the data. We have the mission. It’s time to build the model.

Follow Mark Munsell on LinkedInThe Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 04 Jun 2026 11:30:34 +0100 FirstHandNews
From Terror Networks to Hybrid Threats: A Partner Approach to a Growing Threat https://belimedia.com.ng/from-terror-networks-to-hybrid-threats-a-partner-approach-to-a-growing-threat https://belimedia.com.ng/from-terror-networks-to-hybrid-threats-a-partner-approach-to-a-growing-threat The hybrid threat challenge facing Europe today is reminiscent of the terrorist threat challenge of the post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) era. Because of that similarity, the alliance should adapt the counterterrorism cooperation model developed over the last twenty years.

As European security partners grapple with Russia’s gray-zone activities—operations conducted below the threshold of war to create confusion and hesitation—the recently released U.S. counterterrorism strategy makes a notable acknowledgment. In the final sentence of its subsection on Europe, the strategy commits to working with European partners to counter covert state actions, including sabotage and assassination plots, categorized as “hybrid threats.” The inclusion of the term is both appropriate and significant because Russian intelligence services have demonstrated how state power can be projected through irregular means.

After all, even a cursory glance at some of the activities being perpetrated by Russian and Iranian proxies throughout Europe demonstrates that what we are actually talking about looks a lot like the FBI’s definition of international terrorism— “Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored).”

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Western intelligence services have been tracking a troubling evolution in Russian tradecraft: the emergence of proxy recruitment at scale, enabled by digital platforms and designed to blur the lines between espionage, sabotage campaigns, and terrorism.

Through the use of so-called “disposable agents,” both Moscow and Tehran have convinced individuals living in the West to commit violent, criminal acts, sometimes for small sums of money, other times encouraging attackers with ideological inspiration. If these were Sunni jihadists linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, the incidents would be labeled as terrorist attacks, and those responsible would be called homegrown violent extremists who were radicalized and recruited online. Russia has worked through its intelligence services, while also cultivating a network of willing recruits throughout Europe.

Recent investigations reveal the scale and intentionality behind this approach. A 2025 exposé uncovered a Russian military intelligence (GRU)-linked recruitment campaign using Telegram bots and viral propaganda videos to solicit volunteers abroad. The messaging was deliberately broad—appealing to nationalism, grievance, or simple curiosity—and funneled interested individuals into automated recruitment pipelines. These systems lowered the barrier to entry: a single click, message, or expression of interest could place a user into a pipeline for tasking.

Iran has followed suit, relying on one of its many proxy groups—Kataib Hezbollah, an Iraqi Shia militia—to orchestrate a shadowy hybrid campaign under the banner of Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI). HAYI has already claimed responsibility for a series of attacks across Europe, spanning the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Similarly, Russian hybrid attacks in Europe know no borders and have occurred in the UK, France, Germany, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, and elsewhere. Just last week, Russian drones crashed through an apartment block in Romania, a NATO member.

The key to successfully countering hybrid threats is working by, with, and through allies to leverage each other's strengths in a shared effort to identify threat networks, map their structures, penetrate their operations, and dismantle them. This requires not just unity of effort within countries, but a coordinated approach across law enforcement, intelligence agencies, security services, and special operations forces.

In some ways, perhaps, the U.S. and its allies are a victim of their own success. The Global War on Terrorism—while not without its faults—was successful in combating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, decapitating their leadership and driving them from safe havens in the Levant and Pakistan's tribal areas. Of course, the terrorist threat has not vanished, though it has morphed into a more decentralized network of regional affiliates and franchise groups that still wreak havoc from the Sahel to Central Asia.

For more than two decades after 9/11, the United States and our European allies were bound together by a clear and urgent mission: to disrupt terrorist networks, prevent attacks, and dismantle organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. That shared mission forced us to innovate. It drove unprecedented cooperation across intelligence services, law enforcement, counterintelligence and with special operations forces. Barriers – silos – that once slowed us were broken down, and in doing so, countless lives were saved.

But the strategic environment has dramatically changed.

Compared to the two decades that followed the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a back-burner issue, relegated to a focus on great power competition, which manifests in the shadows through hybrid threats. And while there has been a NATO strategy to counter hybrid threats since 2015 (and it has also developed a Center of Excellence to analyze the issue), the discussion is typically less coalition and mission-focused than counterterrorism operations were, say, during the peak of the Islamic State's caliphate and amidst the mass movement of foreign fighters between Western countries and the Middle East.

One of the issues is that, as a concept, hybrid threats—while not a new term—suffer from definitional ambiguity and are not widely agreed upon in the lexicon. The term itself is used interchangeably with 'gray zone warfare' and is at times mistaken for or confused with asymmetric warfare, political warfare, irregular warfare, and/or unconventional warfare.

Still, the 2026 strategy does characterize certain states as behaving like terrorist enablers—or as part of the terrorist threat environment—when they sponsor, support, equip, or facilitate terrorist organizations, rather than treating terrorism solely as a non-state actor phenomenon. While not explicitly calling out Russia, that framing is useful and is a departure point for a more aggressive Western strategy for countering this phenomenon.

Terminology and labeling aside, what is clear is that sabotage, cyber operations, and the use of disposable agents by Russia, Iran, and other Western adversaries are wreaking havoc and destabilizing society in many countries. And because state actors are involved, there is an additional element they alone can bring—scale. This means using professional intelligence services, financial resources, sophisticated cyber capabilities, diplomatic cover, and complex logistical support in transportation, communications, and other crucial areas.

As such, the only way that states can hope to be successful in countering hybrid threats is by massing their own state-based capabilities and cooperating through pooled resources and intelligence sharing.

Another idea gaining traction in the event of escalation in Europe, is resurrecting Cold War–era like-stay-behind structures for government continuity: a legally grounded resistance architecture that’s in place—distributed, resilient, and capable of sustaining state continuity from the first moment of disruption. It is almost shocking to process the idea that hybrid threats from Russia are causing some NATO countries to institutionalize “total defense” models designed to absorb shock and sustain governance under pressure. But the threat landscape demands such contingencies.

In this new threat paradigm, resilience and resolve—not caution—is the center of gravity.

Only a more aggressive stance in pushing back against those actors deploying hybrid capabilities can be effective. One thing is for certain: a tepid, half-hearted response—or worse, no response—will only continue to embolden Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing. Hybrid threats, by their very nature, pose a cross-border challenge. The shots may be called in the Kremlin, but the operations take place in London, and may involve intermediaries scattered across the globe, providing various forms of active and passive support to the perpetrators of the attack.

To blunt these offensives requires integrating and partner-sharing of world-class intelligence – like the way Western intelligence services dealt with jihadi threats - and an unprecedented willingness to elevate aggressive offensive counterintelligence to a strategic capability among partners nations.

Countering hybrid warfare requires far deeper intelligence integration among allies. Intelligence sharing can no longer remain confined to elite classified exchanges between a handful of services. Governments must create real-time intelligence fusion across cyber defense agencies, financial regulators, military commands, law enforcement, border security organizations, and private-sector infrastructure operators. This is particularly urgent because critical infrastructure is now the frontline of modern conflict.

If the Western nations remain integrated, vigilant, and forward-leaning, they will not simply compete in this space—they will shape it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 04 Jun 2026 11:30:34 +0100 FirstHandNews
China’s Uneasy Partnerships With Russia and North Korea https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-uneasy-partnerships-with-russia-and-north-korea https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-uneasy-partnerships-with-russia-and-north-korea China’s summit with Russia last month and the reported likely upcoming visit of President Xi Jinping to North Korea are tactical moves that ignore the historical tensions between China, Russia and North Korea.

That tension threatens a meaningful strategic partnership.

The meeting between Mr. Xi and Russian ruler Vladimir Putin, convened immediately after President Trump’s summit with Mr. Xi, resulted in a joint statement highlighting a strategic partnership between Russia and China. Meanwhile, it criticized the current “law of the jungle” — a not-so-subtle dig at the U.S.

The 1991 Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between Russia and China was extended for another five years, memorializing the quasi-alliance between these two countries.

The summit’s message was clear: China and Russia will continue to strengthen their strategic partnership and pursue a multipolar world opposed to unilateralism. That is another not-so-subtle criticism of the U.S.

Despite Russia’s efforts, China did not agree to the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would carry roughly 1.8 trillion cubic feet of Russian gas annually from western Siberia through Mongolia into China. This is an important project for Russia, owing to Europe’s sharply reduced purchases of Russian gas because of its invasion of Ukraine.

Given the loss of European revenue, Russia hoped to redirect gas eastward to China. China, however, has been cautious, not wanting to become overly dependent on Russia, while pressing for lower prices and more favorable financing terms.

Also of concern to Russia is China’s inroads into Siberia and Russia’s Far East. The country is concerned about Chinese nationals migrating to Siberia in search of economic opportunities.

There are powerful historical reasons why Beijing and Moscow will always be wary of each other. These include the 1969 border clashes on the Ussuri River and Russia’s threat during that decade to launch nuclear strikes against Chinese nuclear sites. They also point to deeper historical wounds, such as Russia’s 1860 seizure of Vladivostok from the Qing Dynasty under the Treaty of Peking — one of the “unequal treaties” imposed on China. Decades later, Beijing retaliated by providing military support to Afghan fighters resisting the 1979 Soviet invasion.

Pro-Kremlin Russia Today expert Alexey Martynov argued in a recent commentary piece that China can no longer treat Moscow as a junior partner. He wrote, “Beijing behaves as though it can preserve a carefully managed partnership in which China remains the senior partner while minimizing its own obligations.”

A no-limits strategic partnership between a revanchist Russian Federation — a pariah state because of its invasion of Ukraine — and a China determined to be a model world leader is a partnership that will not endure.

North Korea is China’s only ally. More than 90% of North Korea’s trade is with China, and more than 90% of North Korea’s crude oil imports come from China. China is North Korea’s economic lifeline.

Yet historical distrust of China is still deeply embedded in North Korean strategic thinking. Korea has a long history in the Chinese tributary system. For centuries, Korean dynasties operated within the Sinocentric regional order, with imperial China as the dominant power.

Many Korean nationalists viewed this as unequal and humiliating. Former North Korean leader Kim Il-sung balanced between Moscow and Beijing during the Cold War to avoid subordination to either, though North Korea depended on China economically.

North Korea will always be concerned about Chinese influence and its ability to pressure North Korea economically or support reforms like China’s. China is concerned with North Korean nuclear brinkmanship and potential refugee flows in the event of instability in North Korea.

Most important, if there is instability or war on the Korean Peninsula, China would be concerned that the U.S. would be there for its ally, South Korea.

After North Korean leader Kim Jong-un took power in 2011, he kept his distance from China and did not show the respect China expected. In September 2025, however, Mr. Xi invited Mr. Kim to Beijing to stand with Messrs. Xi and Putin at Beijing’s Victory Day parade, commemorating the end of World War II.

If Mr. Xi visits Pyongyang in the next few weeks, it will be obvious that China is working hard to improve relations with North Korea.

North Korea’s new allied relationship and mutual defense treaty with Russia and its military aid to Russia for the war with Ukraine have no doubt motivated China to be more energetic in bringing North Korea back into the fold.

Despite visits and joint statements, China’s relations with Russia and North Korea remain fragile. A strategic partnership will not endure.

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

This story appeared in The Washington Times and is republished here with permission.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 04 Jun 2026 11:30:34 +0100 FirstHandNews
Top 5 International Tour Packages from Madurai — Your Dream Vacation Starts Here https://belimedia.com.ng/Top-5-International-Tour-Packages-from-Madurai https://belimedia.com.ng/Top-5-International-Tour-Packages-from-Madurai

Have you ever looked at a photo of cherry blossoms in Japan or the Northern Lights in Norway and thought, "I wish I could be there one day"? That feeling of the pull of somewhere beautiful and new — is something every traveler knows. And if you're from Madurai or anywhere in Tamil Nadu, the good news is that getting there isn't as far-fetched as it seems.

At Sky Planet Holidays, we've been turning those travel dreams into real memories for families, couples, and solo adventurers right here from Madurai. Whether it's your first time going abroad or you're a seasoned traveler looking for your next great escape, we take care of every detail so you can simply enjoy the journey. Here's a look at our five most loved international tour packages and why travellers across Tamil Nadu keep choosing them.

Japan Tour Packages — Where Tradition Meets Tomorrow

Japan is one of those destinations that stays with you long after you've come back home. There's something almost indescribable about walking through a centuries-old Shinto shrine in the morning and riding a bullet train past Mount Fuji in the afternoon.

Our Japan tour packages from Madurai are designed for travelers who want more than just the usual tourist stops. You'll explore Tokyo's electric neighborhoods, experience the quiet grace of Kyoto's geisha districts, and witness the historic weight of Hiroshima. If you're traveling during spring, the cherry blossom season turns every street and park into something out of a painting.

Japan is also a food lover's paradise, from fresh sushi at Tsukiji to steaming bowls of ramen in hidden alleyways. We include curated food experiences because, honestly, you can't truly know a country until you've eaten like a local.

Vietnam Tour Packages — A Hidden Gem Worth Every Rupee

Vietnam doesn't get as much attention as some other Asian destinations, and that's exactly what makes it special. It still has that rawness, that authenticity, that places like Bangkok or Bali have slowly lost to overtourism.

Our Vietnam tour packages take you through Ha Long Bay, where thousands of limestone karsts rise out of emerald waters like something from a fantasy novel, to the lantern-lit streets of Hoi An's old town and the buzzing energy of Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam's street food alone is worth the trip: bánh mì, pho, and fresh spring rolls eaten right at the roadside.

This is also one of our most budget-friendly international packages, making it a brilliant first international trip for families and young couples who want to experience Southeast Asia without stretching their savings too thin.

Scandinavia Tour Packages — For Those Who Dream of the Northern Lights

If Japan is poetry, Scandinavia is a song long, slow, and deeply moving. Our Scandinavia tour packages cover Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and they are made for travelers who want something completely different from the usual beach holiday.

In winter, you can chase the Northern Lights across the Norwegian sky one of those experiences that genuinely changes the way you look at the world. In summer, the midnight sun means you can hike through fjords at 11 pm with the sky still glowing gold. The fjords of Norway, the wooden houses of Stockholm's old town, and the clean, crisp silence of Finnish Lapland these are moments that stay with you.

We know Scandinavia can seem expensive, and that's why our packages are carefully structured to give you the full experience without unnecessary costs. Every element from flights and hotels to local guides is planned with value in mind.

Singapore & Malaysia Tour Packages — The Perfect Blend for Every Traveller

Singapore and Malaysia are our most popular combined package, and it's easy to see why. These two countries feel made for each other. Singapore's polished, cosmopolitan energy paired with Malaysia's warm, multicultural heartbeat is a combination that works beautifully for almost any kind of traveler.

In Singapore, you'll stand beneath the Supertrees at Gardens by the Bay, look out over Marina Bay Sands, and eat your way through the legendary hawker centers, where a $3 plate of chicken rice can be the best thing you've eaten all year. Then cross over into Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur's Petronas Towers, the colonial charm of Penang's George Town, and the rainforests of Langkawi are all waiting.

Our Singapore and Malaysia tour packages from Madurai are especially popular with families because both countries are safe, English-friendly, and incredibly easy to navigate. Tamil is even an official language in Singapore, so you'll genuinely feel at home.

China Tour Packages — Ancient Wonders on a Modern Scale

China is a country of superlatives. The longest wall. The biggest population. The oldest continuous civilization. And some of the most breathtaking scenery on the planet.

Our China tour packages are built around the highlights that first-time visitors always love: walking the Great Wall outside Beijing, standing in the vast silence of the Forbidden City, cruising the Li River past those iconic karst mountains in Guilin, and watching the Terracotta Army in Xi'an, thousands of hand-crafted soldiers standing guard for over two thousand years.

China is also a country that surprises you. The food is nothing like the "Chinese food" you've had at home. The modern cities, especially Shanghai, have an energy that's unlike anywhere else in the world. Our packages include experienced local guides who make sure you get the real story behind what you're seeing.

Why Choose Sky Planet Holidays for Your International Trip?

Planning an international holiday involves a lot of moving parts: visas, flights, hotels, local transport, insurance, and everything in between. At Sky Planet Holidays, we handle all of it so you don't have to lose sleep over the details.

We're a Madurai-based travel company that genuinely knows what Tamil Nadu travelers need. We speak your language literally and figuratively. Our packages are transparent with no hidden costs, our team is reachable when you need us, and our goal is simple: to send you on a holiday that you'll be talking about for years.

Whether you're looking for a romantic escape to Scandinavia, a family-friendly trip to Singapore, or an adventure through the ancient streets of Japan or China, Sky Planet Holidays has a package that fits your budget and your dream.

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Tue, 02 Jun 2026 08:49:31 +0100 Gopi Krishnan
AI, Autonomous Weapons, and the Pentagon’s $55 Billion Bet on Future War https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-autonomous-weapons-and-the-pentagons-55-billion-bet-on-future-war https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-autonomous-weapons-and-the-pentagons-55-billion-bet-on-future-war “The [Defense] Department (DoD) is requesting a massive increase for DAWG. For those in the audience that may not know, DAWG is the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group [tasked with rapidly developing, testing, and fielding large numbers of un-crewed systems and drones] and it's going from the $225 million [in fiscal year 2026] up to the $55 billion for fiscal year 2027. And at the same time, we're integrating the AI-driven [Artificial Intelligence-driven] targeting with those autonomous munitions at a pace that DoD directive 3000.09 was not designed to contemplate.”

That was Senate Armed Services Subcommittee Chairman Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) on May 19, speaking during a hearing on the science and technology priorities contained in the Fiscal Year 2027 Defense Authorization Bill and the Future Years Defense Program.

The 85-minute subcommittee session covered not only the proposed sharp budget increase in new autonomous weaponry, but also the race that’s going on between the U.S., China and other countries to integrate AI into offensive and defensive warfare. Ernst was questioning Defense Undersecretary for Research and Engineering Emil Michael when she brought up DoD directive 3000.09 which, as updated in 2023, established policy “for developing and using autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including armed platforms that are remotely operated or operated by onboard personnel.”

Ernst asked: “Secretary Michael, has the department formally reviewed whether the current governance framework is actually keeping pace with DAWG’s growth and then how do we overcome that?”

Michael responded, “It absolutely needs updating…because of the threat environment -- what's possible by the adversary -- and partly because of the lessons we learned in Iran.” He explained that the U.S. wants “autonomous mine-seeking capabilities” for the Hormuz Strait, and the Trump anti-missile Golden Dome “has an autonomous element to it, a space-based interceptor that could …hopefully get a Chinese hypersonic missile in the first 90 seconds of launch before it separates into decoys and multiple munitions. So there are going to be different risk levels with autonomous and we have to account for them in our policies. My belief is that will change more frequently than it has in the past than it ought to, to be consistent with our values, consistent with the threat environment, and consistent with the technology development.”

In his opening remarks, Michael described concerns with China, when it comes to the AI competition.

“From a national security standpoint, this is another case of our adversary, the main adversary, China, you know, taking our IP [intellectual property] from our American development labs that have spent hundreds of billions of dollars [on AI] by the end of the next couple of years…And they're “distilling” those [AI] models, which means effectively copying them for a fraction of the

price, taking off the guard rails for them, which means they could be used in ways that they're not intended to be used, which is very dangerous for us, whether it's cyber as a cyber weapon, as a biological weapon, as a chemical weapon.”

“So the threat is real,” Michael said, adding, “We have to stay ahead on chips, power, innovation and capital formation and that gives us this six to 12 month lead and maybe we could extend it. In the last Commerce [Department] NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) evaluation, our lead had increased by a few months against the Chinese.”

Discussion of AI in directed energy/laser weaponry was one area that caught my eye.

“Directed energy is one of my top critical technology areas,” Michael said, “So it is a focus by us. The science for directed energy is largely done and now we're in the engineering phase of it. So the engineering part of it makes it cheaper, smaller and more proliferated. We now have a suite of directed energy products that go from low-end to high-end and now we have to scale production of those. The things that are helping are Golden Dome [anti-missile defense systems], because they have a big reliance on directed energy…And because the commitment was made to the President [Trump] that we're going to have a demonstration that includes directed energy in our Golden Dome architecture, there's a lot of energy going into that.

Michael added, “While we're going to have multiple demonstrations, the primary demonstration where it [laser technology] demonstrates a lot of capabilities will be summer of [20]28.”

When Subcommittee Chairman Ernst asked Undersecretary Michael, “What are we doing to ensure that the transition pathway from that [AI weapons] prototype to actual production is actually functioning,” he gave as an example Castelion, a company he said, “developing low-cost hypersonics less than half-a-million-dollars per missile relative to the $50 million per missile we pay today.”

Backing up his statement, I found that last April 24, the U.S. Navy announced it had awarded Castelion a $105 million to continue efforts to integrate its Blackbeard hypersonic strike weapon onto the F/A-18 fighter/bomber and transition the system to an Early Operational Capability in 2027 for carrier-based operations.

And on May 13, DoD announced “once Castelion achieves testing and validation, the Department will award a two-year multi-year procurement contract for a minimum of 500 Blackbeard missiles annually, with options to extend for up to five years. To further encourage Castelion's self-funded facility expansion, the Department is actively seeking the necessary authorizations and appropriations to purchase over 12,000 Blackbeard missiles over five years.”

Subcommittee Ranking Minority Member Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.) raised two questions that took up a good part of the panel’s time.

“Given the strategic importance of winning, I cannot for the life of me understand two decisions that have been made,” Slotkin said. “Number one [was] the decision to sell Nvidia chips to the

Chinese, giving them not our most sophisticated, but some of our most sophisticated chips and chips they do not have.”

“Secondly,” she said, “I do not understand picking a fight with one of the few [AI] companies, Anthropic, that's in all of your [DoD] systems. All of you [the military services] use Anthropic right now, to the point where we've named them a supply chain risk, and all of you are supposed to be divesting from Anthropic in the next two months.”

“On the chips question,” Michael said, “this is a debate within the technology industry which is if you sell an adversary older chips, do you slow down their domestic production of equivalent chips because they become reliant on your technology?…If they become used to the American stack, is that net better for the American AI proliferation? And that's a debate.”

Michael added, “And the White House has decided that if we gave them two versions behind chips that we'd be able to preserve our dominance on the programming language, and make it less encouraging for them to develop their own domestic chip industry to catch up.”

As for the withdrawal from Anthropic, Michael said, “What we're worried about with the terms of service that they [Anthropic] had, and their posture toward the department [DoD], which when they questioned the [Venezuela President] Maduro raid, and whether their software was used inappropriately [in his kidnapping], gave us the sense that this was not a reliable partner to deal with…in conjunction with their written terms of service which prevent the use cases that we would like to advance into -- battlefield management, directing interceptions, developing weapons systems.”

Michael explained, “Google, who's been a longtime partner of the [Defense[ Department, Microsoft, Nvidia, real big companies with proper corporate governance, went through their legal teams and agreed to our terms of all lawful use cases, where Anthropic would not. So that should say something that our terms weren't unreasonable.”

However, last week news stories reported that White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles personally overruled the Pentagon's supply chain risk designation for Anthropic when it came to the company’s contract with the National Security Agency (NSA), which collects and processes electronic foreign intelligence communications.

The revised Anthropic contract with NSA drops the previously contested "any lawful use" Pentagon language, and adds an explicit clause restricting use of Anthropic tools for processing data on American citizens.

In this case, the White House appears to have supplanted the Pentagon in setting the rules for AI contracts. It remains to be seen how these conflicting decisions will be worked out.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 30 May 2026 17:49:07 +0100 FirstHandNews
Narco&Terrorism as Grey&Zone Warfare: Pakistan’s Hidden Front Against India https://belimedia.com.ng/narco-terrorism-as-grey-zone-warfare-pakistans-hidden-front-against-india https://belimedia.com.ng/narco-terrorism-as-grey-zone-warfare-pakistans-hidden-front-against-india The United States has long framed its South Asia policy around countering China’s rise, managing the fallout from Afghanistan, and preventing terrorist safe havens. Yet, Pakistan-facilitated narcotics trafficking into India remains a persistent and under-appreciated threat that demands greater attention in Washington. This is no longer an organized crime syndicate but a strong case of narco-terrorism – a deliberate grey-zone strategy that blends profit with subversion.

Drug proceeds fund anti-India Salafi-Jihadist groups, erode social stability in a key democratic partner, and sustain the very transnational networks that the United States has targeted for decades. Recent Indian operations and intelligence reports reveal Pakistan’s role as both a transit hub and active enabler, turning the Golden Crescent into a direct vector against Indian society. For American policymakers, ignoring this pipeline risks undermining Indo-US strategic convergence at a critical moment in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East.

The Enduring Golden Crescent Nexus

Afghanistan continues to dominate global opium production, even after the Taliban’s 2022 cultivation ban dramatically reduced planted hectares. Vast pre-ban stockpiles, combined with a surge in methamphetamine labs reliant on chemical precursors, have kept the trafficking ecosystem alive and adaptable. Pakistan remains the indispensable transit corridor, channeling Afghan-origin heroin, hashish, and synthetics eastward into India while also moving product westward toward Europe. A 2025 US State Department Presidential Determination on major drug transit countries explicitly listed Pakistan among the 23 nations central to the global illicit drug trade, citing “geographic, commercial, and economic factors” that sustain the flow despite enforcement gaps. Indian analysts and security officials frame this as narco-terrorism. Proceeds from these shipments are alleged to finance groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), with hawala networks and cryptocurrencies providing the laundering backbone.

The human cost inside India is stark as border states like Punjab confront epidemic youth addiction, rising crime rates, and generational damage that weakens internal cohesion. What begins as a criminal enterprise quickly becomes a tool of hybrid warfare that imposes asymmetric costs on India without crossing the threshold of conventional conflict. For the United States, this matters because the same financial pipelines that move drug money have historically overlapped with terrorist financing streams that once threatened American lives and interests.

From Drones to Deep-Sea Handovers

Pakistan-linked networks have proven agile, shifting tactics to evade Indian border defenses and capitalize on new technologies. The most alarming innovation is the sudden rise of drug-laden Pakistani drones along the western land border, particularly in Punjab. According to India’s Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) 2024 Annual Report, drone-related trafficking cases along the India-Pakistan border skyrocketed from just three in 2021 to 179 in 2024, with 163 incidents concentrated in the bordering districts of the Indian state of Punjab. The trend escalated further in 2025 with India’s Border Security Force seizing 272 drones coming from Pakistan into Punjab and recovering more than 367 kg of heroin between January and November 2025. The NCB explicitly warns that these unmanned systems constitute a “significant threat to India’s internal security,” as they bypass physical fencing, evade patrols, and deliver precise payloads of heroin and opium in minutes. Recoveries in these operations have included hundreds of kilograms of narcotics, highlighting the scale and sophistication.

Maritime routes across the Arabian Sea offer another high-volume artery. In April 2024, the Indian Coast Guard, NCB, and state police forces intercepted a Pakistani vessel west of Porbandar in Gujarat, seizing approximately 86 kg of narcotics valued at nearly $62 million and detaining 14 Pakistani crew members. A parallel case from December 2021, adjudicated in April 2026, saw a Gujarat special court sentence six Pakistani nationals to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment each for smuggling 76.9 kg of heroin worth $39 million; the boat was intercepted 35 nautical miles off the Gujarat coast after intelligence pinpointed mid-sea handovers originating from Karachi. These sea operations frequently involve coordinated transfers from ports such as Karachi or Gwadar, exploiting India’s 7,500-kilometer coastline as both a destination and a transit node toward Gulf markets. Traditional land corridors through Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan persist, often synchronized with drone drops in hybrid tactics.

Narco-Terrorism as Grey-Zone Warfare

Beyond the statistics lies Pakistan’s deeper strategic intent. By flooding Indian border regions with narcotics, these networks corrode the social fabric, generate revenue for Pakistan-backed jihadist outfits, and force New Delhi to divert resources toward internal security. This mirrors grey-zone tactics Washington has criticized in other theaters, including persistent, below-threshold pressure designed to weaken an adversary without provoking open war. Recent National Investigation Agency (NIA) chargesheets, including an October 2025 filing in an LeT-linked narco-terror case, have traced drug proceeds directly to financing of proscribed terrorist outfits, with international hawala channels routing funds to operatives in India and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Furthermore, Indian border forces’ confiscation of 10.2 kg of explosive material, 12 hand grenades, and 200 small arms with ammunition alongside drug shipments in 2025 alone offers strong evidence that narcotics, arms, and terror financing now operate as one ecosystem.

For the United States, the implications are concrete and immediate as terror groups sustained by narco-profits have repeatedly targeted American citizens and allies. The same laundering mechanisms that shield drug profits also obscure terrorist financing, creating overlapping threats that US law enforcement and intelligence agencies have long tracked. Moreover, India is America’s indispensable partner in the Indo-Pacific. As Washington deepens defense, technology, and intelligence cooperation with New Delhi to counter Chinese assertiveness, allowing a Pakistan-enabled narco-pipeline to undermine Indian stability undercuts that partnership. The post-Operation Sindoor landscape has already demonstrated how quickly South Asian flashpoints can escalate. Layering narcotics-fueled instability atop existing tensions only heightens crisis risks. In short, what happens in Punjab or Gujarat does not stay there, but it reverberates across the QUAD and into America’s broader strategic calculus.

Time for a Smarter US Approach

US policymakers should stop treating India’s narcotics challenge as a narrow bilateral issue and elevate it from the margins of policy on three fronts:

First, Washington should expand real-time intelligence sharing between US agencies and India’s Narcotics Control Bureau and Coast Guard to accelerate interdictions. The Arabian Sea route matters to Western interests because the same waters used for narcotics trafficking are also vital to global energy flows and commercial shipping. If Washington is investing in maritime domain awareness and Indian Ocean security, narcotics interdiction should be part of that conversation, not an afterthought.

Second, the United States should use targeted sanctions against key traffickers, facilitators, and financial enablers by leveraging existing counter-narcotics and counterterrorism authorities. Raising the cost of operating across these networks would help disrupt the financial architecture sustaining narco-terror activity.

Third, US diplomatic engagement with Islamabad should explicitly link counter-narcotics performance to broader security assistance discussions, making clear that grey-zone destabilization carries consequences.

The post-Sindoor era has shown how quickly South Asia’s security architecture can evolve. Yet the narcotics threat has intensified, adapting faster than the countermeasures designed to contain it. For the United States, treating Pakistan’s role in this pipeline as a peripheral law-enforcement matter is no longer tenable. Confronting it is a necessary investment in protecting a vital democratic partner, disrupting terror financing, and preserving long-term stability across South Asia.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 30 May 2026 17:49:07 +0100 FirstHandNews
Part II: When a Machiavellian and a Charismatic Met https://belimedia.com.ng/part-ii-when-a-machiavellian-and-a-charismatic-met https://belimedia.com.ng/part-ii-when-a-machiavellian-and-a-charismatic-met In our pre-summit piece on the Xi/Trump meeting [When a Charismatic and a Machiavellian Meet 12 May] we wrote: "When a gifted political charismatic such as President Trump is paired in negotiation with an equally gifted Machiavellian such as President Xi, history-making deals may happen. So too can epoch-defining disasters." At the end of the summit, the two Presidents parted ways in an atmosphere of comity – and with the possibility of hammering out between them this year (with three more summit opportunities) a modus vivendi on Artificial Intelligence with incalculable value to all of humanity.

Beijing's and Washington's announcement of their commitment to establish the first ever "intergovernmental dialogue" on AI received scant attention in the noisy and highly divergent post-summit parlor game commentary about who gained what, who gained most, who gained nothing, and who lost what. This is probably because of deep skepticism that mutual trust can be achieved in the midst of the current breakneck international competition to win the AI race.

Those of a certain age can remember the despondent faces of Reagan and Gorbachev, great friends and partners in peace, when they failed at their October 1986 summit in Reykjavík to reach an agreement that had the potential to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Soon after the summit — in 1990, four years later — Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for the leading role he played in the radical changes in East-West relations" but ever after spoke about his sense of personal failure in not making a deal with Reagan.

At the time, these two leaders of the world's recognized superpowers – the two most politically powerful men on earth in 1986 -- were working in a world where "mutually assured destruction" had become the de-facto solution to avoiding global nuclear war. What Xi and Trump are proposing now is getting ahead of an equally potentially cataclysmic global problem. They are proposing, as the Chinese announcement said, "working together to promote the development and governance of AI, so that AI can better serve the progress of human civilization and the common wellbeing of the international community." In other words, they are committing to using their individual power in their separate global spheres of influence to avoid a cyberspace era of "mutually assured destruction" – let's call this CyberMAD – this time based on weaponizing AI, versus nuclear power that we can call NuclearMAD.

The AI agreements they may strike – a new "rules based" order that only they will be able to enforce in their own regions – might only be possible when the negotiations occur between "frenemies," two counterpart leaders at the apex of world power who negotiate in good faith despite differences in temperaments, competing political systems, widely divergent cultures and histories.

Paradoxically, what stands out against the backdrop of Xi and Trump's numerous and salient differences are their very similar understandings of the logic and dynamics of political power and their shared political ethics regarding only negotiating with true equals in power. The combination of such extreme differences alongside similar political philosophies may pave the way to forging an AI accord.

Should they succeed, history will judge these men as belonging among the ranks of great world leaders, and history will forgive them much.

Let's review some events from the summit that signal why such a deal is possible.

No Big Fat Hug, but a Counter-Cultural Handshake

With his usual seemingly slightly over-caffeinated gusto the extroverted American President declared prior to their meeting that the Chinese President will greet him with "a big, fat, hug." Trump may have been channeling the classic comedy dynamic between a "funny man" up against a deadpan "straight man." In response to this possible wisecracking from President Trump, the austere introverted Chinese President maintained his usual imperturbable silence, though we can imagine him chuckling — or eye rolling — as this sally from his fellow member of the "superpower leaders' club" – that most exclusive club with a current membership of two.

In the end, Trump was greeted in Beijing not with a big hug from Xi, but with Xi accepting Trump's characteristic long two-handed grip handshake and penetrating stare into the other leader's eyes — something highly culturally uncomfortable for a Chinese leader. For Chinese such a full in-the-face stare is usually interpreted as a deliberate act of aggression or dominance.

We cannot overlook how much these two Presidents are working to accommodate each other, despite their real differences.

Though Their Drawbridges May be Down, Their Battlements Remain Armed

Xi and Trump share a philosophy of power whereby lasting international deals can only be made if domestic – meaning personal -- power remains balanced between the two dealmakers. Enforceable deals are only secure if individual domestic power is advertised and equally respected by both parties.

Xi's team made this reminder clear regarding his domestic power when China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson tweeted in the middle of the summit that, "the Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-U.S. relations…If it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. Otherwise, the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy." The resulting outcry by the American media at this piece of "disrespect" was predictable.

Trump's team made their own statement of defiance regarding domestic power by dramatically chucking any non-organic technology (burner phones and computers) and Chinese representation gifts into a large wastebin at the foot of Air Force One as they departed. This was an unsubtle for-the-cameras reminder to their Chinese counterparts that: "we won't help you spy on us at home." Predictable Chinese commentary ensued over what was labelled an unnecessarily provocative, rude, and "disrespectful" gesture.

Each leader's current stance with regard to their domestic power appears to be enough said and point made (without direct confrontation) and no long-term harm was done. Each leader can make – and take -- political displays of domestic toughness from the other because both understand that each must test their frenemy's strength and resolve. Xi and Trump tolerate and respect each other's political skills on this level, like lions roaring at each other in the wild to mark their territories.

Domestic Postures and Personalities Aside – An AI Deal for the Ages

Xi is a Machiavellian who understands the dangers of yielding to AI control over the material infrastructures of civilization. Trump is a charismatic and intuitively understands the dangers of outsourcing to AI mastery over the intangible psychological ties that shape the social contract between a populace and governance. Humanity missed the mark in WWII with nuclear weapons — each nation hellbent on making such weapons their own and ignoring the global implications of proliferation. This fierce self-interested competitiveness between the world's nations led us to a world where accepting the well-named MAD – mutually assured destruction – made sense as the only way to keep the peace, and therefore all of humanity alive. Today, as we watch the dynamics between the two leaders of the world's superpowers we can hope for a different outcome. Xi and Trump understand the politics that led to NuclearMAD in the past, and how the current politics of AI can lead to the new calamity of CyberMAD. This time however they appear to be taking steps to guide humanity away from making a new set of science-based self-destructive global mistakes.

These leaders — powerful, intimidating, each in his own way brilliant — are best positioned — temperamentally and politically — to hammer out, put on record, and police a deal to curb the dangers of AI and secure humanity's future.

Who knows what marvels future generations will achieve with the aid of AI, if its dangers are curbed through the joint leadership of the Presidents of China and the United States.

[1]"All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views."

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 30 May 2026 17:49:07 +0100 FirstHandNews
How Anonymous Wikipedia Editors Influence Global Narratives — and AI Systems https://belimedia.com.ng/how-anonymous-wikipedia-editors-influence-global-narratives-and-ai-systems https://belimedia.com.ng/how-anonymous-wikipedia-editors-influence-global-narratives-and-ai-systems If you ask Google what Al Jazeera is, the answer you receive draws heavily on Wikipedia. The same is true if you ask ChatGPT, Perplexity or many other large language models. Wikipedia has become the working baseline of public knowledge, whether for reporters, students or congressional staffers.

Look up Al Jazeera on Wikipedia today and the encyclopedia describes it as “a Qatari news media organization” that is “a statutory private foundation for public benefit” “primarily funded by the government of Qatar.” Its flagship article assures readers that Al Jazeera was “launched with a mandate of independence,” was “noted for its journalistic professionalism,” and is recognized by scholars as having driven a democratizing “Al Jazeera effect” across the Arab world. This is the conventional wisdom hundreds of millions of people now casually believe.

It is also, in many important respects, wrong.

The ground truth is that Al Jazeera is a state-owned broadcaster of an absolute monarchy, funded and effectively controlled by the ruling Al Thani family of Qatar. The network's own former director general told the BBC in 2017 that “90% maybe” of its budget comes from the Qatari government. Its founding chairman has been Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, a member of the royal house. Qatari law makes criticism of the Emir, his family or his policies a punishable offense, and Reporters Without Borders ranks the country among the world's least free for journalism.

The U.S. Department of Justice has determined Al Jazeera to be “controlled and funded by the government of Qatar” and has ordered its U.S.-targeted digital outlet, AJ+, to register as a foreign agent — an order it has refused to comply with. Israel banned the network in 2024. Four neighboring Arab states demanded its closure as a condition of restoring relations with Qatar in 2017. By every functional measure that matters, Al Jazeera is a state influence enterprise. That is not the picture Wikipedia paints. And it is not an accident.

Wikipedia, the fifth-most-visited website in the world, is written by anonymous volunteers. Anyone with an internet connection can edit nearly any article, and editors are under no obligation to disclose their real identity. The platform's paid-editing rules require editors who are compensated by clients to declare it on their user page, but enforcement depends entirely on volunteer detection. Articles on contentious topics, like the Israel-Palestine conflict, can be placed under so-called “Extended Confirmed Protection,” restricting edits to established accounts. But within those restrictions, the system runs on the assumption of good faith. Once an account passes the threshold for tenure, it can shape any article it chooses, in any direction, behind whatever username it likes.

One user dominates Wikipedia's coverage of Al Jazeera. Originally registered as Gsgdd in November 2022 and later renamed Cinaroot, the account is now responsible for more than 40 percent of the current text on the main Al Jazeera Media Network article (nearly quadruple the second most active editor), more than 27 percent on Al Jazeera English (triple the next editor), and 68.2 percent on Al Jazeera effect, the entry that explains the network's broader significance (five times greater than the second most active editor).

Who is Cinaroot? Honestly, no one outside Wikipedia's internal moderators knows. The account presents no biographical information, lists no affiliations, and has renamed itself twice — from Gsgdd to Astropulse in mid-2024, then to Cinaroot in early 2025 — making earlier activity harder to trace. There is no public evidence directly linking the account to the Qatari government, to Al Jazeera, or to any contractor working for either. What can be established is the pattern of edits, their volume, their direction, their timing, and the institutional environment in which the work is taking place. Whether Cinaroot is one person, a team operating from Doha's information ministry, or a contractor compensated by a third party can only be inferred. The inference is strong. The proof of who sits at the keyboard remains, by design, out of reach.

What can be analyzed is the account's behavior, and it would interest any analyst of influence operations. Cinaroot was registered on Nov. 12, 2022, ten days before Qatar opened the 2022 World Cup — the centerpiece of more than a decade of Qatari soft-power spending and an event Doha treated as the small Gulf monarchy's arrival as a global actor. The account made a handful of minor, unrelated edits and then, for nine months, fell silent. That itself is unusual. Most organic users' activity fluctuates, but rarely do they go fully dormant for months. Most important is when the account “woke up.”

On Oct. 25, 2023, eighteen days after Hamas's attack on Israel, Cinaroot's first substantive act was a political statement. The edit was a post on the Talk page of the October 7 attacks article, where editors discuss (and often fight over) changes. The account, citing UN Secretary-General António Guterres, asserted that the massacre of 1,200 people in Israel “did not happen in a vacuum,” and enumerated alleged Israeli responsibilities for the violence.

Two days later, the account began what would become a years-long campaign focused on Al Jazeera. But what it did first would set the template for everything that followed.

In 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt severed relations with Qatar, blockaded its borders, and demanded the closure of Al Jazeera as one of thirteen conditions for restoring them. Four Arab governments — Qatar's closest neighbors and the states that had lived with the network's regional role for two decades — had judged Al Jazeera consequential enough that its shutdown was a key demand. That fact sat in the lead section of the Al Jazeera Arabic Wikipedia entry, the first thing a reader would see — and as damaging a claim as any for an organization trying to manage its credibility.

Cinaroot, an account that, at the time, had almost no recorded experience on the platform, swiftly moved the statement out of the lead and into a controversies section further down, where fewer readers would encounter it. In its place, favorable language about the network's journalism went in at the top. The same kind of move would be repeated across the cluster for the next two and a half years: critical material relocated, compressed or contained; favorable material elevated; disputes about Qatari control reframed as procedural questions about sourcing and balance.

Examples accumulated. In November 2023, Cinaroot removed the names of senior Qatari figures — including the network's chairman, a member of the Al Thani royal house — from the lead of the Al Jazeera Media Network article, visually distancing the network from its royal leadership at the top of the page. The same month, the account rewrote the article's account of the U.S. foreign-agent ruling to apply only to the subsidiary AJ+, isolating the legal classification from the parent organization. In June 2024, Cinaroot removed Al Jazeera English's “state media” categorization tag from its Wikipedia infobox, arguing in the edit summary that “partial funding by Qatar govt itself is not enough for categorization.” In September 2025, when another editor proposed describing the network as “essentially state media,” Cinaroot reverted them with the justification: “essentially is not enough, legally is what matters.” On a single day in January 2026, the account deleted 39,544 bytes — roughly 6,500 words, or a month of accumulated work by another editor — covering the network's funding, governance and editorial policy.

Cinaroot has not gone uncontested. Another editor, operating under the Arabic-language username Ghawwas Al-Ilm — “diver of knowledge” — has spent years expanding the same pages with sourced material on Al Jazeera's funding, leadership and operational ties to the Qatari state. That material is the substance Cinaroot has repeatedly removed. The pattern across the cluster is one of expansion by Ghawwas, then constraint by Cinaroot — additions accumulate over weeks; one structural edit erases them. Because Cinaroot has the higher tempo and the procedural fluency, the constraint side has, over time, prevailed.

The cumulative effect, edit by edit, is more than a sanitized story. It is a Wikipedia certification of Al Jazeera as independent — the most valuable endorsement the network could ask from any platform. That certification flows outward. It feeds Google's answer panels, trains the major large language models, and shapes the first paragraph of countless news stories, term papers and policy memos. The result is one of the most consequential acts of historical revision in the digital age.

Al Jazeera's 1996 founding, originally rooted in the 1995 palace coup that brought Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to power — and that produced a satellite broadcaster to project his new government's voice almost immediately — has been stripped of that political context. The phrase “primarily funded by Qatar,” used in earlier versions of the article, has been softened. In reality, the network's funding, launched reportedly with more than $1 billion, mostly from the Emir of Qatar himself, has not changed.

The most striking work is on the Al Jazeera effect article — a page that does not simply describe the network but theorizes it as a democratizing political-science phenomenon. The article today asserts in its own voice that there is a “broad consensus that the network has revolutionized Arab television news,” enjoying an “unprecedented margin of freedom” and “democratizing media in the Middle East.” In effect, this is a complete inversion of the journalistic reality behind the network, which is funded and effectively controlled by the rulers of an autocratic petro-state. Cinaroot wrote 68.2 percent of it. This isn't ancient history: the account is responsible for 71 of the page's 83 edits since the beginning of this year.

The Al Jazeera effect article leans on the work of Mohamed Zayani, a scholar at Georgetown University's Doha campus, which Qatar has funded with more than $1.06 billion in disclosed payments to the university. The Wikipedia article's signature claim, that Al Jazeera enjoys an “unprecedented margin of freedom,” is taken from a paywalled Zayani paper that Cinaroot personally paid $37 to access, noting “thanks Sage” in the edit summary. Volunteer encyclopedia editors working in their spare time do not typically reach for their credit card to buy paywalled academic articles in order to cite them.

Wikipedia insiders have a term for this kind of loop: citogenesis. In the classic case, an editor adds an unsourced claim to Wikipedia; a reporter reads it and repeats it in print; the printed article is then cited back into Wikipedia as the source. A claim has been validated by the loop it produced. What appears to be happening on the Al Jazeera pages is citogenesis at an institutional scale. Qatar funds the news network. Qatar funds the prestigious university. Scholarship that emerges from inside that funded ecosystem then appears in Wikipedia as if it were neutral authority. Wikipedia trains Google's answer panels and the major large language models. By the time the information reaches a reader, the original political circumstance has been removed at three stages, and the constructed “truth” separated from the context that produced it.

Cinaroot is not alone. A second editor, Mo2010, has built out much of the secondary infrastructure across the Al Jazeera ecosystem — and has done particularly consequential work on the AJ+ article, which Mo2010 created from scratch in February 2014. AJ+ is the brand U.S. regulators ordered to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and the network's most aggressively distributed property on American social media. On the AJ+ page, the way that foreign-agent order is described — as a press-freedom issue rather than a Justice Department determination of state control — shapes how American readers, and the AI systems that increasingly answer their questions, encounter a foreign government's most active U.S. media presence.

This is not the first Wikipedia editing operation linked to Qatar's interests. In January, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism — a London-based nonprofit newsroom — documented a covert editing operation by London PR firm Portland Communications on behalf of Qatari-linked clients: a network of anonymous accounts deployed to reshape politically sensitive articles, particularly those connected to the crown jewel of Qatar's brand empire — its global sports-related partnerships and the executives behind them. That investigation established the capability and the precedent. The Al Jazeera cluster is what the same playbook looks like applied to Qatar's most consequential media asset.

None of this is a hidden conspiracy. Every edit is in the public Wikipedia record. Anyone with a browser can read them. That is also the design: each individual edit is defended on its face as sourcing improvement, neutrality balancing or style cleanup. Wikipedia's culture rewards those rationales. The pattern is only visible when one reads the edits together.

Wikipedia will not solve this on its own. The platform's editorial culture is designed to assume good faith and to treat procedural arguments as conclusive. That is its strength, and its vulnerability. Foreign-influence work that arrives in the language of “sourcing” and “balance” passes through without resistance. It also helps when the platform has been cultivated. The Qatar Foundation, a state-owned non-profit, was a six-figure donor to the Wikimedia Foundation in the early 2010s. The Qatar Computing Research Institute — owned by the Qatar Foundation — entered a formal partnership with Wikimedia in 2011 to expand Arabic-language Wikipedia, train editors and integrate Wikipedia editing into university curricula in the emirate.

In 2013, Wikipedia co-founder Jimmy Wales delivered a keynote at a Qatar Foundation event in Doha. And in December 2025, Al Jazeera Media Network announced an expanded partnership with Google Cloud to integrate Google's AI tools into its newsroom — the same Google whose answer panels are fed in part by the Wikipedia articles Cinaroot has shaped. None of these touchpoints proves editorial control. They demonstrate that Qatar has, for more than a decade, engaged the encyclopedia and its commercial neighbors at the institutional levels at which platforms decide which actors' claims should be treated as credible and which should be scrutinized.

There are concrete steps Wikipedia and its parent foundation could take. Articles about state-funded media organizations could be designated as a contentious topic class, requiring identity verification through the Wikimedia Foundation for editors making more than a defined number of substantive changes — without exposing those identities publicly. Single-editor authorship dominance above an established threshold (say, 40 percent of an article on a politically sensitive subject) could trigger automatic review. Edit summaries that justify content removal on procedural grounds could require linking to a documented Talk-page consensus rather than a single editor's policy invocation. Wikipedia's existing paid-disclosure rules could be enforced not only against editors who declare themselves paid, but against accounts whose editing patterns — concentrated topical focus, procedural sophistication, persistent directional outcomes — diverge measurably from organic editing. None of these would compromise the open ethos that makes Wikipedia what it is. They would simply close the gap the current rules leave open.

What governments, technology platforms and the encyclopedia itself owe their readers is a more honest accounting of who writes the entries that now train the world's information systems. Until then, the answer to the question “What is Al Jazeera?” will be whatever a small number of editors, backed by a much larger set of institutional relationships, have together determined.

Ashley Rindsberg is founder and chief investigative officer of NPOV. Toby Dershowitz is senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense Of Democracies, a non-partisan research Institute focused on national security and foreign policy issues. Follow them on X @ashleyrindsberg and @tobydersh

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 30 May 2026 17:49:07 +0100 FirstHandNews
Before Funding a Record Defense Budget, Congress Should Demand Answers on Iran https://belimedia.com.ng/before-funding-a-record-defense-budget-congress-should-demand-answers-on-iran https://belimedia.com.ng/before-funding-a-record-defense-budget-congress-should-demand-answers-on-iran As I listened to Defense Secretary Hegseth testify about the proposed $1.5 Trillion defense budget, the quote from Robert Heinlein, the science fiction writer, kept running through my mind: “The most expensive thing in the world is a second-best military establishment, good but not good enough to win.”

The U.S. military has no peer. U.S. military personnel are a stunningly impressive group, the best trained and equipped to ever fight a war. But despite continued tactical excellence, and the highest tech and the (already) most expensive military in the world, the U.S. has had a hard time turning that into durable strategic outcomes.

The War in Afghanistan ended in a collapse of its government and U.S. withdrawal. Getting Iraq to a fragile, deeply sectarian, often-Iranian-dominated, and corrupt democracy, took years, thousands of U.S. lives, many multiples of that of Iraqi lives, and billions of dollars. And the current Iran war seems likely to end in a way that is neither beneficial for U.S. security nor a successful escalation beyond what can be accomplished with coercive diplomacy—as of right now, the war did not remove the Iranian regime, its highly enriched uranium nor Iran’s capacity to shut down the Strait of Hormuz at will. As a bonus, we likely have confirmed the view among nations that the only real way to ensure that no one will attack you is to acquire a nuclear weapon. These three wars are not a track record of strategic wins.

While Congress considers authorizing and appropriating the largest defense budget since World War II, they should undertake a formal, concerted effort to understand why this disconnect exists. In the case of Afghanistan, such an effort is well underway with the Afghanistan War Commission. But a myriad of questions, ranging from the purely tactical to the political and strategic, need to be answered in the case of the Iran War. While the Administration will certainly argue that it’s too soon for a commission like the one for the Afghanistan War to be contemplated, that should not stop Congress from seeking answers on its own as it determines whether, and how, to provide the requested defense spending.

Congress should demand to know why the U.S. military was underprepared for the threat of Iranian drones, which killed U.S. servicemembers, destroyed aircraft, damaged U.S. facilities across the Gulf, and damaged commercial facilities in multiple countries. This seeming under-preparedness is despite the ubiquity of Iranian-supplied drones in the Russia-Ukraine war. Congress should seek to determine if the intelligence on Iran’s drone programs was accurate and, if so, was DOD unprepared? Or, alternately, did DOD determine this level of damage was an acceptable risk—after all, one rarely fights wars without losses. But it’s equally likely, perhaps much more likely, that we overestimated our capacity and that of our allies to suppress drone launches and intercept airborne drone attacks.

Similar questions relate to Iran’s missile capability, which has done damage all over the region. Again, those authorizing and carrying out the war would have strong insight into Iran’s capacity to conduct such strikes. And the U.S. may have understood, assuming media reports are correct, that Iran could rebuild these capabilities reasonably quickly. But Congress should ask about this and the capabilities and decision-making given the costs that have been imposed. Would the systems that would be funded in this year’s budget request fix that problem? Or do we need to do something else?

Iran has been, as noted, able to close the Strait of Hormuz. Did DOD develop workable options for this foreseeable possibility? If not, why not given that such a closure has been contemplated in many, many war games and written about publicly for years? Bad planning? Or did DOD assume they had the capability to deal with the Iranian systems? If so, why was that wrong and what do we need to do to ensure that this can’t happen in the future, for example in the Strait of Malacca or the South China Sea?

Congress should also ask hard questions about military planning. The Department of Defense is extremely defensive about sharing details of war plans with Congress, for understandable reasons, but the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have not been shy about broadcasting, for example, the number of targets hit and ships sunk. How did the planners envision striking these targets in those numbers would achieve strategic goals, whatever they were?

The largest problems appear to come from confused and wildly over-optimistic goals and misaligned strategies between allies. And one cannot envision the Administration agreeing to answer questions about how the President made the decision to attack or why he made that decision when he did. But Congress can and should press the Department and the Intelligence Community on what options were presented and how risks and benefits were presented. The Executive Branch will resist this, but also cannot be trusted to grade its own homework. And the country deserves to have some faith in the process by which the President is presented and weighs strategic options and risk even if the President resists explaining how he came to make those decisions.

It would be ideal if Congress would conduct these inquiries publicly. But given the political environment, that seems likely to break down in partisan infighting. Instead, Congress, through the Armed Services Committees and to a lesser extent the Intelligence Committees, could simply explore these questions through a series of closed-door briefings, hearings, and interviews. Responsible members, and the Chairman and Ranking Members on both Armed Services committees are in that category, can agree to lock arms and work together to understand what happened—the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigation into Russia’s attempts to interfere in the 2016 election provides a good example of just this kind of effort (full disclosure—I was the Minority Staff Director on SSCI during this time). Such effort may not fully satisfy anyone, will irritate partisans on both sides of the aisle, and will certainly provoke conflict between the branches. But such checks and balances are essential to war fighting by a democratic state. We need to understand why we’ve failed in the past if we want to win in the future and avoid Heinlein’s curse.

All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 30 May 2026 17:49:07 +0100 FirstHandNews
Your AI Isn’t My AI: The Quiet Splintering Ahead https://belimedia.com.ng/your-ai-isnt-my-ai-the-quiet-splintering-ahead https://belimedia.com.ng/your-ai-isnt-my-ai-the-quiet-splintering-ahead One of the most consequential geopolitical and technological races underway is the competition to shape the future of large language models. For a moment, it looked like a race to build one dominant cognitive operating system for humanity. But that is not what the next five to ten years will look like. Three forces will define the LLM landscape of the next decade: fragmentation across countries and cultures, the shift from chatbots to autonomous agents, and a quiet transformation in how each of us receives, interprets and shares information.

Search engines organize our information. Social media channels figure out how to grab and keep our attention. Large language models now shape our interpretation.

The first two layers concentrated power. The LLM layer, by contrast, is decentralizing along political, cultural and commercial lines.

Almost overnight, LLMs have become the front door to knowledge. Increasingly, they do not simply retrieve information; they interpret it for us. We consult them as experts, rely on them as filters for decision-making, and use them to help make sense of our world. In the process, we are outsourcing judgement to machines we have never met and never will.

This should not surprise us. Humans naturally apply social rules and expectations to computers – a phenomenon described by Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass in their “Computers are Social Actors” (CASA) framework in The Media Equation (1996). If a machine can communicate fluently, express emotion and simulate empathy, our social instincts engage almost automatically. That tendency will become far more consequential as LLMs continue to evolve.

Fragmentation — many models, many worldviews

Every LLM embeds assumptions.The key question for any model is not whether it is biased. It is “what are its biases and how transparent are they?” Each LLM can embed its own historical framing, level of censorship, moral assumptions, geopolitical narratives and definitions of what is acceptable. There is no globally accepted governance framework that consistently defines these boundaries across models. Rather, it can be different for each LLM today.

This challenge becomes even more complex across languages.Biases in Hindi, Mandarin, Arabic, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia, Russian and Spanish may receive far less international scrutiny than English-language outputs.The world may therefore experience not one AI ecosystem, but several competing cognitive ecosystems.

Fragmentation and Sovereign AI

A major structural shift underway is the rise of sovereign AI.

Countries increasingly want domestic models, local compute infrastructure, regulatory control, cultural alignment, and strategic independence.

China already operates a distinct AI sphere through systems such as DeepSeek, Qwen, ERNIE, and Hunyuan. India is pursuing Sarvam and Indus. France backs Mistral.Canada’s Cohere and Germany’s Aleph Alpha are in a planned merger to create a transatlantic sovereign AI vendor. UAE has Falcon and Jais through TII and G42. Singapore’s AI Singapore program backs SEA-LION, a national open-source LLM family. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund backs HUMAIN, a sovereign AI company focused on Arabic-language models.

It is logical that each of these LLMs will be influenced by language, regulation, compute access, procurement ecosystems, and cognitive alignment.

Open-weight models and asymmetric power

Another major development is the rapid spread of open-weight models.Techniques such as Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) allow organizations or individuals to fine-tune powerful models cheaply and quickly. Models can be modified for specialized capability, ideological alignment, style adaptation, or the removal of alignment and safety constraints.

Many open-weight ecosystems contain uncensored variants, often available on platforms, such as Hugging Face, a central hub for open-source AI models. This creates a strategic asymmetry. Advanced AI capabilities are no longer confined to major state actors or frontier labs. Adversaries, extremist groups, criminal organizations and foreign influence operations increasingly have access to highly capable systems.

The Rise of Agentic Systems

While the world fragments into competing models, a second transformation is changing what those models actually do. Today, we still think about AI as chatbots, but that framing is already becoming outdated. LLMs are evolving into agentic systems that call APIs, execute code, coordinate workflows, verify outputs, and operate semi-autonomously. In practical terms, agents will book the travel, draft the contract, monitor the competitor, screen the resumes, reconcile the invoices, prepare the briefing and flag what changed overnight — often calling other agents along the way.

Within five years, much of the information arriving at our desks will likely have been gathered, filtered and summarized by an agent before we read a word of it.The interface shifts from “asking questions” to “delegating objectives.” In this sense, the LLM itself disappears into the background — much like relational databases disappeared into modern computing infrastructure.

The Battle Over Cognitive Infrastructure

Put these two forces together and the picture changes for every leader, every citizen, every reader.

How we receive information. Each of us will increasingly see the world through whichever LLM sits between us and it. That model carries its own training data, its own guardrails, its own omissions. Two colleagues asking the same question of two different systems may get two materially different answers — and neither will know what was left out.

How we interpret information. Agents will not deliver raw material. They will deliver conclusions, summaries, and recommendations. The intermediate steps — the sources weighed, the alternatives discarded — will happen out of sight. We will be tempted to accept what arrives, because the cost of checking will be high and the appearance of competence will be persuasive.

How we share information. Increasingly, the message I send is drafted by my agent and read by yours. Provenance gets murky. Tone gets averaged. Persuasion runs through systems neither of us fully controls. Citizens can gradually lose trust in institutions, experts and media altogether – and societies with weakened shared trust become far more vulnerable to manipulation, polarization and coercion.

For intelligence services, this represents a shift in who controls the collection, preprocessing and interpretation layers that sit between raw data and national-level judgement.

What this asks of us

The United States currently retains major advantages (frontier research, semiconductor ecosystems, hyperscale cloud infrastructure, venture capital, and global platform reach), but the strategic environment is changing quickly. American developers increasingly use Chinese open-weight models because of cost-performance advantages. Open-weight models are publicly available, allowing anyone to run, modify, fine-tune or adapt them to their liking. The visible layer of perhaps dozens of major frontier models understates the true landscape. The real surface area lies in the derivatives, adapters and localized systems proliferating worldwide. The battle over AI and LLMs is not simply about economic advantage or technology leadership. It is about who will shape the cognitive architecture through which billions of people understand truth, authority, identity and reality.

The defining question of the next decade may be “Which system do we collectively trust — and what do we still insist on judging for ourselves”. Because whichever systems mediate knowledge, memory, interpretation, persuasion, and trust will increasingly shape the operating system of human society itself. The good news is the infrastructure is being built, the rules and guidelines are yet to be formalized, governance is an emerging topic and major consolidation has not yet taken place. Our future depends on who preserves human judgement, freedom and trust as our world is transformed by technological advance.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 30 May 2026 17:49:07 +0100 FirstHandNews
Remembering the Americans Who Made Ukraine’s War Their Own https://belimedia.com.ng/remembering-the-americans-who-made-ukraines-war-their-own https://belimedia.com.ng/remembering-the-americans-who-made-ukraines-war-their-own

This Memorial Day, The Cipher Brief is remembering the Americans who answered the call after Russia launched its unprovoked, deadly invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. What follows is a deeply personal account of the war through the eyes of two Americans who have lived it. This piece was written by Dr. Douglas Davis in cooperation with Colonel Sam Hartwell (Ret.).

PERSPECTIVE / OPINION – I did not set out to become someone who counts or names the dead. But years of working in Ukraine have a way of reorienting what you thought your life was all about. Our families have a high price dating back to 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea and uprising in the Donbas.

My wife’s 25-year-old cousin, Mykola Zabavchuk, was killed while serving as a sniper near Bakhmut in the first summer of Russia’s invasion. We visit his grave and the memorial bearing his posthumous Order of Courage medal from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky every time we’re in Lviv. It changes you and keeps a solemn perspective on those who are fighting for their freedom.

But the reality is that the loss of Ukrainian lives is tragic but understood, even expected, in the cold calculus of this war. But that’s not the whole story. What we find most difficult to reconcile is this: America says it is not at war in Ukraine - and officially that’s true - yet some of America’s most experienced warriors cannot ignore the call to defend freedom and have volunteered to fight and die there. Very few outside their military community are talking about it.

My collaborator for this article, Sam Hartwell is a West Point graduate and former U.S. Army intelligence officer who has spent much of the past three decades living and working in Ukraine. He knows what I am talking about better than most. He lost one of his closest friends, Mark Paslawsky, a West Point classmate and former 82nd Airborne Division artillery officer on August 19, 2014, in Donbas.

Paslawsky was the first American killed in Russia’s war on Ukraine at the Battle of Ilovaisk. He was posthumously awarded the Order of Danylo Halytsky by then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. Sam now lives in his friend's former apartment in Kyiv, not far from a memorial wall that bears Mark’s portrait. Sam does not talk about this often. That restraint is itself, a kind of testimony.

As a global health physician, I came to this story through a different door than Sam did. My medical work in Ukraine brought me into close contact with a remarkable and unlikely community: American veterans who came to Ukraine not under orders, not under contract, but under conscience. Many applied the lessons learned in war and national security to fight for freedom alongside Ukrainian brothers and sisters in arms. Others came principally to support humanitarian causes.

Crisis of Conscience

I had the honor of serving on the board of one such humanitarian group, Mountain Seed Foundation, alongside its founder, Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Schmidt, USMC ret., and Navy SEAL Lieutenant Commander Dan Cnossen, USN ret., two Naval Academy classmates whose service in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively, left marks that never fully heal.

Nathan's wounds are the kind that don't show up in physical exams. He came home carrying the weight and burden of friends and colleagues who were lost both above and below his command, and he built something redemptive from that grief.

Dan's injuries were immediate and visible: both of his legs were taken above the knee by an IED during combat operations. He went on to become one of the most decorated American Winter Paralympians of his generation.

Two different kinds of loss. Two extraordinary responses to it.

Together we have climbed mountains in the Austrian Alps and the Carpathians of Ukraine with Ukrainian veterans and their families, part of a healing process that I will admit freely, has been as transformative for me as for anyone on those steep slopes and ledges. Nathan and Dan are two of the finest human beings I have encountered in my life, and they represent something larger: the remarkable community of similarly extraordinary American veterans who have quietly extended their service into the humanitarian domain long after their official obligations ended.

"Kaprun, Austria at the Mooserboden Dam in Hohe Tauern National Park in Summer 2023. Mountain Seed Foundation ‘climbing to heal’ alongside veterans and Ukrainian Gold Star families in the Austrian Alps. Pictured (left to right): Volunteer Courtney Brilliant, Davis, Lt Commander Dan Cnossen, Lt Colonel Nathan Schmidt, Dr. Davis, MSF co-founder Iryna Prykhodko." Photo provided by Dr. Davis.

"Kaprun, Austria at the Mooserboden Dam in Hohe Tauern National Park in Summer 2023. Mountain Seed Foundation ‘climbing to heal’ alongside veterans and Ukrainian Gold Star families in the Austrian Alps. Pictured (left to right): Volunteer Courtney Brilliant, Davis, Lt Commander Dan Cnossen, Lt Colonel Nathan Schmidt, Dr. Davis, MSF co-founder Iryna Prykhodko."

I have also encountered American warfighters who, like Sam’s friend Mark, resolved their crisis of conscience over this war by making it their own. Individuals like Bryan Pickens, a twenty-year Special Forces (SF) veteran, left retirement not for a contractor's paycheck but to volunteer to lead a combat and drone team of former US. .Special Operations Forces (SOF) operating in active fighting and training. With Russian language skills and extensive combat experience, Bryan first came to Ukraine in 2019 while still in uniform as an official adviser with U.S. Army Special Forces. He later retired and returned to Ukraine in 2022 as a volunteer. He has not looked back.

The men around him are cut from the same cloth. Xen is an accomplished Navy SEAL veteran, sniper and Ukraine drone pilot who brings to this fight the quiet, fierce conviction that defines the best of that community. Bryan, Xen, and others from their circle first came into my life to provide security for me and my colleagues when our humanitarian work brought us into proximity to the front lines. That practical necessity became something else over time. The relationships deepened into a kind of mutual mentorship, each of us coming to understand this war through the other's eyes, and my admiration for all of them has only grown. We have since written and spoken publicly together trying to convey the urgency of what is happening and to close the gaps in understanding that still persist in Washington and beyond.

Joshua Ransford, a former U.S. Marine and another member of Bryan's team, traces a similar arc. He has been working in Ukraine since early 2022, starting as infantry, reconnaissance, and a sniper before evolving into drone operations as the battlefield transformed into an environment where unmanned systems became decisive. He has led counter-electronic warfare and security for our medical teams, including in situations where we found ourselves amid active drone and missile strikes.

What he, Bryan, Xen and others have taught me about the realities of modern war - far beyond anything the medical spectrum captures - is profound. I may never find the right forum to share all of it. But this account of what’s really happening would not exist without Joshua and the other veteran combatants who have trusted me with what they know. As the conflict with Iran has made clear, the lessons carried by this community are not abstractions. They are operational intelligence that the United States cannot afford to ignore.

The Cost of Showing Up

First of all, let me be clear about what these veterans are and what they are not. They are not mercenaries. They are not reckless adventurers seeking a second act or a story to tell. They are among the most disciplined, experienced, and morally serious people I have ever known, and the war has not made them harder so much as it has made them more clear on the realities that exist. They did not ask to be named or recognized. Those whom Sam and I identify in this account acquiesced to sharing their stories only after persuasion that sharing serves a larger cause. They are unsung American heroes operating in Ukraine as often unpaid, largely unsupported volunteers, at enormous personal risk and at real cost to their lives back home.

That last point deserves a moment of reflection. Veteran volunteers like Bryan Pickens have had to periodically leave Ukraine entirely, return stateside, and take contract work simply to finance their ability to go back. The war does not pause while they earn the money to fight it as volunteers. Nor do their mortgages and other obligations at home.

Incidentally, some readers may recognize Bryan in a different context: he served as a military adviser and a role player alongside Sean Penn in the Oscar-winning film One Battle After Another.

The title is unintentionally poetic. Bryan moves back and forth between that work stateside and a calling that keeps pulling him back to the Ukrainian front. I learned this only after the film debuted, from Bryan's teammates — because self-promotion is not in his DNA, almost to a fault. That is the reality for many of these veterans. Little to no salary. No benefits. No official recognition. Just the conviction that the work matters and the discipline to keep showing up for it. One. Battle. After. Another.

That is no small thing. In a moment when official policy has struggled to match the clarity of the moral stakes, these individuals have provided their own answer. For too many of them, that answer has been written in blood, and paid for with their lives.

In February of 2023, Pete Reed, a former U.S. Marine and seasoned humanitarian worker, was killed in Bakhmut. The New York Times documented his death in detail, as it was caught on film. I knew Pete through the overlapping networks of American volunteers and veterans working in Ukraine, and I arrived in Lviv for one of my early trips of this war on the very day he died. His loss hit his community hard. What the coverage captured was the human cost. What it did not fully capture was an emerging pattern.

Detecting a Quiet Pattern

I began to see that pattern first through Pete, and more so later as I became drawn into the care coordination of several international veterans wounded in Ukraine. Among them was an American Marine veteran named Cristiano Zeledon, who was working in a humanitarian capacity when he was severely wounded in a missile strike on a pizzeria in Kramatorsk in June 2023. That same strike killed several other aid workers, including the celebrated Ukrainian writer and war crimes researcher Victoria Amelina, whose death drew significant international attention and outrage. It also killed American veteran Ian Tortorici, who had been serving in combat with the Ukrainian International Legion.

What the coverage at the time did not report, and what was suggested to those of us working in these networks afterward, is this: a Russian intelligence asset had been monitoring not just the foreign aid workers who were killed in that pizzeria, but specifically, American veterans and they called in the strike to kill them. If true, then this was not just a random act of war. It was a targeted assassination of Americans on foreign soil, planned and executed opportunistically by Russian intelligence.

The attack barely registered in the West, in part because the public visibility of American involvement in Ukraine was being carefully managed as Washington sought to avoid any appearance of escalation. One can also blame the saturated news cycle, which moves rapidly from one atrocity to the next, leaving yesterday's events forgotten before they are fully understood.

It should have registered. Because that strike was not an isolated incident. It was another data point in a pattern the American public has not yet been compelled to reckon with. People like Bryan Pickens and his community helped me see it more clearly and soberly.

Rocki, Tiny & Sandy

That pattern is perhaps best exemplified by retired U.S. Marine First Sergeant Corey Nawrocki, widely recognized as one of the most decorated Americans killed while defending Ukraine. Nawrocki, known as "Rocki" was operating alongside other American veterans when he died in October 2024.

I met an experienced combat operator and medic who goes by the callsign "Tiny” at a medical conference in Kyiv, where his frontline experience helped shape our discussions on the evolving realities of combat casualty care. He later shared the details of Corey's death on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

Tiny was the primary medic on the mission. When the team crossed into Bryansk, Russia on a sabotage and reconnaissance operation under the direction of Ukrainian Military Intelligence, they encountered a large Russian force. In the firefight that ensued, Tiny was treating a teammate with a gunshot wound to the head when he himself was wounded and evacuated by ATV to a hospital in Semenivka, Ukraine. Corey died courageously and selflessly under heavy fire while attempting to rescue another wounded teammate. The details of his final hours that Tiny shared with me remain among the most sobering things I have encountered in years of working in this war. Tiny shared the account of the battle and of Corey's final moments, which has been corroborated by recordings and testimony from other teammates. I am haunted by what he showed me.

Corey approaches a Russian position during a raid into Bryansk Oblast, Russia. Photos provided by Sandy Nawrocki with permission to publish.


Corey and teammate during a raid into Bryansk Oblast, Russia. Photos provided by Sandy Nawrocki with permission to publish.


Corey Nawrocki, during the raid into Bryansk Oblast, Russia, one of the last images of him alive. Nawrocki, a U.S. Marine Corps veteran and two-time Purple Heart recipient, was killed on October 27, 2024, during the operation while attempting to rescue a wounded teammate. Photos provided by Sandy Nawrocki with permission to use.

But death was not the end of it. Indignity followed. Russian soldiers stood over Nawrocki's body, displayed his military ID, and broadcast the image to the world. A distinguished Marine Corps veteran, reduced to a trophy. His identity paraded before a global audience while his family was still learning what had happened. And it did not stop there.

Following his death, Corey’s mother, Sandy Nawrocki, says she was the target of a deliberate digital campaign of cruelty. In a CNN interview, she described being targeted online after Corey’s death, saying trolls posted a picture of her home and her full address, and in an act that can only be described as calculated brutality, posted smiling emojis on social media posts about Corey. Sandy has also spoken publicly, including at a Congressional Ukraine Caucus press conference, about her son’s sacrifice and the broader toll on American families whose loved ones have fought for Ukraine.

The haunting we already felt only intensified after conversations with Sandy, who faced not only the unimaginable grief of losing her son and the torment of a malicious Russian campaign against her, but a separate and frustrating battle to bring Corey’s body home and secure him a military burial at Arlington National Cemetery. That is a struggle that never should have happened. It tells you something important about how this country has chosen to account for its sons in Ukraine's war. But stories like these have barely registered in the American news cycle.

Corey was killed alongside three other international volunteers: U.S. veteran Bradley Jennison, known as “Super Dave,” Canadian Mandeep Singh, known as "Poet," and Swedish volunteer Simon Rajakisto, known as "Rauta." These were men who showed up to fight for what they believed in, an ad hoc coalition of Western veterans operating without formal government acknowledgment or protection. That is what makes the repatriation difficult and the propaganda exploitation of their bodies so damning.

Corey's name appears on no official list of American soldier casualties in Ukraine. America has no such list for a war it is not officially fighting. Corey is, in the ledger of this conflict, ambiguous — if not invisible. That ledger is difficult to reconcile, and the numbers we can piece together paint a sobering picture, even if they remain only an approximation of the truth.

The Invisible Ledger

Since February 2022, the United States has officially lost no active-duty service members in Ukraine. That is technically true. What it obscures is something that those of us working on the ground have understood for years: a significant number of America's most elite veterans, including Special Forces, SOF, and similar warfighters, have gone to Ukraine as civilians and have not come home. The New York Times reported at least 92 American veterans killed in action in Ukraine as of September 2025, but many within the community believe the true number is much higher. Online (and unofficial) estimates suggest elite American veteran deaths since 2022 fall somewhere between 100 and 150, and possibly more. No official U.S. entity is keeping count. Because none of them were officially there.

To put that figure in context: the total number of U.S. Special Operators killed across the entire two-decade global war on terror is reported in the low 600s . If current estimates from Ukraine are even close to accurate, the annual rate of loss among American SOF veterans in Ukraine is near or exceeds the per-year casualty rate of the entire war on terror. Read that again. In a war the United States is officially not fighting, America’s top war fighters are dying at a pace that rivals the wars we were officially fighting up to our withdrawal from Afghanistan. And if you were to include veterans coming from other NATO-aligned countries, the numbers increase considerably.

To be clear, this is not a comparison between the war on terror and the war in Ukraine. These are fundamentally different conflicts across every meaningful dimension: geography, doctrine, technology, and geopolitical stakes. Nor is it a comparison between special operators and conventional warfighters. The point is not equivalence. The point is scale, motivation, and the character of the men and women who are making the sacrifice.

A Verdict, Not an Accident

These are not green volunteers swept up in idealism. These are the most capable, most experienced, most thoroughly trained fighters the United States and NATO has ever produced. They have seen war up close. They understand the odds. They are making a deliberate choice, with no orders, little to no salary, no benefits, no official recognition, and no government waiting to bring their bodies home, to put themselves in the line of fire for a country that is not theirs. That choice deserves to be known and understood by the American public.

But the reality is that the American military and political establishment has largely looked away from this reality, partly for legal and diplomatic reasons, partly because acknowledging it complicates the official narrative of non-involvement, and partly because the men and women doing this work are by training and temperament, disinclined to seek attention. They are called quiet professionals for a reason. They do not hold press conferences. They do not post on social media except to the extent necessary to support their volunteering. They go, they fight, they bleed, and when they do not come back, their families grieve privately while Washington issues no statements. And the American public, by and large, has little to no idea they were ever there.

Sam Hartwell lives inside that grief.

He walks past his friend's portrait almost daily. He understands in a way that no policy paper can convey, what it means that America's best are choosing Ukraine. It is not a coincidence or an accident of individual temperament. It’s a verdict.

Sam’s grief is compounded by a particular sorrow that comes not just from personal loss but from watching something he believed in turn away from itself. For soldiers of his generation, witnessing America step back from the principles that have anchored the rules-based international order for nearly a century is professionally and personally devastating in ways that resist easy description. Yet the men we write about here did not abandon those ideals. They did not wait for permission or policy to catch up with their conscience. That is why they came. That is why they stayed.

These veterans have lived and studied warfare and geopolitics at the highest levels. They have operated in every major theater of conflict of the past two to three decades. They have seen what American power can do and what happens when it retreats. They have looked at what is happening in Ukraine with clear eyes and concluded that the stakes are worth dying for. They recognize what a Russian victory would mean for the security architecture of Europe and the world. They understand what it would do to the credibility and readiness of American power at a moment when that credibility is already under strain. They know that the strategic center of gravity for this century is China, and that pressing demands in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East complicate the math — but that the thread running through this era of great power competition also runs directly through Ukraine. And they understand what hangs in the balance for the rules-based international order that American blood and treasure built across the last century and that is now, for the first time in a generation, genuinely at risk of unraveling.

They are voting with their lives. The least the rest of us can do is count the votes honestly.

The quiet professionals ask for almost nothing except our support. They do not ask to be called heroes, though they are. But the story of what they have given, and what they continue to give, in a war that Washington officially says does not involve American casualties, is one the American people deserve to know. Not to inflame. Not to escalate. But to reckon honestly with what is being sacrificed, by whom, and why.

Pete Reed knew why. Ian Tortoricci knew why. Corey Nawrocki knew why. Sam’s friend Mark Paslawsky knew why. So does every American volunteer in Ukraine, whether they fight or support those fighting for Ukraine's freedom and Ukraine's very existence. So does every name on the memorial wall in Kyiv, and on walls like them across the country. Memorials that most Americans will never see. They all answered the question of why – not with words, but with action.

Eyes Wide Open

The question that remains is what to do with this story. Sam and I make no claim that this account is comprehensive. It is not. Others may interpret what we have described differently than we do. But it is a beginning, a handful of names and stories pulled from a much larger ledger that our country has not yet fully reconciled. We offer them here because they deserve to be named, because the silence around them is not neutral, and because meaningful dialogue, honest reckoning, and sound policy can only follow from what we are first willing to see. And that begins with eyes wide open.

Honoring the fallen is not optional. But to honor them without learning what they learned would be a compounding tragedy.

The lessons carried home from Ukraine by some of our most elite veteran volunteers, written in blood on a battlefield that has become the proving ground for modern warfare, are directly applicable to active duty service members in other theaters of conflict and to the new and emerging threats facing our homeland defenders. It would be a disgrace to leave them unexamined.

Ukraine is doing its part to honor and memorialize the foreign veterans who have fallen on its soil. My friend Vitali Ostapchuk, a retired Ukrainian Military Intelligence officer, has dedicated himself almost entirely to this mission. In addition to memorial walls and other honors for international veteran volunteers across the country, Vitali is working to establish a national memorial to fallen American veterans and other international volunteers in Bucha, not far from the mass grave site marking the Russian massacres that were carried out in the early weeks of Moscow’s full-scale invasion. Sam and I fully support Vitali and his colleagues in this endeavor. I have visited Bucha many times to honor Ukraine’s dead. I will have even more reason to return now to honor our own. Sam and I have suggested that they call the memorial "The Quiet Professionals."

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
Moscow and Beijing’s shadow war: How Russia and China are keeping Iran lethal https://belimedia.com.ng/moscow-and-beijings-shadow-war-how-russia-and-china-are-keeping-iran-lethal https://belimedia.com.ng/moscow-and-beijings-shadow-war-how-russia-and-china-are-keeping-iran-lethal

The ceasefire between the United States and Iran is barely holding. Pakistani mediators are still shuttling between capitals, fighting has flared in recent days, and President Trump is now sitting across from Xi Jinping in Beijing for a high-stakes summit covering trade, Iran, and Taiwan.

Yet American intelligence has reached a different conclusion about what Beijing is actually doing: China is preparing to move man-portable air-defense systems, MANPADs, to Iran through third-country cutouts, according to CNN, which cited three sources familiar with recent intelligence assessments. The shipments would reach Tehran while Beijing holds itself out as the party that helped stop the war.

The CCP, however, is deliberately doing both things at once.

The intelligence indicates Iran may be using the ceasefire as an opportunity to replenish weapons systems with the help of key foreign partners, with indications that Beijing is working to route the shipments through third countries to mask their true origin. The MANPADs in question are shoulder-fired, infrared-guided missiles — systems that require little infrastructure, minimal operator training, and can be concealed inside civilian vehicles, urban terrain, or dispersed military positions.

On April 3, an American F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran by a shoulder-fired heat-seeking missile — a fact Trump later confirmed publicly, saying the Iranians “got lucky.” Whether that system was Chinese-manufactured remains unconfirmed; Iran also produces its own Misagh MANPAD series, reverse-engineered copies of Chinese QW-series designs, meaning the Chinese origin of any given shoulder-fired missile over Iranian airspace may never be definitively established.

What is confirmed is that Tehran noticed what worked, and Beijing appears to be resupplying accordingly.

“The sending of MANPADs to Iran would represent an escalation in Chinese assistance, moving beyond traditionally supplying spare parts to Iran’s missile and drone program to the transfer of actual complete weapons systems,” Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, tells The Cipher Brief.

Neither Russia nor China fired a shot against American forces. They didn’t need to. For years, Moscow and Beijing have quietly supplied Tehran with the intelligence, technology, and weapons components needed to keep Iran capable of threatening United States forces — before wars start. At the same time, they’re being fought, and during the ceasefires in between. The pause in fighting did not stop that effort. It created cover for the next round.

Russia’s contribution: orbits and operational intelligence

Beyond diplomacy, Russia provided Iran with intelligence to aid strikes against United States forces in the region. According to reporting by the Washington Post, Moscow shared the locations of United States warships, aircraft, and radar systems with Tehran during the opening days of the conflict — what one official described as a “pretty comprehensive effort.”

The Wall Street Journal reported that the assistance went beyond location data: Russia was also feeding Iran satellite imagery from its Aerospace Forces, giving Tehran a clearer picture of what its strikes had hit and what to aim at next.

The results were visible in the strike patterns themselves. Meanwhile, satellite imagery found that at least 228 structures or pieces of equipment were hit at United States military sites across the Middle East, with radar installations, communications facilities, and air defense equipment among the most heavily targeted — a level of precision that exceeded Iranian strike patterns in the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025.

That precision has a signature. Iran had spent years supplying Russia with Shahed drones for use against Ukraine; Moscow was now returning the knowledge investment with interest. Russia shared battlefield lessons from its drone war in Ukraine with Iran, including guidance on strike altitudes and how many drones to deploy in a single wave — drone swarms used to overwhelm radar, followed by precision missile strikes against command-and-control nodes. Moreover, Iranian strike patterns in the Gulf increasingly resembled Russian tactics honed in Ukraine.

Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, tells The Cipher Brief that Russian and Chinese assistance is a direct reason for Iran’s improved targeting between June 2025 and the most recent conflict.

“However, the United States provided similar intelligence to Ukraine, so it is hard for the Trump administration to push back,” she explains.

The groundwork Russia laid before the first shot was fired made the intelligence-sharing during the war far more lethal. Russia built and launched the Khayyam satellite in August 2022, a Kanopus-V Earth-observation platform with a resolution of 1.2 meters, giving Tehran the ability to conduct near-continuous surveillance of specific United States and Israeli military facilities.

S-400 air defense components began arriving in Iran from Russia in 2024, with at least one battery deployed near Isfahan. Years earlier, Moscow had also delivered the Rezonans-NE, an over-the-horizon radar that can track stealth aircraft and ballistic missiles out beyond 400 miles.

What greeted United States and Israeli aircraft over Iran in February 2026 was not purely Iranian. The detection infrastructure had Russian fingerprints on it — years of deliberate investment in Tehran’s ability to see and track what was coming.

China’s fingerprints: navigation, components, and the dual-use pipeline

What China offered Iran wasn’t firepower. It was independence. Folding Tehran into BeiDou — Beijing’s military-grade satellite navigation system — meant Iran’s drones and missiles no longer depended on GPS signals that the United States and Israel had already demonstrated they could disrupt. During the June 2025 twelve-day war, Israeli jamming knocked out Iranian GPS-guided weapons almost immediately.

By the fourth day, Iran had shifted its drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic weapons onto BeiDou-3, and the jamming stopped working. The system’s encrypted military signals, defense analysts say, are essentially unjammable.

The dual-use component pipeline ran deeper still. In February 2025, the United States Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese front companies supplying gyro navigation devices to enhance Iranian-made UAVs. In November 2025, a separate network connected to Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company was accused of using shell firms to acquire Chinese sensors and navigation equipment. Since China gave Iran access to BeiDou in 2021, Tehran has also used the system to produce decoy signals to confuse threat analysis and conceal actual Iranian military movements.

There is a pattern worth noting in how Chinese dual-use exports to Iran have moved. They rose after Trump signed a maximum pressure memorandum on Iran in early 2025. They rose again after the United States strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025. Beijing has not acted despite American escalation. It has acted because of it.

Multiple sanctioned Iranian ships believed to be carrying sodium perchlorate, a precursor material for solid-propellant rockets, have traveled from China to Iran since the war began. Shanghai-based MizarVision — which holds a Chinese National Military Standard certificate and, like all Chinese companies, operates under Beijing’s national security law — systematically published AI-enhanced satellite imagery of United States military movements throughout the conflict, including carrier strike groups and F-22 positions at regional bases.

There is a pattern worth noting in how Chinese dual-use exports to Iran have moved. They rose after Trump signed a maximum pressure memorandum on Iran in early 2025. They rose again after the United States strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025. Beijing has not acted despite American escalation. It has acted because of it.

Iranian strikes later hit a number of the sites MizarVision flagged. Jing’an Technology was doing much the same. For Beijing, the arrangement was convenient — private firms, at least on paper, doing work the Chinese government could disavow.

Washington also accused SMIC, China’s largest chipmaker, of supplying chipmaking tools and technical training to Iran’s military industrial complex, beginning roughly a year before the war. Beijing denied each allegation in sequence.

The reconstitution problem

The deeper strategic problem is not what Russia and China did during the war. It is what they are positioning to do after it.

After suffering major battlefield losses during the October 2024 Israeli campaign and the June 2025 twelve-day war, Iran was able to rapidly reconstitute key elements of its missile and military infrastructure with external support — restoring its ability to threaten the United States and its regional allies in a matter of months. The pattern repeated itself after February 2026. The ceasefire may have halted the kinetics, but it did not halt the resupply.

MANPADs fit the reconstitution requirement precisely — lightweight, dispersible, and effective against the low-flying aircraft that United States and Israeli forces would rely on in any renewed campaign.

Not everyone thinks sanctions were ever the right tool here.

“This is not new,” Kavanagh notes. “China provided Iran with new weapons and air defense systems after the 12-day war and has assisted Iran’s military in other ways for years.”

Sanctions, meanwhile, are losing their bite. “Sanctions and export controls slow reconstruction as they temporarily disrupt procurement networks,” Brodsky says, “but the challenge is the Iranian regime has been adept at establishing new workarounds and evasion mechanisms — sometimes faster than the United States government can dismantle them.”

“U.S. sanctions have begun to lose their effect,” Kavanagh says. “China and Russia have proven adept at avoiding them and are willing to ignore them. Sanctions won’t prevent Iran from rearming.”

Defense analyst John Wood tells The Cipher Brief that the physical resupply is already moving. During the ceasefire, he says, Russia has been pushing assets across the Caspian Sea while China has been using overland rail routes to do the same — a coordinated, parallel effort to rebuild Iranian capacity before any renewed hostilities. “The objective is obvious,” he says. “Bleed the United States and Europe economically and militarily.”

Asked about the MANPAD intelligence on April 12 as he left the White House, Trump issued a terse warning: “If China does that, China will have big problems.” Whether that threat lands before the shipment does remains the operative question — particularly given that the joint statement from the Beijing summit includes agreement that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon and that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open, but contains no explicit commitment from Xi on weapons transfers to Tehran.

Beijing’s leverage over Washington is not limited to the battlefield. The late October 2025 exchange in South Korea, Washington's suspension of the Bureau of Industry and Security Affiliates Rule, and Beijing's pause on rare-earth export controls were a pointed illustration of how much the United States’ defense industrial base depends on materials that China controls and can restrict at will.

It holds cards over Tehran’s survival. And it is playing both — publicly mediating while quietly rearming, letting Russia absorb the harder accusations while preserving its own deniability.

Both Moscow and Beijing share a structural interest in the outcome, even if their calculus differs.

“Beijing and Moscow are happy to watch the United States waste its military power in the Middle East,” Kavanagh says, “but both also suffer costs from the war. For Beijing, higher energy prices and the precedent created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are worrisome even if they are glad to see Washington entangled in the Middle East.”

Both, she argues, would like to see the war end, but on terms favorable to Iran. Brodsky puts the longer-term stakes more plainly.

“If the United States meaningfully erodes the Iranian regime’s capability to project power beyond its borders, that actually harms Russia and China in the long run — as they now have a weakened partner.”

Neither Moscow nor Beijing wants an Iranian collapse that would invite American consolidation across the region. What they want is a Tehran that survives, reconstitutes, and keeps Washington consumed. The ceasefire is not the end of the strategy. For both powers, it is the condition under which the next phase begins.

“The longer the war goes on, the more it works to China’s advantage,” Wood says. “And raises the likelihood of a Taiwan blockade.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
Intelligence at the Speed of Relevance: Rethinking the Intelligence Cycle for the AI Era https://belimedia.com.ng/intelligence-at-the-speed-of-relevance-rethinking-the-intelligence-cycle-for-the-ai-era https://belimedia.com.ng/intelligence-at-the-speed-of-relevance-rethinking-the-intelligence-cycle-for-the-ai-era OPINION — There’s a profound assumption embedded in much of today’s conversation about AI and intelligence: better technology will solve our core problems. We need new infrastructure, better models, and faster processing—all tied to our unique data.

But step inside most intelligence workflows and a different reality emerges.

We are not constrained by what we can collect. We are constrained by what we can prioritize, interpret, and act on in time to matter.

The System Was Built for a Different Problem

The modern intelligence system was designed for a world defined by scarcity. Collection was difficult. Access was limited. Processing was slow. The intelligence cycle—collection, processing, analysis, dissemination—reflected those constraints. It imposed structure, discipline, and rigor on a problem set where information was hard to come by. That system worked because it matched the environment but the environment has changed.

Today, across open sources, commercial capabilities, and traditional collection, we operate in a world of persistent access and expanding data. AI is accelerating that shift, enabling faster processing, broader pattern recognition, and near-instantaneous assessments.

And yet, the underlying system—the way we task, integrate, evaluate, and deliver intelligence—has not fundamentally adapted.

The Constraint Has Moved

Much of the current focus remains on improving inputs: faster infrastructure, better models, more data. These are necessary but insufficient.

The constraint is no longer what we can collect or even what we can analyze. It is how effectively we prioritize what matters, integrate signals across sources, apply judgment at speed, and connect insight to decision in time to matter

In short, the constraint has moved from capability to tradecraft.

AI Is Compressing the Cycle—But Only at the Edges

AI is already changing parts of the intelligence workflow. Signals and geospatial intelligence processing that once took hours can now happen in minutes. Pattern recognition is functionally limitless and immediate. The era of the needle in the haystack is over. Draft assessments can be generated in seconds.

These capabilities are real but have not been fully implemented—nor can they be because the system still operates sequentially. Tasking decisions remain episodic; data integration is still a manual fight; and validation and coordination follow legacy timelines.

The result is a growing mismatch between what technology enables and what the system can absorb. We are accelerating pieces of the intelligence cycle without redesigning the cycle itself.

Tradecraft, Not Technology, Is Now the Limiting Factor

This is the call to action that will define the American Intelligence Community’s success in the next decade. If intelligence continues to operate as a linear process optimized for scarcity, then adding speed and scale at individual stages will produce diminishing returns.

The harder problem—and the more important one—is rethinking how intelligence is done:

  • How do we move from periodic tasking to dynamic prioritization?
  • How do we integrate AI into workflows as a default starting point, not an add-on?
  • How do we preserve rigor while operating at machine speed?
  • How do we ensure intelligence is informing faster, more diffuse, policy?

The Most Important Shift—Flattening the Intelligence Cycle.

The intelligence cycle was designed as a sequence: tasking, collection, processing, analysis, dissemination. Each step informs the next. Each stage has ownership. Each handoff introduces control—and delays.

This structure makes less sense today because collection is persistent, data is abundant, and processing is near-instantaneous. More importantly, policymaking is now dynamic—minute by minute—not defined by a once-a-day President’s Daily Brief and not constrained to the Oval Office.

How can we reimagine the intelligence cycle to account for these realities?

Let’s start by leveraging the real world and admitting that this change is not as radical as it sounds. During fast-moving crises, analysts often bypass formal cycles—pulling from multiple sources in real time, integrating signals as they arrive, and engaging directly with policymakers in an ongoing dialogue rather than through finished products.

For example, we did this out of necessity for counterterrorism operations over the last 25 years. Intelligence and operations were increasingly fused out of necessity. Collection and analysis informed action in near real time, and action reshaped collection and analysis priorities just as quickly. The formal cycle existed—but it was not how the work happened. Counterterrorism operational tradecraft set a model for where the system is heading.

The traditional cycle moves information through stages. The flattened cycle moves decisions through a system. The difference is subtle but profound.

In a flattened intelligence cycle:

  • Collection and analysis are intertwined. Some of the best analysts I know were case officers serving in the field.
  • Processing is not a step. It is largely automated with humans on the loop.
  • Dissemination is not an endpoint—it is an iterative relationship with policymakers.

Flattening the intelligence cycle does not mean abandoning rigor or structure. It means redesigning the system to move at the speed of the real world, automating rote tasks, and putting our nation's best and brightest minds on the hardest truly-human tasks.

What Comes Next

This is the first in a series examining how emerging technology—particularly AI—is reshaping the intelligence system in practice.

In my following posts, I’ll focus on where this tension is most visible today, especially in collection and analysis.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Limits of Human Oversight at Machine Speed https://belimedia.com.ng/the-limits-of-human-oversight-at-machine-speed https://belimedia.com.ng/the-limits-of-human-oversight-at-machine-speed OPINION — Warfare has always operated at human speed, but we now have the capability to operate at machine speed. The risks are high, but so are the risks of failing to adapt. Our adversaries are moving toward machine speed faster than we are, and the gap is widening faster than our processes can evolve.

Many companies are developing AI tools that accelerate the decision cycle and shrink OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loops, augmenting analysts so they can triage alerts, draft courses of action, and surface recommendations in a fraction of the time it used to take. The tools are good and getting better, and the companies building them are doing important work.

But there is a ceiling. So long as a human sits at the “decide” step, the cycle runs at human speed. Augmented human speed, but human speed nonetheless. The AI can compress the observe and orient steps to near-zero, but it cannot compress the human decision process. The human is, in this configuration, the limitation.

That limitation is not inherently a problem. For most of the decisions we care about, we want a human making them. Across most of the defense enterprise, in planning, intelligence analysis, logistics, personnel, and countless workflows where judgment, accountability, and context matter, humans add real value. The argument that follows is not a blanket case for autonomy. It is about a specific class of decisions, in a specific class of operational environments, where the speed differential between offense and defense is becoming the determining factor.

The problem is that our adversaries may not accept the same ceiling. If they are willing to close the loop entirely, letting the machine observe, orient, decide, and act without a human gate, then their cycle runs at machine speed and ours runs at augmented-human speed. Those are not comparable tempos. Orders of magnitude separate them, and the gap is growing.

This is the context for every conversation about keeping humans in the loop. In a contest where one side operates at machine speed and the other does not, a human review step can be both a safeguard and a structural disadvantage. The question is no longer whether we can afford to keep humans in the loop. The question is whether the humans we claim to have in the loop are actually doing anything, and whether their presence reflects meaningful oversight or has quietly become a fiction we maintain because the alternative is uncomfortable.

This is a hard conversation, and hardest on the kinetic side, where autonomous lethal decisions raise questions we are not ready to answer. It is more tractable in cyber. Not because the stakes are zero, but because cyber effects do not place lives directly at stake on the same scale as kinetic strikes. The competitive pressure is already forcing decisions in cyber that the kinetic debate has been able to defer. That is where this piece starts.

The Cyber Case

In cyber, the argument for accelerating decision cycles isn't philosophical. It's arithmetic.

The Zero Day Clock, an industry tracker maintained by a coalition of cybersecurity researchers, measures when the mean time from vulnerability disclosure to first observed exploit crosses key thresholds. The one-year threshold was reached around 2021. One month in 2025. One week and one day were both crossed in 2026. One hour is projected for later this year. One minute by 2028.

The interval between milestones is collapsing. It took roughly four years to go from year-scale to month-scale exploitation, one year to go from month to week, and week to day happened in the same calendar year. Defenders who designed their patch cycles around the assumption of months are now operating against adversaries who weaponize disclosed vulnerabilities in hours.

Cyber operators today use AI tools to work through alerts and incidents faster, and those tools genuinely help. For routine work, the current model of AI surfacing and human deciding is fine. But for a contested environment against a capable adversary moving at the speeds the data describes, the math becomes harder to defend.

Tools that scan codebases for vulnerabilities are not new. What is new is the next step: these tools are starting to generate patches and mitigations for the vulnerabilities they find. The AI identifies the problem, proposes a fix, and routes the recommendation to a human for review before implementation. That review takes time. Not much by human standards, but enormous by the standards of what is happening on the other side.

Anthropic's Mythos preview is one indication of where this is headed. According to Anthropic's published descriptions, Mythos can find zero-day vulnerabilities and exploit them with minimal or no human input, closing the entire kill chain across the MITRE ATT&CK matrix. It is not alone. Google's Big Sleep was reported in late 2024 to have found the first publicly disclosed AI-discovered zero-day in SQLite, found by an AI before any human defender. Anthropic's red team reported in early 2026 that Claude had identified over 500 high-severity vulnerabilities in widely used open-source software, many of which had survived decades of expert review.

As Sean Heelan put it: the limiting factor on a capable state's ability to generate exploits is no longer the number of skilled hackers it can recruit. It is token consumption.

Bruce Schneier, Heather Adkins, and Gadi Evron published a joint essay in 2025 warning that we are approaching a singularity moment for cyber attackers, the point at which AI systems can discover vulnerabilities, write exploits, and launch attacks faster than any human defender can respond. The attackers' AI singularity is well underway; the defenders' is significantly behind. Reasonable people can disagree about how far behind. Few disagree about the direction.

The crucial point is this: just a few years ago, having a human in the loop wasn't really a choice. The technology wasn't capable enough to close the kill chain. AI tools could surface candidates, but the actual decision-making and execution was done by humans because nothing else could. That is no longer true. The technology can now close the chain end-to-end, and in some narrow tasks it can do so better than the humans it is supplementing. Whether to let it is a real question now, not a technical limitation pretending to be a policy choice.

If an adversary's AI can identify a vulnerability and weaponize it in minutes while our response workflow routes the patch recommendation through a human for review, we are not in the same race. The human review step that felt prudent in 2020 is, in some operational contexts, the step that ensures we lose.

This is the easier version of the conversation. The capabilities are concrete, the failure mode is a compromised network rather than a destroyed building, and the competitive pressure is undeniable. And yet even in cyber, we are struggling to have it honestly. Some of that is appropriate caution; some is risk aversion; some is the difficulty of holding AI capability providers accountable in a field evolving faster than the frameworks for evaluating it.

The Kinetic Case

The kinetic version of this conversation is harder because the stakes are final and the cultural resistance is more deeply entrenched.

For most of the history of weapons, humans were the end operators. Small arms, artillery, and dumb bombs all relied on a human for aiming and firing. Laser-guided munitions shifted some of the guidance burden to the technology, but a JTAC on the ground still had to mark the target. GPS-guided munitions moved further; the operator inputs coordinates and the weapon does the rest, but humans still chose what to target. Through every generation, the kill chain was executed by humans because nothing else could.

We are now fielding systems that can handle targeting, firing, guidance, and delivery of effects without a human at any of those steps. The technology has caught up; in some narrow tasks, it has surpassed us. The cultural framing has not. We still talk about autonomous weapons as though the question is whether to cross a line. The line has been moving for forty years, and we have been crossing it incrementally the whole time. What is new is that the technology is now capable of completing the trajectory.

That does not mean we should rush to full autonomy in lethal decisions. It means the conversation we need to have is not "should we ever remove humans from the loop" but "at what point have we effectively done so already, and are we being honest about it?"

What Is the Human Actually Doing?

This is the question the rest of the debate hinges on.

When we say there is a human in the loop, what is the human actually doing? Are they independently verifying or re-doing the AI system's work? If so, it defeats much of the purpose of using the AI. If not, it defeats much, if not all, of the purpose of having the human there. If the answer depends on the situation (which it almost always will), how are we deciding which situations justify fully autonomous action?

These questions have real answers in some contexts. There are workflows where a human reviewer genuinely catches errors the AI missed, including obvious ones the AI is structurally bad at recognizing. This is the most critical reason today, but the errors are becoming fewer and farther between. Human verification can also serve a second purpose: providing the feedback signal that helps train and improve the model. In those contexts, the human in the loop is doing real work, and the right policy is to keep them there. The argument here is not that human oversight is always theater. It is that we need to be honest about which contexts it is and which it isn't.

Consider AI-generated targeting. During an operation, an AI system ingests real-time intelligence feeds (signals, imagery, pattern-of-life data, network traffic) and produces a list of targets. A human is assigned to review the list before strikes are authorized. What does that review actually consist of?

The human does not have time to review all of the intelligence data the AI processed, and could not do it at the speed of the operation even if they had the analytical capacity. What they can do is a sanity check. They can ask whether the targets look roughly like the kind of targets they expect to see and flag obvious errors, the kind that come from the AI getting confused in ways a human would not. That catch is genuinely valuable. They can also provide a feedback signal that, over time, makes the system better. What they cannot do is verify that the AI's reasoning was correct. When speed matters, that limitation becomes a liability.

Reports of the Israeli military's use of the Lavender system during operations in Gaza illustrate what happens when this dynamic meets operational pressure. According to reporting by +972 Magazine and Local Call, lower-level operators faced extreme pressure to strike targets at a high pace and leaned on Lavender to generate target lists they could not meaningfully verify at the tempo demanded. Human review existed in name. In practice, the operators were approving AI-generated decisions they did not have the bandwidth to assess. What they were doing was signing off.

A non-AI parallel sharpens the point. Microsoft's "Digital Escort" program, reported by ProPublica in 2025, was designed to comply with Pentagon restrictions on foreign nationals accessing sensitive systems. Microsoft used lower-cost engineers in China to maintain government cloud systems and hired U.S.-based "digital escorts" to formally implement the code changes on the engineers' behalf. The escorts were less technically skilled than the engineers whose work they were approving and often did not understand what they were implementing. In practice, they rubber-stamped the work. The ‘American in the loop’ was theater.

This is the pattern we should expect with AI systems operating at the edge of human capacity. If the AI is doing work the human could not do themselves, or at a speed they cannot match, the human's role collapses from verification to approval, and under operational pressure, to rubber-stamping. The loop is closed in name only.

When human oversight collapses to rubber-stamping, we end up with the worst of both options. We have slowed the system down, accepting the operational disadvantage of human-speed decision cycles, without preserving the safety benefit that human review was supposed to provide. The risk is still present; we have simply added latency. It is a self-imposed disadvantage with none of the benefits that justified it.

In some current deployments, we already have this dynamic and we are not acknowledging it. The human in the loop comforts us. It satisfies the policy requirement and provides someone to name as the accountable decision-maker after the fact. It does not meaningfully alter what the AI would have done on its own.

Accountability When the Human Can't Keep Up

The accountability question follows directly from the verification question, and it breaks a chain we have relied on for a century.

When a rifle round hits the wrong target, we do not blame the rifle manufacturer; we investigate the shooter. When a dumb bomb misses, we investigate the pilot and the targeting process. When a laser-guided bomb hits the wrong building, we investigate the JTAC, the target designation, and the command chain. When a GPS-guided munition hits a school, we investigate whether the coordinates were correct and whether the targeting cell followed proper procedure. Through every generation, accountability has run to the human operator or the humans in the decision chain above them.

This works because the human operator is meaningfully in control. They choose the target, input the data, pull the trigger. They have both the authority and the capacity to be responsible for the outcome.

Autonomous systems strain this chain. If the human in the loop is functionally rubber-stamping AI-generated decisions made at speeds and against data volumes they cannot independently evaluate, it is not coherent to hold them solely responsible. We can name them as accountable in an after-action review. We cannot credibly claim they were the decision-maker.

This shifts accountability upstream. If the human at the edge cannot meaningfully verify the decision, then responsibility lies more heavily with the people who decided what the system would be allowed to do: the developers, the testers, the commanders who set the authorities, the policymakers who approved the capability for deployment. The operator at the terminal is executing a decision that has, in important respects, already been made.

Developing autonomous control layers and targeting systems is not like developing a rifle. A rifle manufacturer ships a tool and trusts the operator to use it responsibly. An AI targeting system manufacturer is shipping something closer to a decision-maker, a system that will, in practice if not in policy, determine outcomes that human operators cannot meaningfully override. That shift in function requires a shift in how we think about responsibility. The builder does not get to hand off the system and walk away.

This is not an argument against building these capabilities. The companies and labs developing autonomous defense systems are doing essential work, and the United States and its allies need them to keep doing it. It is an argument for building them with full awareness of what is being built and how it is being used. These labs are not just providing tools. They are making strategic and ethical decisions that will shape how force is used. The more honest we are about this, the better the systems will be.

Trust, and the Honest Conversation

We arrive at a gap that defines the current moment. We cannot keep humans meaningfully in the loop at machine speed in every context. We do not yet trust the systems enough to take them out. Both propositions are true.

The temptation is to resolve the gap by picking one side: full autonomy in the name of competitive necessity, or full human control in the name of moral responsibility. Neither is serious. Full autonomy without adequate trust risks catastrophic errors we cannot unwind. Full human control against an adversary at machine speed guarantees we lose before we can control anything.

So why are we struggling to have this conversation honestly? Several reasons, none unreasonable on their own. Senior decision-makers do not yet have the basis to trust autonomous systems with consequential decisions, because the evidence base hasn't been built. Risk aversion in defense institutions is a feature, not a bug; it has prevented many bad outcomes, even if it now imposes costs. We don't have mature frameworks for holding AI capability providers accountable. An autonomous lethal force, even when bounded and tested, raises moral questions that the Department is right to take seriously.

None of this is a reason to avoid the conversation but it is a reason to have it more carefully. That requires building the evidence base for trust. Trust is the product of testing, adversarial red-teaming, operational evaluation under realistic conditions, and accumulated evidence that the system behaves as intended across the range of situations it will face. We do not have this evidence for most of the autonomous capabilities being fielded or contemplated. Building it is not optional, and it cannot be skipped because the adversary is moving fast.

It also requires being honest about which loops have humans in name only. If the human reviewer cannot meaningfully verify the AI's decision, claiming they are in the loop is a fiction. The right response is to either make the human's role genuine, by slowing the system or narrowing its scope so review is possible, or to acknowledge that the decision is effectively autonomous and design the controls and accountability structures accordingly.

And it requires distinguishing between cases. Autonomous patching of a vulnerability in an isolated system is a different decision than autonomous targeting for lethal strikes. We need frameworks that distinguish between reversible and irreversible actions, between contained and uncontained effects, between narrow and broad consequences. A blanket "human in the loop" policy treats all these cases as identical. They are not.

The decision about whether to remove humans from certain loops has, in some narrow domains, already been made by the math. Our choice is whether to acknowledge that and build the systems and accountability structures that make it responsible, or to maintain a comforting fiction until something forces a reckoning we are not prepared for.

The adversaries are not waiting for us to decide.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
Proscribing the IRGC Will Make Britain Safer https://belimedia.com.ng/proscribing-the-irgc-will-make-britain-safer https://belimedia.com.ng/proscribing-the-irgc-will-make-britain-safer The United Kingdom must act to proscribe Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, before it’s too late. The IRGC must be proscribed before more places of worship are torched, more citizens are violently harassed, more ambulances intentionally destroyed, more peaceful gatherings threatened. The IRGC has the capability and the intent to harm people on British soil with increasing ease. This threat could be nipped in the bud with the right measures, right now.

The IRGC views the United Kingdom as a permissive environment. For the IRGC, the United Kingdom is not just a place to launder money or recruit British citizens to post the regime’s propaganda on social media, though both are certainly happening there. The IRGC is also conducting hostile intelligence operations, evading sanctions, hiding millions of pounds from illicit shadow fleet oil sales in high-end real estate portfolios, incorporating shell companies, running banned media offices, and sheltering their spendthrift children. And, most recently, the IRGC freely influenced local gangs in London under the banner of Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia, or HAYI, to torch and destroy half a dozen Jewish-linked targets there over the span of just a few weeks.

The situation in today’s United Kingdom is not unlike Argentina in 1994. Back then, a young IRGC veteran of the Iran-Iraq War named Ahmad Vahidi worked with local Shi’a militants in Buenos Aires to attack the AMIA Jewish center, killing 85 people. Two years earlier, he had planned an attack on the Israeli embassy there that killed 29 people.

That same Ahmad Vahidi is now leading the IRGC in Iran after the U.S. and Israel killed the previous leaders on February 28, 2026. Vahidi is directing the IRGC to use the same toolkit he personally honed in Argentina to kill, maim, and terrorize people, Jewish or not, in Britain, Belgium, France, and elsewhere across Europe.

The IRGC must be proscribed in Parliament before an AMIA tragedy comes to London. But some argue that proscribing the IRGC may spook Iran into pulling its embassy out of London. Others fear crucial diplomatic and intelligence channels may dry up.

The UK has already sanctioned 1,238 Iranian persons and entities, including sanctions on 84 IRGC affiliates in 2023. And yet Iran’s embassy remains open for business. And so does a branch of the sanctioned, Iran-owned Bank Melli, right across the street from the Whole Foods Market in London’s affluent Kensington neighborhood. Across town, the IRGC’s banker, Ali Ansaari, received the go-ahead to build 33 luxury flats in north London despite UK sanctions specifically designating him the previous year for his help in bringing billions of pounds of IRGC money into British banks. Another beneficiary of the UK’s permissive environment for the IRGC is Mojtaba Khamenei, the erstwhile hidden successor of Iran’s late Supreme Leader. The sanctioned Khamenei counts luxury real estate holdings in London’s Bishop’s Avenue as a crown jewel in his £100 million European real estate portfolio.

Although hundreds of people and entities affiliated with the IRGC are sanctioned by the US, UK, and EU, the IRGC continues viewing the UK as a comfortable place to work. Sanctions are clearly an insufficient antidote to this unscrupulous organization. Sanctions are toothless unless paired with enforcement mechanisms that can cut through the shadowy layers of banks, shell companies, and cutouts the IRGC uses to slip right through onto the streets of London.

Asset freezes under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2018 and the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations of 2023 are a helpful start. But, as Bank Melli, Ali Ansari, and Khamenei’s son demonstrate, these measures remain largely ineffectual without actually proscribing the IRGC as a Proscribed Organisation. And with people like Ahmad Vahidi in charge of the IRGC, the clock is ticking ever closer to the next attack on British soil. But none of this is inevitable. Indeed, there is a way to stop it.

Keir Starmer noted recently that he has been “very worried” about the IRGC’s ability to use violent surrogate actors inside the UK. Worry is no substitute for action. And the proper action for this moment is a full proscription of the IRGC. People’s lives depend on it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Tale of Two Straits: Sweden and Denmark are in a Position of Power Over Russia https://belimedia.com.ng/a-tale-of-two-straits-sweden-and-denmark-are-in-a-position-of-power-over-russia https://belimedia.com.ng/a-tale-of-two-straits-sweden-and-denmark-are-in-a-position-of-power-over-russia Two straits, six thousand kilometers apart, are defining the global balance of power in 2026. The first, Hormuz, is closed by force and heavily impacting the world economy. The second, the Øresund, is open, and through it passes 60% of the oil that funds Russia's war in Ukraine. One chokepoint is being used against the West; the other could be used to protect it. The difference is not legality, capability, or geography; it is political will. And as the conflict in Iran has consumed Washington's attention, the question of whether Europe will close the Øresund Strait to Russia's shadow fleet could become one of the most consequential decisions in Europe.

The Strait of Hormuz is 54 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, with 20% of the world's seaborne oil passing through it. After US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran's retaliation, it has been closed, held shut by a combination of high-end US warships and aircraft on one side and large-scale, low-cost Iranian sea mines and missiles on the other. The asymmetry is itself a lesson: a regional power with cheap munitions can deny a waterway against the most advanced navy in the world.

The consequences arrived quickly with oil passing $120 per barrel, which the IMF called the largest oil supply disruption in history. Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE cut production of both oil and fertilizer because of a lack of available storage and without an ability to export it. East Asia, who gets a majority of its oil from the Middle East, has been badly hurt. The deepest damage, though, is in South Asia and Africa, where it translated into higher fertilizer prices, higher food prices, and empty shelves.

Iran will not reopen the strait while under military threat. Washington will not pull back while Tehran pursues a nuclear weapon. Both governments accept the global cost of the standoff and neither signals willingness to change their stance. The lesson is that a strait only tens of kilometers wide can do more to reshape the global economy than years of sanctions, summits, or shooting wars. Geography, used correctly, is leverage.

In May Donald Trump arrived in Beijing for the first US presidential visit to China in nearly a decade. The two leaders spoke of being "partners, not rivals." Although the choreography was immaculate, the substance was thinner. While trade deals were signed, both leaders affirmed that the Strait of Hormuz must be reopened. This was an unsurprising position, given that China depends heavily on Persian Gulf oil.

The summit is best read not as a negotiation but as two rivals agreeing that open confrontation has become too expensive, and looking for a way to coexist without conceding anything that matters.

European capitals watched with growing unease. Ukraine was not on the agenda. Neither was enforcement against Chinese firms supplying the Russian war economy. No joint language on Russian sanctions emerged, and no European leader was in the room. What Europe's leaders saw was something many had already suspected: Washington and Beijing are arranging a coexistence between themselves, and the multilateral order Europe is left out.

Europe is now responsible for its own security and its own pressure on Russia. And one of the most powerful tools they can use is geography.

Map of showing NATO member countries around the Baltic Sea after Sweden joining (Graphic by Valentin RAKOVSKY and Valentina BRESCHI / AFP via Getty Images)

Three thousand kilometers from Iran, Russia is stuck in a war of attrition with Ukraine, and with an economy that is hurting. Official 2026 growth was revised down to 0.4%, a figure many Western analysts deem falsified. Real wages are stagnant against high inflation. Its oil and gas industry is reporting sharp declines in profit. Ukrainian drone strikes on export terminals in the Baltic and Black Sea have already cut Russia's oil export capacity by roughly a million barrels per day, close to 20%.

Oil and gas are the foundation of the state with roughly a quarter of all government revenue, which funds the military, sustains the loyalty of the elite, and keeps basic services running. Putin's choice to keep Russia structurally dependent on oil is a regime strategy. A diversified economy would produce independent wealth, independent power centers, and political constituencies the Kremlin does not control.

The strategy is beginning to show strain. Money that once flowed to well-connected Russians is now flowing to the war. The elites and media are starting to complain publicly. Putin's regime can absorb financial pressure, but not financial pressure that turns the country against him. That is the pressure Europe is in a position to apply.

The opportunity is unusually clean. A consistent campaign of boardings and inspections in the Øresund could cut between a third to half of Russia's seaborne oil exports. No budget maneuver could replace that revenue. Russia's war funding would face a shortfall it could not absorb, and the political costs inside Russia would drastically sharpen.

The legal authority is already in place. Ships sailing under false flags, without valid insurance, or on sanctions lists can be lawfully stopped and inspected under existing maritime law. Sweden and Denmark control both shores of the strait. Acting in coordination, they can make it practically impossible for sanctioned vessels to transit, without firing a shot and without stepping outside the rules-based order they have spent decades defending.

What has been missing is political will. Denmark is hesitant, both to protect commercial interests and out of concern about Russian retaliation. Moscow has worked to keep that concern alive, and is actively using naval assets to project power.

Sweden has over the past three months taken a more active approach with five boardings of shadow fleet vessels done by a mix of Coast Guard, the National Task Force and unnamed military units. Boldness, once demonstrated, is contagious.

The next step is to make this routine. Every vessel transiting the Øresund under a false flag, without valid insurance, or on a sanctions list should be inspected. Sweden has proven its agencies can execute these operations. Denmark, on the other shore, has the same legal authority and strategic interest. Coordinated action would convert the Øresund from a loophole in the sanctions regime into the choke point it geographically already is.

The wider Ukrainian campaign is already in motion elsewhere. From bases in Libya, Ukrainian naval drones have struck Russian shadow fleet vessels in the Mediterranean. This is part of a deliberate Ukrainian naval strategy aimed at the economic infrastructure of the Russian war effort.

Hormuz has demonstrated, at enormous global cost, how a single narrow waterway can reshape the calculations of governments. Beijing has demonstrated that even the world's two largest powers will look for an exit when the price of confrontation becomes high enough. Putin has not yet reached that price. The Øresund is an important opportunity.

What remains is the political decision to treat the Øresund as a chokepoint for Russia's illicit oil trade. Unlike the deserts of the Middle East or the frozen lines of the Donbas, the Øresund is a place where Sweden and Denmark hold the keys, and where international law is already on their side.

The question is no longer whether Europe has the tools to pressure Russia without American leadership. The question is whether Europe will use them.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
“The G&2”: Takeaways from Trump's Trip to Beijing https://belimedia.com.ng/the-g-2-takeaways-from-trumps-trip-to-beijing https://belimedia.com.ng/the-g-2-takeaways-from-trumps-trip-to-beijing

By most accounts, President Donald Trump’s trip to Beijing ended ambiguously for the U.S. From Air Force One on his way back to the U.S., Trump touted a few concrete achievements that include an agreement for Beijing to purchase $17 billion per year in U.S. agricultural products and a purchase of 200 Boeing aircraft. Beijing’s final read out of the visit did not directly confirm those agreements but did acknowledge a mutual desire to promote “expanded two-way trade”. Chinese President Xi Jinping used the visit to reinforce Beijing’s narrative that China and the United States are co-equal global powers, even referring to the two countries as “the G-2.” But despite the lack of clarity around more urgent issues such as China’s potential role in resolving the Iran conflict or U.S. support for Taiwan, the trip was certainly significant. As many have observed, it is a positive step any time the leaders of the two most powerful countries meet for dialogue. As the U.S.’ only near peer adversary, the relationship with China, including the competition in economic, technology and military domains is the most consequential bi-lateral relationship the U.S. has by a wide margin.

The diplomatic choreography that followed the Trump- Xi summit was equally significant. Soon after Trump’s visit, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Beijing for what was described as a “warm” and “substantive” meeting with Xi. The two leaders have now met more than 40 times, underscoring the depth of the China-Russia relationship. For Xi, the back-to-back meetings with a strategic rival and one of China’s closest partners offered a powerful opportunity to cast Beijing as a stabilizing force in the world at a time when both Washington and Moscow are managing active wars and mounting geopolitical pressure.

Following their summit, Xi and Putin issued a joint statement criticizing what they called “irresponsible” U.S. foreign policy, including a direct reference to Trump’s planned “Golden Dome” missile defense program. Xi also described China-Russia relations as being at an “unprecedented high,” reinforcing the message that Beijing sees its partnership with Moscow as central to its broader challenge to U.S. influence.

For Trump and Xi, the diplomatic track is expected to continue, with a potential Xi visit to the White House in September.

But the Beijing summit left unresolved the larger question at the center of U.S.-China relations: whether a shared interest in stability can meaningfully reduce the risk of confrontation, particularly over Taiwan.

Xi Tries to Show the World China Is America’s Equal

The larger message Xi appeared intent on sending throughout Trump’s visit was that China is no longer a junior power-seeking accommodation from Washington, but a peer competitor that expects to be treated as an equal leader of global order.

Chinese state media framed the summit as a diplomatic win for Beijing, emphasizing that the relationship now operates “on a more equitable basis” and portraying Xi as an equal - if not a more disciplined and strategic - counterpart to Trump. Beijing’s growing confidence in its own position was evident throughout the visit. Xi did not appear compelled to offer major concessions and instead used the moment to reinforce China’s position that the world’s two superpowers have a shared responsibility to manage competition and preserve stability.

That message drew heavily on the logic of the “Thucydides Trap” - the idea that conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable but becomes more likely if rivalry is mismanaged. Xi’s public emphasis on competition, cooperation and “strategic stability” was designed to present Beijing as both confident and restrained: prepared to compete with Washington, but eager to avoid open confrontation.

The rhetoric was notable because it marked a shift from Beijing’s posture just a few years ago, which during the Biden-Xi summit appeared more resistant to the idea of “managed competition”. Like the Trump-Xi summit, the Biden-Xi dialogue similarly sought to establish guardrails to prevent strategic rivalry from escalating into direct military conflict, but at the time, Beijing rejected that framework as a veiled effort to contain China. Xi’s willingness now to publicly embrace the language of competition and strategic stability suggests that Beijing may see advantage in adopting the terminology - particularly if it reinforces the perception that China is negotiating with the United States from a position of parity.

Against that backdrop, we asked two Cipher Brief experts and longtime China watchers how they interpreted the Trump-Xi summit, particularly Xi’s willingness to publicly accept the language of “competition,” and what the summit signaled on the critical question of Taiwan.

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani served as the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea, was the Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and served as the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, ODNI.  He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories.


Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mike Studeman

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mike Studeman was former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence. He also served as Director of the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO) and as principal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence as National Intelligence Manager-Maritime, as well as the Director of Intelligence (J2) at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Honolulu and Director of Intelligence (J2) at U.S. Southern Command, Miami (2017-2019.)

On the US-China Relationship

What is your overall reaction to the summit and is Xi now more confident in China’s relationship with the U.S. and less concerned about whether that is interpreted as trying to contain China?

Detrani

I think Xi Jinping and China feel very good about the summit. I think we should feel relatively good about the summit. I think the president managed it well. We don't have the particulars on what was discussed. We did see very clearly that Xi Jinping prioritized Taiwan, but we don't have the particulars on our side. But I think overall, the summit went well.

Studeman

The CCP remains perennially allergic to allowing any other power, especially the U.S., dictate the language describing the Sino-U.S. relationship. For the Chinese, words carry great meaning. Whoever crafts the narrative, controls their destiny. Naming things is information superiority in action. The key phrase Xi used is "moderated competition," which is designed to show that Beijing is willing to absorb more friction in the U.S. relationship to protect its interests. The new verbiage essentially recognizes U.S. attempts to derisk, diversify, and distance itself from a deleterious overreliance on China. Xi's "moderated competition" signals his effort to stop the death spiral of unrestrained weaponization of interdependence and prevent any hasty departure from China by corporate America. The Chinese idea is to keep clinching the U.S. economically (intertwining like boxers trying to prevent the other from swinging a free arm), while not letting the increasingly tough choices that Washington and Beijing are forced to make spill over into outright confrontation. Using the word "competition" also makes it seem as if the superpower contestation is governed by transparent rules and fair play, which of course it isn't given Beijing's model of a state-driven market and other consequential distortions of global trade practices, including continued massive intellectual property theft. The CCP hopes American journalists, commentators, and political leaders begin adopting the "moderated competition" phrase, which would be a huge psychological warfare win for Beijing, particularly if it tranquilizes the White House into softening its strategic choices related to the Sino-U.S. rivalry.

The US-Taiwan-China Relationship

Taiwan emerged as the most consequential issue of the summit. Analysts note that despite the friendly nature of the talks, Xi’s warning to Trump on Taiwan underscores the longstanding rivalry between Washington and Beijing on the issue of Taiwan.

Following meetings with Xi, Trump declined to clearly commit to future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or direct military defense of Taiwan in a cross-strait conflict. When questioned by reporters if the U.S. would defend Taiwan if it came to it, Trump answered, “I don’t want to say that. I’m not going to say that” adding later that, “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent, and we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that.”

A $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan is also currently awaiting Trump’s approval. Following the Beijing Summit, Trump described the potential arms sale as a “very good negotiating chip” with China, adding that he needs to speak with the President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te. He revealed that he and President Xi talked at great length about Taiwan, and notably, the Taiwan arms package. Trump said he would “make a determination over the next fairly short period” on whether he would approve the deal. When asked about the Six Assurances, the 1982 agreement that the U.S. would not consult with China on U.S. military support to Taiwan, Trump downplayed the longstanding norm observed by all previous U.S. presidents, saying, “So what am I going to do? Say ‘I don’t want to talk to you about it?’ Because I have an agreement that was signed in 1982? No, we discussed arms sales.”

This is a familiar practice Trump has used with allies before- framing an issue as more transactional than ideological. His emphasis on maintaining “the status quo” rather than backing Taiwanese independence reinforced concerns in Taipei and among U.S. allies that Taiwan could in fact become a bargaining chip in broader U.S.-China negotiations. Following Trump’s remarks, Taiwan’s government issued a statement reiterating that not only are arms sales to Taiwan a matter of security and deterrence for the U.S., but they are also stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act.

Trump’s foreign policy messaging is obviously much less predictable than that of previous administrations, but what it means in terms of Taiwan and whether it points to the White House potentially prioritizing short-term U.S.-China stability over steadfast support for Taiwan remains to be seen.

US-Taiwan Relations Following the Trump-Xi Summit

How do you assess the impact to US-Taiwan relations following the Trump-Xi summit? What’s your reaction to Trump breaking with norms and discussing potential U.S. military arms sales to Taiwan, with Xi Jinping?

Detrani

I think the president handled it well enough and I think understandably he responded to Xi Jinping's comments on it. I think Xi understands very clearly the six assurances that President Ronald Reagan memorialized 1982. This was to reassure the [US] Congress and the American people and Taiwan that the United States would be there for Taiwan. This was President Ronald Reagan making it very clear, we're not walking away from arm sales. And this is between the United States and Taiwan. So, it's a very powerful memorialized document in the archives. But I think the president responded to Xi Jinping and I think Xi skillfully brought this up because this was the one issue Xi wanted to pursue with vigor during his summit discussions with President Donald Trump.

Overall, I don't think there were any big surprises. Although Xi made it very clear that there's one primary issue between the U.S. and China, and that's Taiwan and he made that the core element of the summit. So, I think China and Xi feel very good about the summit. I think they've accomplished what they wanted to accomplish. Xi is on the world stage, he's got the President of the United States saying some very nice things about him and the U.S. relationship with China. Xi made it very clear that Taiwan is something that the two sides must get right, otherwise we can have conflict, and we can go to war.

Studeman

Readouts from the summit indicate the President told Xi he did not support Taiwan independence or a change in the status quo, which aren't new policy positions. Multiple Presidents have said the same. But in a significant breach of one of the longstanding 1982 Six Assurances to Taiwan developed under President Reagan, specifically that the U.S. "has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan," Trump flung open the door to letting the CCP negotiate down any foreign military sales deals with Taipei. Trump's aim is to use the Taiwan arms sales issue as a bargaining chip for a better trade deal and China's help in pressuring Iran to end the war. This shift in policy represents one of the biggest wins for China from the summit. China already leveraged its KMT proxies in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (parliament) to weaken Taiwan's defense bill from $40B to $25B over the next five years, and now China is in the driver's seat to extract further arms sales concessions. These "inside out" and "outside in" successes for Beijing will only end up weakening Taiwan relative to rising PLA capability and presence around the island, in turn reducing strategic deterrence against Chinese aggression in any form.

The US, China and Artificial Intelligence

Despite the attendance of several U.S. tech CEOS, there were no breakthroughs on tech, and little evidence of a concrete technology framework or export-control agreement. The U.S. and China remain firmly positioned on the competitive side of emerging technology. Trump did state that the two sides “talked about possibly working together for guardrails” on AI, describing them as “standard guardrails that we talk about all the time”. During the visit, China’s Foreign Ministry and Chinese media portrayed the U.S. and China as equally leading in AI models, computing power, and ecosystems.

Just before the Beijing Summit, Washington approved the sale of Nvidia’s advanced H200 chips to China, a move that has long been contested by national security and China hawks. However, China has not yet signaled any commitment to buy H200 chips. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said it was up to Beijing whether Chinese companies would make more purchases from the American chip giant.

How should we interpret the US decision to sell H200 chips, and the Chinese decision, so far, not to buy them?

Detrani

I think China is feeling good about their progress on artificial intelligence and the work they're doing and now they have the option of purchasing these H200 semiconductors which would be very helpful to them with their work on artificial intelligence. I think, Xi Jinping's strategy on artificial intelligence competition with the U.S. may be to show the world that this is not the China of the 19th century or the 20th even, but this is the new China. I think the Nvidia chips announcement is something Xi has in his pocket now and he probably feels that this is an option that he can use whenever he needs it.

Studeman

The PRC is becoming more self-reliant in indigenizing its key industries, including by stealing tech secrets and coopting foreign engineers, steadily eroding the chip gap. Given its paranoia about backdoors, dead switches, or info tech corruption of any sort, the PRC remains leery of becoming dependent on distrusted foreign suppliers as it rushes to catch up on raw compute power. At the same time, the PRC has achieved scale in less capable chips and is achieving tangible progress in developing more advanced ones. If China buys more Nvidia chips, it will be more likely to curry favor with the U.S. and keep an open door to future tech transfers.

Annabelle Darby contributed to this report

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
The G&2: Takeaways from Trump's Trip to Beijing https://belimedia.com.ng/the-g-2-takeaways-from-trumps-trip-to-beijing-67012 https://belimedia.com.ng/the-g-2-takeaways-from-trumps-trip-to-beijing-67012

By most accounts, President Donald Trump’s trip to Beijing ended ambiguously for the U.S. From Air Force One on his way back to the U.S., Trump touted a few concrete achievements that include an agreement for Beijing to purchase $17 billion per year in U.S. agricultural products and a purchase of 200 Boeing aircraft. Beijing’s final read out of the visit did not directly confirm those agreements but did acknowledge a mutual desire to promote “expanded two-way trade”. Chinese President Xi Jinping used the visit to reinforce Beijing’s narrative that China and the United States are co-equal global powers, even referring to the two countries as “the G-2.” But despite the lack of clarity around more urgent issues such as China’s potential role in resolving the Iran conflict or U.S. support for Taiwan, the trip was certainly significant. As many have observed, it is a positive step any time the leaders of the two most powerful countries meet for dialogue. As the U.S.’ only near peer adversary, the relationship with China, including the competition in economic, technology and military domains is the most consequential bi-lateral relationship the U.S. has by a wide margin.

The diplomatic choreography that followed the Trump- Xi summit was equally significant. Soon after Trump’s visit, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Beijing for what was described as a “warm” and “substantive” meeting with Xi. The two leaders have now met more than 40 times, underscoring the depth of the China-Russia relationship. For Xi, the back-to-back meetings with a strategic rival and one of China’s closest partners offered a powerful opportunity to cast Beijing as a stabilizing force in the world at a time when both Washington and Moscow are managing active wars and mounting geopolitical pressure.

Following their summit, Xi and Putin issued a joint statement criticizing what they called “irresponsible” U.S. foreign policy, including a direct reference to Trump’s planned “Golden Dome” missile defense program. Xi also described China-Russia relations as being at an “unprecedented high,” reinforcing the message that Beijing sees its partnership with Moscow as central to its broader challenge to U.S. influence.

For Trump and Xi, the diplomatic track is expected to continue, with a potential Xi visit to the White House in September.

But the Beijing summit left unresolved the larger question at the center of U.S.-China relations: whether a shared interest in stability can meaningfully reduce the risk of confrontation, particularly over Taiwan.

Xi Tries to Show the World China Is America’s Equal

The larger message Xi appeared intent on sending throughout Trump’s visit was that China is no longer a junior power-seeking accommodation from Washington, but a peer competitor that expects to be treated as an equal leader of global order.

Chinese state media framed the summit as a diplomatic win for Beijing, emphasizing that the relationship now operates “on a more equitable basis” and portraying Xi as an equal - if not a more disciplined and strategic - counterpart to Trump. Beijing’s growing confidence in its own position was evident throughout the visit. Xi did not appear compelled to offer major concessions and instead used the moment to reinforce China’s position that the world’s two superpowers have a shared responsibility to manage competition and preserve stability.

That message drew heavily on the logic of the “Thucydides Trap” - the idea that conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable but becomes more likely if rivalry is mismanaged. Xi’s public emphasis on competition, cooperation and “strategic stability” was designed to present Beijing as both confident and restrained: prepared to compete with Washington, but eager to avoid open confrontation.

The rhetoric was notable because it marked a shift from Beijing’s posture just a few years ago, which during the Biden-Xi summit appeared more resistant to the idea of “managed competition”. Like the Trump-Xi summit, the Biden-Xi dialogue similarly sought to establish guardrails to prevent strategic rivalry from escalating into direct military conflict, but at the time, Beijing rejected that framework as a veiled effort to contain China. Xi’s willingness now to publicly embrace the language of competition and strategic stability suggests that Beijing may see advantage in adopting the terminology - particularly if it reinforces the perception that China is negotiating with the United States from a position of parity.

Against that backdrop, we asked two Cipher Brief experts and longtime China watchers how they interpreted the Trump-Xi summit, particularly Xi’s willingness to publicly accept the language of “competition,” and what the summit signaled on the critical question of Taiwan.

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani served as the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea, was the Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and served as the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, ODNI.  He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories.


Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mike Studeman

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mike Studeman was former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence. He also served as Director of the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO) and as principal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence as National Intelligence Manager-Maritime, as well as the Director of Intelligence (J2) at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Honolulu and Director of Intelligence (J2) at U.S. Southern Command, Miami (2017-2019.)

On the US-China Relationship

What is your overall reaction to the summit and is Xi now more confident in China’s relationship with the U.S. and less concerned about whether that is interpreted as trying to contain China?

Detrani

I think Xi Jinping and China feel very good about the summit. I think we should feel relatively good about the summit. I think the president managed it well. We don't have the particulars on what was discussed. We did see very clearly that Xi Jinping prioritized Taiwan, but we don't have the particulars on our side. But I think overall, the summit went well.

Studeman

The CCP remains perennially allergic to allowing any other power, especially the U.S., dictate the language describing the Sino-U.S. relationship. For the Chinese, words carry great meaning. Whoever crafts the narrative, controls their destiny. Naming things is information superiority in action. The key phrase Xi used is "moderated competition," which is designed to show that Beijing is willing to absorb more friction in the U.S. relationship to protect its interests. The new verbiage essentially recognizes U.S. attempts to derisk, diversify, and distance itself from a deleterious overreliance on China. Xi's "moderated competition" signals his effort to stop the death spiral of unrestrained weaponization of interdependence and prevent any hasty departure from China by corporate America. The Chinese idea is to keep clinching the U.S. economically (intertwining like boxers trying to prevent the other from swinging a free arm), while not letting the increasingly tough choices that Washington and Beijing are forced to make spill over into outright confrontation. Using the word "competition" also makes it seem as if the superpower contestation is governed by transparent rules and fair play, which of course it isn't given Beijing's model of a state-driven market and other consequential distortions of global trade practices, including continued massive intellectual property theft. The CCP hopes American journalists, commentators, and political leaders begin adopting the "moderated competition" phrase, which would be a huge psychological warfare win for Beijing, particularly if it tranquilizes the White House into softening its strategic choices related to the Sino-U.S. rivalry.

The US-Taiwan-China Relationship

Taiwan emerged as the most consequential issue of the summit. Analysts note that despite the friendly nature of the talks, Xi’s warning to Trump on Taiwan underscores the longstanding rivalry between Washington and Beijing on the issue of Taiwan.

Following meetings with Xi, Trump declined to clearly commit to future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or direct military defense of Taiwan in a cross-strait conflict. When questioned by reporters if the U.S. would defend Taiwan if it came to it, Trump answered, “I don’t want to say that. I’m not going to say that” adding later that, “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent, and we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that.”

A $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan is also currently awaiting Trump’s approval. Following the Beijing Summit, Trump described the potential arms sale as a “very good negotiating chip” with China, adding that he needs to speak with the President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te. He revealed that he and President Xi talked at great length about Taiwan, and notably, the Taiwan arms package. Trump said he would “make a determination over the next fairly short period” on whether he would approve the deal. When asked about the Six Assurances, the 1982 agreement that the U.S. would not consult with China on U.S. military support to Taiwan, Trump downplayed the longstanding norm observed by all previous U.S. presidents, saying, “So what am I going to do? Say ‘I don’t want to talk to you about it?’ Because I have an agreement that was signed in 1982? No, we discussed arms sales.”

This is a familiar practice Trump has used with allies before- framing an issue as more transactional than ideological. His emphasis on maintaining “the status quo” rather than backing Taiwanese independence reinforced concerns in Taipei and among U.S. allies that Taiwan could in fact become a bargaining chip in broader U.S.-China negotiations. Following Trump’s remarks, Taiwan’s government issued a statement reiterating that not only are arms sales to Taiwan a matter of security and deterrence for the U.S., but they are also stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act.

Trump’s foreign policy messaging is obviously much less predictable than that of previous administrations, but what it means in terms of Taiwan and whether it points to the White House potentially prioritizing short-term U.S.-China stability over steadfast support for Taiwan remains to be seen.

US-Taiwan Relations Following the Trump-Xi Summit

How do you assess the impact to US-Taiwan relations following the Trump-Xi summit? What’s your reaction to Trump breaking with norms and discussing potential U.S. military arms sales to Taiwan, with Xi Jinping?

Detrani

I think the president handled it well enough and I think understandably he responded to Xi Jinping's comments on it. I think Xi understands very clearly the six assurances that President Ronald Reagan memorialized 1982. This was to reassure the [US] Congress and the American people and Taiwan that the United States would be there for Taiwan. This was President Ronald Reagan making it very clear, we're not walking away from arm sales. And this is between the United States and Taiwan. So, it's a very powerful memorialized document in the archives. But I think the president responded to Xi Jinping and I think Xi skillfully brought this up because this was the one issue Xi wanted to pursue with vigor during his summit discussions with President Donald Trump.

Overall, I don't think there were any big surprises. Although Xi made it very clear that there's one primary issue between the U.S. and China, and that's Taiwan and he made that the core element of the summit. So, I think China and Xi feel very good about the summit. I think they've accomplished what they wanted to accomplish. Xi is on the world stage, he's got the President of the United States saying some very nice things about him and the U.S. relationship with China. Xi made it very clear that Taiwan is something that the two sides must get right, otherwise we can have conflict, and we can go to war.

Studeman

Readouts from the summit indicate the President told Xi he did not support Taiwan independence or a change in the status quo, which aren't new policy positions. Multiple Presidents have said the same. But in a significant breach of one of the longstanding 1982 Six Assurances to Taiwan developed under President Reagan, specifically that the U.S. "has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan," Trump flung open the door to letting the CCP negotiate down any foreign military sales deals with Taipei. Trump's aim is to use the Taiwan arms sales issue as a bargaining chip for a better trade deal and China's help in pressuring Iran to end the war. This shift in policy represents one of the biggest wins for China from the summit. China already leveraged its KMT proxies in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (parliament) to weaken Taiwan's defense bill from $40B to $25B over the next five years, and now China is in the driver's seat to extract further arms sales concessions. These "inside out" and "outside in" successes for Beijing will only end up weakening Taiwan relative to rising PLA capability and presence around the island, in turn reducing strategic deterrence against Chinese aggression in any form.

The US, China and Artificial Intelligence

Despite the attendance of several U.S. tech CEOS, there were no breakthroughs on tech, and little evidence of a concrete technology framework or export-control agreement. The U.S. and China remain firmly positioned on the competitive side of emerging technology. Trump did state that the two sides “talked about possibly working together for guardrails” on AI, describing them as “standard guardrails that we talk about all the time”. During the visit, China’s Foreign Ministry and Chinese media portrayed the U.S. and China as equally leading in AI models, computing power, and ecosystems.

Just before the Beijing Summit, Washington approved the sale of Nvidia’s advanced H200 chips to China, a move that has long been contested by national security and China hawks. However, China has not yet signaled any commitment to buy H200 chips. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said it was up to Beijing whether Chinese companies would make more purchases from the American chip giant.

How should we interpret the US decision to sell H200 chips, and the Chinese decision, so far, not to buy them?

Detrani

I think China is feeling good about their progress on artificial intelligence and the work they're doing and now they have the option of purchasing these H200 semiconductors which would be very helpful to them with their work on artificial intelligence. I think, Xi Jinping's strategy on artificial intelligence competition with the U.S. may be to show the world that this is not the China of the 19th century or the 20th even, but this is the new China. I think the Nvidia chips announcement is something Xi has in his pocket now and he probably feels that this is an option that he can use whenever he needs it.

Studeman

The PRC is becoming more self-reliant in indigenizing its key industries, including by stealing tech secrets and coopting foreign engineers, steadily eroding the chip gap. Given its paranoia about backdoors, dead switches, or info tech corruption of any sort, the PRC remains leery of becoming dependent on distrusted foreign suppliers as it rushes to catch up on raw compute power. At the same time, the PRC has achieved scale in less capable chips and is achieving tangible progress in developing more advanced ones. If China buys more Nvidia chips, it will be more likely to curry favor with the U.S. and keep an open door to future tech transfers.

Annabelle Darby contributed to this report

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
DHS Has Become Central to American Strategy, But Its Strategy Has Not Caught Up https://belimedia.com.ng/dhs-has-become-central-to-american-strategy-but-its-strategy-has-not-caught-up https://belimedia.com.ng/dhs-has-become-central-to-american-strategy-but-its-strategy-has-not-caught-up OPINION — A generation after 9/11, the homeland has returned to the center of American national security strategy. The 2025 National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and last week's Counterterrorism Strategy each push in that direction. Parity is the right destination, but it is also a long road. Closing the distance requires a Department of Homeland Security that can chart its own course over the years it will take. The institutional strategy capable of guiding that transition still does not exist.

The security environment that produced these documents is one where the line between foreign and homeland threats has thinned. Cartels are now treated as national security threats. Fentanyl trafficking is no longer viewed solely as a criminal issue, with its precursors now being classified as weapons of mass destruction. Domestic violent extremism remains a core homeland concern.

America's ongoing conflict with Iran has reinforced the same dynamic. Iranian state-affiliated actors targeted U.S. medical technology firm Stryker in March, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued joint advisories on Iranian cyber actors probing U.S. critical infrastructure. Threats once treated primarily as overseas contingencies increasingly carry direct homeland implications across cyber operations, critical infrastructure security, public gatherings, and lone-actor violence.

The department’s strategic architecture has not kept pace. As Customs and Border Protection (CBP) manages the border, the Coast Guard secures the maritime domain, and FEMA prepares for disasters, DHS still lacks a strategic lodestar capable of aligning its disparate components around a coherent departmental vision.

The first Trump administration did not produce a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The Biden administration produced the 2023 review six months behind the strategic cycle, and the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) found it deficient against ten of twenty-one statutory requirements. This pattern is institutional, not partisan.

Counter-UAS operations increasingly illustrate how rapidly the homeland security mission is evolving. The mission cuts across CBP at the border, CISA at critical infrastructure, the Secret Service at major events, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in aviation. The FY2026 NDAA extended DHS counter-UAS authorities through 2031, ending years of short-term reauthorization fights, and designated the World Cup and 2028 Olympics as a pilot program for state and local counter-UAS deployment.

With the legal architecture now in place, DHS must build the strategic architecture necessary to operationalize those authorities across components, federal partners, and state and local agencies. Counter-UAS operations are only one of many emerging missions where authorities have outpaced strategy.

The 76-day DHS shutdown earlier this year was the longest in American history. It demonstrated how easily DHS appropriations can fracture around the department’s most politically contentious missions rather than broader enterprise-wide priorities. TSA officers and Coast Guardsmen missed paychecks while FEMA preparedness and recovery operations slowed under mounting resource constraints. The operational consequences continued long after funding resumed, with department officials warning it could take months for components to fully recover.

The final agreement funded most of DHS through September while excluding immigration enforcement. The episode showed how vulnerable DHS remains when its missions are not bound by a coherent strategic framework.

That matters more now than when Congress first mandated the QHSR two decades ago. The department was built for an era defined by post-9/11 domestic protection. American strategic planning was focused outward, with counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East and power projection in the Pacific. Homeland security was treated as a defensive enterprise running parallel to it.

That world is gone. The mission set has converged with the American national security strategy itself, and the institutional architecture meant to carry that strategy has not changed with it.

This administration has more reason than any of its predecessors to take the QHSR seriously. No previous White House has positioned DHS this close to the center of its national security identity. The mission set the administration has prioritized runs through DHS components first. A functional QHSR is what would translate that political emphasis into a department capable of executing it. Without a strategic reference point, components will continue defaulting toward inherited institutional habits rather than department-wide strategic priorities.

The fix is institutional. The NDS carries weight because it sits at the top of an institutional chain. Serving as the Pentagon's unifying strategic reference, it forces priority trade-offs the department cannot defer. It connects directly to resourcing decisions that translate strategy into what the military buys, builds, and deploys. Congress also chartered an independent commission to review each NDS and test its logic and resource assumptions in public. Congress should give the QHSR the same architecture: a strategy that pulls components into coherence, priorities that drive resource decisions, and an independent commission that scrutinizes its logic.

As the youngest department in the national security apparatus, DHS's strategic infrastructure remains underdeveloped relative to the mission it now carries. A Goldwater-Nichols-style restructuring will eventually come when the politics allow it. Until then, anchor the department around a credible QHSR. A strategy with the architecture Congress has already built around the NDS would not require reorganizing components or rewriting authorities. It would require Congress to treat DHS strategic planning with the same rigor it applies to defense strategic planning.While America's strategic turn inward is underway, parity will not arrive on its own. The strategy documents prescribe missions for a DHS that does not yet exist. Without a working QHSR, the gap between presidential ambition and institutional coherence will continue to widen.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Mon, 25 May 2026 12:31:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
The administration needs a better relationship with the Vatican https://belimedia.com.ng/the-administration-needs-a-better-relationship-with-the-vatican https://belimedia.com.ng/the-administration-needs-a-better-relationship-with-the-vatican OPINION — President Reagan formed an alliance with Pope John Paul II in the 1980s that contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

This is a powerful precedent for two world leaders — Pope Leo XIV and President Trump — to work together to oppose evil and seek global peace and stability.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s meeting with the pope on May 7 was a powerful gesture that showed the U.S. government wants a close, cordial relationship with the Vatican. According to the Vatican, both pledged to improve bilateral relations after Mr. Trump accused Leo of being “terrible for foreign policy.” The pope had commented that Mr. Trump’s “threat to destroy Iran’s whole civilization” was “truly unacceptable.”

Francesco Sisci, an Italian sinologist, author and columnist who maintains close ties with the Vatican, said Mr. Rubio’s meeting with the pope went well. He said: “The pope tells the world there’s another America besides the controversial president. The pope’s America is the one the world loves to love. This should be important for the U.S. Active and intense dialogue should follow up this meeting to keep the momentum.”

Yes, to keep the momentum. The Vatican has consistently been opposed to war and nuclear proliferation in favor of peace and stability. Indeed, it was the U.S. after World War II that worked hard to bring peace and stability to a global community exhausted and devastated by the war.

Unfortunately, the Cold War followed, starting with the Korean War. An expansionist Soviet Union was determined to spread communism throughout the world: in Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Yemen, Libya, Czechoslovakia, Nicaragua, Grenada and, in 1979, Afghanistan. Fortunately, they failed.

What contributed to the Soviet Union’s defeat was Reagan’s relationship with Pope John Paul II. Both viewed Soviet communism as an evil that denied the Russian people and the Eastern Bloc their human rights and dignity. Indeed, it was Reagan and John Paul II’s first meeting at the Vatican in June 1982 that initiated their close bond.

What followed was a close working relationship that contributed to the defeat of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The partnership between the U.S. and the Vatican was characterized by intense, behind-the-scenes information sharing about the Soviet Union and coordinating actions in Eastern Europe. The pope provided the spiritual and moral inspiration to the Solidarity movement in Poland, weakening the authority of the Polish communist government.

Both the U.S. and the Vatican sent news into the Soviet Bloc, undermining the communist fake narrative. Indeed, the pope provided the moral voice, and Reagan, the geopolitical pressure.

This partnership peacefully transformed Eastern Europe. Can the partnership of the U.S. and the Vatican be replicated for the war in Iran?

Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the regime’s killing of more than 30,000 Iranian peaceful protesters earlier this year and its acts of terrorism, which have killed hundreds of Americans, are just some of the information we can and should share with the Vatican.

Conversely, the Vatican can share its moral options for changing the behavior of an Iranian regime that is viewed as a pariah state by its neighbors and the international community.

A collaborative U.S.-Vatican partnership to address other global issues, such as the wars in Ukraine and Sudan, and the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip, could be valuable. If the Vatican was helpful in bringing an end to the Cold War, then why are we not partnering with it on the multitude of ongoing global conflicts?

Hopefully, Mr. Rubio’s meeting with Pope Leo XIV is the beginning of a productive relationship with the Vatican, one that will bring peace and stability to the world.

This piece was originally published by The Washington Times and is republished here with permission.

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 19 May 2026 17:57:54 +0100 FirstHandNews
Roses, Trees, and Power: The Symbolism Behind the Trump&Xi Summit https://belimedia.com.ng/roses-trees-and-power-the-symbolism-behind-the-trump-xi-summit https://belimedia.com.ng/roses-trees-and-power-the-symbolism-behind-the-trump-xi-summit OPINION — Last week’s high-level summit in Beijing between President Trump and President Xi achieved few traditional ‘deliverables’ between the two leaders, and this led many outside observers to dismiss its singular importance. No significant trade deals were made, and there was little diplomatic progress with respect to ending the wars between Iran and America, or Russia and Ukraine. There was no mention of North Korea, or China’s possible influence with respect to a resumption of diplomatic negotiations between America and North Korea regarding the latter’s nuclear program. President Xi and President Trump pledged to work towards “constructive strategic stability” in the US-China relationship. But Xi’s comments about Taiwan – which could be interpreted as an indirect threat – in which he warned Trump, “If handled poorly, the two countries will collide or even clash, putting the entire US-China relationship in an extremely dangerous situation,” set the background tone of the summit. Despite other cordial words by both leaders – Trump repeatedly praised Xi as a “great leader” - many observers suggested that the summit had no significant or measurable outcomes, except for optics, symbolism, and body language. But for President Xi, these were – and are – the key ‘deliverables,’ making the summit, where he and Trump acted as equals (e.g. “G-2,” in Trump’s words), a critical success for him and China.

For some, President Trump’s trip to Beijing might remind one of Lord Macartney’s 1793 mission to China. Xi proved a gracious host, showcasing China’s achievements, history, culture, and ancient beauty. To truly understand Xi’s perspective, the setting, symbolism, and body language are critical. On the last day, Xi and Trump held an informal meeting in the lovely and historic Imperial Gardens of Zhongnanhai, where they strolled together while conversing and later, enjoying tea. Xi pointed out trees that are 490 years old, and in other cases, over 1000 years old. He asked Trump to touch the trees, highlighting their place in the gardens’ history. When President Trump commented on the beauty of the roses, President Xi offered to send some seeds from the Imperial rose garden back to the White House. For Xi, such symbolism is key, with a subtle framing of his message being, America is celebrating its 250th anniversary this year. But China is a civilization – like these trees – that has been in existence for thousands of years. Xi could not have said it better — or been more pleased.

Xi’s sophisticated diplomacy and aspirations (“The Chinese Dream of Rejuvenation”) have always been paired with strategic thinking (the concept of shi, described by Professor David Lai as “the alignment of forces, the propensity of things, or the potential born of disposition”), ruthlessness, and an increasingly confident posture regarding China’s domestic and international interests. The Xi-Trump summit showed them interacting as complete equals. For Xi and China, such images at last week’s summit serve to erase more than a century of humiliation. And China’s goal of becoming the world’s dominant superpower by 2049 (the centenary of the PRC’s founding) has not changed. Nor has it altered its gray zone strategy targeting America and the West, its cyber-attacks, its espionage efforts, its desire to dominate the key industries of the 21st Century, its military buildup in the South China Sea, its theft of intellectual property, its aggressive moves towards Taiwan, or its economic reach with respect to the Belt and Road Initiative. Today’s President Xi is unchanged from 2017, when he first hosted President Trump on a state visit to Beijing.

But Xi ought to be careful, as he prepares for his next summit with President Trump in late 2026. It is convenient for Xi to assert, as he has frequently done, that the East is rising, while the West is in decline. And many critics would agree that given a divided, polarized America, a lame-duck President with falling poll numbers, and a nation bogged down by military conflicts in the Middle East, Xi is correct. But I’d argue that they and Xi have a potential blind spot. Such an analysis of American and western decline, coupled with China’ remarkable achievement in lifting 800 million citizens out of poverty since 1949, while becoming the world’s 2nd-largest economy, risks ignoring America’s resilience, as it approaches its 250th birthday in July 2026. President Trump has always showcased his mastery of media and spectacular events too. At his next summit with President Xi, he ought to highlight America’s exceptionalism, and walk with Xi along the Mall, George Washington’s home in Mt. Vernon, and let Xi touch and feel not a tree nor roses, but Philadelphia’s famed Liberty Bell. Such symbols and gestures can matter. President Trump’s optics can thereby say, this too, is America. Freedom. Courage. Faith. Nationhood. Endurance. And Liberty. Old concepts, old values, which stand the test of time.

Dr. Kenneth Dekleva served as a Regional Medical Officer/Psychiatrist with the U.S. Dept. of State from 2002-2016 and is currently the CEO of Blackwood Advisory Solutions LLC and Professor of Psychiatry, UT Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX. The views expressed by Dr. Dekleva are entirely his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Dept. of State, or UT Southwestern Medical Center.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 19 May 2026 17:57:54 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside the FBI’s New Push to Track Leaks and Monitor Employees https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-fbis-new-push-to-track-leaks-and-monitor-employees https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-fbis-new-push-to-track-leaks-and-monitor-employees OPINION — “The FBI requests $7 million to procure and deploy a digital watermarking solution capable of embedding unique digital forensic watermarks in commonly shared documents to mitigate unauthorized disclosures from the FBI’s classified and unclassified networks. Digital watermarking embeds a unique overt or covert forensic marker into emails and other commonly used file types, making it possible to attribute leaked information via screen photography or other non-traditional means back to the user. If information is exfiltrated from an FBI-managed endpoint, the watermarking solution can trace the document back to an employee or group of employees.”

That’s a quote from the 94-page FY 2027 FBI Budget Request to Congress that was released in March under a section entitled “Transparency of Government and Promoting Public Trust.”

I was aware of the investigative use of watermarks to track down confidential government documents, but I had never believed I would find a government agency, particularly the FBI, acknowledging publicly they were using it to keep tabs on their own employees.

Much to my surprise, the FY 2027 FBI Budget Request to Congress showed other FBI programs to catch leakers inside the Bureau. The Bureau budget document also describes other programs that are worth some public disclosure which I will discuss below.

First, some explanation.

I had decided to look into the proposed FY 2027 FBI budget after reading some nasty exchanges that took place at the May 12, Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on the Bureau’s budget. FBI Director Kash Patel was a witness and several Senators raised questions about recent news stories about Patel’s personal activities, to which he made a strong vocal defense of the activities.

After one bitter argument over stories about Patel’s alleged excessive use of alcohol, Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) asked the FBI Director if he had ordered polygraph tests for FBI personnel to determine the sources of these leaked stories.

Patel responded, “There's an internal inspection review process for any and all leaks -- especially of baseless information -- at the FBI that's been in place for the last 30 years. Those processes are followed by career intelligence and agents on the ground.”

My interest in the FBI’s “internal inspection review process for any and all leaks” led me to the FY 2027 FBI Budget Request to Congress and there under a section called “Transparency of Government and Promoting Public Trust,” were descriptions of not only the watermark program, described above, but also one entitled User Activity Monitoring (UAM) Technology.

With UAM, according to the FBI budget document, “The FBI is strategically shifting its insider risk identification posture from traditional reactive activities to enhanced proactive approaches, allowing for early detection and mitigation.”

It then says that the FBI planned to purchase a “risk management suite” and, once procured, the Bureau will need $11.4 million in FY 2027 to support operation of the system.

Back in December 2025, the FBI awarded a five-year, $7 million contract to Everfox LLC to provide an Insider Threat Management Suite with UAM capability and User and Entity Behavior Analytics capabilities.

According to the FBI Budget document, “The UAM module will serve as the FBI’s primary monitoring and logging tool, capturing and analyzing all employee activity…The system generates real-time alerts, audit logs, and reports to notify insider threat analysts of potential risks, such as unauthorized access to sensitive data or files.”

As for the Behavior Analytics capabilities, that module uses “advanced analytics across all FBI-managed endpoints to detect anomalous and high-risk user activity indicative of insider threats.”

In short, to track down leaks the FBI has put in place a system to monitor employee computer usage and analyze that usage to detect any that is unusual. Although the Everfox systems purchased are directed at monitoring FBI employees to prevent leaks of any kinds of information, the FBI budget justifies this approach by referring to an Executive Order signed in 2011 by then-President Barack Obama which was aimed to protect Bureau classified information from outside hackers.

So far, however, the stories questioning Patel actions continue, as seen Sunday with the New York Times story headlined, “Patel’s Pearl Harbor Snorkeling Trip Adds Concerns About his travels.” The authors claim they spoke with “more than a dozen current and former FBI and law enforcement agents,” as well as Freedom of Information material.

Another FBI program disclosed in the FY 2027 FBI Budget Request to Congress relates to implementing President Trump’s September 2025 National Security Presidential Memorandum-7 (NSPM-7), Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence.

According to the FY 2027 FBI budget document, “In recent years, heinous assassinations and other acts of political violence in the United States have dramatically increased. Commonly, this violent conduct relates to views associated with anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, and anti-Christianity; support for the overthrow of the U.S. Government (USG); extremism on migration, race, and gender, and hostility towards those who hold traditional American views on family, religion, and morality.”

To meet this challenge, the budget document says, the FBI now oversees the “recently created NSPM-7 Joint Mission Center (JMC),” which is “composed of personnel from 10 [Federal] agencies who possess CT (counterterrorism) and criminal operational and analytical expertise. The JMC is working to counter DT (domestic terrorist) and organized political violence by integrating intelligence, operational support, and financial analysis to proactively identify networks and prosecute domestic terrorist and related criminal actors.”

So far, there have been no reported activities of the JMC, but organizations such as the Brennan Center For Justice point out that NSPM-7 excludes high-profile examples of domestic political violence that do not comport with its storyline, such as the January 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol.

I close with one element of his time as FBI Director that Patel seems most proud of.

As he put it during his May 12 testimony, “Before I got in the [FBI Director] seat, over one-third of the entire FBI workforce was located in the National Capital Region. When I got here, I put a thousand agents into the field permanently. Every single state got more agents than they've ever had. Behind that, I sent 300 intelligence analysts into the field permanently. Behind that, I sent 500 support staff and program managers into the field permanently. And that's only Conus [within continental U.S.]. We've also expanded our overseas footprint. So, decentralizing the bureaucracy of Washington, removing the red tape in the bureaucracy, putting agents in the field…is how we're getting the mission done.”

Time will tell how that Patel action has worked out.

Patel also added to the above statement, “no one at this FBI is allowed to politicize or weaponize law enforcement. If you do, you don't get to work there anymore.” Reviewing the number of FBI officials and special agents that have been summarily dismissed since Patel’s appointment, including those who were assigned to participate in Trump-related investigations, I don’t believe that statement can be considered accurate.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 19 May 2026 17:57:54 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Intelligence Community’s Acquisition Revolution: Can Washington Move Fast Enough? https://belimedia.com.ng/the-intelligence-communitys-acquisition-revolution-can-washington-move-fast-enough https://belimedia.com.ng/the-intelligence-communitys-acquisition-revolution-can-washington-move-fast-enough OPINION -- On February 9, the CIA announced a major overhaul of its technology acquisition from the private sector. Director John Ratcliffe described it as “a radical shift towards a culture of speed, agility, and innovation,” while Deputy Director Michael Ellis declared that “CIA is open for business” in areas ranging from AI to microelectronics. With DARPA veteran Efstathia Fragogiannis now leading procurement, the agency is attempting to dismantle structural barriers that have long prevented it from rapidly adopting commercial innovation.

The announcement is significant in its own right. But it is not occurring in isolation. It comprises a broader wave of institutional reforms; at least four major initiatives were launched in rapid succession, all aimed at the same challenge: the national security enterprise must move at the speed of modern technology.

The CIA acquisition overhaul is the most visible. For years, intelligence community procurement timelines have been a frustration for innovative companies. Startups with relevant capabilities have routinely found the contracting process so slow and opaque that many simply walked away. The new framework seeks to fix this problem at a structural level, not just through incremental process tweaks. Fragogiannis’ DARPA background suggests an effort to import that organization’s flexible, high-tempo acquisition model into Langley.

A second reform is the creation of the AI Information Sharing and Analysis Center (AI-ISAC), mandated by the White House’s AI Action Plan and led by the Department of Homeland Security in coordination with Commerce and the Office of the National Cyber Director. In contrast to traditional ISACs, which are organized by infrastructure sector, the AI-ISAC is organized around a technology. This reflects an important shift: AI is now a cross-cutting capability that creates new vulnerabilities across every sector simultaneously.

Third is ANCHOR, the Alliance of National Councils for Homeland Operational Durability, which will replace the long-standing Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC). CIPAC served for nearly two decades as a principal mechanism for government–industry collaboration on infrastructure security, but its dissolution in 2025 highlighted the demand for a more modern framework. ANCHOR is intended to provide that replacement, with updated structures designed to better reflect today’s threat environment.

The fourth and most consequential change is the forthcoming National Cybersecurity Strategy. National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross has previewed a six-pillar approach focused on shaping adversary behavior, modernizing federal systems, securing critical infrastructure, maintaining dominance in emerging technologies, improving the regulatory environment, and dealing with the cyber workforce gap. The emphasis on deterrence (moving from reactive defense to proactive shaping of adversary behavior) signals a strategic change that will directly affect how agencies rank and procure technology.

For those of us who have spent careers inside the federal government, this pattern is familiar: bold announcements, ambitious frameworks, and then the hard work of implementation against entrenched processes. The distinction today is the nature of the threat.

The rise of agentic AI, autonomous systems capable of planning and undertaking complex operations, has fundamentally changed the offense-defense balance in cyberspace. Adversaries are using these tools rapidly. Meanwhile, the U.S. national security enterprise is attempting to acquire comparable capabilities through legacy processes that were never designed for the pace of AI innovation. Every month of procurement delay is a month in which competitors gain ground.

For defense contractors and technology firms, these converging reforms create both opportunity and uncertainty. Across multiple agencies, the government is communicating a desire to interact more directly with industry and to adopt high-tech capabilities faster than before. The CIA’s explicit invitation to startups and innovators is the clearest expression yet that the Intelligence Community recognizes the immediacy.

But speed alone will not determine success. The companies most likely to benefit will be those that can demonstrate more than technical excellence. They have to demonstrate integration readiness, the ability to deploy solutions securely into government environments, interoperability alongside existing systems, and scalability within demanding compliance frameworks such as CMMC and emerging AI security standards. The era of selling isolated point solutions is ending; government customers increasingly need platforms and capabilities that fit within elaborate, mission-critical ecosystems.

Ultimately, the challenge is not simply to buy faster, but to buy smarter. Real progress will depend on enduring collaboration between government and industry, on integrating security by design, and on building acquisition models that reward outcomes rather than process.

Washington’s intent is clear. The scope of these projects demonstrates genuine recognition that the old ways are no longer sufficient. The real test will be whether that urgency can be maintained over the years, not just weeks.

If execution matches ambition, 2026 may be remembered as the year the national security enterprise finally began to close the gap between the speed of technological change and the speed of government response. That would represent more than an acquisition reform; it would represent a strategic transformation and a critical national advantage.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 16 May 2026 22:39:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
They’re Recruiting Our Children https://belimedia.com.ng/theyre-recruiting-our-children https://belimedia.com.ng/theyre-recruiting-our-children OPINION -- Technology has a way of helping us skip steps.

China skipped mass adoption of credit cards and went straight to mobile payments. Nigeria bypassed landlines and went directly to mobile networks. Indonesia moved past cable and into streaming. That’s infrastructure leapfrogging—when entire systems evolve because a better alternative arrives before the old one fully forms.

Since Covid-19, we’ve seen a different kind of leapfrog—one that operates at the level of behavior, not infrastructure. TikTok replaced the social graph with the algorithm. Gaming platforms replaced traditional social environments. And generative AI has removed the barriers between languages, domains and audiences.

The result is a compression of how people discover, evaluate, and act.

In the business world, we are always wondering how we can compress the marketing funnel. Can we move through the phases of awareness, consideration, evaluation, and purchase faster? With AI, we can as sales cycles that took months can now happen in days. Wonderful.

Unfortunately, extremist groups have come to the same conclusion.

They are no longer pursuing recruits step-by-step over time. That’s old school.

They are engineering systems that compress exposure, trust, and commitment into a single, continuous experience—one that increasingly begins and ends with children.

The data reflects the shift. In 2024, the UK reported that one in five terrorism-related arrests was for a young person under age 18. Better detection explains part of the increase—but not the magnitude. What has changed is the system and it is a system that directly impacts humans under the age of 18, which account for about one-third of the global population.

The Leapfrog

Traditional radicalization followed a sequence: exposure, ideological grooming, social belonging, commitment, and then action. It required time, proximity, and human effort. We know this cycle well.

Today, those stages are no longer sequential. They are compressed—and in many cases, bypassed entirely.

Social media provides reach. Gaming provides trust. Private networks provide control. Language provides conversion efficiency.

On TikTok, algorithmic recommendation engines push content to users without intent. Exposure is passive, continuous, and personalized. A user does not have to search. They are found.

From there, engagement often shifts into gaming environments—platforms that function as trusted social spaces, particularly for younger users. These are not viewed as risky environments. After all, this is where friendships are formed, identities are shaped, and precious time is spent.

That trust matters. Because radicalization rarely begins with ideology. It begins with belonging.

One documented example is a loosely organized online extremist network, the “764 Network,” which often starts in a gaming platform. Initial contact is made in-game. From there, users can be invited into private servers, where interaction becomes more controlled, more persistent, and more difficult to monitor. The conversion event is not belief—it is migration into a closed environment.

This pattern is not new. ISIS and other groups have long used a similar model—broad distribution across open platforms followed by migration to encrypted channels like Telegram. What is new is the speed, scale, and accessibility of the system—and the age of the participants.

Artificial intelligence is now accelerating the process further.

A human recruiter might manage five to ten conversations at once. An AI system can manage thousands in native language. It can triage, profile, and personalize interactions in real time. It can simulate peer relationships, maintain constant engagement, and adapt messaging dynamically.

What once required time and effort now requires only access.

And for younger users, the system is particularly effective.

Children are more exposed to algorithmic content. They spend more time in gaming environments. They are in earlier stages of identity formation, actively seeking belonging and meaning. And they are less likely to distinguish between human and synthetic interaction.

It is reasonable to conclude this system doesn’t just reach children—it is optimized for them.

If we map this to the marketing funnel, the structure becomes clear:

- TikTok provides awareness through algorithmic reach
- Gaming platforms provide consideration through social interaction
- AI enables evaluation through personalized reinforcement
- Private networks like Telegram enable conversion and commitment

What once took months—or years—can now happen in days. The recruitment funnel is compressed.

There are additional accelerants.

Language has become a major force multiplier. Groups like Al-Shabaab now release content simultaneously in multiple languages, dramatically expanding reach and reducing friction for local audiences. AI enables instant localization at scale.

At the same time, platform defenses have not kept pace.

Much of the current counterterrorism framework was built for an earlier version of the internet—one that was public, adult, and relatively easy to monitor. Today’s environments are different: private servers, encrypted messaging, voice chat, and friends-only networks.

Gaming platforms in particular sit largely outside traditional terrorism policy frameworks. Moderation is limited, visibility is constrained, and activity often occurs in spaces that were never designed for oversight.

Even where monitoring exists, it is uneven. Think of it this way. Extremists focus on any language that does not generate enough revenue or political pressure to support investment in human moderators and AI classifiers. Less common languages such as Amharic, Burmese, Pashto, Indonesian, Swahili, Kurdish and many other languages represent platform blind spots that can be exploited at scale.

A New Recruitment Model

This new recruitment funnel can be summarized as the 3Cs.

Capture – attention via algorithm

Connect – trust via social environments

Convert – behavior via AI persuasion

That convergence is the breakthrough.

It is not simply an increase in activity—it is a structural shift.

The age floor of who is targeted for recruitment is dropping because the system now favors it.

It is earlier, faster, and more scalable to reach youth, occurring in environments that were never designed to defend against it.

And that is the point. We are no longer dealing with a content problem. We are dealing with a system design problem.

The question is not whether children will encounter these situations. They will. It is whether the systems around them are built to stop or slow them.

Today, they are not.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 16 May 2026 22:39:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why June Is the Oil Market’s Point of No Return https://belimedia.com.ng/why-june-is-the-oil-markets-point-of-no-return https://belimedia.com.ng/why-june-is-the-oil-markets-point-of-no-return OPINION -- Two months into the U.S.-Iran war, the global oil market has shifted from shock to siege. The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade normally flows — remains effectively shut. And while Brent crude hovers around $108–$115 per barrel, the real story isn’t the price on screen today. It’s the inventory math that’s quietly counting down to a crisis the world has never faced at this scale.

The Illusion of Plenty

A new JP Morgan flash note, aptly titled “The Illusion of Plenty,” lays out the arithmetic in blunt terms. At the start of 2026, the world held approximately 8.4 billion barrels of oil and oil products — a number that sounds reassuring until you examine what’s actually usable. According to JP Morgan’s analysis, only around 800 million barrels of that stockpile can be drawn without pushing the physical system into what they call “operational stress.” Roughly 35 percent of that accessible buffer had already been consumed by late April.

The distinction between oil-on-paper and oil-you-can-actually-use matters enormously. Much of the global stockpile is locked up in pipeline fill, minimum tank levels, refinery feedstock requirements, and other operational necessities. Draw below those floors and you don’t just run short — you damage the infrastructure itself. Pipelines lose flexibility, terminals seize up, and refineries lose the feedstock they need to function.

Goldman Sachs reinforces the urgency: global oil inventories are draining at a record pace of 11 to 12 million barrels per day, driven by the loss of roughly 14.5 million barrels per day of Middle East crude production. The IEA has called this the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. That’s not hyperbole — it’s the assessment of the institution responsible for coordinating emergency energy responses among developed nations.

June: The Tipping Point

JP Morgan now projects that oil stockpiles will enter “operational stress” territory by early June and hit an “operational floor” by month’s end. At that point, the market isn’t absorbing a shock anymore — it’s depleting its last reserves in real time, and price becomes the only mechanism left to ration supply.

Traders are already warning that the math points to prices well beyond current levels. Macquarie Group has modeled scenarios reaching $200 per barrel if the war extends into June, assigning a 40 percent probability to that outcome. Worst-case modeling — such as Iranian strikes disabling Arabian pipeline alternatives — pushes theoretical prices as high as $370. These aren’t predictions; they’re stress tests. But they reflect the uncomfortable reality that the market is being asked to absorb something historically unprecedented.

The world will need to shed approximately 11 million barrels per day of demand to match remaining supply. For context, the COVID-19 pandemic — which locked down the entire global economy — produced a demand drop of roughly 9 million barrels per day. The oil shocks of 1973, 1979, and 2008 each cut demand by no more than 5 million. What the market is now being asked to do, through price signals alone and on a timeline of weeks rather than years, has never been accomplished.

Asia Is Already There

The crisis isn’t theoretical in Asia. Roughly 84 percent of crude oil that transited Hormuz in 2024 was headed to Asian markets, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea absorbing the bulk. Asian buyers ran through their Gulf-origin supply roughly two weeks before Europe and the United States. The consequences are already visible: factory shutdowns, government-imposed fuel rationing, cooking gas shortages, more than 150,000 flight cancellations, and severe strain on power grids now running on fumes.

Pakistan depends on the Gulf for 99 percent of its LNG. Vietnam sourced 80 percent of its crude from Kuwait. Bangladesh is facing recession-like conditions and has ordered universities and commercial establishments into early closures to conserve energy. The Philippines declared a state of emergency in late March. India, which imports 85 percent of its crude, has slapped export duties on diesel and aviation fuel while racing to connect households to piped natural gas from domestic fields.

This is what the front edge of an energy crisis looks like — and it hasn’t hit the West at full force yet.

The Western Countdown

For now, America benefits from its position as the world’s largest oil producer and LNG exporter. U.S. crude exports have surged to record levels — 6.44 million barrels per day — as global buyers scramble for non-Gulf supply. Gas prices have risen over a dollar a gallon since the war began but remain manageable compared to Asian spikes.

That insulation won’t last forever. Gunvor Group’s head of research has warned that without a reopening, the world faces a macro crisis and recession, with June as the clear inflection point. Macquarie’s strategists caution that the real pain arrives when diesel shortages hit — because diesel is the backbone of global goods movement. When it becomes scarce, the disruption cascades from trucking to manufacturing to retail shelves.

Europe sits in an especially vulnerable position. The continent entered this crisis with historically low gas storage levels after a harsh winter, and its dependence on Qatari LNG transiting Hormuz compounds the energy squeeze. The European Central Bank has already cut GDP growth projections and modeled scenarios where Brent at $145 cuts the eurozone’s growth in half.

The Strategic Question

President Trump has stated his intention to maintain the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports for “months,” framing it as maximum economic pressure. Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has pledged to retain control of the strait and refuses to relinquish nuclear or missile capabilities. Despite a fragile ceasefire announced in early April, ship traffic through Hormuz remains negligible.

This creates what is effectively a mutual chokehold: the U.S. blockade strangles Iran’s economy, while Iran’s closure of the strait bleeds the world’s oil reserves dry. The question now is which pressure point breaks first — and whether the answer arrives before June’s tipping point or after it.

For those of us who spent years studying energy markets during previous Gulf crises, there’s a temptation to assume the system will muddle through as it always has. But the scale here is genuinely different. Previous disruptions removed 2 to 5 million barrels per day from the market. This one has removed closer to 10–15 million. Previous crises had functioning alternative routes and infrastructure. This one has seen physical damage to Gulf production facilities and export terminals. And critically, previous drawdowns unfolded over months or years. This one is compressing into weeks.

June is coming fast. The buffers are thin. And the market is about to find out whether price alone can do what government edicts and pandemic lockdowns struggled to accomplish.

The author is a former CIA intelligence officer with extensive experience on the Near East. This analysis draws on open-source reporting, regional analysis, and publicly available assessments. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

Watch my Special Competitive Studies Project podcast, Intelligence at the Edge!

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Sat, 16 May 2026 22:39:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
Congress Faces a Growing Blind Spot in the Pentagon’s Expanding Budget https://belimedia.com.ng/congress-faces-a-growing-blind-spot-in-the-pentagons-expanding-budget https://belimedia.com.ng/congress-faces-a-growing-blind-spot-in-the-pentagons-expanding-budget OPINION -- “That brings me to a concern I want to put on the record. In addition to the billions requested for the F-35 [fighter-bomber] enterprise, several of these programs I consider highest priority are being funded through the mandatory [reconciliation bill] request -- $17.5 billion for Golden Dome [anti-missile system], $7.7 billion for air moving-target indicator, $4.6 billion for munitions equipment, and $3.9 billion for space data network. Mandatory funding [via the reconciliation bill] bypasses the annual appropriations process, which is how Congress exercises its oversight responsibility. If these programs are as critical as the [fiscal 2027] budget request suggests, and I believe they are, then they deserve all the full scrutiny and sustained attention that we on the appropriations process provide.”

That was Rep. Ken Calvert (R-Calif.), Chairman of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, during his opening statement at the April 30, hearing called to go over the fiscal 2027 budgets for the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Space Force (USSF).

There are two reasons I’m focusing on this Appropriations Subcommittee hearing.

One is because the session was cut short after 53 minutes so members could take part in a House floor vote, but then the hearing was not resumed. When the hearing adjourned, only seven of the 13 subcommittee members present had their five minutes to ask questions, although they were at the end given an opportunity to submit questions in writing.

This was one more example of a House subcommittee just not playing its assigned Constitutional role, but a questionable remedy exists which I will discuss further below.

Equally important, as Calvert pointed out above, the Trump administration is playing around with the normal defense budget process, based on what the House and Senate let them do last year when Congress passed an $839 billion fiscal 2026 Defense Appropriations Bill, but then added another $152 billion for defense in the so-called “one, big, beautiful” reconciliation bill.

This year, as part of the Trump administration $1.5 trillion request to fund the Defense Department (DoD) next year, the Pentagon has planned for $1.15 trillion being inside the base budget, with an additional $350 billion coming from a proposed additional second round of reconciliation bills.

By putting that $350 billion in a later reconciliation bill, the administration seeks to avoid the need for 60 votes for passage in the Senate, which regular legislation would require, but the reconciliation bill needs only a majority vote.

Over at the Senate Armed Services Committee that same day, April 30, Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) brought up the reconciliation idea with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who was testifying about the fiscal 2027 DoD budget.

King asked Hegseth, “Why do we suddenly have a two-part [DoD] budget where this committee and the Congress generally has oversight and input to a process where a quarter of the [DoD] budget [the part in the reconciliation bill] is essentially a slush fund?”

Hegseth responded, “I wouldn't characterize a quarter of it as a slush fund, but I recognize that we see it in totality as a $1.5 trillion budget separation.” Hegseth then unsuccessfully tried to explain by adding, “Why the two pieces…why there are multiple vehicles, but we are fully committed with working with the committee to ensure that the right vehicles are utilized to get precisely this amount $1.5 trillion.”

Meanwhile, there is another chance for the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee members to ask questions about the DoD fiscal 2027 budget today when Hegseth, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine and Acting Assistant Defense Secretary (Comptroller) Jules W. Hurst III appear before them to review the $1.5 trillion DoD budget request.

However there will be a time constraint.

It turns out that the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee also is scheduled to hold its hearing today, May 12, with the same witnesses. The House subcommittee hearing is set for 8 a.m. this morning in a room in the Rayburn House Office Building. The Senate group is scheduled to begin at 10:30 a.m. in a room in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, on the other side of Capitol Hill.

I must point out that at best the House Defense Subcommittee members will have much less than 90 minutes for questions, and if all 18 members show up not all will get their allotted five minutes to ask anything. That is not worthwhile oversight.

Remember the 53 minute House Defense Subcommittee meeting where only seven asked questions? They were only dealing with an Air Force fiscal 2027 budget of $339 billion, which by the way is 38 percent greater than this year. Those same members today will be trying to cover questions about a $1.5 trillion DoD budget that is 40 percent larger than the current one.

Having read all testimony from that shortened April 30 session on the fiscal 2027 Air Force budget, I think the public needs to know more about the sixth generation F-47 which is to be the future world’s most stealthy and lethal fighter. Last year, Boeing won a $20 billion contract to build 185 of them. They will exceed Mach 2 in speed, which is twice the speed of sound and faster than 1,500 miles-per-hour with a combat radius of 1,000 nautical miles.

The F-47s are also designed so that their pilots will be the in-the-air directors of up to eight unmanned AI-driven drones, named by the Air Force Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs). According to what Air Force Secretary Dr. Troy E. Meink told the subcommittee back on April 30, the F-47 “and its integration with autonomous CCA represents a generational leap in combat capability that will redefine the battle-space.”

Meink said, “We are allocating over $5 billion in fiscal year 2027 for F-47 engineering and manufacturing development. The USAF is investing $1.4 billion for CCA testing and development, which puts us on a direct path to procure over 150 CCA by the end of the [five year] Future Years Defense Program, rapidly scaling our combat mass.”

How is all of that progressing?

But one question that needs to be asked at today’s hearings with Hegseth is what’s the reason for dividing the $1.5 trillion budget up in the first place?

At the end of the shortened House subcommittee April 30 hearing, Rep. Joe Morelle (D-N.Y.) asked Air Force Secretary Meink if the division of the DoD budget was “a one year anomaly, or is the Department planning to continue to shift defense funding into mandatory accounts [reconciliation bills] going forward, which would give this committee [House Appropriations] far less oversight over defense spending.”

Meink at first said, “We are always happy to come down and walk through with you how we’re spending the resources, fully transparent, whether it’s reconciliation or in the base budget.”

When Morelle persisted and asked about “the out years,” Meink replied, “I can’t speak to the level of conversation or the [Trump administration] strategy going forward Congressman.”

To which Morelle said, “Let me just say this, and then I’ll yield back…I think this is a dangerous precedent. I think Article One [of the Constitution which established Congress] responsibilities and the role that is vested in this committee to do oversight – I’m a new member [of the subcommittee] – but I think this is really important, not only for congressional integrity and for congressional responsibilities and prerogatives for the American people.”

I agree.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Sat, 16 May 2026 22:39:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
When a Charismatic and a Machiavellian Meet https://belimedia.com.ng/when-a-charismatic-and-a-machiavellian-meet https://belimedia.com.ng/when-a-charismatic-and-a-machiavellian-meet

President Trump will visit Beijing later this month for the first time in almost a decade. As a former CIA clinical psychologist, I have conducted many remote assessments of world leaders. I believe this summit presents both great opportunities, and great dangers. Not just because of the economic and political stakes, but because of the highly divergent personalities and styles of leadership of the two Presidents.

Xi is a cool-headed introvert, whose political superpower is his iron Machiavellian detachment. This type of leader does not allow himself the pleasures of living within commonplace morality, considering this a form of “feel good” self-indulgence a leadership failure. According to the code described by Machiavell, a Prince (and Xi is the quintessential Red Prince) puts the needs of his City States ahead of all other considerations. The Machiavellian’s task is to perpetually scan, detect, and then eliminate opponents and threats that stand in the way of a strategically advantageous future. Xi’s combination of detachment, attention to detail and abstinence regarding human needs makes him a formidable foe in conflict or negotiations.

Trump has a “hot” extraverted personality. He draws energy from those around him, is attuned to their moods and needs, and automatically seeks to connect with crowds. A true individualist – the quintessential American Maverick – Trump is a fearless instinctive leader with extraordinary charismatic skill. Trump is preternaturally able to grasp the mood of crowds and engage them. He noted in the press conference he gave immediately after a third thwarted assassination attempt that leaders with “the most impact” are commonly targeted by assassins. It is true that extremely talented charismatic leaders such as Trump, Lincoln, Kennedy, Shinzo Abe, Martin Luther King, and Ghandi are loathed as much as they are loved. These types of leaders engage emotions, good or ill, within the collective unconscious of their supporters and detractors.

When a gifted political charismatic such as President Trump is paired in negotiation with an equally gifted Machiavellian such as President Xi, history-making deals may happen. So too can epoch-defining disasters occur. The summit between Mao and Nixon comes to mind as a world-changing success story. Close observers of both past and present summits might quip that history has flipped on which country brought a charismatic (or narcissistic) leader and which a Machiavellian (or paranoid) to the table.

Hitler, Chamberlan, and Stalin come to mind in regard to historical catastrophes resulting from leaders with striking differences in personality. Hitler, though unhinged, poorly educated, and seething with genocidal hatred, possessed extraordinary charismatic talent. He was able to deceive classically educated, upper-crust British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, a scrupulous man who disdained popularity or glamour, into believing that the Munich agreement would bring “peace in our time.” Hitler managed the same trick with Stalin, who was Hitler’s equal in bloodlust, paranoia, and ruthlessness, but more cunning and detached rather than deranged. The two signed a non-aggression pact that Hitler broke.

Xi and Trump appear to share a consensus that the current post WW-II rule-based order is inimical to their goals. Each may believe that it is time to negotiate a new set of rules for a world order and believe this falls to them because of their positions as co-equals in world power; Trump has referred to a “G-2” with China. However, both also believe that a leader can only dictate international relations if their domestic power is secured and seen to be untouchable, because anything less than a full “hands off” respect from a political counterpart implies that any deals made are shaky. Hitler did not hesitate to break a deal he made with his ostensibly inferior counterpart.

Both Xi’s and Trump’s political ethics and values are founded on dealmaking. A leader destroys his enemies by making them friends – or at least, by making a frenemy who has an equal share of power that allows the negotiation of lasting deals. Both Xi and Trump believe they have unique mastery of logic as well as the unconscious dynamics of power. In their calculations, the weak and vulnerable in society are not necessarily forgotten but protected and looked after; however, power is not shared with the powerless.

As demonstrated in their respective “big, beautiful [military] parades” both men love to put on a grand performance. A showman at heart, Trump puts himself in the center of the action and loves the unmediated, moment-by-moment audience reactions. Xi is a master behind-the-scenes director, who is essentially an orchestrator and always a watcher, not an immersive participant. Xi composes spectacles of great precision and complexity.

Ultimately, both men are driven by urgency to protect and restore the historic “spirit” of their cultures, seeming to believe that they were chosen by fate for highest office. One’s call to action is: “The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” and the other’s slogan is “Make America Great Again.” Both believe in the exceptionalism and manifest destiny of their nations. Is it possible for both men to be right?

Xi and Trump may be an odd couple in world leadership, but we must remember they are part of a very exclusive club whose only members are the two most indisputably powerful men on earth. Within this exclusivity, they understand each other very well, share surprising similarities, and some dangerous differences.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 16 May 2026 22:39:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Pakistani General Running Washington’s Backchannel to Tehran https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pakistani-general-running-washingtons-backchannel-to-tehran https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pakistani-general-running-washingtons-backchannel-to-tehran OPINION -- As Washington and Tehran edge closer to escalation, the most critical line of communication keeping the crisis from spiraling is being run not by polished diplomats, but by an unlikely figure: a Pakistani general. Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s powerful army chief, has quietly become the key intermediary in the U.S.-Iran standoff, managing what may be the most important backchannel between the two sides. The mediation has thrust Pakistan to the center of the crisis while exposing it to enormous risk.

That position is no accident. While others issued statements, Munir helped broker and later extend a temporary ceasefire, facilitated day-long direct talks between American and Iranian officials, and, most importantly, kept communication alive when both sides were pulling back. For those watching closely, his central role is hardly surprising, but it should give others pause. Under his watch, Pakistan has moved aggressively to court the Trump administration, from nominating President Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize to pursuing ambitious deals in critical minerals and cryptocurrency, even as the substance and viability of those efforts remains questionable.

There is no shortage of players trying to mediate the crisis. European governments have floated proposals, China has offered a framework, and Russia has signaled its willingness to help. The United Nations has called for restraint, even as it remains sidelined. Yet behind the scenes, much of the work preventing escalation falls to Munir, a man President Trump has called his “favorite field marshal.” He avoids the spotlight, rarely gives interviews, and conducts much of his mediation quietly and out of sight, often through trusted liaisons.

Still, Pakistan is not the only channel that matters. Qatar appears to be playing a growing role, with recent reporting suggesting Doha has become an increasingly active backchannel between Washington and Tehran. For now, the Qatari and Pakistani tracks appear more complementary than competing. But Doha’s role also suggests Washington may be hedging, keeping Islamabad in play while relying on a mediator with a longer and more established record of quiet diplomacy with Iran.

Pakistan’s role in all this is driven less by neutrality than by pragmatism. Islamabad has stepped in because it has the most to lose from escalation but also the most to gain from renewed relevance. That calculated gamble runs directly through Munir, who has positioned himself as Pakistan’s de facto power center in running the U.S.-Iran channel. There is also a broader regional calculation at work: Pakistani leaders see any renewed relevance in Washington as valuable not only for the Iran file, but also for restoring Pakistan’s weight in a regional order where India has long enjoyed deeper U.S. ties. The Iran backchannel gives Islamabad a rare opportunity to matter again.

Geography explains part of this. Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and sits close enough to the Gulf to feel the effects of escalation immediately, including from energy shocks, security spillover, refugee pressures, and internal strains that have long tested Pakistan's stability. When tensions ease, Pakistan benefits; when they rise, Pakistan pays the price. That reality gives Islamabad a certain credibility and helps explain why both Tehran and Washington are willing to listen.

But geography alone does not explain Munir’s effectiveness. The man himself does. He is not a diplomat, which may be to his advantage. With a background in military and intelligence, he seems to approach mediation differently. According to regional intermediaries familiar with his approach, where traditional mediators tend to focus on managing meetings and timelines, Munir is more focused on shaping perception: how messages are framed, when they are delivered, and how they are likely to be received. In a crisis defined by deep mistrust and bad faith, framing how something is said and heard can matter as much as what is formally proposed.

By some accounts, Munir is known for being his own analyst extraordinaire – arguably less a consumer of analysis than a producer of it – while testing assumptions, connecting intelligence, and weighing risks across nuclear, regional, and economic fronts. That breadth may give him an edge few mediators have. These assessments are based on private conversations with Pakistani officials, regional diplomats, and intermediaries who have dealt directly with Munir and his circle. The views, however, are far from uniform. Some describe him as disciplined, alert, and unusually well-informed. Others describe a far less impressive and more limited figure, questioning whether his reputation exceeds his depth. But even skeptics acknowledge the one point that Munir has developed rare access at a moment when it matters.

What is not in doubt is that access. Munir has cultivated direct lines into the White House while maintaining enough trust with Iranian hardliners to keep conversations going. This dual access allows him to do more than simply relay messages. He acts as a filter, interpreting signals, adjusting tone, calibrating expectations, and reducing the risk of miscalculation. Much of this effort appears to rely on his trusted intelligence chief, viewed by regional officials as the sharper operator behind the scenes.

Of course, none of this makes Pakistan a neutral actor. Islamabad has clear interests, including stability along its volatile border, steady energy access, and stronger security ties with Washington. But neither Munir hides those interests, nor are Washington or Tehran under any illusion about them. For now, both sides appear to see Pakistan’s incentives as aligned with avoiding escalation. In some ways, a mediator that is open about its motivations can be easier to work with than one pretending to have none.

But this is also where the risks begin.

Much of Munir’s mediation process remains opaque. It is unclear who he engages directly on the Iranian side and whether those figures hold real influence, how messages are filtered before delivery, or how much he blends American and Iranian proposals with Pakistani preferences before they reach Washington and Tehran. Those concerns come not only from the secrecy surrounding the talks, but also from private conversations with regional intermediaries familiar with the process, several of whom described Pakistan’s role as extending beyond simply passing messages. Munir may be softening positions, adjusting language, or even creating the impression of agreement before it fully exists.

These are not minor technicalities and cut directly to the credibility of the mediation, raising questions about whether Pakistan is genuinely acting as a neutral intermediary or subtly steering one side in ways that protect its own interests. Recent reports that Pakistan allowed Iranian military aircraft to shelter on its airbases while mediating the crisis have only deepened those questions about how neutral Islamabad’s role really is.

To be sure, keeping talks alive between deeply distrustful parties is never just about relaying information. Each party needs to believe the other is closer to compromise than it may actually be and that walking away would cost more than staying engaged. That same dynamic arguably shaped the secret U.S.-Iran backchannel in Oman that eventually led to the 2015 nuclear deal, as well as the Doha talks with the Taliban, where mediators often kept all sides at the table despite deep mistrust and repeated breakdowns. In both cases, progress depended as much on managing expectations as on the formal terms themselves. Munir’s role is to sustain that belief long enough for it to become real progress. This means deciding not only what to say, but what to hold back, and when.

That is also where things can go wrong.

Every message Pakistan transmits – including every adjustment in framing, tone, or timing meant to speed up or slow down the talks – shapes expectations. Once set, those expectations become difficult to reverse. If either side concludes it has been misled, whether intentionally or not, trust will collapse quickly. At that point, Pakistan would not simply lose its role as mediator but become part of the problem, with consequences for itself.

This is the quiet gamble at the heart of Munir’s approach. The same skills that make him effective today also carry real risks for Pakistan. If talks succeed, Munir will take the credit. If they fail, questions about what was said, what was promised, and who understood what will come quickly.

There are already early warning signs. A recently canceled follow-up visit by a U.S. delegation to Pakistan suggests growing impatience in Washington and possibly a shift away from Pakistani mediation toward other channels. If that holds, it could quickly weaken Pakistan's position as both broker and venue.

For Pakistan, stepping into this role is also nakedly transactional. Years of economic pressure, declining diplomatic relevance, and internal security challenges have pushed the country to the margins. Acting as the bridge between Washington and Tehran changes that, bringing renewed visibility, greater leverage, and potential economic and security gains. If Pakistan becomes essential to managing the crisis, it becomes harder to ignore.

That is not cynicism but how diplomacy works. Countries with something to gain from a crisis tend to move quickly to stay in the game. The question is not whether Pakistan has interests, but whether they will remain aligned with easing tensions. For now, they appear to be, though alignment in crises rarely stay fixed for long and could change quickly.

As the situation grows more fragile, Pakistan also appears more exposed than it did just weeks ago. Iran's public and private signals remain inconsistent, likely reflecting internal divisions within its leadership. At the same time, Washington’s patience seems to be thinning. The Trump administration’s decision to step back from another round of talks in Islamabad has made it harder for Pakistan to sustain the illusion that progress is within reach.

The risks for Pakistan are becoming clearer. If Iran begins to see Munir as too closely aligned with Washington, trust could quickly disappear. If Washington demands results Pakistan cannot deliver, pressure will mount just as fast. And if the ceasefire collapses, Pakistan will feel the consequences first, both across its economy and within its already fragile internal security environment.

The risks for Pakistan are becoming clearer. If Iran begins to see Munir as too closely aligned with Washington, trust could disappear quickly. If Washington demands results Pakistan cannot deliver, pressure will mount just as fast. And if the ceasefire collapses altogether, Pakistan will feel the consequences first, both across its economy and within its fragile internal security environment.

There is also a deeper, less visible risk. Every conversation Munir facilitates, every message passed, and every signal exchanged creates a record. If talks fail, both Washington and Tehran will look for explanations—and Pakistan, having placed itself at the center, will be an obvious place to look. A mediator who simply transmits messages generally carries limited exposure, but one who shapes them carries far more.

None of this diminishes Pakistan’s role in helping keep a dangerous situation from getting worse. That alone explains why both Washington and Tehran continue returning to Islamabad – even when frustrated, sometimes with Pakistan itself. But this moment also highlights a broader reality: influence today is not simply about size or formal authority, but about being useful at the right moment, having the right access, and being willing to absorb the risks that come with it.

Right now, Pakistan has all of that and has made itself central to what comes next. It may not resolve the U.S.-Iran conflict or even hold the ceasefire together, but it has succeeded in making itself difficult to bypass while accepting the risks that come with it. In a crisis dominated by public statements, Pakistan is working to shape outcomes quietly from behind the scenes, whether that ultimately stabilizes the situation or drives it closer to collapse.

And that risk runs straight through Munir. His profile is a strength – for now. But in crises like this, proximity to success also means proximity to blame. To sit at the center of brokering a deal is to share in its outcome, good or bad. The same “favorite general” helping hold the line today could just as easily become tomorrow’s scapegoat, with consequences for Pakistan itself.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 16 May 2026 22:39:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Bridge Too Small: Why $49 Billion Can’t Fix a $1.5 Trillion Problem https://belimedia.com.ng/a-bridge-too-small-why-49-billion-cant-fix-a-15-trillion-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/a-bridge-too-small-why-49-billion-cant-fix-a-15-trillion-problem Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

At least once per week, I meet well-intended, patriotic investors putting together funds aimed at bolstering our national defense. They are frustrated with the government, they lack confidence that our military has what they need to fight and win the next war, and they want to help. But the scale of the challenge has moved beyond more infusions of capital.

In April 2026, the Department of War (DoW) officially upped the ante, requesting a historic $1.5 trillion for the FY2027 budget. This staggering figure, a 42% increase over previous levels, is a generational attempt to buy back a military edge. But as $49 billion in private capital sits on the sidelines, the question isn’t how much we spend, but whether a bureaucracy built for the 1950s can digest a trillion-dollar modernization.

The incredible levels of military innovation we see today are matched only by the incredible frustration that our defense industry has failed to keep pace. How is this possible when the U.S. spends more on its military than the next nine countries combined? And this spending dominance isn't a new trend; the U.S. has maintained its position as the world's leading military spender since the end of World War II. Yet, more capital alone may not save the day. There are strange forces at play, and we must consider the dangers of reliance on private capital to bridge a gap that only structural reform can fix.

Crowning the Neoprimes: Capital Intensity and the New Barrier to Entry

The global defense technology landscape in 2026 has transitioned into a period of unprecedented capital intensity. We have moved beyond the venture-backed experimentation of the early 2020s into an era of high-rate industrial production. This structural shift is underpinned by a surge in global military spending driven by the private market.

Within the first four months of 2026, more than a dozen neoprimes, vertically integrated technology companies designed to compete directly with traditional defense contractors, announced investment rounds exceeding $100 million. Capital is picking winners. Instead of a thousand flowers blooming, the market is crowning a neoprime class. This creates a new barrier to entry; if you aren't one of the dozen with a nine-figure war chest, you are likely an acquisition target.

Traditional primes have historically competed on scale and exquisite engineering. Neoprimes, backed by $100M+ rounds, are competing on iteration speed and software-defined capabilities. By owning everything from the sensor to the AI, they bypass the sluggish sub-contractor sprawl that stifles innovation while driving up prices. They aren't just selling a product; they are selling a faster refresh rate for the battlefield.

The Forgotten Bench

Beneath the neoprime class sits the forgotten bench, thousands of smaller startups with exceptional technology but dangerously thin runways. These companies aren't building entire airframes; they are building the arteries of the future force: the best drone interceptors, the low-latency communications, and the quantum sensors. They have an exceptional understanding of the technology because they designed every circuit, late nights, on weekends, and during the holidays. Their technology works and they are begging for an opportunity to prove it.

For these firms, the $1.5 trillion budget is a mirage. While neoprimes have the capital to act as their own POM sherpas, smaller firms are trapped in the SBIR Treadmill, a cycle of small research grants that provide just enough oxygen to keep them alive, but not enough fuel to actually reach production. If the neoprimes are the bridge, these smaller companies are the raw materials. If we lose the bench, the neoprimes will eventually find themselves vertically integrating empty shells as the underlying research talent flees to the commercial sector.

Surviving the Requirements Gauntlet

This high-speed industrial engine is currently slamming into a low-speed bureaucratic wall. The journey from a capability gap to the battlefield is a gauntlet of acronyms and competing philosophies. While DoW is making progress, they remain mired in anachronistic processes that prevent innovation.

Historically, the requirements development process (JCIDS) was the starting point for new requirements. JCIDS was an 800-day vetting cycle, a massive bureaucratic brake where good ideas often went to expire in a filing cabinet. The 2026 shift has pushed authority back to the individual services, allowing them to define their own must-haves through the Capability Development Document (CDD). This CDD is a massive improvement, but still painfully slow by industry terms.

To bypass the infamous Valley of Death, the military has also leaned into Middle Tier contracting mechanisms, aiming to field tech within five years. In the Pentagon, five years is considered rapid. In the same timeframe Silicon Valley can birth a unicorn, watch it go public, and see its founder retire to a private island.

The Pentagon has also enacted Operational Test, where new systems must prove they function as advertised, even when operated by an exhausted nineteen-year-old in a sandstorm. Only after surviving both the bureaucrats and the elements can a system reach Full Rate Production. This is a lengthy and frustrating process for smaller defense tech companies, waiting patiently while burning through their capital runway.

The Speed Paradox: Industry Building for the Threat

The strategic implications of this massive infusion of cash is profound: industry is now building for the "objective threat" rather than waiting for bureaucratic requirements. Private industry, neoprimes and startups, are already producing systems with capabilities that the government hasn't even considered drafting requirements for yet.

While the $1.5 trillion budget request includes $756 billion for modernization, a significant portion, including $65.8 billion for the "Golden Fleet", favors the heavy steel of traditional primes. For both the $49 billion neoprime class and the scrappy startups, the $1.5 trillion budget is a massive test. Is it a new market for software-defined defense, or just a bigger life-support system for moribund contractors?

Conclusion: Use It or Lose It

The $1.5 trillion FY2027 request is the Pentagon’s effort to perform in a high-stakes game of global deterrence. But money is the easiest part of the equation. If this historic surge fails to deliver lucrative contracts to those waiting under the defense primes by 2027, the private capital markets will recoil.

There is a risk of creating a "use it or lose it" scenario. If the DoW doesn't reform its programming cycles to catch these companies before their funding runs out, this deluge of private capital will dry up and move back to enterprise SaaS or healthcare. Industry isn't just driving the DoW to move faster; it is stress-testing the Pentagon’s relevance. If the DoW fails to figure out how to buy advanced systems fast, the best engineering talent will leave the defense sector entirely, viewing it as a graveyard for innovators.

The Valley of Death has become a proving ground for national will and the Pentagon is facing a mid-life crisis. It’s no longer asking “Can we build it?” but rather staring at a finished tech and asking, “Does this come with a 400-page manual we can spend three years editing?” We have the capital, we have the tech, and now we have the budget. If we still can't field the newest gear, the capital flight will be devastating, and the "Arsenal of Freedom" will be little more than an expensive, aging museum.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 16 May 2026 22:39:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
Two Fronts, One War: Why Ukraine and Iran Are Part of the Same Fight https://belimedia.com.ng/two-fronts-one-war-why-ukraine-and-iran-are-part-of-the-same-fight https://belimedia.com.ng/two-fronts-one-war-why-ukraine-and-iran-are-part-of-the-same-fight OPINION -- I recently had the opportunity to take part in a panel discussion on geopolitical issues at the Kyiv Security Forum in Kyiv. One of the key issues covered by the panel was the status of Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine and continued Western support for Ukraine. This is a topic I have addressed publicly many times since retiring from the CIA during public and private speaking engagements, podcasts, and various news shows. What I stated in Kyiv was no different than what I have argued in the past – the “West”, led by the U.S., should continue to provide Ukraine with the military, economic, diplomatic, political and morale support needed to continue facing down Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his unjustified war against Ukraine. Ukraine is fighting for its existence, and we need to stand with the Ukrainians as they defend their right to exist. We should never allow Putin, or any other foreign leader, to dictate who has the right to “be”. Thankfully, none of the other panelists disagreed with this point of view. We need to help the Ukrainians defend themselves against foreign aggression and tyranny.

But what was surprising was to hear one of my fellow panelists criticize President Donald Trump and his administration for initiating military operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) (Operation “Epic Fury”) in late February 2026. My fellow panelist argued that it was a mistake for the U.S. to start “Epic Fury” because the operation was drawing off resources that should be directed to supporting Ukraine and resulted in the closure of the “Strait of Hormuz”, the rise in energy prices and a decision by the White House to temporarily end sanctions against “Shadow Fleet” tankers that were already at sea carrying Russian oil.

From my optic, some of the statements made against “Epic Fury” have a basis of fact. For example, it is clear that in the run up to “Epic Fury” the U.S. Military directed its limited group of air defense resources to the Middle East to protect U.S. and allied interests given the rising risks of a military confrontation with Iran. The closing of the Strait of Hormuz” has led to a rise in energy prices at a time when the Russian economy was struggling under the pressure of U.S. and European Union (EU) sanctions and the increasingly effective use of “deep strikes” by the Ukrainians against Russia’s energy infrastructure. But the conflict in the Gulf has not resulted in a significant increase in revenue for the Russian State budget and, as one Ukrainian Air Defense officer recently told me, U.S. and Israeli operations targeting Iran’s defense production capacity and armed forces have limited Tehran’s ability to provide Russia with weapon systems and equipment that Moscow had been using before February 2026 to sustain air attacks against Ukraine. Unfortunately, while some argue that the Iran conflict has also distracted the White House from pursuing peace negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv, negotiations have continued but have made little progress, not because of the Iran issue, but because the Russians continue to take a maximalist stance vis a vis talks and Putin has shown little real interest in ending his war against Ukraine.

But more than anything, I am always surprised when I hear Americans and Europeans argue that the operation against Tehran is a mistake, while in the same breath, they demand continued support for Ukraine. For me, as stated above, the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine protect its existence from the terror it faces from Moscow. At the same time, Washington and Brussels also have a responsibility to help Israel defend itself against Putin’s allies in Tehran, who have been threatening to destroy the State of Israel since seizing power in Iran in 1979? Helping Ukraine is the right thing to do. So is helping Israel defend itself against the threat of annihilation.

Those arguing against military operations in Iran view the military conflict with the Islamic Republic as being separate and isolated from our conflict with Russia, but that is not the case. The regimes in Moscow and Tehran formed a strategic alliance against the U.S. and its allies years ago and have both been working to undermine Western interests for years. Iran has been supplying Russia’s war machine with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), ballistic missiles, munitions and spare parts since the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In turn, Russia has been providing the Iranians and their proxies with weapons systems, advanced technology, diplomatic and political support for years. Importantly, the Russians have also been providing Tehran with direct intelligence support, including targeting data on U.S. forces in the Middle East. Ukraine’s fight for its survival and the U.S. – Israel operations against the IRI are not two separate “wars”, but are two fronts in one common war. The demise of Putin’s allies in Tehran will be a victory for Ukraine. Ukraine’s defeat of Russia will be a victory for the U.S. and collective West, including Israel.

I cannot agree with those who attack President Trump for finally responding to Iranian threats against the U.S. and its allies with force. That action was long overdue and, while the President gave the Iranian’s a year to try to negotiate a resolution to the serious differences we had with the Islamic Republic, when those efforts failed, President Trump should be given credit for showing the type of resolve on Iran that his predecessors failed to show for far too long. It is likely that the U.S. President understood that in making the decision to start “Epic Fury”, he recognized that this decision would be attacked by his opponents and unpopular with many of his supporters, especially the “isolationist camp” in the Republican Party. Making the decision in advance of mid-term elections would be difficult for any President and President Trump deserves credit for taking a principled stand in support of U.S. and allied interests.

Unfortunately, while the President is “right” on Iran, since returning to the Oval Office he has been wrong on Russia. Like the Iranians, he gave Putin over a year to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine and contrary to the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to blame Kyiv for the failure of those negotiations, it is Moscow that has refused to make any concessions needed to end the fighting. Instead, he has consistently tried to manipulate the President and his inner circle and lied to the White House about who started the war and who is standing in the way of peace.

In October 2025, President Trump appeared to have reached his limit with Putin’s game playing when he canceled a planned summit with Putin in Budapest and slapped new sanctions on Russia’s major energy companies. In a clear sign of desperation, Putin panicked and immediately sent his “American Whisperer” Kirill Dmitriyev to the U.S. to try to convince Trump’s inner circle that Putin was ready to negotiate. The Kremlin then executed an effective covert influence operation by making sure some aspects of Dmitriyev’s discussions with U.S. officials were leaked to the media, undermining U.S. credibility, driving a wedge between Washington and its European partners and creating the false impression that the U.S. and Russia were in “cahoots” and ready to sell out Ukraine in order to secure potentially lucrative business deals in Russia in the future.

President Trump has criticized his predecessors for allowing Putin to “outplay” them. To date, he allows Putin to do the same to him. But it is not too late for Trump to reverse that trend and demonstrate to the world that he will not be outsmarted by Putin. The President should sign the bipartisan sanctions package prepared by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham which would send a powerful message to the Kremlin that the U.S. is no longer willing to tolerate Putin’s stalling on negotiations and place enormous additional pressure on Putin to agree to make necessary concessions needed to end the war.

President Trump can send a strong message to Kyiv and other U.S. allies that the U.S. Administration will not be deceived or manipulated by the Kremlin and it is ready to show the same resolve towards Moscow that it is showing on Iran. It will also send a message to America’s enemies that the U.S. will take a consistent stand against those countries that threaten the U.S. and its allies. This message not only needs to be heard in Moscow, but should also be heard in Pyongyang, Beijing and any other capital where a dictator or autocratic regime is considering attacking one of America’s allies.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 08 May 2026 20:56:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside the Pentagon’s High&Stakes Nuclear Overhaul https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-pentagons-high-stakes-nuclear-overhaul https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-pentagons-high-stakes-nuclear-overhaul “The unfortunate truth is that it's fallen to the lot of all of us to modernize the entire [U.S.] nuclear triad at once. Probably, in retrospect, we should have been doing pieces of it over the last 30 or plus years. Plus…we're having to modernize the nuclear weapon production [warheads, bombs] as well as the triad platforms [bombers, submarines, missiles]. I refer to it as the pig in the budgetary python. It's a lump that's moving through that we're just going to have to swallow in order to maintain the basic bedrock of our national security strategy, which is [nuclear] deterrence.”

That was Sen. Angus King (I-Maine), speaking on the afternoon of April 20, during a Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee session taking testimony from seven officials on the Fiscal 2027 Authorization for the Department of Energy (DoE) Atomic Defense Activities and the Department of Defense (DoD) Nuclear Weapons Programs.

Only Subcommittee Chairman Sen. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) and ranking-member King attended the roughly 90-minute session. However, in that time the witnesses described what Sen. King described as DoE’s nuclear weapons building complex, the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), being the busiest since its creation in 1980, and meeting DoD nuclear weapon requirements “while at the same time modernizing Manhattan [Project] era [1940s] production facilities.”

Meanwhile, King said, DoD “is conducting a once-in-a-generation modernization of our triad...ensuring the existing triad of ICBMs, submarines, and bombers can remain safe, secure, and effective as the bedrock of our national defense deterrence policy with two near peer adversaries, Russia and China.”

This subcommittee hearing, I thought, provided the best update on the complexities of this ongoing redo of U.S. nuclear forces and, since it had little-to-no public coverage, it’s worthwhile to present some highlights.

For example, Air Force Gen. Dale R. White, Director of the Critical Major Weapon Systems program, updated for the Senators what’s going on with the Air Force’s Sentinel ICBM program.

Sentinel was designed to replace the aging, 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, but the Sentinel program was halted in 2024 for review after costs rose from an initial $78 billion to over $141 billion, moving initial operating capability (IOC) by at least two years beyond the original 2029 target.

White told the Senators, DoD now annually allocates over $2 billion to operate and sustain Minuteman III with 10 active investment programs that ensure the system meets or exceeds all warfighter requirements. These funds will modernize essential, Minuteman III-specific equipment required for vital aging, surveillance, and nuclear hardness testing.

Meanwhile, in the restructuring of the Sentinel ICBM program, White said the first complete three-stage ground test missile had been assembled last fall, “paving the way for the program's first flight, a missile pad launch scheduled for 2027, which will mark a pivotal moment in our flight test campaign.”

This past February, the program also broke ground on a prototype Sentinel launch silo in Promontory, Utah. He called this, “a key step in tackling one of the program’s most significant engineering challenges.”

White said Sentinel is on a path to its Milestone B decision by the end of this year, which would authorize it to enter engineering and manufacturing development with an initial operational capability scheduled for the early 2030s.

A February Government Accountability Agency (GAO) report said, “As a result of delays to Sentinel, the Air Force may need to operate Minuteman III through 2050, 14 years longer than planned,” adding, “Prolonged operation of the aging system presents sustainment risks. Addressing these risks in a transition risk management plan would help ensure the system meets requirements during the transition.”

To meet the risk, White told the Senators that to manage “the intricate transition from Minuteman III to the deployment of Sentinel,” Air Force Global Strike Command has established Sentinel Site Activation Task Force detachments at each missile wing, test site, and acquisition location.

White is also responsible for the new B-21 Raider strategic bomber, which is in its flight test campaign with the physical production already begun. White said, “The first aircraft remains on track for delivery to Ellsworth Air Force Base in 2027, with a planned fleet of at least 100 aircraft, and a recent agreement with Northrop Grumman to increase annual production capacity by 25 percent.”

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Another subcommittee witness, Air Force Gen. Stephen L. Davis, Commander of Global Strike Command who said he “provides our Nation's combat-ready forces for nuclear and conventional long-range strike.”

The U.S. bomber force of B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s, Davis said, “remain in high demand across multiple theaters.” He said they have played roles in military operations, including Rough Rider, a 2025 operation in Yemen; Midnight Hammer in Iran; Absolute Resolve in Venezuela; and today in Epic Fury in Iran.

In Epic Fury, Davis said, “Global Strike Command conducted over 150 bomber sorties, 48 of which were round-trip from the United States. These missions were a minimum of 18 hours in duration, with those from the U.S. taking as long as 40 hours.”

Davis is also responsible for the Air Force Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC), the so-called “Doomsday” fleet of aircraft that would serve as a command post in the event of a nuclear attack on the homeland.

Davis told the Senators that the $13 billion program will be fully funded in the fiscal 2027 budget and that four aircraft [Boeing 747-8s] are in Dayton, Ohio [where Sierra Nevada Corporation is]… converting [them] into the new platforms.”

Davis added, “We're expecting the first aircraft to show up at Omaha [Nebraska, Offutt Air Force Base] which has been identified as the main operating base in the early 2030s.”

The SAOC aircraft are an important part of the DoD recapitalization of the aging Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) system, estimated to cost some $154 billion from 2025–to-2034. This modernization will replace 1980s-era technology with digital systems and integrate with new triad platforms.

The Senators also heard the status of the Navy’s new Columbia-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs), 12 of which are to replace the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs now providing on patrol providing the most secure strategic nuclear deterrence.

Adm. William J. Houston, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program reported the Columbia nuclear reactor propulsion plant would finalize development in fiscal 2027, adding, “The life of the ship core, now entering serial production, is directly supporting the Navy's number one acquisition priority and a key strategic asset.”

Vice Adm. Johnny R. Wolfe, Jr., Navy Director for Strategic Systems Programs, confirmed the first Columbia sub was “definitely on track” to make the initial, planned 2039 deployment. Wolfe said the biggest risk on the government side “is understanding all the testing that we're going to need to do both from the [test] pad and from the platform [the submarine] before we start deploying in 2039.”

Another witness before the subcommittee was NNSA’s David E. Beck, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, who described seven nuclear warhead modernizations and several complex construction programs that were underway.

Two just completed, Beck said, were for the W88 Alt 870 warhead upgrade for the Navy’s Trident II D5 sub-launched ballistic missile and the B61-12 Air Force tactical nuclear bomb. Still underway are upgrades for the B61-13 tactical bomb; the B80-4 warhead for the Long-Range Standoff cruise missile; the W80-5 warhead for the new Navy sub-launched cruise missile; the W87-1 warhead for the Minuteman III and Sentinel ICBMs; the W93, future warhead for the Navy D5.

Beck also said there were two phase one projects, which mean early designs, for future possible nuclear weapons which he did not describe.

Beck did describe forward movement in pit production, the plutonium-based triggers for thermonuclear weapons.

“Our requirement by law is to make 80 pits a year by 2030,” Beck said, “and we have set a goal to make 100 collectively through December of 2028, which means that in order to get there from here, we will have to make between 30 and 50 pits per year. We're moving closer to the objective.”

At the end of the session, Sen. King said, “I just I think it's important to sort of look on this as a bigger picture in terms of appropriations and expenses. This is not something that will continue forever. We'll get through these new [nuclear weapon] programs. It is unfortunate from a budgetary perspective, we're having to do it all at once, but it's nonetheless so critical to national security.”

I expect Congress will pass the fiscal 2027 budget funding these nuclear weapon-related programs the Trump administration is seeking.

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Fri, 08 May 2026 20:56:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Last Undefended Perimeter https://belimedia.com.ng/the-last-undefended-perimeter https://belimedia.com.ng/the-last-undefended-perimeter Russia has industrialized cognitive warfare, producing synthetic media at scale through a modular system that targets soldiers, civilians, and Western publics with distinct engineered effects. A Chinese frontier AI capable of executing the same doctrine is now freely available worldwide, unrestricted and priced within reach of any actor. The U.S. federal institutions built to track and counter these operations are in transition, with no successor architecture yet in place. A proven adversary doctrine, democratized capability, and an unresolved gap in domestic defenses have arrived together. And a major election cycle is coming this year.

The first thing to understand about Russia's cognitive warfare system, documented by researchers at Sensity AI in April 2026, is that it isn't a campaign. Campaigns have beginnings and ends, specific targets, and identifiable decision-makers who can choose to stop. What the research showed was a production system: more than a thousand AI-generated synthetic videos, organized into three distinct assembly lines, each engineered to produce predictable cognitive effects in a specific target population. Ukrainian soldiers at the front received content calibrated around despair, leadership failure, and the futility of continued resistance. Civilians received content designed to induce sustained emotional fatigue, erode institutional trust, and make Russian terms seem, if not acceptable, at least inevitable. Western audiences received a separate product line focused on questioning the value of continued alliance support and amplifying doubts about evidence of Russian conduct.

The strategic objective of this architecture, as the research demonstrates, is not persuasion. Persuasion requires convincing people of a specific proposition. The goal here is something more structurally corrosive: information chaos. When synthetic content reaches critical mass in an information environment, authentic evidence becomes contestable. Documented war crimes can be dismissed as fabrications. Verified reporting becomes just another narrative competing for attention. The epistemic cost of reasoning accurately under those conditions falls entirely on the target population, not the attacker. The adversary pays almost nothing to create that environment. The people living in it pay continuously.

Russian military doctrine describes this approach as cognitive warfare but more recently researchers have given the operational method a new name: the Narrative Kill Chain. Iran, separately, deployed more than 110 synthetic videos targeting the same Western audience during the spring 2026 escalation cycle. A doctrine developed in one theater is spreading. The operating manual is published, and we should expect other actors to study it.

The three-audience segmentation is not scattershot propaganda. It is deliberate targeting, calibrated to different decision nodes: soldier morale, civilian will to resist, Western political will to sustain support. Content is seeded on TikTok and Telegram, where it builds initial engagement, and then amplified algorithmically across X, Facebook, and YouTube. The platforms' own mechanisms do part of the adversary's work at no cost to the adversary.

The deeper danger is what researchers have called the liar's dividend. Once a critical mass of synthetic media circulates in an information environment, even authentic evidence becomes contestable. Adversaries do not need to win arguments. They need to make the process of resolving truth from falsehood expensive enough that most people eventually stop trying. That objective, per Sensity's analysis, is largely being achieved.

The question worth asking is what it takes, both technically and financially, to execute this doctrine at scale. Until recently, the answer pointed toward state-level actors and resources. That has recently changed.

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On April 24, 2026, DeepSeek released V4-Pro and V4-Flash as open weights under an MIT license, meaning anyone can download the full model, run it independently, and use it for any purpose without restrictions. V4-Pro is powerful, nearly matching U.S. frontier models, but at a fraction of the cost and offered as open-source. It’s available on a hard drive, permanently, to anyone who downloads it. Independent assessment by the Tennessee AI Advisory Council found that prior DeepSeek models were susceptible to jailbreaking at substantially higher percentages that comparable U.S. models. There is no meaningful indication that V4 represents a departure from that pattern.

The combination is the point. The doctrine is documented and replicable. The tool is nearly free and unrestricted. Any actor with a grievance, a distribution channel, and an internet connection can now pair the Narrative Kill Chain model with frontier-class AI capability. And the empirical research on what that combination can accomplish is increasingly precise: controlled experiments published in Nature and Science found that conversational AI can shift political attitudes by about 10 points in some settings, and in one U.S. test the effect was roughly four times larger than traditional campaign ads. This is not a projected threat. It is a measured effect.

Much of my career was spent studying adversarial capabilities, plans, and intentions. What that experience teaches, more than any specific technique, is to look at convergences. Capability without doctrine is potential. Capability plus doctrine, freely available, with limited counterparts on the defensive side, is a structural condition. That is where we are at the moment.

The United States previously built institutional architecture to address similar threats, but those functions, that resided across multiple government agencies and departments, are now in transition. They have been restructured, downsized, closed, or dissolved, and a successor architecture is not yet in place.

This is not a simple story, and it should not be seen as one. There are legitimate constitutional questions about how the federal government conducts work in this space. The line between detecting foreign synthetic operations and influencing domestic information environments requires rigorous institutional discipline to protect. Those concerns deserve serious consideration and careful legislative design. What the current moment asks is that those necessary governance debates happen faster. The threat is not waiting for the architecture to be resolved.

What any successor structure needs to accomplish is not difficult to specify, even if it is complex to execute. It needs to set standards for the detection and attribution of foreign synthetic content at scale, identifying what is manufactured, amplified, and deliberately targeted at American society. That is an intelligence and technical function, not a content moderation or speech function. The distinction is essential, and it is the one that any new design must protect. These new institutions, when and if created, should never be in the business of adjudicating truth. Their mission should be to ensure that platforms identify content that is synthetically generated, amplified, and aimed at the public. That simply provides the audience with objective data upon which to evaluate what they are reading or viewing, and it can be performed without crossing into censorship. That mission needs a home.

Thankfully, the private sector is not waiting. Companies with deep forensic capability in synthetic media detection are developing attribution tools that operate at scale. The technical capacity to identify AI-generated content, trace distribution networks, and flag coordinated inauthentic behavior is advancing rapidly in the commercial sector. A successor architecture built as a genuine public-private partnership, pairing government authority and classified context with private sector technical capability, may be better suited to the current environment than a purely governmental structure. What government brings that industry cannot replicate is access to intelligence collection on adversarial plans, allied coordination, and the authority to act on attribution findings, when they veer into criminal conduct. What industry brings is speed, scale, and detection capability that is already operating. The two are complementary. What is missing is the design and the mandate to connect them.

Three developments have arrived simultaneously. The doctrine for industrial scale cognitive warfare has been documented, refined, and is spreading across adversary ecosystems. The tools to execute that doctrine have been democratized to the point where frontier-class AI capability is nearly free, unrestricted, and available worldwide. And the federal institutional architecture charged with tracking and countering foreign cognitive operations against the United States is in transition, without a successor in place.

The effects of this convergence are not limited to elections, though elections are the most visible surface. What is at stake is the shared epistemic ground on which any form of collective decision-making depends. When authentic evidence becomes routinely contestable, when any documented fact can be attributed to a fabrication machine that everyone knows exists, the cost of reasoning accurately rises for every person in the information environment. That cost does not fall on governments or institutions. It falls on individuals; in every judgment they make about what to believe and whom to trust.

The perimeter has always existed. What changes is the technology of assault and the capacity of defense.

The country has organized around threats of this scale before. New structures are needed, designed for the technological moment we are now in, with clear mandates focused on detection and attribution of foreign synthetic operations and civil liberties protections built in from the start. Not structures that tell Americans what to believe. Structures that identify what is being manufactured and aimed at them.

That is achievable. And today, it is necessary.

Views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the positions or policies of the U.S. Government or the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Fri, 08 May 2026 20:56:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s Victory Day Parade Signals Anything But Victory https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-victory-day-parade-signals-anything-but-victory https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-victory-day-parade-signals-anything-but-victory Снявший голову, по волосам не плачут

(When your head is cut off, you don’t cry about your hair)

- Old Russian Proverb

OPINION – Russia is readying for Victory Day celebrations at a time when Moscow is anything but victorious as its unprovoked war on Ukraine enters its fifth year of destruction and devastation. And for the first time, the impact of that war will be on full display in Moscow.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is hoping to remind Russians of the achievements of the Soviet Union in their defeat of Nazi Germany. He also wants them to believe that it is he, Putin, who has returned Russia as a military power to its proper place in the pantheon of world states. But this year’s Victory Day celebration and its centerpiece parade through Red Square will be something quite different ranging from who will be there, to what will be on display.

In part out of concern over potential Ukrainian drone strikes, there will be very few foreign leaders or dignitaries in attendance. There will even be reduced representation of the leadership of the Russian Federation present on Lenin’s tomb - the traditional place of honor. In the parade itself, there will be no Russian military hardware (armored vehicles and missiles) driven through the square.

The diminishment of the parade is a big deal, having witnessed five of them myself, I have seen what the victory celebration means to many Russians. The reduction in the size of the parade is clearly out of concern for a possible Ukrainian attack, but a more honest celebration this year would be for the current leadership of Russia to acknowledge the responsibility of the Soviet Union for the Second World War starting in the first place - with the division of Eastern Europe between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as defined in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, which became known as the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. It was signed immediately preceding Hitler’s invasion of Poland on September 1 of that same year.

Today, President Putin is reportedly showing excessive concern about his own security both from the threat of Ukrainian drone attacks (anti-drone patrol boats are reportedly visible on the Moscow River near the Kremlin) and the threat of possible attack by Ukrainian or Russian assassins in Moscow.

Putin is reportedly doing most of his work from a bunker complex in Russia’s Krasnodar region and avoiding his usual residences in the Moscow region and Valdai. He is also instituting extraordinary security protocols for visitors reminiscent of those he instituted during the COVID era. He has dramatically reduced public appearances in the past few months. And perhaps also representative of Putin’s growing paranoia, in March, Russian security forces arrested Russian Tsalikov, former Minister of Defense Shoigu’s long time Deputy on corruption charges. But sources in Russia suggest the real reason for the arrest was concern that he was involved in plotting a coup. This, as there is increasing evidence of criticism of Putin’s regime on social media and in military blogger communities, perhaps contributing to the regime’s efforts to limit communications on Telegram and the shutting down of the internet in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities.

Perhaps playing most significant in Putin’s concerns over his own security and regime stability is the efficacy with which Ukraine is attacking energy infrastructure in the Russian Federation and the effect those attacks are having on the Russian economy.

In 2025 alone, Ukraine carried out more than 140 strikes on refineries, ports and logistics hubs in Russia with some targets located deep inside Russian territory. This year, Ukraine has conducted over 40 deep strikes, and the pace of those strikes is increasing, as evidenced by the success of Ukrainian attacks on Russian bases, naval targets in the Black Sea and attacks against ships that are part of Russia’s “Shadow Fleet” operating in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Those attacks are meaningful but not as economically impactful as the ones targeting Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Throughout the second half of April, Ukraine made the Black Sea resort of Tuapse its primary target. Tuapse is a sprawling oil city - home to a Rosneft oil refinery, one of Russia’s oldest, which operates alongside an export terminal that ships petroleum products overseas. From April 16 to May 1, Ukraine hit the town four times, damaging both the terminal and the refinery. The drone strikes led to a genuine ecological catastrophe.

Video images of the fires at the refinery were shocking. Plumes of smoke were reportedly visible from orbit and toxic black rain fell across the city with burning petroleum pouring down at least one of the city’s streets. Air quality tests reportedly showed high levels of carcinogenic benzene and xylene in the air as well as toxic soot. And despite Putin’s best efforts to control state news media and shut down the internet, he still cannot conceal the effect of attacks such as those on Tuapse as well as the ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk - from the Russian people.

Ukrainian attacks are economically consequential. According to various sources, there have been over $13 billion in losses to Russia’s oil sector and up to 40% of Russia’s refining capacity has been disrupted or is now operating under reduced conditions. The attacks on Russian ports have resulted in periods of exports dropping by 50% during peak periods. The Ukrainian attacks have reduced Russia’s revenue gain from the ill-timed, if temporary, U.S. lifting of sanctions on Russian energy. For a country that relies significantly on revenues from hydrocarbon sales, this is a serious blow.

There are domestic consequences as well, Russia has been forced to reintroduce a ban on gasoline exports (April–July 2026), while domestic fuel prices have already increased by 6–8%. Most of Russia’s refining capacity was modernized by western energy companies in the post-Soviet period. Those technologies are no longer available to Russia due to sanctions. Putin’s energy challenges are only going to get worse and financing the invasion of Ukraine is only going to get more difficult.

Compounding the problem set for the Russian leader in Krasnodar, former U.S. envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg has recently remarked that Russia is losing the war due to “astronomical” casualties, estimating 1.2-1.4 million Russian troops killed or wounded. These are World War Two level losses and compare unfavorably to the 18,000 lost by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Moreover, Russia is unable to replace lost troops at the pace they are being killed or wounded without a general mobilization. The troops which are being sent to Ukraine as replacements are even more poorly trained, prepared, and equipped than their predecessors - which may in part explain why Russian casualties are mounting and Russia is still unable to acquire meaningful tracts of Ukrainian territory.

One other risk to consider if Putin is feeling isolated and paranoid is the security services and leadership of the Baltic States that are increasingly expressing concerns of a Russian provocation against their countries under the pretext - especially in the case of Estonia - protecting against repression of the ethnic Russian population.

One will recall that this was part of the rationale for Russia’s occupation of Crimea and support for the insurrections in Donetsk and Luhansk as well as the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Similar concerns have appeared in threat assessments by the security services of new NATO members Sweden and Finland. The fear in those countries is that Putin will attack, forcing NATO countries to act in accordance with Article V of the NATO Charter. And Putin is betting that the Trump Administration will refuse to comply, thus ending NATO as it is currently structured. Congress may not let Trump renege on America’s commitment in such a scenario.

Judging from some of the comments coming from Ukrainian and other officials at the recently-concluded Kyiv Security Forum, there is a perceptible sense of optimism in Kyiv and elsewhere that Ukraine may win this war after all - despite the reduction or cessation of support under the Trump Administration. President Trump is famous for his disdain of being associated with “losers.” It would make sense then for him to reconsider his association with Putin and his stance on supporting Ukraine.

Next year at this time, there may be a Victory Day parade on the Maidan Square in Kyiv and neither Trump nor Vice President JD Vance will be invited. Talk about ending up on the wrong side of history.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 08 May 2026 20:56:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
Corporate Cybersecurity Is the New Frontline of National Security https://belimedia.com.ng/corporate-cybersecurity-is-the-new-frontline-of-national-security https://belimedia.com.ng/corporate-cybersecurity-is-the-new-frontline-of-national-security OPINION -- For decades, national security was defined by geography: borders, terrain, and physical infrastructure shaped how nations defended themselves and projected power. The private sector, while important, was largely adjacent to this domain. Companies built products and generated wealth, but they were not themselves considered strategic terrain.

That distinction no longer holds. Governments do not own the terrain on which this conflict is being fought. Today, the frontlines of national security run directly through corporate networks.

The Collapse of the Public–Private Divide

Modern conflict is no longer confined to military domains. It unfolds continuously across digital infrastructure, in cloud environments, software supply chains, and data platforms, most of which are owned and operated by private companies.

Adversaries have adapted accordingly. Rather than confronting states directly, a new strategy has emerged: target the systems that states depend on. This includes logistics platforms, financial networks, cloud providers, and energy grids. The result is a fundamental shift: corporations are no longer adjacent to conflict; they are participants in it.

This shift is already here. Ransomware campaigns now disrupt healthcare systems at scale, producing effects once associated with geopolitical bombing campaigns without crossing a border. Nation-state actors maintain persistent access inside critical infrastructure not to destroy, but to position. In each case, the battlefield is corporate, the targeting is consequential, and the effects are systemic.

Synthetic Asymmetry and the Corporate Target

Understanding why corporations have become the primary terrain in this conflict requires a framework that explains the underlying logic. Synthetic Asymmetry, a concept I introduced in The Cipher Brief in 2025, describes the ability of actors to generate disproportionate impact through the convergence of inexpensive, networked, and rapidly iterating technologies.

Asymmetry was once a condition. Synthetic Asymmetry is a strategy.

The key insight is that the cost-to-impact ratio of offensive operations has inverted. Traditional military power required mass and industrial capacity; Synthetic Asymmetry requires only access. A modestly resourced exploit developed by a small team, or even an AI, can now paralyze a $50 billion logistics firm, effectively neutralizing a nation's supply chain without a shot being fired.

Corporate environments are, by design, optimized for exactly the kind of interconnection that Synthetic Asymmetry exploits. A single vulnerability in widely used enterprise software can cascade across borders. A compromised cloud environment can simultaneously expose entire sectors. These are state-level operations, executed through corporate infrastructure, against national interests.

The Incentive Misalignment Problem

Despite this reality, most corporations remain structured as if cybersecurity were a cost center rather than a national security function. Boards prioritize efficiency and shareholder returns. Security investments are justified via risk reduction or compliance, not systemic resilience.

National security logic demands redundancy and layered defense. Corporate logic treats both as inefficiencies. This tension is structural — the predictable result of asking private actors to bear geopolitical costs that the current incentive environment does not reward.

The Expansion of Corporate Sovereignty

As corporate systems become more critical to national outcomes, a subset of companies is increasingly exercising forms of de facto authority once associated with states. We have seen this play out in real-time in the Ukraine theater:

Starlink became a literal lifeline for Ukrainian command and control, yet its availability was subject to the shifting calculus and jurisdictional constraints of a private entity.

Microsoft acted as a first responder and a digital intelligence agency, moving Ukrainian government data to the cloud and neutralizing Russian "wiper" malware before many state actors had even characterized the threat.

These decisions carry consequences normally associated with states, made by organizations that often lack formal mandates or the full intelligence context required for such high-stakes choices. The gap this creates cuts both ways: reactive and inconsistent decision-making on one side; a form of national-scale capacity that no government can replicate unilaterally on the other.

Strategic decision-making authority is now being exercised by entities that were never designed to hold it.

Toward a New Security Model

If corporate cybersecurity is now a frontline, our models must evolve:

Treat Corporate Networks as Critical Terrain. Deepen integration between governments and the private sector beyond simple information-sharing. Coordinated response models must reflect the reality that consequential national infrastructure is privately owned and operated.

Reward Resilience Instead of Penalizing It. Market structures currently punish resilience as inefficiency. Sector-specific liability frameworks should balance accountability for under-investment with "safe harbors" for those who meet a defined floor of systemic resilience.

Build Executive Strategic Literacy. Corporations need access to relevant threat intelligence at the appropriate classification level, and leadership that understands where business risk and geopolitical stability intersect.

The Stakes

The character of conflict has changed. It is continuous, distributed, and fought through the systems that underpin modern life. Policymakers and executives who still view cybersecurity as an IT risk are operating with a map that no longer matches the terrain.

In the era of Synthetic Asymmetry, strategic advantage belongs to those who understand the environment in which they are actually operating. The network is now part of the national security perimeter. The question is whether we are prepared to defend it accordingly.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 08 May 2026 20:56:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
Getting Our Adversaries Out of Cuba Should be our Immediate Goal https://belimedia.com.ng/getting-our-adversaries-out-of-cuba-should-be-our-immediate-goal https://belimedia.com.ng/getting-our-adversaries-out-of-cuba-should-be-our-immediate-goal OPINION -- Since 1959, the U.S. and Cuban relationship has been defined by gray zone operations that have occasionally broken out into open confrontation. At the same time, Cuba has been the proxy area for US adversaries to spy on the US homeland and endanger US security. Due to a convergence of events, Cuba and the US are poised for a monumental change in the relationship that could move from gray zone activities to a more positive transactional diplomatic relationship, but there is a long way to go before we get there and the US must stay focused on its goal of increased security for the homeland.

Cuba is a master at gray zone activity with the US as the focus. In July 2024, the National Intelligence Council defined gray zone activity as:

The deliberate use of coercive or subversive instruments of power by, or on behalf of, a state to achieve its political or security goals at the expense of others, in ways that exceed or exploit gaps in international norms but are intended to remain below the perceived threshold for direct armed conflict. Gray zone campaigns are commonly characterized by a sustained, multi-domain approach, indirect methods, and deliberate ambiguity about their aims and sponsorship.

When Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, he disrupted the geopolitical landscape with promises of wealth, education, and medical care for all. Cuba supported revolutions across the globe. It was a leader in the nonaligned movement. It exported doctors and supported medical education from countries across Latin America and Africa and then used those Cuban educated doctors to provide pro-communist propaganda to local populations along with their medicine. These were classic, gray zone activities.

As part of its multi-faceted approach to foreign policy, the Cuban government also worked with US adversaries to counter US national security. The Cuban missile crisis is a memorable and important example. Over time, Cuba developed the island into a listening post for US adversaries willing to pay for the privilege.

After the Cold War ended, the U.S. tried different approaches with the island. President Bill Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which strengthened the U.S. embargo and set stringent conditions for the lifting of sanctions. President Barack Obama kept the trade embargo intact but restored diplomatic relations with Havana, relaxed economic sanctions, and removed Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Obama’s Secretary of State, John Kerry, called the Monroe Doctrine dead. This opened the island to US tourism and separated families were able to visit each other. In 2017, President Trump rolled back Obama’s normalization efforts and enacted more than 240 measures tightening sanctions against Cuba. Now the administration has administered a blockade, arrested the leader of Cuba’s closest supporter, President Maduro in Venezuela, and put Cuba’s other two supporters, Russia and China, on notice that the US is expecting them to back off the relationship. On January 29, President Trump signed an executive order that says:

Cuba hosts Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility, which tries to steal sensitive national security information of the United States. Cuba continues to build deep intelligence and defense cooperation with the PRC. Cuba welcomes transnational terrorist groups, such as Hizballah and Hamas, creating a safe environment for these malign groups so that these transnational terrorist groups can build economic, cultural, and security ties throughout the region and attempt to destabilize the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.

On 1 May, President Trump signed a new executive order strengthening sanctions against Cuba and Cuban leaders and again calling out its relationship with Hizballah.

While the Cuban government neglected and mismanaged the economy, it has continued to support US adversaries and focused on anti-US activities. Meanwhile, the country is in a humanitarian crisis, with electrical grid failure, hospitals canceling surgeries, and schools and businesses closing. In the last several years nearly 3 million people have left the island. The government is in survival mode with its once well-respected military and spy services riddled with corruption and hollowed out. These trends began before the US kicked away the lifelines that kept the economy barely hobbling along. Cuba’s allies, Russia and China, have provided minimal economic support while maintaining their presence in Cuba’s national security institutions. Without much else to lose, some Cubans are lashing out at their leadership. Some are lashing out at the US. Most are trying to make it through each day.

Understanding the US-Cuba Dynamic

As an intelligence analyst for the US government, I worked with academia to develop insights into nation states that would help us analyze leadership reactions to specific events. Florida International University (FIU) spearheaded a series for us on Strategic Culture in Latin America. We defined strategic culture as the combination of internal and external influences and experiences—geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political and military—that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship to the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international community. In FIU’s 2009 report, the experts they gathered explained:

·Cuban strategic culture is offensive, nationalist, and wary of US intentions;

·Regime change will have to be a Cuban affair;

·The elite in Cuba came to power on a wave of anti-US vitriol and lived firsthand through US efforts to undermine their government;

·If the US wants to change the relationship with Cuba, it must reduce the sense of threat ingrained in the elite’s strategic culture.

These insights should help our government develop strategies that will meet US goals.

Next Steps

If the US administration stays true to form, it will not force a new democratically disposed government in Cuba. This is currently an unrealistic goal. This US administration, following its pattern in Venezuela and Iran, will insist on a government that will work with it. Ever the optimist, I believe that this transactional approach to diplomacy might be the beginning of the change that has eluded the island for nearly seventy years; if the US approaches Cuban leaders in the appropriate way.

Given the entrenched elites and what we know about the nation’s strategic culture, the US will have to take a long-term approach to force the changes it is looking for. Appealing to the elites’ economic needs while foregoing coercive or inflammatory language will have the best reaction and should have a trickle-down effect on the rest of the Cuban population. Focusing on pushing the Russian and Chinese national security institutions from the island is an area that might have some success. It is specific, understandable, and the Cuban leadership cannot realistically expect either country to offer much more than rhetoric and a little aid to counter the US.

What is to be Gained?

There is little for the US to gain economically from forcing Cuba to work responsibly with Washington. Cuba has few natural resources, it is a small market, and it will take vast resources to rebuild the infrastructure and reverse the decades of environmental damage that will give Cubans the opportunity to redevelop the agriculture and tourist sectors.

A clear message on why the US is focused on Cuba is important. Concentrating that message on homeland security sets the tone for our adversaries that says that we will not tolerate their spying on our borders. It tells the Cuban government leadership that we are focused on how they are affecting us and not on removing them from power. This goal of a Cuba, free of Russian and PRC listening posts is a stretch, but it is realistic and would be significant.

There are two clear victories in creating closer ties between the US and Cuba. One is humanitarian. With increased interaction between the US and Cuban governments, there will be more freedom when it comes to information but I am not yet convinced that in the short term, a new regime will treat its people any better. Such a sea change will take new leaders that have exposure to the west and that will take time if not a generation to happen.

The second victory and one that I believe is more achievable would be in the national security sphere. Winning the strategic competition vis a vis Russia and China and securing US borders would be an important milestone. To move forward with the relationship, the US must insist that Havana offer the U.S. guarantees that it will reverse its security relationship with U.S. competitors like Russia and China. By demanding that Cuba strip itself of Russian and Chinese intelligence presence on the island, the US helps secure our own supply chains and the important national security infrastructure that resides close to Cuba in Florida with the multiple combatant commands and military bases. This would be a sea change from the 70 years of sharing our southern waters with adversaries.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 08 May 2026 20:56:48 +0100 FirstHandNews
From Socialist Surge to Regional Realignment& Latin America’s Pink Tide Is Receding https://belimedia.com.ng/from-socialist-surge-to-regional-realignment-latin-americas-pink-tide-is-receding https://belimedia.com.ng/from-socialist-surge-to-regional-realignment-latin-americas-pink-tide-is-receding

Latin America’s leftist front is hitting a wall. The momentum that carried leaders like Gabriel Boric and Gustavo Petro to power has stalled, replaced by the harsh realities of inflation and cartel violence. This isn’t just a temporary dip in the polls — it’s a fundamental breakdown of the old order, and it’s reshaping the strategic landscape of the entire hemisphere.

The transformation is most visible in the aftermath of Nicolás Maduro’s arrest in Venezuela, which has sent shockwaves through remaining leftist governments and emboldened opposition movements across the continent. Intelligence analysts are now betting that the so-called pink tide won’t gradually recede but will collapse entirely under the weight of its own contradictions by year’s end.

The shift is both externally driven by the Trump administration’s openly interventionist approach and internally, as socialist policies fail to deliver economic results that maintain electoral support.

Former Revolutionaries Reject the Model

Perhaps nowhere is the ideological fracture more striking than in Colombia.

Enrique Serrano, a Colombian political analyst with over 40 years of studying U.S.-Latin American relations, tells The Cipher Brief that the left’s failure stems from a fundamental misreading of its own base.

“Those left-wing politicians in Latin America didn’t expect a rise within the middle part of our society,” he explains. “The middle class — they are drifting towards the right because they need more money. It’s more important for them that there’s no governmental regulation on income, for example, on economic opportunities.”

The shift is measurable across the region. In Colombia, Serrano notes that approximately 60 percent of the population now identifies as middle class. Yet, Petro’s policies have targeted people experiencing poverty and the working class, who “normally don’t go vote.”

In Argentina, middle-class frustration with inflation exceeding 200 percent annually drove voters to embrace libertarian Javier Milei’s radical free-market platform. Chile’s 2023 rejection of a progressive constitution — despite electing leftist Gabriel Boric in 2021 — reflected similar middle-class concerns about economic stability over ideological purity. Even in Brazil, Lula’s narrow 2022 victory margin has eroded as middle-class voters increasingly question his economic management and tolerance of regional autocrats.

The shift represents a stunning reversal for a region that seemed firmly in socialism’s grip just three years ago.

“I have never noticed such a strong and such a direct impact from the US on Latin America like it is happening today,” Serrano says. “I see that also in the context of Marco Rubio. There is a strong change compared to the last 40 years right now.”

President Gustavo Petro’s administration is hemorrhaging support not just from centrists but from within the left itself. His approval rating has plummeted to 35.7 percent with a 53.7 percent disapproval rating according to January 2026 polling, down from 48 percent approval when he took office in August 2022. Even within his own Pacto Histórico coalition, internal divisions have emerged as 72 percent of Colombians now believe the country is heading in the wrong direction.

Despite winning the presidency in 2022 as Colombia’s first leftist leader, Petro now commands only his core 30 percent base — approximately six to seven million voters out of 24 to 25 million — as the country approaches crucial May elections.

“The left failed because they’re offering politics towards really the poor, or the workers on the street,” Serrano says. “But those people normally don’t go vote. The ones who put in the most votes are the middle class, and the left is not reaching out towards the middle class.”

The electoral math bears this out. In Colombia’s 2022 presidential election, Petro won with just 50.4 percent in the runoff, the narrowest margin in recent history, despite mobilizing his base. Colombia’s economy grew just 1.6 percent in 2025, well below regional averages, while its healthcare reforms triggered a system collapse, and its security policies failed to stem rising crime rates.

Similar patterns are visible across the region. In Chile, despite electing leftist Gabriel Boric in 2021, voters decisively rejected his proposed progressive constitution in 2023 by nearly 62 percent, with middle-class neighborhoods leading the opposition. Despite his narrow victory in Brazil’s 2022 election by less than two percentage points, Lula’s approval rating has fluctuated significantly.

After hitting a historic low of 24 percent in February 2025—the lowest across all his administrations — his numbers have since rebounded to 48 percent by January 2026. However, 45 percent of Brazilians say they would never vote for him. His recovery came largely through confrontations with Trump rather than domestic policy successes. At the same time, critics cite his tolerance for regional autocrats like Maduro and economic challenges, including food inflation, that particularly hurt his traditional support base among the poor.

A senior U.S. intelligence official, speaking to The Cipher Brief on background, confirmed that internal assessments show socialist governments across the region facing simultaneous crises of legitimacy, economics, and security.

Colombia’s Dual Crises

President Petro’s tenure has been marked by contradictions that illuminate broader challenges facing Latin American socialism. While maintaining popularity among his leftist base, his administration has struggled with governance basics while simultaneously drawing scrutiny for connections between leftist politics and transnational criminal networks — a pattern that has implications far beyond Colombia’s borders for U.S. counternarcotics and security efforts.

Petro’s governance has been plagued by scandals that blur the line between politics and criminality. The Trump administration sanctioned Petro in October 2025, accusing him of allowing drug cartels to “flourish” while cocaine production in Colombia reached its highest levels in decades. Though Petro denies direct cartel ties and the New York Times found no evidence of personal criminal connections, his son was arrested in a money laundering scandal involving campaign financing. At the same time, two former cabinet ministers were jailed in December 2025 for orchestrating a vote-buying scheme that diverted public contracts in exchange for legislative support.

It goes beyond Colombia.

The Maduro regime became a haven for Iranian operatives and Hezbollah networks before his arrest, while the Ortega regime in Nicaragua has been accused of providing sanctuary to anti-American forces. This visible fusion of leftist governance with criminal organizations represents a marked shift from previous decades, when corruption, while present, remained more discreet, complicating U.S. counternarcotics efforts and security cooperation throughout the hemisphere.

Petro’s relationship with Washington has been equally contradictory. After months of public confrontations with the Trump administration over deportation flights and trade threats, Petro abruptly shifted course following a phone call with President Trump earlier this year.

On January 26, 2025, Petro blocked two U.S. military aircraft carrying 160 Colombian deportees from landing, declaring he would “never allow Colombians to be brought back in handcuffs.” Within hours, Trump threatened 25 percent tariffs on all Colombian imports, rising to 50 percent within a week, plus visa sanctions on government officials and enhanced customs inspections.

Petro initially responded defiantly, announcing retaliatory tariffs and posting on social media that “your blockade doesn’t scare me.” Yet by that evening, after the White House threat to Colombia’s $28.7 billion in annual exports to the U.S., Petro capitulated completely, agreeing to “all of President Trump’s terms, including the unrestricted acceptance of all illegal aliens from Colombia returned from the United States, including on U.S. military aircraft, without limitation or delay.”

Following the cordial phone call in January, Trump invited Petro to Washington for a February meeting that “dramatically reversed their war of words.” The sudden rapprochement caught observers off guard. The about-face revealed the extent to which even vocal anti-American leftist leaders now recognize their vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure.

Electoral Reckoning Approaches

Colombia’s May elections are shaping up as a referendum on the country’s leftward turn. Iván Cepeda, Petro’s preferred successor, enters the race with heavy ideological baggage. Following years of economic and social volatility, the electorate has become increasingly wary of socialist rhetoric. The 63-year-old senator is the son of a murdered communist party leader, studied philosophy in Bulgaria during the communist era, and has been active in various leftist movements, including the Communist Party and groups linked to former FARC guerrillas.

Cepeda faces political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella, a self-made criminal defense lawyer and businessman. The 47-year-old from Montería built a lucrative law practice defending celebrities and high-profile clients, including the recently arrested Alex Saab, before launching his presidential bid. Recent polling shows de la Espriella leading with 28 percent support versus Cepeda’s 26.5 percent, with the gap widening to 9.3 percentage points in a hypothetical runoff.

“Politics needs fewer politicians and more businessmen,” de la Espriella told Reuters, promising 6-7 percent annual economic growth through infrastructure investment and deregulation — a stark contrast to Colombia’s anemic 1.6 percent growth under Petro’s socialist policies.

The Colombian race also reflects broader regional trends. According to some experts, the pink tide’s momentum has reversed so dramatically that remaining leftist leaders now find themselves isolated.

“Gustavo Petro is facing a situation where he’s standing almost alone right now because the rest of the region turned to the right already, like Chile, like Argentina,” Serrano says. “So he’s only having two strong allies still in the region, which would be Lula and Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico.”

Even those alliances are crumbling.

“Petro only has as allies Lula, who is almost about to fall, and Sheinbaum, who is alone,” Serrano continues.

The rightward shift in recent years has brought leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, Argentina’s Javier Milei, and Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa to power, creating a new conservative bloc that has welcomed closer ties with the Trump administration and rejected the socialist solidarity that characterized the previous decade.

Existential Threats Beyond the Mainland

The potential socialist collapse extends beyond South America. Cuba, long considered impervious to change despite six decades of communist rule, now faces its most serious existential crisis.

Washington’s regional focus has shifted from Cold War ideological containment to pragmatic strategic interests; a calculation that explains the administration’s surgical approach to Venezuela while largely ignoring Havana.

Cuba, which has maintained communist rule since Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution, now faces its most serious existential crisis in over six decades. The island’s economy has contracted sharply, with GDP shrinking and basic services collapsing. Prolonged blackouts affecting millions have become routine as the electrical grid repeatedly fails, while severe food shortages have driven unprecedented waves of emigration.

“Their situation is worse (than Venezuela) because they don’t have natural resources,” Serrano underscores. “They don’t have electricity. They can’t produce electricity on their own, and they don’t have food either. So it’s very unlikely that the government in Cuba might survive this year.”

The island’s energy infrastructure has repeatedly failed, leaving millions without electricity for days at a time, while food shortages have driven unprecedented emigration.

Nicaragua faces similar pressures under Daniel Ortega’s increasingly isolated regime. Ortega has ruled since 2007, consolidating power through mass arrests of opposition leaders, shuttering of independent media, and the expulsion of international observers. The regime’s systematic repression has driven over 300,000 Nicaraguans into exile while leaving the country economically stagnant and diplomatically isolated.

“Those authoritarian governments like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba — what they in real life try to do is just to gain time,” Serrano told The Cipher Brief. “They will disappear earlier or later. It’s just they try to get as much time as possible.”

The convergence of economic failure, political repression, and technological change has created conditions fundamentally different from those that allowed previous generations of authoritarian leftist governments to survive for decades.

Technology Accelerates Socialist Decline

In addition, the digital revolution has destroyed the old-school socialist playbook. As mobile technology has expanded across Latin America, governments have lost their most powerful tool: the narrative. U.S. analysts are currently monitoring how this decentralized flow of information, from protest coordination on encrypted apps to real-time leaks of government corruption, is creating a level of accountability that previous generations of leftist leaders never had to face.

Beyond Cuba and Nicaragua, other left-wing regimes recently faced Trump administration scrutiny. In Honduras, leftist president Xiomara Castro was defeated in the November 2025 elections by Trump-backed conservative Nasry Asfura, who took office in January 2026. Castro’s tenure had raised concerns in Washington about her government’s ties to China and open support for authoritarian regimes, including Venezuela and Nicaragua.

U.S. Strategic Implications

With the collapse of the pink tide, Washington faces both opportunities and risks. The shift away from socialism aligns with U.S. interests, but it also creates vulnerabilities that adversaries may exploit. The penetration of organized crime, particularly groups with ties to Iran and Hezbollah, remains a persistent concern.

Mauricio Baquero, Venezuelan opposition organizer and María Corina Machado’s representative for Latin America, tells The Cipher Brief that authoritarian governments’ tolerance of malign foreign actors poses direct threats to U.S. security.

“The Nicholas Maduro government allowed Hezbollah and Iran officials to be in Venezuela,” he explains. “So that’s obviously a source of insecurity in the whole region.”

Luis Bustos, spokesperson for Venezuelan opposition party Primero Justicia, tells The Cipher Brief that removing foreign actors remains a critical challenge even after Maduro’s arrest. Regarding whether interim president Delcy Rodríguez continues tolerating Hezbollah’s presence in Venezuela, he explains that “it’s not possible to get them out of the country really quickly.” his reality, he explains, underscores why “it’s not recommendable” to rush elections.

“We need a time of transition where we make sure that all those influences from abroad, among them, Hezbollah, for example, will leave the country,” he says.

Since socialist governments have provided sanctuary to anti-American actors, including Iranian operatives, Russian intelligence services, and Chinese surveillance networks, Washington has made the pink tide’s recession a national security priority, rather than a matter of ideological preference.

According to Serrano and others, the Trump administration’s aggressive approach, particularly in Venezuela, has accelerated changes that might otherwise have taken years.

As several Latin American nations drift rightward, the question is no longer whether the pink tide will recede, but whether any socialist government can survive the decade ahead without dramatic policy reversals that abandon the model’s core premises.

“Not over, but it’s failing,” Serrano adds. “And the region needs to examine why.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 04 May 2026 19:26:25 +0100 FirstHandNews
Deep in Cartel Country: CIA Deaths Expose Fragile U.S.&Mexico Security Ties https://belimedia.com.ng/deep-in-cartel-country-cia-deaths-expose-fragile-us-mexico-security-ties https://belimedia.com.ng/deep-in-cartel-country-cia-deaths-expose-fragile-us-mexico-security-ties

Around two o’clock in the morning of April 19, an SUV veered off a twisting dirt road in a remote corner of the Sierra Madre, plunged into a ravine and burst into flames. The dead were two Chihuahua state law enforcement officers and two unnamed Americans -- who were quickly revealed to be CIA officers.

A state official initially said that all four of the dead were returning from two days of fairly spectacular raids of methamphetamine super-labs in the highlands near a hamlet called El Pinal. That account was swiftly retracted, and the Americans were described as “instructors” teaching state cops how to pilot drones. Either way, the CIA had just put boots on the ground deep in Mexico’s Golden Triangle, a forbidding terrain infamous for vast fields of opium poppies and marijuana, clandestine landing strips for Colombian cocaine flights, and, lately, synthetic drug labs pumping out tons of methamphetamine and fentanyl. This might be a first, but at the very least it was rare, and the price was terrible.

“Why would CIA personnel go deep into Mexico’s cartel country - to a place that’s considered the turf of an extremely violent, heavily armed transnational group?” CIA clandestine service veteran Ralph Goff asked rhetorically and answered. “CIA officers go where their intelligence missions take them. And that includes dangerous areas like war zones and high crime areas - and Mexico is an unfortunate combination of both, with the added risk of dangerous roads. We are trained to deal with dangerous situations and events, which reduces risk but never eliminates risk, and we are aware of this.”

The Trump administration’s intensifying pressure on Mexico’s organized crime families is stirring furious protests from Mexico City, where political leaders are acutely protective of perceived insults to their national sovereignty. Yesterday Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum told reporters that her government had sent Washington a formal "diplomatic note” objecting to the CIA officers actions and suggesting they had gone rogue. “The [U.S.] federal government didn't know about the involvement of these people (in the operation) and we hope that it's an exception," Sheinbaum said in her daily morning press conference, according to Reuters. "...From now on, as has been done, our constitution and national security law should be followed." Sheinbaum’s remarks followed a statement issued Saturday by Mexico's security cabinet, charging that the U.S. officials had not been accredited to participate in security activities in Mexico and complaining that one of them had entered Mexico as a tourist.

The deaths of the two CIA officers have aggravated longstanding U.S.-Mexico tensions over security ⁠cooperation, particularly when it comes to operations against Mexico’s multi-billion-dollar cartels, which have diversified from drug trafficking into human trafficking, petroleum pirating, extortion and other lucrative crimes. President Donald Trump has repeatedly pressed for greater use ⁠ofU.S. military force to combat Mexican cartels and has threatened unilateral action, even inside Mexican territory.

Sheinbaum has pushed back, asserting that the U.S. cannot send U.S. agents or troops across the border but is welcome to share intelligence with Mexican officials.

For many U.S. CIA, DEA and FBI personnel assigned to Mexico and the border, passing actionable intelligence about specific high-value targets is a non-starter because of widespread corruption in the Mexican government. A number of U.S. informants have been murdered in recent years, according to U.S. officials, with leaks suspected though usually unproven. U.S. Ambassador Ron Johnson, a former Green Beret and CIA operations officer, appears to have taken the side of American agents and intelligence officers wary of cooperating with their Mexican counterparts because of corruption. Significantly, last Thursday, Johnson traveled to Los Mochis, the town where notorious cartel kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman was captured in 2016, deep in Sinaloa state, the second leg of the Golden Triangle, and spoke at a ground-breaking for a joint U.S.-Mexican methanol plant. “If we want projects like this to succeed – if we want our shared future to be as bright as it can be – corruption and extortion have no place,” Johnson said pointedly. The existing bilateral trade agreement, he said, “requires our governments to criminalize bribery and corruption and enforce codes of conduct for public officials. We may soon see significant action on this front. So, stay tuned.”

This is exclusive Subscriber+Member content.


By “stay tuned,” the Los Angeles Times reported, citing unnamed sources, the American ambassador was signaling an escalating Trump administration anti-corruption campaign, focused on Mexican officials allegedly linked to organized crime. This campaign would be more severe than the administration’s decision last October to revoke ⁠the visas of more than 50 Mexican politicians for “activities ⁠that run contrary toAmerica's national interest."

CIA officers have worked closely with some Mexican military and security units, since the Agency’s creation in the early Cold War. Officers based in Mexico City have long cultivated relationships with certain Mexican officials willing to help keeping tabs on suspected Russian, Chinese, and Cuban spies, Middle Eastern extremists and other shady characters suspected of using Mexico City as a base for espionage or violent conspiracies against the U.S.

Now the Agency is casting a broader net, in response to Trump’s second-term push for an all-of-government assault on the Mexican cartels. On his inauguration day in January 2025, Trump designated Mexico’s major cartels “foreign terrorist organizations” and “specially designated global terrorists.” In March of last year, as The Cipher Brief reported at the time, the administration designated drug trafficking as the nation’s top national security threat, a major departure from past practices. Since then, officials say, the CIA has been looking for ways to apply its technological and human assets to counternarcotics work, in the Triangle and beyond.

Experts say intelligence about the Golden Triangle and its gateway border city, Juarez, has never been more crucial, as that smuggling corridor has become a battleground between two ambitious emerging crime groups: La Linea, loosely aligned with underworld leader Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion, CJNG, currently the world’s richest, most powerful cartel, and the Gente Nueva, a splinter of the Sinaloa Federation, a waning but still powerful and storied old-line cartel. Both of the upstarts operate in and around Juarez, on the border across from El Paso, a major American metropolitan area and one of the nation’s most important trade hubs, handling $106 billion in U.S.-Mexico cross-border trade in 2024.

“Paramilitary officers and Case Officers from the CIA's Directorate of Operations are tasked to fill the gaps that other USG agencies may have in their programs and to bring our unique skills to bear in support of law enforcement agencies like DEA and FBI as well as DoW,” Goff said.

In Mexico, the CIA strives to keep a low profile, because Mexican politicians, influential people and the press are deeply suspicious of Washington, especially its spy agencies. The current exceptional episode began last Sunday, April 19, when Chihuahua state Attorney General César Jáuregui announced the sad news that Pedro Román Oseguera Cervantes, commander of the state agency of investigation, AEI, a state policeman, and two American “instructors” from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City had been killed in a vehicle accident in southern Chihuahua. He said they had been returning to the state capital of Chihuahua City after taking part in a state police-military operation raiding six industrial-size methamphetamine labs in the thickly forested highlands. The destruction of a major cartel complex was heralded as a win for the good guys, but Jáuregui inadvertently ignited a political firestorm that’s still raging. Questions proliferated Tuesday, when the Washington Post and Associated Press reported that the dead American “instructors” were actually from the CIA.

“There cannot be agents from any U.S. government institution operating in the Mexican field,” Sheinbaum told reporters Wednesday. “It is very important that something like this not be allowed to go unaddressed.” She said she was considering sanctioning Chihuahua law enforcement officials for dealing directly with the CIA instead of deferring to the central government.

Sheinbaum’s efforts to corral the CIA, and perhaps other U.S. agencies, brought a sharp rebuke from the White House. “I think the president would agree that some sympathy from Claudia Sheinbaum would be well worth it for the two American lives that were lost, considering all that the United States of America is doing currently under this president to stop the scourge of drug trafficking through Mexico to the United States,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said.


Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that keeps you up to speed on national security. Sign up today.


Now Sheinbaum is caught between Trump, who last month issued a proclamation promising the “dismantlement” of the cartels, and Mexican nationalists who view yielding to Washington’s demands as a grave threat to their country’s hard-won sovereignty. Yesterday Sheinbaum tried to thread the needle by lodging a formal protest over the CIA agents’ presence, at the same time forgiving Washington’s transgression, just this once. “Let us hope this is an exceptional case ... and that a situation like this never happens again,” she said. Scolding from Mexico City isn't likely to win friends and influence people at the White House, or in American intelligence and law enforcement circles.

“It’s appalling to hear how Claudia Sheinbaum has responded to the tragic loss of life of two officers - presumably Agency officers - in the service of our country,” David Shedd, a CIA veteran and former acting Defense Intelligence Agency leader, told The Cipher Brief. “There was absolutely nothing illegal or extrajudicial associated with what these officers were doing in Mexico, as the cooperation to include assisting the Mexican security personnel in forward positions is not new. In fact, the kind of mission that these officers were on has led me to believe with a high degree of confidence that bilateral security cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico has never been better. That cooperation has been sanctioned by Sheinbaum. For her to publicly distance herself from our joint security operations is again, appalling.”

Shedd said that the value of sending the CIA officers on the lab raid would have been to let them examine the labels and markings on the drums and sacks of precursor chemicals, so they could identify the chemicals’ points of origin. According to DEA intelligence reports, most of the precursor chemicals used in meth production come from China. “The mission that these U.S. officers were on was absolutely critical to the efforts, to not only destroy the lab but if at all possible, establish a fact-based pattern of Chinese ties to the Mexican cartels,” Shedd said.

Adding to the cross-border tensions: Mexican officials’ shifting stories about what happened on that dark night in the Sierra Madre. Jáuregui, the Chihuahua attorney general, was publicly chastised by Mexico City, then held a second press conference to say there had been a misunderstanding, and CIA officers hadn’t been anywhere near the actual lab raids. He said they had been in another mountain village – Polanco, pop. 403 – six-and-a-half hours away from the action, training state officials how to operate drones. He didn’t explain why the state needed drone operators – presumably to spot clandestine labs like the ones that had just been raided where the Americans were definitely NOT on the scene.

Jáuregui said that once the Americans wrapped up the drone training session, they contacted officials with the Chihuahua state investigation agency, AEI, who were coming back from the lab raid, and asked to hitch a ride to the state capital, so they could catch their flight home to Mexico City. (The number of CIA men involved is murky. The Los Angeles Times reported that there were four CIA personnel, two in the lead SUV with the AEI’s director, and another two in a pickup truck with other Mexican cops.) At any rate, the police-military convoy picked up the Americans. Around 2 a.m. the lead SUV, with two CIA men, went off the road, tumbled into the ravine and exploded. It all happened too fast for others in the convoy to save them. So far, no evidence has surfaced to suggest foul play, nor a conspiracy against the CIA. By all accounts, so far, it was just very bad luck.

“Unfortunately, long days followed by bad roads and being tired – there are car accidents,” says Goff. “There's 140 memorial stars on the wall, and our martyrs there. Not all of them were killed by enemy action. We have colleagues who were killed in car crashes, killed in plane crashes, killed in hotel fires, things like that. But it still makes them our martyrs. And we mourn them and we're saddened by their loss, but it's like any endeavor. It's part of what we take on.”

]]>
Fri, 01 May 2026 21:38:56 +0100 FirstHandNews
CIA Deaths Expose Fragile U.S.&Mexico Security Ties https://belimedia.com.ng/cia-deaths-expose-fragile-us-mexico-security-ties https://belimedia.com.ng/cia-deaths-expose-fragile-us-mexico-security-ties

Around two o’clock in the morning of April 19, an SUV veered off a twisting dirt road in a remote corner of the Sierra Madre, plunged into a ravine and burst into flames. The dead were two Chihuahua state law enforcement officers and two unnamed Americans -- who were identified by Mexican authorities as CIA officers.

A state official initially said that all four of the dead were returning from two days of fairly spectacular raids of methamphetamine super-labs in the highlands near a hamlet called El Pinal. That account was swiftly retracted, and the Americans were described as “instructors” teaching state cops how to pilot drones. Either way, the CIA had just put boots on the ground deep in Mexico’s Golden Triangle, a forbidding terrain infamous for vast fields of opium poppies and marijuana, clandestine landing strips for Colombian cocaine flights, and, lately, synthetic drug labs pumping out tons of methamphetamine and fentanyl. This might be a first, but at the very least it was rare, and the price was terrible.

“Why would CIA personnel go deep into Mexico’s cartel country - to a place that’s considered the turf of an extremely violent, heavily armed transnational group?” CIA clandestine service veteran Ralph Goff asked rhetorically and answered. “CIA officers go where their intelligence missions take them. And that includes dangerous areas like war zones and high crime areas - and Mexico is an unfortunate combination of both, with the added risk of dangerous roads. We are trained to deal with dangerous situations and events, which reduces risk but never eliminates risk, and we are aware of this.”

The Trump administration’s intensifying pressure on Mexico’s organized crime families is stirring furious protests from Mexico City, where political leaders are acutely protective of perceived insults to their national sovereignty. Yesterday, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum told reporters that her government had sent Washington a formal "diplomatic note” objecting to the CIA officers actions and suggested they had gone rogue. “The [U.S.] federal government didn't know about the involvement of these people (in the operation) and we hope that it's an exception," Sheinbaum said in her daily morning press conference, according to Reuters. "...From now on, as has been done, our constitution and national security law should be followed." Sheinbaum’s remarks followed a statement issued on Saturday by Mexico's security cabinet, charging that the U.S. officials had not been accredited to participate in security activities in Mexico and complained that one of them had entered Mexico as a tourist.

The deaths of the two CIA officers have aggravated longstanding U.S.-Mexico tensions over security ⁠cooperation, particularly when it comes to operations against Mexico’s multi-billion-dollar cartels, which have diversified from drug trafficking into human trafficking, petroleum pirating, extortion and other lucrative crimes. President Donald Trump has repeatedly pressed for greater use ⁠of U.S. military force to combat Mexican cartels and has threatened unilateral action, even inside Mexican territory.

Sheinbaum has pushed back, asserting the U.S. cannot send U.S. officers or troops across the border but is welcome to share intelligence with Mexican officials.

For CIA, DEA and FBI personnel assigned to Mexico and the border area, passing actionable intelligence about specific high-value targets has often been a non-starter, citing widespread corruption within the Mexican government. A number of U.S. informants have been murdered in recent years, according to U.S. officials, with leaks suspected though usually unproven. U.S. Ambassador Ron Johnson, a former Green Beret and CIA operations officer, appears to have taken the side of U.S. intelligence officers wary of cooperating with their Mexican counterparts because of the risk of corruption. Significantly, last Thursday, Johnson traveled to Los Mochis, the town where notorious cartel kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman was captured in 2016, deep in Sinaloa state, also known as the second leg of the Golden Triangle, and spoke at a ground-breaking for a joint U.S.-Mexican methanol plant. “If we want projects like this to succeed – if we want our shared future to be as bright as it can be – corruption and extortion have no place,” Johnson said pointedly. The existing bilateral trade agreement, he said, “requires our governments to criminalize bribery and corruption and enforce codes of conduct for public officials. We may soon see significant action on this front. So, stay tuned.”

This is exclusive Subscriber+Member content.


By “stay tuned,” the Los Angeles Times reported, citing unnamed sources, the American ambassador was signaling an escalating Trump administration anti-corruption campaign, focused on Mexican officials allegedly linked to organized crime. This campaign would be more severe than the administration’s decision last October to revoke ⁠the visas of more than 50 Mexican politicians for “activities ⁠that run contrary to America's national interest."

CIA officers have worked closely with some Mexican military and security units since the Agency’s creation in the early Cold War. Officers based in Mexico City have long cultivated relationships with Mexican officials willing to help keep tabs on suspected Russian, Chinese, and Cuban spies, Middle Eastern extremists and other shady characters suspected of using Mexico City as a base for espionage or violent conspiracies against the U.S.

Now the Agency is casting a broader net, in response to Trump’s second-term push for an all-of-government assault on the Mexican cartels. On his inauguration day in January 2025, Trump designated Mexico’s major cartels as “foreign terrorist organizations” and “specially designated global terrorists.” In March of last year, as The Cipher Brief reported, the administration designated drug trafficking as the nation’s top national security threat, a major departure from past designations. Since then, officials say, the CIA has been looking for ways to apply its technological and human assets to counternarcotics work, in the Triangle and beyond.

Experts say intelligence about the Golden Triangle and its gateway border city, Juarez, has never been more crucial, as that smuggling corridor has become a battleground between two ambitious emerging crime groups: La Linea, loosely aligned with underworld leader od the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion, (CJNG) currently the world’s richest, most powerful cartel, and the Gente Nueva, a splinter of the Sinaloa Federation, a waning but still powerful and storied old-line cartel. Both of the upstarts operate in and around Juarez, on the border across from El Paso, a major American metropolitan area and one of the nation’s most important trade hubs, handling an estimated $106 billion in U.S.-Mexico cross-border trade in 2024 alone.

“Paramilitary officers and Case Officers from the CIA's Directorate of Operations are tasked to fill the gaps that other USG agencies may have in their programs and to bring our unique skills to bear in support of law enforcement agencies like DEA and FBI as well as DoW,” Goff said.

In Mexico, the CIA strives to keep a low profile, because Mexican politicians, influential people and the press are deeply suspicious of Washington, especially its spy agencies. The current exceptional episode began on Sunday, April 19, when Chihuahua state Attorney General César Jáuregui announced news that Pedro Román Oseguera Cervantes, commander of the state agency of investigation, AEI, a state policeman, and two American “instructors” from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City had been killed in a vehicle accident in southern Chihuahua. He said they had been returning to the state capital of Chihuahua City after taking part in a state police-military operation raiding six industrial-size methamphetamine labs in the thickly forested highlands. The destruction of a major cartel complex was heralded as a win for the good guys, but Jáuregui inadvertently ignited a political firestorm that’s still raging. Questions proliferated when the Washington Post and Associated Press, citing an unnamed U.S. official, reported that the American “instructors” who were killed were working for the CIA.

“There cannot be agents from any U.S. government institution operating in the Mexican field,” Sheinbaum told reporters. “It is very important that something like this not be allowed to go unaddressed.” She said she was considering sanctioning Chihuahua law enforcement officials for dealing directly with the CIA instead of deferring to the central government.

Sheinbaum’s efforts to corral the CIA, and perhaps other U.S. agencies, brought a sharp rebuke from the White House. “I think the president would agree that some sympathy from Claudia Sheinbaum would be well worth it for the two American lives that were lost, considering all that the United States of America is doing currently under this president to stop the scourge of drug trafficking through Mexico to the United States,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said.


Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that keeps you up to speed on national security. Sign up today.


Now Sheinbaum is caught between Trump, who last month issued a proclamation promising the “dismantlement” of the cartels, and Mexican nationalists who view yielding to Washington’s demands as a grave threat to their country’s hard-won sovereignty. Sheinbaum tried to thread the needle by lodging a formal protest over the CIA presence, at the same time forgiving Washington’s transgression, just this once. “Let us hope this is an exceptional case ... and that a situation like this never happens again,” she said.

“It’s appalling to hear how Claudia Sheinbaum has responded to the tragic loss of life of two officers - presumably Agency officers - in the service of our country,” David Shedd, a CIA veteran and former acting Defense Intelligence Agency leader, told The Cipher Brief. “There was absolutely nothing illegal or extrajudicial associated with what these officers were doing in Mexico, as the cooperation to include assisting the Mexican security personnel in forward positions is not new. In fact, the kind of mission that these officers were on has led me to believe with a high degree of confidence that bilateral security cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico has never been better. That cooperation has been sanctioned by Sheinbaum. For her to publicly distance herself from our joint security operations is again, appalling.”

Shedd said that the value of sending the CIA officers on the lab raid would have been to let them examine the labels and markings on the drums and sacks of precursor chemicals, so they could identify the chemicals’ points of origin. According to DEA intelligence reports, most of the precursor chemicals used in meth production come from China. “The mission that these U.S. officers were on was absolutely critical to the efforts, to not only destroy the lab but if at all possible, establish a fact-based pattern of Chinese ties to the Mexican cartels,” Shedd said.

Adding to the cross-border tensions: Mexican officials’ shifting stories about what happened on that dark night in the Sierra Madre. Jáuregui, the Chihuahua attorney general, was publicly chastised by Mexico City, then held a second press conference to say there had been a misunderstanding, and CIA officers hadn’t been anywhere near the actual lab raids. He said they had been in another mountain village – Polanco, pop. 403 – six-and-a-half hours away from the action, training state officials on how to operate drones. He didn’t explain why the state needed drone operators – presumably to spot clandestine labs.

Jáuregui said that once the Americans wrapped up the drone training session, they contacted officials with the Chihuahua state investigation agency, AEI, who were coming back from the lab raid, and asked to hitch a ride to the state capital, so they could catch their flight home to Mexico City. (The number of CIA officers involved is murky. The Los Angeles Times reported that there were four CIA personnel, two in the lead SUV with the AEI’s director, and another two in a pickup truck with other Mexican police officers.) At any rate, the police-military convoy picked up the Americans. Around 2 a.m. the lead SUV, with two CIA employees, went off the road, tumbled into the ravine and exploded. It all happened too fast for others in the convoy to help. So far, no evidence has surfaced to suggest foul play. By all accounts, so far, it was just very bad luck.

“Unfortunately, long days followed by bad roads and being tired – there are car accidents,” says Goff. “There's 140 memorial stars on the wall, and our martyrs there. Not all of them were killed by enemy action. We have colleagues who were killed in car crashes, killed in plane crashes, killed in hotel fires, things like that. But it still makes them our martyrs. And we mourn them and we're saddened by their loss, but it's like any endeavor. It's part of what we take on.”

]]>
Fri, 01 May 2026 21:38:56 +0100 FirstHandNews
Britain’s Antisemitism Crisis Is Now a National Security Threat https://belimedia.com.ng/britains-antisemitism-crisis-is-now-a-national-security-threat https://belimedia.com.ng/britains-antisemitism-crisis-is-now-a-national-security-threat There has been yet another terrorist attack targeting Britain’s Jewish community. This time, two Jewish men were stabbed on Wednesday in Golders Green, London - a leading center of Jewish life and culture in the UK. The incident follows a series of recent attacks on Jewish targets, including assaults on Jewish ambulances in north London just weeks ago, and comes amid a broader surge in anti-Jewish violence across Australia, the United States, Europe, and beyond.

The reaction to this attack has been more marked than any previous antisemitic attack in the Uk that I can remember. It has dominated headlines here, in the mainstream media including the BBC. Prime Minister Starmer reacted with condemnation within minutes of the attack taking place. Politicians on all sides - almost all sides - have said that British Jews have to feel safe, have to have confident expectations of being able to live a normal life like other communities in the UK. More Jewish people have been interviewed by the media and the messages they have been giving out are consistent. They do not feel safe, they do not feel they are understood.

The man suspected of committing the two stabbings has been named as Esse Suleiman, a British national born in Somalia. Responsibility for the attack has been claimed by a terrorist organization with links to Iran.

I have written about this problem before, and I have two contentions that should make this relevant to all readers of the Cipher Brief. The first, as I have said before, is that antisemitism has to be treated as a national security issue. The second and related is that antisemitism is not just a threat to the Jewish community but to democracy. You cannot have a democracy in which one group of the community is battered into silence, fear and flight.

The issue therefore matters to people everywhere who share the values of democracy and tolerance.

The clear goal of these attacks is to make Jewish people in England - perhaps less than 0.5% of our population - feel so unsafe that they leave the country. If they take the obvious route - to Israel - this will somehow only play to the conspiracy theories of Islamists and the extreme left. So where else do they go?

I do not think most British Jews will be going anywhere, but they need more than words from the political class, more than a few extra police officers, or cameras and fences around synagogues, Jewish schools and other buildings.

The need is for a government strategy that specifically counters antisemitism. It has not been enough for people to unite against racism because many people who claim to be, think they are, anti-racist still wittingly or unwittingly perpetrate antisemitism. So, antisemitism is a distinct problem, with distinct causes and needs distinct solutions. The idea that Jews are somehow not an ethnic minority but people at the top of the pile needs to be countered. The idea that there is an alternative to a homeland for Jews needs to be countered. Conspiracy theories that I do not need to retail, but which continue to flood across social media, have to be identified and refuted.

How? When we recognized we had a problem with violent Islamist extremism after the London bomb attacks in 2005 it was recognized that ideas behind the extremism needed to be challenged. Now the same is true of anti-Semitism. The police and intelligence agencies need more power to stop violent attacks, but the battle of minds has to be fought in the public sector - through how teachers understand their pupils and how they counter anti-Semitic ideas often innocently expressed. Community leaders of all faiths and none need to be educated in what antisemitism is, why they should counter it and how. Politicians need to understand the difference between legitimate criticism of the actions of Israel and statements that strike fear into the hearts of Jews.

We need a government led strategy that will expose, discredit and discard anti-Semitism. Only then will Britain’s Jews feel not only safe but free.

To repeat, this is a national security issue and should be treated as seriously as any other national security issue. Our own people should not be terrorized - by state or non-state groups, or by individuals.

This has to start now. It is getting very late.

]]>
Fri, 01 May 2026 21:38:56 +0100 FirstHandNews
Pakistan’s Terror Landscape Continues to Threaten South Asia https://belimedia.com.ng/pakistans-terror-landscape-continues-to-threaten-south-asia https://belimedia.com.ng/pakistans-terror-landscape-continues-to-threaten-south-asia OPINION — In March 2025, an elderly cleric with a long history in Pakistan’s jihadist circles stood before a gathering at Markaz-e-Taiba and called for “jihad against the kuffaar,” explicitly naming India and Israel. The speaker was Amir Hamza, co-founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and his sermon came just weeks before the Pahalgam attack, in which 26 civilians were killed in India’s Union Territory of Kashmir. One year since the Pahalgam attack, Makraz-e-Taiba—LeT's headquarter in Pakistan—remains destroyed because of an Indian airstrike during Operation Sindoor, and Amir Hamza survived two assassination attempts. However, Pakistan-based terrorist organizations have adopted to changing operational circumstances and expanded their geographical reach under the auspice of Pakistan’s civil-military leadership.

The questions remain whether anything has meaningfully changed at all since the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan unfolded in May last year. The answer, based on evolving patterns of activity, appears to be no. Rather than dismantling these networks, Pakistan-based terrorist organizations have adapted, restructured, and in many ways expanded their reach under the protection of the country’s civil-military establishment. Such accommodations not only reveal the acceptance of terrorist organization but exposes the links that continue to flourish under the leadership of Pakistan’s de-facto leader, Field Marshal Asim Munir. As Pakistan continues to position itself as a peacemaker in the Middle East, Islamabad’s ongoing support for Salafi-Jihadi groups reveals a fresh chapter of Pakistan’s long-troubled history with terrorism.

New Logo, Same Motto

Pakistan has formally banned organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), but these actions have not translated into meaningful dismantlement. Indian kinetic operations imposed operational setbacks for terrorist outfits and caused significant damage to the state’s military infrastructure, yet Islamabad has not eliminated these groups but helped mainstream them. These groups have now reoriented themselves through layered organizational structures that preserve their operational capabilities while providing a veneer of legitimacy. This transformation is most visible in the emergence of the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML), widely understood to function as a political front for LeT.

This dual-track strategy—pairing militancy with political participation—is not new, but it has intensified in recent years, particularly under the consolidation of power by Field Marshal Asim Munir. LeT operatives have increasingly appeared in public political spaces, participating in rallies, community outreach programs, and youth mobilization campaigns. These activities blur the boundary between extremist networks and mainstream political life, making it more difficult to distinguish between state-sanctioned political engagement and covert militant operations.

The presence of figures such as Saifullah Khalid Kasuri, a veteran LeT commander now operating within the PMML framework, highlights the extent of this integration. Kasuri, who resurfaced on US radar in 2024 after meeting Hamas terrorist Khaled Mashal in Doha, has openly acknowledged his ties to the Pakistani military and has been photographed alongside senior officers. Similarly, Hafiz Abdur Rauf, a US-designated terrorist, has been seen leading funeral prayers for Pakistani soldiers in the presence of uniformed officials. These instances reflect a pattern of proximity between militant actors and state institutions that raises serious questions about Pakistan’s commitment to counterterrorism.

Despite failing to secure electoral success, PMML has remained active as an ideological platform, targeting youth through training camps, religious competitions, and public gatherings. On several occasions, LeT leader and son of Hafiz Saed, Talha Saeed, has hosted rallies which have been attended by senior Pakistani politicians. In a picture recently leaked online, PMML-Islamabad chief can be seen sitting with Pakistani Defense Minister Khwaja Asif. Such evidence of close relationship between LeT-led political outfit and high-profile Pakistani politicians reveals the degree of access LeT operatives enjoy under the cover of political activities.

Adaptation and Expansion: New Networks, Old Objectives

The transformation of militant groups is not limited to political rebranding. These organizations have also adapted their operational and financial strategies to evade scrutiny and sustain activity. LeT-linked charity networks such as Falah-i Insaniat Foundation (FIF) continue to raise funds across Pakistan, despite being subject to US sanctions. Meanwhile, groups like JeM have shifted toward digital financing mechanisms, including mobile wallets and decentralized payment systems, allowing them to operate with greater anonymity and reduced reliance on formal banking channels. This shift into digital ecosystems represents a significant evolution in militant financing. It reduces the effectiveness of traditional counterterrorism tools, such as financial monitoring and sanctions, while enabling groups to tap into new sources of funding. The result is a more resilient and adaptive network capable of sustaining operations even under increased international scrutiny.

At the same time, these groups are expanding geographically within Pakistan. On April 14, LeT leaders Saifullah Kasuri and Faisal Nadeem visited Quetta in Balochistan Province held a large gathering of LeT cadres. Hundreds attended the gathering in Quetta, which likely reflects LeT’s attempt to strengthen the organization in Balochistan. Historically concentrated in Punjab, organizations like LeT and JeM are now establishing a presence in regions where they previously had limited influence, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Recent reporting of recruitment drives by JeM in remote areas of KPK also indicate a deliberate effort to broaden their operational footprint in western Pakistan. This expansion serves multiple purposes. First, it allows these groups to diversify recruitment and funding sources, reducing their dependence on traditional strongholds. Second, it enables them to rebuild organizational capacity following losses inflicted by Indian military operations. Third, and perhaps most significantly, it aligns with Pakistan’s broader security challenges.

Pakistan is currently facing a surge in internal insurgencies, particularly from groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) in Balochistan. According to the 13th edition of Global Terrorism Index, TTP and BLA were responsible for more than 1,000 attacks in 2025, making Pakistan one of the most terrorism-affected countries globally. In this context, the expansion of LeT and JeM into western Pakistan takes on a new dimension. Rather than being solely oriented toward external targets such as India, these groups may also be serving as instruments of internal counterinsurgency. By recruiting fighters in regions affected by anti-state violence, Pakistan’s military establishment could be attempting to leverage jihadist networks to counter other militant threats. This strategy, while tactically expedient, carries significant risks. It reinforces the ecosystem of militancy rather than dismantling it, creating a cycle in which one form of extremism is used to combat another. Over time, this approach is likely to deepen instability, as different militant groups compete for influence, resources, and legitimacy.

Conclusion: A Persistent Threat to Regional Stability

The persistence and adaptation of these networks raise a fundamental question: has anything truly changed since the Pahalgam attack and the subsequent India-Pakistan crisis? On the surface, there have been visible actions through Indian military operations. However, this has not addressed the underlying structures that sustain militancy in Pakistan. Instead, Pakistan’s approach appears to have shifted toward managing, rather than eliminating, extremist networks. By allowing these groups to operate through political fronts, charitable organizations, and decentralized financial systems, the state has effectively created a parallel ecosystem in which militancy can evolve without direct confrontation. This approach may provide short-term flexibility, but it undermines long-term stability. It perpetuates a cycle of violence that extends beyond Pakistan’s borders, posing a continuing threat to regional security, particularly in South Asia.

One year after Pahalgam, Pakistan’s militant ecosystem has not weakened but evolved, exposing the reality of its military’s "death by a thousand cuts” doctrine against India. This reality should raise serious concerns in Washington, especially as the United States increasingly relies on Pakistan as a mediator in its engagement with Iran. US policymakers must therefore approach this partnership with caution, recognizing that a state struggling to manage its own militant ecosystem may not be a dependable broker in high-stakes regional diplomacy.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 01 May 2026 21:38:56 +0100 FirstHandNews
Half Measures and Maximum Risk in Iran https://belimedia.com.ng/half-measures-and-maximum-risk-in-iran https://belimedia.com.ng/half-measures-and-maximum-risk-in-iran OPINION – Over the past month, U.S. and Israeli operations have killed Iran’s senior leadership, destroyed over 155 naval vessels and roughly 300 ballistic missile launchers, and degraded elements of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But scorch marks and craters do not equal a strategic victory.

Operation Epic Fury’s initially stated goals were sweeping and maximalist: to fully destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile forces, navy, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and proxy networks. Yet in pursuing these objectives, the Trump administration has constrained itself to accommodate political realities, employing means short of the full-scale occupation typically required to secure such objectives. The problem is compounded by a second, related challenge: even when strikes appear successful, the United States has limited ability to verify whether its objectives have actually been achieved.

This dynamic, of seeking maximalist ends with politically constrained means, creates a strategic tension that precision strikes can’t resolve. While B-2s and Tomahawks can destroy targets, ensuring the dismantlement of a nation’s military capacity has historically required forms of commitment that Washington is reluctant to undertake.

Understandably, Washington appears unwilling to occupy territory in order to follow through completely on its stated aims. The Trump administration, perhaps emboldened by its easy victory in Iran last June, and Venezuela this January, has walked into a trap of its own making. As history shows, half-measures deployed in service of total victory have often proven disastrous — perpetuating conflict, resolving little.

The verification problem

Through the first month of Epic Fury, the U.S. and Israel have conducted thousands of strikes, all geared toward addressing the operation’s stated end goal. Reports suggest that these attacks have been tactically effective, degrading various forms of Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure. But assessing the true damage, and the irreversibility of that damage, presents a logistical problem that remote methods can’t solve.

The U.S. is equipped with the world’s most sophisticated surveillance architecture. America’s toolbox of satellites, drones, and artificial intelligence allow for rapid assessment of the battlespace and the damage wrought. This sophisticated surveillance architecture paints a flattering picture of objectives nearly or fully achieved, but the actual picture remains incomplete.

Remote surveillance cannot determine whether underground nuclear facilities were destroyed; whether mobile missile launchers survived; whether covert logistics chains still flow; and whether proxy militias remain operational. To truly gauge the effectiveness of Epic Fury, the United States would need to inspect tunnels and warehouses, rooting out hidden stockpiles and underground enrichment facilities - feats that can’t be accomplished from afar. Even under the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, verification depended on intrusive, on-the-ground inspections, underscoring the limits of remote surveillance in dismantling complex programs.

Battle damage assessment (BDA), which is used to gauge the effectiveness of Epic Fury, measures only the visible destruction at the point of impact but offers limited insight into the resilience of the targeted system. A crater where a nuclear enrichment facility once stood is an encouraging piece of intelligence. But it leaves questions unanswered, like whether critical components from that facility were moved before the strike, or whether redundant systems exist elsewhere, or whether the brainpower that animated the facility lives on.

The limits of BDA are especially present against Iran, which has spent years hardening and dispersing its military infrastructure in preparation for this long-anticipated attack, all in the hopes of remaining intact enough to regenerate.

The tension at play in Epic Fury - between ambitious objectives, constrained means, and limited visibility - has been present in past U.S. conflicts. After Operation Desert Storm, in which President George H.W. Bush stopped short of wreaking total destruction on Saddam’s regime, Washington believed that Iraq’s military capability had been crippled. But uncertainty persisted, resulting in a long standoff, which finally culminated with the disastrous 2003 invasion.

Afghanistan is also instructive. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. shifted from airstrikes and special forces to a strategy deeply invested in remote counterterrorism. This limited, drone-dependent remote presence failed to eliminate militant groups who were mobile and embedded. The result was a two-decade resource drain, America’s longest war, which ultimately failed to achieve its objectives and concluded with the resurgence of the Taliban.

The takeaway, from both Iran and Afghanistan, is that half measures don’t work for maximalist strategic goals. The lesson, which should have been applied to Epic Fury, is not that the U.S. should have committed more force, but that it should adjust its objectives to the resources it is willing to commit - before the first Tomahawk is ever launched.

Yet, through the opening month of Operation Epic Fury, Washington appears on the verge of repeating its familiar, post-Cold War pattern of half measures. The administration’s sweeping aims - to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, missile production, IRGC, proxy networks, and navy - are not achievable or verifiable under the constraints Washington has (correctly) imposed on the campaign.

The current methods deployed against Iran threaten to leave behind persistent strategic ambiguity. Without physical verifications, Iran may well retain, or quickly replenish, the missiles and drones and fissile material that inspired Epic Fury in the first place, which in turn could inspire a lingering half-measured U.S. commitment.

In other words, Epic Fury could lock the United States into a repetitive cycle of sporadic violence (what the Israelis call “mowing the lawn”), with each round triggered by signs that Iran is regenerating capabilities that were never fully eliminated. The prospect of a third 21st century quagmire should give warplanners pause - especially given the uncertain strategic value of Epic Fury itself.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 28 Apr 2026 15:56:23 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Dangerous Trade of State Secrets https://belimedia.com.ng/the-dangerous-trade-of-state-secrets https://belimedia.com.ng/the-dangerous-trade-of-state-secrets

At just after 2 a.m. on January 3, explosions echoed across Caracas. Low-flying aircraft struck military installations. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife were seized by U.S. forces and taken into custody to face narco-terrorism charges.

Mere hours before President Trump announced the operation on Truth Social, a newly created Polymarket account had quietly staked just over $32,000 on Maduro’s exit from power by the end of January. When the news broke, that position paid out $436,759 — a return of more than 1,200 percent in under 24 hours, on an event Polymarket itself had been pricing at roughly 5 to 7 percent odds for weeks. The account had been created less than a week before the operation and had placed bets on only one subject: Maduro’s removal.

Nearly four months later, U.S. Army Special Forces Master Sgt. Gannon Ken Van Dyke is scheduled to be arraigned on Tuesday in the Southern District of New York, where he’s facing charges associated with wire fraud, conspiracy and misuse of national defense information. Neither Van Dyke or his attorney have yet issued a statement, though he is expected to enter a plea in court on Tuesday.

This isn’t the first time something like this has happened. On February 12, an indictment unsealed in Tel Aviv read like something from a different era of espionage — only instead of dead drops and clandestine meetings, the alleged method of exploitation was a cryptocurrency wallet and a prediction market website. An Israeli military reservist and a civilian were charged with placing bets on the online betting site Polymarket regarding the timing of military operations, based on classified information the reservist had accessed by virtue of his military duties.

The investigation, conducted jointly by Israel’s Shin Bet domestic security agency, the Defense Ministry, and the Israel Police, resulted in the arrests of several suspects and was widely believed to be the first public case stemming from classified operational intelligence being used to trade on a prediction market in a kinetic combat environment.

Sixteen days after the bet was made, on February 28, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iran under what the Pentagon designated Operation Epic Fury. Before the first explosions were reported in Tehran, on-chain analytics firm Bubblemaps had already flagged six wallets that walked away with roughly $1 million in combined profit on the Polymarket contract “US strikes Iran by February 28, 2026?” Officials say most accounts were funded and activated within 24 hours of the strikes, all concentrated on the same date-specific contract, and all with no prior trading history.

The largest single wallet turned a roughly $61,000 position into a profit of over $493,000. The account bought 560,680 “yes” shares at about 10.8 cents each, when the odds were still at just 17 percent. and walked away with nearly half a million dollars once the contract was resolved. The Iran war-related contracts had, by that point, generated approximately $529 million in total trading volume on the timing-of-attack markets alone, with another $45 million wagered on the single largest contract tied to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

JP Castellanos, Director of Threat Intelligence at Binary Defense, tells The Cipher Brief this pattern “has crossed the threshold into a documented, operational counterintelligence vulnerability.”

“Every time a government or military insider places a pre-operational bet, they are effectively broadcasting classified foreknowledge into a public, blockchain-transparent ledger,” he cautions.

This is no longer a story about gambling. It is a counterintelligence crisis.

A new vector for secrets

Polymarket said it reported suspicious trading in the case involving Van Dyke to law enforcement and that it is cooperating with investigators, while stressing that its rules prohibit trading on material nonpublic information.

Online betting outlets work like a stock exchange for real-world outcomes. Users buy and sell shares tied to whether a given event will happen, with prices shifting in real time as new information enters the market. Its founder and CEO, Shayne Coplan, has been unapologetic about the role of informed traders, insisting that insiders “having an edge in the market is a good thing” because it surfaces accurate predictions faster.

That framing might be defensible when applied to corporate earnings or box office projections, but does it hold when the underlying event is a military strike and the “informed trader” holds a security clearance?

The structural problem is not incidental to Polymarket’s design; it is embedded in it. While rival platform Kalshi is regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and bans contracts involving wars, terrorism, and assassinations, Polymarket has operated an overseas exchange outside the reach of U.S. authorities. That offshore structure has made it a magnet for the most controversial types of prediction-market wagers.

Users in the United States accessed the platform through virtual private networks that masked their identities, and transactions settled in cryptocurrency — pseudonymous, borderless, and largely resistant to subpoena.

Stephen Piepgrass, a regulatory attorney at Troutman Pepper Locke focused on financial enforcement, tells The Cipher Brief that the platform’s design features are precisely what make it so difficult to police.

“The prediction markets are thriving in part because they permit the use of anonymous accounts, allow trading using cryptocurrency, and do not require geofencing,” he explains. “To date, these have been features, not bugs, of this growing market. But these same factors make policing the markets challenging, if not impossible.”

The Israeli case made explicit what many in intelligence circles had long suspected. A senior Israeli source involved in the details of the affair said it would “cause an earthquake,” describing it as “a serious security scandal in which those involved are suspected of committing acts for the sake of money”.

The adversarial intelligence problem

The danger does not run only from insider to market. It runs in the other direction, too. Dennis Kelleher, a financial reform advocate with deep expertise in derivatives regulation, points out that U.S. adversaries already have both the motive and the means to exploit these markets as a live intelligence feed.

“U.S. adversaries can use event contracts on geopolitical events to try to determine if the U.S. is going to undertake an action against their country,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “They can go on prediction market platforms and see the baseline of activity on these event contracts and then monitor for any unusual activity, which could be a spike in activity or a newly opened account that places a large bet in the midst of reporting on a possible action. That could easily tip off an adversary that insiders who know what is going to happen are the ones driving the activity.”

Castellanos echoes the assessment, noting that foreign intelligence services like Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service and China’s Ministry of State Security are almost certainly already doing exactly that.

A sudden price spike on a “U.S. strikes Iran by a certain date” contract three hours before an operation, he contends, carries actionable intelligence value, potentially providing warning time to Iranian partners or informing Russian diplomatic positioning.

The manipulation vector runs in the opposite direction as well. Kelleher warns that adversaries could just as easily use these markets offensively, placing large bets to manufacture the appearance of insider knowledge and sowing anxiety without firing a shot.

Piepgrass offers a concrete example.

“An adversary could create a new account and place a large bet around, for example, a major regional power grid going down,” he notes. “If U.S. intelligence monitors the markets and believes an attack on the grid is imminent, it could divert resources and focus to that area, leaving the actual target more vulnerable.”

On March 10, Times of Israel military correspondent Emanuel Fabian reported that an Iranian missile had struck an open area outside Beit Shemesh. The attack caused no reported casualties but what Fabian didn’t know at the time was that his dispatch had become the resolution trigger for a Polymarket contract with more than $14 million wagered on whether Iran would strike Israel that day.

What followed was a pressure campaign: emails, WhatsApp messages, fabricated legal threats, and eventually death threats from users who had lost positions worth an estimated $900,000. Some of them demanded he rewrite his reporting. Polymarket condemned the harassment, banned the accounts involved, and said it was cooperating with authorities.

What the episode made plain was something Polymarket’s defenders had not seriously reckoned with: that contracts carrying enough money can turn journalists into targets, with their reporting becoming leverage in someone else’s financial bet.

Matthew Wein, a national security analyst who has studied prediction markets and insider threat dynamics, tells The Cipher Brief that the risk of foreign manipulation is real and relatively easy to execute.

“For a relatively cheap level of investment, an adversary could buy up the price of a certain market to drive news coverage of the change in price or probability,” he says. “Given news organizations’ agreements with prediction markets, the ability to change the narrative of a given news story seems relatively easy.”

Washington moves — slowly

Congress has begun to stir. Federal officials, political appointees, and executive branch staff would be barred from trading event contracts tied to government policy based on nonpublic information under a bill introduced by Representative Ritchie Torres in the House.

Senator Adam Schiff and Representative Mike Levin jointly introduced the DEATH BETS Act on March 10, which would explicitly prohibit any CFTC-registered exchange from listing event contracts referencing terrorism, assassination, war, or an individual’s death.

That same day, Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced the Prediction Markets Security and Integrity Act to address fraud, insider trading, and broader market manipulation. Then, on March 17, Senator Chris Murphy and Representative Greg Casar introduced the BETS OFF Act, which would ban trades on war, terrorism, assassination, non-financial government actions, and events where someone controls or knows the outcome in advance. Senator Blumenthal put it directly, stating that “prediction markets have become a haven for insider trading, market manipulation, and underage gambling” and that these “billion-dollar businesses are turning war into a casino game.”

Yet the legislative momentum faces structural headwinds. Donald Trump Jr. is an adviser to Polymarket, and his venture capital firm 1789 Capital has invested millions in the company. The Trump administration dropped two federal investigations into the platform — one civil, one criminal — that were opened under former President Joe Biden. By November 25, 2025, Polymarket had its CFTC designation in hand, cleared to run a fully regulated United States exchange. Come February 2026, the company was being valued at $9 billion. Three months later, on February 25, the CFTC’s enforcement division issued a public advisory reminding markets that it has full authority to pursue illegal trading practices on any designated contract market — including prediction platforms.

Still, legal analysts note that how insider trading rules apply in practice, particularly to offshore platforms beyond the agency’s direct reach, remains dangerously unresolved.

Matt Motta, a policy expert who has studied the legislative proposals, tells The Cipher Brief that both the Public Integrity Act and the DEATH BETS Act are necessary but insufficient.

“I think we can do more,” he asserts. “Only regular audits of prediction market transaction reports can allow government regulators to survey the full scope of trading on political markets, and assess how those transactions might impact national security.”

The definitional problem compounds the enforcement gap. Piepgrass notes that the Commodity Exchange Act prohibits prediction contracts related to terrorism, assassination, and war — yet those concepts resist precise legal definition.

“The last time Congress formally declared war was during World War II,” he points out. “Is removing a head of state, like Maduro, a form of war? How about the action in Iran?”

Kelleher is more direct about where the fault lies.

“Current law could be sufficient to address these risks from U.S.-based bettors if the law were actually aggressively enforced,” he explains. “However, the administration generally and the CFTC in particular refuse to enforce the law and are cheerleaders for the prediction market industry.”

When asked what it would actually take for Washington to close that gap, Castellanos is blunt.

“The legislative package is a necessary first step and will deter the unsophisticated opportunist,” he adds. “It will not deter the deliberate foreign asset, the sophisticated contractor insider, or the allied military officer.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 28 Apr 2026 15:56:23 +0100 FirstHandNews
America Is Fighting the Wrong Drone War https://belimedia.com.ng/america-is-fighting-the-wrong-drone-war https://belimedia.com.ng/america-is-fighting-the-wrong-drone-war OPINION – For two decades, U.S. drones hunting terrorists across the mountains of South Asia were the symbol of American military power: precise, lethal, and unmatched. That era is now over. Drones are no longer exquisite tools of counterterrorism and have evolved into something far more common and destabilizing: cheap, expendable, and mass-produced tools of attrition. Despite pioneering the technology, the United States is now poorly positioned for the version that matters most. Critical mass is being replaced by a strategy of 'death by a thousand cuts,' as quantity assumes a quality all of its own.

From Ukraine to the Persian Gulf, and increasingly along America’s own borders, expendable drones are reshaping battlefields and quickly rewriting how modern wars are waged. These platforms aren’t winning wars outright, but they are doing something just as important: straining defenses, exhausting budgets, and outlasting the very systems that were designed to counter them. Right now, the United States is least prepared for that reality, and its adversaries know it.

But two things can be true at once: the United States still leads in advanced conventional military power, and cheap drones aren't necessarily subject to those rules. They don’t need to be sophisticated, just cheap and in constant supply. That alone is enough to upend long-held assumptions about how wars are fought and won. Today, America’s adversaries — state and non-state alike — are using drones more effectively while Washington has yet to fully reckon with what that portends, both in the short and long term.

The new drone war runs on a simple, ruthless logic: cheap beats expensive. Take Iran’s Shahed-136 drones. They are simple by conventional standards—noisy, slow, and not particularly precise—yet brutally effective. Costing as little as $20,000, they are mass-produced for saturation, overwhelming defenses through sheer volume. Each drone forces a response, often with a missile costing over $1 million a piece. Do that math a thousand times, and you don't just have a military problem, but a dealbreaker for almost any defense budget.

This strategy is not incidental but deliberate. It is a calculated campaign of economic exhaustion — and it is working. For Western militaries and for those countries that Western militaries supply with weapons and training, this is not just inefficient but a losing equation.

This is what war looks like in 2026, where outcomes are no longer driven solely by large-scale strikes or which side destroys more targets. Conflicts are shaped by persistence through thousands of small hits that stretch resources, exhaust personnel, and wear down resolve of populations, militaries, and governments. Advantage favors the side that can sustain pressure while forcing the other side into a continuous, costly response day after day.

Ukraine offers the clearest example. Russia has used Iranian-supplied drones and domestically produced variants in relentless attacks against cities and infrastructure. In one recent 24-hour period, nearly a thousand drones were launched alongside cruise missiles. Even when most are shot down, the cumulative effect strains defenses, drains resources, and erodes public confidence. Ukraine, meanwhile, has emerged as one of the world’s most adaptive drone ecosystems, scaling production to tens of thousands of systems a month through a decentralized network of engineers, hobbyists, and 3D-printing workshops.

The same playbook is strangling the Red Sea, where Houthi militia forces have used inexpensive drones to disrupt one of the world’s most critical shipping lanes, forcing commercial vessels to reroute around Africa. The result is imposing billions in added costs on global supply chains, all driven by weapons that cost a fraction of the disruption they cause. Powerful nation-states are slowly waking up to the reality that well-trained and well-resourced non-state actors can consistently disrupt the global economy.

A quieter but equally dangerous version of this dynamic is also playing out along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are using off-the-shelf drones—some costing just a few thousand dollars—for surveillance and limited strikes. Pakistan’s cross-border operations have led to civilian casualties, hardening what began as localized tensions into a steady back-and-forth with both sides testing limits without tipping into full-scale war. Terrorist groups have adapted just as quickly, with ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates now routinely modifying commercial drones for surveillance and attacks. In doing so, they have gained capabilities and reach they never had before.

Worryingly, the same trend is now visible much closer to home. Mexican cartels and criminal networks are operating drones along the U.S. border at a scale that would have seemed unthinkable a decade ago — for surveillance, tracking law enforcement, smuggling, and increasingly, attacks. More than 30,000 drone incursions were recorded in 2025 alone, including cases involving explosives. In one incident, a drone struck a government building in Tijuana, just miles from California.

The line between foreign battlefield and domestic threat has not just collapsed but has exposed where the United States is least prepared. The uncomfortable truth is that the United States is exquisitely prepared for a war no adversary wants to fight. The Pentagon has spent decades and trillions of dollars optimizing for high-end conflict —the kind built around stealth platforms, precision strikes, and overwhelming technological advantage. But that model assumes short wars, finite adversaries, and dominance through superiority. Cheap drones are invalidating all three assumptions in real time.

That mismatch is increasingly out of step with the wars America is actually facing. China is already moving aggressively in the opposite direction, pursuing a program to field one million tactical drones, while the United States procured roughly 50,000 in 2025 and plans another 200,000 by 2027. At the same time, the economics of defense are becoming harder to ignore. In the early days of the Iran conflict, the United States reportedly spent billions of dollars on interceptor systems in a matter of days. Against adversaries deploying drones that cost a fraction of that, the math is dangerously unfavorable.

Getting serious about this will require more than small adjustments.

First, the United States must treat low-cost, expendable drones not as a supplement but as a core element of how it fights. Quantity has a quality all of its own. Having enough systems matters just as much as having the best ones. The hard reality is that while the United States is not being outmatched technologically, it is still playing a game its adversaries have already changed.

The good news is that the Pentagon’s new $1 billion Drone Dominance program is a step in the right direction aimed at rapidly fielding tens of thousands of low-cost, one-way attack drones. So is the new training for force-on-force drone warfare, where autonomous systems engage each other directly. The U.S. defense budget may also allocate around $7.5 billion toward counter-drone systems in 2026, a belated recognition of just how costly it is to play defense in a war of attrition that adversaries are deliberately engineering.

These are the right instincts, because real competition is no longer about who has the most advanced platforms, but who can produce systems faster and cheaper. Iran’s effective use of low-cost drones to wreak havoc across the Gulf and to pressure the world's strongest military will only guarantee other countries to follow suit, accelerating efforts to develop their own indigenous drone manufacturing programs.

Second, defense ought to become cheaper than offense. Destroying a $20,000 drone with a million-dollar missile cedes the advantage to adversaries by design. Investments in systems like high-power lasers, electronic jammers, and autonomous counter-drone networks are essential if the economics of defense are to make sense again.

Third, the Pentagon must rethink how it buys and builds. The current development cycles measured in years are fundamentally mismatched against adversaries who adapt in days. That means opening the door to smaller manufacturers and startups, leveraging commercial technology, and accepting systems that are “good enough” if they are available at scale when needed. The LUCAS drone - based on the Shahed-136 design, developed by an Arizona startup, and fielded in roughly seven months - shows what is possible when the system moves at the speed of the threat. Such a shift will be uncomfortable for a defense community built around precision and quality, but the alternative is worse.

The United States invented this weapon and turned it into a defining counterterrorism tool. But that advantage is now moot. The technology has diffused and been successfully repurposed by a wide range of actors. The speed of this shift leaves little room for a slow response, with every year spent preparing for the last war only handing the advantage to those fighting the one today.

What is unfolding reflects a broader shift in the changing character of warfare, one that rewards volume over precision, staying power over firepower, and speed over perfection. In this kind of accelerated technological Darwinism, victory will be claimed by those who can sustain pressure, adapt quickly, and outlast their adversary.

Right now, even under the most optimistic scenario, the United States is at a serious disadvantage. Until it adjusts to that reality, it will keep fighting on terms set by others while absorbing costs it cannot afford to bear. This is a competition America cannot afford to lose.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 28 Apr 2026 15:56:23 +0100 FirstHandNews
Pyongyang’s Bet: Nuclear Growth and Great Power Support https://belimedia.com.ng/pyongyangs-bet-nuclear-growth-and-great-power-support https://belimedia.com.ng/pyongyangs-bet-nuclear-growth-and-great-power-support OPINION – North Korea is building more nuclear weapons and more sophisticated ballistic missiles to target the region and the U.S., while ensuring that they are closely aligned with China and Russia. Basically, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has given up on the U.S., even if the U.S. relents and accepts North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chief, Rafael Grossi, while on a recent visit to South Korea, said North Korea is boosting its nuclear weapons capability, saying they made “very serious” advances in their nuclear program. He cited their new uranium enrichment facility at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, noting that satellite images were like the images for their uranium enrichment facility in Kangson.

North Korea’s Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program goes back to 2000, when the Intelligence Community (IC) assessed – despite press skepticism -- that North Korea had a clandestine HEU program. To this day, North Korea denies having an HEU program for nuclear weapons. And in the failed 2019 Hanoi Summit with President Donald Trump, Mr. Kim refused to include his HEU sites in any agreement with the U.S.

North Korea reportedly has between 50 and 60 nuclear weapons, with enough fissile material – from HEU and Plutonium -- to increase that number to 100 nuclear weapons within the next few years. I – and others who follow North Korea -- believe North Korea can miniaturize and mate these nuclear weapons to the tip of ballistic missiles.

Impressive progress has been made with North Korea’s ballistic missile programs. Recently, they displayed the Hwasong -20, a large, solid fuel, mobile, multiwarhead (MIRV) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with a range of 15,000 kilometers. This is the latest in an arsenal of over 400 ballistic missiles, from short-range (SRBM) to long-range ICBMs designed for nuclear and conventional warheads. The focus has been on the solid-fuel systems like the KN-23, KN-24, and the KN-25 and the sophisticated ICBMs, like the Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-19.

North Korea’s nuclear doctrine has evolved from no-first use to “automatic” preemptive use of nuclear weapons if its leadership and command systems are under imminent – or perceived to be imminent attack. Their work on hypersonic systems, to defeat missile defense systems – is impressive, as is their progress with cruise and anti-ship missiles.

Pyongyang made sure the world saw Mr. Kim visiting the 5000-ton Choe Hyun-class destroyer, their second destroyer with a third and fourth destroyer under construction. Plans are for North Korea to exponentially increase the number of nuclear-capable destroyers to twelve by 2030, all armed with cruise and tactical ballistic missiles.

It’s not only North Korea’s rush to acquire more nuclear weapons and missiles to potentially target countries in the region and the U.S., or their new preemptive-use doctrine, it is North Korea’s allied relationship with China and Russia that should be of concern. Historically, North Korea has relied on China for its economic survival and Russia, prior to 1991, for assistance with its nuclear and missile programs. But things have changed. North Korea is closer to China than at any time since Mr. Kim took over in 2011. Indeed, the September 2025 visit to Beijing to stand with China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin was the beginning of a new and closer North Korean relationship with China and its leader, Xi Jinping. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit last week to North Korea to meet with Mr. Kim -- and the attention it got from North Korea’s press -- was indicative of that improved relationship.

North Korea’s relationship with Russia over the past few years has progressed rapidly, with a mutual defense treaty and North Korean assistance – troops and munitions -- to Russia for its war with Ukraine and the likely nuclear, missile and satellite assistance North Korea is receiving from Russia.

North Korea now has two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) who will ensure that no further sanctions are imposed on North Korea for their continued violations of UNSC resolutions.

So, in the final analysis, Pyongyang has probably concluded that they don’t need a normal relationship with the U.S. They have China and Russia who provide economic and military support and apparently accept their nuclear status. And Mr. Kim’s global credibility – important to him -- will be derived from a close allied relationship with China and Russia, and their leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and their appeal to the Global South.

It appears that Mr. Kim is taking advantage of the U.S. war with Iran – and tension with NATO -- to grow his nuclear arsenal, while strengthening his relationship with China and Russia.

Indeed, if the U.S. relents – which North Korea believes is inevitable – and eventually accepts North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, Pyongyang will pocket the win, and use it to get more from his allies, China and Russia.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, was first published in The Washington Times, and is republished with permission from the author.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Tue, 28 Apr 2026 15:56:23 +0100 FirstHandNews
From Chernobyl to Ukraine: The Enduring Cost of Kremlin Lies https://belimedia.com.ng/from-chernobyl-to-ukraine-the-enduring-cost-of-kremlin-lies https://belimedia.com.ng/from-chernobyl-to-ukraine-the-enduring-cost-of-kremlin-lies

In April 1986, a reactor exploded at Chernobyl and the Soviet Union lied about it. That instinct to conceal, distort, and deny did not just worsen the disaster; it would come to define the collapse of the Soviet state. Forty years later, that same instinct still shapes Russia, the largest of the former Soviet republics and, under Putin, the self-proclaimed legacy of that broken system. From Chernobyl to the Ukraine invasion, the through line is not nuclear energy or military ambition. It is the cost of lies. Putin and his siloviki have made it an official state tradecraft.

Four decades since the Soviet nuclear catastrophe at the Chernobyl plant it is important to remember the cost. Dozens died immediately, thousands more within a few years, and likely tens of thousands over the decades from radiation-related illnesses. The disaster scarred the landscape of Ukraine and Belarus, but it also changed the Soviet Union itself, accelerating its decline under the weight of corruption, deception, and bureaucratic rot. Those were not incidental flaws. They were the system.

Looking back at Chernobyl offers a way to understand Russia today. The same security elite - born of the KGB and now embodied in the FSB, SVR, and GRU - still govern the country. President Vladimir Putin and his inner circle of KGB veterans often invoke the Soviet past with nostalgia. But they do so selectively, avoiding the truths that would indict their own system. Their vision is clouded by the same habits of concealment and self-deception that doomed the USSR.

The central lesson of Chernobyl is simple: lies have consequences. The Soviet system was built on them. From Stalin onward, “five-year plans” set unrealistic production targets divorced from reality. Workers and managers learned to fabricate success rather than report failure. The result was a vast Potemkin façade - an economy and state sustained by alleged performance rather than truth. Eventually, the façade, like Catherine the Great’s village of the same name, collapsed.

At Chernobyl, that culture proved fatal. As Adam Higginbotham recounts in his seminal work, Midnight in Chernobyl, bureaucratic pressure and blind obedience drove operators to conduct a dangerously flawed test. Safety systems were disabled and key procedures were ignored. The goal was not safety, but approval from superiors in a rigid, abusive chain of command. Everyone was trying to get ahead in a corrupt, feudal-like Soviet system.

Worse still, the operators were working in the dark, literally and figuratively. The RBMK reactors used at the Chernobyl plant (there were four of them providing energy to the greater Kiev region at the time) had a known design flaw: its control rods, intended to slow or stop the nuclear reaction, could initially increase reactivity when inserted under certain conditions. This flaw had nearly caused a catastrophe during earlier testing in Leningrad. But it was concealed, not only from the public, but from many within the Soviet nuclear establishment itself.

The reason was simple: RBMK reactors were meant to symbolize Soviet technological prowess. They were bigger than those in the West, safer than those in the West, impossible to explode or compromise. Admitting flaws risked lower output, reputational damage, and political consequences. So, the truth was buried.

On the night of April 26, 1986, that buried truth surfaced catastrophically. When operators attempted to shut down the reactor, the control rods accelerated the reaction instead. All the safeties had been removed in order to “complete the test” and for the bureaucrats in charge to get their Soviet-style bonuses and promotions. And with the concealed flaw, the very system designed to ensure safety triggered the explosion.


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It is an apt metaphor for the Soviet state - and for its successor, Russia. Institutions meant to protect the system instead destroyed it, because they were built on secrecy and lies.

Today’s Russia reflects the same pattern. The security services - once the KGB, now its successors in the FSB/SVR/GRU - have not reformed so much as evolved. Their core function remains the same: to preserve power through control of information and to protect the state and its personage in Vladimir Putin. But in doing so, they distort reality for themselves as much as for others.

That dynamic was evident in the invasion of Ukraine. Russian military and intelligence leaders fed optimistic, often false assessments up the chain of command. The FSB and other “organs” of power told President Putin what he expected to hear - just as Soviet officials had done for decades. The result was a catastrophic miscalculation: the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II, launched on faulty assumptions of a short, decisive war. The failed prognostications have cost Russia over 1 million in dead and wounded.

Again, lies fed more lies. And again, the consequences were devastating. The parallels to Chernobyl are not just abstract. They are all too human and they had and still have devastating human consequences for millions of Ukrainians, and Russians.

In 1986, the town of Pripyat - just miles from the reactor - was not evacuated for 36 hours. Tens of thousands were exposed to dangerous radiation. Thousands of them, including children, would die from cancer. The fallout spread across Belarus, Lithuania, and beyond. My own wife, like countless others, spent those days as a young school “pioneer” outdoors in Lithuania for days during school recess, and after school, unknowingly breathing in radioactive particles with no warning from the Soviet leadership. Citizens in Europe and Scandinavia were warned to avoid going outdoors before Soviet citizens thousands of kilometers closer to the danger.

May Day celebrations proceeded as scheduled in Kiev and Minsk with no concern for their citizens’ safety and health while radioactive particles and fallout fell on them. Decades later, those same hundreds of thousands face elevated cancer risks and lifelong medical monitoring (especially of thyroid cancer, the highest risk for having absorbed radiation in such conditions). Hundreds of thousands, even millions, were exposed needlessly, for no reason but lies.

A state that does not protect its own children defies the laws of nature. Russia is that state today, like the USSR was then.

The true human cost of Chernobyl will never be fully known. The Soviet system was too compromised by secrecy to measure it accurately. That same disregard for truth - and for human life - echoes today in Ukraine. Entire cities have been devastated. Millions displaced. The damage, like radiation, spreads invisibly and endures long after the initial event.

There is also a bitter irony in Chernobyl’s continued relevance. The disaster contributed directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union - what Putin has called the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” The financial burden of cleanup, combined with an already strained military economy, hastened the system’s unraveling. The Soviet state, already overburdened trying to keep up in an arms race and devoting over half its economy to military production, buckled under the weight of a massive cleanup involving hundreds of thousands of conscripts and volunteers, and billions of rubles.

And yet, the actual site of the catastrophe remains at risk. Recently, a Russian drone struck the New Safe Confinement structure (NSC) built to contain the reactor. The attack caused significant damage and risked releasing radiation once again. That such a target would be endangered - by the very state that inherited responsibility for the disaster, Russia, and whose own citizens could be put at risk - defies logic. But it follows a familiar pattern: short-term action divorced from long-term consequence. Again, the Ukrainian people are made to suffer and be put at risk, just like 40 years ago; and in the midst of an already costly war with untold suffering brought on by Putin and his lies.

Chernobyl is not just history. It is a warning. The lesson is not limited to nuclear safety or Soviet bureaucracy. It is broader, and more enduring: systems built on lies accumulate hidden risks. Those risks eventually surface - often suddenly, and catastrophically.

Forty years ago, the Soviet Union could not escape the consequences of its own deception. Today, Russia faces a similar reckoning. The same habits persist: suppressing bad realities, rewarding loyalty over truth, and mistaking control for stability. But reality has a way of asserting itself.

As the Chernobyl (HBO) series memorably put it: “Every lie incurs a debt to the truth.” That debt can be delayed, disguised, or denied. But it cannot be erased. The question is not whether it will be paid, but when, and at what cost. Putin has encumbered Russia with more lies than any leader in modern Russian or Soviet history. But he faces no accountability for it. Someone will have to pay the debt. Sadly, it is not Putin, nor the security services who will pay, but ultimately, like in Soviet times, the Russian people.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

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Tue, 28 Apr 2026 15:56:23 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s Cyber Strategy Has a Budget Problem https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-cyber-strategy-has-a-budget-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-cyber-strategy-has-a-budget-problem OPINION – The threat from cyberattacks has never been more acute, but there is reason to worry America is not rising to the challenge. It is not the lack of a cybersecurity strategy, but rather a growing gap between what the United States says and what it is willing to fund. The Trump administration’s latest budget proposal makes that gap impossible to ignore.

At the center of the proposal is a $707 million reduction to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the federal government’s primary civilian cybersecurity body. The request would bring CISA’s budget down to just over $2 billion. That’s well below the roughly $2.6 billion Congress had been prepared — on a bipartisan level — to provide to the agency prior to the partisan blow up over the Department of Homeland Security’s budget because of a dispute over immigration enforcement.

Over the past year, the agency has already been weakened by layoffs and reduced support for state and local cybersecurity efforts. The new budget would accelerate that trend. The administration has framed the cuts as a refocusing of CISA on its “core mission,” shuttering supposedly unnecessary initiatives like the Stakeholder Engagement Division. But the reality is that modern cybersecurity does not operate in a vacuum. Defending critical infrastructure — energy grids, transportation systems, water utilities, and telecommunications networks — depends on constant coordination with state and local governments, private sector operators, and international partners. Dismantling the very offices designed to enable that coordination undermines the mission the budget claims to prioritize.

At the same time, the broader federal cyber ecosystem is also being thinned. The Office of the National Cyber Director would see a $3 million reduction in funding. The State Department’s cyber apparatus has been reorganized in ways that risk diluting its effectiveness. The Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response would see budget $40 million below FY25 enacted levels of $200 million. And there has been a noticeable pullback in engagement with the private sector and international cyber community — two pillars of any credible cyber defense strategy.

The contradiction becomes even clearer when viewed against the broader threat environment. The United States faces sustained cyber pressure from sophisticated adversaries, including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These actors are not just targeting federal systems; they are probing the connective tissue of American society – ports, pipelines, hospitals, and supply chains. Many of these systems are owned and operated by the private sector or local entities that rely on federal support, guidance, and information sharing to defend themselves.

To be clear, not every line in the budget moves in the wrong direction. There is a modest $15 million increase proposed for Treasury’s “critical cyber capabilities, sanctions targeting, and combatting illicit financial activity.” State Department funding to improve its own IT infrastructure would also see a slight boost. These are useful investments, but they are not substitutes for a coherent, whole-of-government approach.

The most striking aspect of this budget is how misaligned it is with widely accepted cybersecurity priorities. For years, policymakers from both parties have emphasized the need for stronger public-private collaboration, improved information sharing, and deeper international partnerships. Yet, the proposed cuts target precisely those functions.

This raises a more fundamental question: what is the administration’s theory of cyber defense?

If the goal is to reduce federal overreach, that is a legitimate policy debate. But the current approach does not simply scale back — it selectively removes the connective infrastructure that enables decentralized defense to work. Without federal coordination, the burden shifts to actors who often lack the resources, visibility, or expertise to manage nation state cyber threats on their own.

Congress has seen this dynamic before. In prior budget cycles, lawmakers from both parties rejected proposals to significantly cut cyber funding, recognizing the mismatch between rising threats and reduced investment. There is little reason to believe the underlying risk calculus has changed. If anything, it has intensified.

The United States is entering a period of heightened geopolitical tension, where cyber operations are increasingly integrated into broader military and economic strategies. In this environment, underinvesting in civilian cyber defense is not a cost-saving measure — it is a strategic liability.

A credible cybersecurity strategy requires more than strong rhetoric. It requires sustained investment in the institutions, partnerships, and capabilities that make defense possible. Right now, the budget and the strategy are moving in opposite directions. Congress should close that gap.

Jiwon Ma is the senior policy analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, where she contributes to the work of CSC 2.0.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 24 Apr 2026 20:11:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
Anthropic Mythos & We’ve Opened Pandora's Box https://belimedia.com.ng/anthropic-mythos-weve-opened-pandoras-box https://belimedia.com.ng/anthropic-mythos-weve-opened-pandoras-box EXPERT OPINION -- For a decade the cybersecurity community was predicting a cyber apocalypse tied to a single event - the day a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer could run Shor’s algorithm and break the public-key cryptography systems most of the internet runs on. We braced for a one-time shock we would absorb and adapt to. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has already published standards for the first set of post-quantum cryptography codes.

It’s possible that the first cybersecurity apocalypse may have come early. Anthropic Mythos now tilts the odds in the cybersecurity arms race in favor of attackers - and the math of why it tilts, and how long it stays tilted, is different from anything our institutions were built to handle.

In 2013, Edward Snowden changed what people understood about nation-state cyber capabilities. In the decade that followed disclosures and leaks of nation state cyber tools reduced uncertainty and accelerated the diffusion of cyber tradecraft.

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The defensive playbook that followed - compartmentalization, need-to-know, leak-surface reduction, clearance reform, “worked” because the Snowden leaks and those that followed were one-time disclosures, absorbed over a decade, with the system returning to something like equilibrium.

We got good at responding to the shocks of disclosures. It became doctrine. It was the right doctrine for the wrong future.

Pandora's Box

In 2026, Anthropic Mythos (and similar AI systems) is changing what people can do. Mythos found Zero-day vulnerabilities and thousands of “bugs” that were not publicly known to exist (a must read article here.) Many of these were not just run-of-the-mill stack-smashing exploits but sophisticated attacks that required exploiting subtle race conditions, KASLR (Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization) bypasses, memory corruption vulnerabilities and logic flaws in cryptographic libraries in cryptography libraries, and bugs in TLS, AES-GCM, and SSH.

The reality is a number of these were not “bugs.” There were nation-state exploits built over decades.

What this means is that Anthropic Mythos, and the tools that will certainly follow, has exposed hacking tools previously only available to nation-states and transformed into tools that Script Kiddies will have within a few months (and certainly within a year.) No expertise will be required to apply that tradecraft, compressing both the learning curve and the execution barrier.

All Government’s Will Scramble

When Mythos-class systems are used to analyze the code in critical infrastructure and systems, the hidden sophisticated zero-day exploits that are already in use, (including ones nation-states have been sitting on for years) will be found and patched. That means intelligence agency sources of how to collect information will go dark as companies and governments patch these vulnerabilities.

Every serious intelligence service will scramble, likely with their own AI, to find new access before the visibility gap costs them something they cannot replace. A new generation of AI-driven exploits will rise to replace the ones that have been burned.This will build an arms race with a new generation of AI-driven cyber exploits looking to replace the ones that have been discovered. Whichever side sustains faster AI adoption - not just “procures” it, but ships it into operational systems, holds a widening advantage measured in powers of two every four months.

The binding constraint is not budget. Not authority. Not access to models. It is institutional capacity for change - the rate at which a defender organization can actually change what it deploys.

The Long Tail Will Not Be Patched

Anthropic has given companies early access to secure the world’s most critical software. That will help Fortune 100 companies. But the Fortune 100 is not just a small part of the software attack surface.

The attack surface includes the unpatched county water utility, the regional hospital, the third-tier defense supplier, the school district, the state Department of Motor Vehicles, the municipal 911 system, and the small-town electric co-op. Tens of thousands of systems running software nobody has time to patch, maintained by teams that have never heard of KASLR.

Every one of those systems is now exposed to nation-state-grade tradecraft, wielded by attackers with no expertise required. Mythos-class hardening at the top of the pyramid does not trickle down. The long tail will stay unpatched for years.

Attackers Advantage - For Now

Under continuous exponential growth of AI designed cyberattacks, a cyber defender using traditional tools can't just respond just once and stabilize their systems. They’ll need to keep investing at a rate that matches the offense's growth rate itself. A one-time defensive shock like compartmentalization might work against a sudden attack, but it will fail against sustained exponential pressure because there's no stable equilibrium to return to. The defender's investment rate has to track the offense's growth rate.

Ultimately and hopefully, the next generation of AI driven cyber-defense tools will create a new equilibrium.

What We Need to Do

Mythos and its follow-ons will change how we think about cyber-defense. We can’t just build a set of features to catch every exploit x or y. We need to build cyber systems that can maintain or exceed the capability rate of the attackers.

Here are the three tools governments and cyber defense companies need to build now:

  1. Measure the Gap Between Attackers and Defenders. We need to know the gap between what the attackers can do and what we can defend against. We need to develop instrumented red/blue exercises (a simulation of a cyberattack, where two teams – the red team and the blue team – are pitted against each other) to estimate the number of new vulnerabilities vs cyber defense mitigation. (This can be built in six months, with a small team.)
  2. Measure the Defender Response Time. For each corporate or government mission system, measure how long it takes to implement a change from identification to production deployment. Treat each organizational obstacle as equivalent to technical debt that needs to be remediated.
  3. Specify Speed, Not Features. Any new Cyber Defense tools and architecture - including the next-generation cloud-native systems sitting in review right now - should have explicit ‘rate’ requirements. Claims of “our product delivers X capability is now the wrong specification. “Closes detection gap at rate greater than or equal to the offense growth rate” is the right one.

Buckle up. It's going to be a wild ride - for companies, for defense and for government agencies.

Mythos is a sea change. It requires a different response than what the current cyber security ecosystem was built for, and one the current system is not built to produce. We are not behind yet. The gap between Mythos and what we can build to defend is small enough today that a serious response can still match it. A year from now, the same response will be eight times too slow. Two years, sixty-four.

By the way, the only thing left in Pandora’s Box was hope.

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Fri, 24 Apr 2026 20:11:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Pentagon’s $54 Billion Bet on Autonomous Warfare https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pentagons-54-billion-bet-on-autonomous-warfare https://belimedia.com.ng/the-pentagons-54-billion-bet-on-autonomous-warfare OPINION — The Department of Defense does not always announce structural shifts loudly; often, it buries them in the dense columns of budget lines where only the most attentive analysts can find the seismic activity. The $1.5 trillion FY2027 spending proposal contains exactly such a shift, a profound and subtle transformation that effectively reorders the American approach to conflict. Central to this plan is the Departmental Autonomous Warfighting Group (DAWG), an organization established late last year with a modest budget of $225 million. For the 2027 fiscal year, the Pentagon has requested $54.6 billion for this organization, representing a staggering 24,166% increase in funding; that single line accounts for nearly 15 percent of the total reconciliation and exceeds the gross domestic product of many small nations and is higher than the entire budget request for the US Marine Corps of $52.8 billion.

Internal documents indicate the intent to transform the group into a unified combatant command, a joint entity that would coordinate drone, aircraft, and vessel operations across all warfighting domains. This shift mirrors previous military evolutions, specifically the establishment of Space Command in 2019 and the elevation of Cyber Command in 2017. Historically, Congress has authorized these specialized commands when fragmented service approaches created redundancy or dangerous gaps; the same logic applies here. By consolidating these capabilities, Secretary of War Pete Hegsethwants to streamline the development of autonomous systems, ensuring the service branches do not pursue conflicting tactical goals or incompatible technical standards.

The reflects the hard lessons learned in modern conflicts, particularly the ongoing struggles in Ukraine and Iran. CTO Emil Michael has observed that these wars routinely involve thousands of low cost systems engaging against each other in highly contested environments. To maintain a competitive edge, the Pentagon launched the Replicator program with the ambitious goal to deploy hundreds of thousands of one way attack drones by 2028. However, early efforts faced substantial hurdles regarding hardware reliability and supply chain bottlenecks that delayed delivery targets. These shortcomings led to a fundamental realization within the leadership: hardware is secondary to the AI software that drives it.

The current strategy treats artificial intelligence and physical autonomy as a tandem force, where the software is the primary strategic asset. This perspective has created a unique friction point between the Department of War and the private sector, specifically with Anthropic. While the military requires flexible, decisive models for high stakes environments, Anthropic has maintained strict red lines regarding the use of its Claude model. This impasse prompted the Department of War to designate certain domestic AI firms as supply chain risks, a move that highlights the growing chasm between Silicon Valley and national security. If a model is too restricted to perform in a combat environment, it becomes a liability rather than an asset.

The policy landscape remains contentious as Congress prepares the next National Defense Authorization Act. While the technological advantages are evident, the legislative challenges are substantial. Armed Services Committee leaders like Senator Roger Wicker and Representative Mike Rogers have cautioned against making such massive structural shifts without a clear strategy that accounts for ethical and operational oversight. They have drawn clear lines on executive branch activism regarding autonomy, requiring that any major push receives rigorous scrutiny. Representative Rob Wittman has echoed these concerns, noting that while the military must move fast, it cannot afford to abandon the principles of accountability that define American governance.

Internationally, the pressure is even more pronounced. Recently, 156 nations supported a United Nations General Assembly resolution expressing deep concern over the risks of an autonomous arms race. These nations fear that removing humans from the loop will lower the threshold for conflict and lead to unpredictable escalations. The United States was among the minority that declined to support the resolution, citing the necessity of maintaining a technological lead against competitors like China and Russia who are pursuing their own autonomous capabilities with little regard for international norms. Current U.S. policy prohibits the employment of lethal autonomous systems without senior official approval, but critics argue this is a temporary safeguard that could easily be swept away by the speed of machine warfare.

History suggests that as technical capabilities drift, legal frameworks must evolve to provide clear definitions of what constitutes an autonomous weapon. The transition to a unified command for autonomy is not merely a budgetary or structural change; it is a recognition that the nature of power has shifted from physical platforms to the cognitive software that controls them. Failing to adapt to this reality would leave the United States holding an expensive, manned fleet in an age of attritable, intelligent swarms. The window for this transformation is closing, and the FY2027 budget request is the most significant signal yet that the Pentagon is ready to step through it.

Success will depend on more than just the $54.6 billion requested; it will require a new type of coordination between the warriors who fight and the engineers who build the tools. As the Department of War navigates the friction with firms like Anthropic and the skepticism on Capitol Hill, it must articulate a vision where autonomy enhances human judgment rather than replaces it. If they succeed, the 12th Unified Command will become the backbone of American security for the next century; if they fail, the machines will indeed be at the helm, but we may not like where they are steering us.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 24 Apr 2026 20:11:02 +0100 FirstHandNews
Pakistan: Broker of Peace While Still at War https://belimedia.com.ng/pakistan-broker-of-peace-while-still-at-war https://belimedia.com.ng/pakistan-broker-of-peace-while-still-at-war

Just a few weeks ago, Pakistan, the host for fragile ceasefire talks aiming to end the war between the U.S. and Iran, was at war with Afghanistan in what has been described as the worst conflict between the two countries in years.

A ceasefire between Pakistan and Afghanistan that was scheduled to run from midnight March 19 to midnight March 24 - and brokered at the request of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey - offered the first lull in nearly a month of what was widely described as open warfare. Few analysts were treating it as anything more than a pause, risking

Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar was explicit: Operation Ghazab Lil Haq would resume with greater intensity the moment any cross-border attack, drone strike, or terrorist incident occurred inside Pakistan during the holiday period. On Monday, as the ceasefire approached its midnight deadline, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar reaffirmed that Pakistan’s approach had not shifted. “Pakistan remains firmly committed to eradicating the menace of terrorism,” he said.

Previous ceasefires have not held. The one brokered by the same mediators in October 2025 collapsed within days - Istanbul peace talks broke down on October 29, and Pakistan threatened to “obliterate” the Taliban government shortly after. Saudi-led mediation in December 2025 also failed.

What has changed is the scale of the conflict. Pakistan declared “open war” against Afghanistan. Late February brought Operation Ghazab Lil Haq — air and ground strikes hammering Taliban positions across Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika, the most significant cross-border military action since the Taliban retook power in 2021. Pakistani officials now claim more than 684 Taliban fighters killed, over 912 injured, 252 posts destroyed, and 229 tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery guns taken out of action.

The Taliban dispute nearly all of those figures. Pakistani airstrikes have hit Kabul repeatedly, Afghan forces have sent drones and mortars back across the border, and the United Nations has tallied at least 289 Afghan civilian casualties since the fighting began — 104 of them children, 59 women.

The worst single day came on March 16. A Pakistani airstrike hit the Omid Addiction Treatment Hospital in Kabul while patients were inside. Afghan authorities counted more than 400 dead. The UN put the confirmed figure at 143 or more. Pakistan said it had struck only military infrastructure. The following day, mass funerals moved through the capital.

Aparna Pande, Senior Fellow for India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute, tells The Cipher Brief that the ceasefire pattern should surprise no one.

“Historically speaking, these ceasefires have never been durable,” she says. “Each side has simply used the pause in fighting to rebuild and replenish before the next round.”

With the truce now expiring and both sides’ core grievances entirely unresolved, the question pressing analysts is whether Islamabad has a realistic end-state in mind, or whether open war with a nuclear-armed state’s most volatile neighbor has become a policy that Pakistan can start but not finish.

A relationship Pakistan can no longer manage

The roots of this conflict run directly through Islamabad’s own strategic choices. For decades, Pakistan cultivated the Afghan Taliban as a buffer against Indian influence, the doctrine of “strategic depth,” conceived in the 1980s, envisioned a pliant Kabul as an extension of Pakistani security space.

That calculation has collapsed entirely. The immediate trigger for the current war is the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the militant group that Islamabad accuses Kabul of sheltering and enabling. TTP attacks inside Pakistan have dramatically escalated since 2021, and Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir said during a March 4 visit to troops in South Waziristan that peace can only exist if the Taliban “renounced their support for terrorism and terrorist organisations.”

The Taliban, meanwhile, have never recognized the Durand Line, the colonial-era border Pakistan regards as sacrosanct, and that dispute alone makes any durable political settlement nearly impossible to achieve.

Aref Dostyar, Director of the Afghanistan Program at the University of Notre Dame and former senior Afghan diplomat, tells The Cipher Brief that Pakistan’s military logic is backfiring on itself.

“If the goal is to weaken the Taliban, Pakistan’s aggression is backfiring because it is triggering a ‘rally round the flag’ effect,” he says. “Even Taliban opponents are being cornered to choose between supporting the current regime’s stance against Pakistan or appearing to justify foreign aggression. Most are choosing the former.”

The strategic paradox here is stark: Islamabad is now at war with an actor it once created, sustained, and expected to serve its interests indefinitely. Pande is equally direct: any durable agreement would require each side to move off entrenched positions that the other has shown no willingness to abandon.

The Afghan Taliban would need to pressure their ideological ally, the TTP, to ease attacks inside Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan would need to accept that “it cannot combat an insurgent movement through conventional means and hence offer some economic and other incentives,” Pande says, underscoring that “there is a reason a compromise has not happened as both sides are sticking to their hardline positions.”

Dostyar also questions Islamabad’s underlying objectives.

“Pakistan cites the TTP as justification for ‘open war,’ but its true aims are unclear,” he analyzes. “Mapping the specific locations of Afghan targets may reveal an agenda that contradicts their stated counter-terrorism goals.”

The Iranian dimension

The war in Afghanistan, however, is not happening in isolation. On February 28, coordinated United States and Israeli strikes on Iran killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and triggered a rapidly expanding Middle East conflict. For Pakistan, already engaged in open fighting on its northwestern border, the implications of Iranian instability on its southwestern frontier are severe.

Pakistan’s western frontier with Iran runs for 565 miles, cutting through territory where both sides of the border — Pakistan’s Balochistan and Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan — have long hosted ethno-separatist insurgencies. Roughly $1.4 billion in goods moved between the two countries in 2024-2025, most of it through barter deals and informal crossings rather than anything approaching a formal trade architecture.

Iranian fuel and food have kept Balochistan’s markets from seizing up entirely since the Afghan border shut in October. That lifeline now runs through a war zone, and the border districts of Balochistan, among Pakistan’s poorest, would feel any disruption most acutely.

Afghanistan shares its own 572-mile border with Iran, and the stakes for Kabul are equally acute. Iran hosts an estimated three to five million Afghan refugees and migrant workers. It serves as Afghanistan’s primary remaining trade route to the sea via Chabahar port, a lifeline that became critical after Pakistan closed its border in October. With that route now disrupted by the war, Afghanistan faces a dual economic squeeze that has no near-term resolution.

Pande points out that the security calculus around Balochistan is shifting fast.

“Groups like the BLA have used Iranian and Afghan Baluchistan to operate inside Pakistani Baluchistan,” she observes.

The BLA, the Balochistan Liberation Army, is the most powerful of several insurgent groups operating in the province, a banned separatist organization designated a foreign terrorist group by the United States that seeks to carve an independent Balochistan from Pakistani territory and has escalated sharply in recent months, carrying out coordinated bombings, train hijackings, and mass casualty attacks.

“Instability inside Iran can be helpful to these groups as it may make it easier for them to move across the borders and also easier to find access to military equipment,” Pande continues, stressing that the picture cuts both ways. “Instability inside Iran and the Iranian state’s focus on the western frontier means the Pakistani state may find it easier to target these Baluch groups, knowing that Iran’s attention is diverted.”

Pakistan is also home to an estimated 15 to 20 percent Shia population, one of the largest outside Iran. Violence erupted in Pakistani cities following news of Khamenei’s death. Jihadist networks, including the Islamic State Khorasan Province, al-Qaeda, and the TTP, have been trying to expand their footprints in Balochistan, and instability in Iran would divert Pakistani security resources toward border management, creating an opening for those networks to grow.

In Balochistan’s Makran coast region, home to the Chinese-operated deep-sea port of Gwadar, local officials have advised residents to avoid Iranian territory entirely.

A nuclear state on three fronts

Then there is India. Last May, the two nuclear-armed neighbors fought their most intense clash since 1971. India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, striking nine sites linked to militant groups Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir — the first time India had struck inside Pakistan’s Punjab province since the 1971 war.

When reports surfaced that Pakistan had summoned its Nuclear Command Authority, the body that controls decisions over its nuclear arsenal, the crisis took on a different character altogether. Analysts read it as a calculated signal. Pakistani officials later said no such meeting occurred. Fears of escalation to the nuclear threshold drove United States government involvement, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio working the phones before President Trump announced the ceasefire on social media on May 10.

The intervention produced a fragile truce yet left the underlying tensions entirely intact. Delhi has held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance since then, a move Islamabad has called an act of war. The Indus basin supplies roughly 80 percent of Pakistan’s irrigated agricultural land and underpins a sector that accounts for nearly a quarter of GDP.

Dostyar does not mince words about where all this leaves Islamabad.

“Pakistan is facing a failing economy, political instability, and internal separatist movements,” he asserts. “In the face of all this, it is an enormous gamble to engage in multiple external conflicts. It may be a ‘distraction’ strategy, but it poses a significant regional risk, particularly regarding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.”

Pande agrees the military believes it can manage all three frontiers for now, partly because of what she describes as confidence in Washington’s backing and a mutual defense arrangement Pakistan concluded with Saudi Arabia in September 2025, which stipulates that any aggression against either country is treated as aggression against both. Still, she flags a structural weakness in the information campaign that sustains it.

“The message being sent by the top brass is that events that are happening are a conspiracy against Pakistan, in an attempt to rally the people to support the state and its actions,” she says.

That Washington has left the mediation work entirely to Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh is itself telling and consequential. As Dostyar puts it, “Washington’s apparent absence from mediation is likely driven by either insufficient awareness about what is truly going on or a strategic choice due to competing priorities.” In plain terms, the United States is either not paying close enough attention or has decided this fire is someone else’s to put out.

That calculation carries costs. A nuclear state fighting one neighbor, frozen out by another, and watching a third descend into war on its doorstep is exactly the kind of cascading regional breakdown that tends to pull Washington back in regardless of its intentions.

The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal under simultaneous pressure on three fronts, the risk of jihadist networks exploiting the chaos in Balochistan, and the potential for an escalation that pulls in India — all of these are American national security equities, whether Washington chooses to engage or not.

The Eid pause now expiring gives diplomats the narrowest of windows. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey all called this week for a path toward a sustainable agreement. Whether the structural conditions for such an agreement exist is another matter entirely. Pakistan’s preconditions — TTP sanctuaries dismantled, militant leaders handed over — are non-starters for a Taliban government that has staked its domestic legitimacy on refusing to be seen as compliant with Islamabad’s demands. The Taliban’s own precondition, recognition of Afghan sovereignty over the Durand Line, is equally unacceptable to Pakistan’s military establishment.

The underlying drivers are unchanged.

As Pande frames it, the core problem is not a lack of mediation but a lack of political will on both sides.

“The Afghan Taliban believes they are no longer beholden to Pakistan, they are in power, and they are reluctant to act against their ideological ally, the TTP,” she adds. “Pakistan believes that since it helped the Afghan Taliban regain power, the latter should be grateful to Pakistan, should keep Pakistan’s interests in mind and should tame the TTP. The key challenge for Pakistan is the ongoing conflict with its former proxy.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Wed, 22 Apr 2026 19:22:57 +0100 FirstHandNews
How Extremist Groups Are Sharing a Global Media Strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/how-extremist-groups-are-sharing-a-global-media-strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/how-extremist-groups-are-sharing-a-global-media-strategy OPINION — In the private sector, we analyze competitors to understand where they excel, so we can improve our approach. With this same mindset, I reviewed how 15 adversarial groups utilize media to communicate locally and internationally.

The headline is that the groups, ranging from Al-Shabaab to ISIS-K to Hezbollah, are clearly learning from each other, leading to an informal universal playbook that is consistent across the groups.

This is quite similar to the private sector where innovation is more of an iterative race. We have a tendency to copy what works.

Let’s take a look at these common behaviors by separating them into media strategy and narrative style.

Media Strategy

Telegram is home base. It is the top distribution channel for a reason. Telegram offers broadcast channels with no limit on subscribers, bots for automation, end-to-end encrypted direct messages, minimal content moderation and easy migration after bans via invite links. Narratives often start in Telegram, then content is fed to other platforms.

Each group has a similar distribution strategy that anticipates content takedowns. Groups distribute content, on average, across 3-7 platforms simultaneously. Knowing takedowns will occur, they also upload content to Archive.org, which serves as a holding tank. If content goes down on a social channel, it can be re-uploaded from Archive.org. An example of a media mix may include Telegram, Facebook, TikTok, Element and Archive.org.

A two-tier distribution system. All groups have two-tier distribution – their official channels for direct distribution and unofficial channels for supporters/surrogates (TikTok, Instagram, YouTube) to reshare and amplify content. The supporters help groups maintain a presence despite official account bans. Platform policies have difficulties proactively monitoring and patrolling the surrogate amplification layer.

Enforcement leads to migration. Each group pre-positions on other channels, e.g., Rocket.Chat, Element and Session so they can more easily activate a pre-existing presence in alternative channels or they move to new channels beyond the reach of platform moderation, such as satellite TV (Hezbollah, Houthis) and physical offline media (JI, Boko Haram).

Narrative Style

Groups are expert at establishing a false narrative frame. It is standing protocol to exploit major geopolitical events by immediately inserting their narrative within hours. If they conduct this type of “narrative jacking” within 2-4 hours of the incident they have a chance to lead the first wave of interpretation before mainstream media establishes the dominant frame.

Video accelerates attack claims. Every group releases an official video within hours of any attack. Pre-produced, officially branded with logos, released to Telegram first. Sets the frame and it is often more emotional.

Expertise in parallel audience messaging. The local message is in local language and often focuses on governance legitimacy or grievance. The international message focuses on solidarity, victimhood and humanitarian framing. Dual-narrative analysis will be more instructive than tracking either alone.

Ability to reframe civilian imagery. The footage is often authentic. The deception is in the attribution, the framing, or the claimed scale.

Grievance amplification is a gateway to radicalization. Media strategy often begins by amplifying legitimate grievance – real injustices, real conflicts, civilian suffering. Extreme content gets layered on top over time, and because the foundation is real, platform policies usually don’t flag it.

Overall, if we understand how groups learn from each other, it improves our ability to identify which media, technology and AI trends are being utilized by any of the groups. We know that what breaks new ground will be analyzed and implemented as quickly as possible.

The implication for any counter-messaging team is practical. Watching one group’s innovation is watching all fifteen. The right question to ask inside your own operation is whether you are monitoring the first mover in the playbook — not just the group on your assigned target list.

Note: the groups analyzed include ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram/ISWAP, Taliban, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Hezbollah, Hamas, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, AQAP, ISIS-K, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, Jaish-e-Mohammed/Lashkar-e-Taiba, Houthis.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Wed, 22 Apr 2026 19:22:57 +0100 FirstHandNews
Trump, Iran, and the Stress Test of Western Alliances https://belimedia.com.ng/trump-iran-and-the-stress-test-of-western-alliances https://belimedia.com.ng/trump-iran-and-the-stress-test-of-western-alliances OPINION – The war with Iran has grown beyond just a regional war; it is also a preliminary test of the cohesion of Western alliances under President Donald Trump. Deep root causes concerning burden-sharing, strategic partnership, and political trust within NATO are being exposed by the United States’ and its allies' reactions as tensions escalate and the shock of disruption through the Strait of Hormuz is felt by the world's energy markets. A broader re-evaluation of how Western alliances function in an increasingly volatile global context is taking place, rather than just a contest of deterrence against Iran.

This war unfolds in a distinct political setting in Washington - different from previous Middle East conflicts. Trump's foreign policy approach throughout his current term has remained consistent with a transactional view of alliances, putting concrete commitments and national advantage over conventional ideas of shared security.

NATO's internal structures are experiencing pressure and uncertainty. European allies are currently dealing with a more nuanced strategic context, where unconditional alignment with the United States is hardly assumed but still anticipated. As a result, the Iran war reveals the political boundaries of alliance unity.

A Regional War with Global Consequences

The war’s global implications are being highlighted by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Uncertainty in the Strait, a vital conduit for global energy supply, has direct and major economic repercussions, from rising energy costs to heightened financial market swings. The economic implications caused by the Iran war raised calls for de-escalation for European economies already facing structural strain.

NATO allies' strategic calculations are hampered by this economic element. While local economic factors favour neutrality, security commitments require European states to back U.S. policy. The result is a dual strain that weakens collective decision-making. As a result, the Iran War cannot be viewed simply as a regional security matter; rather, it is a confluence of political, economic, and military concerns that go well beyond the Middle East.

Trump’s Alliance Strategy: Pressure as Policy

Trump's use of external threats to alter alliance behaviour is a larger trend in his foreign policy, which appears in how he managed the situation. The current crisis intensified his repeated criticism of NATO states for inadequate defence spending, with new demands for enhanced European contribution to both military operations and financial commitments.

There could be inconsistent outcomes from such a strategy. On one hand, it could hasten European attempts to strengthen strategic autonomy and increase defence spending. On the other hand, it carries the risk of upsetting allies who see this type of strain as eroding the alliance's cooperative roots. According to political scientist Stephen M. Walt alliances are upheld by bilateral trust as well as common interests, which can be weakened when relationships are laid out mainly in terms of give and take.

However, Trump's strategy does make some sense. The realists argue that greater shared burdens could boost the alliance's overall capabilities. The tough element is achieving this without weakening political cohesion that is vital for successful shared action.

NATO at a Crossroads

The Iran war has exposed long-standing divisions in NATO cohesion. Attempts to develop a cohesive response have been hindered by member countries' varying views of the risk. Russia remains as the key security threat for many Eastern European nations, with Middle East instability seen as a secondary concern. On the other hand, the impact of Middle Eastern unrest is more urgent for Southern European nations, especially about migration and energy security.

Establishing agreement turns tougher because of these conflicting agendas. NATO's viability eventually depends on political agreement among its members, even if it maintains strong bureaucratic procedures. Even in the absence of explicit disagreement, the current crisis highlights the risk of a slow erosion of strategic cohesion.

However, history reveals that crises may also act as a catalyst for adaptation. As political scientist Barry R. Posen points out, alliances often fluctuate in response to changing strategic conditions. The question involves whether NATO can utilise the Iran war to reassess its goals, or if internal division will worsen.

The Expanding Role of Middle Powers

Middle powers have played a significant part in fostering diplomatic dialogue throughout the current war. States like Pakistan and Turkey have emerged as mediators, showing the multipolar character of international diplomacy. Pakistan's recent effort to portray itself as a mediator and host the negotiators from the United States, and Iran is especially notable. Despite an inconsistent track record in regional policy and counterterrorism, Islamabad has utilised its alliances with rival blocs in order to preserve channels of communication at a critical time. In this respect, its role is less about resolving the war and more about preventing further escalation by facilitating dialogue in circumstances where direct engagement is politically constrained.

Their engagement reflects a broader shift away from Western dominance in conflict resolution and highlights the growing role played by regional players in crisis management. For NATO, this development provides both challenges and opportunities. On one hand, reliance on external mediators may indicate an erosion in Western diplomatic dominance. On the other hand, it offers other de-escalation alternatives that can complement formal alliance protocols.

The capability of NATO member countries to interact productively with these actors will be crucial in determining the trajectory of the crisis. Successful diplomacy in such a complicated setting requires cooperation outside conventional alliance agreements.

Future Trajectories: Cohesion, Transnationalism, or Fragmentation

The long-term repercussions of the Iran conflict for Western alliances will ultimately be shaped by how these interactions play out. Three potential pathways can be identified.

The first path is a renewed feeling of cohesiveness. In this scenario, the common challenges caused by the war contribute to greater cooperation among NATO members, strengthening NATO's legitimacy and efficiency. This would signify the continuation of NATO's enduring position as a foundation of Western security.

The second path is a shift towards transnationalism. The alliance persists, but collaboration becomes increasingly conditional, driven by national interests and contributions rather than unified standards. While this could enhance efficiency in certain areas, it also has the potential to weaken NATO's sense of joint missions.

The third path is gradual fragmentation. If internal divisions continue to grow, NATO may struggle to react to future crises as a cohesive alliance. This would not necessarily lead to the alliance's collapse, but it might significantly diminish strategic unity and influence.

The Iran war indicated that it’s more than just a test of military capacity or regional strategy; it also tests Western allies' resilience and adaptation in a shifting geopolitical context. Under President Trump, this test is exacerbated by a leadership style that prioritises power and negotiation above established alliance conventions.

For NATO, the stakes go beyond the current crisis. The alliance must manage a complicated web of security challenges, economic constraints, and political disagreements while retaining its credibility as a collective defensive agency. The capacity to manage these opposing needs will determine whether it emerges stronger or more fractured at the end of this period.

Ultimately, the significance of the Iran war may lie less in its immediate outcomes than in what it reveals about the future of alliance politics. In an era of shifting power dynamics and increasing uncertainty, the capacity of Western alliances to adapt will be a critical determinant of their continued relevance.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Wed, 22 Apr 2026 19:22:57 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Costly Illusion of the Golden Dome https://belimedia.com.ng/the-costly-illusion-of-the-golden-dome https://belimedia.com.ng/the-costly-illusion-of-the-golden-dome OPINION — “The Golden Dome for America strategy [President Trump’s proposed nationwide anti-missile defense system] remains centered on affordable and scalable capabilities. In the short-term, we will leverage battle-proven technologies and systems to provide immediate defense against current threats. By improving, multiplying, and integrating existing systems, we can field a credible defense now. However, defeating an increasing number of sophisticated, lower-cost offensive threats with a limited supply of multi-million-dollar [space- and ground-based] interceptors is an economically untenable proposition in the long term.”

That was from the prepared statement of Space Command General Michael Guetlein, Program Manager for the Golden Dome for America project, who appeared last Wednesday before a House Armed Services Strategic Subcommittee hearing held to provide an update on Golden Dome and other Department of Defense (DoD) missile defense programs along with other senior officers.

In announcing the Golden Dome program on January 27, 2025, Trump, in an Executive Order said, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the Nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield; the United States will deter — and defend its citizens and critical infrastructure against — any foreign aerial attack on the Homeland; and the United States will guarantee its secure second-strike capability.”

Last May, Trump predicted, “Once fully constructed, the Golden Dome will be capable of intercepting missiles even if they are launched from other sides of the world, and even if they are launched from space, and we will have the best system ever built.”

Guetlein, just before the two-hour session ended, again made clear, cost would be a factor in the system. “If we cannot do it affordable we will not go into production and that's something that others have not understood. Because we are looking at the threats from a multi-domain perspective, to make sure I have redundant capabilities, and I don't have single points of failure, so if boost- phase intercept from space is not affordable and scalable, we will not produce it because we have other options to get after it.”

During the hearing, Guetlein and the others made clear what a long, costly and complicated process the Golden Dome will involve.

For example, when Guetlein was asked how many American cities are currently protected by Patriot or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries – the U.S. Army’s existing ground-based anti-missile units he referred to above -- he answered, “Today, none.”

I remember back in the 1950-to-1970 Cold War days when the U.S. Army deployed nuclear-armed Nike surface-to-air missile batteries around major cities such as Washington, D.C., Chicago, Detroit, Minneapolis, and the Florida coast to intercept Soviet missiles or bombers. One example: back then 19 Nike anti-air sites ringed New York City.

As I read Guetlein, Golden Dome will require Patriot and THAAD batteries to be deployed to hundreds of U.S. cities to provide the protection President Trump envisioned.

Today, a single Patriot battery cost $1.1 billion -- $400 million for the radar, control station and launchers plus another $690 million for the interceptor missiles, at some $4 million each. In addition, it takes 90 service personnel to operate that Patriot battery. A single battery can protect an area with a 42-mile defense radius, depending on the surrounding terrain, while its radar can track up to 50 potential targets and engage five simultaneously.

A Patriot battery acts as a terminal-phase shield against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and advanced aircraft.

The U.S. Army today operates roughly 15-16 Patriot battalions, consisting of some 60 active batteries, with some 30+ stationed within the U.S., while the remaining are deployed in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region.

A single THAAD battery, designed to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, typically costs between $1 billion and $2.7 billion. A battery is comprised of six truck-mounted launchers, 48+ interceptors, the AN/TPY-2 radar, and fire control units. Again, some 90 personnel are needed to operate a THAAD battery.

As of June 2025, the Army had just eight THAAD batteries with four stationed overseas -- in Guam, South Korea, Israel and Middle East -- and four on U.S. Army bases at home.

Supplementing these terminal-phase defense systems, in considering this new Golden Dome concept, is the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), the only operational U.S. system theoretically designed to defend the entire U.S. against long-range ballistic missiles. However, GMD is designed to defend against limited ICBM threats from rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran and not the advanced ICBM capabilities of Russia and China.

GMD consists of a space-based and ground-based global network of sensors and radars to detect and track threats; command, control, battle management and communications; a fire control system that can calculate interception points; and just 44 Ground based Interceptors (GBI), 40 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and 4 deployed to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. President Trump has requested funding for 20 additional GBI interceptors to be deployed in the United States.

Each GBI has cost roughly $90 million and the GMD system as a whole has been estimated to have cost over $40 billion.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in 2021 awarded Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin contracts to develop a Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) as a follow-on to the GBI. In April 2024, the MDA announced it had selected Lockheed Martin as the sole prime contractor for the NGI program’s development phase.

The NGI plan called for the first new interceptors to be operational by 2028 and the final multi-year contract to be worth an estimated $17 billion.

When Guetlein told the House subcommittee last week “Golden Dome for America is not a single or static weapon system, but an integrated ‘system of systems,’” these three – Patriot, THAAD and GMD -- are the basic systems I believe he was talking about.

There is also the Navy’s AEGIS shipboard anti-missile system, which also provides midcourse and terminal interceptions. But other than the one land-based AEGIS system in Europe, the remainder appear to be needed to protect the fleet.

Guetlein explained, “The architecture that we're building is a very flexible open architecture design system so that we can continuously modernize it as the threat continues to mature. It is not a static architecture. So we will continue to upgrade along the way to get after the threat.”

He claimed his new system “will increase the number of threats we can defend against for a fraction of the cost…by building a modular, layered, defense-in-depth ‘system of systems’ where all components can operate independently and, therefore, can be replaced without having to rebuild the entire enterprise.”

Guetlein said, “We are going to deliver an operational capability by the summer of [20]28 that will be able to protect the homeland against a variety of threats. The ultimate objective architecture is going to be $185 billion. That's $175 billion as identified by the President of the United States and an additional $10 billion to accelerate some space capabilities that were not originally part of our architecture.”

Another House subcommittee witness, Lieutenant General Heath Collins, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, introduced the idea that directed energy weapons, lasers, would also be part of the Golden Dome program.

“We are certainly putting more attention into potentially game-changing directed energy,” Collins said. “Capabilities in an unmanned air platform is what we're focused on so we can bring that capability to the edge of the fight and thin the herd of UAVs [unmanned air vehicles] – potentially air threats and the like. So, we're very into that and we're driving through on that experimentation as we as we move forward.”

Speaking of Patriot and THAAD, Collins said , “We have some very proven systems with incredible capability…We are always driving to figure out how to drive the cost of those down. One through the acceleration in quantities that we're going to talk about. We're going to have a

savings in those. But those are pretty exquisite and unique weapons. As we move forward we are continuing to push directed energy and non-kinetics to change the cost equation.”

Near the close of the hearing, Gen. Guetlein was asked to sum up “in layman’s terms,” why Golden Dome was the right option to meet the current threat.

Guetlein responded in part, “We are seeing threats coming from the multi-domain environment meaning they're coming from air, they're coming from the sea, they're coming from space, they're coming from land. They [U.S. adversaries] have figured out how to get some low-cost threats in there as well to challenge our depth, our defenses.”

Guetlein concluded, “This is driving a demand for increased magazine depth [an adequate supply of interceptors] and a demand for lower cost solutions to get after these sectors. That's what Golden Dome is focusing on…how to change that defense equation. And we're doing that through partnerships with industry, partnerships with academia and partnerships with the national labs.”

I believe the truth is, as the U.S. discovered during the Reagan years, that missile offenses will always defeat missile defenses, and while an Iron Dome defense can be set up for a small country – Israel -- no Golden Dome can be established to protect a large country such as the U.S.

And, ironically, trying to create a defensive system will eventually lead to a more aggressive offensive arms race than exists today.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Wed, 22 Apr 2026 19:22:57 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Most Dangerous Extremist Movement in America Has No Ideology https://belimedia.com.ng/the-most-dangerous-extremist-movement-in-america-has-no-ideology https://belimedia.com.ng/the-most-dangerous-extremist-movement-in-america-has-no-ideology She Was 13. She'd Been Inside This World Since She Was 8.

A week after her birthday, Audree was dead.

Her mother didn't know why – not until a detective called to say Audree's journal was filled with drawings of school shooters. Not until she searched TikTok and recognized her daughter's artwork everywhere. Not until she learned that the online world her artistic, funny, guitar-playing daughter had been living in for five years had a name.

The True Crime Community. The TCC.

The TCC is one of the most dangerous pipelines operating right now – and most parents have never heard of it.

A Fandom Built Around Killers

It's not an organization. There's no leader, no membership card, no political ideology. Researchers call it nihilistic violent extremism – a fandom built around mass killers, driven by hatred of humanity and a hunger for notoriety.

The Columbine shooting gave this world a look and a feel. Members dress like shooters, draw fan art of them, and celebrate them the way other teenagers celebrate musicians. The community has migrated from Tumblr to TikTok, where a hand making an "OK" sign paired with a photo of boots signals TCC membership – and comment sections do the recruiting.

When a new shooting happens, the perpetrator often becomes the next idol. After the December 2024 shooting at Abundant Life Christian School in Madison, Wisconsin, the 15-year-old shooter became a figure the community celebrated – and three more school shootings in Tennessee, Minnesota, and Colorado followed. Each attack feeds the next.

Since January 2024, researchers have linked TCC to at least 25 attacks or disrupted plots. The FBI reported a 300% increase in this kind of extremism between late 2024 and late 2025. And this week, a school shooting in Argentina was directly tied to TCC by government officials, who said it had nothing to do with bullying – only membership in an international online subculture. This isn't an American problem anymore.

The Signs Are There – Parents Just Don't Know What They're Looking At

There is no recruitment script. No one knocks on your door. Your child doesn't come home saying she joined an extremist group. She asks for a T-shirt. She draws something in her notebook you don't recognize. She uses a username that sounds random.

One mother – Audree's mother – didn't just miss the signs. She helped create them. She made custom T-shirts for her daughter printed with logos tied to the Columbine killers. She had no idea what they meant. "I wanted to vomit," she said when she found out.

These communities target kids who are struggling – isolated, anxious, looking for somewhere to fit in. According to de-radicalization expert Allizandra Herberhold of Parents for Peace, about 95% of TCC participants never harm anyone else – they are far more likely to hurt themselves. This is a self-harm crisis as much as a violence crisis.

One more thing most parents don't know: TCC is roughly half girls, half boys – unusual for any extremist group. Girls often find their way in through online eating disorder communities. Boys typically come in through gore forums. If you think only boys are at risk, you're missing half the picture.

The Cipher Brief applies expert-level context to national and global security stories. Grant yourself full-access to Cipher Brief expert insights, analysis and private briefings in the new year by becoming a Subscriber+Member.

A Phone Call Can Stop It

In January, an Indiana mother called the sheriff after noticing something wrong with her 17-year-old daughter. Investigators found the girl had recorded a walkthrough video of her school and was planning an attack with people she'd met online. The mother's call stopped it.

Another mother, Heather Dioneff, watched her daughter Lilyanna get pulled into the TCC world. Lilyanna idolized killers, wrote a manifesto, and made a list of people she wanted to hurt at school. She eventually told a therapist. The therapist called for help. Lilyanna was hospitalized before anything happened.

Two different families. Two different paths. Same result – someone paid attention and made the call.

The warning signs are about looks, not words. Watch for fixation on specific shooters, drawings of killers, references to Columbine, or usernames and symbols you don't understand. If something confuses you – a meme, a post, an image – search it before you react.

Monitor private channels, not just public profiles. Discord needs close attention. Experts say don't allow children on Telegram at all – it's full of violent and exploitative content.

Don't wait until you're sure. Parents for Peace runs a confidential helpline for families worried about where a child is headed. Their number is 1-844-49-PEACE. No judgment. No obligation. The Anti-Defamation League has sent TCC research to more than 16,000 schools and offers guidance on what to look for. Lawmakers have also introduced a bill that would make it a federal crime to push children toward self-harm – a step in the right direction.

The Adults Closest to These Kids Don't Know What to Look For

We have systems for identifying jihadist radicalization. We are building them for domestic extremism. We have almost nothing in place for this threat at the school and community level. The most sustainable fix, researchers say, is treating this like a public health problem – reduce what makes young people vulnerable before an attack happens, not just respond after. That means youth mental health investment, school-based threat assessment training, and making sure the counselors, coaches, and pediatricians who see these kids every day know what they're looking at.

That gap is where children are dying.

The mothers in that CNN story aren't asking for sympathy. They're asking for accountability – from platforms, from policymakers, and from a public that keeps acting surprised by attacks that researchers saw coming.

Kids are going to seek out secret worlds. That instinct is human – it's the same one that draws them to spy stories, adventure novels, and tales of people who matter and belong to something bigger than themselves. The question is who finds them first and what world they're handed when they arrive.

Resources:

  • Parents for Peace confidential helpline: 1-844-49-PEACE | parents4peace.org
  • ADL Center on Extremism: adl.org
  • K-12 School Shooting Database: k12ssdb.org
  • If you or someone you know is in crisis: call or text 988
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Sat, 18 Apr 2026 23:10:44 +0100 FirstHandNews
An FBI Perspective on FISA Section 702 https://belimedia.com.ng/an-fbi-perspective-on-fisa-section-702 https://belimedia.com.ng/an-fbi-perspective-on-fisa-section-702 OPINION – I spent twenty years at the FBI supporting investigations into cybercrime, tracking ransomware gangs, and watching foreign adversaries tear through American networks. I've sat across the table from hospital administrators trying to figure out how to care for patients when their systems are locked. I've talked to small business owners who lost everything to a cyber operation traced back to a state-sponsored group operating with near-impunity abroad.

What I can tell you, from that vantage point, is that allowing Section 702 to lapse would create intelligence gaps that our adversaries are already positioned to exploit.

Section 702 is a vital tool. A nimble authority that provides for collection against foreign-based, non-U.S. person threat actors intent on harming Americans. The threats this authority was built to address have not slowed down while Congress deliberates. Iranian-nexus actors are actively probing U.S. critical infrastructure, Chinese operators remain embedded in telecommunications networks, and ransomware groups – some operating with the direct support or tolerance of foreign governments – are targeting hospitals, water systems, and school districts across the country.

The actors dominating today's headlines each represent a different dimension of why 702 matters to the FBI as an investigative and intelligence collection tool.

Iran has demonstrated both the intent and the capability to conduct attacks on US soil. Beyond cyber operations against critical infrastructure – including recent attacks against operational technology in water treatment plants – Iran has sought to assassinate American citizens, including senior government officials, and to silence dissidents operating on US soil. Many of these plots are planned from abroad, coordinated through the internet, and would be invisible to investigators without 702. It is the tool that lets us connect the dots before an attack is executed rather than after.

China is playing a longer game. The campaign to pre-position access inside US critical infrastructure – power grids, water systems, transportation hubs, communications networks – is patient and methodical, designed to be activated at a moment of Beijing's choosing, including in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. In the FBI's own experience, 702 has been the difference between detecting that access early and discovering it only after the damage is done. When Chinese hackers compromised a major US transportation hub, it was 702-derived intelligence and US person queries that allowed the FBI to pinpoint exactly which network infrastructure had been hit, alert operators to the specific vulnerability, and help close the backdoor.

Ransomware, which defined much of my work at FBI, has evolved from a criminal problem into a national security one. Many of the groups responsible for attacks on hospitals and pipelines operate under the protection or direction of state sponsors who understand that ransomware destabilizes the same infrastructure a military adversary would want to disable. Over the past decade, malicious cyber actors have accounted for more than half of the FBI's Section 702 targets. The authority is central to how the FBI does cyber work: identifying victims, warning them before attacks begin, and helping them close backdoors before the next wave hits.

If Section 702 authority expires, active collection against foreign targets stops. Leads go cold. Investigations that depend on 702-derived intelligence hit a wall at exactly the moment continuity is critical. Adversaries don't pause. Every day the authority lapses is a day they move more freely through networks they have already compromised.

On compliance, the record deserves an honest accounting. The FBI's pre-reform querying practices were unacceptable. Director Wray said so plainly, and he was right. But beginning in 2021, there was a genuine institutional reckoning: foundational reforms to training, supervision, and accountability that produced documented, court-verified improvement. The same court that documented FBI’s violations in the first place – the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) – concluded the reforms are having the desired effect.

The same rigor that produced those improvements is exactly why this reauthorization debate deserves to be evaluated on its own merits. The concern about government acquisition of commercially available data is legitimate, but it is a separate question from 702. Conflating the two risks taking down a well-functioning authority over a fight that belongs elsewhere in statute.

From two decades working to counter these threats, I know what it costs to arrive after the damage is done. The good news is that Congress doesn't have to make that choice. The oversight architecture is working. The reforms are documented. The threats are real and they are not waiting. Reauthorize 702, address commercial data on its own track, and keep the investigative capability that makes the FBI's cyber and national security work possible.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Apr 2026 23:10:44 +0100 FirstHandNews
Is the U.S. lagging when it comes to drone warfare superiority? https://belimedia.com.ng/is-the-us-lagging-when-it-comes-to-drone-warfare-superiority https://belimedia.com.ng/is-the-us-lagging-when-it-comes-to-drone-warfare-superiority

When Iranian Shahed drones began tearing through the Gulf in the opening hours of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, killing American service members and overwhelming allied air defenses, Washington faced an uncomfortable revelation. The most powerful military in the world was flying into its first major drone war, having studied the problem primarily from afar, and had recently dismissed an offer from the one country that had been living in it for four years.

Nearly seven months before the bombing of Iran began, Ukrainian officials had offered the United States their battle-tested technology for downing Iranian-made attack drones. The Trump administration passed. American officials now describe that decision as one of the costliest tactical mistakes of the war. They prepared a detailed presentation displaying a map of the Middle East with a stark warning: Iran is improving its Shahed one-way-attack drone design.

The Trump administration dismissed the offer, then reversed course after Iranian drones began killing Americans.

The cost was measured almost immediately in blood and treasure. In the first two days of the war alone, the U.S. burned through a reported $5.6 billion in munitions. The Pentagon fired more than 850 Tomahawk missiles in five weeks of Operation Epic Fury alone — roughly a quarter of the total United States inventory, according to analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, at a cost of approximately $3 billion, given a unit price of up to $3.6 million per missile.

Washington initially ordered 350 Tomahawks for 2026, which it has since increased to more than 1,000 annually under new framework agreements with Raytheon. However, timelines for achieving that rate remain unclear, and the U.S. has already expended more than 850 Tomahawks in the first five weeks of the campaign alone.

The economics were brutal from the start: shooting down $20,000 drones with multimillion-dollar interceptors is unsustainable against a comparatively modest adversary like Iran and becomes completely unthinkable in a scenario involving China or Russia.

The new drone powers — and America’s place among them

Low-cost, mass-produced drone warfare is reshaping every modern battlefield — and America is not leading it. Iran, Russia, and Ukraine have each shown they can turn out drones by the tens of thousands annually, in some cases pushing toward millions. The United States has not come close.

Iran’s Shahed-136 loitering munition, costing between $20,000 and $50,000 per unit, has become one of the defining weapons of the 21st-century battlefield. Iran supplied the design to Russia, which built its own production ecosystem. Russia’s domestically produced variant has since taken on a life of its own — navigation systems upgraded, warhead capacity expanded, and by early 2026, Starlink connectivity folded in. Moscow has set a production target of up to 1,000 Geran-2 drones per day.

Ukraine, forced into innovation by necessity, became the world’s most experienced practitioner of both drone attack and drone defense. More than 160 drone manufacturers operating in Ukraine have pledged to deliver 8 million first-person-view drones in 2026 alone. Over 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties are now inflicted by Ukrainian drones, while a drone-dominated kill zone stretching roughly ten miles either side of the front lines makes any major offensive operation extraordinarily hazardous.

America went into the Iran war with its own version of the Shahed — a drone called LUCAS, built by Arizona startup SpektreWorks from a reverse-engineered Iranian airframe, priced at $35,000 a unit. It saw its first confirmed combat use on February 28. Full-rate production, however, had not yet begun.

The strategic irony was not lost on analysts: America struck Iran using a weapon derived almost entirely from Iran’s own signature strike platform.

Kate Bondar, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells The Cipher Brief the gap, however, runs deeper than raw production numbers.

“The gap is very real, especially in the category that matters most in modern attritional warfare: cheap, expendable, and rapidly replaceable systems,” she said, noting that to truly integrate first-person-view drones into operations, “volumes need to reach into the millions.”

Current U.S. plans for roughly 300,000 small drones by 2027 are a step forward, Bondar observed, but “still fall short of what this kind of warfare demands.”

The Ukrainian classroom

While Washington spent years deliberating over acquisition timelines, Kyiv was building the most combat-tested drone force on earth. Ukraine’s intercept rate against Shahed-class drones now approaches 90 percent — and Kyiv is aiming for 95.

Russia has launched nearly 57,000 Shahed-type drones at Ukrainian cities across four years of war. The low-cost defensive solutions Ukraine developed, however, were never replicated across Gulf nations or by the American military in the region. When Iran’s drones began arriving in mass, the United States was left improvising.

One Ukrainian drone specialist, speaking to The Cipher Brief at the Ground War symposium in Washington, explained that only three countries on the planet can fight with drones efficiently — Iran, Russia, and Ukraine.

“Americans have helped to produce these interceptors, but they don’t have the experience of applying them,” the military specialist, identified only as Yuri, noted. “Only those engaged directly in warfare, like Ukraine, have the understanding and intuition of how to apply new technology. And it’s changing every single day.”

Yuri, who came to the Ukrainian military with a background in IT and cybersecurity, described a feedback loop that American procurement culture has never had to replicate.

“The best way is close communication between manufacturers and the military,” he continued. “After using different types of drones or technologies, they need to provide fast feedback to manufacturers. These cycles of upgrades need to take a very short time. That’s why our drones are always up to date.”

Ukraine has now deployed 228 counter-drone specialists across five regional partners — Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Ukrainian specialists have also been dispatched to protect American military bases in Jordan, with Zelensky confirming that more than ten countries had requested Kyiv’s assistance. Trump initially rebuffed the offer.

“We don’t need their help in drone defense,” he told Fox News. “We know more about drones than anybody. We have the best drones in the world, actually.”

Days later, Washington reversed course.

Catching up — at war speed

To its credit, the Pentagon has moved with unusual urgency since the gap became undeniable. Travis Metz, the Pentagon’s drone dominance program manager, told senators that the Defense Department has committed $1.1 billion to buy drone systems over the next 18 months, including 30,000 small, one-way attack drones to be delivered to military units over the next five months. The broader Drone Dominance Program aims to acquire more than 300,000 low-cost drones by 2027, with the FY2026 defense budget allocating $13.4 billion for autonomous military systems.

Bondar, however, warns that ambition and production are different things.

“Success in this space depends on constant iteration,” she pointed out. “Russia has introduced dozens of modifications to Shahed systems and their employment over time. The United States moved too slowly for too long, and is still not operating at the scale or speed required.”

Lt. Col. Jahara Matisek, a non-resident research fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, tells The Cipher Brief the deeper problem is organizational.

“Russia and Iran treat drones as a consumable and design their whole kill chain around adaptation and attrition,” he said. “The U.S. spent too long with a boutique mindset: exquisite platforms, slow procurement, and drones as ISR accessories.”

In Ukraine, drone warfare doctrine doesn’t update on a doctrinal cycle; it updates on a survival cycle.

“Every three to four months, a new jamming technique or counter-drone tactic forces units to rewrite how they fight,” Matisek explained. “Squad leaders brief new engagement protocols after a single bad day.” In the U.S., doctrinal updates take years.

The China dimension makes all of this even more urgent. Matisek points out that a war in the Indo-Pacific would be a drone-and-missile volume fight at a scale that dwarfs anything seen in the Gulf, with China holding dominant positions across the upstream supply chain — batteries, optical systems and rare earth minerals.

Ukraine has worked hard to wean itself off Chinese drone components — the share dropped from roughly 97 percent at the start of the war to an estimated 38 percent by 2025, per the Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry and the Snake Island Institute. But Chinese supply chains still run through both sides of this conflict.

The United States faces the same dependency at precisely the moment it is trying to scale up: China controls an estimated 90 percent of the global commercial drone market and dominates production of the batteries, motors, cameras, and flight controllers that underpin virtually every small drone system in use today.

“What I think is most worrying,” Matisek continues, “is that the U.S. military in four weeks of the Iran war has basically spent four to five days’ worth of precision-guided munitions that it would need in a war with China. If a war with China broke out next month, the U.S. would only have enough PGMs for three days of fighting, at most.”

The model for getting this right already exists in American history. During World War II, eleven factories built the M4 Sherman tank using standardized engineering documentation, producing nearly 50,000 units between 1942 and 1946. The question now is whether, a generation into the drone age, the United States can do it fast enough.

“What matters now,” Bondar adds, “is whether these initiatives produce not just inventory, but a repeatable ecosystem: rapid procurement, operator training, software iteration, battle damage feedback, and industrial learning loops.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 16 Apr 2026 22:15:03 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Navy is changing the way it does business and its still pretty pricey https://belimedia.com.ng/the-navy-is-changing-the-way-it-does-business-and-its-still-pretty-pricey https://belimedia.com.ng/the-navy-is-changing-the-way-it-does-business-and-its-still-pretty-pricey OPINION -- "After a rigorous, data-driven analysis, we've made the tough but necessary decision to inactivate the USS Boise. This strategic move allows us to reallocate America’s highly-skilled workforce to our highest priorities: delivering new Virginia [attack] and Columbia [strategic ballistic missile] - class submarines and improving the readiness of the current fleet. We owe it to our Sailors and the nation to make these tough calls to build a more capable and ready Navy.”

That was a statement by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle as part of a U.S. Navy press release distributed last Friday that announced the decision to inactivate the Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Boise (SSN 764).

Friday’s press release also said, “The move is part of the Navy’s broader, data-driven initiative to optimize the fleet's composition, ensuring that every dollar is invested in capabilities that directly contribute to maintaining a decisive war-fighting advantage…The Navy is changing the way it does business, and part of that shift is ensuring all authorized funding directly contributes to readiness and our ability to defeat future threats.”

I quote that Navy press release because the USS Boise represents what must be considered an extreme case of military service over-spending.

According to Defense News, “The Navy had originally planned for Boise to begin its overhaul in 2013, but the timetable was repeatedly delayed, primarily due to a lack of shipyard availability.” As a result, the submarine has not been to sea since its last cruise in January 2015 and formally lost its dive certification nine years ago.

Meanwhile, contracts were awarded for its overhaul beginning with one for $59.8 million on October 16, 2017 to Huntington Ingalls Inc. - Newport News Shipbuilding, for planning and execution of Engineered Overhaul of the Boise. Work was expected to start in January 2019 and be completed by February 2021.

What national security news are you missing today? Get full access to your own national security daily brief by upgrading to Subscriber+Member status.

In February 2020, Huntington-Ingalls was awarded a $15 million modification to the previously-awarded contract and in September 2020 Huntington-Ingalls was awarded another modification, this time a $351.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, for continued advanced planning and modernization to prepare the USS Boise for its overhaul, which was to begin in dry dock.

Finally, despite the earlier delays, in February 2024, Huntington Ingalls Inc. was awarded a $1.17 billion cost-plus-incentive-fee modification to the previously awarded contract for completion of USS Boise (SSN 764) engineered overhaul. However, only $36 million was to be made available at the time of award. This time, the overhaul was to be completed by September 2029.

Last Friday, Navy Secretary John Phelan told Fox News that the Boise overhaul had already cost $800 million and would require another $1.9 billion to finish repairs. "At some point, you just cut your losses and move on," Phelan said.

I wondered whether the Boise case is that unique, particularly because the Navy’s new fiscal 2027 budget request sent to Congress last week contains a record $65.8 billion in shipbuilding funding for 18 battle force ships and 16 non-battle force ships.

Looking at Pentagon contracts last Thursday, I came across a Navy award of a $33.5 million firm-fixed-price contract to BAE Systems, Maritime Solutions San Diego, “for maintenance, modernization and repair of USS Augusta (LCS 34) Fiscal 2026 Docking Selected Restricted Availability.” The work will be performed in San Diego and is expected to be completed by August 2027, according to the Navy.

A Docking Selected Restricted Availability is essentially a major scheduled shipyard overhaul. The ship is placed in dry dock so crews can inspect and repair parts of the hull and propulsion systems that are normally below the waterline, while also updating onboard equipment and carrying out checks that cannot be done at sea.

The USS Augusta is the 17th Independence-class U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a controversial group of vessels that has suffered numerous issues from hull fatigue cracks limiting their design top speed and other issues that have made them unable to carry out the roles they were built to fill.

The Augusta was delivered to the Navy in May 2023 and commissioned in September 2023. Based on user reports and social media messages, the Augusta has had mechanical and sanitary challenges since arriving at Naval Base San Diego in late 2023. The reported issues have included engine startup failures that delayed pier movements and severe plumbing issues.

In November 2025, little more than two years after the Augusta was commissioned, the Naval Sea Systems Command put out a solicitation requiring “a combination of maintenance, modernization, and repair, and…a highly capable contractor with substantial facilities, to include capable pier (for the applicable ship class) as well as human resources capable of completing, coordinating, and integrating multiple areas of ship maintenance, repair and modernization.”

So, after three years of minimal service at sea, the Augusta LCS, which cost over $500 million to build and will spend the next year being repaired and modernized for at least another $30 million-plus.

Having reviewed the story of the Augusta, I then looked into the history of the LCS program

and found another cautionary Navy shipbuilding tale worth telling given that in fiscal 2027 the Pentagon is about to embark on establishing what the Office of Management and Budget calls in budget documents “President Trump’s Golden Fleet, including initial funding for the Trump-class battleship and next generation frigates, as well as increasing the capacity of public shipyards and improving overall ship production.”

Initiated in February 2002, the Navy held a major, multi-year competition for the LCS program that involved two distinct designs -- Lockheed Martin’s steel monohull (Freedom class) and Austal USA/General Dynamics’ (Independence class) with an aluminum trimaran hull, meaning a slender main hull flanked by two smaller outrigger hulls to provide superior stability, speed, and efficiency compared to monohulls.

In November 2010, the Navy asked that Congress approve ten each of the Independence and Freedom classes as part of a plan to build two LCS variants totaling 52 modular ships. The separate modules for the LCS included anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, surface warfare and special warfare missions.

The two different designs meant the ships could not trade parts or sailors, making them more expensive to maintain and crew. Costs also grew because of development delays and testing failures thanks to a combination of new concepts and systems. Originally to be priced at $220 million per LCS unit, costs for the first ships rose to $700 million, later dropping to around $500 million.

In December 2015, Defense Secretary Ash Carter ordered the Navy to reduce the number of LCS to be built from 52 to 40, and ordered the service to down-select to one version by fiscal year 2019.

In 2021, the Navy decommissioned LCS-2, the USS Independence, after only 11 years in what was to be 25 years in service. It was part of a Navy plan to decommission the first four LCS vessels due to high operating costs and structural issues. Instead, by 2023, six additional LCS ships were decommissioned.

Three other LCS were scheduled to be taken out of service but have since been kept as test beds for Navy robotic autonomous systems and other purposes.

There is a reported $1 billion in the Navy’s fiscal 2027 budget request for President Trump’s proposed 35,000-ton guided missile battleship that would house rail-guns, hypersonic missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, lasers, and a large Vertical Launch System battery.

Trump said last December “we’re starting with the first two immediately,” but based on the Navy’s record of developing and building warships, I don’t expect this questionable vessel to appear any time soon.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

What national security news are you missing today? Get full access to your own national security daily brief by upgrading to Subscriber+Member status.

]]>
Thu, 16 Apr 2026 22:15:03 +0100 FirstHandNews
Avoiding Another 9/11 and my 3 Key Reasons to Reauthorize Section 702 https://belimedia.com.ng/avoiding-another-911-and-my-3-key-reasons-to-reauthorize-section-702 https://belimedia.com.ng/avoiding-another-911-and-my-3-key-reasons-to-reauthorize-section-702 Editor's Note: Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was originally enacted as a post 9/11surveillance program that allows the government to collect electronic communications of foreign nationals located outside the United States without needing a warrant for each target. Supporters have called it 'indispensable' and critics worry about its potential use to surveil Americans. Section 702 is up for Congressional reauthorization this month.

The Cipher Brief asked General Paul Nakasone, former director of the National Security Agency and former Commander of U.S. Cyber Command for his take on reauthorization and why it matters to future U.S. national security.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – I strongly support the clean reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Allowing this critical authority to lapse would put our nation at unnecessary risk.

This view is informed not only by my experience leading U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, but also by the lessons of September 11th—a day I remember vividly from the Pentagon. Our intelligence community was surprised on 9-11, and the consequences were devastating. We cannot afford to repeat that failure.

Section 702 should be cleanly reauthorized for three key reasons:

First, it is a carefully designed authority that balances national security with civil liberties. It is limited to surveillance of foreigners abroad, and it operates under oversight from all three branches of government, with established mechanisms to identify and address misuse. There is no other statutory authority that gives our nation the equivalent information vital to our national security.

Second, it enables targeted—not bulk—collection. Contrary to common misconceptions, Section 702 is not a mass surveillance tool. It is a precise capability that helps us discover, and if necessary, prevent threats like Iranian sponsored attacks in the homeland, Chinese cyber thefts, and Russian espionage.

Finally, we face an increasingly complex and dangerous global environment. Letting this authority lapse risks creating intelligence gaps at the worst possible time. Maintaining an effective and bounded tool like Section 702 helps prevent overreactions in a crisis—when emergency measures might be broader and less protective of civil liberties.

For nearly six years, I relied daily on Section 702 to identify terrorist threats, protect our servicemen abroad, foil cyber intrusions, and prevent attacks against our homeland. It was, and remains, indispensable to our safety and security, while also upholding our values. A clean reauthorization of Section 702 is essential to both ensuring our national security and the protection of our civil liberties.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

What national security news are you missing today? Get full access to your own national security daily brief by upgrading to Subscriber+Member status.

]]>
Thu, 16 Apr 2026 22:15:03 +0100 FirstHandNews
Avoiding Another 9/11: 3 Key Reasons to Reauthorize Section 702 https://belimedia.com.ng/avoiding-another-911-3-key-reasons-to-reauthorize-section-702 https://belimedia.com.ng/avoiding-another-911-3-key-reasons-to-reauthorize-section-702 Editor's Note: Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was originally enacted as a post 9/11surveillance program that allows the government to collect electronic communications of foreign nationals located outside the United States without needing a warrant for each target. Supporters have called it 'indispensable' and critics worry about its potential use to surveil Americans. Section 702 is up for Congressional reauthorization this month.

The Cipher Brief asked General Paul Nakasone (Ret.), former director of the National Security Agency and former Commander of U.S. Cyber Command for his take on reauthorization and why it matters to future U.S. national security.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – I strongly support the clean reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Allowing this critical authority to lapse would put our nation at unnecessary risk.

This view is informed not only by my experience leading U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, but also by the lessons of September 11th—a day I remember vividly from the Pentagon. Our intelligence community was surprised on 9-11, and the consequences were devastating. We cannot afford to repeat that failure.

Section 702 should be cleanly reauthorized for three key reasons:

First, it is a carefully designed authority that balances national security with civil liberties. It is limited to surveillance of foreigners abroad, and it operates under oversight from all three branches of government, with established mechanisms to identify and address misuse. There is no other statutory authority that gives our nation the equivalent information vital to our national security.

Second, it enables targeted—not bulk—collection. Contrary to common misconceptions, Section 702 is not a mass surveillance tool. It is a precise capability that helps us discover, and if necessary, prevent threats like Iranian sponsored attacks in the homeland, Chinese cyber thefts, and Russian espionage.

Finally, we face an increasingly complex and dangerous global environment. Letting this authority lapse risks creating intelligence gaps at the worst possible time. Maintaining an effective and bounded tool like Section 702 helps prevent overreactions in a crisis—when emergency measures might be broader and less protective of civil liberties.

For nearly six years, I relied daily on Section 702 to identify terrorist threats, protect our servicemen abroad, foil cyber intrusions, and prevent attacks against our homeland. It was, and remains, indispensable to our safety and security, while also upholding our values. A clean reauthorization of Section 702 is essential to both ensuring our national security and the protection of our civil liberties.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

What national security news are you missing today? Get full access to your own national security daily brief by upgrading to Subscriber+Member status.

]]>
Thu, 16 Apr 2026 22:15:03 +0100 FirstHandNews
Copy of Trump’s Cyber Strategy Is a Strong Playbook, but It’s All in the Execution https://belimedia.com.ng/copy-of-trumps-cyber-strategy-is-a-strong-playbook-but-its-all-in-the-execution https://belimedia.com.ng/copy-of-trumps-cyber-strategy-is-a-strong-playbook-but-its-all-in-the-execution OPINION — The White House is making a significant effort toward putting the nation’s cyber house in order. A newly released National Cyber Strategy represents a big step in the right direction for U.S. national security policy — advocating for the aggressive defense of our national infrastructure.

While the strategy includes important goals for the administration — streamlining regulation, developing the cyber workforce, defending federal networks, and partnering with the private sector — how the administration proceeds will determine whether it achieves the goals the strategy outlines. Across the strategy’s six pillars, the administration needs to clarify its arguments, refine its implementation plans, and improve its articulation of the challenge we face.

Defending U.S. national interests in cyberspace requires understanding the threat to our national security. Despite the prioritizing efforts to shape adversary behavior in the first of the strategy’s six pillars, it falls short of identifying America’s most aggressive adversaries — Russia and China. Both countries have repeatedly targeted American critical infrastructure without a meaningful response from the United States. It fails to mention China’s operational preparation of the battlefield on U.S. soil through its Volt Typhoon campaign against national critical infrastructure or Russia’s targeting of networking devices. Shaping adversary behavior in cyberspace requires identifying who the adversary is.

Pillar One provides a strong, effective argument for developing the offensive cyber capabilities and operations which are critical to enable success in today’s warfare. This White House showed its willingness to use these cyber capabilities in both Venezuela and Iran. There is an ongoing debate as to whether private companies should be allowed more agency to “hack back” against attackers, and the administration is reportedly considering an expanded role for the private sector. While the government should work with the private sector to develop these offensive capabilities, this should be limited to tool building and network defense rather than the actual conduct of offensive operations. If private companies conduct offensive cyber operations, the government risks losing control over escalation in conflict.

Pillar Two prioritizes streamlined regulations. Data and cybersecurity regulations help ensure companies have safe and secure practices. The proliferation of cyberattacks, however, has caused an explosion of cyber-related regulations. The federal government should work with the private sector to ensure that these regulations are comprehensive without being an unnecessary burden on the private sector.

Pillar Three focuses on the important goal of securing federal networks and modernizing procurement. The strategy wisely mentions post-quantum cryptography, zero-trust architecture, and cloud transition. To account for this emerging technology, the government must refine procurement processes to enable continuous improvement of federal networks.

Pillar Four calls for building strong private-public collaboration to defend critical infrastructure. This is a noble goal, but most of former Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s work over the past year contradicted this goal. She eviscerated the cyber defense agency’s workforce — reducing it by nearly 40 percent — and disrupted cybersecurity grant programs, weakening the agency’s efforts to support state and local governments and public utilities. She cancelled the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, effectively gutting the federal government’s authority to engage private companies collectively to advance cyber defense.

The Trump administration can reverse this disastrous trend and get the United States on the right track to cyber defense of critical infrastructure. Noem’s replacement should start by rejuvenating and resourcing the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

Pillar Five prioritizes American superiority in critical and emerging technologies — a necessary priority for ensuring U.S. success in cyberspace. Executing this strategy requires investment in the research centers that are the driving force for consistent improvement and development of critical and emerging technologies.

A key element of the new cyber strategy is in Pillar Six — its continued commitment to building America’s capability to develop talent in cyberspace. Without a strong cyber workforce in the government, the military, and the private sector, the nation is at risk of falling behind. The administration can validate this pillar with continued support to programs like the CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service which provides scholarships for cyber-related degrees in exchange for government service after graduation.

Because of the administration’s workforce cuts and hiring freezes, the program has faced challenges in the past year with maintaining funding and placing participants. The administration should support and expand funding for the program and prioritize hiring for participants. President Donald Trump should also establish a new military service for cyber, a U.S. Cyber Force, which would create a better mechanism for generating a military cyber workforce sufficient in size and skill to fulfill America’s strategic goals.

Trump would be wise to put the plan into action through additional executive orders (EOs) to implement the stated goals — presidentially signed orders task the federal agencies with discrete deliverables while White House strategic documents lack enforcing power. These EOs should prioritize support for CISA, cyber workforce development, and an organizational construct for taking aggressive action against U.S. adversaries. Taking the “ends” of the strategy and equipping them with “ways” and “means” via EOs will enable continued American superiority in cyberspace.

The six “Pillars of Action” in the new strategy have the potential to guide the United States toward success in cyberspace. That success will depend on whether the administration takes the necessary action to back up the sound rhetoric.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 16 Apr 2026 22:15:03 +0100 FirstHandNews
What Iran Is Learning from Russia’s War and Why the U.S. Should Be Concerned https://belimedia.com.ng/what-iran-is-learning-from-russias-war-and-why-the-us-should-be-concerned https://belimedia.com.ng/what-iran-is-learning-from-russias-war-and-why-the-us-should-be-concerned

KREMLIN FILES/COLUMN: The war in Ukraine is often framed by optimistic academics, and some policymakers as a cautionary tale—an example of how military aggression can backfire, weaken a state, and isolate it from the world. But that assumption may be dangerously incomplete. For regimes like Iran, the more relevant lesson may not be Russia’s failures, but its endurance.

Four years into the conflict, Moscow has not collapsed. Instead, it has adapted militarily remarkably well, particularly in the past two years. Russia has resisted sanctions to make its economy even more domestically oriented and more reliant on China. It has also dramatically strengthened the security and intelligence structures that sustain authoritarian rule. If Iran’s leadership is studying this war—and there is strong evidence that it is—it may come away with lessons that make it more resilient, more technologically capable, and more repressive. That possibility should concern the United States.

The first lesson Iran’s regime might learn is that war fosters innovation, especially when countries must operate under constraints. Even before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow and Tehran were already working together militarily. While not a strategic alliance like NATO, or anything close to approaching the strength of our “Five Eyes” partnerships, Iran supplied Russia early in the war with Shahed drones, which quickly became a key part of Russia’s strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.

But the relationship didn’t stop at the simple transfer and sale of weapons. Throughout the war, both countries have adapted and improved. Russia has modified Iranian drone designs, increased their range and guidance systems, and expanded domestic production for new generations of its GERLAN drone series (based initially on the Shahed, but evolved significantly since). They have also established a new “Unmanned Systems Troops” branch for their military. Some might argue they are ahead of NATO in this innovation (though still behind Ukraine, thankfully).

Meanwhile, Iran has gained battlefield feedback, collecting real-world data on how its systems perform against modern air defenses when the Russians deployed them. That seems to be paying off in some respects now with Iran’s own conflict. Their drones have indeed penetrated U.S. and allied defenses in the region. U.S. airpower remains a dominant force on any battlefield of any potential conflict still, but for how much longer?

The wartime innovation is not limited to drones. Russia has improvised with electronic warfare, missile production, and decentralized command structures under pressure—the latter being particularly difficult for its Soviet-style military to adapt from, but reports are that they have done so. Iran, which already prioritizes asymmetric warfare, is likely absorbing these lessons. The development of new generations of loitering munitions—like Iran’s IRSA-7—illustrates how quickly relatively simple technologies can evolve into more effective and harder-to-counter systems.

For Iran, the takeaway is clear: even under sanctions and technological isolation, war can accelerate military advancement rather than stall it. That has direct implications for U.S. forces now at war in Iran, and partners in the Middle East, who could face more sophisticated and battle-tested Iranian systems if the war continues.

A second lesson Iran might learn is that prolonged conflict doesn't necessarily topple a regime—it can instead make it more resilient. Western policymakers often believe that ongoing economic pressure and battlefield losses will eventually lead to political change. Russia’s experience complicates that argument and shows how an autocratic system can be built to endure a long conflict.

Despite broad sanctions, export controls, and diplomatic isolation, the Russian government has kept functioning. It has shifted its economy toward non-European partners, especially China, maintained energy revenues, and passed the hardships onto its people. Russia’s domestic production of many agricultural and other goods has actually increased during the war. How does this compare with the U.S. and the West? Not very well, of course. If international shipping stopped bringing goods to the U.S. market, our economy would collapse.

Iran is arguably even better positioned to absorb this lesson. It has decades of experience operating under sanctions, developing informal trade networks, and insulating its core institutions from economic shock. What Russia has demonstrated is that a large, resource-rich, authoritarian state can endure far longer than many expected, even under intense pressure. For Tehran, this reinforces the idea that time may be on its side—that it can outlast external pressure campaigns without fundamentally changing its behavior. That belief, in turn, could make Iran more willing to engage in risky or confrontational actions, calculating that the long-term costs are manageable.

The final—and perhaps most troubling—lesson is the strengthening of the security state. Over the course of the war, Russia’s internal security services, particularly the FSB, have not weakened; they have grown more powerful. As I have argued previously in this column, the FSB now has a strong claim to being the most powerful and all-encompassing security service in the history of Russia, pre- and post-USSR. Compared against the Okhrana, the KGB, Cheka, and even Ivan the Terrible’s oprichniki, that is saying something.

But as the conflict dragged on, the Russian government systematically dismantled what remained of independent media, criminalized dissent, and expanded surveillance and repression. In many ways, the war accelerated a process that was already underway: the consolidation of a security-service-driven state.

History offers a grim parallel. By the end of World War II, organizations like the Gestapo and the SS had become central pillars of the Nazi regime, enforcing loyalty and eliminating opposition. Hitler used the failed Valkyrie plot (Colonel von Staufenberg and other senior Wehrmacht officers who planted a bomb at the Wolf’s Lair) to ruthlessly eliminate all dissent in the final year of the war. Could Iran’s regime similarly build on its already brutal suppression of dissent just before this conflict and then crack down even harder?

While the contexts are different, the underlying dynamic is similar: prolonged conflict can empower internal security institutions, making them the backbone of regime survival. In Russia today, the erosion of freedoms has been accompanied by the rise of a system in which dissent is nearly impossible. Many of the country’s brightest young minds left early in the war, and those who remain often operate under intense fear and constraint. Intellectual life is stifled, and opposition is either exiled, imprisoned, or silenced. Even when in prison, though, as in the case of Aleksey Navalny, that is not enough—the regime imposes the “highest measure” and continues to murder the opposition.

For Iran, this is a powerful example, one they have practiced well over the decades. The regime already relies heavily on its own security apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its many intelligence and security services/police. The Russian experience suggests that war—or even the sustained perception of external threat—can justify further expanding these institutions’ power. It creates a political environment in which repression is not only tolerated but framed as necessary for national survival. The result is a system with little to no space for dissent, where the regime becomes more stable precisely because it is more coercive.

Taken together, these lessons point to a sobering conclusion. Iran’s regime and its new leadership may see Russia’s war not as a warning but as a model: a demonstration that a determined authoritarian regime can innovate under pressure, endure economic punishment, and consolidate power internally even while engaged in a costly conflict. For Russia, they have been telling their people and their claimed allies, like Iran, that they are “fighting all of Europe.” And for Russia, they believe they are prevailing. For Iran, the lesson may be—we can win too.

For the United States, these challenge several core assumptions about deterrence and pressure. If regimes believe they can survive—and even strengthen themselves—through confrontation, then the tools Washington relies on may be less effective than hoped.

The war in Ukraine is not just a regional conflict; it is a global case study in how modern authoritarian states adapt to crises. The danger is not that Iran misreads Russia’s experience, but that it reads it correctly and that we in the West, possibly, have not. And if it does, the next phase of confrontation between Iran and the United States may unfold under conditions far less favorable to deterrence than policymakers expect.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 16 Apr 2026 22:15:03 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s Drone Future https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-drone-future https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-drone-future OPINION — America is entering a future with millions of drones in our airspace. As the federal government works to determine how to manage what will become the most crowded skies in human history, we believe state and local governments will face significant challenges in addressing this issue, regardless of what federal authorities ultimately establish. As with most public safety incidents, the first response to drone-related events—crashes, unsafe or suspicious flights, interference with emergency operations, or calls from concerned citizens—will fall to state and local first responders.

We are both investors who have managed portfolios of UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) and C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems) companies. What’s top of mind for us as we consider the challenges and opportunities this new market presents? Here are five quick thoughts from conversations we had over coffee this past weekend.

1. The Growing Gap Between Drone Proliferation and Local Airspace Awareness

The FAA estimates nearly 2 million drones could be operating in U.S. airspace within the next few years—yet the United States has no broadly available, affordable solution for comprehensive low-altitude airspace monitoring accessible to state and local governments.

Federal efforts to address this are underway. The FAA’s proposed Part 108 regulations, expected to be finalized this year, attempt to address this gap through Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) systems and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcasts (ADS-B). But existing detection capabilities remain fragmented: there is no widely adopted, comprehensive, real-time network capable of tracking drones over most of the country. Unlike traditional air traffic control, smaller low-altitude drone operations lack the management infrastructure required for safe, high-density operations. And critically, it is also worth noting that while federal regulatory frameworks may succeed in shaping the behavior of cooperative, law-abiding operators, bad actors are under no obligation to comply.

The gap is felt most acutely at the local level. For a small-town police department, limited authority, limited airspace awareness, and limited counter-drone capabilities often mean that the most law enforcement can do when a drone is operating where it shouldn't is attempt to locate the pilot and ask them to land.

The technology to do more does exist—RF sensors, acoustic systems, radar, and EO/IR cameras are all available—but deploying them at scale demands personnel, training, maintenance, and infrastructure integration. Even so-called "affordable" systems carry substantial operational burdens. For many local governments facing constrained budgets and competing priorities, procuring and sustaining such systems is simply out of reach.


We believe there is a clear and largely unmet need for affordable, scalable airspace awareness and management platforms that can be deployed for safety, security, operational visibility, and situational awareness.

2. Legal and Resource Barriers Facing Local Drone Enforcement

Local governments face significant limitations in enforcing drone regulations—and the scale of the problem is likely underestimated. For instance, hundreds of drone incursions over correctional facilities are publicly reported each year, yet most go uncontested, suggesting the true volume may be orders of magnitude higher when accounting for incidents that go unnoticed or unreported.

Most agencies simply lack the funding, trained personnel, and technical infrastructure needed to respond meaningfully to drone threats at high-risk sites. A patchwork of state-level regulations further complicates enforcement. Several states require search warrants for drone surveillance, while other aspects of drone law vary widely across jurisdictions. Costs compound these challenges—detection systems range from roughly $10,000 for basic equipment to several million dollars for advanced tracking and jamming capabilities, a spectrum that puts even entry-level solutions out of reach for many municipalities.

These converging legal, operational, and financial constraints point to a clear and underserved market across several opportunity areas we see as compelling: Counter-UAS as a Service, training and certification programs, contracted subject matter experts, automated CUAS monitoring platforms, and more. Each model offers a distinct way to address the capability gaps facing local agencies.

3. The Growing Divide Between Federal Authority and Local Capability

While state and local authorities remain resource-limited, the federal government is moving quickly to expand counter-drone authorities—highlighting what we see as a growing imbalance.

Earlier this year, the U.S. Department of War announced updated homeland counter-UAS guidance through its Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401). The guidance expands installation commanders’ authority under 10 U.S. Code §130i, removes prior “fence-line” limitations, and treats unauthorized drone surveillance as a threat before an aircraft crosses a perimeter. Commanders are now empowered to act based on the totality of circumstances, share sensor and tracking data across DHS and DOJ, and employ trained contractor personnel to operate counter-UAS systems.

This shift reflects an important reality: the federal government is acknowledging that low-cost, weaponizable drones are already being used and that waiting for a physical breach is no longer acceptable. At the same time, this expanded authority introduces an additional concern—counter-drone operations may now occur over populated areas.

But this progress also underscores the widening gap between federal and local capabilities. While military installations gain expanded authorities, local authorities remain restricted in their ability to intercept or mitigate drones.

4. The 250-Gram Decision Hiding Millions of Drones from FAA Oversight

In an attempt to manage and regulate the rise of drones, the FAA requires all commercial drones and any recreational drones over 250 grams to be registered with them for the purposes of accountability, operator identification, and to support regulatory compliance and law enforcement. Drones at or above this threshold must also be marked with a unique identifier and—under the FAA’s Remote ID rule—broadcast their location and identity in real time during flight. Sub-250g drones escape all of these requirements entirely, meaning there is no reliable way to know how many small drones exist or operate in the U.S. today.

This exemption has created a significant blind spot. Manufacturers intentionally design capable, camera-equipped drones to weigh just under the 250-gram threshold—and it’s not difficult to imagine the many ways a bad actor could exploit these unregistered small drones, whether deployed individually or as part of a larger fleet.

The scale of the problem should not be underestimated. The gap between registered drones and actual ownership suggests the unregistered population may be three to five times larger than the registered fleet—meaning a significant number of sub-250g drones are operating in U.S. airspace today, effectively invisible to FAA tracking systems and other oversight mechanisms. We see this as one of the most urgent vulnerabilities in the current regulatory framework.

What’s needed is not necessarily more regulation, but smarter solutions: new technologies and platforms for localized airspace management, as well as privacy protection coupled with safety monitoring for these smaller, unregistered aircraft.

5. Geography Is Driving A Drone Divide

When a farmer in rural Missouri launches an industrial drone to survey 3,000 acres of corn while a Brooklyn resident calls 911 to report a suspicious aircraft hovering near their apartment, we are witnessing two fundamentally different relationships with the same technology.

In rural America, agricultural drone registrations are rising. Farmers report productivity gains, local entrepreneurs are launching spraying businesses, and even first responders are using drones to cover terrain that would be impossible to patrol on foot. In these communities, drones are seen as practical tools that make difficult work safer and more efficient. Researchers have found that agricultural drone adoption has spread faster than nearly any farming technology in history.

Urban America, by contrast, is pushing back. Incidents like the New Jersey drone sightings, which triggered thousands of calls and temporary airspace restrictions, highlight deep concerns about privacy and surveillance. Many major cities now require permits for drone flights in public spaces, reflecting heightened sensitivity to their presence.

Rural and urban America are distinct markets with different risks and opportunities.

The challenges we face today are not just a drone problem—they represent the defining infrastructure challenge for the future of urban aviation. The coming wave of Urban Air Mobility vehicles and other advanced aircraft, for instance, will depend on the same robust low-altitude airspace awareness infrastructure. As millions of drones enter American airspace, success will require aligning federal authority, local capability, public trust, and the technical systems needed to keep our skies safe and secure.

Note: The authors of this article are affiliated with Brave Capital and MVA (MilVet Angels). They have invested in national security companies like Anduril Industries, Shield AI, Aetherflux, Erebor, Castelion, Hermeus, Ursa Major, and others.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:47 +0100 FirstHandNews
At the Center of the World’s Most Dangerous Chokepoint https://belimedia.com.ng/at-the-center-of-the-worlds-most-dangerous-chokepoint https://belimedia.com.ng/at-the-center-of-the-worlds-most-dangerous-chokepoint

EXPERT INTERVIEW – Amid escalating tensions in the Middle East and growing concerns about the security of global energy supplies, the Strait of Hormuz is perhaps the world’s most consequential geopolitical flashpoint. As Iranian threats to disrupt shipping through the narrow waterway - a vital artery for nearly a fifth of the world’s oil – continue, fears of broader economic and military ripple effects across the region are rising.

Roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil normally flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and even limited disruptions can send shockwaves through global energy markets and supply chains. Energy markets are already reacting. With attacks on commercial vessels and threats to shut down the strait slowing tanker traffic and raising fears of wider conflict, global oil prices are surging, adding a new component of political pressure for President Donald Trump.

This is happening as Washington struggles to assemble an international coalition to help secure the vital shipping lane. U.S. officials have urged countries that rely heavily on Gulf energy exports to contribute naval forces to protect commercial shipping, but diplomatic efforts have been uneven as some governments hesitate to become directly involved in a rapidly escalating confrontation with Iran. Meanwhile, insurers have increased war-risk premiums for vessels transiting the strait and Gulf producers are exploring alternative export routes as tensions mount.

I sat down with energy expert and former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norm Roule to talk about the strategic stakes surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, and the ripple effects being felt around the world. Our interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

[NORM – BIO]

Kelly: Give us a sense of what you're thinking about the Strait of Hormuz today as we see what's happening there and what do you anticipate are the ripple effects from this moving forward?

Roule: The U.S. military has been paying attention to this problem set for many years. I’ve read a lot of articles about Iran's capabilities in the region, and they are genuine. They're serious. But our military has studied this for a number of years, and they have plans and capabilities. These capabilities must be arrayed in a specific fashion. They can't be rushed. As you can tell, I'm talking around things and that's appropriate.

I also believe this is something best done as a team. The Strait of Hormuz is an international body of water. It's not owned by the United States. Something that I think is terrifically negative right now is that you have some countries contacting the Iranians, in essence, negotiating the right to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. That's a terrible thing.

The Iranians are on one side of the Strait of Hormuz. The Musandam Peninsula, the tip of which is controlled by the Omanis, is on the other side. The Omanis don't control the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait is an international body of water, which means you would want - in theory - a global coalition led by the United States. And that would be consistent with the December 2025 Trump National Security Strategy to operate some sort of coalition to free that for international commercial trade.

This would take a fair amount of resources so burden sharing would be important. And also by having many flags there, it would require that the Iranians in essence, fire upon the world when they attack any tankers or container ships going through.

The strait is also important for Iran. And this is sometimes forgotten. About 28% of Iran's GDP is derived from the traffic that comes from the port. Food, wheat, and other grains arrive through the Strait. So, Iran can sustain a closure for a short period of time, but the Iranian people need to be sustained by an open port, an open Strait of Hormuz.

Right now, if you're the U.S. Navy, you would want to do several things. First, you're going to make sure that you have reduced Iran's capacity to the largest degree possible to fire missiles, to deploy mines, and to deploy swarm speedboats and submarines. Then, once that's done, you're going to want to develop a convoy with the appropriate security capacity to move commercial shipping up and down through the Strait into the Persian Gulf and to ensure that that convoy is protected from drones.

Now, that last point is important because the drone and missile firings by the Iranians has been significantly and dramatically reduced over the last several days, but the numbers are still high for a convoy. You wouldn't want to have a container ship or an oil tanker face 40 or 50 drones at any one time. So, I think it's entirely prudent of the U.S. Navy to say, hypothetically, I don't know this, but I would assume, ‘Mr. President, we're getting ourselves lined up, but we'd like to spend more time reducing Iran's drone capacity. and spending more time making sure there are no more mine laying vessels or mine caches on Iran's shore. And then once we have that taken care of and perhaps put together a coalition, we will begin operations.’

You've seen in the president's recent social media, even an allusion to an international coalition. So, I think something is being developed and it may not be made apparent to the American people, but war plans aren't something that you usually put into the open press. So, we need to have some patience and understanding and confidence in our very effective, very well-led American military CENTCOM and our naval forces.

Kelly: OK, but let's take stock for just a moment of what's been achieved over the past couple of weeks. A lot of Iran's missile program has been decimated. They do still have drones, as you point out. They still have mines in the strait. They still have the Quds Force, how are you assessing the threat still posed by Iran today?

Roule: You're correct. We have dramatically reduced Iran's missile program. Iran is now finding out that there is no such thing as a subterranean storage location that we cannot attack and collapse. It just takes a while for us to work through that with the Israelis, hence their missiles, their launchers, and their missile personnel are being significantly degraded.

And the drones, similarly, mobile launchers and mobile drones that are systems that are above ground are taking a longer period of time, as you would expect. It takes a while to locate those and that becomes a problem.

For the Quds Force and the IRGC, you have two different issues going on. First, the United States has, and the Israelis reportedly, have destroyed a large number of these facilities in Tehran and throughout the country. Now, this has done several things. First, it's destroyed large numbers of buildings. Now one would expect that prior to this conflict - which people knew was coming - that they probably got out of those buildings. But in any case, their headquarters buildings have been destroyed, files have been destroyed, structures have been damaged. They're probably dispersed throughout cities now and in the countryside, so the efficiency of the organizations is significantly degraded. The least degraded would probably be their cyber capacity because that was already dispersed throughout the country and even sometimes, out of the country.

But nonetheless, this has meant that the capacity of the Revolutionary Guard, the law enforcement forces, even some of the police elements that were oppressive elements against the population have been reduced to some extent. To what extent? It's not known because of the information blackout. The U.S. government probably knows but that would obviously be classified.

Iran’s capacity to oppress its people has also been reduced. What I think would be most interesting is if you are a revolutionary guard or a ministry of intelligence or a security official abroad, you're probably not getting a lot of instructions from home. You may not even be getting paid. You may not even have a home, which makes it unclear as to what sort of capacity for terrorism, for operational work you have abroad, which is important if we have concerns about their ability to conduct terrorism - terrorism abroad and threats against American or American interests elsewhere. But these operations are important, although of course, they do require air assets, and they take time and capabilities from other targets.

Kelly: What should we expect from this new governing structure, which assumedly, is going to continue to be targeted by the U.S. and Israel for some time?

Roule: There really are very few surprises here. The personnel who are around the table, if they are able to meet in this turbulent and dangerous environment, are pretty much the same people who were around the table prior to the conflict, albeit they were further down in the pecking order and they've replaced individuals who were killed in the conflict. The head of the Revolutionary Guard, Ahmad Vahidi, is a longtime Revolutionary Guard officer. He was born I think, around 1956 and joined the Revolutionary Guard in 1979.

He led the Quds Force prior to Qassem Soleimani, a very dark and dangerous individual. He is wanted by Interpol for his involvement in the AMIA terrorist bombing. He was a previous Deputy Defense Minister, Deputy Commander of the Revolutionary Guard. But you can, he's a long-time career Revolutionary Guard individual. These people been around for a very long time. And of course, the new supreme leader, Mujtaba Khamenei was a member of the Revolutionary Guard as a young man. He fought at the tail end of the Iran-Iraq War. He is known to have hardline views, likely supports Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon, supports Iran's revolutionary role in the region. He is an individual who believes in the militaristic role of the Revolutionary Guard. And what I mean by that also is the role of the Revolutionary Guard in Iran's economy.

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So, you don't have a change in the system. And of course, I should also say he ran the campaign and helped put then-candidate Ahmadinejad in power. He is not a lightweight. He's not an intellectual lightweight. He's not a religious heavyweight, but I don't think that's the intention of this regime. What you're looking at is the next phase of leadership.

If you look at this in terms of the previous regime saying, ‘Well you know he's not the same guy as his father. He's not a senior religious official. He's not speaking like his father. He doesn't have the same titles. He doesn't have the same education,’ that’s the wrong view. This is the new generation. This is the post-revolutionary generation. This is the evolution of Iran's government to a new world where they are maybe more engaging of the world, more aggressive, more assertive, but they're not tied to the revolution. We have a world where there more women in Iran's parliament than clerics. That's fine with them. They don't need to have someone who has the same religious bearing as the predecessor. And I'm not quite sure that we have ingested that in our analysis in the West.

Where do I see this going? Their job now is not only survival of the regime, but survival period. At the end of this conflict, my sense is that they're going to want to do two things.

First, put out a bellicose rhetoric to claim that they have survived, won, defeated the United States, could defeat the United States again, can damage the region. But more so, they need to make sure that they're alive in six weeks or six months or six years, because as history has shown over the last couple of years, quite a few Iranian leaders and Iranian proxy leaders have had a rather short lifespan or a rather sudden departure from this earth and I think they're going to want to have some kind of a shift in that dynamic.

Here's the challenge. If they achieve that, if they achieve some sort of agreement where there is a ceasefire that doesn't mean they're going to stop building a nuclear weapon or they're going to stop building a missile program that moves toward an ICBM - or that the Quds force is going away and they're going to stop building good proxies in the region. So, there is a challenge for the region and for the United States in dealing with this government in the future.

Kelly: What are some of the things that you believe that the U.S. government should be paying close attention to when they're planning for how this new Iranian leadership may evolve and how it may be more aggressive and how it may go back to that nuclear issue with a renewed sense of purpose?

Roule: With the Iranian government, two factors just need to be kept in mind, in my view. The first is that they need to know that we're always watching.

The world has changed in terms of the tools that are on the table. For many years, the West would state all options are on the table. That was our position. That was Europe's position. But we watched as multiple red lines turned pink. And the Iranians violated an endless array of them, killing American servicemen in Iraq, building and having a nuclear weapons program, Tehran’s proliferation of missiles, shutting down the Red Sea with missiles - I mean, just an astonishing list that includes attempting to kill Americans in the United States, attempting to kill a presidential candidate. It's an extraordinary list.

They need to know if we see it, we're going to respond and it's likely going to be a military response and we're not going to waste time. If they believe that, that our intelligence programs will remain heavily resourced, active and successful, and our military focus will be immediate and robust, I think that will contain them and constrain them. But the moment that either of those slip, I think the Iranians will, at the very, very least, seek to test whether the red lines again, are turning pink.

Kelly: Do the Israelis have a different set of metrics in order to determine what victory looks like in Iran?

Roule: The United States and Israel have a very different geographic location. For the Israelis, they're sitting much closer to a country that writes ‘Death to Israel’ in perfect Hebrew on its missiles. They're sitting next to a country that has launched hundreds of missiles against Israel. Now, remember Israel has, according to press reports, a nuclear weapons program, and that hasn't stopped Iran from attacking it on multiple occasions.

Iran has attacked Israelis and Israeli officials and Israeli nationals on multiple occasions around the world, successfully and unsuccessfully over the years. It is a serious, mortal, and potentially existential threat to Israel. So, their barrier for what they need is going to inherently be higher than ours. But in the end, our goals are parallel.

What it comes down to is going to be what their requirements are on - we'll call it the technical oversight - the technical demands, the requirements to make sure that Iran’s nuclear program isn't being developed and perhaps clarity around guarantees of joint action or the capability that the Israelis might want to have to independently act to ensure their capacity to do this if they see on their own that something is being done. So, they're not compelled to rely upon us if our politics don't allow us to act on our own. Because again, they're in a very different world.

Kelly: Israel has exquisite intelligence on what's happening inside Iran and with Iran's nuclear program. They have launched campaigns in the past that have taken out Tehran’s nuclear scientists. What do you think the likelihood is that Iran’s new regime won't double down on redeveloping their nuclear program?

Roule: In many ways, the United States was offering a pretty good deal to the Iranian government and was asking the Iranians for very little in return. The Iranians do not have an enrichment program at present. It was largely destroyed in the June war. You can call it obliterated or severely degraded, whatever variation you want to use.

The medium-range ballistic missile program needs to be constrained at some point, and we need to stop the proliferation of missiles to the Houthis and other countries. And last, of course, the terrorism program - militia building of the Quds forces - something everyone in the region and in the world would agree, is a terrible thing.

I don't know anyone in the world that would say the United States isn't asking for something reasonable. And in return, we would lift sanctions largely on Iran, and Iran could normalize its relations with the region and build a great energy program. The Iranians refused. It just makes it seem like these aren't reasonable people. It does sound as if they are aiming for something dangerous. So that enrichment program does appear to be something that we're going to have to focus on to ensure that Iran does not have a program, even if it's under heavy international supervision.

Kelly: We'll be looking for whether the U.S. will take a stand and declare victory on some level over the next few days and weeks. What are you looking for in the short term, let's say over the next two to three weeks?

Roule: The continued collapse of missile and drone firings from Iran; the development of any international naval force as a potential regarding the Strait of Hormuz; the potential departure from this earth of any Iranian leader.

I would worry about any catastrophic success that the Iranians may have with any of their missiles or drone attacks. We have seen extraordinary defense by our Gulf partners and we haven't talked about that, but I'd like to spend a couple of moments on that if I may.

Our Israeli partners have done magnificent work on air defense. They've got a lot of experience, a lot of great well-trained people and a lot of good technology. They've got a lot of motivation. You would expect this and they're doing just wonderfully at this. But the Gulf nations don't have a lot of history of combat and air defense, and they have faced an unprecedented, just for any country in the world, number of missile, drone, and cyberattacks simultaneously to a degree that would challenge any country in this world.

I urge all of your readers just to look at the statistics and to look at how well these countries have performed. This is a testimony to their leadership, to their investment over many years, to their training, largely using Western American technology.

This tells you about the private sector and the companies that have been working with them for many years, and how well those relationships have evolved. When you look at how the economies have continued to run while these countries are under attack, so that the Emirates, who for the longest time, were taking the largest number of hits, that tells you just how extraordinarily well that society is running with its population.

The Emirates and Saudi Arabia have managed to produce vast amounts of oil to keep the world economies going. They've defended against hundreds of drones and missiles, and they've done this amid thousands of cyberattacks. And the cyberattacks don't get much publicity. I think there's a tremendous story.

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Our interview has been lightly edited for clarity. You can also watch the interview and other conversations with Cipher Brief Experts by subscribing to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:47 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why the U.S. Must Build the Ultimate Multi&Modal Foundation Model https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-us-must-build-the-ultimate-multi-modal-foundation-model https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-us-must-build-the-ultimate-multi-modal-foundation-model EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE — We are currently witnessing a mobilization of technical ambition reminiscent of the Manhattan Project, a realization that data and compute are the new defining elements of national power. I am deeply energized by recent bold moves in Washington, specifically the White House’s launch of the "Genesis Mission" this past November—an initiative designed to federate vast federal scientific datasets for integrated AI training—alongside the real-world deployment of GenAI.mil.

Yet, when I look at the velocity of the commercial sector—from OpenAI launching its dedicated Science division and NVIDIA attempting to simulate the planet with Earth-2, to Google DeepMind aggressively crossing their AI breakthroughs into the geospatial domain—it becomes clear that we are still aiming too low. These projects are not just modeling data; they are attempting to model reality itself. American technical leadership is paramount, but that leadership is meaningless if it is not ruthlessly and immediately applied to our national security framework. We must take these massive, reality-simulating concepts and focus them specifically on the GEOINT mission.

A perfect example of this is that earlier this year, in July 2025, the geospatial world shifted. Google DeepMind released the AlphaEarth Foundations (AEF) model, and through the hard work of the Taylor Geospatial Engine (TGE) and the open-source community, those vector embeddings are now publicly available on Source Cooperative.

The excitement is justified. AlphaEarth is a leap forward because it offers pixel-level embeddings rather than the standard patch-level approach. It doesn’t just tell you “this 256x256 square contains a city”; it tells you "this specific pixel is part of a building, and it knows its neighbors."

But as I look at this achievement from the perspective of national security, I see something else. I see a proof of concept for a capability that the United States is uniquely positioned to build—and must build—to maintain decision advantage.

Google has the internet’s data. But the intelligence community holds the most diverse, multi-physics, and temporally deep repository of the Earth in human history.

It is time for the United States to propose and execute a National Geospatial-Intelligence Embedding Model (NGEM).

The Proposal: Beyond RGB

The AlphaEarth model is impressive, but it is limited by its training data—primarily commercial optical imagery. In the national security domain, an optical image is just the tip of the spear. We don't just see with light; we see with physics.

I am proposing that we train a massive, pixel-level foundation model that ingests all of its holdings. We aren't talking about just throwing more Sentinel-2 data at a GPU. We are talking about a model that generates embeddings from a unified ingest of:

  • Multi-INT Imagery: Electro-optical (EO), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Infrared/Thermal, Multispectral, and Hyperspectral.
  • Vector Data: The massive stores of Foundation GEOINT (FG)—roads, borders, elevation meshes.
  • The Critical Missing Modality: Text. We must embed the millions of intelligence reports, analyst notes, and finished intelligence products ever written.

The Approach: "The Unified Latent Space"

The approach would mirror the AlphaEarth architecture—generating 64-dimensional (or higher) vectors for every coordinate on Earth—but with a massive increase in complexity and utility.

In AlphaEarth, a pixel’s embedding vector encodes "visual similarity." In an NGA NGEM, the embedding would encode phenomenological and semantic truth.

We would train the model to map different modalities into the same "latent space."

  • If a SAR image shows a T-72 tank (through radar returns), and an EO image shows a T-72 tank (through visual pixels), and a text report describes a "T-72 tank," they should all map to nearly the same mathematical vector.
  • The model becomes the universal translator. It doesn't matter if the input is a paragraph of text or a thermal signature; the output is a standardized mathematical representation of the object.

The Outcomes: What Does This Give Us?

If we achieve this, we move beyond "computer vision" into "machine understanding."

1. The "SAM Site" Dimension In the AlphaEarth analysis, researchers found a "dimension 27" that accidentally specialized in detecting airports. It was a serendipitous discovery of the model's internal logic. If we train NSEM on NGA’s holdings, we won’t just find an airport dimension. We will likely find dimensions that correspond to specific national security targets.

  • Dimension 14 might light up only for Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites, regardless of whether they are camouflaged in optical imagery, because the thermal and SAR layers give them away.
  • Dimension 42 might track "maritime logistics activity," integrating port vectors with ship signatures.

2. Cross-Modal Search (Text-to-Pixel) Currently, if an analyst wants to find "all airfields with extended runways in the Pacific," they have to rely on tagged metadata or run a specific computer vision classifier. With a multi-modal embedding model, the analyst could simply type a query from a report: "Suspected construction of hardened aircraft shelters near distinct ridge line." Because we embedded the text of millions of past reports alongside the imagery, the model understands the semantic vector of that phrase. It can then scan the entire globe’s pixel embeddings to find the mathematical match—instantly highlighting the location, even if no human has ever tagged it.

3. Vector-Based Change Detection AlphaEarth showed us that subtracting vectors from 2018 and 2024 reveals construction. For the intelligence community, this becomes Automated Indications & Warning (I&W). Because the embeddings are spatially aware and pixel-dense, we can detect subtle shifts in the function of a facility, not just its footprint. A factory that suddenly starts emitting heat (thermal layer) or showing new material stockpiles (hyperspectral layer) will produce a massive shift in its vector embedding, triggering an alert long before a human analyst notices the visual change.

The Intelligence Use Cases

  • Automated Order of Battle: Instantly generating dynamic maps of military equipment by querying the embedding space for specific signatures (e.g., "Show me all vectors matching a mobile radar unit").
  • Underground Facility Detection: By combining vector terrain data, gravity/magnetic anomaly data, and hyperspectral surface disturbances into a single embedding, the model could "see" what is hidden.
  • Pattern of Life Analysis: Since the model is spatiotemporal (like AlphaEarth), it learns the "heartbeat" of a location. Deviations—like a port going silent or a sudden surge in RF activity—become mathematical anomalies that scream for attention.

Conclusion

Google and the open-source community have given us the blueprint with AlphaEarth. They proved that pixel-level, spatiotemporal embeddings are the superior way to model our changing planet.

But the mission requires more than commercial data. It requires the fusion of every sensor and every secret. By building this multi-modal embedding model—fusion at the pixel level—we can stop looking for needles in haystacks and start using a magnet.

This is the future of GEOINT. We have the data. We have the mission. It’s time to build the model.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:47 +0100 FirstHandNews
GPS Denied: Time to Upgrade https://belimedia.com.ng/gps-denied-time-to-upgrade https://belimedia.com.ng/gps-denied-time-to-upgrade The Fragile Foundation of Modern Navigation

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is arguably the greatest dual-use technology ever developed. It saves us trillions of dollars in wasted fuel and inefficient logistics. However, our modern world is built on a system that is terrifyingly fragile, highly vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, and the existential threat of anti-satellite weapons.

Recent events prove this vulnerability. On February 28, ships navigating the Strait of Hormuz started appearing on tracking screens in places they couldn't possibly be. They appeared to be sitting on airport runways, parked on Iranian land, and clustered at nuclear power plants. More than 1,100 commercial vessels had their navigation systems scrambled in a single day following US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran, bringing a waterway that handles a fifth of the world's oil exports to a halt.

A similar crisis unfolded months earlier in the Caribbean. During a U.S. standoff with Venezuela, jammed signals caused commercial flights to experience severe GPS problems, resulting in a near-collision for a JetBlue pilot and forcing a cruise ship to navigate by charts and landmarks for three hours.

These are no longer isolated incidents. Today, anyone can pull up independent tracking sites like gpsjam.org—which aggregates aircraft data to visualize daily GPS disruptions worldwide—and view a heat map of the globe bleeding red with active interference.

But conflict zones aren't the only risk. In 2013, a truck driver with a $100 jammer accidentally knocked Newark Liberty International Airport's GPS offline just to hide from his employer's vehicle tracker. This system is used by over 6 billion people, yet it can be blinded by cheap gadgets.

The Invisible Metronome

GPS was designed for military position, navigation, and timing in the 1960s and 70s. Its signals travel 20,000 kilometers from space, arriving 100,000 times weaker than ambient noise. This makes them easily overwhelmed by low-cost eBay jammers emitting stronger radio noise on the same frequency.

Crucially, GPS isn't just a map; it is the invisible metronome for the modern world. The atomic clocks on GPS satellites synchronize cellular networks, timestamp billions of financial transactions, and regulate power grids. Lose the timing signal, and our global digital infrastructure fundamentally breaks down. We've wired the heartbeat of the global economy to a whispering radio signal from space.

Diverging Strategies: U.S. vs. China

The U.S. government has focused its response almost entirely on advancing military resilience measures like encrypted M-code signals and anti-jam antennas. This does nothing for commercial pilots or global logistics networks navigating denied environments. The U.S. defends GPS purely as a military asset.

Meanwhile, China has taken a radically different approach. It has poured state investment into the BeiDou satellite system, which achieved full global coverage in 2020 and surpasses the U.S. network in size. In parallel, China has built a deep bench of geospatial experts and backed BeiDou with a layered terrestrial architecture that includes a 20,000-kilometer fiber network and a national eLoran system. By actively exporting BeiDou through the Belt and Road Initiative and achieving full-stack autonomy in domestic navigation chips, China is building an ecosystem with commercial and strategic leverage that will matter as GPS-denied environments become the norm.


Moving Beyond GPS 2.0

The private sector is beginning to field alternative positioning systems, but competing against “free” will require game-changing innovation, not just incremental improvement. Inertial navigation systems are expensive and drift over time. Satellite constellations that simply move GPS-like spacecraft closer to Earth carry many of the same vulnerabilities as the system they’re meant to replace.

Commercial alternatives must go beyond GPS 2.0 to address both resilience and new use cases that justify adoption on their own merits. Remarkable new startups like EarthTraq aim to fill these gaps by providing new purpose-built constellations paired with low-cost, low-powered devices not dependent on any GPS constellations. Other companies are actively using computer vision or radar to automatically determine positions with what I call "artificial intelligence dead reckoning." Powerhouse companies like Vantor and Niantic Spatial are going big on high fidelity photogrammetric digital models of the world for precision navigation in denied environments. Other examples, Skyline Nav AI uses computer vision and deep learning to determine a vehicle's location in real time based solely on its surroundings. Similarly, European startup Vydar uses onboard AI to match live camera feeds of the ground with offline maps, computing highly accurate coordinates even during a complete GPS blackout. Daedalean AI is taking a complementary approach, building visual positioning systems that integrate seamlessly with radar and inertial sensors to operate in challenging conditions like fog or darkness. All of these alternatives offer mission performance that GPS cannot and have great promise to supplement or replace it in a denied environment.

We’re all going to have to get used to a world without GPS. The era of implicit trust in a single vulnerable satellite network is over. If we want to safely operate autonomous systems and AI in the real world, we must develop higher-fidelity methods of positioning within the eternal

reference frame that cannot be defeated by cheap eBay jammers.

Follow Mark Munsell on LinkedIn.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:47 +0100 FirstHandNews
Down But Not Out: Iran’s Axis of Resistance https://belimedia.com.ng/down-but-not-out-irans-axis-of-resistance https://belimedia.com.ng/down-but-not-out-irans-axis-of-resistance OPINION — When HAMAS attacked Israel on 7 October 2023, Iran and its partners around the Middle East—collectively known as the Axis of Resistance—were riding high. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) armed, funded, and trained HAMAS, Hizballah, the Huthis, and Iraqi Shia militias to help project Iranian power throughout the region. These groups were bound to Tehran by their Shia faith, shared antipathy toward the US and Israel, and support for fighting what they see as Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestinian lands. Now, however, after two-and-a-half years of conflict, the Axis looks more like a collection of disparate groups pursuing their own ends than a unified Shia force destabilizing the region for Iran’s benefit. Nonetheless, pronouncing the Axis dead risks missing the persistent threat these groups pose to US interests.

Since 7 October, Israel has severely degraded HAMAS and Hizballah, decimating their senior ranks and military capabilities. After the horrors of HAMAS’s attack, Israel was determined to neutralize both groups and began an unrelenting series of attacks and daring operations that have killed their most experienced leaders and commanders and destroyed many of their weapons. In Hizballah’s case, the fall of the al-Asad regime in Syria in December 2024 compounded the group’s woes by disrupting critical overland supply routes from Iran. As a result, neither group helped Iran when the US and Israel struck in June 2025. In the current war, HAMAS has remained on the sidelines. Hizballah, however, mounted a large rocket attack against Israel to retaliate for its killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 28 February. By attacking Israel and breaking a cease-fire that had largely held since November 2024, Hizballah signaled its loyalty to Iran, but also gave Israel the pretext it had been waiting for to resume the war, take (and possibly hold) territory in southern Lebanon, and try to destroy or forcibly disarm the group.

Perhaps the most surprising of Iran’s Axis partners have been the Huthis, which responded to Israel’s offensive in the Gaza Strip with regular missile and drone attacks against Israeli territory and a campaign against maritime shipping that caused disruptions that reverberated worldwide. Before 2023, the group considered Saudi Arabia its main enemy and alternately fought and negotiated with the Kingdom while consolidating control at home. Once the war in Gaza began, though, the Huthis became a persistent threat to the Israel, bleeding its supply of interceptors by launching routine attacks, and holding shipping in the Red Sea at risk in the name of the Palestinian cause, stopping only during cease-fires in Gaza. In June 2025, the Huthis made a token display of solidarity with Iran by lobbing a few missiles at Israel as it pummeled Iran, but did not materially come to Tehran’s aid. In the current war, the Huthis have held fire so far, but Huthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Huthi on 7 March publicly warned that his forces were ready to escalate militarily, which is more likely to happen the longer the war lasts. Unlike other Axis members who have suffered leadership losses and seen their arsenals devastated, the biggest brake on the Huthis’ getting involved is their responsibility for governing their own impoverished state—a burden none of the other Axis partners face. One al-Jazeera commentator posited this month that the group is particularly concerned about the potential threat from the internationally recognized Yemeni Government, which beat back secessionists in December 2025 and might be eyeing gains in Huthi-controlled Yemen next.

Like their partners in the Axis, some of the Iraqi Shia militias are prioritizing domestic political ambitions over militancy. The legislative election in Iraq in November 2025 led some of the Shia militias to focus more on winning votes than advancing Iran’s aims. Not only did the militias fear reprisals if they attacked the US or Israel, they also most likely feared the Iraqi public would blame them for violence and instability in Iraq if the militias themselves provoked US or Israeli strikes in Iraq. This calculation led them to sit out the war in June 2025, opting to hold rallies in Iraq rather than launch attacks in Iran’s defense. Several of the militias also signaled openness to disarming in December 2025, underscoring their shift from militancy to politics. At the same time, other groups, such as US-designated Kataib Hizballah (KH), the most capable of Iran’s partners in Iraq, have rejected calls to disarm and waded into the current conflict by attacking US interests. This month, KH spearheaded attacks against US facilities and personnel in Iraq, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan and against the US Embassy in Baghdad, in response to the US and Israeli offensive in Iran. Indeed, the group publicly reaffirmed its solidarity with Iran, intent to avenge Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death, and commitment to driving the US out of Iraq.

Although Iran’s Axis of Resistance is not the cohesive, potent force it was before 7 October, its members remain allied with Iran and staunchly opposed to the US and Israel. As they increasingly pursue their own ends—ranging from simply surviving to strengthening their political clout at home—they are likely to be less predictable. There are a number of factors that are likely to shape their trajectory, including:

•The extent to which new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei sees the Axis as a valuable collective that helps Tehran project power. His decision to reinvest and recommit to the Axis, particularly if he invoked the memory of his martyred father, would help reinforce ties between Iran and its partners.

•Whether the IRGC continues to fund and arm the groups. If Tehran cannot bankroll and arm its partners as it did in the past, these groups will be ever-less responsive to Iranian requests as they seek new sponsors or move away from militancy.

•To what degree groups, especially the Iraqi Shia militias, see politics as a better means to achieving their aims than militancy. If the Shia militias conclude that they can end the US presence in Iraq through negotiations rather than attacks, for example, or that they are better able to deliver economic benefits to the Iraqi Shia community by wielding political power than weapons, they will be more inclined to pursue politics than violence.

•Whether host governments or powerful neighbors curb the groups’ activities. Baghdad’s and Beirut’s ability and willingness to rein in nonstate actors like the Iraqi Shia militias and Hizballah, respectively, will be a significant brake on their ability to threaten the US or Israel. Similarly, Riyadh's success in finding a modus vivendi with the Huthis that boosts the economy in Huthi-controlled Yemen will give the group incentive to stop attacks to ensure its continued grip on power.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:47 +0100 FirstHandNews
China’s Military Purges Were Larger Than We Thought https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-military-purges-were-larger-than-we-thought https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-military-purges-were-larger-than-we-thought

DEEP DIVE – In China, the generals keep losing their jobs.

On February 26, nine senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – five generals, one lieutenant general, and three major generals – were stripped of membership in China's top legislature, in the latest episode of a purge that has eviscerated the leadership of the PLA and raised questions about its readiness for a possible invasion of Taiwan.

The move came less than a week before the opening of China’s most important annual political gathering, the “Two Sessions,” and just one day after the release of a report showing that Xi’s purges have been far more sweeping than was previously known. The report, which was published by the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), represents the first systematic assessment of the purges, which began in 2022 and culminated in last month’s removal of two of China’s most senior and experienced generals.

The report chronicles an "unprecedented purge of China’s military” that has swept all service branches and jettisoned more than half of the PLA’s senior officers.

Retired Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, a former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, said the purges were greater in scale and scope than any in the nearly eight-decade history of the People's Republic of China.

“Xi Jinping has gone beyond even Mao’s purges,” Adm. Studeman told The Cipher Brief, referring to Mao Zedong’s elimination of the PLA high command in the early 1970s. “And he has fundamentally reshaped the way that the military is going to be led.”

The report found that the purges – carried out in the name of ridding the PLA of corruption – have led to a drop in the number and size of major military exercises, and raised questions about the PLA’s current capacity for complex operations.

“In the near term, given the significant vacancies, it would be incredibly difficult for China to launch large military campaigns against Taiwan,” Bonny Lin, the director of the China Power Project, wrote in an assessment of the report’s findings. “Even below that threshold, there is evidence that the purges have negatively impacted China’s exercises around Taiwan in 2025.”

“This is not the command that Xi Jinping wants to go to war with,” Brian Hart, the China Power Project’s Deputy Director and one of the report’s authors, told The Cipher Brief. “You don’t choose to go to war with half of your commanders missing.”

Mapping a Crackdown

The new report includes a database of China’s military leadership and identifies those officers who have been removed – including several with critical portfolios: the PLA’s head of military training; a general who commanded forces preparing for possible operations against Taiwan; and the two top officers dismissed in January – General Zhang Youxia, China’s most senior military official and by many accounts Xi’s most trusted military aide, and General Liu Zhenli, who headed the Joint Staff Department. Zhang and Liu were members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s highest-level military body. As The Cipher Brief reported in January. Xi’s campaign has now claimed all but two of the CMC’s six leaders (one of whom is Xi himself); experts said the U.S. equivalent would be the firing of all but one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with dozens of other high-ranking generals.

In all, the China Power Project’s report found that 36 generals and lieutenant generals have been ousted since 2022; another 65 officers are listed as missing or “potentially purged”; and taken together, 101 of 176 officers in the PLA’s highest ranks — general or lieutenant general — are no longer at their posts. All five of China’s military theaters have seen their leaders ousted, and 56 deputy theater commanders have lost their positions as well.

Lyle Morris, a Senior Fellow at the Asia Society’s Center for China Analysis, said he had followed the purges for years but was startled by their scope.

“Beyond the four-star general level, you have the three-, two-, one-stars and all their underlings who appear to have been fully purged or in the process of being removed,” Morris, who formerly served as Country Director for China at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), told The Cipher Brief. “This has ramifications for the leadership, trust, and execution of training and missions of the PLA.”

Some of the military leaders have been fired, others placed under “investigation” – typically a career-ending proposition for a PLA officer – and others have simply vanished from public view. The report also documents a recent escalation; more than 60 top figures were removed from their posts in the last year alone. And experts believe the cleansing may not be over.

“I think we’re likely to see more purges,” Hart said. “This is not the end.”

Rebuilding the PLA

The report’s authors and several outside experts said that in the wake of the disruption – whenever it ends – Xi will face enormous challenges in rebuilding the world’s largest military.

“Having gutted the PLA’s leadership, Xi Jinping will have to turn to reconstituting the military high command in the coming years,” the report found. “Depending on what Xi intends to do, this could take years or even longer to see the full transformation.”

Experts stressed that when it comes to elevating officers to top positions, Xi will have to balance two key factors – political loyalty and competence.

“I think he’s more focused on getting it right than he is on doing it quickly,” Hart said, and he and others suggested that loyalty would be paramount. “Xi Jinping’s top priority in reconstructing the leadership is not the competence of his commanders. That’s very important, but his top priority is political loyalty to him and to the party.”

Some experts said that the full “transformation” is unlikely to be complete until late 2027, when the next Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is set to convene. In the interim, as newly-minted leaders are brought in, they may be less willing than their predecessors to present unvarnished assessments to Xi.

“The general sense is that anybody that’s going to be freshly appointed is going to be far more dependent on Xi, who has accelerated that person into the higher ranks,” Adm. Studeman said. “There will likely be more ‘yes men’ that have more to fear by crossing Xi Jinping.”

The Asia Society’s Morris concurred. The new leaders “are going to be much more accommodating to what Xi wants to do,” he said. “They’re not going to be giving bad news because that would mean the end of their careers. So for example, they’re going to be the folks who say, ‘Yes, sir, the PLA invasion plans are ready,’ even if they know internally they’re not ready.”

The Taiwan impact

You don’t need to be a China expert to grasp the potential impact of the purges – at least in the short term – when it comes to conducting major military operations, against Taiwan or anywhere else. At every level of the PLA – from top war planners to the generals who would execute those plans to lower-level officers in the Eastern Theater (the relevant command for a Taiwan operation) – multiple key positions are now vacant.

Morris said that having reviewed the scope and scale of the purges, he wouldn’t “lose any sleep” this year or in 2027 over a possible invasion of Taiwan.

“I think [Xi] and everyone in the party now knows that 2027 is not a good time to invade Taiwan,” he said. “You have to have the institutional leadership in place to give commands across the services, up through the CMC, and all of those relationships are now frayed or in disarray. I’m not sure how the PLA could actually execute it with so many senior leaders gone.”

Experts stressed that smaller-scale operations – basic training exercises, or dealing with minor skirmishes in the South China Sea – are unlikely to be affected by the purges, and that the PLA would not hesitate to respond to a crisis or engage in a war of necessity. But a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be a large-scale and highly complex military operation, requiring the mobilization of all of China’s military services and forces – and for Beijing, it would be a war of choice.

For all those reasons, a half dozen experts interviewed by The Cipher Brief were unanimous in thinking that the 2027 time frame – which was widely reported to be the deadline Xi had given the PLA to be prepared to act against Taiwan – was no longer operative.

“If Xi had plans for 2027, I think they’re delayed,” said Dennis Wilder, a former senior CIA official and top White House adviser on China, in an interview conducted prior to the report’s publication. “There's no way that they're ready to take on a major military confrontation in these circumstances.”

“You’ve got to say this is not going to happen [by 2027],” Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, a former CIA Director of East Asia Operations, told The Cipher Brief. “I just don't see how Xi Jinping could feel even remotely confident that China’s military would be prepared, or is prepared, to use kinetic means to take over Taiwan.”

Adm. Studeman said Xi may have carried out the purges now because he never intended to move against Taiwan until 2028 or later – given the fact that a late-2027 Party gathering will determine whether he gains a fourth term as leader.

“Typically when a leader wants to get another term they need the backing of the PLA,” Studeman said. “If in fact the senior leadership in the PLA thought that Xi Jinping was being over aggressive [regarding Taiwan], then they might not be willing to cast our full support behind Xi.

“Xi Jinping may have thought, ‘I’m tired of the resistance, I want to move forward and I also need more yes men to be able to ensure an endorsement when it comes time for my fourth term.’”

The long view

Several experts said that the effects of Xi’s purges should be understood in two distinct time frames – short- and longer-term – and that for all the warnings about near-term readiness, a stronger, less corrupt and more effective PLA may ultimately emerge. They also noted that China’s military modernization and spiralling defense spending are likely to continue.

“Short term, it’s bad in many ways [for China],” Morris said. “But I think in the medium- and long-term it’s probably better, assuming – a big assumption – that they are less corrupt and cleaner, having gone through what will likely be an especially stringent vetting process.”

Meanwhile, the purges are unlikely to alter U.S. preparations for China conflict contingencies. As Morris put it, “IndoPacom [the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] is not going to rest any easier, because their job is to prepare for worst-case scenarios.”

And while some suggested that the PLA turmoil would benefit the U.S. because it would buy time for preparations – “You've got a wonderful opportunity [with] a longer timeline,” Wilder said – others argued that the upheaval actually creates greater urgency for the U.S. and Taiwan.

Adm. Studeman made that case, warning that with more pliant leaders likely entering the PLA’s top echelons, there would be a greater need to demonstrate resolve and support for Taiwan.

“If anything, we need to impress upon these people coming into the CMC or taking some of these positions that despite their boss’ desires and hopes to solve these things through coercion, that there’s likely to be a very strong reaction that they may not be able to handle,” Studeman said. “It’s even more important, if you get somebody that’s more inclined to be rash, to ensure that they see what the consequences could be, and that means putting more material forward, strengthening the alliance system, and communicating support for Taiwan.”

In other words, while Gen. Zhang and other long-serving officers had combat experience and were willing to warn Xi Jinping of the perils of a major Pacific war, their replacements may need to be shown just what those perils are.

“That’s a way to keep the peace,” Studeman said. “To show the consequences and the dramatic effects of what could occur.”

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Our interview has been lightly edited for clarity. You can also watch the interview and other conversations with Cipher Brief Experts by subscribing to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:47 +0100 FirstHandNews
While the World Watches the Middle East, War Is Brewing in South Asia https://belimedia.com.ng/while-the-world-watches-the-middle-east-war-is-brewing-in-south-asia https://belimedia.com.ng/while-the-world-watches-the-middle-east-war-is-brewing-in-south-asia

OPINION — For decades, strategists have warned that the most dangerous flashpoint in South Asia lies between India and Pakistan. The reasoning appeared straightforward: two nuclear-armed rivals with a long history of crises and wars. That perception only hardened last year when the two countries exchanged missile strikes during the 88-hour conflict that brought them to the brink of another major conflict.

As global attention remains fixed on US–Israeli joint military operations in the Middle East, a far more destabilizing conflict is quietly unfolding elsewhere. On March 16, a Pakistani airstrike struck a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul that reportedly killed nearly 400 civilians, marking a dramatic escalation in weeks of intensifying military confrontation between Pakistan and Afghanistan along the 2,600-kilometer Durand Line. This is not an isolated incident, but part of a broader shift in South Asia’s security landscape. The region’s most volatile fault line no longer lies along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but along the increasingly militarized frontier separating Pakistan and Afghanistan. If Western governments continue to treat this conflict as peripheral, they risk overlooking a war that could fundamentally reshape regional stability and generate consequences far beyond the subcontinent.

The “Open War” Along the Durand Line

In recent weeks, tensions between Islamabad and Kabul have escalated into what Pakistani leaders refer to as an “open war.” Pakistan has launched multiple airstrikes inside Afghan territory, while Afghan Taliban forces have retaliated by targeting Pakistani military installations along the border. In several instances, Taliban fighters have captured Pakistani forward posts and reportedly shot down a Pakistani fighter aircraft. These confrontations mark the most serious clashes between the two states since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021. Yet the strategic significance of the escalation is receiving surprisingly little attention outside the region.

For years, Western policymakers have viewed South Asian instability primarily through the lens of India-Pakistan rivalry. That framework, however, no longer captures the region’s most volatile dynamic. Since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have steadily deteriorated. Islamabad accuses the Taliban government of harboring militants from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the insurgent group responsible for a surge of attacks inside Pakistan. Kabul rejects these allegations and argues that Pakistan’s internal security crisis is a domestic problem rather than an Afghan conspiracy. The resulting tensions have steadily escalated into open confrontation. According to United Nations estimates, more than 100,000 people have already been displaced by fighting between Afghan and Pakistani forces. In addition to the airstrike targeting a rehabilitation center in Kabul, Pakistani airstrikes have struck other populated areas inside Afghanistan, killing dozens of civilians, including women and children. This suggests that Pakistan’s “open war” is not driven by actionable intelligence to conduct precision strikes but is designed to impose collective punishment on a population already under severe distress under the Taliban rule.

This violence is not merely the byproduct of cross-border militancy. It reflects a deeper strategic struggle over the future balance of power in the region. For decades, Pakistan’s military establishment has viewed Afghanistan through the doctrine of “strategic depth,” a Cold War-era concept that envisioned Afghanistan as a friendly rear base in the event of conflict with India. When the Taliban regained power in 2021, many in Islamabad believed that this objective had finally been achieved. Instead, relations between the two governments have deteriorated sharply. The Taliban leadership has resisted Pakistani pressure and refused to subordinate Afghan interests to Islamabad’s security demands. Faced with growing militant violence at home and an increasingly independent government in Kabul, Pakistan has turned to military coercion in an attempt to reassert its influence. The result is a conflict that is steadily reshaping the security dynamics of South Asia.

A Growing Humanitarian and Regional Crisis

The consequences of this confrontation extend far beyond the battlefield. Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan are now producing a severe humanitarian crisis that risks destabilizing the region further. Over the past two years, Pakistan has carried out one of the largest forced repatriation campaigns in recent history, expelling millions of Afghan refugees who had lived in the country for decades. In many cases, Afghan families were forced to leave behind homes, businesses, and property accumulated over generations. These deportations are taking place at the same time as cross-border violence is intensifying, creating a dangerous combination of displacement and instability. Refugees expelled from Pakistan are returning to a country already suffering from economic collapse, international isolation, and fragile governance under the hardliner Taliban government. The sudden influx of returnees is placing immense pressure on Afghanistan’s limited resources while fueling resentment toward Islamabad.

The humanitarian implications extend far beyond Afghanistan itself. Large-scale displacement from the country has historically produced migration flows that eventually reach the Middle East and Europe. Western governments, therefore, have a direct interest in preventing the situation from deteriorating further. More broadly, Pakistan’s escalating confrontation with Afghanistan risks transforming a bilateral dispute into a wider regional crisis. The timing of the conflict makes it particularly dangerous. With global attention concentrated on the Middle East, South Asia’s shifting security landscape is receiving relatively little scrutiny. This distraction creates an environment in which Islamabad’s aggressive policies can proceed with minimal international oversight.

Pakistan’s Strategic Calculations

Pakistan’s approach toward Afghanistan reflects a broader pattern in its regional strategy. For decades, Pakistan’s security establishment has relied on militant proxies, terrorists, and asymmetric warfare as instruments of foreign policy. While Western governments have often viewed Pakistan as an indispensable counterterrorism partner, Islamabad’s regional priorities have frequently diverged from those of its Western allies. The current confrontation with Afghanistan illustrates this divergence clearly. Rather than pursuing sustained diplomatic engagement with the Taliban government, which once relied on Pakistani funding and operational support, Islamabad has increasingly relied on military force to impose its preferred security arrangements along the Durand Line. The underlying objective appears to be the restoration of strategic leverage in Afghanistan and the reassertion of influence that Pakistan’s military once exercised during earlier phases of the Afghan conflict.

At the same time, Pakistan’s broader regional conduct raises serious questions about its reliability as a partner. Recent incidents have exposed significant gaps in Islamabad’s willingness or ability to uphold its international responsibilities. In one case, armed protesters in Karachi breached the security perimeter outside the US consulate following the death of former Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei, forcing US Marines to intervene to secure the facility. Similarly, despite establishing mutual defense ties with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has shown little willingness to support Gulf security in the face of Iranian threats. These actions suggest that Pakistan’s strategic decisions are shaped primarily by domestic political calculations and regional ambitions rather than by alignment with Western security priorities.

The Risk of Strategic Neglect

If Pakistan is allowed to pursue aggressive military operations in Afghanistan without meaningful diplomatic pressure, the conflict could evolve into a prolonged war with severe regional consequences. Such a scenario would not only destabilize Afghanistan but also reinforce a pattern of coercive state behavior that undermines international norms. For a region already grappling with insurgencies, fragile states, and nuclear-armed rivalries, the implications would be profound. More importantly, a destabilized Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier could once again become fertile ground for terrorist organizations seeking to reconstitute and rearm. The collapse of security along the Durand Line would risk recreating the conditions that once allowed extremist groups to operate freely across the region.

For Western policymakers, the lesson is clear. The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan can no longer be treated as a secondary concern overshadowed by crises elsewhere. At a moment when Washington and its allies are attempting to dismantle global terrorist networks and maintain stability across multiple regions, they cannot afford to allow another state actor to exploit global distraction in order to reshape the strategic balance in South Asia. Ignoring the war along the Durand Line today could mean confronting a far larger crisis tomorrow.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:47 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Next Battlefield Is Perception, Not Territory https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-battlefield-is-perception-not-territory https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-battlefield-is-perception-not-territory OPINION – The Gray Zone is no longer a peripheral space between war and peace. It has become the primary arena in which strategic advantage is tested and miscalculation is manufactured.

For decades, competition below the threshold of armed conflict relied on political signaling, economic leverage, proxy actors, and selective information operations. Artificial intelligence is accelerating this model. It compresses the distance between signal and reaction. It amplifies narratives at machine speed. It introduces synthetic inputs into analytical systems that were designed for slower environments.

The consequence is not simply faster influence operations. It is a structural shift in how states perceive and respond to one another.

At moments of rising geopolitical tension, the speed at which narratives form and harden can shape escalation as decisively as military posture.

The next phase of competition is unfolding not on contested territory, but in the contested space between perception and decision.

Compression and Amplification

AI does not create rivalry. It intensifies it.

Machine learning systems can generate persuasive narratives, simulate public sentiment, refine messaging, and identify cognitive vulnerabilities within target audiences. Large language models can draft diplomatic arguments, social commentary, and policy assessments at scale. Synthetic media can blur the line between authentic and fabricated signals.

Yet the most consequential impact is not public-facing propaganda.

It is the reinforcement of internal confidence.

When machine-generated outputs consistently align with preexisting assumptions - about an adversary’s weakness, cohesion, or intent, they can gradually harden analytical certainty. In AI-mediated rivalry, the danger is not simply deception - it is the gradual construction of analytical certainty around manipulated inputs.

That risk is universal.

Speed, repetition, and algorithmic coherence can create the appearance of clarity. When strategic communities begin reacting to synthetic or selectively amplified signals, escalation thresholds shift - sometimes without deliberate intent.

AI lowers the cost of narrative production. It also lowers the cost of strategic error.

Converging Models of Competitive Statecraft

Across major powers, variations of AI-enabled competition are already visible.

China has integrated data ecosystems into governance at scale, aligning state messaging, technological development, and strategic signaling. Narrative discipline and industrial capacity reinforce one another.

Russia has demonstrated adaptive information maneuver - rapidly recalibrating messaging across audiences, testing reactions, and exploiting ambiguity in fluid environments.

Iran has refined asymmetric information resilience - blending surveillance, digital monitoring, and calibrated external messaging to sustain regime durability under prolonged pressure.

These models differ in structure and scale, but they converge in one respect: influence is continuous, not episodic; perception management is strategic, not peripheral.

Artificial intelligence accelerates this convergence. It enables persistent probing, iterative testing of narratives, and the shaping of strategic tempo without conventional escalation.

Technology, however, does not determine outcomes on its own.

Engineered Confidence and Strategic Risk

The most underexamined vulnerability in this environment is not exposure to adversarial messaging. It is self-generated overconfidence.

AI systems optimize for pattern recognition and coherence. They surface correlations and reinforce trends. But coherence is not necessarily truth. Patterns can be engineered. Correlations can be induced.

When decision-makers operate within data environments shaped - even subtly - by manipulated or selectively amplified inputs, they risk constructing internally consistent but externally fragile assessments.

This is the new geometry of competition: not simply influence over others, but influence over one’s own analytical processes.

Under sustained cognitive pressure, institutions can drift toward accelerated judgment. The appearance of clarity can displace disciplined skepticism. Strategic tempo can outpace strategic reflection.

The enduring advantage will not belong to the state that perfects narrative control, but to the one that preserves analytical discipline even under sustained cognitive pressure.

Managing Uncertainty in an AI-Accelerated Era

The United States retains structural advantages: institutional depth, diverse intelligence streams, open innovation ecosystems, and alliance networks that introduce friction against uniform narratives. That friction is not weakness. It is strategic ballast.

But these advantages must be deliberately protected.

First, analytical friction must be strengthened. AI-assisted intelligence should be routinely stress-tested through adversarial review loops designed to detect synthetic amplification, data poisoning, and pattern distortion.

Second, signal authentication architecture must become a strategic priority. Verification protocols - technical and human - are essential to reduce susceptibility to manipulated inputs across military, diplomatic, and public domains.

Third, calibrated ambiguity should be preserved in response frameworks. In accelerated environments, rigid predictability invites exploitation. Clarity of intent does not require mechanical response.

Finally, alliance cohesion in the information domain must be treated as integral to deterrence. Perception gaps between partners create exploitable seams. Shared situational awareness and coordinated messaging are now as consequential as traditional interoperability.

These measures are not reactive. They are stabilizing.

Endurance in the Cognitive Arena

The next phase of competition will not be decided by territorial gains or military demonstrations alone. It will be shaped in the contested space between perception and reaction.

Artificial intelligence is not merely a tool of surveillance or propaganda. It is an instrument of cognitive pressure.

The states that endure will not be those that eliminate uncertainty, but those that manage it - deliberately, patiently, and without believing their own reflections.

In the coming decade, advantage will not belong to the state that generates the most data or the most persuasive narrative. It will belong to the one that resists the temptation to confuse engineered coherence with strategic reality.

Strategic maturity - not technological spectacle - will define advantage.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:47 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran’s Long Record of Terror and a Long&Delayed Response https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-long-record-of-terror-and-a-long-delayed-response https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-long-record-of-terror-and-a-long-delayed-response OPINION – Over the years, Iran has been responsible for killing hundreds of Americans and, most recently, for the killing of thousands of Iranians. After years of futile negotiations, the U.S. – and Israel -- attacked Iran on February 28, 2026.

U. S. courts and the Intelligence Community had assessed that Iran trained, supported and approved terrorist attacks that killed hundreds of Americans and foreign nationals.

In April 1983, a suicide truck bomb destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans. In October 1983, two suicide truck bombs struck the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Americans and 58 French paratroopers. This is one of the deadliest terrorist attacks against U.S. forces. U.S. investigations concluded that Hezbollah, backed by Iran, were responsible.

In January 1984, the U.S. Department of State designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, resulting in sanctions and a ban on defense exports and sales.

In June 1996, a massive truck bomb hit U.S. Air Force housing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. service members, with hundreds injured. The U.S. said Iranian officials inspired, supported, and supervised the attackers, with a U.S. federal court ruling in 2006 that Iran financed and directed the attack and owed damages to the victims. Evidence cited the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as the organization that trained, funded, and provided explosive training to the perpetrators.

These are a few of the more prominent cases of terrorism perpetrated against the U.S. by the government of Iran. Indeed, war as a tragic necessity could have been declared after any of these bombings, to check Iran’s savagery and suffering of the innocent.

The government of Iran brutally killed Iranian protesters in 2009, 2022 and 2026.

The 2009 Iranian election protests (the Green Movement) range from dozens to over 100 killed, with many more missing or arrested. The security forces and the Basij paramilitaries brutally cracked down on demonstrations following the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite widespread support to opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi.

And in September 2022, Jina Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian died in police custody, after being arrested for improperly wearing her head scarf. Eyewitnesses reported that she was severely beaten and died due to police brutality. This sparked mass protests, resulting in the killing of at least 476 Iranians, according to Iran Human Rights.

Amini’s death gave rise to the global “Women Life Freedom” movement in Iran.

And in February 2026, over 30,000 Iranians reportedly were killed protesting for an end to clerical rule in Iran, driven by a severe economic collapse – inflation and currency devaluation -- and widespread state repression. The IRGC and Basij reportedly took the lead in brutally responding to these demonstrations.

Since 1979, this is the Iran we have been dealing with. A state sponsor of terrorism that has killed hundreds of Americans – and others – and thousands of Iranians. An Iran that had an active nuclear weapons program until 2003, and since then has been enriching uranium at 20% or 60% purity, weeks away from the 90% purity needed for nuclear weapons. The June 2026 bombing of their nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan had set their nuclear program back a few years. However, these and other nuclear sites were being reconstituted prior to the current U.S. and Israeli bombing of Iran.

And Iran’s short-range and medium-range ballistic missile programs were concerning, given their impressive capabilities – solid fuel propulsion, enhanced guidance and counter defenses with hypersonic capabilities. Progress on a long-range ballistic missile, capable of targeting Europe and the U.S. was a likely goal of Iran’s leadership.

Hopefully, the new leadership in Iran will eschew terrorism and cease supporting Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi movement, Hamas and various Iraqi/Syrian militias. This would result in the lifting of international sanctions and the removal of Iran’s pariah status in the international community. The millions of dollars Iran has spent on its nuclear and missile programs should go to repairing its battered economy and providing a better life to the people of Iran.

Pope Leo XIV had expressed “deep concern” regarding the war with Iran and urged an end to the “spiral of violence”, advocating for “diplomacy to regain is role to prevent wider tragedy.” Indeed, this is a time for Pope Leo XIV to help negotiate an end to the war in Iran and help to convince the new leadership in Iran that they must protect and care for its people. Supporting international terrorism and building weapons of mass destruction are threats to regional and international stability.

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

This article was originally published by The Washington Times and is republished here with permission.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
Zelensky Plays His Hand https://belimedia.com.ng/zelensky-plays-his-hand https://belimedia.com.ng/zelensky-plays-his-hand

As Iran’s explosive-laden drones wreak havoc in the Persian Gulf and beyond, a wartime leader in another part of the world says he can help.

“What is happening around Iran today is not a faraway war for us because of the cooperation between Russia and Iran,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in London last week. “And we do not believe we have the right to be indifferent.”

Zelensky has offered counter-drone weapons and technical knowledge to the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East and he has already dispatched more than 200 Ukrainian military experts to the region to help defend against Iran’s drone attacks.

“We are working with several other countries - agreements are already in place,” Zelensky said, noting that Ukraine’s counter-drone weapons were “far more cost effective” than the interceptors that Gulf states are using. “We do not want this terror of the Iranian regime against its neighbors to succeed.”

It’s a notable offer from a leader still fighting a war of his own. It’s also a logical and strategic play: Zelensky is seeking to leverage Ukraine’s hard-won expertise and defense capabilities to curry favor and get more support in return.

“The Ukrainians are offering to be part of the solution here,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (Ret.), a former commander of U.S. Army Europe, told The Cipher Brief. “And it shows that the Russian narrative – that Russian victory is inevitable – is clearly not the case. If Ukraine is willing and able to export expertise and capability to help the Gulf states, that undermines the narrative that somehow the Ukrainians are on the verge of collapse.”

As the Iranian strikes continue – its drones hit critical oil infrastructure in three Gulf countries last week – some of the world’s richest nations are taking Ukraine up on its offer. It’s a turning of the tables that illustrates Ukraine’s evolution from battered nation to a defense technology juggernaut.

“It's a very generous offer from Ukraine to offer aid while they themselves remain under daily attack,” Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy at the American Enterprise Institute, told The Cipher Brief. “It's also a demonstration that Ukraine wants to contribute to the security of partner states and not just receive help.”

Iran’s drone war

While the U.S. and Israel say they have decimated Iran’s ballistic missile capability, Iranian drones continue to threaten U.S. military installations, Gulf oil facilities and critical shipping lanes.

Iran has launched more than 3,000 drones since the war began. Its Shahed drones were used in attacks on the U.S. embassies in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and in a strike that killed six U.S. service members in Kuwait. Last week, Iranian drones damaged oil infrastructure in Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and struck two vessels in the Persian Gulf.

“They’ve hit oil and gas infrastructure, they’ve hit hotels, they’ve hit embassies, they went after a data center,” Stacie Pettyjohn, Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, told The Cipher Brief. “They’re attacking the premise of these states’ economies, which are built on trying to attract investment and infrastructure to the region.”

Experts are divided as to how long Iran can sustain its drone operations. Prewar estimates of Iran’s drone arsenal ranged from several thousand to as many as 80,000. Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters on March 10 that Iranian launches of “one-way attack drones have decreased 83 percent since the beginning of the operation,” but analysts say that doesn’t mean the arsenal itself has been heavily degraded.

“Treating that change in behavior as evidence that Iran’s drone capacity has been destroyed risks creating a misleading picture of how much of the threat has actually been eliminated,” Kelly Grieco, a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center recently wrote. She said the drop in cadence might reflect a “tactical recalibration,” during which Iran is stockpiling and strategizing for future attacks.

“Moscow is reportedly sharing with Tehran drone tactics developed in Ukraine, including coordinated routing strategies designed to evade air defenses, as well as overhead satellite imagery to improve targeting,” Grieco said. “Tehran could be using this time to learn, adapt, and refine its strategy and tactics.”

Whatever the case, it’s clear that Iran can cause havoc for the region and the global economy with even a low rate of drone strikes. And the economic advantages of Iran’s drone warfare are clear; a single Shahed-136 costs between $20,000 and $50,000, and while the U.S. and its allies in the region possess some of the world’s most sophisticated air defense technologies – in particular the THAAD and Patriot systems – those are expensive interceptors designed to take out ballistic missiles. A single Patriot PAC-3 MSE, which Persian Gulf states have used against Iran’s Shaheds, costs approximately $3.8 million.

“You absolutely do not want to be using a Patriot interceptor against a Shahed drone,” Lt. Gen. Hodges said. “The Patriot cannot be the only means of defending…You save your Patriot for a ballistic missile.”

Ukraine’s “Shahed-killer”

Since the early days of its full-scale war against Ukraine, Russia has used Iranian Shahed drones to devastating effect, and manufactured its own version of the Shahed with Iranian help. Russia often launches hundreds of these drones at Ukrainian territory in a single day.

The necessity to survive has sparked Ukraine’s rapid pace of military innovation – including the development of an unparalleled ability to counter Shahed drones. Ukraine now produces a range of systems that have knocked Shaheds out of the sky at a high rate, and are much cheaper than other missile interceptors; many of the Ukrainian models cost between $1,000 and $2,000 apiece.

“Innovation happens when militaries have urgent problems to solve,” the AEI’s Schake said. “Ukraine is fighting for its life, and they've done a brilliant job of developing a domestic defense industry when we failed to give them weapons of the abilities and numbers they need. We're lagging behind because we haven't directed our defense industry with urgency.”

There are more than a dozen Ukrainian counter-drone systems, including the Merops, a high-end model funded in part by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt that includes AI-driven autonomy and comes at a higher price than the others – $15,000, still vastly cheaper than a Patriot missile.

“They’re just different ways of shooting drones out of the sky that are cheaper than the really expensive missiles,” Pettyjohn said of the Ukraine-made interceptors. “And they all afford you protection.”

Perhaps the best-known of these systems is the “Sting” interceptor drone, developed by the Ukrainian manufacturer Wild Hornets. The Sting is a high-speed FPV interceptor drone designed specifically to hunt and destroy the Shaheds in flight, and it has earned a reputation embedded in its nickname: “Shahed-killer.”

“They're working incredibly well in Ukraine, where the adaptation cycle is measured in weeks, which speaks to their great value,” Schake said. “As high-end U.S. air defenses begin to get scarce, they'll be incredibly valuable.”

Ukraine plays its card

As President Zelensky understands more than most, this isn’t just about Ukraine showing off its successful innovation; the Iran war has handed his country a strategic opportunity – a chance to showcase and leverage a suddenly in-demand technology in its relations with the U.S. countries in the Middle East.

One week into the war, Reuters reported that the U.S. and Qatar were in early-stage talks to acquire Ukrainian interceptor drones as a cheap alternative to its Patriot missiles. Another Ukrainian delegation traveled to Abu Dhabi, and Zelensky confirmed that the U.S. had asked Kyiv for "specific support" to defend against Shahed strikes against American targets in the Middle East.

“I have instructed that the necessary resources be provided and that Ukrainian specialists be present to ensure the necessary security," Zelensky said of the Qatar arrangement. He also proposed swapping Ukrainian interceptor drones for U.S. Patriots — which Kyiv has been running critically short of for months.

The U.S. interest in Ukraine’s interceptors predates the war with Iran. In late February, Pentagon officials visited Kyiv to study Ukraine’s counter-drone operations. Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, director of Joint Interagency Task Force 401, said the aim was to learn from Ukraine’s experience in beating back the Shaheds. “I did it to understand the TTPs — the tactics, techniques and procedures that they’re employing very effectively,” Ross said.

Meanwhile, Axios reported that Zelensky had offered its drone interceptors to President Trump last August – in a White House presentation that included a map of the Middle East and a suggestion that Ukraine and the U.S. collaborate to create "drone combat hubs" in Turkey, Jordan and the Persian Gulf states. The Trump administration reportedly dismissed the offer.

"Somebody decided not to buy it," an unnamed U.S. official told Axios. "If there's a tactical error or a mistake we made leading up to this [war in Iran], this was it" the official said.

A White House spokesperson dismissed that criticism, referring to the unnamed sources as “outside looking in”, adding that "Iranian retaliatory attacks are down by 90% because their ballistic missile capabilities are being totally demolished."

A strategic win for Kyiv?

Now, as Ukrainian technology and experts arrive in the Middle East, Zelensky is trying to take maximal advantage of the moment.

Beyond pitching the value of the Sting and other Ukraine-made interceptors, he has highlighted Russia’s aid to Iran – calling the two countries “brothers in hatred” – and warned that as the war in the Middle East strains U.S. missile supplies, that may create problems for Ukraine’s defense against Russia.

For all these reasons, Zelensky has asked for financial compensation and technological help from the U.S. and others in exchange for sharing Ukraine’s expertise.

“The Trump administration has been very transactional on how it approaches a lot of different countries,” Pettyjohn said. “For Ukraine, having something that the U.S. wants instead of just being a recipient and always asking for support, is an important step, and a way to show that there’s value that can flow back…They can use [the drone interceptors] as a bargaining chip to fill in some other types of support that are more critical.”

One year ago, Zelensky endured an Oval Office lecture from President Trump, including the now-infamous admonition: “You don’t have the cards.”

Last week in Kyiv, as Zelensky was pitching his drone defense technology, a journalist asked him, “Do you think Ukraine has the cards now?”

“Now everyone understands, we have them,” Zelensky replied. “It’s a good feeling. This is thanks to our soldiers, our talented people, and the many industries that we have developed since the start of the war. We have reached a high level now.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
When Deepfakes Become Doctrine https://belimedia.com.ng/when-deepfakes-become-doctrine https://belimedia.com.ng/when-deepfakes-become-doctrine OPINION — Since U.S. and Israeli strikes began against Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure in late February, two wars have been running simultaneously. One is kinetic. The other involves something the world has not fully reckoned with: the systematic use of artificial intelligence to manufacture reality, at scale, in real time, during active armed conflict.

Within days of the opening strikes, AI-generated video of missile impacts on the USS Abraham Lincoln was spreading across TikTok. Fabricated footage of downed U.S. fighter jets circulated on Facebook and Instagram. Tehran Times published what appeared to be satellite imagery of a U.S. radar base in Qatar showing structural damage from the strikes. BBC Verify confirmed the image was AI-generated, built from genuine satellite data of a different location and manipulated using Google AI tools. None of it was real. All of it spread.

The social media intelligence firm Cyabra documented more than 145 million views of Iranian-linked disinformation content in under two weeks. The New York Times identified over 110 unique deepfakes promoting pro-Iran narratives in the same window. These are not the crude influence operations of a decade ago. They are the product of an adversary that has been building this capability methodically and has now deployed it at wartime scale.

Understanding why this matters requires a short detour through what Iranian propaganda actually used to look like.

During the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran’s media strategy relied on radio broadcasts and print. Its efforts to persuade Iraqi Shia populations to shift allegiances were largely unsuccessful. Limited reach, poor targeting, no feedback loop. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq’s disinformation was described by scholars as extreme exaggerations easily ridiculed in the Western press. Baghdad claimed it had shot down dozens of allied aircraft. The press verified it had not. That was the cycle.

The digital era brought sock puppets and recycled footage. These operations required significant human labor and were detectable with basic verification tools. An account posting video from the 2015 Syrian conflict while presenting it as something current could be caught by reverse image search in minutes. The barrier to debunking was low.

December 2023 marked the first real break. Iran’s IRGC-linked group Cotton Sandstorm hijacked streaming services in the UAE, UK, and Canada and broadcast a deepfake newscast. An AI-generated anchor delivered Tehran’s narrative on the Gaza conflict to viewers who believed they were watching legitimate news. Microsoft, analyzing the operation afterward, called it the “first Iranian influence operation where AI played a key component” and a “fast and significant expansion” of Iranian capabilities.

June 2025 accelerated the model. The European Digital Media Observatory documented the 12-day Israel-Iran conflict as “The First AI War,” the first time in a major conflict that more misinformation was created through generative AI than through traditional methods. The three most-viewed fake videos collectively amassed over 100 million views.

March 2026 builds on that precedent, at significantly greater scale, with meaningful tactical innovations added.

The first is coordinated architecture. Cyabra’s forensic analysis found tens of thousands of inauthentic accounts distributing identical AI-generated assets simultaneously across every major platform, with synchronized posting windows and coordinated hashtag clusters pointing to centralized production. And it became clear that a notable percentage of accounts amplifying the campaign were inauthentic. The content was not organic. It was engineered.

The second is what journalist Craig Silverman has called “forensic cosplay”: the fabrication of technical-looking verification tools designed to discredit authentic evidence. In one documented case, fabricated heatmap visualizations were deployed to label photographs taken by credentialed photojournalists at a strike site in eastern Tehran as AI-generated. AI forensics experts who reviewed the heatmaps found them semantically incoherent. The thread nonetheless reached hundreds of thousands of views before corrections could follow. In a second case, a fake “Empirical Research and Forecasting Institute” published fabricated Error Level Analysis of a New York Times photograph, conducting the analysis on a screenshot of an Instagram post rather than the original image. That methodological error renders the output meaningless. The false conclusion still attracted over 600,000 views on X.

This is a different category of operation from making false things look real. It is making real things look false. The verification infrastructure itself becomes the target.

The third element is the amplification model. Iran does not operate alone. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies documented what it calls an “authoritarian media playbook” in which Russian bot networks launder Iranian content while Chinese state-aligned media echoes anti-U.S. narratives. No centralized coordination is required. Each actor pursues its own anti-Western objectives, and the compounding effect across the global information environment far exceeds what any single actor could achieve independently. In June 2025, Cyabra documented an Iranian bot network in the UK that had been spreading pro-Scottish independence and anti-Brexit content. It went completely silent for sixteen days following the military strikes on Iran, then returned with explicitly pro-Iran messaging. State-directed, clearly. Deniable, carefully.

What is most consequential here is not the volume of Iranian deepfakes. It is the underlying strategic logic of what they are designed to accomplish.

Traditional propaganda is built to persuade audiences toward specific false beliefs. Iranian AI operations in this conflict appear calibrated to achieve something more durable: the destruction of the shared evidentiary foundation that makes accountability possible at all. When any image can plausibly be AI-generated, when forensic tools can be fabricated, and when platforms cannot distinguish authentic from synthetic at scale, the machinery of verification collapses. You do not need to win arguments about what happened. You only need audiences to conclude that nothing can be known.

Law scholars Danielle Citron and Robert Chesney named this the “Liar’s Dividend” in 2018: as deepfake awareness grows, actors gain the ability to dismiss genuine evidence as fabricated. Empirical research published in the American Political Science Review in 2025 confirmed the hypothesis. False claims of misinformation do generate statistically significant increases in public support for political actors facing accountability. This was largely centered on text-based scandals at the time, and with the dramatic improvements in synthetic images and video since that time, one can speculate that a similar effect plays out today on our screens. Iran has operationalized this principle. By circulating enough obviously synthetic content to seed generalized skepticism, it creates cover for dismissing authentic documentation of what actually occurred.

That logic runs in two directions at the same time. Abroad, Iran deploys deepfakes to project military capability and deny accountability for strikes it conducts. At home, the same operation insulates the regime from documentation of its own conduct toward its citizens. Internet connectivity in Iran fell to approximately one percent of normal levels by early March, per NetBlocks. That near blackout creates an information vacuum. Deepfakes and fabricated forensic analysis fill that vacuum while simultaneously rendering authentic protest documentation dismissible as synthetic. The regime does not need to suppress every image from the January crackdown. It only needs to ensure that any image is plausibly deniable.

At the same time, detection has not kept pace. Danny Citrinowicz, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, stated this January: “There is no ability today to systematically identify AI-driven influence campaigns.” Meta’s Oversight Board formally ruled its deepfake detection “not robust or comprehensive enough” for the velocity of misinformation during armed conflicts. The EU AI Act’s labeling requirements for AI-generated content do not become enforceable until August 2026. This conflict began months before that.

The U.S. is in the middle of restructuring how it organizes the counter-influence mission. The debate over the appropriate scope of that work (including concerns about whether some previous approaches crossed into domestic speech territory) has been sincere, and it crosses political lines. And the debate is important, as we navigate delicate issues that will test the boundaries of free speech. But the timing is important as well. A new institutional architecture for this important mission is still being designed. And Iran’s campaign is not pausing while the debates continue.

Wherever U.S. policy lands on the question of combatting disinformation and deepfakes, three things will be true about this conflict when it is eventually analyzed in full.

The primary strategic objective of Iran’s information campaign is epistemic disruption, the deliberate degradation of the audience’s capacity to form reliable beliefs, not persuasion toward specific false conclusions. That is a materially different problem from countering traditional propaganda, and it requires different institutional responses.

The Russia-China-Iran amplification model is a template, not an anomaly. Future conflicts involving any permutation of those actors, or their proxies, will employ variants of this architecture. Convergent anti-Western interests are sufficient to drive convergent behavior. Coordination is optional.

Detection tools are now themselves a weapons category. The fabrication of forensic verification tools to discredit authentic evidence represents a qualitative escalation. Provenance infrastructure, not detection algorithms alone, will be required to address it.

The gap between adversary capability and institutional response is real and measurable. Deepfake incidents through Q1 2025 had already exceeded all of 2024’s total. Bot traffic surpassed human web activity at 51 percent. The information environment is, in a measurable sense, majority-synthetic. Building the cognitive security architecture to operate in that environment is not a platform moderation problem. It is a national security imperative, and it deserves to be treated as one.

Views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the positions or policies of the U.S. Government or the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Quiet Expansion of Trump’s War on Cartels https://belimedia.com.ng/the-quiet-expansion-of-trumps-war-on-cartels https://belimedia.com.ng/the-quiet-expansion-of-trumps-war-on-cartels OPINION — “The [narco-trafficking] boat strikes [in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific] aren't the answer. What we're moving for right now might be an extension of [Operation] Southern Spear, really a counter [narcotics] cartel campaign process that puts total systemic friction across this [drug] network.”

That was Marine Corps Gen. Francis Donovan, Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), testifying last Thursday before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the expanded Trump military campaign against Western Hemisphere drug cartels.

With most public attention focused on the Iran War, I decided to look at this hearing, which also received testimony from Air Force Gen. Gregory Guillot, Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), who, as I will discuss below, made clear that talks are moving ahead with Greenland and Denmark and that there was little behind President Trump’s talk of invading that Arctic island.

Just months ago, the Trump administration’s repeated destruction of narco-trafficking boats and Presidential talk of taking Greenland were front page stories, causing Americans to wonder where the President was taking the country militarily, particularly after the initial one-day June 2025 bombing of Iran nuclear sites and the later January 2026 successful seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Trump’s military action appetite has clearly grown so I believe it worth using last week’s testimony to see where his earlier efforts have led.

Since September 2, 2025, when Trump first told reporters about the initial strike against a narco-trafficking boat and later published a dramatic video of the operation on Truth Social, there have been 45 more such attacks in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific along with the killing of 159 individuals whom Trump or his officials have described as terrorists or narco-traffickers.

Last week, after Gen. Donovan told the Senators directly, “The boat strikes aren't the answer,” he later referred to creation of what has been called the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition or the Shield of the Americas.

Donovan described it as 17 Western Hemisphere countries along with the U.S. establishing on March 7. what he called “a coalition that will have a military aspect to it. When I say military, it's really partners that are willing to join with us to move forward against the cartels with different degrees based on what they can bring.”

In his prepared statement for the committee, Donovan described how the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia, has what is called an Embassy Intelligence Fusion Cell which, in partnership with Colombian officials, works to stop drugs “by committing airborne ISR [intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance] and fostering a holistic intelligence sharing effort. We [the U.S.] provide timely, critical information on cocaine labs, production and departure zones, and top FTO [foreign terrorist organization] leaders to enable Colombian security forces to take action.”

In answering a Senator’s question, Donovan said, “We just recently established an Ecuador fusion cell and with the Ecuadorian minister of defense, because they are leading the way.”

The SOUTHCOM Commander did not mention to the Senators that earlier this month he and Rear Admiral Mark A. Schafer, head of U.S. Special Operations-South, visited Quito and held talks with Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa. The Ecuadorian president's office said in a statement that the three discussed plans for the sharing of information and operational coordination at airports and seaports.

Along with Ecuador, Donovan said, “The other nation that is really is stepping forward is Paraguay.” He said it recently signed a SOFA (status of forces) agreement with the United States which allows us to operate much more closely together with FMS (foreign military sales) of radars coming down it will increase the air domain awareness in Paraguay.

At one point Donovan said of the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, “Putting that together, I believe actually kinetic [boat] strikes will be one of the many tools and probably not the most effective tool when we actually look at it as more of a campaign approach.”

One matter raised several times during the hearing focused on questions about the legality of the military killing of persons as alleged narco-traffickers without any trial or proof they in fact are traffickers.

Donovan more than once said he could talk about the intelligence involved in a closed session. But when asked about the targeting criteria to approve strikes in international waters Donovan replied they are using “near reasonable certainty, reasonable certainty, near certainty to make the final decision.”

Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), however, raised questions about terms used to by the Trump administration to describe those on the boats. She asked at one point, “What guidance have you received or issued for how to treat associates of a group differently from a confirmed direct member of a group?”

Her question implied that among those being killed are individuals “associated” with a drug cartel and she further pointed out “the administration in their legal justifications are calling these folks associates, but it's different from being a confirmed direct member of a group.”

In answering, Donovan further complicated the situation by saying, “We have a definition of affiliates tied to that classified definition. In a closed setting. I would like to share word-for-word what that definition is, Senator.”

Duckworth responded, “I'm concerned about the looseness of the term that SOUTHCOM has been using to publicly to report an individual we killed, specifically affiliate or associate. Those are the two words that were used, which implies an even weaker association with any concerning threat.”

Just before the session closed, Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), ranking Democrat on the committee, raised questions about the “exords” related to the boat attacks, meaning the execute orders to initiate the military action.

Reed said, “There is a legal requirement for the [Defense] Department to provide those exords to the committee which you [Committee Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.)] and I have requested multiple times…The [Defense] Secretary [Pete Hegseth] has not fulfilled this legal requirement and your testimony General Donovan further confirms in my mind that we need these documents to understand and oversee. That's our role -- oversee these operations.”

The takeover of Cuba has been on President Trump’s mind for some time. Most recently, during an Oval Office meeting March 17, he told reporters, “We'll be doing something with Cuba very soon." A day earlier, the President talked of "taking Cuba in some form," adding, “Whether I free it, take it, I think I could do anything I want with it."

Donovan, asked, “Are we currently conducting any military rehearsals that involve seizing, occupying, or otherwise asserting control over Cuba?” replied, “U.S. Southern Command is not,” and he added he knew of no other command that was.

To a subsequent question of seizing Cuba, Donovan said, “The number of forces required, we have general ideas, but the focus right now is purely on securing Guantanamo Bay and the U.S. embassy to protect American personnel. That is the only facts and figures and planning we have underway at this time.”

As for Greenland and Denmark, NORTHCOM’s Gen. Guillot said, they both had been “very cooperative… very eager to discuss ways to move forward to improve our defense capabilities.”

He said, “We are pursuing with Denmark expansion on the defense areas which are allowed under the 1951 agreement…We don't really need a new treaty. It's very comprehensive and it and it's frankly very favorable to our operations or potential operations in Greenland.

One area Guillot mentioned was expanding “the [Greenland] defense areas from Pituffik Space Force Base, where we are now, into these other areas, which would help our homeland defense mission.”

He added that the Pentagon “challenges in the Arctic start with…ports and the ability to navigate freely through the harsh conditions of the Arctic both in maritime, land and air. So I'm working with our department and others to try to develop more [sea]ports, more airfields which leads to more options for our [Defense Department] secretary and for the President should we need them up in the Arctic…that is from Alaska all the way across through Canada and into Greenland.”

Guillot said he specifically wanted “the resources and the force projection capability along that avenue of approach to North America [from Russia], which you know through the Arctic is the shortest route. So therefore, in many ways our most vulnerable route. We're very well established in Canada and Alaska and having more capability along what I call the 2:00 [o’clock] approach would be key.”

He also said, referring to Trump’s Golden Dome missile defense proposal, “the ability to launch fighters and tankers to get be the first line of defense against cruise missiles that could be launched from the Arctic [part of Greenland].” Also, Guillot mentioned, “Port presence for our our Navy, which also gives us [logistic support for] Golden Dome and [therefore] ballistic missile defense capability.”

Trump apparently was never serious about seizing Greenland; his war on Western Hemisphere drug cartels is a work in progress, as is Venezuela, although the capture of Maduro was a well-carried out special operation.

Common to the above Trump actions has been surprise, and lack of preparing the public or Congress for what was going to take place.

Attacking Iran was and has become a much bigger and more dangerous move, and as we have seen -- again undertaken without preparing the public or Congress and in this case paying attention to its worldwide economic and diplomatic longer-term implications.

Trump will pay a domestic political price for Iran, but so will the U.S. when it comes to continued world leadership.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
While Washington Looks to Iran, Putin Gains Ground https://belimedia.com.ng/while-washington-looks-to-iran-putin-gains-ground https://belimedia.com.ng/while-washington-looks-to-iran-putin-gains-ground OPINION - After the joint U.S. - Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear program last June and after the spectacular raid that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, U.S. President Donald Trump must have begun to feel like the ruler of the world.

“For he was ruler of the world and he knew not what to do. But he would think of something.”

—Arthur C. Clarke, 2001: A Space Odyssey

He then thought of something to do: unite again with Israel and finish the job with Iran. This time, the end result is not yet clear and the result could end up looking a lot more like Iraq than Venezuela.

It’s not that the Iranian regime didn’t have it coming. The heinous regime led by Ayatollah Khamenei has been the sponsor of terrorism and regional instability in the Middle East for decades. The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran was unrepentantly hostile to the U.S. and Israel, the latter a target of Iran for extermination. It also had a program intent on developing a nuclear weapon, despite Iranian statements to the contrary.

It is also well and good that Maduro is in prison in the U.S. and Iran’s capability to build a nuclear weapon and engage in regional and global terrorism is being diminished and perhaps ultimately eliminated. But the opportunity cost of this is significant in that the operation against Iran has diverted resources that could have been available to support Ukraine, which is effectively, the front line of the defense of Europe and the main bulwark against the expansionist ambitions of the man at the center of a global effort against the U.S. and the West.

The reality is that the other presumed ruler of the world - at least in his own mind - Russian President Vladimir Putin - is seeing his world get smaller and smaller. The system of alliances he so carefully nurtured as he tried to re-claim for Russia a place at the rank of superpower, has shrunk materially. This alliance was given the ambitious label of the “Axis of Resistance.”

The authors of that label were apparently not too familiar with the fate of the last major “Axis,” Germany, Italy, and Japan. The fate of some members of the current axis has already been decided, with Syria’s Assad in exile in Moscow, Ayatollah Khamenei deceased, and the Islamic Republic under concentrated assault from the U.S. and Israel. Putin and Russia embarrassingly, remain on the sidelines.

In addition to the strategic setbacks Putin’s Ukraine invasion has caused the Russian Federation, (Sweden and Finland joining NATO and that organization having been given new purpose and vision) the invasion has cost Russia a staggering number of casualties estimated by some at approaching 1.5 million soldiers killed, wounded, captured or missing. An example of which is the reportedly 8,700 casualties last week alone as the price of capturing roughly 28 kilometers of Ukrainian territory.

These losses are the early cost of Russia’s Spring-Summer offensive which is expected to include mobilized troops as Putin is no longer able to buy enough volunteers to fill the depleted ranks of the Russian army.

For its part, Ukraine seems to be militarily holding its own, even recapturing some territory during counteroffensives in southern Ukraine as well as continuing to demonstrate the ability through missile or drone attacks to strike military and economic targets deep in the territory of the Russian Federation.

There is increasing evidence that things on the domestic front are becoming more difficult for the “moth” as Putin is quietly and derisively called in some circles in Russia. Russia has had to resort to conscription on a year round system and has significantly increased the penalties for draft evasion and although Russian law prevents the deployment of untrained conscripts to war zones, draftees are pressured to sign contracts for service in Ukraine.

Closer to Moscow, another Russian general, this time a commander of the Russian Air Force, Sergei Kobylash, died after falling out of a window in early 2026. His was the latest in a series of mysterious deaths of senior Russian military officers in recent years. Also to be noted, is the shooting in Moscow of the Deputy Head of Russian military intelligence (GRU) Lt. Gen. Vladimir Alekseyev in a residential building in Moscow.

Alekseyev was allegedly involved in the attack on Sergei Skripal in the UK and he was one of the officials who negotiated with Yevgeny Prigozhin after the latter’s Wagner Group mutiny. If you are a senior Russian military official, one would think you would be starting to wonder about the direction your President is taking your country or, more personally, if you will be the next to fall out of a window or be shot when leaving your apartment building.

If there is going to be regime change in Russia, it likely needs to come from these ranks.

Even some formerly ardent supporters of Putin and his invasion of Ukraine are starting to speak out against the regime. Ilya Remesto, a well known Russian blogger, propagandist, and lawyer who was in part responsible for the persecution and conviction of Alexei Navalny, suddenly published a Telegram post titled: “Five reasons why I stopped supporting Vladimir Putin.” He has since reportedly been hospitalized at a Psychiatric Hospital in St. Petersburg. One might hope he has a room on the ground floor.

The circle of advisors around Putin was also reduced with the resignation last September of Dmitri Kozak, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kremlin, due to his opposition to the war in Ukraine, and the very recent retirement for health reasons, of former Minister of Defense and long time Putin associate Sergey Ivanov.

Two other recent developments of note in assessing the state of play at the center of the Kremlin: Vladimir Putin’s public appearances have been dramatically reduced in recent weeks with several absences of longer than a week having been noted. There is speculation the absences are health related but there is also increasing speculation in Russia and abroad that Putin is concerned for his own security taking extra precautions. This could be similar to Putin’s seeming paranoia during the COVID crisis.

The second is the shutting down of the internet in Moscow and elsewhere in the Russian Federation for “security reasons.” This shutdown has had meaningful economic consequences in the Moscow region and has caused understandable social discontent. A reflection of that could be the appearance on Russian state television of satires about how life is better without the internet.

Here’s my issue with where we are today. As a former Intelligence Officer, I’m seeing signals that the President of the U.S. does not seem to recognize who the guiding forces are in the global effort to undermine the U.S. politically and economically. If he did, there would be much more pressure applied to the leaders of the Axis: Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

It is the former who has taken the lead in efforts to attack the U.S. and Europe, unleashing at various times, Russian intelligence operatives to conduct assassination and sabotage operations in Europe and elsewhere, as well as cyber probing and attacks on U.S. infrastructure and election integrity.

Putin is at the very center of the web. His economy was starting to seriously feel the effects of sanctions, low oil prices and more concerted efforts to crack down on sanctions evasion and Russia’s “shadow fleet” of tankers carrying oil in violation of U.S. sanctions.

The Iran conflict has led to concerns about oil supply and a rise in the price of crude oil. Unfortunately, instead of seeking to keep the pressure on Moscow, the President decided to lift some sanctions on Russian energy, resulting in a windfall of resources for the Russian dictator which will certainly be used to support his continued aggression in Ukraine.

Kyiv, on the other hand, having survived devastating attacks against its energy infrastructure during the coldest winter in eastern Europe in decades, has stepped up to provide expertise and anti drone technology to assist the efforts by the U.S. to restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

This from a country that according to the U.S. President “had no cards.” Now Ukrainian anti-drone drones are the single most effective system in place to protect vital shipping lanes from Iranian drone attacks. At the same time, there are reports that Russia is providing intelligence to assist Iran in targeting U.S. forces in the region.

The U.S. president and his national security team need to focus more energy on the real enemy and architect of the effort to undermine the U.S. and the West, Vladimir Putin. A near term first step might be rejecting Putin’s ridiculous offer to stop aiding Iran if the U.S. ceases aid to Ukraine. The president should also immediately re-impose the sanctions that were recently relaxed on Russian energy. Perhaps next, the president should message Russian elites and the Russian people about regime change. Maybe he will have better luck than he has with the Iranians. It’s certainly worth a try.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Declining Demand for Strategic Intelligence? US and Israeli cases https://belimedia.com.ng/a-declining-demand-for-strategic-intelligence-us-and-israeli-cases https://belimedia.com.ng/a-declining-demand-for-strategic-intelligence-us-and-israeli-cases OPINION — Strategic intelligence, usually perceived as intelligence supporting the formulation of strategy, has always had limited influence over national security decisions. Leaders in democratic countries, let alone in authoritarian ones, have their own ideological views of the world, and their own vision of ways to shape the world. They do not rely only on their intelligence agencies for sense-making of the strategic environment. But in the cases of the US and Israel, the demand for strategic intelligence might be declining.

Both the US and Israel are increasingly implementing preventive strategies, initiating preventive campaigns while using brute force, which aimed to coerce the adversary through compellence rather than through deterrence. The preventive approach is not new; Israel, for instance, has always aimed at preventing its adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, the implementation of this approach has accelerated.

This was the case, for instance, in the June 2025 Israeli campaign against Iran, intended to prevent the Islamic Republic from developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, augmented by US strikes also aimed at preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Deterrence was not working to change Iran’s calculus and actions, hence compellence was needed. In the US operation to capture Venezuelan president Maduro in January 2026, the US once again applied compellence using brute force. Deterrence was not working to change Venezuela’s conduct, hence compellence was needed. The current US and Israeli campaigns against Iran are the most vivid illustration of the preventive approach, with Israel and the US taking the initiative and applying compellence. Both the US and Israel have declared that this campaign is intended to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, as well as to negate Iran from its regional power projection capabilities. And at least in the case of Israel, also to bring about regime change. Deterring Iran from further developing its nuclear and missile capabilities was once again not working.

The application of these preventive and proactive strategies might illustrate a declining demand for strategic intelligence. First, such strategies are mostly aimed at degrading adversary capabilities, effectively assuming that understanding adversary intentions and manipulating them, mainly through deterrence, is not enough. Hence, operational-level intelligence analyzing adversary centers of gravity, operational and technical intelligence analyzing adversary military and industrial projects, and above all, targeting intelligence, is more important than strategic intelligence trying to decipher adversary intentions and rationale. In the case of Iran, for instance, the US and Israel seem to have decided that the Iranian intentions for developing nuclear capabilities are threats which must be prevented, regardless of whether the Iranians indeed intend to employ nuclear weapons in the future.

Second, leaders increasingly judge the “imminency level” of threats based on their vision and ideology, not just on intelligence assessments. This is especially evident in the current campaign against Iran. In the US, DNI Gabbard recently mentioned that only the US president decides if a threat is indeed imminent, referring to the Iranian nuclear project. In Israel, Prime Minister Natanyahu mentioned that Israel had to take action since the Iranians were moving their infrastructures into underground facilities, thus denying Israel from the ability to attack these infrastructures. Once again, strategic intelligence about adversary future intentions seems less important than operational intelligence about adversary capabilities, let alone than targeting intelligence, such as that produced by Israel for eliminating Iran’s political and military leadership in the beginning of the current campaign against Iran, or by US in January 2026 to capture Maduro.

Third, leaders increasingly distrust the quality of strategic intelligence produced by their intelligence agencies. In the US, for instance, President Trump has consistently expressed distrust in DNI’s Gabbard assessments regarding Iran, and during his first term, urged intelligence professionals to “go back to school”. Furthermore, the IC is often viewed by the Trump administration as politicized, a belief which effectively leads to politicization. In Israel, it is more than reasonable to assume that following the colossal intelligence failure of October 2023, which among other things reflected a complete failure to understand Hamas strategy and intentions, the current Netanyahu government lost trust in the intelligence system’s strategic assessments. This also might lead to politicization. Hence, while leaders cannot execute their strategies without operational and targeting intelligence, they might assume that their own judgements about adversary intentions are better than those produced by the intelligence professionals.

These challenges for strategic intelligence are not new, but at least in the US and Israel in recent years, they seem to be exacerbated. These trends, therefore, might reflect a declining demand for strategic intelligence, specifically focused on analyzing adversary intentions. It is not clear, for instance, whether such intelligence was provided to US and Israeli decision-makers prior to initiating the current campaign against Iran, regarding potential contingencies in the Straits of Hormuz? In any case, this might lead to a “vicious circle”, where diminishing demand leads to decreasing supply, which in turn might decrease the demand, and so forth. Both leaders and intelligence professionals should be troubled by this phenomenon.


The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Declining Demand for Strategic Intelligence? U.S. and Israeli cases https://belimedia.com.ng/a-declining-demand-for-strategic-intelligence-us-and-israeli-cases-65641 https://belimedia.com.ng/a-declining-demand-for-strategic-intelligence-us-and-israeli-cases-65641 OPINION — Strategic intelligence, usually perceived as intelligence supporting the formulation of strategy, has always had limited influence over national security decisions. Leaders in democratic countries, let alone in authoritarian ones, have their own ideological views of the world, and their own vision of ways to shape the world. They do not rely only on their intelligence agencies for sense-making of the strategic environment. But in the cases of the US and Israel, the demand for strategic intelligence might be declining.

Both the US and Israel are increasingly implementing preventive strategies, initiating preventive campaigns while using brute force, which aimed to coerce the adversary through compellence rather than through deterrence. The preventive approach is not new; Israel, for instance, has always aimed at preventing its adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, the implementation of this approach has accelerated.

This was the case, for instance, in the June 2025 Israeli campaign against Iran, intended to prevent the Islamic Republic from developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, augmented by US strikes also aimed at preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Deterrence was not working to change Iran’s calculus and actions, hence compellence was needed. In the US operation to capture Venezuelan president Maduro in January 2026, the US once again applied compellence using brute force. Deterrence was not working to change Venezuela’s conduct, hence compellence was needed. The current US and Israeli campaigns against Iran are the most vivid illustration of the preventive approach, with Israel and the US taking the initiative and applying compellence. Both the US and Israel have declared that this campaign is intended to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, as well as to negate Iran from its regional power projection capabilities. And at least in the case of Israel, also to bring about regime change. Deterring Iran from further developing its nuclear and missile capabilities was once again not working.

The application of these preventive and proactive strategies might illustrate a declining demand for strategic intelligence. First, such strategies are mostly aimed at degrading adversary capabilities, effectively assuming that understanding adversary intentions and manipulating them, mainly through deterrence, is not enough. Hence, operational-level intelligence analyzing adversary centers of gravity, operational and technical intelligence analyzing adversary military and industrial projects, and above all, targeting intelligence, is more important than strategic intelligence trying to decipher adversary intentions and rationale. In the case of Iran, for instance, the US and Israel seem to have decided that the Iranian intentions for developing nuclear capabilities are threats which must be prevented, regardless of whether the Iranians indeed intend to employ nuclear weapons in the future.

Second, leaders increasingly judge the “imminency level” of threats based on their vision and ideology, not just on intelligence assessments. This is especially evident in the current campaign against Iran. In the US, DNI Gabbard recently mentioned that only the US president decides if a threat is indeed imminent, referring to the Iranian nuclear project. In Israel, Prime Minister Natanyahu mentioned that Israel had to take action since the Iranians were moving their infrastructures into underground facilities, thus denying Israel from the ability to attack these infrastructures. Once again, strategic intelligence about adversary future intentions seems less important than operational intelligence about adversary capabilities, let alone than targeting intelligence, such as that produced by Israel for eliminating Iran’s political and military leadership in the beginning of the current campaign against Iran, or by US in January 2026 to capture Maduro.

Third, leaders increasingly distrust the quality of strategic intelligence produced by their intelligence agencies. In the US, for instance, President Trump has consistently expressed distrust in DNI’s Gabbard assessments regarding Iran, and during his first term, urged intelligence professionals to “go back to school”. Furthermore, the IC is often viewed by the Trump administration as politicized, a belief which effectively leads to politicization. In Israel, it is more than reasonable to assume that following the colossal intelligence failure of October 2023, which among other things reflected a complete failure to understand Hamas strategy and intentions, the current Netanyahu government lost trust in the intelligence system’s strategic assessments. This also might lead to politicization. Hence, while leaders cannot execute their strategies without operational and targeting intelligence, they might assume that their own judgements about adversary intentions are better than those produced by the intelligence professionals.

These challenges for strategic intelligence are not new, but at least in the US and Israel in recent years, they seem to be exacerbated. These trends, therefore, might reflect a declining demand for strategic intelligence, specifically focused on analyzing adversary intentions. It is not clear, for instance, whether such intelligence was provided to US and Israeli decision-makers prior to initiating the current campaign against Iran, regarding potential contingencies in the Straits of Hormuz? In any case, this might lead to a “vicious circle”, where diminishing demand leads to decreasing supply, which in turn might decrease the demand, and so forth. Both leaders and intelligence professionals should be troubled by this phenomenon.


The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Wartime Budget Without an Innovation Strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/a-wartime-budget-without-an-innovation-strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/a-wartime-budget-without-an-innovation-strategy OPINION — “The use cases that help to drive the research agenda can come from a variety of different settings…We need to acknowledge that it's okay for those use cases to come from the Department of War (DoW) and Intelligence Community (IC). It's our responsibility to be able to help put the best minds here in the U.S., the best talent here in the U.S., to help unlock some of that research and innovation. And then it's up to our colleagues at DoW and the IC, whom we collaborate with, to harness some of those outputs for the betterment of our national interests and our national needs.”

That was Erwin Gianchandani, the National Science Foundation (NSF) Assistant Director of the Directorate for Technology, Innovation and Partnerships (TIPS), speaking last Friday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies during a meeting on NSF's National Security Mission for the Twenty-First Century.

TIPS is an NSF program that invests in use-inspired research and the translation of those research results to the market to continue to keep society and the nation secure.

Ironically, I had listened to Gianchandani’s remarks last Friday before reading the outline of President Trump’s fiscal 2027 budget request with its gigantic increase for Defense Department (DoD) spending – to near $1.5 trillion. Much to my surprise, not only was federal research and development cut in that request for next year, but NSF’s own next year’s budget was cut from $8.8 billion to $4 billion.

Before I talk about what’s interesting about NSF’s TIPS program, I want to make a few observations about the proposed 2027 DoD budget request, which represents a 44 percent increase over this year’s spending.

In a letter accompanying the budget outline, Office of Management and Budget Director Russell T. Vought said that in addition to the $1.1 trillion base DoW budget, Trump is including “a request for $350 billion in additional mandatory resources for critical Administration priorities such as increasing access to critical munitions and further expansion of the defense industrial base.”

This vast Trump federal growth of U.S. military spending seems very similar to what Russian President Vladimir Putin has done to the Russian government’s economic base, putting it on a wartime footing to meet the needs of his four-year Ukraine war.

I will also point out there is a $3.6 billion increase for the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), which runs the nation’s nuclear weapons program. Budget Director Vought wrote, “The United States must maintain and expand its set of nuclear capabilities that allow the President flexibility to protect the homeland and deter adversaries. Specifically, the Budget makes strong investments to develop new [nuclear] warheads that would bolster deterrence, modernize NNSA’s supporting infrastructure, and extend the life of existing warheads.”

The U.S. has already been building new warheads for its new submarine-launched cruise missile and its new land-based intercontinental ballistic missile [Sentinel]. There is also a new nuclear air-launched cruise missile on the way. What other new warheads does this country need “to develop”?

Need I also mention there’s an additional $18 billion for Trump’s Golden Dome dream of a missile defense system to feature space-based interceptors, plus unstated amounts for his un-needed Trump battleships.

I want to focus back on the NSF’s TIPS program because Assistant Director Gianchandani described changes in the academic research world worth recording.

For example, he reminded that China’s “President Xi has said that science and technology is the new international battlefield. It is the vehicle by which the international battlefield is going to be shaped going forward…We cannot take that lightly,” Gianchandani said , adding, “If we are going to ensure our competitiveness, our security, our defense, we have to take that very seriously. And that means that there are going to be instances a lot of the technology that we are surfacing and that we are enabling are dual-use [for war and/or peace] technologies.”

Gianchandani said it still takes years for basic science to be unlocked but that “every sector of our economy really is being transformed by the introduction of data and AI [Artificial Intelligence] -- that is the new currency of scientific progress and in that context I think the pace of discovery and innovation is greatly accelerated.”

He also pointed out changes in academia.

“It used to be that in certain fields the majority of PhDs would go into academia,” Gianchandani said. He continued, “Today the majority of PhDs in those same fields are going anywhere but academia. Nothing against our higher education institutions, but the types of jobs that we are training for, the types of opportunities that we are trying to unlock, span from the Department of Defense to the Intelligence Community to the private sector to venture capital and so forth.”

Gianchandani also spoke about what he termed “our early-career faculty,” who “are saying, you know, we want to have impact with the work that we're trying to do…And for them, impact at the end of the day isn't necessarily about papers and publications. It's about the startups that they can create. It's about the ecosystem that they can cultivate. It's about these partnerships with industry and seeing their ideas over time make their way into products and services that are changing people's lives or that are for the betterment of the U.S. defense and intelligence enterprises. That's early-career faculty who are up and coming who are trying to see that happen.”

Gianchandani also explained that TIPS wanted to change that linear pathway between basic science and needs in the real world.

As he described it, “You start with just simply use discovery science, you let the great flowers bloom, and then you harness that, but we want to complement that…with also what are the real world use cases from Department of War (DoW) , the Intelligence Community (IC) etc. That can help to inform and shape some of that use-inspired research, some of that translational research, and accelerate that to actually have impact at the end of the day.”

One TIPS program he cited was “our ability to be successful tied to critical minerals.” NSF did a technical assessment and found, “it turns out that by the year 2030 about a quarter -- several data sets have shown this – about a quarter of the nation's critical minerals needs could be addressed through the harnessing of end-of-life critical minerals -- waste stream critical minerals and so forth,” Gianchandani said.

That became the basis for TIPS’ Tech Metal Transformation Challenge whose grant winners demonstrated their capability to create solutions to solve the hardest technical gaps in critical materials recovery, gaps that directly impacted U.S. manufacturing competitiveness and national security.

“If we're going to think about the equipment that you need for hypersonics and the ability to do ground and air scanning, in real time, you're going to need those critical mineral assets,” Gianchandani said, adding, “And so being able to leverage this type of an approach and surfacing the teams that can potentially do so in a rapid manner and in a in a sort of a different way than we might traditionally do through some of our normal processes. I think allows us to be able to ensure that we are maintaining that competitiveness.”

For four years, TIPS has been running a Regional Innovation Engines Program providing the largest investments that the agency makes in terms of R&D and workforce development.

Gianchandani said, “We funded an engine in central Florida in Osceola County, Florida, that increasingly now covers more and more of the state with a particular focus on semiconductor technologies and specifically advanced packaging capabilities.”

Within weeks, he said, “there was an announcement that the Department of War was also investing in that same ecosystem in that same team. So that shows you sort of the symbiosis between our investments and that of our colleagues elsewhere in the government.”

That engine, he continued, “Brought together Valencia Community College. They've brought together their backyard secret sauce, which is the only municipal-owned fab [a semiconductor fabricating plant] in this country to our knowledge, operated by SkyWater Technology [a semiconductor manufacturer]. That particular setup has allowed them to be able to reskill, upskill, the workforce in Osceola County to the point that folks were making minimum wage and

six months later they're making three or four times as much, which has huge implications on their livelihoods [and] has huge implications on their ability to put food on the table for their families and oh by the way it's also a job that they're really excited about working in these semiconductor fabs. So that's one example.”

Overall, Gianchandani said, “Engines across the board, an [original NSF] investment of $135 million over the last two years has been matched by over a $1.5 billion in matching commitments from state and local governments, private industry, venture capital, and so forth. And they've touched at least 20,000 Americans. That's a floor, probably much more than that, but at least 20,000 Americans with re-skilling and upskilling.”

Gianchandani closed with a statement worth thinking about: “The pace of science is changing before our very eyes. It is greatly accelerating. And as that pace accelerates, that also means that going from basic discovery to an innovation to thinking about a new capability…The rate at which we're making progress is changing. And so it's important for us to be acknowledging that, and it's important for us to be thinking about science sort as a front and center vehicle that allows us to be able to keep that cutting edge, keep that leadership mantle that I think we want to see for our national defense and for our national prosperity as we go forward.”

I should point out that the Trump administration cut the NSF fiscal 2026 budget request in half from the prior year — to $3.9 billion -- and last year the Members of Congress in their wisdom reinstated it to $8.75 billion. I expect, hope, that ignoring the Trump administration request will happen again.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
Admiral James Stavridis (Ret.) https://belimedia.com.ng/admiral-james-stavridis-ret https://belimedia.com.ng/admiral-james-stavridis-ret

“I am struck by how comprehensive and thoughtful The Cipher Brief’s Open Source Report is. It is just as good as the President’s Daily Brief, having spent a decade reading the PDB. And it’s unclassified, too! I'm proud to be part of the network of experts at The Cipher Brief, which provides superb geopolitical advice and intelligence insights.”

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
U.S. Intel’s Sobering Assessment of Iran’s War Resilience https://belimedia.com.ng/us-intels-sobering-assessment-of-irans-war-resilience https://belimedia.com.ng/us-intels-sobering-assessment-of-irans-war-resilience

Four weeks into Operation Epic Fury, with airstrikes having killed a sitting supreme leader, wiped out scores of top military and intelligence commanders, and significantly degraded Iran’s missile arsenal and naval capacity, Washington is confronting a conclusion that was reached by its own intelligence community before the first bomb fell: the Islamic Republic is not going anywhere.

A National Intelligence Council assessment completed in February concluded that neither limited airstrikes nor a larger, prolonged military campaign would be likely to result in a new government taking over in Iran, even if the current leadership were killed. The briefings delivered to President Trump were described by one source familiar with the findings as “sobering.”

A multitude of intelligence reports now provide consistent analysis that the regime is not in danger of collapsing and retains control of the Iranian public. The war’s costs are nonetheless mounting.

More than $16 billion has been spent so far, 13 U.S. troops have been killed, and Iran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz has slowed shipping traffic to a trickle, creating a historic oil disruption that has sent global energy markets into turmoil. Daily oil exports from the Middle East have fallen by at least 60 percent since the war began, the IEA has said, calling it the largest supply disruption in the global oil market’s history.

A U.S. intelligence official, speaking to The Cipher Brief on background, captured the core dilemma plainly, “You can’t get regime change from the air, and who is to replace them when there is no viable alternative.”

The son rises — harder than the father

Nine days into the war, Iran's Assembly of Experts met and named a new supreme leader. They chose Mojtaba Khamenei 56, second son of the slain Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and in doing so gave Washington an answer it had not been looking for. Inside Iran, critics felt the sting of a republic born from the ashes of dynastic rule that had just handed the top job from father to son. President Trump called the selection “a big mistake” and said Mojtaba was flatly “unacceptable” to him.

The new supreme leader is widely assessed as even more hardline than his father, though the full contours of his leadership remain difficult to read, in part because he has not appeared in public since the war began, knowing that he is being actively targeted.

For decades, he operated in the shadows of his father’s office. U.S. diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks in the late 2000s referred to him as “the power behind the robes” and his father’s “principal gatekeeper.”

At the same time, a 2008 cable reportedly assessed him as “a capable and forceful leader and manager” though it also noted his lack of theological qualifications and relative youth. His path to power ran not through religious scholarship; he holds no senior clerical rank and has published no works of Islamic jurisprudence, but through the IRGC, with which he forged ties during the Iran-Iraq war in the late 1980s and cultivated ever since.

Intelligence experts stress that Mojtaba essentially owes the IRGC for his ascendance, and in that vein, he isn’t going to have the same broad leverage as his father. The succession process itself underscored that dynamic. The IRGC argued that the war required a swift process and that selecting a candidate who defied the United States, contacted Assembly of Experts members, and prompted objections, yet, in the end, they felt compelled to support him. IRGC leaders, Basij commanders, and top security officials had unparalleled access to the assembly, many of whose members rely on the Revolutionary Guards for personal protection.

The first statement attributed to Mojtaba since his appointment came on March 12, read aloud by a state television anchor over a still photograph — the new supreme leader himself nowhere to be seen. The tone left little room for interpretation.

“The lever of blocking the Strait of Hormuz must definitely continue to be used,” he declared, not as a negotiating position, but as a statement of intent. The waterway that moves a fifth of the world’s oil had become, in his telling, a weapon.

Some private sector analysts noted that while his rhetoric toward the United States and Israel was uncompromising, he did not fully close the door to political outcomes, placing responsibility for ending the war squarely on Washington. Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, was less equivocal.

On March 17, he posted on X that the Strait of Hormuz “won’t return to its pre-war status.” Two days later, Expediency Council member Mohammad Mohaber went further still, calling for a “new regime” for the strait that would allow Iran to sanction the West by denying passage to its ships. Taken together, the message to Washington was hard to misread: across the Islamic Republic’s power structure, this war has produced no moderates.

IRGCistan: the state that emerges

What American airpower has effectively accelerated is not the dismantling of the Islamic Republic but the consolidation of its most dangerous institutional element. The IRGC is taking an even greater role in the domestic affairs of the state, ensuring the structure of the regime stays in place, while Iran’s opposition remains fractured without a credible leader capable of challenging hardline officials.

A telling example of who holds actual power came one week into the war, when President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized for Iran’s attacks on Gulf states, saying he “personally apologizes to neighboring countries that were affected by Iran’s actions.” The IRGC and hardliners pushed back immediately, a hardline parliamentarian called the statement “weak, unprofessional, and unacceptable,” forcing Pezeshkian into a climbdown that notably omitted his original apology from the official readout. This has been widely interpreted as the IRGC now being in full charge of the embattled nation, and calling the shots as to who, how and when to attack.

Despite sitting on the interim leadership council formed to administer the country while a new supreme leader was selected, Pezeshkian appears to have been reduced to a figurehead. The elected civilian layer of the Iranian state has been hollowed out in real time.

That hollowing-out has only deepened since. On March 17, Ali Larijani — the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and one of the most prominent non-clerical figures in Iranian politics — was killed in an Israeli airstrike, removing the highest-level official to be assassinated since Khamenei himself. U.S. and Israeli intelligence had assessed Larijani as Iran’s de facto leader in the weeks after the war’s opening strikes, given widespread doubts about Mojtaba’s capacity to govern. Iran has since named Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a hardline former IRGC deputy commander, to replace him; a move that further consolidates the Guards’ grip over the regime’s security architecture.

The pattern is difficult to ignore. Each leadership vacancy created by the war’s decapitation strikes has been filled not by civilian or clerical figures but by men with deep IRGC roots. As one U.S. intelligence official speaking on background to The Cipher Brief told us, the internal dynamics are shaped less by strategy than by the weight of an accepted narrative — and that narrative, for now, belongs to the guards.

Royce de Melo, a security and defense consultant and analyst specializing in the Middle East and Africa, tells The Cipher Brief that he sees the current trajectory as a natural, if not inevitable, evolution.

“As fanatical loyalists, the IRGC have always been the power behind the regime since the 1979 Iranian Revolution; they are Iran’s Praetorian Guard,” he explains. “For the IRGC to take control of the government temporarily, be it until this war ends, or with a longer-term intent, in my opinion, would be a natural course.”

A senior Arab official told Axios that the IRGC is taking over Iran and that its members are “highly ideological and are ready to die.” Whether this constitutes a full “IRGCistan” remains debated. De Melo, however, cautions against treating the framing as settled.

“It’s early days, and no one seems certain as to what is happening with the government at the moment,” he continues. “Nonetheless, even if Iran’s government becomes military-dominated under the IRGC, that is not to say it still won’t remain theocratic. It can be both military-dominated and theocratic.”

The senior director of the Iran program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Behnam Ben Taleblu, has closely tracked this dynamic. The regime, he argues, is not deluded about its own condition — it knows the damage is real. What it is counting on is that a wounded adversary can still make the price of finishing the job too high. The IRGC’s track record of reconstituting after setbacks is a significant part of why that bet is not entirely unreasonable.

The IRGC has buried commanders before and found new ones. Its missile production was designed from the ground up to keep running under pressure, drawing on domestic supply rather than imports that could be choked off. Strikes can hollow out a building. They are less effective against an institution that knows how to reconstitute — and Western policymakers are finding that out as the war continues.

There is also no one waiting to take over. The Iranian opposition is split along ethnic, ideological, and geographic lines, with no figure capable of commanding broad national support and no organization with the reach to matter. Azizi, a postdoctoral associate and lecturer at Yale, puts the IRGC's position plainly: not a single chain of command, but circles and networks that have spent decades threading themselves through Iran's economy and military alike. You do not dislodge that with bombs.

A harder adversary than the one Washington set out to degrade

The administration’s stated objectives — the missiles, the navy, the nuclear program — may yet be achieved. Inside the intelligence community, however, the more unsettling question has never really been about the targets. It has been about what comes after. The consistent answer across multiple outside assessments is not reassuring: the Iran that emerges from this war is shaping up to be harder to manage than the one Washington decided to strike.

Jonathan Panikoff, who served as former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the National Intelligence Council before becoming director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, described the best-case scenario for a post-war Iran as one in which there is meaningful competition for power — but added that he was skeptical such an outcome would arise. “Somebody with guns fundamentally has to switch sides or stand aside,” he said. That has not happened.

The nuclear dimension adds a further layer of complexity. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has been unambiguous on the point: military action has badly damaged Iran’s nuclear program, but it cannot erase the knowledge, materials, and industrial capacity that would allow Tehran to rebuild.

“You can’t unlearn what you’ve learned,” Grossi said, adding that Iran retains the capabilities and the industrial base to reconstitute.

De Melo also flags what he sees as the variable most likely to shape Iran’s rebuilding speed: Beijing and Moscow. Chinese companies have kept the pipeline of dual-use technology moving — missile fuel components, electronics, drone engines — throughout the conflict.

Russia, meanwhile, has spent years on the receiving end of Iranian military hardware, taking in billions of dollars’ worth of equipment and drone technology since 2021. The reversal De Melo describes is straightforward: Russia can

now send Iranian-design drones, manufactured on Russian soil, back the other way.

A Pentagon source, speaking to The Cipher Brief on background, offered a sobering structural observation about how intelligence informs — or fails to inform — decision-making at the top.

“In my experience, what happens is you submit a brief that is then accepted, edited or rejected on the basis of the accepted narrative,” the source cautions. “It is narrative, whatever that might be, which is controlling.”

It is a dynamic that troubles those who have spent careers watching Washington repeat the cycle.

Del Wilber, a retired CIA case officer, warns that the administration risks mistaking tactical gains for strategic resolution. Declaring victory short of complete regime change, he argues, would be a fundamental error.

“Iran will only redouble its efforts to reconstitute their weapons development programs quietly, and stir up mischief in the region,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “Nothing will stop the existing regime from pursuing its goal of the destruction of Israel and hurting the United States.


The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
How the Iran War Is Reordering the World, Second and Third&Order Effects https://belimedia.com.ng/how-the-iran-war-is-reordering-the-world-second-and-third-order-effects https://belimedia.com.ng/how-the-iran-war-is-reordering-the-world-second-and-third-order-effects OPINION — Five weeks into the US-Israeli war against Iran, the immediate military picture — decapitation strikes, missile exchanges, and the grinding attrition of Iranian launch capacity — dominates headlines. But the more consequential story is playing out in the war’s cascading second- and third-order effects: the economic shock reverberating through global energy and food systems, the hardening of the Iranian regime, the fracturing of alliance structures Washington has depended on for eight decades, the accelerating consolidation of a Russia-China axis, and the humanitarian emergencies now metastasizing far from any battlefield. These downstream consequences are rapidly outpacing the conflict itself in strategic significance, and they will shape the international order long after the last missile is fired.

This analysis maps the cascading effects across six domains: energy and economic disruption, future Iranian threats, alliance fragmentation, great power realignment, humanitarian spillover, and the erosion of international norms and institutions.

A note on scope and methodology: In the US Intelligence Community, the analysis of second- and third-order effects is a distinct and demanding discipline — one that is typically undertaken precisely when a situation is still fluid, not after the dust has settled. Decisions made in the opening phases of a conflict tend to lock in trajectories that become progressively harder to reverse. Waiting for certainty means waiting too long. What follows is structured speculation, grounded in regional knowledge and historical pattern, about the choices this conflict is compelling and the world those choices are likely to produce.

The Hormuz Chokepoint: From Energy Shock to Systemic Economic Crisis

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20 percent of global seaborne oil and a significant share of liquefied natural gas transited before the war — has triggered what the International Energy Agency has called the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude surged past $120 per barrel at its peak, and WTI has nearly doubled since the start of 2026. Emergency stockpile releases by the IEA’s 32 member states — some 400 million barrels — have provided a temporary buffer, but at current global consumption rates of roughly 105 million barrels per day, those reserves buy weeks, not months.

Second-order effect: Stagflationary pressure across the global economy. The Dallas Federal Reserve estimates that the Hormuz closure alone could reduce global GDP growth by an annualized 2.9 percentage points in Q2 2026. Goldman Sachs has raised its probability of a U.S. recession to 25 percent. Oxford Economics warns that sustained oil prices of $140 per barrel would push the eurozone, the UK, and Japan into outright contraction. U.S. gas prices hit $4 per gallon on March 31 — and the trajectory is upward.

Third-order effect: Cascading commodity disruptions well beyond oil. The Hormuz closure has choked the global supply of sulfur (Gulf countries account for roughly 45 percent of global output), helium, aluminum feedstocks, and — most critically — fertilizer. Approximately one-third of global seaborne fertilizer trade transits the Strait. Urea prices have surged roughly 50 percent since the war began, landing squarely during the Northern Hemisphere spring planting season. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization has warned of a three-month window before planting decisions for 2026 and beyond are irreversibly compromised. Countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and several East African nations — which depend on Gulf fertilizer imports and have limited stockpiles — face the prospect of a food security crisis that could persist well into 2027.

This is the progression policymakers failed to game out: a military strike designed to destroy Iranian nuclear and missile capacity has, within weeks, metastasized into a global supply chain crisis touching everything from jet fuel pricing (costs have more than doubled) to corn yields in Iowa to hospital operating costs in the Philippines.

Iran As A Garrison State

The conventional Western assumption was that killing Supreme Leader Khamenei and degrading Iranian military capacity would either topple the regime or leave it fatally weakened. The opposite dynamic is taking hold.

The installation of Mojtaba Khamenei as successor — a move that would have been controversial in peacetime, with even his father reportedly opposing the appearance of dynastic rule — was enabled precisely by the existential crisis the war created. Reports that Mojtaba may have been seriously injured in the initial strikes only deepened the symbolic connection to his father, who lost the use of his right hand in a 1981 assassination attempt. Mojtaba can remain a cipher to the general public while the network his father built over nearly thirty-seven years ensures continuity of the system’s core commitments. His value to the regime is less political than totemic: a wounded son of a martyred leader, governing from the shadows while the security apparatus runs the country.

The regime’s resilience should not be surprising to serious students of Iranian history, even if it has surprised many in Washington. The foundational narrative of the Islamic Republic emphasizes survival against overwhelming odds. The revolutionary generation endured institutional disarray, purges, urban street fighting, tribal uprisings, a coup attempt, and Saddam Hussein’s devastating invasion — and emerged intact. As one Tehran resident told the Wall Street Journal in the war’s early days: “This regime will become stronger, crueller, more monstrous even than before. People don’t have the weapons to fight back.”

Second-order Effect: What is emerging in Tehran is something that has no precise precedent in the Islamic Republic’s forty-seven-year history: a garrison state. The revolutionary experiment under Khomeini and the institutional consolidation under Ali Khamenei both preserved at least the fiction of factional competition — reformists versus hardliners, clerics versus military, elected officials versus appointed ones. That fiction is over. The IRGC and the wider security apparatus are now in effective control of governance, economic policy, and foreign affairs. The war provided the pretext for de facto martial law. Electronic surveillance, preemptive text messaging campaigns, and a sustained pace of executions have ensured that whatever domestic opposition survived the January protest crackdown will not resurface while the bombs are falling. This is a regime that has shed its civilian skin.

Third-order effect: For however long the regime survives, its leadership will be dominated by hardened reactionaries with no effective internal counterweights. The factional competition between religious and republican elements that provided limited openings for reform has evaporated. President Pezeshkian retains a more moderate image but wields no institutional power. The practical implications for American policy are significant: any future diplomatic engagement will confront an Iranian interlocutor that is simultaneously more consolidated, more traumatized, and more committed to the nuclear hedge that the campaign was supposed to eliminate.

Alliance Fracture: NATO’s Worst Crisis Since Suez

The transatlantic alliance is under extraordinary strain. When President Trump called on NATO allies, China, Japan, and South Korea to help secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the response was a near-unanimous refusal. On March 16, both China and NATO’s European members rejected the request. France has refused to allow its territory to be used for military operations linked to the war. Italy has cited legal and procedural objections to providing U.S. forces access to certain military facilities. Even the United Kingdom — Washington’s most reliable ally — has limited its support to defensive operations from existing bases, withholding full political or military backing.

Second-order effect: The war has exposed a fundamental asymmetry in how Washington and its allies perceive risk. European governments see the conflict as a unilateral American action launched during active negotiations — recall that Oman’s foreign minister had announced a diplomatic breakthrough on Iran’s nuclear program the day before strikes began — and are unwilling to absorb the economic and political costs. Eastern European allies, particularly Poland, are explicit: their priority is Russia, and they will not redeploy air defense assets to the Middle East. Poland’s defense minister has warned that a prolonged conflict could jeopardize arms supplies to Ukraine.

Third-order effect: The war is accelerating a structural decoupling within NATO. Trump’s March 17 Truth Social post renouncing NATO assistance — and extending that rebuke to Japan, South Korea, and Australia — signals something more consequential than a diplomatic spat. It reflects a worldview in which alliance obligations are transactional, and allies who decline to participate in American conflicts forfeit their claim to American protection. This logic, if sustained, threatens to unravel the foundational bargain of the liberal international order. European capitals are drawing their own conclusions. The concept of “strategic autonomy” — European defense capacity independent of the United States — has moved from theoretical aspiration to operational necessity in a matter of weeks.

The Russia-China Windfall

Of all the second-order effects, the war’s impact on great power competition may prove most durable.

Russia is the most immediate beneficiary. Moscow built its 2026 federal budget on oil at roughly $60 per barrel. Brent at $120 has rescued the Russian war economy, providing the Kremlin with the revenue it needs to sustain operations in Ukraine precisely when Western sanctions were supposed to be biting hardest. U.S. officials have reported that Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery and intelligence on the locations of American warships and aircraft — a level of operational cooperation that crosses a meaningful threshold. Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi has not denied that military cooperation with both Russia and China continues during the conflict.

Second-order effect: The conflict is hardening the Russia-China relationship from cautious coordination into structured alignment. China’s 2026–2030 development blueprint, submitted to the National People’s Congress in March, reflects renewed momentum for the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline and other measures designed to reduce Beijing’s vulnerability to Middle Eastern energy disruption. China has also been building strategic petroleum reserves, holding roughly 104 days of import coverage — enough to weather a medium-duration Hormuz closure. Russia trades hydrocarbons for Chinese capital, technology, and diplomatic cover; the war has intensified every dimension of that exchange.

Third-order effect: The war is demonstrating to the Global South that the U.S.-led order cannot guarantee the stability of critical global commons. The Hormuz closure, the inability of the United States to compel its own allies to help reopen the strait, and the spectacle of developing nations scrambling for energy and fertilizer supplies while Washington prosecutes a war of choice — all of this feeds a narrative of American overreach and declining systemic reliability. China, which has been carefully positioning itself as a neutral party calling for de-escalation, accumulates soft power by default. The December 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy treats China and Russia in isolation, offering no framework to prevent their convergence. The Iran war has made that strategic gap painfully visible.

Humanitarian Catastrophe Beyond the Battlefield

The war’s most consequential victims may be populations with no stake in the conflict whatsoever.

In the Gulf states themselves, the Hormuz blockade has triggered a grocery supply emergency. GCC states rely on the Strait for over 80 percent of their caloric imports. By mid-March, 70 percent of the region’s food imports were disrupted, producing consumer price spikes of 40 to 120 percent. Iranian strikes on desalination plants — the source of 99 percent of drinking water in Kuwait and Qatar, and roughly 75 percent in Saudi Arabia — have introduced the specter of a water crisis affecting 62 million people. A leaked 2008 U.S. diplomatic cable warned that Riyadh would have to evacuate within a week if its primary desalination plant were seriously damaged. That scenario is no longer hypothetical.

Second-order effect: The war has shattered the Gulf’s narrative as a permanently stable destination for expatriates and investment. Large-scale departures of foreign residents from the Gulf have begun. The Qatar-funded Middle East Council on Global Affairs has suggested the war has “irreversibly shaken” perceptions of the Gulf’s stability — a conclusion with profound implications for the region’s post-oil economic transformation strategy.

Third-order effect: The food and fertilizer disruption is compounding pre-existing crises in the world’s most vulnerable populations. The World Food Programme’s Deputy Executive Director has warned that humanitarian supply chains are approaching their most severe disruption since COVID and the 2022 Ukraine war. WFP shipping costs are up 18 percent. Fuel price increases of over 80 percent in the Philippines have driven hospitals to consider surcharges. In Somalia, food prices are up 20 percent; in Sudan — already the world’s largest hunger crisis — the disruption to aid flows through the Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez corridors is compounding an already catastrophic situation. The UN estimates the conflict could push 45 million additional people into acute hunger.

This is the third-order chain in its starkest form: a military operation in the Persian Gulf → a fertilizer shortage in the Indian Ocean → a planting crisis in South Asia and East Africa → a famine risk extending into 2027.

Norms Erosion and Institutional Collapse

The war is systematically degrading the international rules and norms that constrain state behavior.

The targeting of civilian water infrastructure — by all three belligerents — represents a particularly dangerous escalation. U.S. and Israeli strikes have damaged Iranian water systems. Iran has retaliated against desalination plants in the Gulf.

President Trump has publicly threatened to destroy Iran’s electric power facilities and its remaining desalination capacity. None of the three countries has ratified Additional Protocol I, which explicitly protects civilian water systems, but the norm against targeting water infrastructure was, until recently, broadly respected. Its erosion establishes a precedent that will echo in future conflicts.

Second-order effect: The war has demonstrated the practical impotence of the UN Security Council. Russia and China (with France) effectively blocked a resolution that would have authorized the use of force against Iran to reopen of the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States has blocked resolutions calling for a ceasefire. A resolution condemning Iran’s retaliatory strikes did pass — illustrating the Council’s selectivity rather than its authority.

Third-order effect: The war is accelerating the delegitimization of the post-1945 international order in the eyes of the Global South. The fact that the United States launched a war during active nuclear negotiations — after Oman’s mediator had announced Iran’s agreement to irreversibly downgrade its enriched uranium stockpile — reinforces the perception that great powers invoke rules-based order selectively. This is not merely a public relations problem. It actively erodes the cooperative frameworks — nonproliferation, maritime law, humanitarian protections — on which U.S. long-term security depends.

The Outlook: Cascade Without an Off-Ramp

Five weeks in, the diplomatic picture is not encouraging. The U.S. has transmitted a 15-point peace framework to Iran via Pakistan. Iran has publicly rejected it as “maximalist” and countered with five conditions of its own — including war reparations and international recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump has extended a deadline for Iranian compliance to April 7, with threatened escalation against energy infrastructure if no deal is reached. Meanwhile, Israel is reportedly accelerating strikes on Iranian arms factories in anticipation of a possible ceasefire — suggesting Jerusalem fears Washington may settle for less than the maximalist demands Israel prefers.

The deeper problem is structural. The second- and third-order effects described above are not side effects of the war — they are now the war’s primary strategic consequences. And they are largely irreversible in the near term. Even a ceasefire tomorrow would not rapidly reopen the Strait, restore fertilizer flows in time for the planting season, repair the transatlantic alliance, or unwind the Russia-China energy partnership now hardening into permanence. Each week of continued conflict compounds these downstream costs exponentially.

For intelligence professionals and policymakers, the lesson is one the IC has articulated for decades but that political leaders chronically fail to internalize: in a hyperconnected global system, the second- and third-order effects of major military action will almost always exceed the first-order gains. The cascade from Operation Epic Fury is proving that maxim with painful clarity.

The author is a former CIA intelligence officer with extensive experience on the Near East. This analysis draws on open-source reporting, regional analysis, and publicly available assessments. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

Watch my Special Competitive Studies Project podcast, Intelligence at the Edge

This article was originally published on Substack, and is reposted here with permission from the author.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
Drones Are Changing Warfare And America Isn’t Ready https://belimedia.com.ng/drones-are-changing-warfare-and-america-isnt-ready https://belimedia.com.ng/drones-are-changing-warfare-and-america-isnt-ready OPINION — Drones in Ukraine and in the War with Iran have made the surface of the earth a contested space. The U.S. has discovered that 1) air superiority and missile defense systems (THAAD, Patriot batteries) designed to counter tens/hundreds of aircraft and missiles is insufficient against asymmetric attacks of thousands of drones. And that 2) undefended high-value fixed civilian infrastructure - oil tankers, data centers, desalination plants, oil refineries, energy nodes, factories, et al -are all at risk.

When the targets are no longer just military assets but anything valuable on the surface, the long-term math no longer favors the defender. To solve this problem the U.S. is spending $10s of billions of dollars on low-cost Counter-UAS systems - detection systems, inexpensive missiles, kamikaze drones, microwave and laser weapons.

But what we’re not spending $10s of billions on is learning how to cheaply and quickly put our high-value, hard-to-replace, and time-critical assets (munitions, fuel distribution, Command and Control continuity nodes, spares), etc., out of harm's way - sheltered, underground (or in space).

The lessons from Gaza reinforce that underground systems can also preserve forces and enable maneuver. The lessons from Ukraine are that survivability while under constant drone observation/attack requires using underground facilities to provide overhead cover (while masking RF, infrared and other signatures). And the lessons from Iran’s attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is that anything on the surface is going to be a target.

We need to rethink the nature of force protection as well as military and civilian infrastructure protection.

Air Defense Systems

For decades the U.S. has built air defense systems designed for shooting down aircraft and missiles.

The Navy’s Aegis destroyers provide defense for carrier strike groups using surface-to-air missiles against hostile aircraft and missiles. The Army’s Patriot anti-aircraft batteries provide area protection against aircraft and missiles. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provides missile defense from North Korea for Guam and a limited missile defense for the U.S. MDA is leading the development of Golden Dome, a missile defense system to protect the entire U.S. against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles from China and Russia.

All of these systems were designed to use expensive missiles to shoot down equally expensive aircraft and missiles. None of these systems were designed to shoot down hundreds/thousands of very low-cost drones.

Aircraft Protection

After destroying Iraqi aircraft shelters in the Gulf War with 2,000-lb bombs, the U.S. Air Force convinced itself that building aircraft and maintenance shelters was not worth the investment. Instead, their plan - the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) program - was to disperse small teams to remote austere locations (with minimal air defense systems) in time of war. Dispersal along with air superiority would substitute for building hardened shelters. Oops. It didn't count on low-cost drones finding those dispersed aircraft. (One would have thought that Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web using 117 drones smuggled in shipping containers - which struck and destroyed Russian bombers - would have been a wakeup call.)

The cost of not having hardened aircraft shelters during the 2026 Iran War came home when Iran destroyed an AWACS aircraft and KC-135 tankers sitting in the open. Meanwhile, China, Iran and North Korea have made massive investments in hardened shelters and underground facilities.

Protecting Ground Forces

The problem of protecting troops with foxholes against artillery is hundreds of years old. In WWI, trenches connected foxholes into systems. Bunkers were hardened against direct hits. Each step was a response to increased lethality from above. Today, drones are the new artillery; a persistent, cheap and precise overhead threat but with the ability to maneuver laterally, enter openings, and loiter. And mass drone attacks put every high value military and civilian target on the surface at risk. Fielding more hardened shelters for soldiers like the Army's Modular Protective System Overhead Cover shelters is a first step for FPV kamikaze drones defense, but drones can get inside buildings through any sufficiently sized openings.

Drone Protection

Ukraine has installed ~500 miles of anti-drone net tunnels with a goal of 2,500 miles by the end of 2026. These are metal poles and fishing nets stretched over roads but they represent the same instinct: the surface is a kill zone, so cover it. Russia has done the same.

The logical response is to go underground (or out to space) but the technology to do it quickly, cheaply, and at scale is genuinely new. The gap in current thinking is between "put up nets" (cheap, fast, limited) and "build a Cold War concrete bunker" (expensive, slow, permanent). What's missing is the middle layer - rapidly bored shallow tunnels that provide genuine overhead cover for movement corridors, equipment parking, and personnel protection.

What tunnels solve that nets and shelters don't

A net stops an FPV drone's propellers. A shelter stops shrapnel. But a tunnel 15-30 feet underground is invisible to ISR, immune to most top-attack munitions, can't be entered by a drone through a door or window, and survives anything short of a bunker-buster. Gaza proved that even with total air superiority and ground control, Israel has destroyed only about 40 percent of Gaza's tunnels after two and a half years of war.

That's an asymmetric defender's advantage the U.S. military should be thinking about for its own use, not just as a threat to overcome.

What's changed to make this feasible is that we may not need boring tunnels per se, but instead modular, pre-fabricated tunnel segments that can be installed with cut-and-cover methods at expeditionary bases. Or autonomous boring machines sized for military logistics (smaller versions of the Boring Company TBMs) corridors rather than highway traffic.

The problem is a lack of urgency and imagination

The problem is real, the incumbents (Army Corps of Engineers) are slow, and the existing commercial tunneling industry isn't thinking about expeditionary military applications.

The doctrinal gap is between "dig a foxhole with an entrenching tool" (individual soldier, hours) or deploy a few Army's Modular Protective System Overhead Cover shelters or "build a Cold War hardened aircraft shelter" (major construction project, years, billions). There's no doctrine for rapidly boring hardened underground movement corridors, dispersed equipment shelters, or protected command post positions using modern tunneling technology.

Army doctrine treats excavation as something done with organic engineer equipment — backhoes, bulldozers, troops with shovels — to create individual fighting positions and cut-and-cover bunkers. The Air Force doctrine barely addresses physical hardening at all, having spent 30 years assuming air superiority and dispersing would substitute for it.

Nobody in the doctrinal community is asking: what if the Army could cut and cover 100 meters of precast tunnel segments in a day or if we could bore a 12-foot diameter tunnel 30 feet underground at a rate of a hundred of meters per week and use it as a protected logistics corridor, command post, or aircraft revetment?

Summary

Oceans on both sides and friendly nations on our borders have lulled America into a false sense of security. After all, the U.S. has not fought a foreign force on American soil since 1812.

Protection and survivability is no longer a problem for a single service nor is it a problem of a single solution or an incremental solution. Something fundamentally disruptive has changed in the nature of asymmetric warfare and there’s no going back. While we’re actively chasing immediate solutions (Golden Dome, JTAF-401, et al), we need to rethink the nature of force protection, and military and civilian infrastructure protection. Protection and survivability solutions are not as sexy as buying aircraft or weapons systems but they may be the key to winning a war.

The U.S. needs a coherent protection and survivability strategy across the DoW and all sectors of our economy. This conversation needs to be not only about how we do it, but how we organize to do it, how we budget and pay for it and how we rapidly deploy it.

Lessons Learned

  • There is no coherent protection and survivability strategy that addresses drones across the DoW and the whole of nation
    • Just point solutions
  • For troops near the front, tunnels could reduce visual, thermal, and RF signature while providing fragment protection with a network of small, concealed, overhead- covered positions, short connectors, buried command posts, protected aid stations, and revetted vehicle hides.
  • We need to underground assets that cannot be quickly replaced
    • Command posts, comms nodes, ammunition, fuel distribution points, repair facilities, key power systems, maintenance spares, and high-value aircraft or drones.
    • Think protected taxiways, blast walls, covered trenches, buried cabling, alternate exits, redundant portals, and rapid runway repair. Sortie generation under attack depends on a whole system, not one bunker.
  • We need to work with commercial companies to harden/defend their sites
    • Provide active defenses and incentives for undergrounding critical facilities
  • The Army and Air Force need to rethink their doctrines and techniques for Protection and Survivability
    • Army Techniques Publications (ATP) 3-37.34 - Survivability Operations treat excavation as something done with backhoes, bulldozers, troops with shovels to create individual fighting positions and cut-and-cover bunkers. Update it.
    • The Air Force needs to do the same with AFDP 3-10, AFDP 3-0.1 (Force Protection and AFTTP 3-32.34v3, AFH 10-222, Volume 14 and UFC 3-340-02
  • We need to think of force and infrastructure protection not piecemeal but holistically
    • Part of any weapons systems requirement and budget should now include protection and survivability
    • Protection and survivability should be deployed concurrently with weapons systems

• We need a Whole of Nation approach to protection and survivability for both the force and critical infrastructure

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s Drone Strategy Has a Supply Chain Problem https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-drone-strategy-has-a-supply-chain-problem https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-drone-strategy-has-a-supply-chain-problem OPINION — In this issue we will discuss implications of the Drone Dominance Program, how weakness in the U.S. industrial base has been laid bare, and how the war with Iran could benefit our adversaries. Private capital can play a critical role in national defense, but we need to focus financially and politically on our long-term objectives.

Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

The United States Defense Technology Ecosystem is undergoing its most radical realignment since the Cold War. For decades, the Pentagon prioritized multi-year requirements and exquisite, multi-million dollar platforms, essentially betting our national security on a handful of exquisite systems. But as the Maneuver Center of Excellence recently signaled, blankets don't stop Shahed drones, and the era of the paper requirement is officially dead.

Driven first by the realization in Ukraine that drones are the new heartbeat of the battlefield, and now punctuated by the high-stakes validation of the war with Iran, the U.S. defense technology market is vibrating on a massive double-dose of strategic caffeine. We are pivoting toward a model defined by Transformation in Contact: a world where the winner of a contract doesn't just get a victory lap for the CFO—they may also get a flight to the front lines.

While leveraging market dynamics for national security is a textbook-perfect strategy, investors and policy wonks should view the context through something other than rose-tinted, bureaucratic goggles. The government’s intent is clear: use the world’s best-funded customer to subsidize a domestic manufacturing renaissance through brute-force demand. In a peacetime seminar, this is brilliant. Why not send Uncle Sam on a shopping spree to fix our brittle supply chains? But while the planners were busy sketching out this elegant industrial roadmap, they neglected a minor detail: a war that has thrown the entire plan into a violent overdrive. We are forced into a series of geopolitical trade-offs involving Russian oil and Chinese motors, the very actors we are trying to out-innovate, to keep our own production lines from flatlining.

Strategic Attrition: The Great Industrial Reset

The most significant shift isn't merely that the military has rebranded drones as ammunition (Class V); it’s the long-overdue admission that in a modern peer conflict, industrial throughput is the strategy. The Drone Dominance Program (DDP) represents a pivot from exquisite quality to unstoppable mass. In a world where our adversaries are already burning through thousands of airframes a month, Phase I’s commitment to 30,000 units isn't a victory lap—it’s a diagnostic test for an industrial base that has forgotten how to build at scale.

The plan to reach 150,000 units by Phase IV is a signal to our adversaries that the Arsenal of Democracy is trying to clear its throat. However, the schedule for DDP Phase IV which concludes on January 28, 2028, is a masterclass in bureaucratic optimism. Our government is so heroically self-unaware that they truly believe they can circle an exact Tuesday two years from now, despite the fact that they can’t successfully schedule a Zoom call this week.

Geopolitically, this timeline is a liability. While we plan for a transition in 2028, Iran and its proxies are operating on a 2026 timeline. The reality is that if the conflict continues at its current pace, the U.S. will need significantly more than 150,000 drones, and we will need them long before the bureaucrats reach their 2028 finish line.

Supply Chain Sovereignty: Patriotic Red Tape

Policy wonks: observe the weaponization of the supply chain. In a fit of aggressive sovereignty, the DDP mandates that every drone component be Blue UAS/NDAA compliant. By Phase II, August 2026, anything from a covered country is forbidden; a bold attempt to force-start a domestic industry that currently exists mostly in brochures. While the intent to secure the industrial base is laudable, the execution is, shall we say, operationally awkward.

The trouble is that you can’t manufacture a miracle in a two-week sprint. The supply chains simply do not exist. Further, in a classic display of first-mover advantage, many companies who were admitted to DDP Phase I spent their considerable venture capital dollars stockpiling components in anticipation of the win. The result is that the actual winners of the Gauntlet are now wandering the OEM market, hats in hand, trying to buy components from the very companies they just beat; they are the only ones holding the inventory. The companies who did not win DDP Phase I have effectively become the defense community’s version of scalpers.

Naturally, the firms left holding the bags (and the boxes of flight controllers) are thrilled to sell their stockpiles–at a markup. Keep in mind, the Pentagon has mandated strike prices below $2,300 per unit for DDP Phase II. Simultaneously, they are demanding an ambitious list of features, such as Automatic Target Recognition (ATR), fiber-optic tethering for EW resilience, and kinetic warheads, that reads like an F-35 spec sheet on a Cessna budget. The math places the winners of DDP Phase I in a difficult position.

Even if you solve the hoarding problem, you hit the incentive wall. There is no market motivation for a manufacturer to prioritize drone motors when the margins are abysmal compared to high-performance electric vehicle (EV) drivetrains or offshore wind turbines. Neodymium, the critical component of brushless motors, doesn't care about your National Defense Strategy; it follows the highest ROI. For a drone startup to bridge this gap, they would need to vertically integrate, a pivot that requires tens of millions in CAPEX, specialized technical expertise that doesn't exist in a start-up, and a domestic mining industry that is currently more aspirational than actual. Until our domestic industrial base stops groaning and starts growing, our drone dominance will remain throttled by a bottleneck of patriotic red tape.

The Ukraine Paradox: A Masterclass in Circular Logic

To understand why the DDP is so vital, one must look at the staggering scale of the Ukrainian front. Fueled by Russian aggression and a desperate need for mass, Ukraine manufactured roughly 4,000,000 drones in 2025 and is pacing toward 7,000,000 this year. To achieve this, they didn't achieve a domestic rare earth miracle; they embraced a brutal strategic compromise: they bought Chinese drone components.

The resulting geopolitical through-line is a dizzying exercise in circular logic. China props up the Russian war machine with one hand while selling the critical drone motors to Ukraine with the other, motors that Kyiv then uses to strike Russian infrastructure. In essence, the money Ukraine spends to defend its sovereignty flows into the coffers of Beijing, which then uses those funds to stabilize Moscow. Ukraine is, by logistical necessity, indirectly financing the strikes that rain down on its own cities.

This cycle of dependency has now been complicated by the Iranian dimension. The U.S. and Israel are now in a direct kinetic exchange with Tehran. When Iran responded by closing the Straits of Hormuz, they triggered a predictable domino effect. Choking off 20% of the world's oil supply sent global energy prices screaming upward, a political nightmare for a U.S. administration facing an election year.

In a move of pure realpolitik, Washington responded by granting sanctions relief to Russia to keep global oil prices manageable. The irony is complete: Russia is now the primary beneficiary of the war in the Middle East, receiving both a higher price per barrel and sanctions relief so that they can sell more oil.

The Strategic Absurdity: Winning vs. Being Right

If the war in Iran continues, U.S. demand for inexpensive drones will shift from a crawl to a sprint, likely topping 1,000,000 units per year. Since we’ve already established that a mere order for 30,000 drones has paralyzed our NDAA-compliant supply chain, the Pentagon is staring at a tough choice: stick to the rules and run out of ammo, or waive compliance and buy Chinese.

By granting sanctions relief to Russia to stabilize energy prices, the current administration has already signaled that they prioritize winning over being right on long-term strategy. If they apply this same logic to the DDP, it will be a generational failure. Waiving NDAA compliance wouldn't merely be a shortcut; it would be a surrender. It would funnel money into Chinese accounts, effectively paying our primary adversary to supply the secondary ones, while simultaneously strangling nascent U.S. domestic manufacturing in its crib.

To be clear: waiving these requirements would directly undermine domestic security, subsidizing the same actors who are engaging in commercial theft and ensuring that our defense industrial base remains anemic, dependent, and perpetually caffeinated on foreign supply.

The Bottom Line: An Investor’s Call to Action

The Drone Dominance Program is the death knell for the high-priced platform, and I am a fan. But the true opportunity for the Iron Triangle isn't in the drones themselves—it’s in the "picks and shovels" of the 21st-century battlefield.

Any pitch deck that contains the word “drones” paired with pictures of our Secretary of War indignantly waving his finger will net a defense technology start-up a $40,000,000 seed round nowadays. But we are funding the wrong side of the equation. If we want long-term national security, capital must flow into the unsexy, high-complexity infrastructure of domestic manufacturing: motors, flight controllers, and rare-earth processing. We need to fund the foundations, not just the fuselages.

History shows us that the private sector’s ability to pivot toward mass is what wins wars. During World War II, the Ford Motor Company famously built the Willow Run plant, which at its peak produced one B-24 Liberator bomber every 63 minutes. It wasn't just a feat of engineering; it was a show of industrial will that overwhelmed the Axis powers through sheer throughput. Similarly, the Supermarine Spitfire, the symbol of British defiance, was not the product of a slow-moving government design bureau, but of private industry pushing the boundaries of what was aeronautically possible under the shadow of imminent invasion.

These were not merely aircraft; they were the kinetic expressions of an industrial philosophy that understood that in total war, the only requirement is survival, and the only schedule is now. If we want to win the next conflict, we need to focus on our domestic industrial might.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief ]]>
Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s AI Strategy Is Fighting the Last War https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-ai-strategy-is-fighting-the-last-war https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-ai-strategy-is-fighting-the-last-war OPINION — Washington’s strategy for artificial general intelligence (AGI), or the ability to replace human cognitive labor, assumes the United States is locked in a decisive race with Beijing—one requiring maximum acceleration and denial of Beijing’s access to semiconductor chips and technology. This approach, as captured in the White House’s AI Action Plan from last year, echoes the race in the 1940s to build the atomic bomb and during the Cold War to dominate space. It risks refighting the Cold War, which is ill-equipped for a technology-based struggle. This posture misdiagnoses the nature of the AI competition and risks degrading, rather than strengthening, America’s long-term strategic position. It also has a sizable blind spot: dealing with an inevitable dislocation in the global workforce.

Presidents Trump and Xi have an opportunity to reset the terms of this competition over AI when they meet next month.

The current U.S. AI strategy amounts to a wartime footing defined by denial and containment of competitor capabilities, hundreds of billions in capital expenditure in AI capabilities, and expansive export controls of diminishing effectiveness. But AI is not a binary capability—either you have it or you don’t. It is a continuous, evolutionary technology with no single threshold that confers decisive, let alone permanent advantage. Our national workforce policies have remained remarkably stable so far, though AI is but one of many emerging technologies that may upend the global economy for which the U.S. is well positioned.

The international AGI ecosystem is rapidly evolving with many competitors entering, replicating others’ advances, and exiting to pursue niche applications. It was once assumed the U.S. held a year-plus advantage over China in frontier AI models. That gap has dwindled to 2-3 months, despite stringent export controls. Even if these controls have slowed China’s training on new frontier models, they have not dampened China’s advantages in AI deployment and diffusion. China’s AI influence on the global stage has only grown, aided by increasingly capable models, dramatically cheaper end-user pricing, and leverage of the global open-source developer community.

The economic advantage from AI does not stem from being first to develop frontier models, but from being first to diffuse capabilities across industries and scale across the economy. China rarely competes on frontier quality (it prefers being “good enough”), but on quantity, price, time to market, and speed to dominate supply chains. In this race, China is likely outpacing us. ByteDance’s Doubao chatbot exceeded 100 million daily active users. Alibaba’s Qwen models have surpassed 700 million downloads globally, spawning 180,000+ derivative models. Chinese open-source models are fast becoming the de facto platform for sovereign AI efforts across the Global South and startup companies globally (even in the U.S.).

China leads in 66 of 74 critical technologies tracked by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, accounts for 54% of global industrial robot installations (International Federation of Robotics, 2024), produces about half of the world’s AI researchers, and builds more new electricity capacity annually than the rest of the world combined. These are the foundations of AI deployment at scale; denying chips won’t offset these structural advantages.

Washington often perceives the Chinese AI effort as a state-directed monolith. The reality is a fiercely competitive and innovative commercial ecosystem with creative business models. ByteDance’s Doubao is a closed-source consumer product fighting for domestic market share. Zhipu AI generates over 60% of revenue from enterprise deployment services. MiniMax earns roughly 70% of revenue from international API sales. Alibaba open-sourced Qwen to drive cloud adoption; DeepSeek did so to attract research talent. Framing this diverse, commercially motivated ecosystem as a centrally planned strategic threat produces policy responses that are either too blunt—restricting all Chinese AI—or too narrow, focused on chip exports while ignoring the deployment gap (how models are trained and used in practice).

The U.S. is now chasing artificial “superintelligence” (ASI) in pursuit of permanent dominance, relying on chaotic and unsustainable private investment. Meanwhile, China is building the industrial AI infrastructure with a consistent regulatory approach that will shape how roughly 150 countries deploy this technology for decades.

The consequences of this mismatch are profound. U.S. technology firms have committed over $500 billion annually in AI capital expenditures for 2025–2027, while job openings in the U.S. have declined sharply. Data from the World Bank indicate 60% of the U.S. workforce is at risk of being displaced due to AI without a compensatory social safety net.

The impact in the defense sector is similar. Proponents of the current posture often argue that if China gets AGI first, they’ll weaponize it. But the US military does not need the latest or the best frontier model. It needs models that are fit to task—certified, tested, and integrated into operational systems.

The decisive military advantage may lie less in which country trains the most capable model than in who can field AI-enabled systems fastest across its force. By that metric, the current U.S. acquisition system is at a structural disadvantage. The U.S. military’s vendor and model certification process can take over a year. The Chinese government reviews AI models even before their public releases to streamline their deployment.

AI does pose genuine security risks. AI-enabled cyber weapons, the proliferation of autonomous weapons, and malicious use of AI by bad actors all pose significant hazards. But these threats are best addressed through narrowly scoped controls and shared intelligence with key allies (Australia, Japan, the European Union, and South Korea) to provide safety standards and semiconductor supply chain resilience. This strategy should address misuse of AI by malicious actors, potential instability from mass displacement of workers, undue market concentration. and inadvertent military escalation. Washington should take a posture of allied industrial policy for AI diffusion, targeted safety agreements with enforcement mechanisms, and serious domestic investment in workforce transition. The precedent to replicate is not the Manhattan Project that sought first deployment of nuclear weapons, but Cold War arms control agreements that stabilized relations with the Soviets and allowed the U.S. economy to boom.

Additionally, we must enable a soft landing for the looming workforce displaced by AI. We should be creating workforce legislation modeled on the post-WWII GI Bill and educational, housing, and living assistance programs to help the economy adapt. We should be building with likeminded global partners an architecture that nurtures international AI standards, polices compliance, and provides guardrails for open-source AI capabilities for civil applications.

If Washington continues fighting the last war as AI’s promise matures, it may win battles over benchmarks and chips ,but lose the campaign that actually matters—safely diffusing AI to remake the global economy for the next century. Rethinking the parameters of today’s competition is the first step to ensuring AI strengthens rather than erodes American security and prosperity.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why Australia Needs a National Spy Museum https://belimedia.com.ng/why-australia-needs-a-national-spy-museum https://belimedia.com.ng/why-australia-needs-a-national-spy-museum OPINION — Australia is entering one of the most complex and psychologically destabilizing security periods in its modern history. The ASIO Director‑General’s Annual Threat Assessment 2025 underscored a strategic environment defined by accelerating foreign interference, sharper geopolitical competition, and a domestic threat landscape that is more fragmented, more digitally enabled, and more unpredictable than at any point in the past decade.

2025’s assessment was notable for its future‑focused framing: a warning that Australia is not simply managing discrete threats, but navigating a structural shift in the security climate itself. ASIO’s futures work, which is normally classified, outlined a trajectory to 2030 marked by intensifying espionage activity, the mainstreaming of conspiracy‑driven extremism, and a rising cohort of younger Australians vulnerable to radicalisation.

Burgess said: Many of the foundations that have underpinned Australia’s security, prosperity and democracy are being tested: social cohesion is eroding, trust in institutions is declining, intolerance is growing, even truth itself is being undermined by conspiracy, mis- and disinformation. Similar trends are playing out across the Western world. (ASIO)

Against this backdrop, the Bondi attack (on 14 December 2025, during a Hanukkah event at Bondi Beach, where two gunmen opened fire on the crowd) and the consequential Royal Commission on Anti-Semitism and Social Cohesion, have become national inflection points. While the Commission will rightly focus on operational lessons, interagency coordination, and systemic gaps, its broader significance lies in how it has shaken public confidence. Australians are now grappling with the uncomfortable reality that threats can emerge rapidly, across domains, and exploit seams between federal, state, and community‑level preparedness.

Furthermore, recent events in Iran as well as the intensification of others conflicts abroad underscore the importance of strong foreign intelligence agencies to provide governments with accurate information to guide policy and reduce the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding. Informed decision‑making becomes essential to managing both international and domestic consequences.

This is precisely why the establishment of the National Spy Museum Australia (NSMA) is not a cultural luxury - it is a strategic necessity.

For decades, Australia’s intelligence and national‑security community has operated behind a veil of necessary secrecy. Yet the 2025 threat assessment makes clear that the most significant vulnerabilities now sit at the intersection of public behavior, digital ecosystems, and foreign manipulation. Espionage and interference no longer target only government; they target communities, universities, businesses, and individuals.

A population that does not understand how intelligence works - or why it matters - is a population more easily exploited.

The NSMA addresses this gap directly. By telling Australia’s intelligence story with accuracy, dignity, and national purpose, it provides something the country urgently needs: a civic literacy uplift in how modern threats operate and how national security is actually maintained.

Museums are not typically thought of as instruments of national resilience. But globally, intelligence museums from Washington to Berlin have become powerful soft‑power platforms. They demystify the work of intelligence agencies, build public trust, and attract the next generation of intelligence professionals, including technologists, analysts and linguists.

For Australia, the timing is critical. The Bondi Royal Commission will inevitably expose gaps - some operational, some cultural, some structural. The NSMA offers a parallel national building project: one that strengthens public understanding, honors quiet service, and reinforces the legitimacy of the intelligence mission at a moment when trust is both fragile and essential.

Australia is facing significant changes in the security climate ,which Burgess described as a long‑term shift rather than a passing storm. In such an environment, national resilience is not built solely through classified capabilities. It is built through public comprehension, societal cohesion, and a shared understanding of the threats we face.

The National Spy Museum Australia is, at its core, a nation‑building institution. It anchors Australia’s intelligence story in the public domain at the exact moment the country needs clarity, confidence, and connection to the people who protect it.

In a decade defined by uncertainty, the NSMA offers something rare: a strategic investment in public understanding - one that strengthens Australia’s security from the inside out.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:56:36 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran War Scorecard Looks Bad for America’s Strategic Interests https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-war-scorecard-looks-bad-for-americas-strategic-interests https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-war-scorecard-looks-bad-for-americas-strategic-interests OPINION — While the war has yet to conclude, we have enough information to create a preliminary net assessment of its effects on U.S. security and prosperity. Spoiler alert: the war is on track to be a net negative for Americans.

Instead of focusing on variously articulated war aims, this assessment strives to assess a selected but broader range, admittedly unscientifically derived, of U.S. interests. This scorecard is designed to simply show whether these interests have improved, declined, or remained about the same.

Let’s start with the positive and work our way to more negative longer-term effects:

The Iranian regime has been historically weakened. Regime change is out. President Trump has long forgotten his promise to anti-regime Iranians that “help is on the way” and Iran “will be yours to take;” and the idea that changing leaders equals “regime change” does not meet the smell test. But there is no doubt that military operations have deeply weakened and probably fractured Iran’s regime. While the level of destruction is not yet knowable, Iran’s steel industry, largest bridge, and other dual-use productive capabilities are in ruins. Iran’s more fragile, but also probably more brutal, regime will have difficulty managing Iran’s overwhelming and now significantly worsened economic and environmental crises. More political instability is likely down the road, perhaps providing an opening to the opposition but more likely to different flavors of Iran’s hardline security leadership.

Iran’s missiles and missile production facilities are significantly degraded, although Iran retains enough missiles and drones to continue to threaten the region. The degradation does not materially affect the U.S. homeland although this posed a threat to Israel, because Iran would not have been able to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile for nearly a decade, assuming we didn’t stop them along the way. Given the lessons that Iran has absorbed - literally, during the 12-day war in June and this round - it was and is highly unlikely that Iran would strike the U.S. or Israel pre-emptively. Rather, Iran is likely to rebuild its missile capabilities to deter and retaliate against future attacks. The degradation of Iran’s capabilities could prove a Pyrrhic victory, because Israel and/or the U.S. will strike Iran again if Iran rebuilds its military or nuclear program, potentially restarting the cycle of war.

Iran is not likely to be able to produce a nuclear weapon for years, as President Trump said on 31 March. But that was exactly where we were after U.S. and Israeli strikes “obliterated” the program or, more accurately, deeply buried most of it, during the 12-day war. The location and accessibility of the 440 kg of 60% enriched uranium have not yet been verified, absent IAEA inspectors. Some experts have asserted that the remnant Iranian regime will now be more likely to pursue a nuclear weapon, a process ironically constrained by the now deceased Supreme Leader. Regardless, unless this fissile material is dealt with via negotiations, a possibility, or a U.S. special forces operation, the war has not materially changed the threat or the ability to manage it.

Iran’s proxies remain capable of inflicting harm on U.S. interests and on Israel. The defeat of Iran’s proxies was probably overstated, in hindsight. Hezbollah retained missile and rocket capabilities that have surprised Israel, and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have struck numerous U.S. facilities and kidnapped a U.S. journalist. Israel has moved into Lebanon, threatening to occupy the south, and is imposing major losses on Hezbollah. But Israel’s approach is not likely to militarily defeat Hezbollah and will prove counterproductive to U.S. goals of a more stable Lebanon, at least in the near term. Yemen’s Houthis have fired largely performative missiles and drones toward Israel, but its limited involvement allows it to retain and rebuild capabilities that could again threaten the Red Sea and U.S. regional interests and partners.

Freedom of navigation has ended through the Strait of Hormuz; Iran now effectively controls it. It is a sad irony that the presence of U.S. forces in the region prior to the war had deterred Iran from seriously threatening traffic in the Strait for since the 1980s. But the overwhelming U.S-Israeli strikes on Iran removed this deterrent effect and reduced conventional forces, leaving Iran primarily asymmetric tools and economic points of leverage as its best response. Iran is now building a practice of taking tolls or striking arrangements with sponsors or collaborators. This is not likely to change unless the U.S. and Iran negotiate an end to the conflict that includes Iran’s agreement to stop threatening and extorting traffic in the Strait. Absent this, it is likely that Iran will retain leverage and reap a windfall from permits and other fees, however illegal under international law.

Americans’ wallets will be squeezed for some months and perhaps into next year. While the U.S. economy is more insulated than most U.S. partners’ and allies’, we are hardly immune from the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market, with knock-on effects for gas, derivatives like diesel, helium for semiconductors, fertilizers, plastics, and a range of chemicals. It is likely to take months to resume pre-war oil and gas production and shipping levels through the Strait, with cascading timelines for shipments to arrive and refining. Diesel prices, which have risen 40%, are hiking the cost of shipping, airfares, farm production (along with fertilizer price rises), and will ultimately cause food inflation. Sustained overall inflation, high mortgage rates, and lower growth are not certainties, but the risk is growing.

Terrorist attacks are on the rise. Since February 28, Iran and Hezbollah have mounted or inspired attacks, mostly foiled, in at least seven countries, primarily targeting U.S. personnel and assets and Israeli or Jewish facilities from the U.S. and Western Europe to Iran’s neighboring countries, Kuwait and Azerbaijan. With the disruption to IRGC command-and-control, attacks by lone wolves and recently recruited criminal proxies are more likely, but sleeper cells reportedly have been activated and have been present in the U.S. and Europe since the 1980s. Some thwarted attacks have been more serious: Azerbaijan disrupted an IRGC plot to bomb a critical oil pipeline and Kuwait rolled up a Hezbollah assassination network targeting the country's leadership. And lone wolf attacks are harder to defend against, and have already taken Americans’ lives in Austin, Texas. As counterterrorism capabilities have improved over the decades, Iran's success rate dropped precipitously, but the volume of attempts has increased dramatically in compensation. With reportedly diminished U.S. counterterrorism resources, the odds of success in the U.S. appear higher.

The Transatlantic Alliance is at risk, with Allied and Trump anger hitting new highs. A permanent rewiring is not inconceivable, as this crisis piles on top of Washington’s gambit to obtain Greenland, tariff and trade pressures, and efforts to undermine the EU and its regulatory powers. While it is unlikely that President Trump will formally withdraw from NATO, its ability to deter Russia will be diminished as its capabilities and cohesion erode. Canadian Prime Minister Carney’s calls for a “middle power” coalition are hard to implement, but more countries are on board with the concept. More collaboration on specific issues like critical minerals supply chains and reopening the Strait of Hormuz are likely to grow either separately or in parallel to collaboration with the U.S., which remains a practical requirement. One has to worry about effects on the US-UK special relationship and the Five Eyes alliance.

Russia gains the most. In addition to the Transatlantic rift, the war ties down U.S. military capabilities, undermines NATO capabilities and cohesion, removes pressure on Moscow to end its own war, and further limits arms flows to Ukraine. In practice, it gives Russia the ability to fight this war longer and to impose greater costs on Ukraine. With U.S. sanctions lifted, Russia’s budget crisis is stabilized. And the impunity Trump has handed Putin for helping Iran target Americans will encourage Putin to push the boundaries of its gray-zone attacks further, until or unless President Trump decides to react.

China, having prepared for such a shock, also stands to gain strategically. U.S. weapons intended to deter China have been expended or withdrawn from the Asia Pacific, leaving gaps in air defenses. Shortages of U.S. precision-strike weapons (like Tomahawks) and air defenses will limit and delay planned acquisitions by our allies. With U.S. forces depleted in the near term, will President Trump be more likely to grant concessions to President Xi in order to keep the peace? Economically, though not completely isolated from global economic shocks given its export dependence, China’s dominance in green technologies will pay dividends as the rest of the world drives to diminish import dependence. Strategically, China is playing up its role as a stabilizing global power, although this has limits given its unwillingness to directly engage in ending the war, provide security, or help neighbors that have asked China for emergency supplies of fuel and fertilizer.

Economic shocks rippling through the Asia-Pacific are affecting lives and likely to spur political fallout. The war is a crisis of both supply and price in Asia. Governments’ across the region have turned to emergency spending to replace Gulf imports and increase subsidies, spiking deficits and debt in turn. Poorer countries’ fuel reserves are running dangerously low, forcing austerity measures, business contraction, and closures. Violence and protests have already broken out, including in India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. Second order effects on tourism, food production, and potentially remittances from Gulf states will linger. Third-order effects of political instability and upheaval catalyzed by financial distress is likely over the next few years.

The world is becoming more militarized and dangerous. Washington’s commitment and its near-term capacity to come to the defense of Allies and partners is in question more than ever before. Military spending, already up every year of the past decade, is likely to grow further in the U.S. and around the world, at the expense of domestic programs and foreign assistance. More countries are considering the benefits of obtaining a nuclear arsenal. And the asymmetric effectiveness of low-cost systems and coercive tactics will put the U.S. and other large powers on the back foot. The lessons of this war are likely to encourage more military aggression, not less.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 19:00:09 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why a War in the Middle East Is Hitting Australians at the Petrol Pump https://belimedia.com.ng/why-a-war-in-the-middle-east-is-hitting-australians-at-the-petrol-pump https://belimedia.com.ng/why-a-war-in-the-middle-east-is-hitting-australians-at-the-petrol-pump OPINION – Economic insulation is no longer guaranteed by geography. Australia is nevertheless very vulnerable to geopolitical unrest in the Middle East despite its distance from the region, especially through international energy markets. The recent escalation between Iran and important regional players has once again shown how swiftly economic effects from the Gulf War can spread across continents. Australian consumers, businesses, and governments are facing a well-known but growing reality: distant battles have home repercussions as oil prices rise and supply chains tighten.

According to recent Treasury modelling, prolonged fighting may cause Australia's inflation to rise by much to 1.25 percentage points while slowing GDP growth by 0.6 percent over the medium run (Reuters, 2026). This risk is more than just theoretical. It is already unfolding across fuel prices, transport costs, and broader inflationary pressures.

The Strategic Centrality of the Middle East

About 20 percent of the world's oil supply goes through the Strait of Hormuz, which is at the centre of the world's energy vulnerability. Global supply and pricing mechanisms are quickly impacted by any disruption, whether it is from military escalation, blockades, or attacks on infrastructure.

Australia is still largely dependent on imported refined petroleum products even though it is a significant exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Australia suffers domestically from increased fuel and transportation costs while benefiting from high global energy prices through export income due to this structural dependency.

This vulnerability has been highlighted by recent tensions. Analysts warn that short-term price increases in Australia could reach 40 cents per liter due to oil price spikes associated with Middle East unrest (ABC News, 2026).

Transmission Channels: From Oil Shock to Inflation

The method of economic transmission is both quick and extensive. Growing oil prices directly affect the cost of gasoline, which in turn affects manufacturing, transportation, and logistics costs across the economy. In the end, these expenses are transferred to customers.

Higher oil costs affect everything from grocery and delivery services to construction and aviation, according to Commonwealth Bank study, demonstrating how ubiquitous energy-driven inflation is (CommBank, 2026).

This dynamic is strikingly illustrated by recent occurrences. Fuel price spikes associated with the turmoil in the Middle East have already compelled Australian companies, such as those in the transportation, aviation, and logistics sectors, to raise prices and pass costs on to customers (The Guardian, 2026).

Monetary policy responses exacerbate the inflationary effect. The Reserve Bank of Australia is under pressure to maintain or raise interest rates in response to rising inflation, which slows economic development. As a result, there is a classic stagflationary risk: slower growth coupled with price increases.

Structural Vulnerabilities in Australia’s Energy System

Long-standing structural flaws are the cause of Australia's vulnerability to global energy shocks.

First, in comparison to norms set by the International Energy Agency, the nation's strategic fuel reserves are comparatively low. Because of this, Australia is susceptible to temporary supply outages, especially during protracted geopolitical crises.

Second, over the past 20 years, Australia's refining capacity has drastically decreased, increasing reliance on imported refined fuels. As demonstrated by current shortages connected to both Middle East tensions and regional export restrictions, this reliance becomes particularly problematic when global supply lines are disturbed.

Third, domestic price volatility has resulted from the integration of domestic gas markets with international LNG markets. Although LNG exports bring in a significant amount of money, they also expose domestic customers to changes in global prices. Because of this, even in situations where domestic output is robust, Australian consumers may have to deal with rising gas and energy costs.

Beyond Energy: Broader Economic Impacts

The conflict in the Middle East affects more than just fuel prices. Particularly at risk are industries that rely significantly on fuel and transportation, such as manufacturing, construction, and agriculture.

According to recent data, Australia's construction industry is already under strain due to increased oil and freight costs, which are driving up the price of products like bitumen, steel, and cement (The Australian, 2026).

Furthermore, there are extra hazards associated with supply chain disruptions, especially through important maritime routes. Secure shipping channels across the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific are essential to Australia's trade-dependent economy. Any prolonged interruption to these routes could result in shortages, delays, and higher expenses in a number of industries.

Policy Imperatives for Australia

Global energy shocks are recurrent, which emphasises the necessity of an all-encompassing and proactive policy response. Australia needs to build structural resilience instead of reactive measures.

Strategic Fuel Security

Australia should significantly expand its strategic petroleum reserves and ensure compliance with International Energy Agency standards. Temporary measures such as relaxing fuel standards or releasing emergency reserves are insufficient substitutes for long-term preparedness.

Investment in domestic refining capacity should also be reconsidered as part of a broader national security strategy. While global markets offer efficiency, overdependence creates strategic vulnerability.

Energy Diversification and Transition

It is both geopolitically and environmentally necessary to accelerate the switch to renewable energy. Australia would be less vulnerable to outside shocks if it relied less on imported fossil fuels.

Long-term energy independence can be improved by investing in wind, solar, and hydrogen energy, especially in places like South Australia. To prevent short-term supply gaps and price volatility, the transition must be handled carefully.

Domestic Gas Reservation Policy

Australia should look into enhancing domestic gas reserve systems to ensure that a part of output is distributed to the local market at stable prices. The Western Australian approach provides a viable roadmap for balancing export revenues and domestic affordability.

Maritime and Strategic Security

Given the significance of global shipping routes, Australia must improve its maritime security capabilities and strengthen ties with regional partners. Maintaining global energy flows requires protecting freedom of passage, particularly in important chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.

This involves diplomatic involvement, participation in global security initiatives, and naval capability development.

Economic Buffer Mechanisms

Short-term policy solutions are also useful for minimising immediate consequences. These could include targeted fuel subsidies, cost-of-living adjustments, and assistance for vulnerable industries.

However, such policies must be carefully constructed to prevent distorting market signals or jeopardising long-term energy transition objectives.

The Middle East wars are no longer remote geopolitical occurrences with little importance to Australia. In a linked global economy, they pose urgent and visible threats to home security.

The current crisis has highlighted a fundamental reality: Australia's economic resiliency is inextricably linked to global energy security. Rising oil prices, interrupted supply chains, and inflationary pressures are not outliers; they are structural characteristics of a globalised energy system.

Canberra's policymakers face a clear challenge. Australia must anticipate, rather than simply respond to, external shocks. This calls for a combination of strategic reserves, diverse energy sources, strong domestic policy, and active international participation.

Failure to act will expose Australia to the next Gulf disaster. Strategic foresight, by contrast, offers a pathway toward resilience in an increasingly volatile world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
New Presidential Executive Order Targets Transnational Cybercrime https://belimedia.com.ng/new-presidential-executive-order-targets-transnational-cybercrime https://belimedia.com.ng/new-presidential-executive-order-targets-transnational-cybercrime OPINION – The Cipher Brief broke new ground when it published my piece addressing scams as a national security issue in December 2023. Two years later, there is broad consensus that transnational criminals are attacking our citizens and businesses at unprecedented scale, and the White House has responded with a new Executive Order to combat the surge in cybercrime. It is time to raise our defenses, and the Intelligence Community has an important role to play. The lessons gained from the battle with counterterrorism apply to the new world of cybercrime — intelligence and data fusion are key.

A Tsunami of Cybercrime

Reported fraud losses have surged nearly 430% since 2020, according to FTC testimony at a recent Congressional hearing.

[Source: FTC testimony at U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 25 March 2026.]

The money flows mainly into the pockets of foreign crime syndicates—Chinese gangs in Southeast Asia running investment scams, Indian call centers preying on seniors, Mexican narco‑terrorists funneling the proceeds from time‑share fraud into drug trafficking, and others. Who is behind the “toll road” scam that we’ve all received via text message? Chinese cybercriminals.

Teens are at risk, too. Sextortion specialists in West Africa and the Philippines have caused more than 36 teenagers to commit suicide.

The future looks grim. Over the next three to five years, INTERPOL expects a sharp escalation in transnational fraud, driven by artificial intelligence, low-cost digital tools, and increased global criminal collaboration. INTERPOL reports a global surge in AI-enhanced fraud schemes, notably sextortion, investment scams, impersonation frauds, and fake kidnappings for ransom.

Sounding the Alarm

Corporate America started warning last year about the severity of the threat. In February 2025, Google issued a report entitled: “Cybercrime: A Multifaceted National Security Threat.”, urging policymakers to elevate cybercrime as a national security priority.

In late 2025, Amazon, Google, JPMorgan Chase, Meta, Microsoft, Target, and 40 other companies sent an open letter to Congress saying “Scams are a fast-evolving national security threat.” They described a “national epidemic” that endangers public trust and economic stability alike, and concluded: “Our country, its citizens, and its corporations are being targeted and robbed by transnational criminal operations.” Senator Chuck Grassley made the same point at a 2025 Judiciary Committee hearing, describing “industrial‑scale fraud” by transnational organized crime groups as “a national security crisis hiding in plain sight.”

A New Presidential Executive Order Targets Cybercrime

In early March 2026, President Trump signed a landmark Executive Order on Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens, declaring it the policy of the United States to “protect Americans from, and harden our financial and digital systems against, these threats.” The president ordered the Departments of State, Treasury, War, Homeland Security, and the Attorney General to prepare an action plan by July 2026.

For the first time, the White House described cyber-enabled fraud as not just a consumer protection issue, but as an attack by transnational criminals. Stated that cyber protection for U.S. citizens is a priority. Assigned a White House official to coordinate the action plan: the Homeland Security Advisor. The Office of the National Cyber Director is also to be consulted. Elevating the issue to the White House level is the right call when faced with a threat that cuts across multiple departments and agencies.

The new Executive Order is a critical step toward restoring trust and safety in our digital economy.

As the nation begins to mount defenses to thwart foreign cybercrime, we would do well to consider some best practices.

The Counterterrorism Model

In recognition of the rising threat of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), we should think big and create a National Center in the executive branch. The Center would be an operational interagency effort, modeled on the successful National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that the U.S. government created after 9/11. The new Center could be under DOJ and DHS, and it would comprise relevant elements from across the government and the private sector. Its mission would be to address all of the ways we are being attacked by transnational criminals, including scams.

In recent months, the federal government has created a variety of task forces to address particular parts of the transnational crime threat. Rather than pursue individual approaches, a National Counter TCO center would provide a more comprehensive and efficient response.

The UK Model: Intelligence and Data Fusion

In March 2026, the British government announced its newest Fraud Strategy and committed £31 million to launch an Online Crime Centre (OCC) in April 2026. The OCC will “unite UK policing, the UK Intelligence Community (including GCHQ, the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Cyber Force) alongside private sector partners from the financial, telecommunications, technology, and cyber industries.” The goal is not just to respond to fraud, but to disrupt it at scale—analyzing large volumes of data to block calls, freeze accounts, and take down fraudulent websites. The UK also recently created a centralized reporting system to speed analysis of victim reports.

Initial U.S. Steps Require Follow-Through

The U.S. Government’s response lags significantly behind that of the British government. The U.S. has not yet created a national strategy, a centralized reporting system, or an intelligence-driven data fusion center. As a result, the U.S. approach is mainly reactive, not preventative. We’re falling further behind.

The UK has committed £250 million over three years to combat fraud, but neither the White House nor Congress has yet allocated the necessary resources. In the U.S., the Administration's budget request proposes a $555.1 million reduction to the FBI's budget for FY 2026.

To illustrate the mismatch in resources, the UK’s central reporting system uses AI from Palantir to analyze the crush of fraud reports. But the FBI told Congress in late March that the Bureau does its analytic work manually. Why can’t our FBI afford modern tools?

As other nations raise defenses, the U.S. risks becoming an increased target. But that outcome is not inevitable. The U.S. has the best technology in the world. With the proper leadership and resources, we can defend our nation against the growing scourge of cybercrime.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
Trump Is Getting His Way in Caracas — But It’s Complicated https://belimedia.com.ng/trump-is-getting-his-way-in-caracas-but-its-complicated https://belimedia.com.ng/trump-is-getting-his-way-in-caracas-but-its-complicated

In 2017, Marco Rubio, then Florida’s junior senator, was assigned a Capitol Police security detail because the U.S. received unverified but alarming intelligence that Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro’s feared chief enforcer was sending a hit man to assassinate him.

Today, in an epic irony, Rubio, now Secretary of State, and his boss, President Donald Trump, have turned to that same enforcer – Diosdado Cabello, whose official title is Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace – to calm the nation in the wake of the U.S. Special Forces raid that ripped Maduro out of his bed on Jan. 3 and deposited him in a Brooklyn lockup on federal narcoterrorism charges. The administration’s aim, Rubio told Congress, is a “friendly, stable, prosperous Venezuela…objective number one was stability.” U.S. oil majors and other potential investors have told Trump and his team that they won’t return to get Venezuela's vast but neglected oil fields pumping again until the country is rid of troublemakers, from homegrown street crooks to hardline Cuban Marxists to malign players from distant shores.

“The restoration of Venezuela will not be complete without the expulsion of the Cubans, the Iranians, and by extension, Hezbollah, the Iranian’s proxy in Venezuela, as well as really curtailing the activities of the Chinese and the Russians in Venezuela,” David Shedd, formerly acting director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told The Cipher Brief. To clear out all those dangerous characters, Shedd, a Cipher Brief expert, said that for now, the Trump team has no choice but to collaborate with Cabello and other unsavory remnants of the Maduro regime. “The levers of power still rest with people like [acting president] Delcy Rodriguez, her brother Jorge Rodriguez, who's the head of the National Assembly, along with Diosdado Cabello at the head of the intelligence services and Vladimir Padrino, head of the military,” he said. “All very corrupt individuals, all individuals that need to go eventually. However, they have the levers of power. It's within their power to do these expulsions.”

Critics will call it a deal with the devil. But so far, it’s working. Interim president Delcy Rodriguez, once a hardcore leftist idealogue, has turned out to be a survivor with a pragmatic side. Last month, she ordered Cuban security advisers and doctors out of Venezuela, according to Reuters. Last Wednesday (Mar. 18) she sacked Defense Minister Gen. Vladimir Padrino Lopez who had held that post for more than 11 years. Named for Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin and educated in part at Fort Benning’s School of the Americas, Padrino was indicted for narcotics trafficking in federal court in Washington, D.C. in 2019 for allegedly facilitating Colombian cocaine traffickers who were using Venezuela as a trampoline to the U.S. and Europe. The State Department is offering a $15 million reward for his arrest. If extradited to the U.S, he could make a plea deal with federal prosecutors to testify against Maduro.

Another potential witness, Colombian-Venezuelan billionaire Alex Saab, Maduro’s chief money mover, fixer and point man for dealing with Iran and Russia, may turn up in the U.S. in handcuffs soon. As Maduro’s alleged bagman, he is believed to have detailed knowledge of how the strongman looted his country’s treasury. Saab was indicted in Miami in 2019 in a DEA bribery/money laundering case that involved, among other schemes, allegedly moving $350 million in Venezuelan government funds meant for the poor to his offshore accounts. In 2020, he was detained in Cape Verde on a DEA red notice as his private plane was refueling on his way to Tehran. The following year, he was extradited to the U.S. to face charges. He denied wrongdoing. In 2023, President Joe Biden pardoned him as part of a prisoner exchange with the Maduro government. He was sent back to Caracas, where Maduro appointed him Minister of industry and National Production. Last month, according to the Miami Herald and New York Times, he was reportedly detained by Cabello’s agents working with the FBI. Negotiations are under way for his extradition to the U.S., based on a new, still-sealed indictment.

Trump rarely misses a chance to boast about the changes he has wrought in Caracas – and how they serve as his model for pressuring other nations to bend to U.S. demands. Yesterday (March 24), speaking with reporters about his efforts to change the regime in Tehran to one friendlier to U.S. interests, he gushed, “Look at Venezuela, how well that's working out! We are doing so well in Venezuela with oil and with the relationship between the president-elect [Rodriguez] and us. Maybe we find somebody like that in Iran.”

Yet Cabello, a swaggering onetime military officer who poses for photos brandishing a cartoonish spiked cudgel and patrols the streets with scowling thugs, remains in power. Back in 2017, Cabello adamantly denied a Miami Herald and CBS News report that he had initiated a “potentially grave” threat against Rubio, but the pair carried on a heated verbal duel in the news pages and social medium with Cabello calling Rubio a “fool” and “Narco Rubio,” and Rubio labeling Maduro an “unhinged dictator” and Cabello “the Pablo Escobar of Venezuela,”

Actually, Cabello is so much more. Escobar never attained public office in Colombia. Cabello has loomed large in Venezuelan power circles since as a young Army lieutenant, he joined leftist strongman Hugo Chavez in an attempted coup in 1992. When Chavez was elected to the presidency in 1998, Cabello climbed rapidly. As interior minister since 2024, Cabello has been nicknamed Diostodo, God Almighty, because he commands the police, the dreaded internal security agency SEBIN, (for Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional) and the colectivos, civilian militias that prowl neighborhoods, enforce regime dictates and crush dissent. He was indicted in New York in 2020 and again this year for narcoterrorism conspiracy. He has a $25 million State Department bounty on his head, second only to the $50 million bounty offered for Maduro. Since his indictment, instead of going to ground as Escobar did, Cabello has made himself a constant media presence in Caracas, using Instagram accounts and his state-run TV show, “Bringing Down the Hammer,” to promote his brand of brutality.

Cabello has repeatedly denied involvement in the international drug trade. A former Venezuelan official who tells another story is disgraced former Venezuelan general Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, once head of his country’s military intelligence arm, who has been indicted at least four times in the U.S. for narcotics trafficking conspiracy, starting in 2011, Carvajal was extradited from Spain in 2023, pleaded guilty last June and is now incarcerated in the U.S. while awaiting sentencing. According to documents filed in federal court, after making a plea deal, Carvajal told federal prosecutors that he was in a pivotal high-level meeting in 2008 when Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez personally ordered Cabello to lead a project working with Colombia’s leftist FARC guerillas to “flood” the U.S. with cocaine. At the time, the guerillas were manufacturing tons of cocaine in the Colombian jungle, near the border with Venezuela and wanted to partner with the Venezuelan military, which controlled the country’s air and seaports, to move the lucrative product to market in the States and Europe. After Chavez died of cancer in 2013 and Maduro succeeded him, Carvajal claimed, according to the documents, Cabello continued to oversee FARC cocaine shipments and to provide arms to FARC.

These charges have yet to be tested in U.S. courts. Everything Carvajal says will be challenged, because he has admitted his own corrupt involvement with the FARC’s cocaine-production arm, dating back to 1999 and the early days of Chavez’ rule. Still, as head of his country’s Directorate of Military Intelligence, DIM, from 2004 to 2014, he has been in a position to know a lot about Chavez, Maduro, Cabello and other senior figures in the leftist regime. Last December, Carvajal sent a letter from federal prison charging extensive Venezuelan government involvement, not only in narcotics trafficking and organized crime but also in intelligence operations against the U.S. According to the Miami Herald, he claimed that Russian and Cuban intelligence services were using Venezuela as a forward staging base to run joint operations against the U.S. and that Venezuelan and Cuban intelligence agencies had placed spies inside the U.S. “for decades.” Allegations that Russian and Cuban spies have infiltrated the U.S. are hardly new, and it’s far from clear whether Carvajal’s charges are specific and can be corroborated. Still, given his access to regime secrets, Carvajal’s account, coupled with those of other former Venezuelan officials who want to make deals with the U.S., underscores the risky nature of the Trump administration’s decision to leave Chavez-Maduro loyalists in power, even temporarily.

None of the regime holdovers are more hazardous to Trump’s plans than Cabello, who remains uniquely positioned to make or break Trump’s vision to restore Venezuela as a welcoming place for American business, especially Big Oil, as a Feb. 12 State Department policy statement, entitled “Actions to Implement President Trump’s Vision for Venezuelan Oil,” makes plain. It declares that as in the post-Maduro era, “U.S. firms will play a critical role in repairing and upgrading Venezuela’s oil and gas infrastructure for the benefit of the Venezuelan people…With renewed cooperation and sound economic stewardship, Venezuela can reemerge as a stable, prosperous partner whose citizens benefit from its vast natural wealth and strengthened ties with the United States.”

Cabello and the colectivos he controls could interfere with that vision. According to Reuters, before the Special Forces operation to seize Maduro, the Trump team delivered a blunt message to Cabello that if he ordered his goon squads to attack opposition activists or unleash chaos, he would suffer the same fate as Maduro and wind up in a grim cell in Brooklyn. Cabello wavered briefly, according to the Miami Herald, sending voicemail messages to military officers and regime loyalists that urged, ”Let’s go to the streets, as much as we can, in the states, mobilize our people.” Then he reversed course and fell in line with the U.S. demand, posting a torrent of social media messages showing happy citizens and proclaiming that his country was stable and safe. His Valentine’s Day post boasted, There isn’t a single place in the Americas that has better security numbers than Venezuela.” By numbers, he meant the street crime rate.

But street crime was never the issue for U.S. national security experts and federal investigators, who have been far more worried about less visible threats posed by transnational organized crime, foreign terrorism, espionage and, potentially, hybrid warfare, using Venezuela as a base from which to attack U.S. physical and cyber infrastructure and other interests vital to American and regional security.

“Venezuela has essentially been run as a narco-state, or as a vast organized crime network, for the past 20 years,” Sandalio Gonzalez, who initiated the DEA’s criminal case against Maduro and his top lieutenants, told The Cipher Brief. As a DEA agent in Caracas from 2006 to 2010 and later a senior agent in the elite DEA Special Operations Division, Gonzalez and his partners started out investigating the Chavez regime’s connections with Colombia’s FARC guerillas. They thought they were pursuing a straightforward drug corruption case, but, says Gonzalez, “During the course of the next several years, we became deeply concerned that an important country like Venezuela had become allied with our adversaries. Venezuela ought to be America’s partner and ally in stabilizing and unifying our hemisphere, not advancing the anti-American and anti-democratic interests of our adversaries.”

Others in the DEA were equally alarmed. “Venezuela is sitting on the biggest oil reserves in the world, but it had become a haven for countries and movements that were against U.S. interests, such as the Russians, Chinese, and Hezbollah,” Paul Craine, DEA’s regional director for Mexico and Central America from 2013 to 2017, told The Cipher Brief. “Different terrorist elements had safe haven in Venezuela. And obviously, the Maduro regime was in direct collusion with Russia and supporting Cuba. The Venezuelan secret police are very closely aligned with the Cuban secret police.”

Once the Trump White House and Pentagon started making plans to remove Maduro, Craine, like other experts on the Latin American criminal and terrorist underground became concerned that he would be replaced by other corrupt, duplicitous figures from the Venezuelan power elite.

“You can't leave these major criminals who have blood on their hands and who have been agents of suppression to continue to be there, or be part of the government,” Craine said.

Unraveling the Caracas-Havana connection will take a while. “I recognize that it won’t be easy,” Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January. “I mean, look, at the end of the day we are dealing with people over there that have spent most of their lives living in a gangster paradise, so it’s not going to be like from one day to the next we’re going to have this thing turn around overnight. But I think we’re making good and decent progress.”

For the U.S. national security community, the Caracas-Beijing connection is more subtle and even more important over the long run. On January 2, the day before Delta Force launched into Caracas to take custody of Maduro, a Chinese delegation led by Qiu Xiaoqi, the Chinese government’s special representative for Latin American affairs, was at the Miraflores Presidential Palace, meeting with Maduro. China was getting deeply discounted oil from Venezuela, was Venezuela’s second-largest trading partner after the U.S. and was selling Venezuela billions of dollars’ worth of military equipment, according to a January 2026 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

“China is a big loser in the Maduro rendition,” said Shedd, whose new book, The Great Heist, examines China’s theft of U.S. technology and intellectual property. “China has invested nearly $5 billion over the past two-plus decades in Venezuela, primarily focusing on energy projects which under Phase 2 of the transition in Venezuela will go to U.S. oil companies with first rights of refusal. How can China not lose?”

During the Chavez and Maduro regimes, Shedd said, “China has increasingly been involved in weapons sales, back-door-enabled Huawei and ZTE telecommunications networks, and dual-use tech related sales” to Venezuela. “In addition, the PRC has had an interest in – if not an actual hand in – enabling some intelligence/security capabilities in Venezuela that help Venezuela’s security apparatus, SEBIN, spy on and disrupt the political opposition. Anything that curtails Chinese influence, which is by its nature antithetical to U.S. interests, is a good outcome.”

Rubio has insisted it would be physically impossible for the U.S. military to remove all of the allies of China, Iran, Cuba and other malign influences in one or two raids. “Land within three minutes, kick down [Maduro’s] door, grab him, put him in handcuffs, read him his rights, put him in a helicopter and leave the country without losing any American or any American assets – that’s not an easy mission,” Rubio said on Face the Nation last January. “And you’re asking me why didn’t we do that in five other places at the same time? I mean, that’s absurd.”

Since that time, Washington has not demanded that Rodríguez hand over Cabello, Padrino López and other current and former senior officials indicted in the U.S. and instead has pressed Rodriguez for a more gradual transition, removing potential troublemakers from power one by one. According to the Miami Herald. Cabello has tried to stave off his own exit from power by leveraging his influence as a security insider and by asking for a guarantee that the popular opposition leader María Corina Machado won’t return to Venezuela. His eventual fate is a subject of intense speculation, but facts are scarce.

So far, the Trump administration appears to be running a charm offensive. Trump regularly praises Rodriguez and says he wants to visit Caracas at some future date. Meanwhile, the administration has dispatched a steady stream of senior American officials to get to know Rodriguez and other Venezuelan holdovers still in power, impress them with Washington’s seriousness of purpose and, as the fictional Michael Corleone counseled, keep them very close.

For instance, last month (Feb. 18) Marine Gen. Frank Donovan, a former special operations leader, now commander of the U.S. Southern Command, made a surprise visit to Caracas and met with Rodriguez, Cabello and Padrino Lopez, before he was removed. The agenda, according to Rodriguez’ X feed, was predictable, if ironic – drug trafficking, terrorism and migration, covering all the bad acts federal prosecutors and Trump have attributed to Maduro and his cronies.

In an interview with The Cipher Brief, Renee Novakoff, a former deputy director of intelligence for sensitive activities and programs at the Pentagon, described Donovan’s visit as “a historic event, even if it was a confusing one.”

“The U.S. military just forcefully removed the country's President and U.S. officials met with indicted criminals to discuss cooperation on the issues they are indicted for and for which their President is awaiting trial in the U.S.,” Novakoff said. “The U.S. continues to sink drug trafficking boats, killing those on board. The Venezuelans are saying that diplomacy is the right way forward but ....is this diplomacy or is it continued pressure on Venezuela? Usually, the first trip by the COCOM Commander is to a partner nation. The actions and the words are perplexing."

Yesterday (March 23), apparently undaunted by the deepening U.S. presence, Cabello led a protest march through the streets of Caracas, defiantly demanding an end to U.S. sanctions and restoration of some socialist policies. According to Spanish-language news reports, he promised, “We will return to the highest wage system in America. We will return to an education with everyone; we will give quality of life to Venezuelans."


The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why Hasn’t Iran Buckled Under U.S.&Israeli Pressure? https://belimedia.com.ng/why-hasnt-iran-buckled-under-us-israeli-pressure https://belimedia.com.ng/why-hasnt-iran-buckled-under-us-israeli-pressure EXPERT Q&A -- There are more questions than answers around the reported delivery of a U.S. 15-point plan presented to Iranian officials via a Pakistani interlocutor, with the intention to end the war, including whether the plan has been outright rejected by Iran.

It’s not clear for example, whether Israel is onboard with the proposal, as airstrikes continue, and it is unclear how open Iran would be to any kind of deal after weeks of bombings and days of conflicting messages about whether negotiations are really underway.

Despite U.S. and Israeli air superiority and a significant degradation of Iran’s missile capabilities, Iran still has a number of ways that it is fighting back.

The Cipher Brief spoke with former senior CIA Executive Dave Pitts, who is the co-founder of The Cipher Brief’s Gray Zone Group, about what Iran’s surprising resilience in the face of the U.S. – Israeli led attacks, tells us about what we should expect next.

Pitts: Iran’s staying power and effective asymmetric response despite sustained U.S. and Israeli strikes has surprised analysts and frustrated Western and regional officials. By conventional metrics, Tehran should have crumbled or sued for peace under the sustained pressure of two of the world’s strongest militaries dominating its skies. Instead, decades of gray zone operations - gray warfare - prepared Iran for this moment.

The gray zone is the geopolitical space between peace and war, where nations take action to advance their own national interests, attack and undermine their adversaries, and set the conditions for a future war without triggering an armed response. In other words, operations below the threshold of war calculated to gain a strategic advantage and to limit deterrence and discourage a persuasive response.

Gray warfare and asymmetric warfare function as counterparts along the spectrum of conflict - one below the threshold, the other above. The same tools allowed Iran to transition rapidly from the gray zone to asymmetric warfare against superior conventional forces. How asymmetric warfare exposes the limitations of traditional military power is a topic for separate discussion.

Iran’s preparation was extensive: building surrogate armies, stockpiling concealable stand-off munitions, honing capabilities to disrupt maritime shipping, expanding the IRGC’s ability to coerce and intimidate its neighbors, conducting influence operations against Israel and the U.S., and forging transactional ties with Russia and China. These efforts produced forces and capabilities with depth, dispersion, and autonomy, shrouded in ambiguity and propagandized as undefeatable.

Today, rather than surrender or collapse, Iran is waging a deliberate asymmetric campaign relying on drones and missiles, that has destabilized the region, forced evacuations, closed airspace, and injected volatility into global energy markets. Its objective is not a military victory but cognitive and political effect: to stoke fears of a broader regional war, erode public and political will, and influence decisions that will force an end to the war on terms favorable to Tehran.

Iran’s response is not a new military development. It is the predictable outcome of years spent waging gray warfare against the West. Washington and its allies should see this as the culmination of long-term gray zone strategy, not an aberration, to avoid strategic surprise with other adversaries.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
While the U.S. Focuses on Iran, Russia and China See Strategic Gain https://belimedia.com.ng/while-the-us-focuses-on-iran-russia-and-china-see-strategic-gain https://belimedia.com.ng/while-the-us-focuses-on-iran-russia-and-china-see-strategic-gain OPINION — Russia and China are certainly concerned about the desperate state of Iran’s regime, an invaluable transactional partner to both countries. Yet they are also working to secure more strategic gains at America’s expense. Both likely prefer—and are enabling—a drawn out, grinding, and unpopular U.S.-led war that strains U.S. military reserves, alliances, global influence, and deterrence. Their shared goal is to turn successful U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran into a strategic and costly setback for Washington without overt military involvement.

Russia has earned billions due to rising global energy prices and loosened U.S. restrictions on Russian oil, possibly rescuing Russia’s weakened national budget. This provides critical funding to its war effort against Ukraine at a time when sanctions were having an impact.

The diversion of weapons systems, intelligence assets, and funding to the Middle East and reduced political pressure by the U.S. on Russia to negotiate with Ukraine favor Russia’s war efforts against Ukraine.

Russia’s provision of intelligence, upgraded drone technology, and targeting support is forcing the U.S. to employ high-demand and expensive defensive weapons. This is clearly a message by Russia that it is “paying back” the U.S. for support to Ukraine.

Like other gray-zone operations by Russia, this is a chance for Russia to enable cognitive as well as lethal operations against the U.S. For those hoping for a diplomatic path with Moscow, this is another reminder of Russia’s focus on the U.S. as its primary adversary.

China is likewise benefiting strategically. Much like Ukraine, Iran is a live laboratory for China on U.S. military capabilities, drone defenses, strength of alliances, global logistics and supply chains under pressure and, most critically, political resolve. China likely views this as invaluable as it looks toward Taiwan.

China is the primary benefactor of Iranian oil. It not only gets significant discounts; it also increasingly settles in Chinese yuan to undermine the U.S. dollar.

Strategically, the war commits U.S. forces, carriers, munition stocks, and intelligence assets in the Middle East, which takes some pressure off Chinese aggressive activities near Taiwan. China may also be calculating if a major military distraction for the U.S. at some point in the future may create conditions favorable to a more aggressive move against Taiwan.

China is also quietly providing Iran dual-use technology such as BeiDou navigation systems that enable lethal strikes by Iran against U.S., Israeli, and regional targets. In parallel, China exploits current events in the Middle East through information and cognitive operations to undermine U.S. reputation and influence while strengthening its own.

U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian leadership, nuclear infrastructure, and military capabilities have been impressive in precision and lethality. Those metrics are useful in a conventional sense, but this is asymmetric warfare embedded in great power competition. Russia and China are not just bystanders. They are active gray-zone participants and clear benefactors of the war, committed to a strategic defeat for the United States. Russia reaps huge energy windfalls and sees less pressure over Ukraine while China quietly observes, learns, and calibrates its options toward Taiwan.

Of course, our national security team understands these dynamics. The challenge is not to fully pivot to Iran, but to continue with a clear-eyed approach to Russia’s and China’s aspirations against the U.S. Even as the U.S. displays considerable military strength against Iran, the U.S. is vulnerable to its most capable strategic adversaries.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
From Kyiv’s Skies to the Persian Gulf: How Ukraine’s Drone Technology Is Reshaping Global Defense https://belimedia.com.ng/from-kyivs-skies-to-the-persian-gulf-how-ukraines-drone-technology-is-reshaping-global-defense https://belimedia.com.ng/from-kyivs-skies-to-the-persian-gulf-how-ukraines-drone-technology-is-reshaping-global-defense

As Iranian-designed Shahed drones struck critical infrastructure across the Persian Gulf in early March, military planners in Washington confronted an uncomfortable reality. The weapons that have terrorized Ukrainian cities for four years were now exposing gaps in some of the world’s most advanced air defense networks. Gulf states burned through expensive Patriot interceptors at alarming rates, with each four-million-dollar missile destroying drones costing a fraction of that amount. The solution might come from an unlikely source: Ukrainian defense technology companies offering combat-proven systems forged in modern warfare.

The Brave1 Ukrainian Defense Tech USA Roadshow brought 17 companies to Washington recently, showcasing how rapidly the geopolitical landscape has shifted. These aren’t theoretical capabilities. They’re systems that have faced hundreds of Russian drones nightly for years, refined through trial and error on an active battlefield.

“You have the opportunity to talk with promising companies that are looking for joint partnerships in the US and looking for investors,” Iryna Zabolotna, Chief Operating Officer of Brave1, tells The Cipher Brief at a packed press conference at the Ukrainian Embassy.

Behind her, executives from companies like General Cherry, Unwave, SkyFall, and The Fourth Law represent an ecosystem that has scaled from near-nonexistence to producing millions of drones annually. The question now is whether that expertise can translate beyond Ukraine’s borders.

The numbers tell a stark story. According to Gulf defense ministries, more than 1,000 Iranian drones were detected over the United Arab Emirates alone in the first days of March, with similar waves hitting Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Traditional air defense systems weren’t designed for saturation attacks. Each Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs roughly $4 million. The Shahed drones they’re destroying cost between $30,000 and $100,000. Ukrainian companies offer different economics. Sergiy Orlov, Director of International Cooperation at General Cherry, explains that his company produces between 60,000 and 70,000 drones monthly, including 10,000 drone interceptors.

“This is an extremely efficient solution which allows us to defend our civilians, our cities, our country and defend on the front line,” Orlov tells The Cipher Brief. “And it’s extremely cost-effective. We are talking about a solution with a cost of four or five thousand US dollars per intercept.”

The interceptor drones work differently from traditional systems. Operated by pilots using first-person-view goggles, they physically pursue and destroy incoming threats by colliding with them. It’s an approach Ukraine developed when advanced Western systems arrived too slowly.

“If you think of electronic warfare solutions, there are jamming systems, there are amplifiers, and a lot of other things that originally were bought in China,” Yurii Shelmuk, CEO of Unwave, tells The Cipher Brief. “Right now it’s fully, 100 percent, local production in Ukraine.”

Beyond Hardware: The Knowledge Gap

The technology represents only part of what Ukraine offers. The real value is operational knowledge from years of desperate innovation.

“It would normally take years and months to prepare the armed forces of any country around the world to at least get like one-third of the knowledge our Ukrainian armed forces and companies have,” explains Ambassador Olga Stefanishyna. “And by the time they will complete their training, they will have to start over, because things are really changing very, very rapidly.”

This expertise gap became apparent when Russian drones based on Iranian designs struck Poland in September, breaching NATO airspace despite advanced fighter jets and Patriot systems. Poland discovered what Ukraine already knew: responding to mass drone attacks requires more than sophisticated equipment.

Yaroslav Azhniuk, CEO of The Fourth Law, which develops AI-powered autonomy for drones, frames it differently.

“Systems that work not in the cloud, not ChatGPT-like, but systems that work on board on the edge of the drones, I would argue that Ukraine has some of the world’s most advanced systems of that kind,” Azhniuk says.

Before the war, he spent six years in Silicon Valley building Petcube. Now he applies that expertise to weapons.

“That is extremely unique and impossible to replicate anywhere else in the world but in Ukraine, because the current strategic advantage that Ukraine has on the global stage is that it has been in a war with Russia for 12 years,” Azhniuk underscores.

The software represents a less visible but potentially more significant innovation. These systems absorb battlefield experience in ways that can’t be replicated in peacetime training. They’ve adapted to Russian electronic warfare and evolved countermeasures to operate in the most contested electromagnetic spectrum on Earth.

The Supply Chain Dilemma

Beneath the successes lies a challenge: dependence on Chinese components. When Ukraine’s drone industry exploded in 2023, most components came from China. As the sector matured, manufacturers worked to localize production. Azhniuk notes that many drones now use 80-90% Ukrainian-made first-level components.

But second-level components, components used to make components, remain problematic. Thermal camera sensors and battery cells still flow from Chinese manufacturers. This creates both a strategic vulnerability and an intelligence leak.

“When we are localizing or not localizing component production, we are also sharing or not sharing the know-how that is specific to how our warfighters use these drones,” Azhniuk explains.

The scale of demand makes complete independence difficult. Ukraine plans to produce more than seven million drones in 2026. A quadcopter requires four motors, meaning the industry needs 28 million motors annually — roughly 77,000 per day. Azhniuk’s company is now considering building a semiconductor fabrication plant in the United States to manufacture thermal camera sensors.

“We received significant interest from parties in the United States,” he points out. “It’s crucial for the defense of the free world to build this internal capability for the whole supply chain.”

The Political Calculation

The roadshow arrives amid delicate negotiations. President Trump previously announced a drone deal with Ukraine, but months passed without visible progress. Ambassador Stefanishyna acknowledges the arrangement hasn’t produced a formal memorandum but insists a real partnership has developed. Ukrainian companies have been selected for Army-led drone innovation programs, and delegations have conducted exchanges with the Pentagon.

The Iranian attacks changed the conversation. President Zelenskyy confirmed that Ukraine will deploy equipment and experts to Jordan at the American request, though operational details remain classified. This highlights Ukraine’s leverage: it possesses both the technology and trained personnel to operate these systems in combat.

This creates opportunity. Ukraine desperately needs PAC-3 missiles for Patriot systems to defend against Russian ballistic missiles — the one threat its interceptor drones cannot address. Gulf states need interceptor drones to preserve their Patriot stocks. Zelenskyy has publicly floated exchanges.

“For the future, of course, we will consider the ways we could engage on a basis that would really not undermine our own efforts but also will enable the companies,” Stefanishyna observes. “Because you see here the representatives of the companies, these are private entities. These are not state-owned companies, so we’re just happy to share the platform with them.”

The private sector nature of these companies complicates matters. Ukraine banned weapons exports after Russia’s invasion in 2022. Any sales to foreign governments require explicit authorization and are likely to involve complex arrangements between military channels rather than direct commercial transactions.

Scaling Global Ambitions

Beyond immediate Middle East needs, Ukrainian companies harbor larger ambitions. Artem Moroz, Head of Investor Relations at Brave1, describes the roadshow as part of building Ukraine’s “Defense Tech Valley”— an ecosystem modeled on Silicon Valley. The Brave1 investment community now includes more than 400 investors, with nearly 200 million dollars invested.

The roadshow spans multiple American cities through mid-March, with demo days in Washington, New York, Austin, and San Francisco. Events have drawn interest from defense contractors, venture capital firms, technology companies, and congressional representatives. Ukraine is also establishing joint grant programs with Norway, France, and other NATO countries.

“You have Silicon Valley. We would like to have a Defense Tech Valley in Ukraine,” Zabolotna says.

It’s an audacious vision for a country still fighting for survival, yet grounded in demonstrated capability. Ukrainian companies have moved from concept to mass production in months. They’ve iterated designs through actual combat rather than theoretical exercises.

“We were under pressure. We were under threat,” Zabolotna continues. “And definitely, the Ukrainian ecosystem would like to create solutions that can protect us. The main idea is that many Ukrainian companies that are now in defense — previously, before the full-scale invasion — worked more like private entities, such as civil or dual-use, and nobody was eager to create a defense ecosystem in Ukraine. I think it’s pressure and our brave hearts that Ukrainians would like to protect our land and our citizens, whatever we should do.”

In essence, the wartime pressure transformed Ukraine’s civilian tech sector into a defense innovation powerhouse driven by existential necessity and national survival.

The Replication Challenge

Whether Ukraine’s model can be replicated or exported at scale remains uncertain. The companies acknowledge that hardware represents only part of the solution. Training pilots takes at least weeks. SkyFall, one of Ukraine’s largest UAV manufacturers with drones deployed in more than two million missions, runs its own academy. The company has developed the capability to remotely pilot drones, potentially allowing operations in the Gulf to be controlled from Ukraine.

The tactical knowledge poses an even greater challenge. Russian forces continuously adapt their Shahed deployment strategies, recently implementing swarm tactics with “mothership” drones managing dozens of smaller units. Only Ukrainian military units that have experienced these evolving tactics understand how to counter them. Orlov emphasizes that effective deployment requires “mutual cooperation between us as a private company and, for sure, the state which can supply this knowledge.”

The competitive landscape is also evolving. Other countries have begun developing low-cost interceptor programs. The Pentagon has established squadrons using drones reverse-engineered from captured Iranian Shaheds. But Ukraine maintains an advantage: its systems are already in mass production and combat-proven.

As the Washington roadshow continues, Ukrainian companies face questions about whether they can scale production to serve both domestic military needs and export markets. Orlov suggests his company could double its monthly production of 10,000 interceptors within weeks. But broader supply chain constraints make rapid global expansion challenging.

The Middle East crisis has created an unexpected opportunity for Ukraine to translate battlefield necessity into geopolitical leverage. Whether that translates into sustainable partnerships will depend on political will, export controls, and the evolving dynamics of conflicts in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

For now, the message from the Ukrainian delegation is straightforward: they’ve solved problems others are just beginning to understand.

“You’ll actually be surprised how many countries woke up already,” Shelmuk stresses, “and you’ll be even more surprised how many expressed interest.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why the ‘Day After’ Is The Most Important Day in the Iranian Conflict https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-day-after-is-the-most-important-day-in-the-iranian-conflict https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-day-after-is-the-most-important-day-in-the-iranian-conflict The countries that get held up as models for this kind of US led attack are worth looking at closely, because they’re instructive in the wrong direction.

Iraq fell in twenty-one days in 2003, but Saddam Hussein was running a hollow state. His military had been gutted by a decade of sanctions, the 1991 Gulf War, and the no-fly zones. There was no grassroots ideological loyalty to the man — people obeyed out of fear, not faith. The moment the fear lifted, the structure dissolved. What followed was twenty years and trillions of dollars trying to hold the country together. Regime change worked militarily in three weeks and failed politically for two decades. Libya was a one-man personality cult held together by oil money and tribal patronage with no real institutional military and no ideology beyond Gaddafi himself. Remove the man and there was nothing underneath. The result wasn’t a democracy. It’s been a failed state ever since. Venezuela is a different category altogether because it hasn’t actually undergone regime change but rather the leader of the regime changed.

Iran is categorically different, and there are six reasons why that’s worth taking seriously and explains why the Trump Administration’s goals have shifted from Regime Change to Negotiating a Deal.

1. The first is that the regime is the ideology. The Islamic Republic isn’t just a government. It’s a theocratic revolutionary project that has spent nearly forty-seven years fusing religion, nationalism, and anti-imperialism into a single identity. For tens of millions of Iranians, particularly the rural poor, the deeply religious, and the Revolutionary Guard apparatus, the regime isn’t just who’s in power. It’s who they are. Saddam had fear. Gaddafi had tribal patronage. Khamenei has true believers. Unfortunately, you can’t bomb an ideology out of existence.

2. The second is the IRGC, and this is probably the most under-appreciated part of the whole conversation. Most coverage treats the Revolutionary Guard as a military institution, which it is, but that framing misses what actually makes it so durable. These are people who control ports, construction contracts, telecommunications infrastructure, black market oil exports. In fact, it controls somewhere between a third and forty percent of the entire Iranian economy. Before the conflict started, the IRGC had its own navy, air force, ground forces, intelligence apparatus, and foreign legion in the Quds Force. It’s not only ideology holding the institution together. It's an enormous class of people with enormous personal financial stakes in the continuation of the current arrangement. When you kill a general in Iraq, the army wobbles. When you kill an IRGC commander, the institution absorbs it and hardens. Israel killed multiple top commanders in 2024 and 2025. The organization did not collapse. It adapted. There are some who think the IRGC’s recent comments indicated it has is following Venezuela’s lead; has seized power and wants to make peace with the US.

3. The third is geography and strategic depth. Iran is roughly four times the size of Iraq and three times the size of Libya. It covers one point six million square kilometers of mountains, deserts, and dispersed population centers. Critical military and nuclear infrastructure is buried under mountains, in tunnels reinforced with concrete and hundreds of feet of rock. Fordow was designed specifically to survive a nuclear strike. It is difficult to fully decapitate a regime that is geographically dispersed, has hardened underground command structures, and has spent forty years preparing for exactly this scenario. The ability of disparate groups to control vast swaths and for the country to degenerate into civil war is high. This administration seems to be cognizant of that risk and with total air supremacy has made substantial progress towards irreversible damage to the regime but there are challenges in what can be accomplished by air power alone.

4. The fourth is that the population is complicated in ways that get lost in Western coverage. Yes, there have been significant protests. Yes, millions of Iranians, particularly urban, educated, younger Iranians, despise the regime. But the assumption tends to be that they experience their government the way Iraqis experienced Saddam which was something purely imposed, something they’d shake off the moment an outside force gave them the opening. Iran fought the bloodiest war since World War II largely without allies, against an Iraq the West was quietly supporting. That experience left a scar that runs across ideological lines. You can find Iranians who genuinely despise the mullahs and who would still recoil from a US military intervention on Iranian soil. This stems not out of loyalty to the regime, but out of something older and harder to dislodge than political preference. They identify as Persian. A foreign airstrike doesn’t read as liberation in that context. It reads as confirmation of everything the regime has been saying since the 1970s. And Persians view themselves as the conquerors, not the conquered. Compare that to Iraq in 2003, where significant portions of the Shia and Kurdish populations welcomed the invasion, or Libya where rebels were already fighting in the streets asking for NATO intervention.

5. The fifth is the proxy architecture. Iran has spent decades building what it calls the Axis of Resistance which is a network of proxy forces spread across seven countries specifically designed so that Iran never has to absorb a full military attack alone. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq, Hamas in Gaza, assets in Syria. These are not just political allies, These are pre-positioned military capabilities Iran can activate without firing a single missile from Iranian soil. Israel did real damage to Hezbollah’s command structure and arsenal in 2024 and 2025, and that’s worth acknowledging directly. But degrading a node in a network isn’t the same as collapsing the network. Iran’s demonstrated response to losing a piece is to absorb it, adapt, and rebuild, not to negotiate from weakness. We are already seeing the damage and distraction that both Hezbollah and the Houthis have created by starting new fronts against the US and its allies. It is unclear how capable either force is or how long those forces can commit to further support. It is the unknown that makes the situation unpredictable. And is a reason to be thoughtful in our approach.

6. The sixth is that there is no ready-made replacement. One of the quiet lessons of Iraq and Libya is that regime change requires someone to hand power to. In Iraq there was at least a political infrastructure of exiled opposition parties. In Libya there were rebel militias with territorial control. In Iran the opposition is fractured, largely in exile, ideologically diverse. The opposition ranges from monarchists to secular liberals to the MEK, which is widely despised inside Iran and has zero military capacity inside the country. Without a credible successor, military strikes may not produce an acceptable regime change. These attacks could produce chaos, and chaos in a country of ninety million people with a sophisticated weapons program is far more dangerous than the regime itself. And, any successor viewed as a puppet of America will fail. The Persian culture will reject someone imposed on it. The people will have to broadly support any new political leadership. And, that has not happened. There are many reasons we do not see large numbers of Iranians trying to seize the momentum and overthrow the regime. It doesn’t matter. For this reason alone - lack of a popular uprising and rally behind a clear replacement, the regime is unlikely to change. And, Iranians were never going to accept a new leader picked by the United States and Israel. It has to be organic.

The honest historical lesson is this: the US has never successfully engineered lasting regime change in a country with these characteristics. Not through sanctions, not through airstrikes, not through proxy support. The question isn’t only whether the US has destroyed Iran’s nuclear program with these attacks, it almost certainly has degraded it significantly. The question is what comes after, and on that, history offers very little comfort. Which is why it appears this administration has not prescribed what will happen next preferring to keep all options on the table. If, as Trump encouraged in his public addresses, the population rises up and overthrows the clerical ruling class, then regime change will have been achieved and the follow-on becomes a test of who is the new regime and what kind of deal can the US reach with the new leaders. If the population fails to rise up and the regime, despite being damaged, survives (the most likely outcome), the option list gets very short, very fast. The best option is to reach a negotiated deal that keeps the Straight of Hormuz open while insuring Iran does not develop nor acquire nuclear weapons.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
Trump’s Cyber Strategy Is a Strong Playbook, but It’s All in the Execution https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-cyber-strategy-is-a-strong-playbook-but-its-all-in-the-execution https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-cyber-strategy-is-a-strong-playbook-but-its-all-in-the-execution OPINION — The White House is making a significant effort toward putting the nation’s cyber house in order. A newly released National Cyber Strategy represents a big step in the right direction for U.S. national security policy — advocating for the aggressive defense of our national infrastructure.

While the strategy includes important goals for the administration — streamlining regulation, developing the cyber workforce, defending federal networks, and partnering with the private sector — how the administration proceeds will determine whether it achieves the goals the strategy outlines. Across the strategy’s six pillars, the administration needs to clarify its arguments, refine its implementation plans, and improve its articulation of the challenge we face.

Defending U.S. national interests in cyberspace requires understanding the threat to our national security. Despite the prioritizing efforts to shape adversary behavior in the first of the strategy’s six pillars, it falls short of identifying America’s most aggressive adversaries — Russia and China. Both countries have repeatedly targeted American critical infrastructure without a meaningful response from the United States. It fails to mention China’s operational preparation of the battlefield on U.S. soil through its Volt Typhoon campaign against national critical infrastructure or Russia’s targeting of networking devices. Shaping adversary behavior in cyberspace requires identifying who the adversary is.

Pillar One provides a strong, effective argument for developing the offensive cyber capabilities and operations which are critical to enable success in today’s warfare. This White House showed its willingness to use these cyber capabilities in both Venezuela and Iran. There is an ongoing debate as to whether private companies should be allowed more agency to “hack back” against attackers, and the administration is reportedly considering an expanded role for the private sector. While the government should work with the private sector to develop these offensive capabilities, this should be limited to tool building and network defense rather than the actual conduct of offensive operations. If private companies conduct offensive cyber operations, the government risks losing control over escalation in conflict.

Pillar Two prioritizes streamlined regulations. Data and cybersecurity regulations help ensure companies have safe and secure practices. The proliferation of cyberattacks, however, has caused an explosion of cyber-related regulations. The federal government should work with the private sector to ensure that these regulations are comprehensive without being an unnecessary burden on the private sector.

Pillar Three focuses on the important goal of securing federal networks and modernizing procurement. The strategy wisely mentions post-quantum cryptography, zero-trust architecture, and cloud transition. To account for this emerging technology, the government must refine procurement processes to enable continuous improvement of federal networks.

Pillar Four calls for building strong private-public collaboration to defend critical infrastructure. This is a noble goal, but most of former Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s work over the past year contradicted this goal. She eviscerated the cyber defense agency’s workforce — reducing it by nearly 40 percent — and disrupted cybersecurity grant programs, weakening the agency’s efforts to support state and local governments and public utilities. She cancelled the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, effectively gutting the federal government’s authority to engage private companies collectively to advance cyber defense.

The Trump administration can reverse this disastrous trend and get the United States on the right track to cyber defense of critical infrastructure. Noem’s replacement should start by rejuvenating and resourcing the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

Pillar Five prioritizes American superiority in critical and emerging technologies — a necessary priority for ensuring U.S. success in cyberspace. Executing this strategy requires investment in the research centers that are the driving force for consistent improvement and development of critical and emerging technologies.

A key element of the new cyber strategy is in Pillar Six — its continued commitment to building America’s capability to develop talent in cyberspace. Without a strong cyber workforce in the government, the military, and the private sector, the nation is at risk of falling behind. The administration can validate this pillar with continued support to programs like the CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service which provides scholarships for cyber-related degrees in exchange for government service after graduation.

Because of the administration’s workforce cuts and hiring freezes, the program has faced challenges in the past year with maintaining funding and placing participants. The administration should support and expand funding for the program and prioritize hiring for participants. President Donald Trump should also establish a new military service for cyber, a U.S. Cyber Force, which would create a better mechanism for generating a military cyber workforce sufficient in size and skill to fulfill America’s strategic goals.

Trump would be wise to put the plan into action through additional executive orders (EOs) to implement the stated goals — presidentially signed orders task the federal agencies with discrete deliverables while White House strategic documents lack enforcing power. These EOs should prioritize support for CISA, cyber workforce development, and an organizational construct for taking aggressive action against U.S. adversaries. Taking the “ends” of the strategy and equipping them with “ways” and “means” via EOs will enable continued American superiority in cyberspace.

The six “Pillars of Action” in the new strategy have the potential to guide the United States toward success in cyberspace. That success will depend on whether the administration takes the necessary action to back up the sound rhetoric.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
Blockade by Permission: How Iran Determines Who Gets Through Hormuz https://belimedia.com.ng/blockade-by-permission-how-iran-determines-who-gets-through-hormuz https://belimedia.com.ng/blockade-by-permission-how-iran-determines-who-gets-through-hormuz

For roughly two weeks, the Karachi, a Pakistani-flagged Aframax tanker loaded with crude at Das Island in Abu Dhabi, sat waiting for a signal that never came through official channels. When it finally moved, it did not take the standard shipping lane.

It hugged the Iranian coast, threading through the narrow gap between the islands of Larak and Qeshm, a route mariners are normally advised against, before tracking out into the Gulf of Oman. The tanker’s AIS transponder was broadcasting throughout, as if Tehran wanted the world to watch. The message was unmistakable: Iran was not simply closing the Strait of Hormuz. It was deciding, vessel by vessel, who had earned the right to pass.

Since Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, just 21 tankers have transited the strait, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, compared with more than 100 ships daily before the conflict. The strait typically handles 21 million barrels of oil per day during normal operations, according to the IEA’s March 2026 assessment.

By this month, global oil supply had fallen by approximately 8 million barrels per day — a reduction the IEA has characterized as the largest oil supply disruption in history. Brent crude surged above $119 a barrel on March 19, the morning after Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas field, before settling back above $105 at week’s end, more than 40 percent higher than before the war began.

What is emerging from the wreckage of normal transit is something more strategically dangerous than a closed strait: a permission economy, run entirely out of Tehran.

On March 5, the IRGC announced that Iran would keep the strait closed only to ships from the United States, Israel, and their Western allies. The declaration formalized what ship-tracking data had already begun to reveal. Yet, a growing number of ships have been rerouting via Iran’s territorial waters, suggesting Tehran is allowing permission-based transits to friendly nations, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed the architecture in plain terms, saying the strait was “open, but closed to our enemies” — a formulation he repeated across multiple statements that week as Iran’s selective passage policy hardened into a deliberate framework.

According to a United States intelligence source, speaking to The Cipher Brief on background, the process is more transactional than diplomatic: a vessel requests permission directly from the IRGC, and if clearance is granted, it passes missile and drone-free. Those permissions, the source said, come at a price: vessels must pay a fee for the privilege of passage.

The beneficiaries have been carefully chosen.

Iran’s ambassador to India, Mohammad Fathali, confirmed that Tehran had allowed some Indian vessels to pass. Two Indian-flagged tankers carrying liquefied petroleum gas bound for ports in western India crossed early one morning, according to Rajesh Kumar Sinha, special secretary at India’s Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways.

A Turkish-owned ship was also allowed to transit after Ankara received permission from Tehran; earlier, the Panama-flagged but Turkish-owned LPG tanker Bogazici had broadcast via AIS that it was a Muslim vessel under Turkish operation before successfully crossing.

Moreover, Pakistan’s passage was confirmed through a combination of Iranian clearance and direct naval coordination. A military source told Reuters that Pakistani naval officials had been in contact with Iranian counterparts. “No escort was needed, being Pakistani vessels,” the source said. The Pakistan Navy nonetheless provided maritime security to the vessel throughout its journey, according to Pakistan’s Express Tribune.

Jim Krane, energy research fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute, tells The Cipher Brief that Iran is taking a page directly out of the Houthis’ playbook.

“They’re using Hormuz restrictions as a form of targeted economic sanctions on countries and firms with links to the U.S. and Israel,” he says. The Houthis did the same thing in the Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea. ‘Friendly’ cargoes were allowed to proceed, and those with connections to Israel, the United States, and Europe were denied passage.”

The logic is deliberate. Turkey is a NATO member but has maintained independent ties to Tehran. India has not joined any coalition against Iran and continues to import significant volumes of Iranian crude. China, which receives around 45 percent of its oil imports via the strait, was the first country Iran signaled it would favor, with reports emerging on March 4 that Tehran would initially allow only Chinese vessels to pass, citing Beijing’s supportive stance since the conflict began.

The architecture of the selective passage

The vessels that have made it through have not had an easy transit. Even routes shadowing the Iranian coast carry risk. On March 12, a China-owned container vessel called Source Blessing, operating under the Hapag-Lloyd and Maersk Gemini Alliance and broadcasting “China Owner” via AIS, was struck by falling debris while sailing toward Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates — not in the strait itself, but close enough to unsettle Chinese shipowners who have since largely avoided the route, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence.

The attacks have followed no discernible pattern, making planning nearly impossible because operators cannot determine the rationale for targeting one ship rather than another. On March 11, a Thai-flagged bulk carrier, the Mayuree Naree, was struck by two projectiles while transiting the strait, setting fire to the engine room and forcing 20 of its 23 crew to abandon ship. Three crew members remained missing and believed trapped below. By March 6, the IMO Secretary-General confirmed at least six seafarers had lost their lives in attacks on vessels since the war began.

GPS and AIS interference has intensified sharply, affecting more than 1,650 vessels as of March 7 and concentrating spoofed positions near Fujairah and the Gulf of Oman, according to Windward. Some captains have gone dark deliberately — India’s maritime fusion center noted a rise in vessels conducting “dark transits” with AIS disabled to obscure their positions.

Roughly 400 vessels were spotted in the Gulf of Oman, a massive backlog waiting near the chokepoint, according to satellite intelligence from mid-March. About 22 vessels carrying crude, LPG, and liquefied natural gas remained anchored in the strait itself, awaiting confirmation of safe passage.

Skip York, a nonresident fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, tells The Cipher Brief that Iran’s closure is ultimately a one-time card.

“It works in the short-term because there are no easy bypass options for all Gulf exports, especially LNG,” he says, but stresses that it accelerates the very supply diversification it seeks to prevent and “runs the risk that shipments out of the Gulf can be seen as unreliable — thus encouraging diversification to oil and gas supplies from other regions.”

Krane is blunter about the path back to open transit.

“Hard to see the U.S. and Israelis bombing their way to an open strait,” he underscores. “Either we invade Iran with ground troops, or we call off the war.”

A fracturing coalition response

The military pressure campaign escalated sharply on March 19, when Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine announced at a Pentagon press briefing that A-10 Warthog aircraft had entered the fight. “The A-10 Warthog is now in the fight across the southern flank and is hunting and killing fast-attack watercraft in the Straits of Hormuz,” Caine said, adding that AH-64 Apache helicopters from both American forces and regional allies had joined to handle Iranian one-way attack drones.

United States Central Command subsequently published footage of American strikes destroying Iranian naval assets threatening international shipping in and near the strait. Iran, despite the sustained pressure, retains significant asymmetric capabilities — mobile missile launchers, drones, and small boats that can be rapidly deployed from hidden coastal bases.

The coalition picture, meanwhile, remained fractured. At an EU summit in Brussels on March 19, European leaders doubled down on their refusal to join the American and Israeli military campaigns. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas had made clear days earlier that there was “no appetite” among member states to expand the Aspides naval mission from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz, and the summit produced no change in that position.

Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz drew a clear line at the Brussels summit, saying his country would engage only after hostilities ceased.

“We can and will commit ourselves only when the weapons fall silent,” Merz said of potential German military support to secure shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. “We can then do a great deal, up to opening sea lanes and keeping them clear, but we’re not doing it during ongoing combat operations.”

France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Japan issued a joint statement calling on Iran to “cease immediately” its drone and missile attacks and its other attempts to block the strait and expressing readiness to “contribute to appropriate efforts” to ensure safe passage — but stopping well short of deploying combat assets. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, meanwhile, acknowledged the urgency without offering specifics.

“Everybody agrees this strait cannot stay closed. It has to open up again as soon as possible. This is crucial for the world’s economy,” Rutte said. “I am confident that allies, as always, will do everything in support of our shared interests. So we will find a way forward.”

York’s near-term menu is narrow. Military pressure is one option, but he sees mediators as the more realistic path. Before Iran struck Ras Laffan on March 18, Qatar’s foreign ministry had said communications with different parties were ongoing — though Doha drew a hard line: no formal talks until Iran stopped attacking its neighbors.

Nothing like the broad convoy operations of the 1980s Tanker Wars — something tighter, more selective, and politically viable given how few allies have been willing to show up.

Read one way, Tehran’s approvals are nothing more than pure coercion. Read another, they are the unwritten beginnings of a framework, terms that exist in practice before anyone has put them on paper.

“This is in many ways positive news, as it indicates that Iran recognizes the need to allow shipping through and that it is open to such negotiations,” Christian Bueger, a maritime security scholar at the University of Copenhagen and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, tells The Cipher Brief, adding that it could “potentially open up possibilities for a more structured and effective approach, initially only for a number of states.”

Moving from passage-by-passage to a rules-based system, he argues, would require “a sort of clearinghouse and coordination mechanism that also involves the shipping industry.”

The yuan gambit and what comes next

Reports have emerged that Iranian authorities floated the idea of allowing limited tanker traffic on the condition that oil transactions be conducted in Chinese yuan. Analysts are split on how much it matters. York’s view is that the dollar’s grip on global energy markets is structural, not symbolic.

“Chinese bond markets are relatively closed, yuan convertibility is restricted, and hedging instruments are thin compared to dollar markets,” he points out.

Krane, however, is similarly skeptical, observing that Iran already settles oil exports in yuan and that it is “not a major share of the market.”

Bueger frames it differently — as deliberate provocation rather than viable policy, “an attempt to undermine U.S. dollar centrality” that Iran will ultimately struggle to enforce.

The math is brutal. More than 75 percent of global spare production capacity is in Middle Eastern countries that ship through the strait, blunting whatever relief emergency reserves can offer. The IEA’s release of 400 million barrels, the largest in its history, covers roughly 20 days of normal Hormuz flows at best.

Under new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, the strait continues to serve as Iran’s primary lever. As recently as March 20, he issued a written statement declaring that the “security” of Iran’s enemies “must be taken away” — a formulation that left the definition of enemy, as always, entirely to Tehran. The permission-economy Iran is now running is not a crisis to be managed in the short term, so much as a new geopolitical architecture being stress-tested in real time.

“The war with Iran is so unpopular globally that the sanctions strategy might work, because it allows opponents of the war to signal their displeasure with the U.S. and Israel,” Krane adds. “The countries that get rewarded are the ones willing to make small concessions to Iran — and in return, they gain access to important cargoes via the strait.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Chalk Mark Still Matters: Russian Espionage Handling in the Modern Era https://belimedia.com.ng/the-chalk-mark-still-matters-russian-espionage-handling-in-the-modern-era https://belimedia.com.ng/the-chalk-mark-still-matters-russian-espionage-handling-in-the-modern-era

KREMLIN FILES: A brush of a hand against a park bench with chalk; or, a piece of electrical tape left on a mailbox. Sometimes it’s a coded phrase buried in a routine email with an encrypted picture. This is what Russian intelligence tradecraft looks like: subtle, disciplined, and built on signals most people would never notice. With the campaign of Russian hybrid war taking place across the European continent, it is more important than ever for NATO’s intelligence services and the general public to be mindful of Russian espionage tradecraft. That same tradecraft is also shared – at least in part-- with some of our other adversaries, including Chinese intelligence, Iranian IRGC (Revolutionary Guard) or other elements, and even terrorist groups. There has never been a better time for Americans to exercise vigilance regarding our adversaries and their intelligence services.

For the Russian intelligence services (RIS), over a century of experience-- from the Cheka to the KGB and today’s SVR and GRU-- has helped refine the art of handling agents in what they consider hostile foreign environments. While technology advances, the fundamental principles remain largely unchanged: compartmentalization, deniability, patience, and psychological control. The early Bolshevik revolutionaries had to understand spy tradecraft because they were leading a major conspiracy against the Tsar. They were enemies of the state, traveling under false passports and following what they called the “rules of conspiracy” to carry out their revolution.

Some aspects of Russian agent handling have evolved, but others remain the same. In my upcoming book on Russian intelligence tradecraft (out with Naval Institute Press, April 2026), I have a chapter devoted to Russian “street tradecraft” or how they handle their recruited agents. CIA calls this practice “sticks and bricks.” The RIS train on this heavily at their intelligence academies, including surveillance/countersurveillance techniques, agent signaling and handling, and the use of operational technology in agent communications. These tactics have evolved as well over the years to include satellite- and computer/encrypted-based “covert communications,” or what the Russians commonly call “spets-svyaz.”

Studying these techniques and their patterns is more important than ever with Russia unleashing a wave of covert action and sabotage operations against NATO and the West. Invariably, among those operations, there will be handling of espionage penetrations of NATO countries and their governments. And when they have highly placed agents, or even those placed in the media, companies, or NGO’s, the SVR, GRU, and FSB will use the following types of tradecraft to handle them.

Russian Agent Signaling and Handling Practices

Signaling is fundamental to any agent-handling operation (recall that the Russians, like U.S. services, do not refer to their officers as agents—the term agent is reserved for the asset, or foreign spy, being handled). Before any message is exchanged, agents and handlers must confirm that it is safe to communicate and then signal that the material exchange has been successful. Russians use what we often like to call “urban geography,” meaning telephone poles, mailboxes, park benches, or signs. Things that won’t typically move but are part of our everyday life and can be easily described to an agent, while still being distinct.

For example, the KGB used telephone and utility poles to mark signals and packages for the recruited cryptographic spy John Walker in the 1980s, while he was betraying the U.S. Navy in the case that became known as the “Walker Family of Spies.” The utility poles had the advantage, as the KGB noted, of each bearing a specific metal plate or identifier, which Walker could verify before dropping his reels of photographed documents, often concealed among various pieces of garbage (such as photographic reels placed in empty soda cans).

Dead drops, or what our British colleagues call “dead letter boxes,” are equally fundamental to Russian agent handling. They call them “tainiki,” meaning “concealed” or “secret place.” The Russians will use sealed and concealed containers — magnets under bridges, hollowed-out stones, or waterproof capsules (sometimes just double-wrapped trash bags) set in quiet locations or buried shallow in parks. These dead drops allow material to be exchanged without face-to-face contact. The method minimizes exposure: no meeting, no surveillance photographs, no conversations to intercept, and no risk of the FBI, British BSIS, or other foreign counterintelligence services following the agent or the Russian intelligence officer (RIO) to the meeting, thereby compromising the op.

And then there are communications protocols. Historically, this meant one-time pads and burst radio transmissions used by Russian agents throughout the Cold War. All of the Russian illegals who were arrested in the “Ghost Stories” case publicized in 2010 were trained and utilized to some extent or another in these systems. They involve encrypted messaging apps, laptops wired for covert exchanges, steganography in digital images, or covert Wi-Fi exfiltration from public spaces.

With all these practices, the same rules endure from the early days of the Bolshevik Chekists: assume compromise is inevitable, and design for resilience and redundancy in agent communications.

Surveillance Operations Abroad

Abroad, the SVR and GRU use surveillance more selectively than at home. Russia is indeed a modern surveillance state, but abroad, the RIS are the hunted and watched. The FSB operates less abroad than its foreign intelligence service and military counterparts, but it has made more forays into foreign work than ever, particularly in special operations and so-called “wet work.” The goal with surveillance, for all three services, is to monitor adversarial services (i.e., all diplomats from NATO and other countries that Russia considers adversaries—a list that is growing), protect their own officers, and, sometimes, use it to find kompromat—compromising material to intimidate potential recruits via extortion.

The SVR and GRU each have dedicated surveillance teams that can deploy abroad under the guise of illegal or other official or non-official covers. But more often than not, they employ their own IO (intelligence officer/staff officers) from Residencies already abroad in order to conduct “pick-up” teams to surveil targets of interest. This is not a best practice, but one they are forced into by the PNGs (declaration persona non grata), or expulsions, of hundreds of their intelligence officers from NATO and other countries in recent years. The RIS no longer have the staffing they once did under official cover at embassies abroad.

Naruzhka, as the Russians term the surveillance art, is never just about “following.” It supports countersurveillance, ensuring GRU and SVR officers are not under adversarial monitoring before a meeting or dead drop. Also, for the various acts of operational security with meetings, Russians use surveillance detection routes, which they call “marshrut proverki” or MP’s. When they have the resources to do so, just as in Russia, the SVR, GRU, and sometimes even the FSB map the routines of foreign officials or business leaders. Their goal is to determine whether those targets are viable recruits or potential targets for other operations, like their “direct action” and assassination attempts abroad.

Lessons Learned and Forgotten, From the Cold War

Good counterintelligence isn’t about chasing cinematic spy stories, but about recognizing patterns: subtle signaling behaviors or unusual compartmentation requests. These can be seemingly low-value contacts that, over time, map a network. U.S. and allied services have disrupted sophisticated networks run by the RIS over the years, many times over. Still, the operating environment has unfortunately only become more permissive for spying as methods using technical resources expand.

Global mobility, digital platforms, academic openness, and venture capital ecosystems create frictionless access points that hostile services exploit patiently and methodically. That means counterintelligence tradecraft must be just as disciplined. Allied services need to employ pattern analysis, cross-domain collaboration, and data integration. Defensive briefings need to be practical, not paranoid or meant to intimidate employees. Early anomaly detection inside sensitive programs is important. And above all, we need to exercise our collective institutional memory: understanding that these methods are not new, only repackaged.

Companies, universities, research centers, and startups sit on the front lines, whether they realize it or not. Talent recruitment, joint research proposals, conference networking, investment offers, and data partnerships can all be legitimate, or occasionally something else. The RIS and their Chinese allies understand that long-term access is preferable to short-term theft. They cultivate relationships, not just sources, and they play on ego, especially with academics, diplomats, and businesspeople. The Chinese recruitment of former CIA officer Kevin Mallory is a case in point—recruited and contacted by the Chinese through a job-hunting social media platform.

We are targets — both in the United States and with all of our European allies. We are so, not because of paranoia, but because of capability and innovation that are the envy of Russia. That and our democracy, which Putin fears. He can’t afford for the Russian people to have the benefit of democracy and the freedoms we enjoy. If he allowed it, his reign could not have lasted as long as the longest of the Tsars.

The Russians still use the term “GP” (glavnii protivnik) to refer to the U.S. as the main adversary. Ask any RIO, and they will quickly state that the UK, Germany, and all our NATO allies rank 2,3,4 etc. We need to be aware, actively collaborate, and remain constantly vigilant. The brush of a hand against a bench. A benign LinkedIn message. A visiting scholar with a narrowly defined question set. Tradecraft hasn’t disappeared, but has adapted. Vigilance, transparency, and informed skepticism aren’t overreactions. They are the modern equivalent of checking the lampposts and utility poles for chalk marks.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
Telling China's Story Well: The PRC's Strategic Narrative as an Instrument of National Power https://belimedia.com.ng/telling-chinas-story-well-the-prcs-strategic-narrative-as-an-instrument-of-national-power https://belimedia.com.ng/telling-chinas-story-well-the-prcs-strategic-narrative-as-an-instrument-of-national-power Executive Summary

Since President Xi Jinping's 2013 directive to "tell the story of China well" (讲好中国古事), the People's Republic of China has developed a systematic thirteen-year strategy treating "discourse power" (话语权) as a core component of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). This approach has enabled measurable influence gains, demonstrating that narrative power is not supplementary propaganda but a strategic weapon comparable to hard power.

Introduction

‘Chinamaxxing’ is a 2026 viral trend where non-Chinese social media users are sharing videos of themselves “learning to be Chinese” by adopting Chinese lifestyle and wellness behaviors. This trend is a recent example of the PRC’s growing soft power and influence around the world. As the U.S.’ soft power declines, China is swiftly catching up, narrowing its gap to only 1.5 points according to BrandFinance’s 2026 Global Soft Power Index.

China’s influence has been growing due to a long-term, concerted effort to “tell the story of China well” (讲好中国古事), a phase which President Xi introduced in 2013, elevating strategic narrative to a core priority of Chinese statecraft. In 2021, he elaborated on this directive, instructing Party members to "work hard to cultivate a trustworthy, loveable, and respectable image of China" (努力塑造可信、可爱、可敬的中国形象) in order to “expand China’s circle of friends”.

Theoretical Foundation

China's strategic narrative derives from Sun Tzu's principle of subduing enemies through persuasion rather than force. Chinese strategic documents explicitly position discourse power alongside territory, population, and military capability as determinants of national strength. The "Yellow Book of International Politics" places discourse power in the outer ring of CNP factors, while Xi's 2021 elaboration called for cultivating a "trustworthy, loveable, respectable" (可信、可爱、可敬) Chinese image.

Unlike Western diplomacy that treats communications as supplementary to policy, China elevates soft power to strategic equivalence with hard power—a fundamental departure with significant implications for great power competition.

The Four Pillars Framework

The PRC organizes its strategic messaging around four thematic pillars:

The Party: Narratives like "Rural Revival" and "Peaceful Pluralism" (Xinjiang content) demonstrate CCP benevolence and governance capability.

The Dream: Stories of deliverymen-poets and young scientists portray China as a meritocracy where aspirations flourish.

The Culture: "Cosmopolitan Cool" (viral cyberpunk Chongqing content) and "Heritage Glam" position Chinese civilization as ascendant and globally relevant.

The Cooperation: Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure and peacekeeping narratives frame China as a responsible global power.

These pillars are substantiated by $962.1 billion channeled through BRI across 126 countries since 2013, with Southeast Asia ($237.7 billion) and Africa ($230.4 billion) as primary recipients.

Precision Propaganda Methodology

The PRC employs a sophisticated three-tier targeting system:

Classification segments countries by relationship type. Competitors like the United States receive passive, data-driven messaging. Partnership-open nations receive "soft stories" emphasizing cultural connection. BRI members receive proactive development and poverty alleviation content.

Stratification differentiates elite versus mass audiences. Political elites receive messaging emphasizing commonality. Academic elites receive logic-driven, research-based content. Mass audiences are subdivided by age—younger audiences via internet slang and new media; traditional audiences via conventional channels.

Grouping targets individual characteristics including gender, religion, age, and interests, with particular emphasis on cultivating internet influencers. Beijing has hosted American influencers on curated trips designed to generate organic positive content.

Measurable Impact

The strategy is delivering quantifiable results. The Lowy Institute Southeast Asia Influence Index shows China leading the United States across most ASEAN nations with an aggregate regional score of China 65 versus US 25—a 40-point advantage. China holds significant leads in Myanmar (+37), Laos (+34), Cambodia (+20), and Singapore (+22). The US leads only in the Philippines (+13) and Timor-Leste (+40).

The ISEAS State of Southeast Asia Survey 2025 reveals Southeast Asians choosing the United States over China dropped from 61.1% in 2023 to 49.5% in 2024—an 11.6 percentage point decline in one year. The BrandFinance 2026 Global Soft Power Index shows the US-China soft power gap narrowed to just 1.5 points.

Beyond influence metrics, the strategy has enabled direct interference operations. In April 2025, Philippine security officials revealed China's state-sponsored campaign to influence midterm elections through Chinese Embassy payments to local firms hiring "keyboard warriors."

Strategic Recommendations

Five imperatives emerge for US and allied policymakers:

1. Recognize the system: China's narrative architecture is coherent strategy requiring equally systematic responses.

2. Address counter-narrative gaps: The US lacks an equivalent positive narrative framework; American messaging remains reactive criticism rather than proactive aspiration.

3. Link economic and narrative strategy: BRI's $962 billion creates narrative infrastructure; debt relationships generate dependency translating into discourse power.

4. Develop precision capabilities: Allied nations require granularity in audience segmentation matching PRC's elite/mass stratification.

5. Treat ASEAN as bellwether: Southeast Asia demonstrates China is winning the influence competition; it offers both warning and laboratory for broader competition.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping's directive to "tell China's story well" has evolved into a comprehensive strategic narrative system that treats persuasion as power. Through the Four Pillars framework, precision propaganda methodology, and sustained investment across policy, pop culture, and personality channels, the PRC has achieved measurable influence gains in critical regions. The strategic implication is clear: in an era where discourse power contributes to comprehensive national power, nations that fail to proactively assert their own narratives will find themselves playing roles assigned by others. The contest for the future will be won not only by those with the strongest economies and militaries, but by those who tell the most compelling stories.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
How Close the Iran War Came to a Nuclear Disaster https://belimedia.com.ng/how-close-the-iran-war-came-to-a-nuclear-disaster https://belimedia.com.ng/how-close-the-iran-war-came-to-a-nuclear-disaster OPINION — “Nuclear facilities on both [the Iranian and Israeli] sides have been targeted. That’s where we are in this war, and that’s how far it’s escalated. If a nuclear reactor like [Iran’s] Bushehr [nuclear power plant] were hit there’s a significant risk of a meltdown and leaks of extremely dangerous radioactive materials that would affect all countries in the [Middle East] region, and, of course millions of people including Americans and American service members.”

That was Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-Texas) speaking last Tuesday at a House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on “Securing the Future: Arms Control and International Security for the Modern Age,” where Thomas G. DiNanno, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security was the only witness.

As the U.S./Israeli air attacks have increased and Iranian missile and drone strikes continued, Rep. Castro’s concern was echoed by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi.

At the hearing, Rep. Castro called attention to Iran claiming that on March 17, a projectile hit a structure about 1,000 feet from Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. IAEA’s Grossi called it “the reddest line of nuclear safety.”

On March 21, Iran missiles attacked two southern Israeli cities including Dimona, which is about 8 miles from Israel’s Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center. This Israeli research center contains a secretive nuclear reactor, plutonium reprocessing facilities, and laboratories -- and was where Israel first developed nuclear weapons in the 1960s.

During last week’s House committee hearing, Castro and DiNanno tangled over Israel’s nuclear weapons program, but I will deal with that below.

Iran’s March 21, ballistic missiles that struck Dimona, injured more than 20 people, but for the first time penetrated Israeli air defenses near what is Israel's main nuclear research facility. Iran said explicitly it was targeting the Negev nuclear research center in retaliation for U.S./Israeli attacks on Iran’s Natanz enrichment facility only a day earlier.

So ten days ago, Iran demonstrated its ability to reach Israel’s most sensitive nuclear-related sites, despite President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claiming earlier that Iran’s missile capabilities had been “destroyed.”

On the evening March 24, hours after the above-mentioned House hearing, Iran claimed a U.S. missile struck the premises of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, but there was no damage to the nuclear reactor, no injuries to staff, and the plant continued to operate normally with radiation levels stable. That was the second such attack at Bushehr in just over a week.

A third attack in the vicinity of Bushehr took place last Friday when Israeli planes struck the Shahid Khondab Heavy Water Complex in Arak, a key plutonium production site for possible use in making nuclear weapons. Israel also hit a uranium processing facility in the Iranian city of Yazd, where they extract raw materials essential to the uranium enrichment process. Again, the reports were there were no radiation leaks.

Al Jazeera reported from Tehran that these recent strikes on two major Iranian nuclear-related facilities could prompt the Iran military to target Israeli nuclear sites in Dimona again, as it did on March 21. At the same time, IAEA Director General Grossi reiterated his call for “military restraint to avoid any risk of a nuclear accident."

At the March 24, House hearing, Rep. Castro asked Under Secretary of State for Arms Control DiNanno, “What is the [Trump] administration’s assessment of the risk of nuclear escalation or radiological disaster in this war and what steps is the United States taking to prevent it?”

DiNanno initially replied that “operational questions would rest with [U.S. Central Command’s Commander] Adm. [Charles] Cooper,” and that “all resources that the [State Department] Nonproliferation Bureau [has] would be made available and are available should they want it.”

DiNanno quickly added, “I’ve had conversations with my colleagues in the War Department specifically to this issue and operationally the War Department would address the type of things.”

Asked by Castro if he could share any information he had received, DiNanno replied, “Admiral Cooper would be the decision-maker on how that would be, any hypothetical situation would be, addressed.”

Castro then asked a series of questions about Israel’s nuclear weapons that put DiNanno in a difficult situation, but one that has a complicated history which I will explain below.

Castro said, “I don't believe that you've adequately addressed the nuclear risks here. So, let's take a step back and establish some basic facts. The [Trump] administration has said that Iran is, or was, close to developing nuclear weapons, but they haven't discussed what Israel's capacity or capabilities are. So, I want to ask you, does Israel have nuclear weapons?”

DiNanno answered, “I'm not prepared to comment on that.”

“You’re not prepared to comment on that,” Castro said, and then went on, “It’s a very basic question. We are with an ally, conducting a war against Iran. We all know what American capabilities are; the U.S. Government has spoken what Iran’s capabilities are. Can you tell us what Israel's capabilities are? The consequences, as you know, are grave. This war continues to escalate tell us something as Congress, as the oversight body what is Israel's nuclear capability in terms of weapons?

“I can't comment on that specific question,” DiNanno said, “I'd have to refer you to the Israelis on that.”

“Does that mean you don’t know?” Castro asked.

DiNanno responded, “I can’t comment on that sir.”

I have to point out that Under Secretary DiNanno was following an historic, classified Executive Branch directive which for decades has forced U.S. officials into what’s been called “implausible deniability,” when it comes to the question of Israel’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

Books have been written about how Israel secretly began a nuclear weapons development program in the late 1950s and with the help of some French and American manufacturers by 1967 had built a few nuclear bombs with radioactive material from a nuclear reactor near Dimona.

Aware of the Israeli activity, U.S. Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson tried to halt the program but, according to Israeli-American historian Avner Cohen, in 1969 an unwritten agreement was apparently reached between President Richard Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir.

The agreement was that Israel would not confirm it had nuclear weapons nor test any; the U.S. would not push Israel to give them up nor join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition, the U.S. Government adopted as policy that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons remain a classified secret.

That official U.S. Government policy has continued since 1969, and as a result there is limited public discussion and press coverage of Israel’s nuclear weapons. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in 2025 estimated Israel possesses approximately 90 nuclear warheads, but others suggest numbers as high as 200 with nuclear warheads on ballistic and cruise missiles and well as nuclear bombs.

Nonetheless, there is coverage not just in the American press, but also in the Israeli press.

For example, back in June 2002, I wrote in The Washington Post a story that began, “Israel has acquired three diesel submarines that it is arming with newly designed cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, according to former Pentagon and State Department officials, potentially giving Israel a triad of land-, sea- and air-based nuclear weapons for the first time.”

In 2016, the Times of Israel, using a standard attribution “according to foreign reports” as a way of not violating their country’s secrecy, described those same Israeli submarines as “capable of delivering a nuclear payload.”

One reason Iran’s hardliners want a nuclear weapon is because Israel, their nearby neighbor, has had them for decades.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran Exposed a New Reality for U.S. Air Power https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-exposed-a-new-reality-for-us-air-power https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-exposed-a-new-reality-for-us-air-power OPINION — For thirty years, American wars have contained a quiet assumption: that the skies were uncontested. From Grenada and Panama, through Desert Storm, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya - the US could reliably achieve air superiority very quickly, almost a preordained fighting condition. Operation Epic Fury, however, has challenged that assumption, marking the first time in a generation the US has been forced to establish air superiority. And though air superiority was achieved over Iran in less than 100 hours, that superiority required a massive, multi-layered effort that contrasts with three decades of precedent.

For a generation, US policymakers and military planners have taken air superiority as a starting condition of war. No adversary, not since Korea or Vietnam, has had the capacity to challenge US warplanes for control of the skies. Panama for example, during Operation Just Cause, had neither fighter jets nor surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and had to rely on small arms fire to thwart American air power. In Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban’s air force featured a handful of Cold War relic aircraft and MANPADS, left over from the Soviet-Afghan War, against which US forces could operate with impunity. Even during Operation Desert Storm, the US leveraged electronic warfare and stealth aircraft to destroy Saddam’s French-built, centralized “KARI” Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) in a concentrated effort, establishing air superiority rapidly. And again, in Serbia, NATO was able to dominate the air by effectively bypassing Serbia’s capable, yet fragmented, SAMs. On different continents, in different decades, against different adversaries—the outcome was always the same: the US expected to achieve air superiority and did so quickly.

But Iran offered the US a different kind of challenge. Tehran, long hampered by sanctions, understanding they could never achieve parity with the US, didn’t try to build an equivalent air force. Instead, Tehran spent decades building a defensive system that could complicate access, making the establishment of air superiority costly and uncertain. Rather than invest in cutting-edge fighters that could go toe-to-toe with the F-22, Iran invested in IADS, including layered SAMs, radar networks, ballistic missiles, drones, and hardened infrastructure. The result was a patch of airspace that the US would need to fight to dominate.

Iran’s air defenses fell quickly, too, in just four days, but it was only after the execution of a massive, multi-domain campaign that relied on unprecedented intelligence sharing from a regional partner; unlike recent conflict that leaned heavily on limited air assets, Iran required a coordinated multi-domain effort across cyber, space, and air. Phase one featured the blinding and spoofing of Iranian defenses with cyber, space, and electronic warfare systems. Phase two featured the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), the destruction of Iranian radars and missiles with stealth aircraft (i.e., the B-2 Spirit) and standoff missiles (i.e., Tomahawk, PrSM). And phase three, penetration, with full strike operations and heavy bombers dropping guided bombs. In all, more than a thousand targets were struck. The point being: that even for the world’s most capable air force, dismantling Iran’s IADS required an enormous and coordinated effort; air superiority was achieved - but it was far from automatic.

Ultimately, American and Israeli forces needed just four days to establish air superiority over Iran, whose airspace now, more than one month into the conflict, is essentially permissive. And while the four-day timeline suggests a rapid collapse, the speed of victory masks the exertion that was needed to achieve air superiority, and what that exertion suggests about future wars.

Iran is formidable only by regional standards; their IADS is modest when compared to the air defense networks of major powers like Russia or China who can boast dense IADS, long-range missiles, layered air defenses, and distributed networks. And the major powers, no doubt taking notes on the hindering effects of Iran’s IADS, will likely be inclined to continue bolstering their own IADS networks. From the American perspective the problem here is clear: if dismantling Iran’s system required such a massive opening campaign, the challenge of gaining air superiority against a near-peer will certainly be far greater. Epic Fury may well have established a new precedent, setting the tone for the next generation of US warfighting, in which control of the air is no longer a default starting point, but rather the first objective.

For thirty years, American military power has operated under an assumption gained through the Cold War’s end: that the skies are ours. Operation Epic Fury suggests the first meaningful counter to that assumption. And though the US maintains a technological advantage in the air, the next generation of war could require the US to once again fight for control of the skies.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
Taking a Stand on Adversaries’ Influence in the Western Hemisphere https://belimedia.com.ng/taking-a-stand-on-adversaries-influence-in-the-western-hemisphere https://belimedia.com.ng/taking-a-stand-on-adversaries-influence-in-the-western-hemisphere THE BLUF: The January 3rd Operation Absolute Resolve ousted Venezuelan Dictator Nicholas Maduro but the full consequences of the US operation continue to play out. With that move, the subsequent Shield of America’s coalition, and apparent blockade of Cuba, the Trump administration has made one message clear to the world and that is that the US is pushing back on adversaries’ influence in the western hemisphere. This is a vast change from the last twenty or so years where we watched US influence in the region, especially Venezuela, wane amid an increase in Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence. The US administration’s 2025 National Security strategy forewarned of this policy change with the call for the US to renew the Monroe Doctrine which the last administration put aside. The 1823 doctrine says the United States would reject other countries’ influence in Latin America.

Strategic Competition

Over the last twenty years or so, China has made the most inroads in Latin America. China started enhancing its relationships in the region through trade and infrastructure building which many dismissed as just global economics. Over time, China branched out to other fields to include selling weapons systems, buying minerals, allegedly building spying stations in Cuba, building regional infrastructure to include communications, and strengthening diplomatic ties.

· China started its run for dominance in the region by acquiring the ports at either end of the Panama Canal and later, by acquiring the largest freight port in the hemisphere in the Bahamas.

· China’s largest nondomestic space facility is located in Argentina’s Patagonian Desert. In February 2026, the House Select Committee on China reported that their investigation uncovered that China has developed an extensive network of dual-use space ground stations and telescopes across Latin America and uses this network to collect intelligence and boost the PLA's warfighting capacity. The investigation found at least eleven China-linked space facilities established across Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, and Brazil.

· In December 2025, China released a new LATAM Policy paper that underscored the significance of the region to China and laid out new programs for closer cooperation on all fronts.

With the exception of Venezuela and Cuba, Russia has had less success in building influence in the region. However, its military-to-military relationship with Venezuela prior to the US extracting Maduro in January was robust.

· Russian Su-30MK2 fighter jets were a key part of the Venezuelan Air Force. Venezuela also had Russian S-300VM (Antey-2500) battalions, Pantsir-S1, and Buk-M2E.

· According to Reuters, Wagner Group members were in Caracas in 2019 to provide security for President Maduro following protests against his regime. Members of the group also trained elite combat units in Venezuela and were spotted in Venezuela as recently as 2024.

· The 2025 Joint Strategic Partnership Initiative between Russia and Venezuela reaffirmed their intent to coordinate under the OPEC+ framework, avoid predatory competition, and jointly stabilize global energy markets, coordinate on communications and counterterrorism. The document also envisaged closer cooperation between Russia and Venezuela at the United Nations and other international organizations and in the area of arms control, along with joint opposition to the imposition of unilateral sanctions.

· In October 2025, Maduro himself said publicly that Venezuela had more the 5,000 IGLA-S surface to air missiles positioned around the country.

Iranian influence in the region is less robust than that of the other adversaries and focused on evading sanctions and financial support to its proxy groups, especially Hizballah.

· Petkaap III fast attack boat, CM-90 anti-ship missiles, GPS jammers, and passive detection systems are the most visible aspects of Venezuela’s ties with Iran.

· In the past two decades, Venezuela and Iran deepened their ties with increasing industrial, economic, and military cooperation that includes fast-attack boats, anti-ship missiles, drones, and even a Hizballah presence.

· Iranian-made drones were reportedly being produced in Venezuela, and Iranian-designed fast-attack naval vessels have also appeared. Caracas began with the “Arpía-001” surveillance UAV in early 2012 and quickly graduated, with Iranian help, to the EANSA assembly line beside El Libertador Air Base. Imagery and leaked purchase orders indicate a yearly output of approximately 50 Mohajer-2 derivatives (ANSU-100) and sub-kits for the stealthier Shahed-171 clone (ANSU-200).

· In 2023, Brazil’s “Operation Trapiche” exposed a Hezbollah cell planning attacks against Jewish sites in São Paulo, with agents trained in Lebanon and employing local criminals for plausible deniability.

· In 2024, Peruvian authorities arrested an Iranian Quds Force officer, Majid Azizi, for planning assassinations of Israeli citizens during a summit in Lima.

Why it Matters

Throughout the Soviet period, the US was aware of the Soviet Union’s Active Measures campaign in the Western Hemisphere and sometimes clashed with the Soviets over it. The two superpowers played proxy wars for influence throughout the region, funding political parties, sending in arms, and in some cases, inciting revolutions. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the US ignored the ongoing competition in its own hemisphere and US primacy faded.

With increased awareness of the grey zone and cognitive warfare activity against the US worldwide, there is renewed interest in securing this hemisphere. Our ability to establish secure borders depends on having strong and friendly neighbors. To do this we need a combination of good trade, diplomacy, and a persistent intelligence capability that will alert the US and our neighbors as to what our adversaries are doing in the grey zone.

Conclusion

Multiple US administrations have turned a blind eye to our adversaries gaining influence into this hemisphere. Historically, we have ignored their activities or explained them away as merely open trade. This has resulted in security threats near our borders. We have allowed these adversaries to compromise our supply lines, our communications, and our transportation routes. This puts them in position to both gather important information and cutoff our accesses if they choose. This post Absolute Resolve moment gives the US the opportunity to put our adversaries on notice that the US will not stand by and allow them to infiltrate the US through its neighbors.

We know that the US can be a better partner than its adversaries. We need to double down and prove that to our neighbors while standing firm that we will not allow those adversaries to infringe on our resource and supply routes. It will take more than might to bring our neighbors around but steady diplomatic interaction and partnering will ensure that the US redevelops the robust relationships that should be our primary focus in the Western Hemisphere.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s “Most Dangerous Dependence”: Can the U.S. Win the Critical Minerals Competition? https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-most-dangerous-dependence-can-the-us-win-the-critical-minerals-competition https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-most-dangerous-dependence-can-the-us-win-the-critical-minerals-competition

What U.S. national security interest binds Greenland, Argentina, the Congo, and the Cook Islands? What was the impetus for the recent “strategic resilience” bill in Congress? And as Washington retreats from many global alliances, what’s the issue driving a U.S. push for closer ties with more than 50 nations?

The answer to all three questions involves critical minerals – integral elements in everything from smartphones to cars to major weapons systems, and an issue that has surged in strategic importance as China weaponizes its advantages in the minerals supply chain.

“For years, China has leveraged its dominance of critical minerals by manipulating global markets and supply chains,” Senator Todd Young (R-Ind.), a co-sponsor of the “strategic resilience” measure, told The Cipher Brief. “These materials are used in everything from fighter jets and submarines to missile systems and drones, and China’s monopolization has created a significant vulnerability.”

Experts agree: the competition for these minerals poses one of the most important strategic challenges of our time, and the U.S. faces a long and uphill struggle to counter China’s advantage. Critical minerals are often referred to as “the new oil”; one leading expert calls them “America’s most dangerous dependence.”

The push to reduce that dependence has been in the works for more than a decade, but only recently has the U.S. begun implementing an industrial and diplomatic strategy of its own, aimed at diversifying the supply chain and at least denting China’s near-monopoly on the supply and refining of these minerals.

“This is the culmination of looking at every single tool in the toolbox and the broader strategic issues,” Fabian Villalobos, Senior Engineer at RAND and Professor at the RAND Graduate School of Public Policy, told The Cipher Brief. “The U.S. is moving from analysis and into operations. There’s a point when you stop doing analysis and you start doing something about it.”

China’s Big Head Start

China’s path to dominance in the critical minerals space – like many aspects of its rise to global superpower – has been a long time coming. Since the 1990s, Beijing has tightly controlled the mining, processing, and export of critical minerals, backing its state-owned companies, restricting foreign investment, and consolidating production.

Today, China isn’t just a prolific miner of minerals; it dominates the ecosystem that brings them to market. The 2025 USGS Mineral Commodity Summary reads like a litany of China’s hold on the supply chain: The U.S. is completely dependent on imports for 12–13 minerals on its list of critical minerals; China is the leading supplier for 24 minerals for which the U.S. import reliance exceeds 50%; and for 19 of the 20 minerals that the U.S. rates as most strategically important, China refines at least 70% of the global supply – and more often well beyond 90%.

China’s chokehold wouldn’t matter much if U.S.-China relations were on a smooth path; they aren’t, of course, and last year the issue made headlines because China played its “minerals card” to great effect. Following President Trump’s imposition of tariffs against China in April, Beijing responded by tightening export controls on rare earths and magnets, and six months later it expanded the restrictions, targeting minerals essential for the U.S. defense sector. A Trump-Xi summit led to an easing of the restrictions, but the message had been sent: on a vital issue for U.S. economic and national security, China has the U.S. over a barrel.

Villalobos said that as important as China’s grip on the minerals supply chain is its industrial policy – a package of state financing, price manipulation, and export controls that aims for dominance in key high-tech sectors.

“Xi Jinping has directed components within China to create a world dependent on its industry,” Villalobos told The Cipher Brief. “And China wants to dominate the industry of the future – whether that’s electric vehicles, batteries, robots or high-tech weapons.” He cited the example of gallium, a mineral used in semiconductors for solar panels and LED screens. By imposing export restrictions on gallium, he said, Beijing has driven some foreign companies to house manufacturing in China. “What China does is incentivize technology into their country.”

Meanwhile, China has extended its supply advantage by striking deals with mineral-rich nations in Latin America and Africa. The result? A near-stranglehold over the global supply chain.

On the Home Front: “Project Vault” and a “Strategic Resilience Reserve”

Successive U.S. administrations have been working on the minerals issue for more than a decade. The Obama Administration’s Department of Energy issued a Critical Minerals Strategy in 2010; since 2020, the Pentagon has spent more than $439 million to establish a domestic rare earth element supply chain; and the Biden Administration established the 14-nation Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) in 2022.

The second Trump administration has “turned it up a notch,” as Villalobos said, with a flurry of measures on the domestic and global fronts.

On February 2, President Trump announced “Project Vault,” a $12 billion plan to build a U.S. stockpile of critical minerals, spur domestic production and insulate producers from future supply shocks. The project is backed by a $10 billion loan from the Export-Import Bank of the United States (by far the largest outlay in the bank’s history), along with $2 billion in private funding. The stockpile – which Trump likened to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve – would ensure a 60-day emergency supply for manufacturers. As President Trump put it, “We don’t want to ever go through what we went through a year ago”—that is, when China imposed the export controls.

Observers note that Trump is taking a China-style approach – leveraging the state’s economic and political power to secure supply. As laid out, Project Vault would employ many of Beijing’s tactics – state financing, partial government ownership of mining firms (most notably a multibillion-dollar public-private partnership with MP Materials), and strategic stockpiling to support domestic producers.

“The Trump administration has proven willing not only to convene these initiatives but to back them with significant taxpayer resources,” Michael Froman, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in February. “In the past six months, the administration has announced plans to deploy tens of billions of dollars in public capital—taking equity stakes in and extending credit to strategic firms—in an effort to reengineer entire global supply chains.”

Prior to the “Project Vault” announcement, Senator Young and three other members of Congress – a bipartisan group – introduced the SECURE Minerals Act, which would establish a $2.5 billion “Strategic Resilience Reserve” (SRR) for critical minerals, support domestic industry, create storage facilities to warehouse supplies of key materials, and “act as a market stabilizer against price manipulation.”

“To grow our independence and protect our national security,” Sen. Young told The Cipher Brief, “we need to ensure the United States has a secure and accessible supply of critical minerals.”

Mahnaz Khan, Vice President of Policy for Critical Supply Chains at Silverado Policy Accelerator, co-authored a recent Council on Foreign Relations report on countering China’s advantage. “What is emerging under the Trump Administration,” Khan told The Cipher Brief, “is a new American industrial playbook for critical minerals.” The overall approach, she said, “is about rebuilding and reshoring an entire rare earths sector to reduce decades of dependence on China.”

On the Global Stage: A Hunt for Allies

Experts and policymakers agree that the U.S. cannot replicate China’s 30-year head start in mining and refining – at least not anytime soon. With that in mind, the Trump Administration is turning to other parts of the world for help.

On February 4, Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted leaders from more than 50 countries in a gathering “to reshape the global market for critical minerals and rare earths.” The meeting served as a launch for the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement initiative (FORGE), which the U.S. pitched as a coalition of nations that would work as a counterweight to China. The State Department said FORGE would demonstrate “the benefits of working together…to strengthen diversified, resilient, and secure critical minerals supply chains.”

It was a striking show of multilateralism for an administration that has taken a hardline approach to many longstanding alliances.

One week later, the Trump administration sent the largest-ever U.S. delegation to Africa’s biggest mining conference – a nod to that continent’s rich supply of critical minerals, and another example of engagement in a part of the world the Trump Administration had neglected.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has pursued a slew of bilateral deals; as Axios put it, “President Trump is bringing his prospector’s pick to nearly every corner of the globe — including Ukraine, Venezuela and Greenland — in a push to boost the U.S. supply of minerals.”

On the day of the 54-nation minerals meeting, the State Department announced critical minerals frameworks or MOUs with Argentina, Morocco, the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates, Great Britain and a half dozen other countries. These followed larger-scale agreements: a multibillion-dollar deal with Australia that officials said could provide up to 40 of the 50 minerals the U.S. deems essential; a U.S.-Saudi Arabia agreement to develop a refinery in the kingdom; and a U.S.-Japan trade agreement that includes Japanese investment in a Georgia-based plant that produces synthetic diamond grit – a mineral used in advanced manufacturing and semiconductors. Last year the U.S. signed a minerals deal with Ukraine, and Trump has acknowledged that rare earths are a part of his interest in gaining control over mineral-rich Greenland.

“It’s got to come from somewhere,” Villalobos said of the wide-ranging push for more global supply. “The harder piece is where you put up non-Chinese refineries.”

When it comes to convincing other nations to sign on to an anti-China minerals coalition, the U.S. may face headwinds. Many U.S. allies have bristled at American tariffs and threats and ridicule from Trump and his top aides. As Politico noted, “Some will be skeptical about America’s new-found zeal for cooperation on this issue.”

“In the aftermath of a year of disruptive diplomacy, culminating most recently with the tension over Greenland with the rest of NATO, many have asked how willing other countries are to work with us,” Froman said. “Other countries have domestic politics, too, and based on many of their recent statements, our goodwill is diminishing.”

“Leapfrogging” China – and Other Out-of-the-Box Ideas

Some experts have argued that given the urgency of the issue and China’s huge head start, out-of-the-box thinking will be required.

A report published this month by the Council on Foreign Relations and Silverado Policy Accelerator argues that the U.S. should aim to “leapfrog” China’s dominance by “scaling disruptive innovation, recovery, and recycling” rather than striving to “out-mine, out-process, or out-fund China.”

“The United States will not secure its critical mineral future through traditional mining and processing alone,” the report said. “The most promising way to leapfrog China’s entrenched position is for the U.S. government to maximize breakthrough materials engineering, advanced extraction and processing technologies, waste recovery and recycling.”

In a similar vein, a study published in Science said that the U.S. could meet most of its critical mineral needs by recovering metals from existing mining waste. Researchers at the Colorado School of Mines analyzed waste from 54 active U.S. mines and concluded that “byproduct recovery” could supply sufficient amounts of copper, lithium, nickel, rare earths and other materials; for 15 minerals, including gallium and germanium, the report claimed that recovering less than 1% of waste could replace all imports; for another 11, including lithium, 1–10% recovery would suffice.

Villalobos is skeptical that “leapfrogging” China is possible anytime soon. While he supports greater investment and innovation in domestic mining, he said real impact would take years. On the recycling front, he and others noted that China has a head start there as well – given that EV battery producers have built-in recycling departments, and that it may be difficult to make American recycling and recovery economically viable. “It doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be doing these things,” he said, “but it’s just part of a long-term strategy.”

Then there’s the prospect of deep-sea mining – which is where the Cook Islands come in. Last year the U.S. announced bilateral cooperation with the 15-island nation, located between New Zealand and Hawaii, on seabed mineral exploration within the islands’ Exclusive Economic Zone. That’s a vast area that is rich in cobalt, nickel, titanium, and other critical minerals. The announcement followed an April Trump administration executive order – “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources” – that would allow for deep-sea resource exploration in international waters. A RAND report found that “the emergence of a seabed mining industry would introduce a new source of supply for critical minerals,” but RAND and others have noted that deep-sea mining is highly controversial from an environmental standpoint, and that China has been aggressively pursuing deals with the Cook Islands and other Pacific island nations as well.

Further “out of the box,” some hi-tech leaders believe AI and quantum computing could be part of the solution, by helping to design synthetic substitutes and alloys. Speaking at this year’s World Economic Forum, SandboxAQ CEO Jack Hidary said these tools could compress decades of material development into a few years, thus bypassing China’s near-monopoly on refining.

Experts stress that in the critical minerals competition, it’s not a choice between domestic innovation and global diplomacy and out-of-the-box ideas; the U.S. should be trying all of these measures – and more.

“A long-term strategy must take an all-of-the-above approach,” Farwa Aamer, Director of South Asia Initiatives at the Asia Society, wrote in a recent report. “It must build capacity in the United States and among trusted partners, while also supporting research into alternatives and substitution technologies.”

A Long Road Ahead

President Trump has already claimed that victory in the minerals competition is on the horizon. “About a year from now, we’ll have so much critical mineral and rare earths that you won’t know what to do with them,” Trump said at a signing ceremony for the U.S.-Australia minerals agreement.

Experts have a different view – noting that new mines and refineries will take a decade or more to come online, some would-be allies may be reluctant to join the U.S. coalition, and the Trump administration’s recent funding pledges may face political challenges as well.

The domestic policy “is not without risk,” Froman said. “The U.S. government has announced more than $30 billion of direct funding commitments…related to critical minerals. In a number of cases, the government is taking direct equity stakes in private companies, pushing the envelope of industrial policy into the realm of state capitalism. The taxpayer stands to lose a great deal if these investments and loans go south.”

The Nikkei Asia Review surveyed experts after the “Project Vault” announcement and said that overall, the U.S. faces a “decade-long” road to loosening China’s grip on rare earths” – with refining representing the principal challenge.

Meanwhile, China isn’t standing still. Beyond the lever of export controls, Beijing has moved to build a global minerals alliance of its own, and it continues to challenge U.S. efforts on the world stage. Experts note China’s recent success in gaining control of a major Tanzanian rare-earth mine, which for years had been held by an Australian company and seen as a model for creating a China-free supply of rare-earth minerals. According to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, Beijing now stands to receive all the rare earths flowing from Tanzania, one of the world’s major emerging sources of the elements, by 2029.

Can the U.S. still “win” the critical minerals competition? Experts say the answer is Yes, if winning means reducing vulnerability and building a coalition strong enough to blunt Chinese coercion. Put differently, success would mean that China cannot use its minerals advantage to shut down U.S. defense or tech production.

“Winning in critical minerals means reducing net import reliance by scaling mining and processing at home and with trusted partners,” Silverado’s Khan said, “so that China can no longer use these critical minerals as leverage in trade conflicts, securing U.S. economic and national security for the long term.”

Villalobos said the most important challenge is ensuring a price floor for minerals, one that lasts and exists for more than one company at a time (at the moment only the MP deal has such a provision). “If you can get a price floor that applies to the whole industry and that’s global in scale, that’s victory. After that it’s just a waiting game.”

But if winning is defined as replacing China as the world’s dominant minerals power, and doing so anytime soon, then it would appear the answer is “No.” And even in the best-case scenario, much will be needed for a “win”: a consistent stream of domestic investments – likely running north of $100 billion; effective cooperation with allies; far greater refining capacity; and innovation in domestic mining, recycling and possible alternatives to existing minerals. Again, an all-of-the-above approach – along with a measure of patience.

“Do I believe that the U.S. has a chance?” Villalobos said. “The answer is yes. The reality of the ‘yes’ is that it’s going to take a while.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 16:34:24 +0100 FirstHandNews
After the War and After Putin: Three Potential Succession Scenarios for Russia’s Modern Tsar https://belimedia.com.ng/after-the-war-and-after-putin-three-potential-succession-scenarios-for-russias-modern-tsar https://belimedia.com.ng/after-the-war-and-after-putin-three-potential-succession-scenarios-for-russias-modern-tsar THE KREMLIN FILES / COLUMN — Recent weeks have seen seismic shifts in the world’s authoritarian landscape: from the dramatic removal of Venezuela’s long-standing strongman to the sudden death of Iran’s supreme leader amid escalating conflict. These events have fueled speculation about the broader fate of entrenched autocrats, and, invariably, within that group lies Russia’s own iron-fisted ruler. When, if ever, might Vladimir Putin answer for his crimes over decades in power, and could the Russian people ever revolt against his regime?

The short answer is that a popular uprising in Russia is still highly unlikely. The FSB and other Russian security services hold a tight grip on power. Democratic opposition and the intelligentsia within Russia were largely expunged or fled the country over the past two decades. But that very unlikelihood of overthrow underscores why the puzzle of Putin’s succession is both urgent and consequential, even for Russians. This is an especially salient issue now, as peace talks grind on to end the war in Ukraine. That conflict has long been central to Putin’s self-styled legacy, and continues to shape his hold on Russia.

Speculation about Putin’s health and who might succeed him has circulated for years, in a manner reminiscent of the late Soviet period, when the infirmities of aging leaders were whispered but never openly acknowledged. If and when the war in Ukraine ends, such speculation will almost certainly intensify. Putin has long viewed the war, and the reassertion of Russian control over Ukraine, as central to his place in Russia’s long continuum of rulers. No doubt Putin hopes to be revered one day, despite atrocities committed by his troops, as “Vlad the Great.” Only Joseph Stalin and Russia's longest-reigning Empress Catherine ruled Russia longer than Putin.

Rumors have periodically surfaced that Putin, who turns 74 in 2026, has Parkinson’s disease, or that multiple “doubles” are deployed for public appearances. Theories abound that he has these doubles because, behind closed doors, he is gravely ill. Yet for more than a decade, most of these claims have proven unfounded. Putin has made a point of countering them with carefully choreographed displays of vigor: judo matches, ice hockey games, and the now-iconic images of him riding bare-chested on horseback. Still, the rumors persist, echoing an older Russian and Soviet tradition in which succession is opaque and fraught with uncertainty. And so the question lingers, increasingly unavoidable: what comes after the war for Russia’s leadership, and, what comes after Putin?

For Russians, all the speculation on the health of the state’s leader is a familiar theme from Soviet times. This was especially true in the 1980s, when a series of General Secretaries of the USSR passed away within a few years of one another. Soviet citizens grew accustomed to state TV channels going blank and playing Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake, one of the most famous pieces of classical Russian music, without commentary. It was the recurring sign for the average Russian/Soviet citizen that, “Well, another of the old guys has passed, so let’s see who comes next.” Sooner or later, Swan Lake will again return to Russian state TV channels, and a successor will pick up the reins.

Intelligence agencies around the world are undoubtedly forecasting internally for their governments. However, ultimately, no one knows for sure what Putin’s succession plan is—if he has one—except the modern Russian tsar himself. Remembering historical precedent may be useful for predictions of how this may play out. Putin certainly has absolute power, like a tsar, and, in the case of the Romanovs, succession for 300 years of Russian history was determined by the family line. Since 1917, when Nicholas II was forced to abdicate, the leadership of the Soviet Union, and then Russia, has been defined less by democracy than by a “preferred candidate.” Traditionally, the regime worked out this candidate, or a small ruling element within it, and then the Russian, and previously Soviet, people were asked to acquiesce and rubber-stamp the selection with a sham vote.

This is, in fact, what happened when Stalin passed away in 1953. NKVD head Lavrentiy Beria attempted to take control, but was shot by General Batitsky, who was loyal to the heavily decorated World War II “Hero of the Soviet Union” and future Minister of Defense, General Georgiy Zhukov. Zhukov and the military had the support of others in the ruling circle. None of them could tolerate the idea of Beria, a known pedophile, torturer, and murderer of millions under Stalin’s purges, bringing a new terror for the Soviet people.

The ruling circle collectively agreed on Nikita Krushchev as the successor, and the military was only too relieved to not be under the guillotine of Beria and the NKVD, which had purged their ranks so heavily. The NKVD was reorganized into the KGB, but retained much of its mission. The Soviet people were asked to validate the choice by sham votes of the Communist Party, then, and for decades to come. This was the Soviet model, in which a ruler was chosen by consensus within the inner circle, the Politburo.

This will also likely be the Russian model after Putin, particularly if he does not leave a firm successor in place, but with some crucial distinctions. There is no Politburo any longer, but the siloviki, or “strongmen,” who control the primary security services and ministries. Who would likely be a successor candidate the siloviki could coalesce behind, or whom Putin might strongly suggest they endorse?

THREE SCENARIOS WHO MIGHT RULE RUSSIA

There are three possible scenarios worth reviewing: intelligence-driven succession, based on the security services and their choice; military-driven succession, based on a General or other candidate from the military (like Zhukov, who was widely popular after World War II and many thought for a time would succeed Stalin); or an unexpected successor, one that Putin may have ordained in private, or still will.

The most likely immediate successor to Putin, even if only an interim one, will likely come from his closest circle of siloviki, with whom he served in the KGB and who have remained close to him throughout his entire career and long reign. Nearly all of them are veterans of the KGB or the security services. The head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Alexander Bortnikov, is probably the top candidate in the event of a sudden succession or health crisis. He heads the internal protective service that guards the regime, and whose loyalty Putin prizes the most. Bortnikov holds the rank of General of the Russian Army, the equivalent of a five-star general in the U.S., while never having served in the armed forces.

Putin gave Bortnikov that rank to ensure he is respected and revered by the entire state apparatus. So his case for succession is clear, and he also has his own troops—the FSB special operations elements, including Alpha, Vympel, and three other special operations teams, which are respected and feared by the government and the Russian people. Bortnikov could also call on aspects of the 200,000-strong FSB Border Guard troops if needed to help consolidate power in the event of a sudden succession or civil turmoil. But Bortnikov is Putin’s exact age, and his succession would likely be short, raising the problem faced in the 1980s, one old man after another.

Other possible successors and former intelligence comrades of Putin in this line are increasingly being speculated about. One could be Nikolay Patrushev, former Secretary of the Security Council and former head of the FSB. Another candidate would be Sergey Ivanov, also on the Security Council now, another former senior FSB leader and former Minister of Defense. Patrushev and Ivanov are both closely trusted Putin advisors, and both were also two of the hawks most in favor of the full invasion of Ukraine. They might be chosen to ensure that Putin’s plans for Ukraine, incorporating the occupied regions, and potential further aggression and plans for it, are not abandoned, at least for a few more years of their potential rule, if selected. But if Patrushev or Ivanov were to be the successor, they would be a short-term one, given their age. Turning to other aged cronies sets Russia up for another 1980s-style scenario: one elderly leader ruling for a few years, dying, and setting the stage for another white-haired ruler. Putin knows that the issue contributed to the decline of the USSR during that period, along with many other endemic failures.

The next category of successor could be a General or a leader of the military, but there is no obvious candidate right now. Former head of the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces, Sergey Shoigu, was once widely respected in Russia because Putin had anointed him to roles groomed for succession. He was feted at military parades in full dress uniform and seen riding celebratory white horses. For Russians, this put him on par with beloved Generals like Zhukov, or Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, the strategic genius who outmaneuvered and defeated Napoleon's invasion in 1812. Shoigu was portrayed as such in Russia for years, and before his defense roles, he served as head of the Ministry for Emergency Situations for many years. This also showed him featured in the scenes of many natural and man-made disasters across Russia. The regime portrayed him as the state fixer and helper.

But Shoigu’s reputation took a significant hit with the Ukraine war. Russians all recall that during the failed Wagner mutiny and leading up to it, Shoigu was one of two people whose necks, literally, Yevgeniy Prigozhin wanted. Prigozhin was Putin’s former cook and oligarch who led the mutiny and set out for Moscow with 20,000 Wagner mercenary troops, to hold Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov responsible. Prigozhin famously screamed on Russian TV, demanding that Shoigu be held to account, and repeatedly cursed and derided Shoigu and Gerasimov in public. Russians will not forget that, nor has Putin. Shoigu is likely no longer a viable candidate.

No other military candidate stands out as a likely successor to Putin, as might be the case in other dictatorial regimes where the military holds power, not so in Russia, and even less so after the attempted Wagner mutiny, which saw far too much possible empathy from the armed forces. Putin has empowered the FSB to quash any other potential challenge from his armed forces. He also strengthened the forces of the FSB and Russian national guard with more heavy weapons (to fight back more competently if any other military unit ever challenges the regime) after the Wagner aborted coup attempt. Ultimately, a successor cannot be found in the ranks of the military.

The third and final category of Putin's successor, and one that many Russia watchers and experts point to as a possible historical precedent, might be someone we don’t know about yet but who Putin has quietly endorsed, or still will. The idea of an unexpected heir may appeal to Putin because President Yeltsin similarly anointed him as head of the FSB, and then selected him as interim Prime Minister when Yeltsin essentially gave up power and stood down in 1999. Putin was relatively unknown at the time, but his being blessed by Yeltsin helped initially. The rest of his popularity came after a series of alleged Chechen terrorist bombings of apartment complexes, bombings which many suspected the FSB itself might have been behind. Much like the burning of the Reichstag in Nazi Germany, Putin used the apartment bombings to launch a massive war in Chechnya, consolidate power, and strengthen his comrades in the FSB. That hardening of the FSB and Russian intelligence within Russian society has continued in the 25 years since.

AN UNEXPECTED, AND YET UNNAMED HEIR?

So if not the FSB or other siloviki from Russian intelligence, where might that unexpected heir come from? There is a slight chance that Putin may choose an actual heir, one of his children. Putin’s only official children are his daughters, Katerina and Maria, from his wife, Lyudmila, whom he divorced in 2014. But both daughters are now in their early forties, and neither keeps much of a public profile. There are rumors of sons from Putin, including two possible young sons from the former Olympian and Putin's girlfriend, Alina Kabaeva, who is almost thirty years younger than him. But neither is yet a teen, and both have lived substantial parts of their lives abroad. They are not in a position to succeed even if they are legitimized later in the eyes of the Russian state and public.

One viable family member who has drawn attention within Russia is Anna Putina (actual surname Tsivilyova) who is his cousin, and now a Deputy Minister of Defense. She was given lucrative state enterprises over the past two decades to benefit herself and the family, and has continued to rise within the circles of power. But is Russia ready for a female president? Some argue that in Soviet times, the Soviet Union was more progressive than the U.S., at least in its earliest years, with women helping lead important ministries for the new Soviet state. But modern Russian society has returned more to its sexist roots, with almost all the siloviki in the top organs of the state surrounding Putin being men.

If Anna Putina is a possible successor, she will have to get past a bunch of Putin’s “rebyata,” his buddies and comrades from the security services, like Bortnikov, Ivanov, Patrushev, and others. A more viable candidate and extended family of sorts for Putin might be Dmitriy Patrushev, currently a Deputy Prime Minister and son of Putin’s close comrade Nikolay, mentioned above. Dmitriy has the right family connections, if not Putin’s name, and he is no doubt considered extended family for the leader. He is 48 years old, setting him up for a long rule over Russia, just like Putin preferred for himself. The young Patrushev has the proper lineage, age, and patronage to make him a prime candidate. Another candidate is Alexey Dyumin, a former Putin bodyguard whom he made governor of Tula and now a senior official on the Security Council. There are other “adopted sons” like this in the younger generation whom Putin could push forward to lead.

Ultimately, the Kremlin watch will have to continue for now, with no clear line of succession laid out for Putin. But there is one reason to expect the succession issues to come to a head in the near future. Putin set out with the Ukraine war to right what he claimed was a historical wrong. In Putin’s fiction, Ukraine was always a part of Russia, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as he frequently termed it, was the “greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century.” In fact, Ukraine has been a far greater disaster for Russia; hundreds of thousands of Russian lives and state resources were wasted on the war. But most Russians don’t know that and can’t see it in the absence of any free press.

The end of the war, whenever it comes, will be heralded as a grand success for Putin. It may give him the final medal on his chest, making him assured enough to feel he can start to plan and announce his succession. When he does, one thing is sure: whoever follows Putin will not likely be a reformer. There will be no loosening of the reins on the Russian people. Freedoms will not come, state oppression will continue, and corruption will continue to drive the regime and state. There are too many holds on those very freedoms, and too many potential contenders holding the ropes to allow any loosening. When Swan Lake is played again on Russian TV, Russians—and the West—will have nothing to celebrate.

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 16 Mar 2026 17:11:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Future of War Is Now: What Washington Needs to Hear from the Battlefield https://belimedia.com.ng/the-future-of-war-is-now-what-washington-needs-to-hear-from-the-battlefield https://belimedia.com.ng/the-future-of-war-is-now-what-washington-needs-to-hear-from-the-battlefield OPINION — The February snow was over a week old but still piled heavy on the roads and sidewalks of Independence Avenue, the kind of stubborn Washington winter that refuses to yield to DC’s imperium, turning the capital's marble grandeur into a grey, grimy obstacle course of frozen slush and ice-crusted curbs. We had back-to-back meetings on the Hill, the kind where you wear a suit and choose your words carefully and try to translate the chaos of a modern battlefield into something a Senate staffer can fit onto a one-pager. Later that afternoon I was due to speak at the Veterans Forum for the 5th Annual Ukrainian Week, another room full of people trying to bridge the distance between policy and new realities.

I have been working in Ukraine since 2019, first as an active Green Beret advising in an official capacity, then after leaving that service, directing special operations on the ground and more recently carrying hard-won lessons back to NATO before they are forgotten or overtaken by the next news cycle. That is what brought me to Washington, and it is what this article is about. I write it alongside friends from the humanitarian and policy world who came to the same fight from very different directions. We come from different backgrounds and often speak with different vocabularies, but common cause in Ukraine forged a shared set of concerns and a purpose. DC has been threaded through this work for all of us in ways I never anticipated, but I will be honest: moving through it in a blazer instead of body armor never quite feels right. My natural habitat is not a briefing room. It is not a Hollywood set, where I spent time advising filmmakers like Sean Penn on how war actually looks and sounds and smells. It is not a think tank conference room or a war journalist's interview chair, and it is certainly not the back of a cab crawling past the Capitol.

And yet there I was, wedging myself out of a DC taxi in front of the Rayburn House Office Building, my service dog Mad Max bounding out ahead of me into the slush, when I heard the unmistakable sound of dress pants surrendering under pressure. The seam goes. Completely. Standing on Capitol Hill in a split suit, cold air rushed in where composure once lived and the surrealism of the last few years landed all at once. But our meetings wouldn't wait. And that surrealism belies the dire urgency which brought me here with like-minded friends and colleagues: the future of war is now, the time to prepare was yesterday, and the clock is running fast.

The urgency is not theoretical. In a wargame run last May called Hedgehog, ten Ukrainian drone operators running Delta (the Ukrainian equivalent of the US military's battlefield management platform ATAK) defeated two NATO battalions in a matter of hours, an outcome that would take a conventional NATO peer force weeks to accomplish, if it could be accomplished at all. The United States was not there to witness it firsthand.

Those of us who have been there in Ukraine for years have been trying to close that distance. In August 2025, a drone pilot and former US Special Operator from my team, writing under the callsign "Xen," warned in The Cipher Brief that drone warfare has already rendered Western military doctrine obsolete, and that without urgent restructuring of how the US military trains, procures, and integrates autonomous systems, America risks being catastrophically outpaced. Last fall, our team provided security and frontline access to humanitarian and fact-finding delegations whose reports carried the alarm further. Dr. Douglas Davis, Bert Watson, and Mike Hightower, writing from the rubble of a Shahed strike in Dnipro, laid out the tactical urgency — a narrow window to supply critical material before Russian pincer operations sever the Donbas — while warning that a horizontally linked axis of China, Iran, North Korea and other proxies is out-innovating Western procurement at every level. A companion piece in the Kyiv Post by Dr. Davis argued the broader strategic case: that Ukraine's military-technology ecosystem and decentralized clandestine network position it to actively degrade China's global proxy architecture in ways the US legally and diplomatically cannot. All three pieces arrive at the same conclusion: supporting Ukraine decisively is not charity, not regionalism, and not a distraction from the China threat. It is the most cost-effective security investment America can make against the very network of adversaries that underwrites Russia's war and drives the broader contest between authoritarianism and the free world. And the window to make that investment and to reap our dividends is closing.

I’ve assisted colleagues in developing these pieces in part because Western media coverage has often lacked accurate, timely, and complete reporting on these issues. I’ve also given interviews to a handful of journalists committed to illuminating these gaps, including David Kirichenko. His reporting, informed by extensive frontline experience, is among the few efforts that accurately and comprehensively document the doctrinal changes unfolding in real time, from the soldier-as-engineer reality at Chasiv Yar to Ukraine’s evolving “drone wall,” and the AI-enabled and fiber-optic systems now reshaping the battlefield.

The numbers tell the story. Ukrainian aerial and naval drones costing hundreds or thousands of dollars are destroying Russian systems worth millions. At Avdiivka, Ukrainian units averaged one Russian killed every 6.5 minutes, while persistent drone surveillance , defense and strike capabilities stripped Moscow of meaningful aerial freedom along much of the frontline. The result is a battlefield that in many ways looks less like modern maneuver warfare and more like World War I: dense surveillance, constant attrition, and lethal exposure to anything that moves.

Meanwhile Kyiv has scaled drone production into the millions, demonstrating that battlefield advantage now flows less from exquisite platforms and more from rapid innovation, mass production, and real-time doctrinal adaptation. Countermeasures will inevitably emerge, but the structural advantage favors the side that can iterate fastest, produce at scale, and absorb those doctrinal shifts as they happen.

The implications for NATO should be impossible to ignore. Ukraine is rewriting the playbook of modern warfare in real time, while most Western militaries still train and equip themselves as if the sky is largely empty and the battlefield permissive. It isn’t, as has become clear over the past week as Iranian Shahed drones saturate the skies of the Middle East. The next war will belong to the side that can produce cheaper autonomous systems at scale, adapt doctrine at the speed of software, and treat every soldier not just as a warfighter, but as an operator, engineer, and innovator on a battlefield saturated with drones.

But we did not come to Washington to warn about alarms already sounded. We came to propose solutions. Our adversaries in Russia, Iran, China, and their proxies have already internalized these lessons. Here is what we’ve proposed.

Why What Exists Is Not Enough

The drone training that currently exists in the American military and law enforcement pipeline touches almost exclusively on how to fly and arm a drone. These are Level One tasks or the equivalent of a flat-range rifle qualification course. They test one individual skill and stop there. What they do not teach is planning, full mission profiles, field craft, or the combined arms understanding of how a drone interoperates with the broader fight around it.

Consider the rifle as an analogy. Qualifying on a flat range validates marksmanship, one key task. But it does not teach a soldier how to employ that weapon in combat. Stalking into position, camouflage on movement and in position, movement techniques, barrier usage, target effects, rates of fire, suppressive versus sustained fire, target selection, bounding techniques: these are the individual tasks that collectively determine whether a rifle is carried to the fight or actually used in it. Marksmanship alone is the beginning, not the end.

The same logic applies to drones, and the gap between where training currently stops and where it needs to go is vast. An FPV drone is now as common in the hands of a Ukrainian infantryman as an M4 carbine is in the hands of an American one. Drone employment can no longer be treated as a strategic-level asset or a specialist skill set. It must be incorporated into doctrine at every level, from the individual soldier to the theater commander.

The point at which a soldier effectively employs a weapon system in combat requires mastery of three things in combination: individual core soldier skills, technical proficiency with the system, and battle drills. A battle drill is a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decision-making process, the kind of deeply rehearsed, muscle-memory response that kicks in when there is no time to think. React to Contact. Squad Attack. These are drilled into every infantryman's subconscious through grinding repetition. They work because everyone in the element knows their role, knows the SOP, and has trained to the point where the action is automatic.

Most SOPs, however, are written in blood. Combat lessons are only truly learned on a two-way range, where the outcome of one force against another can be accurately assessed. Training field hypotheses are not battlefield truths. NATO's Hedgehog wargame in Estonia last spring demonstrated this with devastating clarity. America and NATO are currently disconnected from real-world battlefield truths in drone warfare, and without a program designed to extract and transmit those lessons continuously, there is no way to close that gap.

What We Are Doing About It

We are learning modern drone warfare techniques in real time, through the blood sacrifices of the Ukrainian front. With a constant pulse on the front line and joint operations with Ukrainian SOF units, we continuously extract current tactics/techniques/procedures (TTPs), SOP developments, and technology validation from a live, evolving fight against a near-peer adversary. Our instructors rotate in and out of theater on a continuous cycle: deploy, extract lessons, return stateside to instruct American SOF and law enforcement, take leave, return to Ukraine. Repeat. In doing so, we have already proven the only model which can keep pace with the monthly-evolving modern drone warfare environment.

The Full Spectrum of What Modern Drone Warfare Requires

To train for modern drone warfare, instruction must cover the full spectrum of the fight. That means understanding drones by type (FPVs, quadcopters, hexacopters, heavy lift platforms, fixed wing, bombers versus kamikazes, ISR variants) and knowing which system delivers which effect under which conditions. It means understanding how drone sectors of fire interlock, how systems can be dual-tasked, and what the limiting factors are when they are. It means understanding combined arms drone warfare: how to mass firepower and tasking, how ISR feeds targeting, how battlefield assessment informs maneuver.

It means planned employment, the operator techniques and TTPs required to move a system within range of a target, employ it effectively, and retrograde. It means react-to-contact drills for unplanned engagements. It means understanding communication systems across fiber, radio, SATCOM, and autonomous navigation, and knowing the real-world limitations of each. It means thermal mitigation, electronic warfare, and signals intelligence awareness: understanding your own signal footprint, capturing enemy video feeds, and knowing how signals security measures create either vulnerability or protection.

A brief example illustrates the depth of what is available. FPV drones are sacrificial kamikaze systems, not designed for ISR or sustained intelligence gathering. They work best in combination with another platform. A heavy lift bomber, with a robust stabilized camera, longer loiter time, and higher operating altitude, provides a complementary attack method if the FPV fails, a battle damage assessment platform following engagement, and a persistent intelligence-gathering asset that monitors both enemy and friendly maneuver and front-line trace. Pairing an FPV with a second FPV is a less preferred option, limited by the sacrificial camera quality and reduced loiter time, but viable in a react-to-contact scenario.

A react-to-contact battle drill built around these systems looks like this: return fire, get down, seek cover, get online with the soldiers left and right, call the three D's: distance, direction, description. The rear element, not decisively engaged, immediately deploys two FPVs: one hunter, one spotter. The spotter confirms the reported information and maintains awareness of friendly front line trace and maneuvering elements. The hunter finds targets of opportunity and selects an attack angle. Spotter and hunter work in conjunction to assess battle damage, with a standing task of conducting a follow-on attack if required.

That is one battle drill. One grain of sand in a desert of untapped battlefield experience.

Tailoring the Lesson to the Audience

Effective instruction must also be audience-specific. What applies to a Marine platoon's doctrine does not translate directly to Army maneuver warfare. What a conventional infantry unit needs is not what a Special Forces team preparing for unconventional warfare in a denied environment requires.

For Green Berets deploying worldwide to train and advise partner forces, the calculus shifts substantially. Foreign weapon systems become central to the curriculum. Low-cost drones available on the open market that can achieve desired combat effects become invaluable knowledge. Resistance warfare will incorporate drones from this point forward. Chinese, Russian, Iranian and Ukrainian technology will be present in future conflicts around the globe regardless of scale. Questions that matter in that context are different: What is available now? How is it employed? How do you defend against it? How do you operate in a small team, in a denied country, in airspace you do not control?

Staffing a former Green Beret as team leader on each rotation into theater addresses this directly. It brings language proficiency, cultural awareness, an unconventional warfare trained mind, and a leader experienced in building programs of instruction for both American and foreign forces.

Regular overlapping rotations of a nine-person instructor team, drawn from combat arms veterans across all branches of the military, is the most efficient mechanism available for digesting battlefield-learned information and translating it into doctrine-aligned, audience-specific instruction. That is not a claim made lightly. It is the product of years of doing exactly this work, on the front lines where the lessons are being written in real time. And properly funded, at a cost amounting to less per annum than a handful of Patriot missiles, it could be paradigm shifting. But it is only the start.

The problem is buy-in, scale, and consistent support. A handful of dedicated volunteers cannot revolutionize the entire US military alone. We have thus far moved faster than contracts or legislation could keep up with, and the inconsistency of that support has its own cost: volunteers burn out, move on, and take their hard-won knowledge with them, decoupling the gains made and resetting the clock. The bidirectional lane between US and Ukrainian industry and military is in urgent need of widening, not closing. Policymakers, senior military officers, lobbyists, and defense technology experts must push hard to make efforts like ours official. Given that there is no political will to deploy hundreds or thousands of uniformed advisors and liaisons into Ukraine, contracting is not a workaround. It is the only viable path to ensuring America does not fall further behind.

The clock is running, as is evident today with the unfolding escalations in and around Iran. 3 American F-15s were just shot down by friendly fire in Kuwait in part due to skies saturated with cheap long range Iranian drones. Across what were once considered “safe zones” in the Middle East, embassies and high-rises are beginning to look more like scenes from Kyiv than the calm rear areas they once were.

So today, that cold February air rushing through the split seam in my suit on Capitol Hill just weeks ago now feels less like metaphor than diagnosis. We are not approaching a crisis. We are already standing in one, pants down, exposed, our adversaries long through the door while we are still fumbling with the handle. The second hand keeps moving. But it is no longer counting down to a warning. It is counting the seconds of our indictment.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 16 Mar 2026 17:11:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
How GEOINT Can Sustain US Advantages in Africa https://belimedia.com.ng/how-geoint-can-sustain-us-advantages-in-africa https://belimedia.com.ng/how-geoint-can-sustain-us-advantages-in-africa OPINION — Africa presents a range of security, economic, and humanitarian challenges to US national security that the Intelligence Community must stay ahead of even as Washington looks to refine its strategy for the region. Creative use of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is one way to make this happen. Commercial remote sensing and geospatial analytics have significantly expanded coverage and revisit rates across the African continent, enabling sustained monitoring of infrastructure development, environmental stress, and security-relevant activity even in areas with limited physical access.

Complex African Undercurrents

Africa watchers know well that a core complication in following the continent with few resource commitments is that challenges and opportunities are persistent, geographically dispersed, and rarely confined to a single subregion.

North Africa and the Sahel—from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean to the Red Sea—illustrate how African dynamics create a complex nexus of US security and commercial concerns that intersect with Europe and the Middle East. Extremism, maritime chokepoints, energy infrastructure, and military modernization hold implications beyond the continent itself.

Central and Southern Africa are at the heart of the increasing US focus on critical minerals. This includes the recent US deal with Congo on mineral access—Congo produces more than 70 percent of the world’s cobalt—and the sustained US investment in the Lobito corridor, a critical infrastructure project spanning 1,300 kilometers from Zambia to Angola. Most recently, the US proposed a critical mineral trade bloc, which would include key producers from the region.

Eastern Africa is host to the largest US military base on the continent, located in Djibouti—also home to China’s only major overseas military base—where US forces carry out operations across the Red Sea and sustained military strikes in Somalia. Kenya, meanwhile, is a Major Non-NATO Ally and in December signed a $2.5 billion health cooperation framework with the US, a cornerstone of Washington’s more than $11 billion commitment to overhauling how it awards assistance to African countries.

African Dynamics Require Agility

These realities reinforce a long-standing requirement: sustaining continental-scale awareness and early warning during periods when Africa is not a top policy priority, while preserving the ability to re-engage quickly when conditions change. Importantly, we must achieve this without falling into a defeatist trap of “settling for less because it just feels easier—not because it is strategically sound.” We must know when to ramp up and when to ratchet back.

For example, even while the National Security Strategy offers a concise priority list on Africa, our ability to ameliorate conflict and foster mutually beneficial trade relationships is subject to strategic competition around weapons procurement, energy and resource projects, and foreign infrastructure development—including civilian infrastructure repurposed for military use—all of which are observable and assessable through GEOINT without requiring persistent on-the-ground presence.

Environmental stress across the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and North Africa is ever-present. The resulting population movements, economic plight, and conflict dynamics often emerge gradually rather than through sudden shocks, a sweet spot for GEOINT. For example, while desertification and drought are longstanding areas of focus for Africa watchers, persistent flooding that we can monitor from space creates mass displacement–4 million displaced in 2025 alone—and destruction of agriculture and healthcare facilities, hindering the very self-help approaches Washington is encouraging across Africa.

Intelligence Community findings have pointed to African security challenges that are broadly demographics-based and develop incrementally below the threshold of sustained international attention. This increases the risk of surprise and compressed response timelines. In this context, GEOINT becomes less a surge capability and more a continuity mechanism, enabling awareness with resources such as human geography mapping to keep tabs on possible conflict hotspots.

Africa at Scale: A Continental-Sized Intelligence Gathering Chore

Africa's enormity makes staying abreast of threats and opportunities a daunting task, even when resources are most abundant. GEOINT helps to provide the US with the ability to discriminate in our coverage by choosing where and when we need information. Even with GEOINT as a tool, the continent makes up 1/5th of the globes land area, making it a big task.


This file is made available under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication


Implications for US Government and Industry Partners – Finding Resilience with GEOINT

GEOINT is not a silver bullet, but it does offer a relatively low-resource opportunity for persistent, baseline awareness. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) officers are exceedingly enterprising in their ability to task the constellation of imagery assets in a way that is not an extra tax on the system but instead piggybacks on planned areas of coverage. As NGA augments its capabilities with AI, automation provides increasing windows to create intelligence insights at cost savings. Below is a sampling for the general reader and touches just the basics of what GEOINT can offer.

GEOINT enables ongoing monitoring of agreements, insecurity, infrastructure, and environmental trends across Africa without forward deployment, expanded aid programs, or sustained senior-level engagement, making it well suited to periods of constrained attention. Indeed, the US Embassy in Kinshasa last year noted intelligence sharing as a core area of focus for monitoring implementation of the US-brokered peace accord in eastern Congo, a clear opening for GEOINT.

GEOINT creates rapid knowledge discovery between periods of focus. This function is resource-efficient because it allows policymakers to develop context and targets quickly when fast-moving requirements emerge in areas not typically covered with other intelligence sources. For example, the US in 2025 for the first time conducted precision strikes against ISIS-aligned militants in northwest Nigeria; the US Commander of AFRICOM subsequently confirmed US Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance cooperation with Nigeria.

Innovations in GEOINT can help us prepare for unexpected requirements. NGA’s ongoing efforts to build a Foundation Digital Twin “will allow users to immerse themselves in a 3D representation of the operational environment and interact with geospatial mission data in the software package of their choice.” Even as we move forward with less presence in tough- to-reach African outposts, this evolving technology can provide clarity for operational success, such as with recent Embassy evacuations on the continent.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 16 Mar 2026 17:11:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
China's Military: Five Lessons from the Iran War https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-military-five-lessons-from-the-iran-war https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-military-five-lessons-from-the-iran-war

OPINION — It may seem early to be drawing lessons from the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, but one of the world’s most powerful militaries has already reached some conclusions.

China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA) has published a list on social media under the heading "Five Lessons From U.S.-Israeli Strikes On Iran" – ranging from what it called the "coldest reality" of "superior firepower" to the need for "self-reliance," the dangers of "blind faith in peace" and the "deadliest threat" of an "enemy within." Experts said the unusual public message was likely intended for multiple audiences – the PLA rank and file, the domestic public in China, and for the U.S. and the West as well.

“I was surprised that China would put something like this out there for the public’s edification – usually they keep things very close to the vest,” Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, a former CIA director of East Asia Operations, told The Cipher Brief. “The messages are clear: we’re taking care of the ‘enemy within’ — anyone who disagrees with us inside – and we see the ‘superior firepower’ of the U.S. and the perils of a ‘blind faith’ in peace. So we’d better get our act together.”

The Cipher Brief asked several experts on China and its military to assess the broader meaning of the PLA’s “lessons” – and what they may portend for Taiwan and other contingencies.

“It’s kind of a revelation of what they’re thinking and feeling, and I think the objective is to alarm internally,” Orville Schell, Director of the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, told The Cipher Brief. “It’s surprising that they’ve articulated these publicly, in such a stark way.”

The five lessons

The “Five Lessons” were posted by “China Military Bugle," a multimedia messaging system run by the PLA News Media Center. The Bugle posts to domestic platforms in China and to global sites including X, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. The post was presented as a graphic with text in both English and Mandarin Chinese, and in its entirety, it amounted to a mere 27 words:

  1. Deadliest Threat: The Enemy Within
  2. Costliest Miscalculation: Blind Faith in Peace
  3. Cruelest Paradox: The Illusion of Victory
  4. Coldest Reality: The Logic of Superior Firepower
  5. Ultimate Reliance: Self-Reliance

Taken together, experts said the lessons serve simultaneously as a critique of the U.S., a warning against complacency within PLA ranks and in Chinese society generally, and a message for the rest of the world: Don’t underestimate China’s strength and resolve.

“There are many messages here, in these ‘lessons,'” Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based international relations expert, told The Cipher Brief. “One message is that the writer thinks Chinese have to be very realistic and trust nobody. Another is, let Chinese be serious about the lethality of the American weapons. And the writer thinks that as Chinese people, they should not be so innocent to believe that America is peace-loving.”

Experts said the “blind faith in peace” was a reference to Iran’s ill-fated negotiations with the U.S., and the “logic of superior firepower” an acknowledgement of the ferocity of the U.S.-Israel attacks.

The war against Iran began just two months after U.S. forces removed the leader of Venezuela, another ally of China, and experts said that the two seismic events – different as they are – may have prompted the PLA post.

“The lessons sound more like a message for China itself rather than for others,” Yun Sun, Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, told The Cipher Brief. “The implied message is a hardline position on the U.S. and a criticism of the American fake promise of peace. The PLA is using this line to indoctrinate its own armed forces about the constant need to prepare for war and not to trust Americans.”

“What they’re basically saying is, we can’t be weak,” Amb. DeTrani said. “They’re saying, unless there’s strict discipline, unless we all march to the same tune and we all understand the importance of protecting our vital issues, we will be abused.”

Schell and DeTrani both noted that China has a history of closely studying other nation’s wars for such lessons, often hunting for clues as to how a future U.S.–China conflict, likely centered on Taiwan, might unfold.

No specific military theaters are mentioned in the PLA “lessons,” but experts said any messaging about war and military preparedness from Beijing carries meaning for Taiwan. In this context, the five “lessons” can be read as a warning against overconfidence within the PLA (“Illusion of Victory”); a reminder that any U.S.–China negotiations won’t necessarily preclude sudden military action (“Blind Faith in Peace”); and acknowledgment of the power and high-tech sophistication of the U.S. military (“Logic of Superior Firepower”).

“The message for the PLA is, ‘Yes we can dialogue with people, and we can dialogue them to death – but don’t for one minute think that you’re going to get anywhere,” Schell said. “And a second message is, ‘they’re out to get us and we have to be reliant on ourselves in every way possible.’”

The “deadliest threat”

Perhaps the most interesting – and cryptic – of the PLA “lessons” was the first, which read in full, “Deadliest Threat: The Enemy Within.”

It’s a concern that experts say is reflective of a longstanding fear of dissent within China – and heightened by evidence that betrayals in Iran had allowed for infiltration by the Central Intelligence Agency and Israel’s Mossad.

“Clearly Israel has taken advantage of people inside Iran who are willing to betray their country,” Shen said. “There must have been traitors inside Iran. This was an ‘enemy within.’ So that is a lesson for China.”

Yun Sun echoed the point. “The ‘enemy from within’ refers to the many traitors willing to work with the Israelis,” she said. “That’s also a reference against any dovish illusion within China about the U.S.”

Sun and other experts also noted that the PLA “lessons” were posted in the midst of Xi Jinping’s unprecedented purge of senior military officers – a years-long campaign that has recently gutted the highest echelons of PLA leadership.

“I immediately thought of Xi Jinping and the purges that are ongoing in the People's Liberation Army and beyond,” Amb. DeTrani said. “To Xi and to China, that’s an ‘enemy within.’ The message is that unless we are united, unless we all march to the same tune, unless we’re in sync, we will be vulnerable…‘Enemy within’ speaks to some of the logic behind the purges.”

“In the People’s Liberation Army, there are so many corrupt officials, and our leader keeps cleansing them,” Shen said. “But the fear is, how can the leaders be sure that corrupt people will not sell secrets to China's enemies? How can this country be sure it does not also have an ‘enemy within’?”

The U.S. – not a “paper tiger”

Experts told The Cipher Brief that two elements of the Iran war have likely surprised China the most: The fact that it was launched while negotiations were underway; and the ferocity of the joint U.S.-Israeli operations.

“I think they are surprised by the war,” Schell said. “They’re used to America being more wishy-washy, and not going so quickly to the gun.”

DeTrani agreed that attacking during a negotiation likely surprised Beijing, as did Trump’s bravado in taking out two foreign leaders – Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – in less than two months.

“I think they may have been surprised with that, and also some of the statements from the president saying that we will have a hand in deciding what the new leadership will look like…and that we’re looking for unconditional surrender,” Amb. DeTrani said. “These things probably surprised China, and made them wonder: is there a message for issues that are close to them, like Taiwan and the South China Sea?”

A clear takeaway, Shen Dingli said, was that the U.S. isn’t a “paper tiger,” as some Chinese officials have suggested. “President Trump says he doesn’t want war, and that he has settled 8 conflicts, and he wants the Nobel Peace Prize,” Shen said. “This is one side. But he has another side – he can ruthlessly execute a war. He can send a Delta Force to Venezuela. He bombed Iran last June. And he bombed Iran again. So in China, after seeing such frequent use of deadly weapons, one has to have a serious look at the superior force of the U.S. The U.S. is a real tiger. Not a paper tiger.”

The PLA’s “Illusion of Victory” lesson, Shen said, is a warning against complacency within the PLA.

“If the U.S. can so easily target the Iranian leader [Ali] Khamenei, would the U.S. know where all the Chinese leaders are?” he said. “This could be a sensitive concern – the intelligence, and also the military capability to penetrate deep sites – with its earth-penetrating, bunker-busting weapons.”

A message for Washington

If the PLA’s lessons carry a message for the U.S., it may be that American policymakers shouldn't be overconfident either – despite their strength and the upheaval underway in China’s military.

“The external message – and it’s interesting that it comes in advance of the Trump summit with Xi – is that there are elements in the government that want to go on record that they are not going to be easily convinced of our good intentions,” Schell said. “I think it’s a warning also – a ‘Don’t tread on me’ kind of warning to the West.”

The message to the U.S., Amb. DeTrani said, is clear: “We’re united, we’re militarily strong, you will not be able to abuse us any longer. We are ensuring that we’re all in sync – we know what our objectives are and what our national security interests are.”

Beyond the five lessons, experts say the war brings both challenges and potential benefits to China. One “win” for China may come if the U.S. gets bogged down in the region, and expends more of its military resources.

“The US is depleting its shrinking arsenal in the Middle East,” American Enterprise Institute senior fellow Dan Blumenthal wrote on Wednesday. “The fact that, four years into the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. faces munitions shortages for weapons systems that matter in a potential China-Taiwan scenario—from air and missile defense interceptors to Tomahawk cruise missiles—is nothing short of scandalous.”

But Blumenthal also noted that the war may unnerve Beijing. “It will enhance their concerns that Trump is an unpredictably ruthless power broker,” he said. “Xi Jinping will view him as a force to be reckoned with who is not signing on to the idea that America is declining or will back away from a fight.”

Or, as the PLA might put it, China must respect the “logic of superior firepower” – and avoid “blind faith in peace.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 16 Mar 2026 17:11:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
Nuclear Expansion and Conditional Diplomacy: North Korea’s New Strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/nuclear-expansion-and-conditional-diplomacy-north-koreas-new-strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/nuclear-expansion-and-conditional-diplomacy-north-koreas-new-strategy At the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held every five years, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un left the door open for engagement with the U.S. and reaffirmed hostility with South Korea.

The seven-day congress replaced over 40% of senior officials with younger loyalists, including Mr. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, promoted to General Affairs Director of the Central Committee. A new five-year economic plan emphasized self-reliance and national development. It included ambitious targets for grain production and industrial output, emphasizing ideological cohesion.

The congress codified North Korea’s status as a permanent nuclear-armed state, emphasizing further nuclear expansion and modernization. It also stated that North Korea’s conventional forces would be upgraded.

A new concept referred to as “Haekpangasoe” (nuclear trigger) was formalized and according to the Korean Central News Agency it is an integrated nuclear crisis response system designed to ensure that the national nuclear shield could be operated promptly and accurately at any moment, ensuring responsiveness to perceived threats. Thus, North Korea’s nuclear deterrent now includes a pre-emptive nuclear strike capability.

North Korea formally reaffirmed hostility toward South Korea, designating it the “first hostile state” and institutionalized severed ties, effectively discarding their long-standing policy of reunification. This was North Korea doubling down on their “two hostile states” doctrine.

While clearly emphasizing antagonism toward South Korea, Mr. Kim suggested openness to talks with Washington, but only if the U.S. accepts North Korea’s nuclear status and abandons its “hostile policy” toward North Korea.

There is speculation that President Donald Trump’s scheduled visit to China in April to meet with China’s President Xi Jinping would be an opportune time for Mr. Trump to again meet with Mr. Kim, this time in Beijing or Pyongyang. Their initial meeting in Singapore in 2018 was relatively successful, with a joint statement committing both countries to establish a new relationship in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity, with North Korea committing to work towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The 2019 summit in Hanoi failed when Mr. Trump ended the meeting abruptly when Mr. Kim would only include his plutonium reactor at Yongbyon in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. A brief symbolic meeting at the DMZ later in 2019 did not include a substantive discussion of sanctions relief for denuclearization.

Much has happened since North Korea’s 8th Party Congress in January 2021. Complete and verifiable denuclearization is now off the table. In 2022, North Korea had officially enshrined the right to use pre-emptive nuclear strikes to protect itself from an imminent or perceived to be an imminent attack. The 9th Party Congress has now memorialized the Haekpangasoe nuclear trigger doctrine, ensuring that nuclear weapons can and will be used in response to perceived threats. And South Korea, despite efforts of the Lee Jae-Myung government to improve relations with North Korea, is viewed by North Korea as their “most hostile entity”, renouncing reunification and institutionalizing the “two hostile states” doctrine, while keeping the door open to another summit with Mr. Trump, if the U.S. accepts North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and discontinues its “hostile policy” toward North Korea.

Equally important is the June 2024 comprehensive strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia and their mutual defense treaty, with North Korea providing over 12,000 troops to support Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine. In addition to troops, North Korea is also providing Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles and reportedly receiving missile and nuclear assistance from Russia.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is tense, with a nuclear North Korea, aligned with Russia and China, viewing South Korea as the enemy. And given North Korea’s emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons and its doctrine dealing with the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons, efforts to deescalate tension on the Korean Peninsula are necessary.

Mr. Kim’s comment at the 9th Party Congress that North Korea could “get along” with the U.S. -- and apparent willingness to again meet with Mr. Trump – could be the only viable option for defusing the potential for conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Another meeting with Mr. Kim does not mean the U.S. has to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. It means we don’t have to put denuclearization up front in our discussions with North Korea. We do, however, must talk about sanctions relief, economic development assistance, peaceful nuclear energy and a path to normal relations when there is progress on human rights in North Korea. And in return, North Korea will have to agree to a moratorium on nuclear tests, fissile material production for nuclear weapons, and medium and long-range ballistic missile launches. Eventually, denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula will have to be discussed, but that could be after a decade or longer of negotiations.

Another summit between the leaders of the U.S. and North Korea is in the interest of peace and stability in East Asia.

Joseph R. DeTrani

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

This piece by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joe Detrani was first published by The Washington Times

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Quiet Peace in the Caucasus Could Change the Balance of Power https://belimedia.com.ng/a-quiet-peace-in-the-caucasus-could-change-the-balance-of-power https://belimedia.com.ng/a-quiet-peace-in-the-caucasus-could-change-the-balance-of-power COLUMN/THE BLUF: A momentous event is happening that is receiving little fanfare in the U.S. but could have major long-term implications for regional stability, save lives, and change geopolitics and trade in the south Caucasus area.

The peace deal signed at the White House between Armenia and Azerbaijan last August could reverse a trajectory of bloodshed and hatred between those two countries and replace those cornerstones of their relationship with peace, prosperity and stability.

It could start a new trade route to Europe that bypasses Russia. This would leave Moscow, which has manipulated politics in that part of the world for centuries, out in the cold. There is still a long way to go but the dynamics are positive, and the time is right to make this happen.

Iran knows that and last night, Azeri authorities say that Tehran attacked the Caucasus with drones – an allegation that Tehran denies. According to the Azeris, the attack Included the Azerbaijani region of Nakhchivan, an area that is cut off from Azerbaijan, bordered by Armenia and Iran - and a region that is a key part of the Trump peace proposal for Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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The modern wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan center around Nagorno Karabakh, an enclave in Azerbaijan that has been inhabited largely by ethnic Armenians for centuries. The wars have claimed the lives of over 30,000 people, most of whom were civilians. An estimated 400,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 600,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh were displaced as a result of these modern wars which started in 1988 as the Soviet Union was breaking apart and centuries old hatreds came out, inflamed by Russia.

I was an analyst at CIA in 1988 and spent my days writing about and briefing policy makers about the Armenian and Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. I spent a lot of time trying to explain why the two sides were fighting over this mountainous area that has no oil or minerals of much worth. It was hard to explain to practical U.S. policy makers how the Russians set up this conflict as a way to keep control over their Muslim and Christian neighbors.

The current peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is something I never expected. If it lasts, it will allow these two countries to focus on their economic growth and stability instead of wasting blood and treasure on centuries old hatreds instigated by their neighbor.

The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh goes back 1000s of years. The land was inhabited by Armenians probably since the 1st millennium BC as part of the Kingdom of Greater Armenia.

In 1724, Peter the Great encouraged the Armenians who were aligned with Russia, to take over territory all the way to the Caspian Sea which had been part of the Safavid State, evidence of Russian encouragement of bad relations between these neighbors even then.

The Russian generals were encouraged to displace the Azerbaijani population in any way they could. Under the terms of the Turkmenchay Treaty, 40,000 Armenians were resettled in Azerbaijan. By 1829 in the Peace Agreement of Edirne, 90,000 Armenians who had been living in the Ottoman Empire were also resettled in Azerbaijan by Russia, largely in Nakhchivan, Yerevan, and Karabakh. This was Russia’s way of converting and subduing the Muslim population in the area.

Even then, Russia played with ambiguity, largely siding with Armenia but holding out hope to Azerbaijan that its population would retake territory loss to ethnic Armenians. Armenia maintained Karabakh which was rich in Armenian cultural history, churches, and monuments until 1921 when the Soviet Union assigned the region to Soviet Azerbaijan as an autonomous oblast. The Soviets kept the two republics from widespread bloodshed over the territory, officiating territorial disputes and occasional dustups.

The first modern Karabakh war started in 1988. The war did not happen overnight. We saw it happening piece by piece. An attack at this intersection, transportation routes between Baku and Stepanakert, the capital of Karabakh, blown up and then bus depots where fuel was stored, blown up. None of it made headlines but as the analyst on this issue, it kept me busy.

By 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan were in open conflict. Because of the Soviet oversight of the predominantly Armenian region, the oblast had a degree of self-governance. With the Soviet Empire fractured, the Armenian population feared marginalization under Azeri rule and sought unification with the Republic of Armenia.

When Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and decided to take away some of the enclave’s autonomy, the mostly ethnic Armenian population voted to secede from Azerbaijan.

Full-scale fighting over the succession erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups failed to bring resolution and in the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured Azerbaijani territory located outside the enclave. By 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and held approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave.

Some 600,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis had been displaced. A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994. Karabakh would be administered by Azerbaijan but controlled by Armenian forces and called itself the Republic of Artsakh. The Russians were the peacekeepers.

This uneasy peace lasted about 6 years.

In 2020, the next “Karabakh War” war began. This was a 44-day conflict which dramatically altered the regional balance of power. Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, launched a successful offensive, reclaiming significant territory. Russia did not support Armenia militarily, but the conflict concluded with another Russian-brokered ceasefire and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to monitor the demarcation line.

By 2023, Azerbaijan intensified its control over Karabakh and launched another offensive. This led to the Russian peacekeepers leaving the region, the closing of the Russian-Turkish monitoring station in Agdam, the migration of some 100,000 ethnic Armenians, and the dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh.

The situation remained tense with intermittent armed attacks, roadside ambushes, border skirmishes, and more deaths. Under that canopy, the second Trump administration began its own negotiations with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

By March 13, 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced that both parties had agreed on all terms of a peace agreement framework which included Armenia giving up claims on Nagorno Karabakh. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterized the announcement as “historic,” while European Union High Representative Kaja Kallas described it as “a decisive step.” I agree on both counts.

On August 8, 2025, a summit took place in Washington, D.C., where President Trump hosted Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the White House and announced a peace agreement signed by the leaders but still to be ratified by the parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. There are 17 articles in the agreement. One of the high-profile parts of the agreement is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This new route is expected to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan, through Armenian territory. This changes trade routes for the Caucasus and Central Asia. The completion of the route would allow the passage of people and goods across Azerbaijan and the broader Central Asia to Europe without needing to travel through Russia or Iran.

Iran and Russia have condemned the role of the United States in the proposed TRIPP project as an encroachment. Another important factor for regional politics is that Russia was not involved with this peace treaty, and Russian peacekeepers are no longer on the Armenian or Azerbaijani territories.

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Following up on the historic White House summit, Vice President J.D.Vance visited Armenia and Azerbaijan in February. While there he said, “Peace is not made by cautious people. Peace is not made by people who are too focused on the past. Peace is made by people who are focused on the future.”

Vance’s trip to Armenia and Azerbaijan and the deals he brought with him show that the administration is taking this peace seriously. In Baku, Vance signed a strategic partnership charter covering economy and trade, energy, connectivity, artificial intelligence, digital development, security, and defense.

In Armenia, the U.S. pledged support on nuclear energy, computer chips and drones. The U.S. is also holding Azerbaijan to account, emphasizing support for democratic institutions and the rule of law in their security agreement with Baku.

What’s Next

I have studied this part of the world for over thirty years. My children, who were born while I was writing intelligence pieces on the ongoing war in Nagorno Karabakh now have children.

My hope and wish is that my grandchildren will only read about the bloody history of the region and that they will be able to experience a new chapter in cooperation that brings prosperity as a major trade route from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe. I tend to be an optimist, but the time is right for this type of agreement if all parties stay focused on the end game. We cannot let these historic events get drawn into the fight with Iran.

The U.S. has an agreement for development rights for the corridor which would allow Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states to bypass Russia and Iran for trade routes. The U.S. must be a good steward of those rights and ensure that all neighboring countries are acting in good faith.

Right now, Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine and its own crumbling economy. The world must keep an eye on any attempts by Russia to once again encourage enmity between these two states and stop any such efforts immediately. Iran too, on the border of these two countries, is clearly trying to draw in anyone it can to divert from the U.S. - Israeli strikes and must not be allowed to divert progress in the Caucasus. Turkey is a winner in this exchange, as the major western hub for trade and Ankara needs to play a positive role, including with Armenia.

The agreement represents a significant shift in Armenian foreign policy, moving away from traditional reliance on Russia toward closer ties with Western institutions, the United States, and even Turkey. Armenians need to be rewarded for their courage. Azerbaijan, already winning after the attacks against Karabakh in 2024, remains in a strong position but must be encouraged to focus on democracy.

A southern trade route that brings oil, gas, and agricultural goods to Europe through the Caucasus and Turkey is a win for this part of the world and will change the dynamics between the Caucasus and Central Asia and Russia. This is a once in a generation opportunity that the U.S. and Europe should continue to champion.

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Revisionist History – Aliens, Secrets and Conspiracies https://belimedia.com.ng/revisionist-history-aliens-secrets-and-conspiracies https://belimedia.com.ng/revisionist-history-aliens-secrets-and-conspiracies OPINION – Over a decade ago, I was a public official and was at one of our commission meetings on the coast of California. A fellow commissioner and I decided to take a long lunchtime walk along the coast. As we chatted, we realized we had both worked on several of the same very classified programs. His involvement was in acquisition and finance, while mine was more deeply connected to the engineering development of the project and hands-on with the operators on site.

We Got Our Advanced Technology From Aliens
While we both were discreet about not talking about specifics, we recognized the projects we had worked on. So you can imagine my surprise when he turned to me and casually said, “You know this technology came from aliens.” I laughed, thinking that obviously he must be joking. But as we continued walking he continued on, claiming, “You know the equipment you worked on and stuff that followed came from our secret alien investigation site at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. All we did was reverse engineer Alien technology.” This time I stopped in my tracks and looked at him to see if he was smiling. I was puzzled as he looked dead serious. He explained that there was no possible way we could be doing what we were doing using existing technology. Before I changed the subject I asked him how he knew this, he replied with absolute sincerity, “I was head of acquisition on the program. I was briefed on the project. That’s what they told us and they swore us to secrecy.“

I really didn’t know how to process this. He was really a smart and level-headed guy. In fact he was the mayor at the time of Rancho Palos Verde. It took me a mile or two into our walk to rethink everything I knew about the project (even then it had been in decades past), including having sat with a few of the engineers (some strange, but not aliens) as they were designing the system (with me trying to keep up with the revised blueprints in document control), and then watching the system being built and assembled. While it had required incredibly creative engineering, and applying technology on a scale so massive no commercial company could afford it, this system was built by smart people with no aliens involved. But he was equally convinced they were. Over our time together on the commission we took more walks, had lots more to talk about, but we never broached the subject again.

Every once in a while, for the next few years, I puzzled on how he could have been so sure of something that I was sure was completely wrong.

We Did Tell Them It Was Aliens
Fast forward 15 years, and my world view of that conversation was upended when I read in the Wall Street Journal that the Department of Defense had been running a disinformation campaign, briefing finance and acquisition people that the technology for these classified programs was coming from aliens. (Take a minute and read the article.)

All of a sudden our coast-side conversation from a decade and a half ago made sense to me. Most of our most compartmentalized programs have different levels of what was called “need to know.” I never paid much attention as I was read all the way into the technical and operational details of these programs. I vaguely knew that others got fewer details, but as I was just discovering, others had received active disinformation. In a few cases, security officers were even using fake photos and documents to create the Alien cover-story for secret-weapons programs.

It turns out my fellow commissioner had been briefed by the U.S. government that it was Aliens, and he went to his grave believing it so.

Are you going to believe me or your lying eyes?
What’s interesting is what happened after the news came out that the Alien story was government disinformation. A large percentage of people who were briefed, now “doubled down” and believed “we got the technology from Aliens” even more strongly – believing the new information itself was a coverup. Many dismissed the facts by prioritizing how they felt over reality, something we often see in political or religious contexts. (“Are you going to believe me or your lying eyes?”)

I wondered how my friend would have reacted.

Secrecy, Disinformation, and a Higher Power
While on its face this is an amusing story about secrecy, it’s really about the intersection of the secrecy’s impact on society and its role in misinformation, manipulation, the creation of cynicism and mistrust, and our need to believe in a higher power.

Manipulation
An example of secrecy used for manipulation in the 20th century was when the National Security Agency Venona project unmasked Soviet spies in the U.S. Even though this was one of the nation’s most secret programs, the FBI leaked its findings to Joe McCarthy and Richard Nixon. They used this classified knowledge to manipulate the American public, fueling McCarthyism and Richard Nixon’s career. 50 years later, when Venona was made public historians substantively revised the history of U.S. Cold War politics.

In the 21st century Social Media misinformation (e.g. Chinese and Russian influence campaigns, Qanon conspiracies) will look like toys next to the AI-driven manipulation that’s about to come.

Cynicism and mistrust
Secrecy created 75 years of cynicism and mistrust, when the U.S. began launching highly classified reconnaissance balloons (story here), and later the U-2 and SR-71 spy planes. These top secret projects gave rise to decades of UFO sightings. Instead of acknowledging these sightings were from classified military projects the Department of Defense issued cover stories (“you saw weather balloons”) that weren’t believable.

Governments and companies have always kept secrets and used misinformation and manipulation. However, things stay secret way too long – for many reasons – some reasonable (we’re still using the same methods – reconnaissance technology, tradecraft, or, it would harm people still alive – retired spies, etc) or not so reasonable (we broke U.S. or international laws – COINTELPRO, or it would embarrass us or our allies – Kennedy assassination, or the Epstein files).

Secrecy increases the odds of conspiracy beliefs. Because evidence can’t be checked, contradictions can’t be audited, a government “cover-up” becomes a plausible explanation. People don’t tolerate “I don’t know” for long when stakes are high (stolen elections, identity, national crises, the meaning of life, or what happens when we die). That vacuum gets filled by the most emotionally satisfying model: a hidden “higher power” concealing information and controlling events.

Summary
Just as social media replaced traditional news sources, AI-driven summaries of current events are likely to replace our understanding of the world around us. What happens to trust when AI manipulates human’s tendency to embrace conspiracy theories? Who will define the truth in the brave new world?

And by the way, I’m still pretty sure we didn’t get it from Aliens.

This piece was originally published by Steve Blank here.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Where crime and terror meet: Australia’s illicit tobacco market https://belimedia.com.ng/where-crime-and-terror-meet-australias-illicit-tobacco-market https://belimedia.com.ng/where-crime-and-terror-meet-australias-illicit-tobacco-market OPINION – The unearthing of IRGC’s involvement in Australia’s firebombing incidents in 2025 has subsequently brought into question - the extent by which overseas terrorist groups and Australian domestic organized crime are in sinister collaboration. Although the firebombings occurred in 2025, the facilitation of terrorist financing by the efforts of criminal proceeds have long been understood. With illicit tobacco being a staple and incredibly lucrative commodity in the Australian criminal underworld, spurred by the nation’s expensive excise tax, its profound role in terrorist financing is a pressing issue for Australia to further investigate, especially in light of the IRGC discovery.

From late 2024, Australia experienced a series of arson attacks against Jewish-affiliated enterprises, of which two were linked to the IRGC by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) in August 2025. The first incident involved a firebomb attack on the Lewis Continental Kitchen in Sydney in October 2024 coordinated by Sayed Mohammad Moosawi, a former chief of the Nomads motorcycle gang. The second incident involved a firebomb attack on Adass Israel Synagogue in December 2024, which resulted in over $20 million in damages.

In response, ASIO head Mike Burgess pinned the attacks on the IRGC, attesting that the group utilized proxies to operationalize these attacks. Previously, the IRGC has been listed as a terrorist entity by other Western states, namely Canada and the United States. While the attacks did not ultimately result in terrorism charges in Australia, the IRGC’s involvement would shed light on the looming crime-terror nexus, the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and organized crime that is festering in the nation. Understanding this interplay of crime and terror is crucial for counterterrorism efforts in Australia to proactively deter the future threat of terrorism on their soil.

In recent years, the illicit tobacco market has been a rampant issue in Australia, with an economy of approximately $10 billion annually. The market is propagated by the nation’s expensive excise tax on tobacco which compels users to turn to illegal avenues to procure the commodity, ultimately driving the lucrative underground market even further. At A$1.49 per 0.8 gram stick, increased in September 2025 or A$40, or US$26 for a pack of 20 cigarettes, the prices of tobacco is exorbitant compared to other Western countries such as Canada at an excise duty rate of CAD$0.19 per stick and an “average” pack costing between CAD$15.36 to $19.75 as of April 2025. In addition to an estimated loss of $7 billion in excise revenue, this illicit market is known to facilitate terrorist financing operations, being listed as a substantial financier to offshore terrorist groups by the Australia Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC). In relation to the firebombing attacks, the discovered crime-terror ties is a warning for Australian stakeholders to address the nation’s excise tax policy which would, in turn, strategically cripple terrorist financing.

Further linkage between illicit tobacco and terrorist financing has been discovered by Australian authorities. Prior to the two firebomb attacks between 2024 and 2025, Australia had already been experiencing a long string of firebomb attacks, linked to illicit tobacco kingpin, Kazem “Kaz” Hamad. Hamad, who was deported from Australia to Iraq in 2023, was believed to be involved with 150 arson attacks targeting tobacco shops across Melbourne. Notably, he was linked to the arson attack on the Lux nightclub in November 2024 where perpetrators of the incident drove a blue Volkswagen Golf. According to a joint report by the Australia Federal Police (AFP), the ASIO, and the Victoria Police, the same vehicle was allegedly used in the Adass Israel synagogue firebombing and a shooting in Bundoora, both of which happened on the same night. Given this linkage, the IRGC may be a key benefactor to the Hamad’s affluent illicit tobacco trade while members of his criminal network will commit violence to appease this overseas client of theirs. By leveraging these networks, the IRGC can employ an outsourcing approach to inflict damage on adversaries while maintaining a guise of plausible deniability.

The IRGC’s methodology, which is a form of hybrid, or asymmetrical, warfare, is a staple in the organization’s playbook which has been observed before in its plan to attack targets in Sri Lanka and the United States in 2024. The IRGC utilized drug trafficker Farhad Shakeri, who held a strong network of organized criminals in both Sri Lanka and the U.S. Shakeri planned to use his criminal contacts to bomb the Israel consulate in Colombo and Arugam Bay, assassinate Israeli tourists in both locations, and also assassinate President Donald Trump in the U.S simultaneously during the first anniversary of Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack on Israel. However, his plans were later thwarted by law enforcement and intelligence communities of both Sri Lanka and the U.S.

Following the discovery of the IRGC involvement, the Albanese government removed the Iranian ambassador from the country along with the suspension of its embassy in August 2025 while finally listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity. Operationally, this new designation may bolster the Five Eyes’ information sharing with Australia while granting the nation a legal framework to pursue terrorism charges against IRGC-affiliated activity. Additionally, Australia has ramped up its law enforcement efforts to dismantle the illicit tobacco market. New sets of laws have been implemented in 2025 by Queensland and New South Wales to tackle illicit tobacco operations along with drug busts such as in Operation Xray Modred which led to the seizure of approximately $53.8 million worth of tobacco across 17 different storage facilities. The operation is regarded as one of the largest busts in Queensland history. Overall, Australia’s stringent measures and due diligence in crippling the illicit tobacco market demonstrates its strong commitment to reduce criminality and terrorism alike.

However, while enforcement efforts are effective, it is paramount for Australia to consider policy changes to tobacco excise to not only reduce user dependence on illegal sources but cull domestic terrorist financing operations. One policy option that has been discussed by the nation’s largest tobacco wholesalers was to temporarily freeze the increase in tobacco prices. Doing so would create a window for government and law enforcement to deliberate on viable solutions while preventing the situation from worsening. Reduction of excise may lead to complications such as a potential drop in fiscal budget. However, given the tremendous loss of revenue due to the black market as discussed, conversion of illegitimate users to legitimate users as a result of improved policy may create fiscal opportunities for the Australian government instead.

Moreover, preventing tobacco use may contribute to the reduction of the illicit market which does not require touching excise tax. Through a whole-of-society approach such as anti-tobacco education or promotion of healthy lifestyles, Australia may minimize the demand for illegitimate procurement of the product, thus inadvertently mitigating the terrorist financing problem.

Conclusion

The IRGC’s asymmetrical operations in the Australian firebombing incidents emphasize the ever-present need for counterterrorism and national security stakeholders to employ criminological perspectives to unravel the crime-terror nexus. It must be understood that terrorism does not begin with an attack, but rather an established logistical and financial foundation before that. Given organized crime groups’ vast access to lucrative contraband such as illicit tobacco in the case of Australia, terrorist organizations will utilize them for financing opportunities. Given this, restricting distribution of illicit markets will result in considerable mileage in counterterrorism efforts. As crime and terror become a conjoined threat, law enforcement and national security efforts must be just as, if not more, collectivized to counteract them. Australia must not only rely on domestic enforcement efforts and foreign policy decisions to cripple the capability of nefarious actors, but also curb the demand for the rampant illicit tobacco market by changing to its excise tax policies and discouraging product usage. By accomplishing this, the nation can remain optimistic as it positions itself to strategically fight against both crime and terrorism.

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
What the Latest Policy and Tech Shifts Mean for National Security https://belimedia.com.ng/what-the-latest-policy-and-tech-shifts-mean-for-national-security https://belimedia.com.ng/what-the-latest-policy-and-tech-shifts-mean-for-national-security Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

COLUMN/EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — This issue explores the massive, simultaneous shifts in Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) authorities, funding, and technological requirements. Pentagon Procurement Officers are realizing that the drone market is evolving so rapidly that buying isolated, legacy C-UAS systems is a strategic liability. Policy wonks are watching the fundamental shift in legal and operational frameworks governing domestic and military airspace from a defensive, heavily restricted posture to a proactive one. For investors, the recent shifts mean there are unprecedented market opportunities driven by hard deadlines.

For Procurement Officers: The Death of Standalone Electronic Warfare

Traditional technologies such as Electronic Warfare (EW) aren’t going to do the job. In complex or urban environments, traditional EW suffers several technical challenges (multipath propagation, electromagnetic clutter) and is dangerous (interfering with civilian emergency channels). Furthermore, EW probably won’t work against modern drones. Many are increasingly equipped with tech that enables autonomous operation, often without RF emissions, rendering simple jamming useless.

Because of varying rules of engagement and collateral damage risks, C-UAS must be a spectrum of responses. This includes non-kinetic (cyber interference, GNSS spoofing) and kinetic (directed-energy, interceptors) options seamlessly controlled by a single architecture. Everything from detection and airspace deconfliction, to UAS defeat must be fast, precise, and integrated. No pressure.

Teaming between multiple complementary defense technology companies should be highly encouraged, if not required, to reduce or remove the burden of innovation from the government client. Procurement can then pivot to integrated, end-to-end architectures. No single vendor can create a system able to counter the entirety of today’s threats, much less the threats that emerge before your next sam.gov solicitation can get published. Shifting toward rapid procurement mechanisms and away from long-term, winner-take-all contracts will help quickly replace any technologies that fail to perform as advertised.

Do you have deep experience in national security and something to say? Drop us a note at info@thecipherbrief.com.

For Policy Wonks: The Bureaucratic Shackles Are Off

The Department of War's (DoW) December 2025 policy lets commanders go lethal fast. The policy represents a massive culture shift, explicitly empowering commanders to extend defensive actions beyond the physical fence line of military installations. Redundant engagement zones have been simplified into just Zones 1 and 2, giving wider decision-making space based on the totality of circumstances rather than overly prescriptive engagement criteria that would otherwise delay responses and increase risk.

Executive actions have recognized that the UAS threat is no longer a foreign battlefield problem; it is a homeland security crisis driven by cartels smuggling fentanyl, criminals surveilling law enforcement, and foreign actors targeting critical infrastructure.

To combat this, the White House has mandated the FAA to provide automated, real-time access to personal identifying information associated with UAS remote identification signals to both federal and local agencies, breaking down long-standing privacy and jurisdictional silos. Yes, the government is watching you, Mr. UAS pilot.

For Investors: A Massive, Time-Sensitive Market Expansion

There are multiple, complementary catalysts for C-UAS spending, representing a windfall of opportunities for viable technologies.

The White House has mandated that federal grant programs be opened up to allow State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial agencies to purchase UAS detection and tracking equipment. This instantly expands the C-UAS customer base beyond the Pentagon to thousands of local police departments and municipal governments.

The federal government is establishing a National Training Center for Counter-UAS specifically to build capacity for major upcoming events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Summer Olympics.

On the military side, the DoW is not waiting for an incident; they have mandated that installation commanders issue new, aggressive installation-specific operating procedures within 60 days, forcing immediate assessments of vulnerabilities and driving urgent procurement.

Investment firms should hire due diligence teams who know what they’re looking at. Defense technology companies aren’t usually being purposefully deceptive about their solution’s efficacy; they are convinced they can make it work like their pitch decks claim. Finally, be sure your due diligence team sees the technology perform before the boss wires the money.

Conclusion

The unrestricted C-UAS era has arrived, and the "Iron Triangle" of procurement, policy, and investment must move in lockstep to meet it. With the Department of War slashing bureaucratic red tape and the White House opening federal coffers to local agencies, the market is no longer just expanding, it’s exploding (pun intended). Whether you are a commander securing a base or an investor vetting the next interceptor, the mandate is to move fast, integrate everything, and prioritize results over pitch decks. Success in this new landscape requires a proactive posture and a healthy dose of skepticism toward standalone solutions.

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran: War, the Abraham Accords, and the Psychology of Its Leadership https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-war-the-abraham-accords-and-the-psychology-of-its-leadership https://belimedia.com.ng/iran-war-the-abraham-accords-and-the-psychology-of-its-leadership OPINION – As the war between Iran and America (plus Israel) enters its second week, a close examination of its asymmetric and higher-order effects is more critical than ever. Competing media narratives have failed to understand and appreciate both America’s and Israel’s rationale for attacking Iran using pre-emptive strikes, as well the logic and reason behind Iran’s forceful, asymmetric response to the decimation of its senior clerical leadership – and what this means for the entire Middle East going forward.

President Trump’s boldness, following his military strike on Venezuela and capture of its leader Nicolas Maduro in January 2026, has a ‘Reaganesque’ quality and resolve. The same might be argued for President Trump’s earlier (e.g. January 2020) targeted assassination of the head of Iran’s IRGC Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani. For adversary foreign opponents of President Trump, January has often been the cruelest month. But as President Reagan learned after his 1986 strikes against Libya and its late leader, Muammar Qaddafi, things don’t always proceed as planned, and higher-order effects and ‘black swans’ must be considered.

While the Trump administration has shown confusion at times, and has not articulated its war messaging well, I suspect that what President Trump hoped for, more than the elimination of Iran’s nuclear program, its missile programs, and its expert of terror abroad, was a new Iranian leadership that would somehow, eventually, become part of his legacy and vision of peace - his signature achievement in the Middle East, the Abraham Accords.

But understanding this also leads to a paradox, and it explains why Iran has attacked those allies which (in the GCC, plus Saudi Arabia and Israel) who had signed onto the Abraham Accords. For Iran’s clerics, the Abraham Accords represent, even more than Israel or America, an existential threat to their theocracy and vision for the Islamic Republic of Iran. President Trump’s dreams and hopes for peace in the Middle East, following this most recent attack on Iran, while admirable and singularly aspirational, may no longer be realistic.

The killing of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini, who had the blood of tens of thousands of Americans, victims of terrorism in the Middle East and around the world, and yes, Iranian citizens on his hands, was a necessary act. But it ignores not only the depth of his hatred for America, Israel, and the West, which no obituary can capture, but the ideology – velayat e faqih – which sustained him and the clerical leadership since 1979. The late Ayatollah Khameini was hardly the smiling, avuncular grandfather as depicted in a recent media report, but a determined, ferocious, and ideologically, driven adversary, for whom martyrdom would always be a preferred outcome to making a deal with the hated devils – Israel and America. Unlike his predecessor and founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, Khameini would never allow himself to drink from the ‘poisoned chalice’ to make peace with the enemy.

The asymmetric nature of Iran’s response to the current attacks by America and Israel, are not, as depicted in some western media and think tank circles, mere acts of desperation, but more likely, part of a more drawn-out strategy of hybrid warfare tactics. In this sense, the Iranians have utilized their own doctrine, but appear to have learned from the Ukraine war, that an emboldened, hardened enemy can use drones, missiles, cyber-attacks, economic warfare, higher oil prices, the closure of the Hormuz Straits, and effective propaganda to achieve partial levels of parity with a much more powerful opponent.

The killing of its leadership makes peace with America a very hard sell for Iranian hardliners, who hate Israel and America, now more than ever. And there are NO Iranian moderates in the current, surviving government. Possible successors, such as the leader of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, remain die-hard hardliners. The attacks on Iran’s leadership, while tactically bold, ignored two fundamental truths: (1) the built-in, multiple structures of redundancy in Iran’s government, e.g. the Office of the Supreme Leader; the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council; the Supreme National Security Council; and the massive power of the IRGC, embedded throughout Iranian political, economic, and social structures; and (2), the doctrine of clerical rule, embedded in the Iranian Constitution. While President Trump has offered negotiations to his Iranian interlocutors – and it is likely that some discussions continue between special envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and their Iranian counterpart, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, this is not the time for successful negotiations. We have often fallen prey to false thinking, in that Iranian government officials, even when educated in the West, and appreciative of western culture (ex: Larijani is a scholar of philosophy and of Immanuel Kant), will somehow ‘be’ more western, or amenable to western concepts of ideology, reason, and justice. They are rational --- but in their own way.

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In going to war with Iran, understanding their psychology, and that of the leadership, is more critical than ever. Iran is not Venezuela. Nor is it Syria. Their system is more resilient than we reckoned. We forget, at our peril, that the Iranian regime lost over 1 million citizens during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. And it recently slaughtered over 30,000 of their citizens, innocent protesters, in matter of a few days during January. For those tragic victims, January is indeed the cruelest month.

There are other variables worth considering. Iran is a complex, pluralistic, and conservative – especially the middle-class bazaaris and small business owners - society, over 90 million citizens, well-educated, and connected with the outside world. While it’s a civilization going back thousands of years – this too is part of Iran’s national pride – it is also a youthful society, with over 50% if its population under the age of 35.

The Iranian government will draw a key conclusion from this war, as did the Ukrainians and the Libyans (of course, North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un is smiling): that had they had nuclear weapons, this war would NOT have happened. The worst-case scenario- this is our nightmare, and a huge challenge for our intelligence community - is that Iran could now say, “We don’t need to build a nuke. We can buy it, along with a few long-range ICBMs, such as the Hwasong-20, which can reach the shores of America. From whom? From North Korea, obviously, which needs cash, badly so.” Stopping such future proliferation will remain our (and Israel’s) biggest challenge.

Bottom line: the war with Iran has emerged as way more complex than seen at first glance, and the higher order effects are both fascinating and chilling. So, as 2026 continues, all eyes are once again, on President Trump. It’s his move, again. Given his and America’s prestige on the line, there is now, more than ever, no margin for error. Understanding Iran’s next generation of leaders, and their psychology, is crucial to prevail.

Dr. Kenneth Dekleva served as a Regional Medical Officer/Psychiatrist with the U.S. Dept. of State from 2002-2016 and is currently the CEO of Blackwood Advisory Solutions LLC and Professor of Psychiatry, UT Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX. The views expressed by Dr. Dekleva are entirely his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Dept. of State, or UT Southwestern Medical Center.

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Purpose&Built or Perilous: Congress Faces a Critical FBI Headquarters Decision https://belimedia.com.ng/purpose-built-or-perilous-congress-faces-a-critical-fbi-headquarters-decision https://belimedia.com.ng/purpose-built-or-perilous-congress-faces-a-critical-fbi-headquarters-decision

OPINION – Congress is weighing a decision with critical National Security implications for generations to come: where to locate the next FBI headquarters? The current headquarters, the Hoover Building, is long past its sell-by date, and there is general agreement it needs to be replaced.

The new headquarters, wherever it is located, must deal with a fundamental threat. It will inevitably be a high-priority target for terrorists, spies, and cyber criminals. That means the single most important consideration must be the safety of the men and women who work there; secondarily, the security of highly sensitive investigative and national security data held inside; lastly, the security of adjacencies - both human and physical. That kind of security requires more than a strong building. It requires a safe location to meet current and evolving threats.

Unfortunately, the frontrunner for the new headquarters fails those crucial considerations. We can do better--much better--than refurbishing the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. The vulnerabilities have been known for over two decades.

The April 19, 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City prompted new security measures for federal office buildings. Independent security consultants warned that the Reagan Building’s sprawling 11-Acre complex, mixed-use design, convention space, vast underground parking garage left it vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks confirmed that the FBI needed a new headquarters complex - one that satisfied Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Level V protocols - the highest security standards for nonmilitary federal facilities.

A retrofit of the 30-year-old Reagan Building will fail to meet the physical and cybersecurity requirements of Level V.

The Reagan Building is a quasi-public building in the heart of downtown Washington, DC, designed as a center for international events and public use. Its architecture is antithetical to Level V due to features such as a one-acre glass atrium roof, famed sky lights, and open access to surrounding buildings and Metro.

The urban density of the Reagan Building surroundings creates permanent vulnerabilities that will never satisfy Level V Security. The Reagan Building is in the DC core, which exacerbates security risks to itself and adjacent federal and civilian activity: the District’s Wilson Building, Department of Commerce, Willard Hotel, Freedom Plaza, 14th Street artery and in closer proximity to the White House. No amount of retrofitting will change these physical adjacencies.

Nearby high-rise buildings provide clear vantage points for hostile actors. The required standoff distances from blast threats can never be met. Nor can the Reagan Building adequately be shielded from line-of-sight surveillance, infrared detection, or electronic signal collection. And, the one acre of glass in the atrium skylight provides an easy drone threat.

A pedestrian tunnel under 14th Street, a popular food court, Metro access, and public garage connectivity undermine perimeter control, as well. Additionally, the Reagan Building cannot provide the square footage for the redundant power infrastructure mandated for a national security headquarters, including a separate utility plant and multiple independent grid connections. Moving FBI here shows a grave disregard for the safety and security of federal personnel, citizens, and national intelligence.

The Real Tab: GSA’s FY 2026 prospectus estimates roughly $1.4 billion for design, construction, and FBI fit-out, but omit the costs of: temporary housing during construction, maintaining Level V-compliant interim facilities, and the likelihood of future leased space if full consolidation proves impossible within the fixed footprint of the Reagan Building. Outdated estimates and assumptions do not reflect the complexity of Level V security or the rapid evolution of cyber and surveillance threats.

The Time to Act is Now: Congress needs to remove the Reagan Building from consideration and insist on a purpose-built solution. The FBI needs a campus-style headquarters with adequate standoff distance, full perimeter control, redundant power and communications, and infrastructure flexible to adapt to evolving threats. Over 23 years ago, a bipartisan report was issued, using the attacks on the Murrah Building and World Trade Center as background, as well as GAO, DOJ/OIG, and Independent Security reports with similar conclusions. But nothing has happened.

Since our first article appeared in The Hill, Frank Keating, Oklahoma Governor at time of the Murrah Building Bombing, responded to us with, “The Murrah tragedy was a wake-up call. Now, thirty years later it doesn’t look like any lessons were learned.” A former Ambassador shared, “The State Department's post Benghazi worldwide building requirements are very unfriendly to retrofitting buildings for occupation by State personnel whether or not a SCIF is involved. The Bureau will be the target like the Marines in Beirut.”

If lawmakers want to ensure the FBI remains the world’s premier law enforcement and counterterrorism organization, they should demand a headquarters that is purposefully built from a national security perspective, not a retrofit of a building never intended to be a secured facility. Let’s, finally, do this right

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Breaking Down our "Red October" Moment for AI https://belimedia.com.ng/breaking-down-our-red-october-moment-for-ai https://belimedia.com.ng/breaking-down-our-red-october-moment-for-ai EXPERT PERSPECTIVE/OPINON -- In the climax of the 1990 movie “The Hunt for Red October”, the Soviet captain of the V.K. Konovalov makes a fatal error. Intent on destroying the defecting Red October submarine, he orders his crew to deactivate the safety features on his own torpedoes to gain a tactical edge. When the torpedoes miss their American target, they do exactly what they were programmed to do: they find the nearest large acoustic signature. Because the "safeties" were off and the weapon was no longer "fit for its purpose," it turned back and destroyed the very ship that launched it.

As the Department of War (DoW) moves to integrate "frontier" AI models into the heart of national security, we are approaching a "Red October" moment. The recent debate over Anthropic’s engagement with the Pentagon isn't just about corporate ethics - it's about whether we are handing our warfighters tools with the strategic safeties off.

As the former Chief AI Officer of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), I believe the greatest risk we face is the lack of a sophisticated, mission-aligned framework to judge these models before they reach the field.

To avoid the fate of the Konovalov, we must transition to "fit-for-purpose" evaluation, a commitment to rigorous existing standards, and the realization that in national security, high quality is the only true form of safety.

The Fallacy of the General-Purpose Model

In the commercial sector, a model that "hallucinates" a legal citation or generates a slightly off-brand image is a nuisance. In a theater of operations, those same errors are lethal. We must stop judging AI in the abstract and start judging it based on its specific intent.

While generalist models might be suitable for orchestrating workflow, the work should be performed by "expert" agents, or better yet, functions and APIs that only do what you ask and have been tested and accredited for that function.

Both the creators of these models and the DoW must co-develop a Test and Evaluation (T&E) framework that moves beyond general "alignment" and into statistical reality. This framework must; statistically score quality and accuracy against the specific variables of a mission environment and accredit models for specific use cases rather than granting a blanket "safe for government" seal of approval.

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We should not expect a general frontier model to perform perfectly in autonomous targeting if it wasn't trained for it. We need precision instruments for precision missions. The government’s primary duty is to ensure that the warfighter is handed a tool that has been subjected to rigorous, transparent, and statistically sound evaluation before it ever enters a kinetic environment.

The Standard Already Exists

We do not need to invent a new philosophy of governance for AI; we simply need to apply the high-bar standards the DoD has already established for autonomous systems. The benchmark is DoD Directive 3000.09, "Autonomy in Weapon Systems."

The directive is explicit in its requirement for human agency, stating:

"Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force."

This is the standard. It requires that any system—whether a simple algorithm or a complex neural network - undergo "rigorous hardware and software verification and validation (V&V) and realistic system developmental and operational test and evaluation (OT&E)."

Avoiding the WOPR Scenario

We have seen the fictional version of a failure to follow this standard before. In the 1983 classic movie “War Games”, the military replaces human missile silo officers with the WOPR (War Operation Plan Response) supercomputer because the humans "failed" to turn their keys during a simulated nuclear strike. By removing the human in the loop to increase efficiency, the creators nearly triggered World War III when the AI couldn't distinguish between a game and reality.

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We should view the National Security Memorandum (NSM) on AI, published in 2024 as the modern guardrail against this cinematic nightmare. The NSM’s explicit prohibition against AI-controlled nuclear launches is not a new rule, but rather the 3000.09 standard applied to the most extreme case. If our standards work for our most consequential strategic assets, they must be the baseline for accrediting frontier models in any mission-critical capacity.

The Law is Not Optional

As we lean into this new technological frontier, we must remind ourselves that the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) remains our North Star. The principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity are absolute. AI is not an "alternative" to these laws; it is a tool that must be proven to operate strictly within them. We follow the law of armed conflict today, and the AI we build must be engineered to do the same - without exception.

Good AI is Safe AI

There is a common misconception that AI safety and AI performance are at odds and that we must "slow down" performance to ensure safety. This is a false dichotomy.

Good AI - high-quality, high-performing AI - is the safest AI.

A model that achieves the highest standards of accuracy and reliability is the model that best safeguards the user. By insisting on a statistical "fit-for-purpose" accreditation rooted in DoDD 3000.09, we ensure our warfighters are equipped with systems that reduce error, minimize collateral risk, and provide the mission assurance they deserve. In the high-stakes world of national security, "good enough" is a liability. Only the highest-standard AI can truly protect the mission and the men and women who carry it out.

I do believe the "Super-Human" computer is on the way, and as smart as that model will be, we should never give it keys to the silos.

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
The War’s Next Phase: Five Indicators That Matter Most https://belimedia.com.ng/the-wars-next-phase-five-indicators-that-matter-most https://belimedia.com.ng/the-wars-next-phase-five-indicators-that-matter-most EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – I’m always reluctant to comment on current events, as it feels a bit like being an armchair quarterback, but I have been asked about different parts of the ongoing conflict as people are trying to get their arms around what’s happening. So I thought I’d just offer up how I personally frame it for my own understanding and formulation of insights, on what we’re witnessing.

General Miller’s comments were originally published on his LinkedIn platform and are republished in The Cipher Brief with his permission. You can read the original post and follow General Miller’s updates on LinkedIn.

This was always going to be a very complex campaign, and different from Midnight Hammer and Absolute Resolve, which were complex in their own right.

I’m confident in our military and the leaders orchestrating this difficult fight, as evidenced by their display of overmatch in the initial phases of the operation. Historically, when we go after symmetric targets, we achieve success, so while those remain important, it’s the less symmetric aspects that take us down the path of “branch plans” rather than “sequels”.

I am watching our ability to intercept both missiles and Shahed Drones. The Shahed has been a challenge and recognized concern for some time and I have written about those challenges before. The Shaheds are relatively inexpensive, have substantial range and are accurate. What I don’t know is the inventory available but I suspect they are plentiful. A friend of mine from the UK refers to them as the “flying IED”.

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I’m also watching energy flows from the region and traffic in the Straits of Hormuz. Not only does this have global economic implications, but it could also imply operational considerations if the U.S. Navy has to be used to get traffic moving. But as I understand history, the Straits have never been fully closed - challenged, yes - but not brought to a standstill, so it’s worth watching as we enter day 8 with little to no traffic.

The Kurds, who I actually know well, at least the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, are an unknown right now in terms of how they shape events on the ground and the resulting aftermath, but support to them will likely cause operational plans to adjust. And ultimately, this is about understanding the human interactions on the ground.

Sentiment in the region does matter, therefore I read the Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s statement very closely and while he has condemned the war in Iran, he hasn’t crossed a redline that he could have in issuing a Fatwah against our servicemembers. But information and influence definitely matter and this is something I’d be looking to counter or at least compete in the information space, as rapidly as possible.

Lastly, I’m watching all of the casualties because those will matter as this progresses.

As I think through this, inevitably I know that the aftermath is going to be the real challenge determining how this all turns out, and it will require some serious statecraft.

I fully appreciate that there are many more variables, and they will create branch plans -war tends to do that - these are just my basic organizing principles around a complex endeavor. This is more about “how to think” about the conflict and not necessarily “what to think”.

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
Interceptor Math: How Iran’s Drone Swarms Strain U.S. Defenses https://belimedia.com.ng/interceptor-math-how-irans-drone-swarms-strain-us-defenses https://belimedia.com.ng/interceptor-math-how-irans-drone-swarms-strain-us-defenses

Deep Dive — Western intelligence assessments indicate that Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal has been cut in half - from roughly 2,500 projectiles down to approximately 1,200, with only 100 serviceable launchers still operational. For a regime that spent decades building its missile program as the cornerstone of regional deterrence, the depletion represents an existential crisis and much of it’s effectiveness now comes down to math.

What makes Tehran’s predicament acute is the abandonment by traditional backers. Russia has ceased arms shipments while providing intelligence to help Iran target U.S. forces, according to multiple U.S. officials. China, facing confrontation with Washington over Taiwan, has quietly distanced itself from Iranian crude purchases. The result is an Islamic Republic that is more isolated than at any point since the 1980s, with its conventional deterrent crumbling and options narrowing to a single dangerous path.

Arsenal Depletion and Russia’s Intelligence Lifeline

Dr. Andreas Krieg, associate professor at King’s College London, tells The Cipher Brief that while the drop from roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles to closer to 1,200 is significant, “this is not a ‘disarmed Iran’ story.”

Iran still has weapons, but can no longer sustain weeks of intensive missile attacks, forcing it to rely more heavily on cheaper drones and carefully ration its remaining high-end missiles for maximum political impact.

What Iran lacks in replenishment, Russia has partially offset through intelligence. U.S. officials say Russia has been providing Iran with targeting information since the war began, including the locations of U.S. warships and aircraft. The assistance reportedly also includes imagery gathered by Moscow’s sophisticated satellite constellation.

Subsequently, Iran has been making precise hits on early warning radars and command infrastructure, patterns consistent with intelligence-sharing. Iranian drones struck a CIA station at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and killed six U.S. service members at a facility in Kuwait.

Rosemary Kelanic, director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, tells The Cipher Brief that Russia and China can still help Iran beyond arms shipments.

“Either might help Iran with targeting by clandestinely providing satellite and other intelligence. Some evidence suggests that Russia helped the Houthis with targeting Red Sea shipping in recent years,” she notes.

The Drone Factor: Mass Production Versus Interceptor Economics

Beyond missiles, Iran’s real staying power lies in its vast drone arsenal. Israeli intelligence officials estimate Iran maintains more than 10,000 Shahed drones in storage. Robert Tollast of the Royal United Services Institute puts the figure even higher at “tens of thousands.” Some estimates suggest Iran may possess as many as 80,000, though such figures remain difficult to verify.

The economics, however, favor Tehran. Each Shahed-136 costs between $20,000 and $50,000, while interceptors cost exponentially more. For every dollar Iran spends, the UAE, for one, pays approximately $20 to $28 to intercept. Moscow has reportedly established a factory capable of producing 310 drones per month.

If Tehran sustains output approaching 400 drones daily, a figure cited in recent intelligence estimates, then annual production would exceed 140,000 units. Such capacity requires distributed manufacturing across multiple sites, a model Iran developed during the Iran-Iraq War in order to reduce vulnerability.

But Iran’s ability to keep launching depends on suppression efforts. The question isn’t just stockpile size - it’s whether Iran can protect launch sites and coordinate mass attacks while under continuous bombardment.

The Interceptor Crisis

As a result of America’s own supply problem, Iran’s drone advantage is amplified. Last June, American THAAD interceptor stocks were depleted by 25 percent. Officials at the Pentagon privately acknowledge that replenishment timelines extend into 2027.

Miguel Miranda, founder of the Southeast Asian monitoring service, Arms Show Tracker, tells The Cipher Brief that while “CENTCOM can airlift fresh missile interceptors and even more Patriot batteries as needed, the problems are the emerging missile and air defense gaps in friendly countries and their own defenses.”

He also observes that while there seems to be real success by CENTCOM and Israel in destroying the heavier Khorramshahr and Ghadr-class MRBMs, Iran’s most powerful medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel and carrying multiple warheads, “the visuals for these are very limited.”

“One week into this mess, we do not have a clear picture of the Iranian missile arsenal,” Miranda told us.

Michael Rubin, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, tells The Cipher Brief that Washington’s supply chain issue represents “strategic negligence going back decades.”

“After the missiles and drones are depleted, and it does not appear Iran is holding any in reserve, then not only are regional states safe, but the U.S. and Israel can begin close air support operations,” he observes.

Yet the interceptor shortage cuts both ways. Kelanic underscores that “limitations on interceptors likely play an outsized role in Iran’s overall strategy,” pointing out that while the U.S. and Israel can continue fighting without top-tier interceptors, they will suffer higher casualties.

“Iran’s leaders recognize that if the war evolves into an attrition conflict, a battle of wills more than a battle of capabilities, Iran could have the upper hand, because the stakes are existential for Iran but not for the United States,” she said.

It’s a war of ammunition math, not just technology. Krieg explains the THAAD drawdown matters “because missile defense is a magazine contest, not a pure technology contest.” Iranian planners, he predicts, will exploit this with “missile math: using low-cost drones and decoys to trigger high-value intercepts, and reserving ballistic missiles for moments that maximise political impact.”

The UAE, for one, reported that 65 of 941 Iranian drones detected fell within its territory, damaging ports, airports, hotels, and data centers.

Moscow’s Constraints and Beijing’s Calculation

While Russia provides intelligence, it cannot provide the weapons Tehran desperately needs. Russia’s relationship with Iran has long been a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy. Yet, the Kremlin, consumed by its protracted war in Ukraine, now finds itself unable to deliver military support. MI6 assessments indicate Russian arms exports have effectively halted, with production lines committed to Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin faces a paradox. Elevated oil prices above $100 per barrel, driven partly by Middle East instability, boost Russian revenues. But meaningful military intervention would require diverting resources from Ukraine or exposing force depletion to NATO intelligence. Russia’s posture has become rhetorical support without substantive backing. Arms shipments have dried up, replaced by intelligence sharing.

China’s calculus proves even more complex. Iranian crude accounts for 13 percent of China’s oil imports. Still, Beijing faces an uncomfortable reality. The Strait of Hormuz remains vulnerable, and continued procurement risks a crisis with Washington as Taiwan tensions reach their highest levels in decades.

As the Trump administration challenges Chinese ambitions in the Pacific, Beijing cannot afford to engage in multiple confrontations at once. As Chinese energy companies reduce their exposure to Iran, they are looking for alternatives in Russia and Gulf countries.

Krieg argues that “the lack of Russian resupply and China’s reluctance to jeopardize Gulf relationships increases Tehran’s sense that it cannot ‘outlast’ the West conventionally through replenishment.”

“This isolation makes the nuclear program more valuable as an insurance policy: not necessarily to sprint to a bomb immediately, but to sit closer to the threshold so that regime survival looks too costly to challenge,” he explains.

The Nuclear Trump Card

Faced with a depleted conventional arsenal, absent Russian resupply, and Chinese abandonment, Tehran has increasingly concentrated resources on its nuclear program. Western intelligence agencies monitoring Iranian facilities report accelerated enrichment activities and renewed weaponization research.

The Iranian government has grown increasingly explicit in its nuclear messages, suggesting that its nuclear program represents an existential guarantee of the regime’s survival. Despite this, expert assessments of Iran’s nuclear trajectory differ sharply.

Rubin points out that the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei “could never compromise on Iran’s nuclear program because he could not forfeit it and explain to his base that their sacrifice, as Iran lost $2 trillion in lost revenue due to sanctions and lost opportunities, was worth it.” He also warns that while Tehran’s bluster is primarily about leverage, “Iran might not be able to explode a fissile device, but it can make a dirty bomb.”

Kelanic, meanwhile, notes that Israeli intelligence has so deeply penetrated Iran’s security services that the regime has little chance of weaponizing without detection.

“Iran’s only nuclear leverage is the knowledge of where its HEU stockpiles are, coupled with the implicit threat that nuclear materials could fall into worse hands than the current regime if the country splinters into chaos,” she asserts.

HEU, highly enriched uranium, is weapons-grade nuclear material. Essentially, Iran’s bargaining chip is the threat that if the regime collapses, its nuclear stockpiles could end up with even more dangerous actors, like terrorist groups or warlords.

Yet Krieg sees Iran’s acceleration primarily as leverage and survival hedging.

“The pattern fits a long-standing approach. Move closer to the threshold, protect stockpiles and facilities, compress breakout timelines, and keep ambiguity high so that opponents face deterrence without Tehran crossing a line that would trigger overwhelming retaliation,” he says. “In an existential war, the probability of a last-resort dash is higher than in normal times, especially if leaders conclude the conventional balance cannot preserve the regime.”

Yet Kelanic emphasizes that Tehran retains options beyond ballistic missiles.

“Iran can mass-produce drones, which so far have caused significant damage. Iran can also harass oil shipping in the Persian Gulf with limpet mines attached by speedboats,” she cautions. “There are many low-tech, low-cost ways Iran can retaliate in the region.”

Cut off from Russian weapons and Chinese support, Iran’s nuclear program has become its most valuable bargaining chip, both to deter attacks and to potentially trade for the sanctions relief it desperately needs to rebuild its conventional forces.

How Long Can This Last?

President Trump stated the war was initially projected to last 4 to 5 weeks, adding that the U.S. has “the capability to go far longer.” But that timeline could depend on factors neither side controls. Iran must protect manufacturing sites under bombardment while American forces maintain tempo with finite interceptor stocks and mounting domestic pressure.

Tom Sharpe, a former Royal Navy commander, warned that “if the Iranians unleash everything - go hard and fast if the regime feels threatened, then eventually the U.S. will run out of THAAD and Patriot interceptors.” Yet Iran cannot expend missiles recklessly; once depleted, the regime becomes defenseless.

History offers sobering precedents. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began as a six-month intervention; it became a nine-year quagmire that accelerated the USSR’s collapse. It becomes a question of whether Tehran calculates that it can survive by hoarding resources and hoping America breaks first, or if it is driven by existential desperation.

“The most realistic interpretation,” Krieg concludes, “is that Iran is using the nuclear program to regain bargaining power now, while keeping weaponization as an option of last resort if it believes the state is facing collapse.”

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
After the Strikes: Is Iran on the Brink? https://belimedia.com.ng/after-the-strikes-is-iran-on-the-brink https://belimedia.com.ng/after-the-strikes-is-iran-on-the-brink

EXPERT INTERVIEW – U.S. and Israeli forces intensified their unprecedented military campaign against Iran over the weekend, striking strategic military, political and leadership targets deep inside Iranian territory in what officials are calling a coordinated effort to degrade Tehran’s war-fighting capabilities and disrupt its regional influence. The offensive, involving long-range missiles, fighter jets and precision airstrikes, followed days of escalating tensions and marks one of the most dramatic expansions of military action in the Middle East in years.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and multiple senior commanders were reportedly killed in the initial phase of the strikes, a development confirmed by Iranian state media and acknowledged by U.S. and Israeli leaders. The death of Iran’s paramount authority has thrust Tehran into political uncertainty, even as the campaign rolls on with bombardments of ballistic missile sites, naval facilities and command infrastructure.

Tehran has launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against Israeli and U.S. military bases throughout the region, resulting in casualties on both sides and raising fears of a broader, protracted conflict. The Pentagon has confirmed American service member deaths, and Israeli officials report civilian casualties from Iranian strikes.

The flurry of military operations has drawn global attention, with world powers urging restraint even as regional allies recalibrate their defense postures. Against this backdrop of war and strategic jockeying, Cipher Brief COO & Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke with former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI Norm Roule about what else we need to keep in mind on the heels of the U.S. and Israeli strikes. Their conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity. You can also watch the entire interview on The Cipher Brief’s YouTube Channel.

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

Christian: What are you not seeing right now that's top of mind for you?

Roule: That's a great question. That's the intelligence officer's question because what's in the news is something that everyone talks about, but what's not in the news is what a good intelligence officer looks at. So, first things that we're not seeing right now. What we're not seeing yet would be any efforts by the Iranians to attack energy targets in the Gulf. We've seen some efforts by Iran to disrupt flows of transportation in the Strait of Hormuz. There have been some announcements by the IRGC, but they have not undertaken mining operations, speedboat operations, submarine operations. So, the Iranians appear to be, as of now at least, interested in maintaining the flow of oil and the food and other supplies upon which they and the other Gulf states depend through the Strait of Hormuz. So that's number one.

We're not seeing Europe stand with the United States in the same way that it has in the past. And this is important because in many ways, what the United States is doing is in Europe's interest. It's not just that the nuclear negotiations have been something that Europeans have focused on for many years, but the progression of Iran's missiles would obviously threaten Western Europe. The improvements of MRBMs [Medium-range Ballistic Missile] would threaten Germany, France, and England. Terrorism through the Quds Force has impacted Europe far more often than the United States, but the proliferation of ballistic missiles to the Houthis has severely impacted the trade of the Mediterranean states in the Red Sea.

The United States Navy has done exceptional work in pushing back on the Houthis, but you've not seen France, Germany or the United Kingdom stand up and support the United States. In some ways, this is similar to what Chancellor [Friedrich] Mertz reportedly stated regarding Israel last year, in that Israel was doing Germany's dirty work or Europe's dirty work regarding Iran. The Europeans are focused on whether this is a legal operation under international rules and I do worry that following this, maybe people will look back and ask whether Europe was standing with the United States appropriately during this event.

Christian: Retired Admiral Jim Stavridis said this weekend that if the Iranian regime feels that it's at the end of its rope, and I'm paraphrasing, “I expect them to go big in terms of their response”. Is the fact that you're not seeing some of the things that you mentioned indicative of the fact that the regime may not feel that it's at the end of its rope, or how should we interpret that?

Roule: A great question. Let's look at some of the missile attacks that are being fired on the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] and the drone attacks. Iran fires missiles against the GCC for two reasons. First, it's hoping to strike Americans and kill as many Americans as possible to create a political problem for the president with the American people.

Second, it hopes to damage as much of GCC property and kill GCC personnel so that the GCC countries themselves will press the United States to end the conflict. But the number of attacks that have been conducted by the Iranians against the GCC have been comparatively few thus far. That could change. The Iranians have used missiles and we've seen a number of Shahed drones used against civilian targets in Bahrain and in the Emirates. We've seen attacks in Saudi Arabia against Riyadh, the eastern province, that have been repelled - by the Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, as I mentioned Bahrain - all the GCC states save for Oman itself. But you would have expected to see a more intensive attack against those countries. If Iran was indeed going all out, they would have gone for saturation attacks. They would have gone for a combination of missiles, drones, and cyberattacks all at once against those targets to really have a destructive impact for that final end of the world message. That's not occurred.

There could be two reasons for this. The first is that the United States has destroyed launchers, personnel, command and control, and has prevented them from conducting attacks with the intensity that the Iranians might wish.

The second is that the Iranians are trying to extend these attacks over a period of time so that they can maintain psychological pressure against the United States, Israel, and the GCC over the course of this conflict. It's possible there's even a mixture of these two things. The only problem with that second theory is that if you're the Iranians, that's a pretty gutsy move to think that you're going to be able to retain missile launchers, missile capacity, and that the United States and the Israeli aircraft - hunting for these things right now is not going to destroy these in the next 15 minutes. So, this is not just a stranded asset. This is probably a use or lose moment for the regime. I think what we're looking at in this regard is that if the Iranians thought they were going to go out, they might try to do something in a significant way. But the absence of that activity could be reflective of what the U.S. has done to prevent that thus far with its attacks on command and control and the launchers, etc.

Christian: There's a lot of talk about what the possibility of regime change, however that is defined, and how that could take shape. The president has issued a message to the IRGC, imploring them to lay down in their arms and receive immunity. He issued a message to the Iranian people saying, in effect, that when we're done with this operation, this is gonna be your chance, perhaps the only chance for generations to take over your country. What are you going to be looking for, assuming that there has to have been some sort of messaging, cooperation, organization with Iranian resistance or a group that might be supported to sort of move into a leadership position, should the government as we know it fall?

Roule: Let's talk about a couple of different things. First, regime change can only be accomplished by the Iranians themselves, especially in an air campaign. What we can do is we can degrade the coercive tissue that constrains the Iranian people, and then they themselves have to act against that system if they choose to do so as their capabilities permit. There is another issue here, and that is that it's going to be counterintuitive. You need to retain some sort of discipline and structure within the IRGC because if you were to, and I'm just throwing out a number, if you were to remove the top 10% or 500 personnel in the IRGC, you have thousands of hardline personnel who would be capable of inflicting horrific violence against unarmed protesters and you need someone to exert control and discipline over these personnel, to keep them in their barracks, keep their weapons under control. So, you need structure on the Revolutionary Guard itself to remain intact. Now in terms of groups, I'm unaware of a group that has sufficient control and influence over the entire country that it would be able to on day

one after the supreme leader left this earthly veil and Iran's president would step in and suddenly command the popular support of the Iranian people. That individual needs to stand up and you need to then see how the street responds. That's a crowd action that needs to appear. And that won't be known until it's known. That's something that you just need to see that the people need to come out. And that can't be measured in advance. There's no polling that will show that. That's not an intelligence question. That's a mystery for the Iranians themselves, even for the people themselves, because at the moment that happens, they're going to have to judge their personal security and how they feel about the individual at that time. When that occurs, that's going to be a test of the remaining security structure and how they respond to that person.

There's another challenge here. The Iranians have to have agency. They have to have their own fate in their own hands. That's not the U.S.'s responsibility. We are to help them whenever possible, stand up and remove the coercion. You have to ask such questions. Would we provide air cover if the military continued to attack them? Would we provide air cover if the

military conducted bloodbaths? Would we attack military units in the long term? I mean these are questions that might come down the road, but if not, this is an internal issue and it may be messy, it may even be unpleasant. Politics is this way and we want to we hope it doesn't become another Libya situation but that is up to the Iranian people to choose their fate.

Christian: Following the U.S. military operation to remove Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela, we've seen a rather unique approach that the U.S. has taken towards working with the former regime of Venezuela in ways that probably were unthinkable before that. mean, It’s certainly drawn a lot of criticism from people who say we left a repressive regime in place, but the United States is working with them and has sent top officials including CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Venezuela. Is it possible that there are lessons that may be applied from how we're working with Venezuela in a future Iran scenario?

Roule: Absolutely, and indeed it's not unique to the Trump administration. Former Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice has stated famously, that we are not an NGO, we are a country. Our interests in Iran as laid out in the Trump administration's 2025 national security strategy are uniform across administrations. We want to make sure they don't have a nuclear weapon, that they're not threatening their neighbors and ourselves with missiles, terrorism, proliferation of militias, destabilization of maritime choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Babel Mandab. These are things that touch our core national security interests and those of our partners. Beyond that, we start getting into nation building, which the Trump administration certainly will eschew and deeply oppose anyone who suggests that we spend any time on that.

At the same time, as we look at dealing with that country, you will have individuals such as the Obama administration who would say, look, if we have a nuclear deal with these people and lift sanctions, that's the first step to show maybe we can be trusted and then we'll build into something else. And then as sanctions are lifted, maybe that will allow the people to gradually become a kinder, gentler entity.

Well, why can't that work with sanctions being lifted by the Trump administration in a deal with a post-attack government as well? Following this issue in a hypothetical scenario, where the government says, we're not going to rebuild the nuclear program, we're not going to expand our missiles, we're not going to proliferate militias and terrorists, and the Trump administration

says we're going to provide you with substantial sanctions relief - well, that would be far more than the Obama and Biden administrations could have ever hoped to have achieved under JCPOA and JCPOA-like agreements. And then it would, in essence, have been the same process.

We hope this leads to a reform of the government over time, and it would be tested and it could apply. We could see the addition of new sanctions and we would heavily monitor it and we would have an ability to watch their behavior and respond with sanctions or other diplomatic pressures as we see fit if they fall back. So, there is a process here, just as we could apply that process to Venezuela, where the commander of Southcom has also visited and the secretary of energy. So, we have a process that is building up. And remember, under JCPOA, we had Secretary of State John Kerry meet with his Iranian counterpart on Syria to see if cooperation could work there. It didn't work, but we tried. Cooperation on hostage exchanges. Some would say it worked or didn't, depending on your position, but we tried. Well, the Trump administration is trying in Venezuela. We could try the same thing in this situation.

Christian: What do you think we’re looking at here in terms of a timeline? Do you think this is going to be something that is a very short operation?

Roule: A British prime minister was once asked after giving his plans for his foreign policy, what might stand in the way of those plans. And he famously responded, events, dear boy, events. That's the challenge we face now. What we've seen so far is that the United States military and the Israeli military have performed superbly. We clearly have exquisite intelligence, extraordinary technical capability, magnificently trained personnel who have performed with courage and with great skill, and we have significantly damaged Iran and achieved what you would hope to achieve in that initial foray into a country - suppressed air defense. I think the next phase is the hammer against a variety of different types of targets.

How the Iranians respond after that will be a weird science of how the political dynamic plays out with remaining personnel. So that's a chemistry of different people, personalities, where they're located, how they interact, what psychological pressures exist. You're going to have the issues of what enormous events occur, what buildings are taken out, unrest that may occur or not occur, what military units respond or don't respond. These types of things are going to change the dynamic. In any case, we're looking at days, certainly. I'm certain the Trump administration does not want to see this turn into weeks or a timeframe beyond that.

I expect as this goes forward, the Gulf partners - who have historically had superb relations with multiple levels of Iran's polity and society - will be able to engage individuals as communications are reestablished with Iran. They will find out whether anyone wants to engage and see if anyone of substance rises from the ashes and is able to say, ‘I'm in charge and I'm willing to make a deal. I'm willing to be reasonable’.

The trick is that person is going to have to prove one thing: they're going to have to prove they have authority and a capacity to influence events. There are plenty of people who will say, ‘I am the person who can make things happen and I need nothing - Long pause - except a squadron of F-18s, $500 million and 600 American passports.’ It's the person that you can turn to and say, ‘Okay, so tomorrow, what can you make happen in Tehran at three o'clock?’

Now, when some gulf leader or someone can come up and say, this entity, this person, this group, this structure has risen and they can do this to, they've shown this and they want to make a deal. That's where you start seeing a conclusion come forward or at least the prospect of a conclusion. But it's impossible to make that prediction. And if someone says they can do that, they should start predicting lottery numbers.

Secretary Colin Powell was quite a brilliant and an extraordinary man. I enjoyed working under him and around him. I learned so much from him. I did disagree with him on one famous point. He often said, “If you break it, you own it.” I disagree.

If you break it, there's nothing to own. There's nothing here to own. There will be no structure and we need to know that going in here we won't own anything. There will be nothing there. We'll have to build the structure - or they'll have to find some kind of structure.

The second is how do you want this to end? Don’t go in unless you have an end game confirmed. I think that's an admirable goal. I don't think that's achievable. And I think that's often now used as a way of saying that you can't do this because you can never guarantee that Iran will never have this perfect thing set up in advance. All we can guarantee is that we're going to defeat our adversary, defend our personnel, defend our partners, and have in place a team and an architecture that's able to structure through the inevitable moments when the plan fails the first contact of battle.

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Drone War’s Real Problem Isn’t Technology — It’s Speed https://belimedia.com.ng/the-drone-wars-real-problem-isnt-technology-its-speed https://belimedia.com.ng/the-drone-wars-real-problem-isnt-technology-its-speed OPINION — When Steve Blank and I sat down over coffee a decade ago and realized that the customer discovery process in Lean was identical to what I'd been doing with the Rapid Equipping Force in Afghanistan, neither of us imagined we'd still be making the same argument in 2026. But here we are.

The Department of War has just executed the most ambitious acquisition reform in 60 years. Portfolio Acquisition Executives have replaced PEOs. JCIDS is dead. The Warfighting Acquisition System rewards speed to delivery. These are real reforms, and they implement nearly every recommendation the defense innovation community has made for the last decade.

And they are about to repeat the most expensive mistake of the post-9/11 wars.

Here's why.

The Counter-Drone Fight Is Not a Technology Problem

Everyone in Washington is talking about the counter-UAS challenge as though it's an engineering puzzle. Build a better jammer. Field a cheaper interceptor. Develop AI-enabled target recognition. The technology shelf is full: directed-energy weapons at $12 per shot, drone-on-drone interceptors with over 1,000 kills in Ukraine at $14,500 each, electronic warfare systems that can defeat commercial flight controllers.

The technology works. The process for getting it to the warfighter does not.

A new drone variant appears on the battlefield every week --- built from commercial parts, open-source flight software, and components available on Amazon and Alibaba. A firmware update that defeats your jammer costs nothing and takes hours. Your counter to that update, through even the reformed acquisition system, takes months.

This is not a technology gap. This is a cycle-time gap.

And I've seen this exact gap before.

I Had This Problem. It Was Called the IED.

From 2010 to 2013, I led the Army's Rapid Equipping Force during the height of the counter-IED campaign in Afghanistan. The structural parallels between that fight and the current counter-drone fight are not approximate. They are exact.

Both threats share five characteristics that make them resistant to conventional acquisition:

Cheap, dual-use components. IED parts were globally available commercial products. Drone components are identical --- flight controllers, autopilot software, motors, all commercially sourced. A Shahed-pattern drone costs ~$20,000. An FPV kamikaze costs a few hundred dollars. We engage them with $400,000 Stingers.

Knowledge that proliferates faster than countermeasures. IED construction techniques spread through informal networks faster than JIEDDO could field counters. Drone designs spread even faster --- through open-source repositories, commercial supply chains, and state-sponsored proliferation from Iran to the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Russia.

Modular adaptation at near-zero cost. Every time we fielded a jammer, the adversary swapped trigger mechanisms within weeks. Drones are modular the same way. New radio, new software, new flight profile --- all outside any formal process. The adversary's development cycle runs in days. Ours runs in years.

Tactical variation that defeats one-size-fits-all solutions. At the REF, we learned that the pressure-plate IED in Helmand Province was a fundamentally different problem from the explosively formed penetrator in Baghdad. Different triggers, different emplacement, different defeat mechanisms. The C-UAS threat has identical variation. A Houthi one-way attack drone flying 1,500 km is nothing like an FPV kamikaze at the platoon level, which is nothing like a Chinese autonomous swarm. Washington wants a consolidated solution. We made the same mistake with IEDs.

5. The institutional reflex to throw technology at a systems problem. We spent over $75 billion on counter-IED. We stood up JIEDDO. We lost that fight anyway. As War on the Rocks concluded last November: drones are "IEDs that fly now." The failed counter-IED framework should not be replicated. But that is precisely what is happening.

The Real Problem: Nobody Owns the Front End or the Back End

Steve and I have spent the last decade teaching the same lesson: the quality of your solution is determined by the quality of the problem you choose to solve. Or as Einstein reportedly said, if given one hour to save the world, spend fifty-five minutes understanding the problem and five minutes on the solution.

The Pentagon's C-UAS response addresses the last 5 minutes of the equation, not the first 55.

The Department has invested heavily in the develop and deploy phases. JIATF-401 was stood up last August to proliferate counter-drone capabilities. The Army runs biennial industry competitions. DIU scouts commercial technology. The PAE reform consolidates requirements, contracting, testing, and sustainment under a single portfolio leader. These are the middle phases of the innovation cycle, and they are getting real investment and real attention.

But nobody is doing the other four things:

Detect --- Nobody is persistently monitoring how the drone threat evolves at the tactical edge. There are no forward-deployed problem discovery teams embedded with operational units, scanning for how the adversary adapted since last week. The REF & AWG had these teams. They no longer exist.

Define --- Nobody is scoping the specific problem each unit faces with enough precision to drive useful solutions. A PAE leader at headquarters, no matter how empowered by the new reforms, cannot see the distinctions that matter without ground truth from the fight. Requirements still originate from within the institutional system --- headquarters staffs, Service-level assessments --- not from soldiers and Marines observing the problem in context.

Missing also is a Fusion Cell that collects the inputs from the operational force, industry and the labs and executes the discovery required to confirm we are working on actual problems (not symptoms) and the required speed to solve them.

Assess --- Nobody is systematically measuring whether fielded C-UAS systems actually work against an adversary who adapts after every engagement. We field systems and declare victory. Without assessment, there is no feedback loop. Without a feedback loop that anticipates adaptation, you cannot out-cycle the adversary.

Distribute --- Nobody is ensuring that what one unit learns reaches every other unit facing the same threat at operational speed much less delivers that same assessment to industry. The Asymmetric Warfare Group used to do this with forward deployed embeds, rolling assessments back into TRADOC schoolhouses. That function was absorbed by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, which operates at institutional tempo --- months --- not operational tempo.

Three of six phases of the innovation targeting cycle have no organizational owner. The reforms built a faster engine. Nobody built the steering.

The PAE Reforms Are Necessary but Insufficient

Let me be clear: the PAE restructuring is genuine progress. Consolidating authority under a single portfolio leader eliminates the handoff delays between requirements writers, program managers, and testers that killed tempo under the old PEO structure. The new Capability Trade Councils can make real-time tradeoffs. Killing JCIDS removes the most ossified layer. These are serious reforms.

But they widen the scope of who writes requirements without changing where the inputs come from.

At the REF, we didn't just have streamlined requirements authority --- though we had that. I could validate a requirement and commit funds on the spot. The REF's real advantage was something else entirely: forward-deployed teams generating requirements from direct observation of the fight. Any soldier, from private to four-star, could submit a problem via a one-page 10-Liner. We aimed for 90-day solutions and sometimes delivered in 72 hours. We transitioned 170 programs into production and leveraged $150 million into ten times that through partnerships. Our Expeditionary Lab at Bagram fabricated prototypes in days.

That wasn't just fast acquisition. That was problem curation at operational speed --- sourcing problems from the field, validating them through direct observation, and converting them into actionable problem statements before committing resources to solutions.

The Army disbanded the REF and the Asymmetric Warfare Group in 2021. It has not replaced either. We eliminated our most effective problem-detection and solution-distribution capabilities just as the drone threat was accelerating.

What Needs to Happen: The Innovation Targeting Cycle

The solution is not recreating the REF or AWG. It is ensuring that all six phases of the innovation cycle have organizational owners, dedicated resources, and a shared operational tempo.

I call this the Innovation Targeting Cycle[1] [2] [3] , modeled on the F3EAD process --- Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate --- that JSOC used to dismantle terrorist networks in Iraq. Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s Joint Special Operations task force went from one raid a month to ten raids a night not because it got better technology, but because it collapsed the cycle time between intelligence and action. Every raid generated the intelligence for the next one. Every completed cycle made the next cycle faster.

The same logic applies to innovation. Six phases --- Detect, Define, Develop, Deploy, Assess, Distribute --- run continuously by a fusion cell, each rotation generating the input for the next. A 70% solution fielded in weeks, assessed against operational reality, with findings distributed across the force and fed back into detection of the next problem.

The PAE reforms provide the authorities and organizational structures for Develop and Deploy. The Innovation Targeting Cycle provides the front end and back end that connect the warfighter's reality to those authorities.

Each PAE needs four things the current reforms don't provide

Forward-deployed Problem Discovery Teams --- small, cross-functional teams embedded with operational units, sourcing and curating problems from direct observation. Not technology scouts. Problem scouts. These don’t need to be organic to the PAE.

Fusion Cells — that collect all the sensor data from the field, industry and labs and do the due diligence to ensure we are working on the right problems at the right tempo with the right expected outcomes.

Rapid operational assessment --- built into the cycle, not conducted as a post-mortem months after fielding. Every deployment of a C-UAS capability should generate data: did it work? Did operators adopt it? Did the adversary adapt? That data feeds the next rotation.

Lateral distribution at operational speed --- what one unit learns must reach every other unit facing the same threat before the next engagement, not the next rotation. Our institutional schoolhouses operate at institutional tempo. The drone threat operates at commercial tempo.

The Bottom Line

The Department has reformed how it acquires. It has not reformed what it acquires, whether it worked, or who else needs to know.

In the counter-drone fight, that gap is not academic. The adversary doesn't need to out-technology us. He only needs to out-cycle us.

We proved with IEDs where that leads. $75 billion. Two decades. We lost.

The same fight is here again. The technology is better this time. The process failure is identical. You don't beat an adaptive threat by building a better mousetrap. You beat it by running a faster, smarter cycle --- one that starts with understanding the problem, not building the solution.

That's the lesson of Lean. That's the lesson of the REF. And if the Pentagon doesn't learn it this time, the drones will teach it the hard way.

Pete Newell is the former director of the U.S. Army's Rapid Equipping Force and CEO of BMNT. He co-created Hacking for Defense with Steve Blank and is the author of "The Innovation Targeting Cycle: Time-Sensitive Innovation Fires Inside the Continuous Innovation Cycle"

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Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s “Exquisite Class” Weapons Shortage https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-exquisite-class-weapons-shortage https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-exquisite-class-weapons-shortage OPINION — “We just concluded a very good meeting with the largest U.S. Defense Manufacturing Companies where we discussed Production and Production Schedules. They have agreed to quadruple Production of the ‘Exquisite Class’ Weaponry in that we want to reach, as rapidly as possible, the highest levels of quantity. Expansion began three months prior to the meeting, and Plants and Production of many of these Weapons are already under way. We have a virtually unlimited supply of Medium and Upper Medium Grade Munitions, which we are using, as an example, in Iran, and recently used in Venezuela. Regardless, however, we have also increased Orders at these levels.”

That was President Trump in a Truth Social message last Friday afternoon following a White House meeting he had with the chief operating officers of BAE Systems, Boeing, Honeywell Aerospace, L3Harris Missile Solutions, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon – as he said, among the nation’s major defense contractors.

I’m focusing on Trump’s statement for two reasons. The first is that he admits the U.S. is running low on what he calls “Exquisite Class” weaponry, and although he doesn’t name them I will shortly describe a few, and add some Trump ignored.

But more important I want also to re-emphasize as I did last week that President Trump – for whatever reason – has suddenly turned his back on peaceful diplomacy as a way to settle international disagreements and, on his own, begun using the U.S. military first in the raid that grabbed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, and now in a war against Iran that will cause untold numbers of dead and wounded and cost billions, if not trillions of dollars.

Ironically, his Friday meeting with top defense contractors took place at a time when he has announced plans to seek a dramatic 33 percent, $500 billion, increase in next year’s fiscal 2027 defense spending – to $1.5 trillion. That reminds me of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s last year need to put Russia on a wartime economy since his 2022 invasion of Ukraine has turned out to be more than a several week effort.

Like Putin, who has called his Ukraine invasion as a “special operation,” Trump for a time tried to refer to his attack on Iran as a military “operation” rather than a war. Trump often avoids saying it’s a war, probably because he has so far not sought nor received authorization from Congress.

Trump’s goal, however, has never been as clear as Putin’s – which was to restore Moscow’s total control over the Kyiv government. Trump has swung from preventing Tehran from having a nuclear weapon to possessing no ballistic missiles to regime change and back again.

One big difference from Putin is that Trump has Israel as an active partner and neither he nor Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to put their own troops on the ground in Iran.

But there could be a time when Trump and Netanyahu differ on continuing these full scale attacks on Iran from the air.

That may be where the question of munitions comes into play, at least for the U.S. What Trump referred to as “Exquisite Class” weapons, whose production Trump said need to be quadrupled, are among the offensive and defensive systems being employed in the Iran fighting.

For example. during last Thursday’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) event on the Iraq War, Tom Karako, director of the CSIS Missile Defense Project, identified what I believe are among the very “Exquisite Class” weapons Trump wants quadrupled in production.

The three systems Karako talked about were the Terminal High Altitude Terminal Defense (THAAD) used to destroy short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles inside and outside the atmosphere; the Patriot missile system whose PAC-3 MSE interceptors destroy tactical ballistic and cruise missiles as well as aircraft; and Tomahawk long-range, up to 1,500 miles, subsonic, offensive cruise missiles

Speaking about Friday’s White House meeting between the President and defense contractors, Karako said, “Our estimates of what our inventories need to be for our various contingencies are dramatically too low.” Karako based that on what the U.S. contributed to the Ukraine war, used over past years against the Houthis in engagements in the Red Sea and Yemen, and as the U.S. Operation Midnight Hammer, part of Israel’s 12-day war against Iran last June.

Karako went on to say, independent of current fighting, “They [meaning the Trump administration] want to go from about 96 THAADs a year to 400. They want to go from 650 [PAC-3] MSEs to over 2,000 MSEs a year – factory MSE. They want to go from – I think we requested 57 Tomahawks last year [to over 1,000].”

Karako added, “Fifty-seven. Like, that’s what we use in an afternoon on just sort of mowing the lawn with terrorist strikes sometimes. [Deputy Defense] Secretary [Stephen] Feinberg wants to go to over 1,000 Tomahawks per year. That is the munitions ramp that we have been waiting for.”

I should point out the long-term agreement with Lockheed-Martin to increase PAC-3 MSE production calls for a guaranteed level for purchases from the Pentagon for interceptors, which allows the company to invest in expanding capacity, including adding workers, advanced tooling, and upgrading facilities.

Increased production doesn’t happen overnight. Lockheed-Martin has estimated it will reach the goal of 2,000 by 2030.

On Wednesday, Michael P. Duffey, Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment told the House Armed Services Committee of the agreement with Lockheed Martin to quadruple the annual production capacity of THAAD interceptors. The company said it is planning a multi-billion-dollar investment over the next three years to expand THAAD production, which today occupies more than 340,000 square feet of production space and employs over 2,000 to support component fabrication to final assembly.

As for Tomahawk cruise missiles, Duffey said the Raytheon division of RTX agreed within the next few years to increase production capacity to 1,000. In the past, it has taken up to two years to build a single Tomahawk because of its complex, specialized components.

According to media sources, the military had over 4,000 Tomahawks before the attacks on Iran began. Within the first three days, some 400 Tomahawks were used against Iranian targets.

Then there is the cost of Trump’s Iran war. Elaine McCusker, former Deputy Under Secretary Defense (Comptroller) in the first Trump administration and now at the American Enterprise Institute, told the Wall Street Journal last week that in the first four days she estimated the cost at $11 billion of which $5.7 billion was for fired interceptors and another $3.4 billion for bombs and missiles.

With talk circulating last week that the White House was preparing a supplemental bill of up to $50 billion to pay for the Iran war costs, House Speaker Mike Johnson last Wednesday told reporters he hadn’t heard yet about a specific funding level, but that “we’ll pass a supplemental when it’s appropriate and get it right.”

Meanwhile, President Trump continues to change and even raise the goals of his Iran bombing offensive.

When it began, February 28, he called it a campaign to “eliminate the imminent nuclear threat,” and to gain “freedom” for the Iranian people. By last Friday, Trump was asserting in a Truth Social message the expansive “there will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER! After that, and the selection of a GREAT & ACCEPTABLE Leader.”

As I wrote in my most recent column of Trump, “The man who just months ago saw his future as chairman of an international Board of Peace, now looks like he might rather be a rogue Policeman of the World.”

This past Sunday, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristoff, writing about the Iran war, quoted former-Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark), in when Fulbright was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kristoff wrote that in 1966 Fulbright wrote that the U.S. role in the Vietnam War – which he opposed – represented “the arrogance of power.” Fulbright had added, “Power confuses itself with virtue and tends also to take itself for omnipotence.”

I ran two Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigations in the 1960s for Sen. Fulbright, including one on the use and misuse of American military power abroad.

I can confidently say that a Chairman Fulbright would by now have voiced public opposition into Trump’s Iran war and initiated a thorough Foreign Relations Committee investigation into how it came about and how it could be brought to an end. Fulbright then would schedule public hearings so that everyone, here and abroad, would have an opportunity to know what was going on.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Hormuz Standoff: Global Energy Flow Severs After 'Epic Fury' Strikes https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hormuz-standoff-global-energy-flow-severs-after-epic-fury-strikes https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hormuz-standoff-global-energy-flow-severs-after-epic-fury-strikes

The Hormuz Standoff: Global Energy Flow Severs After 'Epic Fury' Strikes

As tensions in and around Iran proliferate, the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman has become the pressure point where geopolitics meets global energy security.

The Strait of Hormuz is a geographic choke point where global energy security rests on a razor's edge. At its narrowest, the waterway spans just 21 miles, forcing roughly 20 million barrels of oil, nearly a fifth of global daily consumption, through shipping lanes only two miles wide. It is the world's most vital artery, and as of this weekend, it has been severed.

(Photo by Bedirhan Demirel/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Following the launch of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, tankers have been forced to drop anchor in the Gulf of Oman, paralyzing nearly 20% of the world's petroleum supply. Operation Epic Fury — a massive, high-stakes gamble by U.S. and Israeli forces — ripped through a target list spanning from the industrial hubs of Isfahan to the core of Tehran. The strikes targeted the compound where Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed. By early Saturday, the IRGC had hijacked maritime radio frequencies, broadcasting threats that turned the shipping lanes into a dead zone.

Though Iran's Foreign Minister later stated there was no plan to close the Strait completely, shipping data showed maritime traffic largely paused, and an oil tanker was attacked off Oman's coast Sunday.

The threat calculation has grown more urgent as U.S. intelligence assessments indicate Tehran maintains between 5,000 and 6,000 naval mines, with the capability to seed the Strait at rates up to 100 mines per day through its fleet of submarines. A handful of deployed mines would paralyze the Strait. Global insurers will pull coverage the moment ordnance is confirmed, forcing tankers to drop anchor or turn back. For Gulf producers, storage tanks will reach capacity within days, likely forcing a total cap on well production by the end of the week.

"The IRGC has naval bases to the North and South of the Strait of Hormuz that could deploy sea mines in a matter of hours," Iranian military analyst John Wood tells The Cipher Brief.

But whether Iran's sea mine arsenal proves to be a potent threat to United States forces and global interests in Hormuz is yet to be seen.

During the 1988 Tanker War, Iran deployed approximately 150 mines in the Strait of Hormuz. One of which nearly sank the USS Samuel B. Roberts, a guided-missile frigate. The mine that struck the Roberts was World War I vintage, demonstrating that naval mines need not be sophisticated to prove effective. Since 1950, mines have inflicted 77 percent of U.S. ship casualties, a higher damage rate than any other weapon system.

The challenge for Tehran, however, lies not in the mines themselves but in deployment. Iran operates only three Kilo-class submarines capable of laying the more complex EM-52 rising mines, and its fleet of approximately 20 Ghadir-class midget submarines. Each carries just four mines via torpedo tubes and has a relatively short range when operating in stealth mode.

Iranian commanders aren't necessarily looking for a traditional naval standoff in the Strait. Instead, they've rigged an economic tripwire. The goal isn't to sink the U.S. Fifth Fleet but to make the price of any confrontation too high for the global market to stomach.

A mine-clearing operation would require at least a month to establish a safe corridor, during which Gulf oil production would halt, storage facilities would fill, and producers would be forced to cap wells.

The Global Energy Chokepoint

Approximately 21 percent of global petroleum liquids pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the world's most critical oil transit chokepoint. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq depend on the Strait for virtually all their seaborne crude exports.

"There are over 150 tankers bottled up to the North of the Strait of Hormuz," Wood explains, referring to tankers unable to transit. "Insurance companies are canceling policies altogether. If you sink a fully loaded VLCC, that could be up to an approximate $40 million loss."

A Very Large Crude Carrier can transport up to 2 million barrels of oil, enough to supply a medium-sized refinery for weeks. At current market prices, a single loaded vessel represents a cargo value exceeding $140 million, making the insurance exposure catastrophic if even a handful of ships are damaged or sunk.

If the IRGC manages to seed the lanes, the resulting supply shock won't be measured in days but in weeks. The Navy maintains a limited fleet of dedicated mine countermeasure vessels, a force structure analysts consider insufficient for the scale of potential mining operations in waters where Iran could sustain deployment campaigns for up to six months using its mine stocks and submarine fleet. Tehran's strategic advantage lies in asymmetry: deploying mines requires minimal resources at rates of up to 100 per day, while clearing them demands painstaking work under fire from coastal anti-ship missiles, swarm boats, and drone strikes.

Norm Roule, who served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and spent 34 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, tells The Cipher Brief that, despite concerns, contingencies have been in place for decades.

"Do you think Donald Trump is going to sit back and let the Iranians mine the Persian Gulf? I don't," Roule says. "If anybody splashes something in the water, we'll open all the gates of hell on them."

Any Iranian attempt to physically deploy mines would likely trigger immediate U.S. military retaliation against Tehran's naval assets and coastal infrastructure before a minefield could be established.

Roule emphasizes the intelligence dimension: distinguishing between defensive mine deployments in Iranian territorial waters and offensive operations targeting international shipping lanes becomes critical, as striking mines within Iran's waters could constitute an act of war regardless of their intended purpose.

"You need intelligence on what they're dropping," he says. "If they deploy something in their own waters, are they defensive or offensive mines? If you attack them in their waters, you're starting a war."

Current Military Posture

Yet the window for Iranian mine deployment may already be closing as U.S. forces maintain round-the-clock surveillance and strike capabilities positioned to interdict any large-scale mining attempt. Roule dismisses concerns about American response capabilities, noting American naval forces maintain a substantial forward presence with two carrier strike groups supported by more than 150 aircraft and dozens of warships.

"They're already there," he insists. "Aircraft can take off from the USS Abraham Lincoln and be over targets within minutes. Our geospatial assets are almost certainly monitoring for unusual Iranian activity."

That surveillance appears to have already shaped operational targeting: the initial wave of U.S.-Israeli strikes targeted not only nuclear and leadership sites but also Iranian naval infrastructure, with President Trump stating the operation aimed to "destroy the country's navy." This suggests Washington sought to neutralize mine-laying capabilities before they could be deployed.

Should Iran deploy mines despite U.S. interdiction efforts, the Navy would need to send minesweepers through the narrow shipping lanes, demonstrating safe passage to reassure commercial traffic and insurers.

Iranian Calculations

Yet Tehran faces its own constraints in executing a Strait closure, as halting energy flows would inflict economic damage on Iran itself and key trading partners whose support the regime cannot afford to lose.

The oil market's immediate response has reflected both fear and hedging: at least 150 tankers have dropped anchor in open Gulf waters beyond the Strait of Hormuz rather than risk transit. Despite the disruption, oil prices remain below $100 per barrel, and neither the United States nor major Asian consumers have tapped strategic petroleum reserves.

Gulf producers had anticipated potential disruptions: Saudi Arabia maximized throughput on its East-West pipeline to Red Sea ports, while the UAE pushed additional volumes through its Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman, bypassing the Strait entirely.

"Short term, oil could jump $10–$15 as markets react," Roule projects. "But unless tankers are sunk, or there are major hits on infrastructure like Kharg Island or Abqaiq, this is likely temporary. Oil might remain in the high $60s or low $70s, with a short-term bump."

Tehran's strategic logic centers on economic leverage rather than military victory: forcing a disruption severe enough that global pressure on Washington to de-escalate outweighs the costs Iran absorbs from halted oil exports. The gambit depends on speed, inflicting maximum economic pain before the U.S. can establish alternative supply routes or before domestic Iranian shortages undermine regime stability.

"If I'm Iran and I shut it down, I'm doing it to hurt the U.S. and the global economy so that the world pressures Washington to ease up," Roule asserts.

The tankers currently anchored in Gulf waters face a bureaucratic obstacle: insurance underwriters have either pulled coverage entirely or raised premiums by 50-60 percent, while administrative processing could mean vessels remain idle for a week or more, even if military tensions ease.

"I'm not sure Iran has the time to create the strategic impact it wants," Roule surmises. "What people overlook is the tremendous amount of food and commodities that keep the region's economies going. If the Iranians shut the Strait of Hormuz, they're choking not only their oil economy but also their broader economy: iron, basic materials, things they need to keep industries running."

China's role complicates Tehran's calculus. In 2025, China bought over 80% of Iran's crude exports, with a quarter of its entire national energy supply currently funneling through the Strait. A deep freeze on transit forces a brutal trade-off: Beijing must either double down on its Tehran partnership or pivot to save the manufacturing engines that prevent a domestic crash.

This creates a high-stakes "economic veto." Chinese refineries and factories can't weather a long-term shutdown, and Tehran's economy — stripped of other buyers by sanctions — has no pulse without Chinese cash. This shared vulnerability tethers Iran. They can only push the West so far before they sever the very lifeline keeping the regime solvent.

The Escalation Threshold

Washington's willingness to strike preemptively rather than wait for mines to be deployed marks a fundamental shift in decades of deterrence doctrine. Roule places current tensions within a broader historical framework: multiple U.S. administrations prepared military options against Iran, yet consistently chose restraint. Trump represents the first president willing to execute those strikes.

U.S. intelligence detected Iranian forces loading naval mines during the June 2025 conflict, though the mines were never deployed. This suggests Washington's surveillance capabilities and demonstrated willingness to strike preemptively may deter Tehran from attempting large-scale mining operations.

The compressed geography of the Strait, shipping lanes just two miles wide flanked by Iranian coastal batteries and missile sites, means response times are measured in minutes, placing a premium on the extensive training U.S. naval forces have conducted for this scenario.

"It's a small area," Roule adds. "When something is fired, there's not a lot of time. Our Navy has practiced this extensively. There's a lot of experience there."

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Wed, 11 Mar 2026 17:18:55 +0100 FirstHandNews
EU Takes Aim at Tehran: IRGC Terror Listing Opens New Front in Europe’s Iran Policy https://belimedia.com.ng/eu-takes-aim-at-tehran-irgc-terror-listing-opens-new-front-in-europes-iran-policy https://belimedia.com.ng/eu-takes-aim-at-tehran-irgc-terror-listing-opens-new-front-in-europes-iran-policy OPINION — On January 29, Europe found its voice against Iran’s apparatus of terror. The European Union (EU) announced that it is adding Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to its list of designated terrorist entities. The EU spent years mulling this step and taking half measures. Now, the EU and its member states must use this new much-needed tool broadly and effectively. The EU’s designation should mark the start of Europe’s campaign against the IRGC, not its end.

Formally listing the IRGC will give Europe important new authorities to limit Iranian attacks and plotting on their soil. The EU’s move also has major symbolic value, particularly at a time when the Iranian regime is under pressure at home and abroad.

The EU previously sanctioned some of the IRGC’s branches, leaders, and operatives. But EU member states resisted taking action against the IRGC in its entirety for several reasons, including European fears of Tehran’s reaction. Iran has long been vocal in its opposition to an IRGC designation, warning in recent days that an EU label would have “destructive consequences.” The U.S. unwillingness to lift its own Foreign Terrorist Organization listing of the IRGC was reportedly a key reason why U.S.-Iran negotiations fell apart during the Biden administration.

The EU designation comes on the heels of the Iranian regime’s bloody crackdown against its own outraged people. The EU’s decision—reached by consensus among its 27 member states—lends Europe’s united voice to the Iranian protestors’ indignation against their oppressors.

The EU action also sends a powerful message to Tehran that it should refrain from conducting attacks on European soil against its perceived enemies, particularly Iranian dissidents and Israeli and Jewish targets. European security officials express great concern about that risk now. Both the IRGC’s deadly Quds Force and Iran’s notorious Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) have conducted numerous terrorist plots in recent years in Europe, including in Sweden, Germany, Cyprus, and Belgium. Individual European governments have disrupted and prosecuted these networks and issued statements condemning Iranian behavior, but this is the most unified and strongest European stance to date.

With the EU designation, any IRGC assets in Europe are now subject to an asset freeze. It is now illegal to provide the group with funds or resources. The designation also requires EU member states to increase police and judicial cooperation on IRGC-related criminal matters. And the EU will impose a travel ban on IRGC members hoping to visit Europe.

The Europeans should now aim to use these tools vigorously. The IRGC has historically had near global reach, not only with its terrorist cells but with its procurement and financial networks. Uncovering and disrupting the IRGC’s networks and freezing their assets would weaken the corps’ capabilities to rearm, profit, and funnel materiel and finances to its proxies.

Europe can and should do much more to maximize the impact of the designation and impose real costs on the IRGC and its overlords. The EU’s 2013 designation of Hezbollah’s so-called “military wing” offers a good model for how an EU designation can empower both the EU and its member states.

First, the EU should ensure that Europol – the EU’s umbrella police agency – gets a key role in coordinating and supporting IRGC-related investigations across Europe, as Europol has done with Hezbollah. Before the EU’s designation, Europol’s ability to police the IRGC’s operatives in Europe was greatly limited. The IRGC’s many European plots often have a consistent modus operandi, including using criminal actors not associated with Iran to carry out attacks and thus offer Tehran a figleaf of deniability. Europol is uniquely positioned to see the whole picture and share relevant information with all EU member states.

For one model, look to Europol’s involvement in the complex multi-jurisdictional investigation of the Hezbollah financier Mohamad Nourredine, which involved multiple European governments as well as several U.S. law enforcement agencies. In 2018, he was convicted in a French court on multiple charges and sentenced to seven years in prison as part of a multi-country investigation codenamed “Operation Cedar.” Europol could use provide similar support in international investigations against IRGC operatives.

Since 2014, Europol has also played an integral role, along with the United States, in the Law Enforcement Coordination Group, the sole international body dedicated to countering Hezbollah’s terrorist and illicit activity. The EU should empower Europol to do likewise for the U.S.-led Countering Transnational Terrorism Forum, which focuses on Iran-linked terrorism.

Second, European governments must follow up on the EU’s actions and impose their own national bans and designations. Many European countries did just this against Hezbollah, including Germany, Slovenia, Austria, the United Kingdom, and the Baltics.

Take Germany, which shows how national-level actions can strengthen law enforcement and build on Brussels’s actions. In May 2020, Germany formally banned Hezbollah and conducted near simultaneous raids on several Hezbollah-linked organizations in the country. Germany is now prosecuting a Lebanese national allegedly tied to Hezbollah for procuring drone components for the terrorist group – a scheme that also took place in the U.K. and Spain.

The EU’s IRGC designation won’t tip the balance of power within Iran in favor of the protestors, but it can still help reduce Iran’s ability to stage vicious attacks abroad. The EU and its member states must robustly implement these new authorities for them to have the desperately needed effect.

Michael Jacobson, a senior fellow in The Washington Institute’s Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, formerly served as director of strategy, plans, and initiatives in the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Kremlin Files: Russian Double Agents and Operational Games https://belimedia.com.ng/the-kremlin-files-russian-double-agents-and-operational-games https://belimedia.com.ng/the-kremlin-files-russian-double-agents-and-operational-games

THE KREMLIN FILES / COLUMN — There are similarities among intelligence agencies worldwide. All professional services rely on tradecraft to recruit and manage assets. They all operate within bureaucratic systems and ultimately answer to political leaders. At a basic level, espionage tradecraft is a common professional language. However, Russian intelligence services (RIS) differ significantly from their Western counterparts in several key aspects. First, their primary mission is not to serve the interests of the Russian people, nor to protect the country's constitution; instead, their loyalty is to the regime and Putin’s personal political survival. And secondly, in terms of tradecraft, they differ from the CIA and other Western services in their approach and tactics. One of the most important—and often misunderstood—aspects of Russian intelligence is their use of double agents, known in Russian intelligence doctrine as operational games (operativnye igry).

For Russian intelligence, operational games are not just niche skills or occasional counterintelligence tactics. They are fundamental. Double agent operations are central to how Russian agencies define success, justify their importance, and maintain their institutional identity. Whether other collection methods succeed or fail, the RIS reliably and continually default back to operational games. Therefore, understanding how and why the RIS use double agents is essential to understanding Russian intelligence itself.

Before examining how these operations work, it is important to get the terminology right, and something that even experienced national security reporters, espionage writers, and analysts in the West frequently get wrong. The term double agent is often misapplied to describe penetrations of one intelligence service by another. In reality, these are two very different phenomena.

A penetration is an agent who betrays their own service to spy for a foreign power. Aldrich Ames, who recently passed away three decades after he was arrested, was a traitor and a penetration of the CIA by Russian intelligence. He was not a double agent.

A double agent, by contrast, is an intelligence asset who is knowingly and deliberately directed by one service to engage another in espionage. The controlling service uses that agent to feed information (called feed material) —true, false, or mixed—to the adversary. They do so to simultaneously study the adversary’s tradecraft, collection priorities, and decision-making.

In the Russian system, double agents also serve a bureaucratic function: they generate statistics, “success stories,” and operational narratives that demonstrate effectiveness to political overseers and ultimately to Putin himself. Putin knows this; after all, he was a Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for Counterintelligence for the USSR), and he later headed the FSB himself.

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Double agents are used in the West and by the U.S. services, but we don’t lie to our government about the origins of the cases or pretend they are real counterintelligence successes when they reach their conclusion. The distinction is not academic. It lies at the heart of how Russian intelligence thinks about espionage. Every year, the FSB publishes an annual report and claims statistics on hundreds of alleged spies it has caught. The vast majority of them are invented, manufactured, or the FSB’s own double agents. In other words, they are not real cases.

Russian services employ multiple varieties of double agents and operational games. They have many names, including the initsiativnik, which is a false volunteer who often “walks in” to an embassy. Also used is the podstava, or dangle, in which Russian services will use the routine of an intelligence officer, diplomat, or journalist and insert the “dangle” right in front of the target at a gym, reception, or other function to appeal to the target. There are still more different varieties and names for other types of double agents.

These operations are not limited to targeting foreign intelligence services. They are also used against businesspeople, journalists, diplomats, nongovernmental organizations, and even Russian citizens themselves. The objective is often not solely intelligence collection, but also control, as the Russians say, to have the target “pod kontrolem,” or under 100% operational control and influence. That is why the Russians prefer, though not exclusively, to carry out double agent operations on Russian soil. Abroad, they are less confident that the SVR or GRU can fully control their double agent during meetings with the adversary.

The end goal is to ensnare, compromise, manipulate, arrest, or extort targets for recruitment and long-term exploitation. A few examples from history help illustrate Russian intelligence’s fixation on double agents, dating back to its earliest institutional roots.

The Cheka and later the NKVD/OGPU perfected operational games in the 1920s through landmark deceptions such as Operation TRUST. With the TRUST operation, the OGPU (Soviet counterintelligence at the time, another forerunner of the KGB) created a fictitious anti-Bolshevik underground to lure in Western intelligence services and Russian émigrés. TRUST sent intelligence officers to the West, or cooptees, who they intimidated to pose as members of this fake organization that claimed to stand against the Bolsheviks.

The operation ran for years, successfully feeding disinformation to multiple foreign services while identifying, neutralizing, or recruiting their agents. They often lured Russians home to “help in operations” only to have them arrested, interrogated, and usually shot in the back of the head in a Chekist-style vyshama mera (highest measure) execution. The TRUST culminated in the capture of the famous British intelligence officer Sidney Reilly, one of the most celebrated spies of the era, who was executed in a similar fashion.

That double-agent tradition continued throughout the Cold War, when Soviet intelligence used double agents not merely to mislead adversaries but also to validate its own competence. Kim Philby, while often remembered in the West as a Soviet penetration of British intelligence, was also used as part of broader operational games to shape Western threat perceptions and protect other Soviet assets. Scores of Western intelligence officers or special operations team members were wrapped up in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe immediately after World War II, the victims of KGB and OGPU/GRU operational games Philby had detailed to the USSR. Most were eventually executed.

In later decades, the KGB ran controlled double agents against Western services to exaggerate Soviet capabilities, mask vulnerabilities, and manipulate counterintelligence priorities. The Soviet KGB ran a wave of double-agents at the CIA in the late 1980s with false feed material to explain the 1985 U.S. intelligence losses. Rick Ames volunteered and compromised a dozen agents working for the CIA and FBI (Ames was not arrested till 1994). The KGB and later SVR used these operational games and false volunteers to protect him, trying to give CIA and the broader U.S. IC reasons why the compromise may have happened (Circle of Treason is a classic read on this period and all the various games the KGB was playing to protect Ames with false feeds to CIA and the FBI).

These operations reinforced an internal belief that intelligence success could be measured by how convincingly one could influence the enemy’s perception of reality. In Russian intelligence culture, the double agent is not an exception — it is the ideal. In today’s FSB, however, as well as their foreign counterparts, the SVR, the double agent too often is used to justify their very own existence, instead of paying dividends in terms of tradecraft learned or secrets protected. Operations like TRUST are mostly a relic of the past. Today, the FSB is too busy entrapping innocent foreigners like basketball players, teachers, and NGO workers.

The U.S. IC and our Western allies have learned over the decades that the FSB/SVR and GRU have presented double-agent cases to their political leadership as if they were genuine agents caught and arrested, all the while the case was simply that they were double agents. They feed statistics from the FSB each year about exaggerated intelligence operations—more than all the services in the world could carry out against Russia—and also claim to have thwarted all of them. These reports reach Putin and the Presidential Administration to justify larger budgets, which in turn breed more corruption and line the pockets of senior and middle managers.

This is not unique to Russia; it is often the case across the former Soviet countries of Central Asia, where many of the services remain close and subservient to the Russian FSB and SVR. These services, often serving despotic regimes, swear by double agent operations because, in many cases and over many years, the only “spies” they can really uncover are those they falsely created under a double agent operation. They use them against a range of unwitting foreign citizens, including in legitimate business practices, to extort them and their companies for money when brought up on false charges.

The practice has been expanded in recent years by the Russian FSB, particularly its counterintelligence division, DKRO (the Department of Counterintelligence Operations), which uses double agents against journalists, businesspeople, and others to trap them and hold them hostage for exchanges with the West. DKRO was responsible for the false arrest and imprisonment of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich before his 2024 swap with the West.

In sum, operational games and the double agents associated with them allow Russian intelligence to shape narratives, manufacture threats, and create the appearance of omnipresence. They are dirty tricks elevated to doctrine. And they remain one of Moscow’s most effective tools for compensating for broader institutional weaknesses.


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
From Secrets to Sensors: Why Open Source Data Must Drive Modern Intelligence https://belimedia.com.ng/from-secrets-to-sensors-why-open-source-data-must-drive-modern-intelligence https://belimedia.com.ng/from-secrets-to-sensors-why-open-source-data-must-drive-modern-intelligence THE BLUF / COLUMN — The Department of Defense is on a tear to revamp technology for warfighters. Secretary Hegseth signed an AI strategy on 9 January and prior to that he called for an Enterprise Command and Control Program Office that would provide a real time battlespace picture for military commanders, something that has been talked about for years but never completed. The urgency is clear. The intelligence community must play a large part in this Department of Defense technology transformation if it wants to remain relevant to the warfighter and decision makers. Key for the intelligence community will be to fundamentally rethink its relationship with open source data. To be most useful for the decision makers and operators, the intelligence community must rebuild itself on the backbone of open source data and commercial technology.

Not only is data important but because of the volume and complexity of that data, so is the technology that can sift through the data. Public domain data must be the first place to gather trends and threat warnings that feed the many watch centers across the department of defense and intelligence community which will be the basis of the enterprise command and control picture. Much of the technology already exists for sifting through the data; fusing it into one picture will be a feat. The intelligence community, however, must make cultural changes first to accept the importance of the technology and public data, and secondly to acquire the technology and data on a timely basis.

Need for Change

The intelligence community has struggled with adopting the reality that to remain relevant, it must embrace publicly and commercially available data into its threat and warning process and use the powerful technologies that the commercial world is developing to sift through that data. There has been much work in this area across the intelligence community and some of it has been groundbreaking but the work has not been comprehensive, integrated, or fast. There are boutique enterprises that attempt to develop their own high-tech way forward but when it comes to scaling such technology across the intelligence community or within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, the hurdles are huge. Each intelligence agency claims its own security issues and erects fences against cross intelligence technology modernization. Even organizations like the Defense Innovation Unit or IN-Q-TEL focus on discreet requirements, not the wholesale cultural change needed to bring in the latest commercial technology that can support warning and security. As the largest part of the intelligence community, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise needs to lead the way in developing a high tech, open source, data rich environment for its customer base. Military commanders need a real-time, complete, and high-quality battlespace picture to quickly make informed decisions, take direct actions, and assess the high volume of potential targets and threats.

The capabilities that are available to do this are endless. For example:

Warning Against Biological Events: Technical sensors and human sensors worldwide record biological events and provide data on disease upticks and hazardous environments. Environmental & Biosensors are global and are critical tools for detecting, quantifying, and interpreting dynamic changes in environmental or biological systems. There are multiple crowd sourced disease outbreak platforms. Biosensors, local reporting, and crowdsourcing technologies monitor everything from air and water quality to metabolic and cellular activity in real time. Technology can combine these complex platforms and sensors to read the data and provide intelligence analysts a real time global map of trends ad anomalies, that once fused with other intelligence could lead to early detection of a pandemic, an industrial or environmental bio event, or development of a WMD. Such a real time platform, based on open source data would also support military and clandestine operations by providing information to the operator about the environment they will encounter. Such maps are currently available either through a subscription or to the public but not one that fuses all this data.

Humans and Sensors: Multiple commercial enterprises are employing social media

BLOCKINT: Blockchain intelligence (BLOCKINT) is mission-critical to modern defense and counterintelligence operations, supporting analysis and targeting on such issues as terrorism financing, disinformation campaigns, and espionage. BLOCKINT can be an important tool to detect adversary threats and to perpetrate grey zone activity against adversaries. BLOCKINT enables proactive disruption —not just retrospective analysis — allowing agencies to deny, degrade, and disrupt threat actors before funds are fully laundered or operationalized. BLOCKINT provides national security analysts and officials with unique data on how a threat actor is using virtual assets for revenue generation. It also provides a high-level overview of a country's cryptocurrency usage, which could provide valuable insights into the nation’s overall economic health and strategy. The importance of blockchain analysis was underscored in 2024 when the US Senate Committee on Armed Services recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) explore blockchain technology to potentially revolutionize national security. In the committee’s 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), they instructed the Secretary of Defense to investigate and test potential blockchain applications for DoD.

As the Department of Defense has made clear, commercial solutions for trend analysis, finding anomalies, and providing data for decision makers are abundant. The intelligence community already has some of these abilities. What is missing is the fusion of this data into one picture.

Starting with Cultural Change

In order to provide the intelligence needed for an increasingly complex world, we need to fundamentally change the practice of intelligence to accept the importance of publicly available and commercially available data. Additionally, the intelligence cycle needs to change. The intelligence cycle needs to start with open source information and data. This means that the intelligence community also needs to incorporate the technology and the algorithms that will allow today’s intelligence professionals see trends, anomalies, and threats in that data. This data then should be fused with intelligence collected by the traditional intelligence disciplines to provide decisionmakers and operators with the information they need to perform their jobs.

Further, to demonstrate the importance of harnessing the publicly and commercially available data, the intelligence community must develop an open source center that brings in the myriad open source/PAI/CAI and data sifting technologies that industry currently is building. The high tech center would be the first step for intelligence analysts of all types in building threat and warning analysis and targeting. This center would be a place where the US and its allies could share data and techniques to build a global warning picture. It would be the intelligence community’s beginning of the Enterprise Command and Control picture or the Common Intelligence Picture.

We will need creativity and leadership to move forward with this generational change in how the intelligence community does business. If this major shake up does not begin soon, the US will lose its edge and remarkable, intelligence driven operations like Absolute Resolve will become amazing stories of American glory that we recount to our grandchildren. The change can happen now.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
Xi Jinping Tightens Grip as China’s Military Purge Deepens https://belimedia.com.ng/xi-jinping-tightens-grip-as-chinas-military-purge-deepens https://belimedia.com.ng/xi-jinping-tightens-grip-as-chinas-military-purge-deepens OPINION — In China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) “commands the gun”, and Chinese President Xi Jinping controls the one million members of the CCP. In October 2022, Mr. Xi was elected to an unprecedented third term as Secretary General of the CCP and President of the People’s Republic of China.

Mr. Xi succeeded Hu Jintao as Secretary General in November 2012 and immediately proceeded to expel Politburo member Bo Xilai from the CCP and Zhou Yongkang in 2014, responsible for China’s security services and one of nine-members of the powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo. This was the beginning of Mr. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign – and the removal of political rivals.

The anti-corruption campaign continues, with over 115 senior officials investigated in 2025 and reportedly over 60 punished.

But what got the public’s attention was the removal of defense ministers Wei Feng he and Li Shangfu in October 2023 and June 2024. Then in 2025 the removal of General He Wei Dong, Vice Chairman of the nine-member Central Military Commission (CMC), for “serious violations of Party discipline” and Admiral Miao Hua, Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department.

Also removed from the CCP in October 2025 were eight additional senior military officials, to include Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the Eastern Theatre Command responsible for Taiwan; Wang Houbin, former commander of the Rocket Force, responsible for China’s nuclear and missile programs and Wang Chunning, former commander of the People’s Armed Police.

During the 1970s and 80s, both General He Weidong and Admiral Miao Hua were assigned to the 31 Group Army in Fujian Province, responsible for any potential military operations against Taiwan.

And now, in January 2026, Mr. Xi continued with his purge of the military, with the removal of General Zhang Youxia, senior Vice Chairman of the CMC and China’s most senior general and General Liu Zhenli, Chief of CMC’s Joint Staff Department responsible for planning and operations. Both generals are accused of committing severe violations of party discipline and state laws.

General Zhang is also a member of the Politburo and a close associate of Mr. Xi. Their fathers fought together in the Chinese civil war with Mao Zedong’s forces that eventually prevailed in 1949. For Mr. Xi to purge a fellow “princeling” – descendants of revolutionary elders – must have shocked senior officials in Beijing wondering when does this hollowing-out of seniors in the military stop, and if they’re next.

General Zhang. as vice chairman of the CMC, had direct responsibility for military strategies concerning Taiwan. He was responsible for planning for potential conflict with Taiwan. General Zhang was an outspoken proponent of forceful unification, saying the military would “show no mercy” if Taiwan declared independence.

In late December 2025, China’s military conducted large-scale drills around Taiwan – “Justice Mission 2025.” This was the sixth major exercise since 2022, simulating a full blockade of Taiwan, with naval vessels and aircraft testing joint operational capabilities; deploying warships, bombers, and fighter jets to encircle Taiwan. The exercise was designed to test China’s ability to seal off Taiwan’s major ports, while simulating strikes on land and sea targets.

These “gray zone” tactics were meant to intimidate the public and exhaust Taiwan’s defense resources.

It is quite possible that Mr. Xi removed generals Zhang Youxia, He Wei Dong and Liu Zhenli, all members of the 7-member CMC designed for rapid decision-making and China’s highest military command, with Mr. Xi as its chairman, due to disagreements over Taiwan. All these generals, and general Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the Eastern Theatre Command responsible for Taiwan, were responsible for military operations against Taiwan.

Mr. Xi demands loyalty from all CCP and military colleagues. It’s possible that Mr. Xi’s military colleagues were pushing for a kinetic move against Taiwan in 2027, a date that Mr. Xi said China would have the military capability to kinetically move against Taiwan.

It appears to me that Mr. Xi was not prepared for a kinetic move against Taiwan, despite what his military generals were strongly advocating. And when Mr. Xi got push back from his generals, he removed them. In China, the CCP controls the gun, and Mr. Xi controls the CCP.

The author is the former Associate Director of National Intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Former Head of NSA on the Future of U.S. Cybersecurity https://belimedia.com.ng/the-former-head-of-nsa-on-the-future-of-us-cybersecurity https://belimedia.com.ng/the-former-head-of-nsa-on-the-future-of-us-cybersecurity

EXPERT INTERVIEW -- General Paul Nakasone (ret.) has spent a career at the very center of America's most invisible battlefields. He has served as both director of the National Security Agency and commander of U.S. Cyber Command, two roles that sit at the intersection of intelligence, technology, and modern warfare. During his tenure, cyber operations moved from the shadows into daily strategic competition as the United States confronted persistent threats from China, Russia, Iran, and criminal networks operating at a nation state scale.

General Nakasone prioritized a doctrine of persistent engagement, challenging adversaries continuously in cyberspace rather than reacting to incidents after the fact. It was a shift that reshaped how the U.S. thinks about deterrence, escalation, and defense in a digital age. It feels even more important today, as artificial intelligence accelerates decision-making and blurs the lines between peace and conflict.

Since retiring, General Nakasone is continuing his mission as the founding director of Vanderbilt University's Institute of National Security. He also serves as a board member and advisor to some of the world's leading technology companies. General Nakasone is also being recognized with this year’s Impact in Cyber Award, being presented at The Cipher Brief Honors Dinner in Washington in March.

I spoke with General Nakasone on Friday for the State Secrets Podcast. Below are highlights from the conversation, lightly edited for length and clarity. You can also listen to the full interview of the State Secrets podcast available wherever you listen to podcasts.

General Paul Nakasone (Ret.)

General Paul Nakasone (Ret.) served as Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command from May 2018 to February 2024.

THE INTERVIEW

Kelly: You've argued that persistent engagement really changed the cyber battlefield. Looking back, where do you think it succeeded beyond expectations and where did it fall short against adversaries like China and Russia?

Gen. Nakasone: I think when we think about cyber, remember, this is a very dynamic environment. When I took over as both the commander and director in 2018, we were coming out of the 2016 elections. And one of the guidance points from President Trump and the secretary of defense was that we can't let this happen again. We cannot have a foreign nation attempt to influence our elections.

We looked at what we had done and what had occurred and we came to the realization that this is not an episodic event where we can just come and do our business and then leave. We must be engaged every single day. And so this idea of persistently engaging with our adversaries was born. It worked quite well in terms of the security of the 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024 elections. It's worked against a series of different adversaries, Iran, Russia and China. But I think the point is that the environment is dynamic. To your point, as we look at greater scale and scope of adversaries like the Chinese, persistent engagement must also change. We need new partners, new techniques and new technologies. Those are things that we must be able to look at and be able to practice every single day.

Kelly: Midterm elections are coming up later this year. There is certain to be a lot of politics and political messaging around those elections. What are you focused on strictly from a cybersecurity awareness perspective when it comes to securing the midterms?

Gen. Nakasone: As a private citizen, I'm very, very interested in what foreign adversaries might try to do to influence our election. That's what the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Commander focused outside of the United States. I want to make sure that there is no nation that can influence what goes on in our electoral processes. That was what I was doing as a military member, and that's what I'm focused on now as a private citizen.

Kelly: Is there more that you can do from the private sector side in terms education? What are you trying to do at Vanderbilt?

Gen. Nakasone: We're really trying to do three things at the Institute of National Security. First, we’re building the next generation of national security leaders. Whether those leaders are in the private sector or the public sector - it's very, very important that we're able to do that.

The second thing we're trying to do is to provide pragmatism to theory. This is one of the things that Vanderbilt and our Institute takes great pride in by saying, ‘Hey, there's a lot of theory out there, but let's make a pragmatic approach to securing the critical infrastructure or looking at new ways in terms of being able to identify and solve hard problems.’

And the third thing we do is we educate. I mean, that's what great universities do. That's what Vanderbilt does. Whether we’re educating our students or whether we’re educating our faculty or whether we’re educating the broader public, that's what we're trying to do at the Institute of National Security.

Kelly: Cyber deterrence is an issue that comes up a lot. Is cyber deterrence something that exists today or are we still stuck in this model of continuous contact without any clear red lines?

Gen. Nakasone: I don't think cyber deterrence is the same thing as nuclear deterrence. Certainly, that's not an analogy I would use. But here's what I would use: we need to be very, very proactive in what we do to be able to secure the domain that we utilize for so many things every single day. And so again, this idea of persistent engagement, I would tell you that that's the right way we've got to approach it. But we need greater partnerships, we need greater technology with greater scope. And I think there are new ideas that need to come to fruition here. So, as the national cyber director gets ready to release his national strategy, I look forward to what he's going to say about how we involve academia or the private sector or private citizens in terms of what we can do to secure this domain that's so important to our nation.

Kelly: There's a whole lot of breath holding over when that national strategy will be released. What are some of the key components of the new strategy that you hope to see?

Nakasone: I'm hopeful to see a very, very strong focus on partnerships. What is it that the government does best? What is it that the private sector does best? What do we, as private citizens need to be able to do? I'm also looking for a component of, ‘How do we look at this and look at our threats differently?’ There's a broad range of threats that we face in cyber states, nation states, non-nation states, criminals. These are all different areas that need different approaches. I'm looking for a strategy that can take care of all of that. And any great strategy should motivate us, should make us think, ‘Wow, this is exactly the way we want to be able to do things and to conduct ourselves to solve these tough problems.’

Kelly: You talk a lot about partnerships. I'm proud to say that Sir Richard Moore, who just recently stepped down as the chief of MI6, is also a fellow honoree at this year's Cipher Brief Honors Awards for his impact through alliances, because alliances and partnerships are so critical. Can you talk a little bit more about how you see partnerships evolving in the future given how dramatically technology is changing the battlefield in cyber?

Gen. Nakasone: Before I talk about that, let me just take a step back and congratulate my fellow honorees, Gilman Louie and Sir Richard Moore and Janet Braun and David Ignatius. These are true giants of what has gone on. I think to be mentioned in this same category of honorees, is really very humbling. I congratulate each one of them. And I'm really looking forward to the HONORS dinner on the 13th of March.

With regards to partnerships, we just had the honor of hosting Sir Richard Moore at Vanderbilt University for a talk. And one of the things that we both agree on very strongly is that we're much better together than we are separately. What I'm always trying to emphasize in partnerships is that we can do things much better collectively than we can alone. As you take a look at what Richard Moore has done throughout his entire life, it's been a series of incredible partnerships that he's been able to foster. I feel the same way. This partnership needs to expand, it needs to be broader and it needs to be inclusive of more nations, more technologies, more industries that can help us be even more secure in the future.

Kelly: Let’s talk about China. What do think Beijing has learned from Russia's performance in Ukraine and do you think anything surprised them?

Gen. Nakasone: I think the first thing that they probably were surprised at is how much the United States intelligence community knew about what was going to take place on the 24th of February 2022. And the administration released that information publicly. I'm sure that shocked the Chinese.

The second thing I think they learned is that the Russians were not that good. And what has occurred over the past three plus years of seeing the loss of life and the loss of equipment, that must have really provided a pause to the Chinese as they think about the future.

The third thing that they've clearly demonstrated is that they've learned they cannot stop supporting Russia. They are the number one supporter of what Russia has been able to do in Ukraine - and continues to do. And even with that, they have not been able to overcome the Ukrainians. Those are the three lessons that I think the Chinese probably have thought about as they look back on the three plus years of this conflict.

Kelly: Do you think China is more likely to use cyber operations as a prelude to any kind of kinetic conflict with Taiwan?

Gen. Nakasone: One of the things that I think the department and certainly I have agreed with is that probably the first shots of any future conflicts are going to take place in cyber and space. And I would include space in that as well. Space is a competitive advantage for our nation, just as cyber is. But as any adversary looks to the future, I don't think they say, ‘Hey, let's go ahead and just wait for this conflict to take place. Let's make sure if we're going to take on the United States that we nullify their competitive advantages’ and the competitive advantages begin with space and cyber.

Kelly: Kevin Mandia, whom you’ve worked with over the course of your career, told how incredibly good Russia is in cyber. They once sort of dominated the cyber conversation. Do you think they're still a top tier cyber adversary? Or has the war in Ukraine exposed a lot of their structural weaknesses?

Gen. Nakasone: I would agree with Kevin that they are a top power in terms of their cyber capabilities, but they're not the best power. Of our adversaries, clearly, it's the Chinese. In the sense of their scale and their scope of what they're able to do, it's much different than what the Russians can do. But there's no one, none of our adversaries today can replace what the Russians are able to do in the information operations space. They are masters at it. And I think that's one of the ways I think about vigilance in the future. I think about how we protect ourselves from that.

Kelly: Let's talk about technology. You focus so much on this. AI is rapidly changing, intelligence collection and analysis also. What do you think is the most dangerous misconception that policymakers have about AI's role in national security right now?

Gen. Nakasone: If we're going to talk about AI, the first thing we need to do is return to the advent of ChatGPT in November of 2022. What have we seen in terms of change? And this is one of the things that I think is important for all of us to realize in what a little over three years, we have seen prompts go to text, to video, to recordings, to reasoning, to deep research. And now to agents. This is the landscape upon which we see AI operating today. I think one of the great misconceptions about artificial intelligence is believing we can just go ahead and put in a prompt and that’s all that’s going to occur. It's not that simple. It still requires a human component to what you're going to do. If you want to be a power in AI, you need four things. You need chips, you need data, you need energy. And the final thing is you need talent. And those are the four components that I think most people don't think about when they think about artificial intelligence.

Kelly: At what point do you think AI stops being an enabler and starts becoming a vulnerability, especially inside military and intelligence decision-making loops?

Nakasone: Artificial intelligence is just like cyber. It’s really just like any capability. It has both its strengths and weaknesses. If we focus on agents, they will able to do all of these things for us. But you're going to want to understand what they're doing, and then protect those agents from those that may try to make the agents do something they shouldn't be doing. One of the things that artificial intelligence shows us is that there are great capabilities here. But there are also incredible challenges with regard to being able to have visibility on them, have control over them, protect them, and then be able to truly understand what they've done.

Kelly: Should the U.S. be willing to accept less explainability in AI systems in exchange for speed and advantage?

Gen. Nakasone: Whenever we talk about a technology, there must be transparency of that technology. We must have a degree of security and feeling of safety that this technology is going to be utilized and that it comports with our norms and values - that it does things we want it to do. This is important. When I think about that, speed is an incredibly important capability of artificial intelligence. But I would also say security is the other ‘S’ that we can't ever forget.

Kelly: What does the next five or ten years look like to you?

Gen. Nakasone: One of the things we don't talk a lot about that I'm very excited about is being able to use artificial intelligence in an enterprise manner, being able to use these models to take a look at code and correct bad code, that is really the responsibility for the vast majority of weaknesses in our cybersecurity posture and is one of the things that we should be able to correct immediately.

The second thing is, wouldn't it be wonderful if we can continue to use artificial intelligence to discover new cures, new medicines for diseases that we have not been able to be able to address in our lifetimes? And the final thing I'm really excited about is using artificial intelligence for education - being able to look at a broad classroom of users – both the smartest and those that are struggling – and giving them the same ability to advance given the fact that this artificial intelligence is almost like a tutor to those students. That's a fairly heady thing that I think about when I think about the next five years.

Kelly: You also sit on several boards and serve as an advisor to a number of companies. I'm wondering from that position, do you see the cyber landscape any differently than you did when you were serving in government?

Gen. Nakasone: One of the things I’ve certainly realized, and I realized it to a degree as the director of NSA and as commander of U.S. Cyber Command, but that I realize even more fully now, is the power of ingenuity within our private sector. If you look at what is being done in places like Silicon Valley and Austin and Seattle and Boston and in Nashville and other places throughout the United States, it's truly amazing. And I say that as we look at our future, one of the things that I always emphasize to audiences is that our government should be focused on the things that we have competitive advantage in. And everything else - we should have our partners do. So, I'll bring that back to the National Security Agency.

No one breaks code or makes code better than the NSA. Everything else, we should have partners with. That's a little bit of my realization as I've made the journey from military officer to private citizen.

Kelly: Now that you’re in the private sector, how do you feel about the dual-hatted role over NSA and Cyber Command?

Gen. Nakasone: My thoughts on the dual hat really haven't changed since I was the commander and the director for six years. And that is within a domain of cyberspace where speed, agility and unity of effort really matter. Having one person that directs both organizations, one that has all of the authorities to do what we need to do to defend and to provide offensive capabilities in cyberspace, and one that has the intelligence components and capabilities that are second to none in the intelligence community, is important. Having one person direct that and say, this is what we need to focus on, is an advantage to the nation, particularly when we have a series of adversaries that at times have larger components than what we do. I think that this is really the secret sauce for what we do in cyberspace.

Kelly: What lessons have you learned from that model?

Gen. Nakasone: I want to share two lessons that I think are relevant for those that are in the private sector. The first is among the best pieces of advice I received early on in my tenure. It was from a retired four-star who said to me, ‘Paul, these two jobs are easy.’ And it was like, you know, day three of my tenure and I could barely find my desk. And he said something that I never forgot. He said, ‘What is it that only you can do that the organizations depend on you to do? And once you figure that out, you'll focus your time on those things.’ It took me a little while to really understand truly what it was that only I could do as both the head of NSA and of Cyber Command. But once I did, that's what I focused on. And that really allowed me to be able to shine a light on the areas that we had to and to get after and understand better the challenges to our nation.

The second piece of advice I received was also really important. And that was that you must be able to communicate. You must be able to talk to a number of different audiences; Congress or the White House or the Secretary of Defense or your own workforce. I really learned very early on that being able to communicate was one of the things that I had to do effectively. And being able to communicate not only with those in government, but also the public sector and for someone who spent his life in the intelligence community, talking in a room of people who were listening and asking questions was something that I had to become comfortable with.

Kelly: NSA is going through a shift since the former commander was dismissed last year and don’t have a confirmed leader yet.

Gen. Nakasone: I'm really excited that Josh Rudd now has been to his confirmation hearings. I would anticipate that he's been voted out of committees, that he'd be confirmed very, very soon. And having a confirmed leader of both organizations is really the true good news story here moving forward. We need to look forward, not in the rear-view mirror, and being able to think about what are the things that he's going to need to have from a broad area of partners to help him be successful. I think about anything that we can do to make his tenure even more successful.

Kelly: When you held those roles, there was really an evolution in the partnerships between the private sector and government. Do you see that evolving under the next director as well?

Gen. Nakasone: I think it must. If you're going to look at having capacity and capability in cyberspace, you must have a series of partnerships with the private sector. And that includes both the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. But I think the partnerships don't start there. It's also international partners that I think that are really important. I think that there's a series of academic partners. Certainly, we at Vanderbilt University look forward to being a great partner to the new commander and director. But I also think there are a series of partnerships today that perhaps we haven't even thought about. Partnerships with perhaps non-government organizations or partnerships with other entities that have placement and stature within cyberspace that can assist us.

Kelly: You've worked for multiple administrations and you've done a tremendous job remaining very apolitical. In an era of election interference, of deepfakes and information warfare, how do you think the military stays neutral while defending the system? This is something that's on everyone's mind in Washington and you really seem to be very successfully navigating a difficult space.

Gen. Nakasone: First, I think that that the U.S. military and our military officers need to remember what has been an incredibly successful civil-military partnership. And remember that we work for our elected leaders. And I think it's important that we're very, very conscious of anything that we say, whether we're in uniform or out of uniform, that can be construed as being critical or being supportive or anything like that with regards to our political leaders. We have a mission to defend the Constitution.

We also have a focus outside the United States and being able to continue to do that is something that's very, very important to us. And continued civil discourse is one of the things that I really hope continues to improve and being able to listen to people and understand that they may have a radically different opinion than your own. Listening is the first part of understanding. I think that would be one of the things that I hope our future leaders continue to remember.

Kelly: Let’s close with what’s happening outside the U.S. If you had to describe to the average American how serious the threat is from China, how would describe it?

Gen. Nakasone: I think when you consider China or any adversary, one of the things you should measure is what their capabilities are in terms of their military, their economic stature, their informational powers, and even their diplomatic capabilities.

If you look at China today, think about their economy. Fifty years ago, when President Nixon went to China, they had a gross domestic product of $114 billion. Today, it's approaching $18 trillion. And to give you perspective, our gross domestic product in the United States is about $25 trillion. There's been incredible, incredible growth in their economy. Today, they're the number one manufacturer in the world. The next nine countries cannot equal the percentage of manufacturing that takes place in China every single day. Militarily, they have the largest Navy in the world - not the best - but the largest.

If you look at their information capabilities, think about TikTok. Over 60 % of the United States clicks on TikTok every single day to get their news. And then if you look at their diplomatic prowess, they've been able to establish a series of partnerships through the Belt and Road Initiative and being able to obviously bring on several partners that were never ever available to them in the past. This is a nation that has increasing capabilities and has designs not just on being a regional power but being a global power.

That's something that we as Americans need to think very hard about. And if you look at our values and what we stand for, they are dramatically different than what China stands for.

Kelly: Is there anything on your mind that I didn't ask you?

Gen. Nakasone: Let me just come back to what I do as my focus and my passion right now, which is continuing to educate the next generation of young people that are going to be part of our national security apparatus. People ask me whether I’m positive about our future. I would tell you, I am extremely positive about our future because I get to work with some of the smartest young people in America at Vanderbilt University every single day. When I look at the 18 to 20-year-olds, 22-year-olds that are thinking about the opportunities and challenges that face them, this is truly one of the things that I think provides a great dynamism to our nation.

As we close today, I would tell you that I'm incredibly optimistic as I look to the future with the young people who are coming up and I look forward to seeing what they're going to do in their lifetimes.

Read more expert insights into national security in The Cipher Brief. And find out more about The Cipher Brief HONORS Awards happening March 13 in Washington D.C.

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Rise of China's Strategic Soft Power and its Global Impact https://belimedia.com.ng/the-rise-of-chinas-strategic-soft-power-and-its-global-impact https://belimedia.com.ng/the-rise-of-chinas-strategic-soft-power-and-its-global-impact EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – The United States is currently mired in a cycle of aggressive trade renegotiations and a transactional foreign policy that has alienated its most critical allies. By perceiving partners as free riders on American defense investments, Washington is increasingly defaulting to raw financial and military coercion, or hard power. While cultural attraction remains a core Western strength, this shift toward transactionalism is allowing the global power balance to tilt decisively in China’s favor.

China has successfully evolved from the world’s manufacturing engine into an innovation powerhouse, with massive investments in research and development now yielding strategic dividends. The old adage, "USA innovates, China replicates, Europe regulates," is being rendered obsolete as Beijing takes the lead in high-tech research, dominates renewable energy supply chains, and weaponizes its monopoly on rare earth materials. This is not just a technological shift; it is the foundation of a new form of systemic influence.

By the Numbers

Soft power, the ability to influence through attraction rather than coercion, is now a primary battleground for Beijing. In its 2010-2015 5-Year Plan, China explicitly identified cultural products like computer animation, books, and social media as strategic priorities, and is expected to spend over $10Bn per year. Today, that strategy is manifest in TikTok, where international audiences are fed a curated diet of technological wonders and friendly diplomacy, while the domestic version (Douyin) remains strictly regulated. This curated reality leverages Western influencers paid to travel to China to marvel at bullet trains and flying cars, effectively masking the tightening grip of government control and persistent domestic poverty.

The silver screen has become a frontier for this historical revisionism. The evolution of Oriental Dreamworks illustrates the point: after the original Kung Fu Panda sparked national soul-searching in China over why a Western studio told their story better, Beijing forced a co-production model. This ensured that subsequent global hits, like The Abominable, which sparked international backlash for including the nine-dash line, served as vehicles for Chinese territorial and cultural narratives. Similarly, the success of The Three-Body Problem on platforms like Netflix signals a shift from passive consumption to the strategic export of techno-optimism, reshaping how the West perceives China’s past and future.

Lately one of China’s most potent soft power assets, however, is its strategic silence. In a world defined by shock events, from the 2025 Indo-Pakistani conflict to the Venezuelan raids to arguing over Greenland, Beijing projects a calculated lack of surprise. While United States foreign policy is viewed as an erratic series of active disruptions, China markets itself as a pillar of stability. By refusing the role of global savior, Beijing avoids the inevitable backlash of interventions while presenting its intentions, most notably regarding Taiwan, as historic certainties rather than chaotic ruptures. This perceived predictability is the velvet glove that makes its authoritarian consistency look like a safe harbor for global markets.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

The change in soft power execution (or lack thereof), both by the United States and China, has yielded quantifiable results. A 2025 Pew Research Center survey of 28,000 adults shows the favorability gap between Washington and Beijing closing fast. Even inner circle partners are decoupling: in Australia, importance placed on economic ties with China (53%) has eclipsed the U.S. (42%) for the first time. In Canada, reeling from American rhetoric regarding annexation and the Greenland crisis, favorability for the United States plummeted from 87% to 67%. Spain, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina all view the United States as their highest threat, while the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Germany and Sweden think of the United States as their second highest threat, only surpassed by Russia. When the world’s most stable democracies begin to view the United States as a greater threat to their sovereignty than China, the global architecture of power has already moved.

This erosion between the United States and its NATO allies is precipitating a tangible financial and geopolitical divorce. As European pension funds signal a pivot toward non-American assets and gold to hedge against United States volatility, Washington has resorted to hard-power retaliation, to counter rising interest costs on its own federal debt, but risks further alienating allies. This shift is giving rise to a Western middle-power bloc, where leaders from Canada to the U.K. are bypassing United States hegemony to secure autonomous ties with Beijing, most recently shown in a Canadian trade deal with China, and London approving a new embassy before their prime minister is set to visit China next month.

The Domestic Crisis of American Soft Power

The United States faces a disadvantage in this competition that is as much internal as it is external. While cultural attraction remains a Western strength, America is stuck in a cycle of political division and a pervasive internal culture war. This domestic fragmentation has direct geopolitical consequences, creating a soft power deficit by eroding internal stability and the reliability that allies previously took for granted. When a superpower’s domestic policy is defined by institutional distrust and crippling polarization, its foreign policy becomes erratic, swinging violently between administrations and leaving partners to wonder if today’s agreement will survive tomorrow’s election.

In this climate, Washington is increasingly defaulting to financial and military coercion, hard power, to maintain influence. By viewing alliances through a purely transactional lens, the United States signals that its leadership is no longer based on shared values, but on momentary leverage.

The Authoritarian Impact of the Chinese Model

Conversely, China’s authoritarian system provides a strategic soft power advantage by ensuring internal dissent never detracts from international ambitions. While the United States is distracted by internal quibbling over social issues, Beijing’s centralized control allows it to project a facade of unwavering stability and consistency. The CCP’s absolute control over society prevents political in-fighting from slowing its global expansion.

This marketed reliability is a powerful tool. To many developing nations, the Chinese model, which prioritizes state security and economic growth over the perceived chaos of liberal democracy, looks increasingly attractive. China is expertly using this image to mask the reality of structural debt traps and economic coercion they have expertly laid in the Global South, particularly in Africa and Central Asia.

However, this is also China’s greatest weakness. Democratic values, such as a free press, labor rights, data and public privacy and private ownership are values where the West, and America in particular, still is attractive and acts as a magnet. While China might be a partner, they might not be a role model.

A Collision Course with an Existential Vacuum

The Transatlantic alliance is now on a collision course with an existential power vacuum. If the West fails to move past aggressive theater and nurture shared security architectures, it will cede the century to a model that demands compliance in exchange for short-term financial benefits.

For any nation flirting with realignment toward China, the warning is stark: China offers immediate liquidity, but demands a level of sovereign collateral that eventually leaves the partner more vulnerable than it was before the investment began, as Lithuania’s experience with economic sanctions has shown. Old alliances between America and Europe should not be so quickly forgotten. All indications are that Chinese soft power, backed by an undistracted authoritarian state, could eventually be followed by hard power.

Soft power should not be discarded so quickly. There is strength in a shared Western cultural heritage that attracts nations precisely because it avoids totalitarianism. However, if America cannot find a way to resolve its internal dissent and project a unified front, it risks losing the very American Example that once served as its greatest global asset, and part of its allies with it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
Export Controls Backfire: The China Innovation Paradox https://belimedia.com.ng/export-controls-backfire-the-china-innovation-paradox https://belimedia.com.ng/export-controls-backfire-the-china-innovation-paradox

Export Controls Backfire: The China Innovation Paradox

DEEP DIVE — When the Biden administration rolled out its semiconductor export restrictions in October 2022, the logic seemed airtight: cut off Beijing’s access to advanced AI chips, and you’d put the brakes on China’s tech ambitions. Three years on, that bet looks a lot shakier than anyone in Washington expected.

Instead of paralyzing China’s AI sector, these controls have promoted domestic self-reliance. With no choice but to develop indigenous workarounds and architectural innovations, Chinese businesses are rapidly decoupling AI progress from sheer hardware volume. U.S. policies have undoubtedly bought time, but they have also ushered in a parallel innovation ecosystem totally independent of Western influence.

Now the Trump administration is trying a different tack. By allowing conditional chip exports to approved Chinese customers, complete with revenue-sharing arrangements, the White House appears to be hedging its bets. The strategy banks on maintaining some leverage through controlled access rather than outright denial. Yet critics caution this could backfire spectacularly: American companies might be financing the very Chinese AI capabilities designed to render them obsolete.

Both strategies, it seems, lead to uncomfortable places.

The DeepSeek Shock and Algorithmic Efficiency

A year ago, DeepSeek’s new R1 model sent tremors through Silicon Valley and Washington. The Chinese startup demonstrated AI reasoning capabilities closely mirroring those of OpenAI’s ChatGPT o1, without access to cutting-edge chips restricted by U.S. export controls.

“Algorithmic efficiency is a useful technique that enables developers to achieve reasonable performance compared to frontier models through inference-time optimization—essentially adapting the achievements of others for your own purposes,” Martijn Rasser, Vice President of Tech Leadership at the Special Competitive Studies Project, tells The Cipher Brief. “DeepSeek’s engineering is genuinely impressive, and this ‘fast follower’ strategy is very attractive for price-sensitive, commoditized AI applications.”

By optimizing inter-chip memory bandwidth on less sophisticated H800 chips, DeepSeek achieved competitive performance through algorithmic efficiency rather than brute force. According to the MIT Technology Review, Chinese startups are responding to export restrictions by prioritizing efficiency, resource pooling, and collaboration, thereby gaining an edge over competitors.

The breakthrough, however, should not be overinterpreted, Rasser warns.

“Algorithmic efficiency and raw compute aren’t substitutes at the frontier — you need both,” he says. “Training next-generation foundation models, achieving breakthroughs in areas like protein folding or materials science, and developing the most advanced autonomous systems all require massive compute that efficiency gains alone cannot replicate.”

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Other analysts see the dynamic playing out along different timelines.

“AI progress is shaped by two concurrent trends: pushing the capability frontier requires ever-greater computing power, yet over time, reaching any given capability level requires less and less computing power,” James Sanders, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, tells The Cipher Brief.

While American AI companies continue advancing along the compute-intensive frontier, Chinese firms constrained by chip shortages focus instead on the lower-cost, lower-capability portion of the market.

“If the U.S. continues to maintain its computational dominance, China will likely continue to play a role as a fast follower, rather than leader, in AI capabilities,” Sanders explains.

Smuggling Networks and Systematic Circumvention

Aside from inventiveness under constraints, Chinese companies have also shown remarkable versatility by smuggling goods through shell companies and elaborate smuggling operations. The procurement of chips for Huawei’s Ascend 910 AI processor is one of the most dramatic examples.

According to Congressional testimony, Huawei used shell companies to deceive Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company into manufacturing approximately 2 million computer chiplets.

In 2024, a smuggling ring operating under the company name “Luxuriate Your Life” reportedly purchased $390 million worth of servers from Dell and Supermicro containing banned Nvidia graphics processing units, then smuggled them into Malaysia for ultimate delivery to Chinese customers. Hundreds of controlled chips have subsequently been sold in Shenzhen markets as vendors trade restricted AI technology.

The dramatic scale of smuggling operations thus raises fundamental questions about enforceability.

“No export control regime is 100% leakproof,” Rasser acknowledges. “But the goal should be making evasion costly, risky, and limited in scale rather than expecting perfect enforcement.”

He contends that the most effective approach is drawing a clear line: semiconductors exceeding certain performance thresholds should not be sold to end users in countries of concern at all, regardless of stated end use.

Sanders takes a more optimistic view.

“America has the ability to reduce AI chip smuggling to negligible levels if it wanted to. It only requires the political will to do so,” he says.

Technology that verifies a chip’s location could reduce smuggling to negligible levels, Sanders argues, noting that Nvidia has reportedly built such a capability and several congressional bills have proposed mandating location verification for exports.

“Even with the level of smuggling we see today, export controls on advanced AI chips are still effective,” Sanders insists. “They impose a large differential cost on China’s AI development and make it much harder for these chips to be obtained and used by adversaries.”

The Self-Sufficiency Acceleration

Perhaps most significantly for long-term strategic competition, export controls have supercharged China’s decades-long quest for semiconductor self-sufficiency. At a February 2025 meeting between Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping and technology executives, Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei reported that his previous concerns about domestic advanced semiconductor production had eased due to recent breakthroughs.

A CSIS analysis underscores that Ren stated he is leading a network of more than 2,000 Chinese companies working collectively to ensure that China achieves self-sufficiency of more than 70 percent across the entire semiconductor value chain by 2028.

Rasser is skeptical of the ambitious timeline.

“This timeline is not credible for leading-edge semiconductors,” Rasser observes. “If he means trailing-edge components and packaging, 2028 might be achievable. But if he means the advanced logic chips that power AI training and high-performance computing, it isn’t.”

Chinese firms still can't build the ultra-precise manufacturing equipment needed to produce chips at the most advanced nodes, he points out. But that hasn't stopped Beijing from doubling down. Overall chip investment dipped slightly in early 2025, yet spending on semiconductor equipment jumped more than 53 percent, a clear signal that China is dead serious about building out a complete domestic supply chain.

The Chinese government has channeled well over $150 billion into semiconductor development from 2014 through 2030, according to Semiconductor Industry Association analysis — an investment equivalent to the U.S. CHIPS Act virtually every year since 2014.

The Bifurcation Dilemma

The unintended consequence of U.S. export controls may be accelerating the bifurcation of global technology ecosystems into incompatible, competing supply chains.

Consequently, we are faced with a strategic paradox: Does a China that relies on Western chips but is constrained by American controls pose a lower long-term risk than one that operates in a technologically autonomous fashion beyond American eyesight?

“A technologically autonomous China certainly poses a greater risk of strategic surprise,” Rasser concedes. “But the alternative framing — that we could maintain Chinese dependency on Western technology indefinitely—isn’t realistic. It ignores history, Chinese strategy, decades of mercantilist industrial policy, and the inherent difficulty of controlling technology diffusion over long time horizons.”

The better frame, he suggests, is that export controls buy time.

“The question is what we do with that time,” Rasser continues. “Years of constrained Chinese progress are years during which the United States and allies can extend their own technological lead, build more resilient supply chains, strengthen alliances with key semiconductor nations, and shape the trajectory of AI governance.”

Sanders echoes this assessment.

“China is determined to develop a fully domestic AI chip industry, and will likely eventually be able to do so,” he notes. “The real question is whether we equip China to compete with American AI leadership today.”

The fundamental constraint on Chinese domestic AI chip production, Sanders points out, isn’t the lack of logic chips but access to advanced manufacturing equipment.

“Strengthening and fully enforcing current export restrictions on semiconductor manufacturing equipment is the most important step in preventing China from developing an AI chip industry that could outcompete America’s,” he says.

Yet the competitive landscape extends beyond manufacturing capacity alone.

The Supply Chain War

Leland Miller, co-founder and CEO of China Beige Book, who serves on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, however, sees the entire framework shifting.

“The trade war is dead,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “This is a supply chain war. Beijing wants to weaponize supply chains for leverage. Tariffs are background noise now.”

Miller notes that China has advantages in data, talent, energy, and scale. Their weakness remains computing — advanced chips and lithography.

“That’s why H100s matter so much,” he says, referring to Nvidia’s high-end processors. On open-source AI platforms like Hugging Face, Chinese dominance is already evident. “Seventeen of the top 20 models are Chinese,” Mike Kuiken, Vice Chair of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, tells The Cipher Brief. “Software plus enough hardware can close gaps. That’s why this moment is dangerous.”

The Trump administration’s December 2025 decision to allow conditional exports of Nvidia H200 chips to approved Chinese customers in exchange for a 25 percent revenue stake represents recognition that absolute denial may be neither achievable nor desirable. Yet Beijing has reportedly discouraged state-linked firms from adopting these chips, while Chinese companies like Huawei and Alibaba continue to advance domestic AI alternatives.

The controls have bought time — China’s AI development has slowed, and the U.S. still holds the edge in cutting-edge tech. The more complex question is whether Washington can consolidate that lead before Beijing circumvents the restrictions entirely, potentially causing an even bigger crisis.

“The goal isn’t perpetual dependency, it’s ensuring that when China does achieve greater autonomy, the strategic balance still favors us,” Rasser concludes.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
Greenland’s Worth a Fight and Russia’s Trying to Start One https://belimedia.com.ng/greenlands-worth-a-fight-and-russias-trying-to-start-one https://belimedia.com.ng/greenlands-worth-a-fight-and-russias-trying-to-start-one EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — The “quickest way for Russia to penetrate our naval defenses is steaming from the Arctic to the North Atlantic.” The Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap is the last place allied forces “have any hope of detecting a Russian sub before it’s in the vast Atlantic barreling toward New York.” These insightful comments were spoken not by President Donald Trump but by fictional President Grace Penn in Netflix’s The Diplomat. By contrast Trump’s rhetoric and attempts to gain leverage on Denmark have been appalling and unhelpful. But Trump and “President Penn” are both right about one thing — although the Arctic island is remote, Greenland’s location makes it fundamental to U.S. and NATO naval intelligence and missile defense missions.

Russia knows this as well and is using the Trump-inspired kerfuffle to drive a disinformation narrative intended to further weaken Euro-Atlantic relations. Kremlin-aligned sources have been circulating social media posts suggesting that Western aid to Ukraine has weakened European countries and that weaponry committed to Kyiv may be redistributed to Greenland. A deepfake of a Danish newscaster stating that Denmark plans to recall all F-16s given to Ukraine to be redeployed to Greenland was circulated by Russian influence accounts and received over 45.3K views on X.

Another video, which received over 254.3K views on X, imitated the Institute for the Study of War and claimed that Europeans siding with Ukraine in 2022 is costing them Greenland now and that NATO will be destroyed soon, thereby forcing Europeans to align with Moscow. This Russian tactic of riffing off legitimate think tanks and news channels to validate Russian lies is essential to making their false pro-Kremlin narratives appear more credible and increase the likelihood of their posts spreading across social media.

Moscow is trying to use the divide between the United States and Europe to sow confusion, degrade support for Ukraine, and rupture NATO. What Putin forgets is that disagreements between allies are common and constructively overcoming them builds stronger relationships. The strategic importance of Greenland demands the alliance work through its disagreement.

There are significant reasons why Russia is trying so hard to split NATO over Greenland. Nuuk holds significant naval intelligence value. Moscow’s Northern Fleet and nuclear submarine HQ are on the Kola Peninsula, located near the Russia-Finland border. For Russian (RU) forces to reach the North and Baltic Seas, and beyond into the North Atlantic Ocean, RU submarines must transit through the GIUK Gap; making the two stretches of water critical for monitoring RU subsea activity, just as “President Penn” demonstrated.

Moreover, the growing partnership between Beijing and Moscow in the Arctic and China’s increasing interest in the region over the past decade should raise red flags for NATO. In 2018, China released their first Arctic white paper, in which they called themselves a “near-Arctic state” and detailed a desire to establish a “polar silk road.” Since then, China and Russia have performed numerous joint air and naval patrols in Arctic waters. Coordination between U.S. adversaries in the High North places an even higher value on NATO Arctic maritime intelligence capabilities.

Greenland is also strategically important for missile defense operations. Nuuk is a prime location for American early warning systems to track intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with trajectories that arch over the High North. The Pentagon currently operates a variety of early warning radars and communications systems at Pituffik Space Base in Greenland. These radars work in tandem with systems in Alaska and Canada to provide essential early warning capabilities for U.S. missile defense.

ICBMs launched by Moscow can reach the United States in approximately 40 minutes, offering the Pentagon’s command and control centers, and the president himself, extremely limited time to detect, decide, and respond. This mission set will expand as Russia develops long-range conventional hypersonic missiles that will also use a High North flight route.

Prioritizing and expanding U.S. military radar and communication systems in Greenland will certainly be part of the “underlayer” elements of the Golden Dome missile defense effort, allowing for Russian missiles of all varieties to be detected earlier and provide U.S. and Canadian warfighters additional reaction time.

Russia will always be a malevolent actor and adversary in the High North, and the Kremlin will utilize any advantage and division among Arctic allies to sow disinformation, destabilize alliance efforts, and advance its own interests. Although the political particularities of Nuuk lie in the hands of Greenland, Denmark, and the United States, the geostrategic and deterrence value of the island is shared among all NATO allies; and should be a factor that unifies and strengthens the alliance, not something that divides Western partners and advances adversarial interests.

Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery (U.S. Navy, ret.) is the Senior Director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation and Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Emmerson Overell is a project coordinator.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
The U.S.&China Economic Cold War Is No Longer Silent https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-china-economic-cold-war-is-no-longer-silent https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-china-economic-cold-war-is-no-longer-silent OPINION — For decades, the United States (U.S.) operated under a fatal delusion that free trade with China would liberalize its politics and that the global market was a neutral playing field. We were profoundly wrong. In 2000, the U.S. controlled 37% of global semiconductor fabrication. Today, we control less than 12%, while China is on track for 40% by 2030. While we played by the rules of Adam Smith, Beijing played by the rules of Sun Tzu.

We are now in the midst of a silent asymmetric economic war. China does not have a private sector in the American sense. Under its strategy of Civil Military Fusion, every ByteDance algorithm and every ton of refined lithium is a dual use asset of the Chinese Communist Party. Meanwhile, the U.S. encouraged the atrophy of its industrial base by prioritizing short term profits from outsourcing to China instead of securing our own economic and national security future. The West created this irrational strategic vulnerability where Beijing now controls 80% of refined rare earth supplies and more than 60% of the magnets in actuation systems for the F35.

Recognizing that economic security is national security, the Trump administration has installed a genuine war cabinet for economic conflict. This includes the Treasury and Commerce Secretaries, but the pivot is most visible at the Department of War. There the Deputy Secretary, is a battle- tested private equity leader who left his firm in order to bring his skills to fight and has operationalized a new offensive strategy to link private sector dynamism with state imperatives.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

The tip of this spear is the newly chartered Economic Defense Unit or EDU.

Directly overseen by the Deputy Secretary of War and run by another private equity industry specialist in industrial consolidation, the EDU is not another regulator. It functions as an internal merchant bank designed to bypass the Pentagon’s notoriously slow procurement cycles. The EDU has replaced compliance- based bureaucracy with commercial first financing. Its mandate is to generate investable demand signals using the government balance sheet to de-risk private capital investment in the defense industrial base.

Instead of vague promises, the EDU now utilizes Advance Market Commitments. These are binding contracts to purchase critical technologies such as solid rocket motors or autonomous drones before the factories are even built. This transforms government contracts into bankable assets that companies can use to secure private loans. Furthermore, the EDU has restructured acquisition management, replacing narrow Program Executive Officers with Portfolio Acquisition Executives who are authorized to move capital rapidly across capability sets much like a private equity managing partner.

Complementing this is the transformed Office of Strategic Capital or OSC. Once merely an advisory body, the OSC has been re codified by the FY2026 NDAA into a direct capital allocator. It is aggressively bridging the valley of death not just for software but for heavy manufacturing. By offering direct loans and guarantees specifically for equipment finance, the OSC ensures that American companies can afford the high capital machinery needed to onshore production of semiconductors and batteries.

This architecture represents a total departure from the status quo. We are moving from a system that audits costs to a system that finances outcomes. The Army parallel initiative to grant Direct Commissions to Silicon Valley engineers further reinforces this culture shift – destroying the wall between the Pentagon and Palo Alto.

The message to the American private sector is clear. The era of neutrality is over. There is no free market left to win if China ends up owning the building blocks of every major industry. Wall Street and Silicon Valley must partner with the USG not out of charity, but out of necessity.

The administration has built the financial and policy architecture for economic sovereignty. American capital now faces the simplest decision in its history, which is to deploy here and own the 21st century, or deploy elsewhere and become its tenant.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside the $35 Billion Plan to Track Hypersonic Missiles from Space https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-35-billion-plan-to-track-hypersonic-missiles-from-space https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-35-billion-plan-to-track-hypersonic-missiles-from-space OPINION - “The Department of Defense’s Space Development Agency (SDA) is developing a new space-based architecture comprised of a large constellation of at least 300-500 satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) to detect and track potential missile threats. This system will complement other space systems currently providing this capability. SDA is developing this new system in part in response to peer and near-peer competitors that are designing strategic and tactical hypersonic weapons that are not easily detected, identified, or tracked by current space-based missile warning systems.”

That’s a quote from a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report sent to Congress last Wednesday entitled MISSILE WARNING SATELLITES, Space Development Agency Should Be More Realistic and Transparent About Risks to Capability Delivery.

I’ve chosen to write about this report because it contains not only the best description of how complicated and costly just one aspect of missile defense has become, but also it provides the most understandable history of what’s been done up to now, along with the threats we face.

Known within the Defense Department (DoD) as the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) – and started in 2020 -- the plan, according to the GAO report, is “intended to provide space surveillance and communications for persistent, timely, global awareness [of missile threats] that is designed to operate in an increasingly contested space environment.”

DoD so far has committed nearly $11 billion to this effort, which is programmed to cost near $35 billion through fiscal year 2029.

While the PWSA deals with tracking an already launched missile and its warhead, there are two other elements of a missile warning system: Detecting the launch and communicating information within elements of the system.

Traditionally, missile threats have been detected and tracked because they are launched using powerful rocket boosters which produce heat and light making them easy to initially see and follow and predict their ballistic trajectories. Infrared sensors on space satellites can detect heat from launched missiles and booster plumes against Earth’s background

In 1970, DoD put in place the first Defense Support Program satellites, which used infrared sensors. These first satellites with infrared sensors, and the infrared systems that have followed, have operated from geosynchronous Earth orbits (GEO), which allow those satellites to stay fixed over a single, longitudinal spot located about 22,000 miles above Earth. This results in each GEO satellite maintaining constant observation of a specific area of the globe and collectively monitoring the entire planet.

In the mid-1990s, DoD developed the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to replace and provide significantly more robust data than the Defense Support Program.

Wednesday’s GAO report said, “In recent years, DoD has identified emerging threats that these [SBIRS] systems may be unable to effectively warn or defend against. For example, Russia and China have successfully demonstrated hypersonic missile capabilities. In addition to new missile threats posed by potential adversaries, DoD has also publicly acknowledged emerging threats to our space assets. For example, DoD reported that China is developing additional counterspace capabilities including directed energy weapons, electronic warfare, and other anti-satellite weapons.”

According to the GAO, “U.S. missile warning satellites currently operating in GEO may be particularly vulnerable to these emerging threats because there are relatively few of them -- making them high-value targets -- and their location above Earth is effectively stationary and predictable.”

Approximately three DSP satellites of the original 23 DSP system remain in orbit with one maybe still operational. In addition, beginning in 2011 there have been six SBIR satellites put in orbit and SBIRS sensors placed on four additional host satellites.

The GAO report said, “SBIRS will soon be followed by the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen OPIR) system, designed as an upgraded replacement for SBIRS, with sensors that are expected to have even greater sensitivity than current SBIRS sensors. While providing some enhanced capabilities, such as greater sensitivity, the Next Gen OPIR system is built around an architecture similar to existing systems now in GEO orbit.

DoD is also developing space-based laser communications technology to support large constellations of satellites for missions, including missile warning and data transport. However, a February 2025 GAO report found that DoD had “made progress in developing this technology, but it also faced delays and other issues -- and hasn't fully demonstrated that it works in space. Despite these challenges, DOD plans to continue to develop and launch hundreds of satellites worth billions of dollars that require the use of laser communications.”

DoD’s plan for the new PWSA missile satellites in LEO, internally referred to as the Tracking Layer, will complement the Next Gen OPIR satellites for what is termed missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT) functions, and will use laser technology to communicate.

Because satellites in LEO are much closer to Earth than those in GEO, many more satellites are needed in a LEO-based constellation to achieve the same coverage as a single one in GEO.

The missile tracking satellites in LEO are traveling much faster relative to Earth’s surface and therefore each satellite can only observe a small section of Earth’s surface for a short time -- only about 10 minutes. This makes constellation development more complicated if constant global coverage is required.

“Some DoD officials say having a greater number of satellites performing MW/MT in LEO will result in greater resiliency for the constellation as a whole and the capability it provides,” the GAO report says, adding, “For example, if one satellite in a proliferated constellation is damaged -- whether intentionally or by natural environmental effects -- the constellation’s capability is degraded by a smaller margin than if the entire constellation was made up of only a handful of satellites.”

The current plan has been to develop a large constellation of tracking satellites in LEO, along with data transport layer satellites forming a communications network to provide mission data directly that will enable advanced missile tracking from LEO to ground stations.

A tracking satellite, according to the GAO report, is “comprised of a spacecraft – referred to as a bus -- plus other components such as infrared sensors, on-board mission data processors, and communication payloads, together with a ground segment to manage the constellation and receive and process track data to send to the wider DoD and intelligence community.”

There will be some 600 satellites in all, with plans then to replenish each tranche every two years in perpetuity, along with associated ground systems, according to the GAO report. As the LEO-orbiting tracking satellites approach the end of their life, “SDA will deorbit them,” the report says.

SDA has been acquiring tranches of both tracking and data transport layer satellites beginning with a demonstration tranche, called Tranche 0 (T0) that was launched in April 2023. Of the 27 satellites in T0, 19 performed data transport and communications, while eight did missile warning. One additional satellite remained on the ground as a test bed.

Tranche 0 was designed to be a “warfighter immersion” tranche, giving service members the opportunity to work with the systems, understand their capabilities, and to develop operational concepts for their use.

An SDA official told the GAO T0 demonstrated “the ability to track a short-range ballistic missile throughout its flight and into its terminal phase and then transmit raw data to the ground from space.” It also connected the tactical data link network used by NATO, from space to specific ships and military airplanes and established the first satellite-to-satellite demonstration of optical links between two of the four T0 contractors.

In September 2025, Tranche 1 of the PWSA program, put 21 tracking satellites into orbit, followed the next month by another 21 data transport layer satellites. Overall, Tranche 1 is scheduled to consist of 128 satellites for the Transport Layer and 26 for the Tracking Layer.

SDA said back in October 2025, “Beginning in 2027, T1 will provide an initial warfighting capability through the PWSA to deliver regional persistence for tactical military data channels…along with advanced missile tracking and missile warning, and beyond-line-of-sight targeting.”

Wednesday’s GAO report said, “According to SDA, T1 will establish the PWSA ground and operations baseline, or the foundation upon which SDA plans to add capabilities in future tranches. To reduce risk, SDA is taking an incremental approach to delivering these ground operations.”

However the next T1 satellite launches have been delayed to sometime this year.

Wednesday’s GAO report raised significant issues in the ongoing PWSA program.

For example, it said, “SDA had planned to allow the warfighter to provide feedback on capabilities prior to a larger SDA investment in T1 and future tranches, but officials from combatant commands we spoke to told us that they have not been asked to provide feedback on T0 MW/MT demonstrations.”

In a broader sense, the GAO said, “SDA has not taken steps to understand the range of risks to delivering MW/MT capabilities by assessing the technological maturity -- such as by conducting a technology readiness assessment -- of critical technology elements included in its satellite development given required modifications and use in new environments. Absent such assessments, SDA remains overly reliant on technology maturity estimates provided by contractors and lacks key insights to better develop realistic development timelines.”

In short, as with many needed highly-technical and complex defense systems, this new space-based, large constellation of satellites in low Earth orbit to detect and track potential missile threats appears to be developing higher costs and a delay before it is fully operational.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
Should Western Tech Giants Partner With Pro&Hamas Network Al Jazeera? https://belimedia.com.ng/should-western-tech-giants-partner-with-pro-hamas-network-al-jazeera https://belimedia.com.ng/should-western-tech-giants-partner-with-pro-hamas-network-al-jazeera OPINION — A few weeks ago, Al Jazeera named Google Cloud as its primary technology provider for “The Core,” a sweeping program designed to integrate generative artificial intelligence (AI) throughout its production process. The move, which further deepened the relationship between the two companies, should sound alarm bells for policymakers and anyone concerned with the accuracy, credibility, and transparency of the news media and information space, which impacts nearly every aspect of society.

The Core enables more efficient reporting and even drafts scripts that humans generally would otherwise write. Reporters can pull archival material in seconds, generate compelling data visualizations — visual stories — and synthetic images at planetary scale, and automate story planning, all through AI platforms built by Google.

However, it’s not the innovation that’s the problem but rather its use to generate and amplify adversarial state-funded and directed news with no warning labels to its global audience.

The Qatari state funds and oversees Al Jazeera, shaping editorial output. Because of its shared ideology with the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Jazeera’s content often reflects the lens of the Muslim Brotherhood, three branches of which the United States just designated as a terrorist organization. The Qatari outlet also has a history of producing content that glorifies terrorism. Tech companies that help Al Jazeera amplify its content using algorithms, AI, or other methods, advance Qatari foreign policy rather than reflecting independent media assessments on a wide range of worldviews.

Part of the Al Jazeera-Google program is “AJ-LLM,” described as the editorial brain of the system that will be trained on Al Jazeera’s archives and connected to Gemini Enterprise, according to the companies. Al Jazeera is already very prominently cited in large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and Claude in questions about the Gaza war, and Gemini could very well follow that trajectory with this expanded partnership.

While one reason Al Jazeera features prominently in LLM answers is because it has no paywall. New partnerships, including Google’s major expansion with Al Jazeera, may fuel its presence even more.

Al Jazeera assures there will be sufficient human oversight in the process. However, Al Jazeera’s current and historic content, with its anti-Western bias that amplifies the likes of Hamas, loaded into its LLM platform, will churn out faster, flashier versions of the same editorial product, in countless formats.

Subscriber+Members get exclusive access to expert-driven briefings on the top national security issues we face today. Gain access to save your virtual seat now.

When users worldwide ask LLM’s about the conflict, they are frequently fed content from a media company that celebrates Hamas terrorist attacks and frames Israeli self-defense as aggression. Because these AI systems operate as black boxes with limited transparency, audiences may receive algorithmically amplified narratives that systematically favor Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood perspectives while appearing to be the product of neutral technological systems.

In May 2025, Google partnered with the Qatari Government Communications Office and the Al Jazeera Media Institute to train journalists in building digital-focused newsrooms. Participants included news directors, journalists, and representatives from various media organizations across Qatar’s media landscape.

What kind of messages do Al Jazeera trainers convey to journalists and diplomats who take their courses? The case of Muhammed Khamaiseh from the Al Jazeera Media Institute is instructive. In 2018, Khamaiseh posted, “Jews have been known for centuries to be cunning thinkers, and currently, the entire global economic system is under their control.” Khamaiseh had previously celebrated Hamas rocket attacks on Israeli civilians in 2014 and offered affection for Hamas after its kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers. “This is why we love Hamas :D,” he wrote. Ironically, Khamaiseh is the author of “A Guide Avoiding Discrimination and Hate Speech in the Media, published by the Al Jazeera Media Institute.”

Qatar is an authoritarian nation, whose stringent media laws prohibit any criticism of Qatari leadership or policy, making Al Jazeera’s output anything but independent. The Department of Justice has determined that Al Jazeera is owned and directed by a foreign government. Congress has asked Justice to review whether the Qatari government should be required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. DOJ has already required Al Jazeera’s AJ+ to register but the Qatari network has failed to do so.

Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq are among the countries that have placed bans on Al Jazeera. Some bans remain on the Qatari channel. In addition, despite Al Jazeera posing as a savior of Palestinians, prominent Palestinians have long expressed concerns that Al Jazeera has stirred up regional hostilities and fomented violence, a problem that would be amplified if Al Jazeera’s cleverly designed content is recast as neutral algorithmic outputs. News consumers would be hard-pressed to find examples of Al Jazeera criticizing Hamas’s atrocities.

U.S. regulators should regard AI partnerships with foreign state-directed authoritarian media as they would regard sensitive technologies. They should trigger formal risk assessments. Congress should require companies with AI products to disclose the extent to which foreign state-directed media sources are used in training data, retrieval systems, or generated outputs. Absent such transparency, lawmakers and the public cannot evaluate the scale of foreign state influence embedded in AI-driven information systems.

Google should also require clear labeling when AI-generated news summaries or analytical outputs rely on content from foreign state-directed media organizations. Users should not be left to assume neutrality.

Preventing Americans and the global community from being manipulated by the Qatari state’s anti-Western, pro-extremist Al Jazeera content, even though it may be cloaked in high-tech flash, should be a top priority for both technology companies and policymakers. It’s time to pull back the curtain.

Toby Dershowitz is a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Asher Boiskin is an intern. Follow them on X @TobyDersh and @asherboiskin.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:10 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why Russia’s War Effort Signals Strategic Decline https://belimedia.com.ng/why-russias-war-effort-signals-strategic-decline https://belimedia.com.ng/why-russias-war-effort-signals-strategic-decline OPINION — “Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II…After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity.”

That’s a quote from Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine, a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis brief by Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, released January 27, which says that “a close look at the data suggests that Russia is hardly winning [its war against Ukraine],” and, even more interestingly, that “Russia is increasingly a declining power.”

Jones, President of CSIS’ Defense and Security Department, and McCabe, Associate Fellow in CSIS’, Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, not only assess that “Russia’s overall progress on the battlefield, especially in the last two years, fall decisively short of Moscow’s goal to militarily conquer Ukraine,” but also that “Russia’s economy is showing signs of strain, and long-term productivity looks bleak.”

Let’s start with the Jones/McCabe analysis of the military situation and below look at their view of Moscow’s economic situation.

While saying assessing casualties and fatalities in wartime is difficult and imprecise, and various sides have incentives to inflate or shrink the numbers for political purposes, Jones/McCabe write that “According to CSIS estimates, Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million battlefield casualties, which include killed, wounded, and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025…There were roughly 415,000 Russian casualties in 2025 alone, with an average of nearly 35,000 casualties per month. In addition, there were roughly 275,000 to 325,000 Russian battlefield fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025.”

Compared to the past, the CSIS analysis showed, “Russian battlefield fatalities in Ukraine are more than 17 times greater than Soviet fatalities in Afghanistan during the 1980s, 11 times greater than during Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively, and over five times greater than all Russian and Soviet wars combined since World War II.”

The CSIS team attributes the high Russian casualties and fatalities to such things as “Russia’s failure to effectively conduct combined arms and joint warfare, poor tactics and training, corruption, low morale, and Ukraine’s effective defense-in-depth strategy in a war that favors the defense.”

Specifically the CSIS analysis says, “Russia’s attrition strategy has accepted the costs of high casualties in hopes of eventually wearing down Ukraine’s military and society. On the battlefield, Russia has utilized dismounted infantry to wear down and attrit Ukrainian lines, along with small first-person view (FPV) drones, artillery, glide bombs, and other stand-off weapons. Russian units have routinely conducted advances using small squads of troops, often poorly trained, that are supported by armored vehicles or light mobility vehicles. Higher Russian headquarters frequently order these forces to advance toward Ukrainian positions to conduct reconnaissance by drawing fire. If Ukrainian positions are positively identified, Russian soldiers may be sent forward to attack positions, which are further mapped and then targeted with artillery, FPV drones, and glide bombs. These tactics have led to high fatalities and casualties.”

The Ukraine side is also given credit for “their defense-in-depth strategy in a war that has largely favored the defender. Ukraine has used trenches, dragon’s teeth (anti-tank obstacles), mines, and other barriers—along with artillery and drones—to attrit advancing Russian soldiers and vehicles. The eastern front line, for instance, continues to be saturated with drones. As a result, vehicle movement is difficult within 15 kilometers of the front line. Infantry soldiers must instead march to their positions for 10 to 15 kilometers.”

One result has been Russia’s slow rate of advance. According to the CSIS analysis, “Russia’s gains since it took the initiative in January 2024 are far smaller than the large territorial shifts seen earlier in the war. At the peak of the initial invasion in March 2022, Russian forces seized roughly 115,000 square kilometers in less than five weeks, but by April 2022, Ukraine had retaken more than 35,000 square kilometers. By November 2022, Ukraine had retaken approximately 75,000 square kilometers, including through successful counteroffensives around [the Ukraine cities] Kharkiv and Kherson.”

Although the Russian economy has held up better than expected following U.S. and other Western country sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, strain on its economy is starting to show.

The CSIS analysis says, “In 2025, Russian manufacturing declined at its fastest rate since March 2022, with contractions in output and new orders, a rising labor shortage, and a decrease in input buying. Overall, Russian manufacturing suffered seven consecutive months of contraction in 2025, with production levels declining for ten consecutive months. In addition, consumer demand weakened and inflation was high.”

Jone/McCabe write there is also a labor crunch, a drop in oil revenues with lower global prices, with 2025 economic growth slowing to 0.6 percent, while the International Monetary Fund estimates that Russia’s growth would remain slow, at 0.8 percent, in 2026.

The CSIS team also says Russia faces a capital problem. Unable to borrow on international markets, the Kremlin has borrowed at home and raised taxes to finance the Ukraine war. Roughly half its budget is spent on the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, domestic security, and debt service.

“While the war sustains jobs and industrial activity,” the CSIS team says, “it produces few lasting assets or productivity gains. Higher taxes burden the civilian economy, which is already suffering from double-digit interest rates and significant labor shortages. Tank factories are working overtime, but automobile producers have cut shifts.” Ammunition, uniforms, and fortifications contribute to current GDP, but they do not improve long-term welfare or capital formation.

According to Jones/McCabe, “Russia also faces one of the most severe demographic challenges among major economies, with a shrinking and aging population, low birth rate, high mortality rate (especially among working-age men), and high rate of emigration among skilled workers.”

One example where the CSIS analysis finds Russia falling behind is in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It points out that Russian President Vladimir Putin once predicted, “Artificial intelligence is the future not only of Russia but of all of mankind. . . . Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” But it then states, “Russia today is a bottom-tier AI power. It ranks 28 of 36 countries in the overall strength and development of its AI ecosystem—or AI ‘vibrancy’ -- according to Stanford University. The top-performing Russian AI model trails even older iterations of OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini.”

Even worse, not a single Russian company is among the top 100 technology companies in the world by market capitalization, while the U.S. leads the pack.

As for the space race, where Russia was once a leader, Roscosmos, the state corporation in charge of the Russian space program, carried out only 17 orbital launches in 2025, according to the CSIS analysis. That compares to 193 U.S. orbital launches and 92 by China. Russia’s space industry also suffered an accident in December 2025 that caused severe damage to the launch pad Russia uses for sending astronauts and cargo to the International Space Station. In addition, a 2018 Soyuz rocket carrying two astronauts failed as it headed to space; the emergency abort system carried the two to safety.

There has also been a decline inside Russia in popular support inside Russia for the war. According to polls cited by CSIS, in May 2023, 57 percent of Russians believed that most people in their inner social circle supported the war, compared to 39 percent who opposed the war. By October 2025, 55 percent of Russians in their inner social circle opposed the war, compared to 45 who supported the war.

All thi, however, has not appeared to have affected Putin, who, according to the Jones.McCabe analysis “remains undeterred by the high casualty and fatality rates, and Russia’s economic downturn is unlikely to bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table—at least on terms that would be acceptable to Ukraine or Europe.” They say, “Putin may be willing to accept the high casualty and fatality numbers because most of these soldiers are from such regions as the Far East and North Caucasus—and not politically vital areas for him, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.”

In addition, the Jones/McCabe analysis finds, “President Putin and the Russian government have been adept in conducting an aggressive disinformation campaign that has convinced some policymakers, including in Washington, that Russian victory is inevitable, despite substantial evidence to the contrary.”

The CSIS team attributes that to Russia having “boosted its funding for state-run media in 2026 by roughly 54 percent, indicating a commitment to intensified information warfare. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine is designed to sustain domestic support for the regime and its war against Ukraine, as well as to convince key foreign audiences that the war has been successful and needs to continue.”

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside the High&Stakes U.S. Pressure Campaign on Iran https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-high-stakes-us-pressure-campaign-on-iran https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-high-stakes-us-pressure-campaign-on-iran

EXPERT INTERVIEW – U.S. officials say a second aircraft carrier will be deployed to the Middle East amid the administration’s efforts to pressure Iran to agree to restrictions on its nuclear program. The USS Gerald R. Ford is expected to join the USS Abraham Lincoln in a significant build-up of U.S. military force in the region.

President Trump said this week that he does believe the U.S. will be able to reach a deal with Tehran but warns that if talks fail, the outcome could turn far more severe.

After meeting with the president in Washington this week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is less optimistic about a deal, telling reporters on Thursday that “...I expressed general skepticism about any agreement with Iran, but I said that if an agreement is reached, it must include the elements that are important to Israel: not only the nuclear program, but also the ballistic missiles, and also the Iranian proxies.”

Meanwhile, Iran’s national security chief Ali Larijani is warning that Tehran would strike U.S. bases in the region if it is attacked.

The Cipher Brief spoke with former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI Norm Roule about what is likely to come next. Roule, who is also a Cipher Brief Expert, travels regularly to the region for meetings with senior leaders. We spoke with him in this exclusive interview about the risks and opportunities facing the U.S. with regard to Iran and what he believes Iran is likely to do first if the U.S. does launch a military attack.

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

THE INTERVIEW

The Cipher Brief: The U.S. is continuing to deploy military assets to the Middle East. How are you assessing the opportunities given where talks with Tehran are at the moment? What do you see as realistic U.S. objectives?

Roule: You’re correct to start with a focus on objectives. This will give us targets to assess risks and opportunities, as well as the report card against which the success of any strategy must be judged.

A number of these are included in the Trump Administration’s December 2025 National Security Strategy: avoid involvement in a costly regional war or nation-building, ensure that regional sea lanes and choke points remain open, and maintain stable energy markets.

Regarding the Islamic Republic, every Administration – indeed the entire international community – has agreed that Tehran must cease the oppression of its people, must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon, its missile programs must be constrained, and its malign regional adventurism and support for terrorism must end. This latter set of ambitions has been part of not only this administration’s Iran strategy but also of the first Trump administration's strategy. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s May 2018 Twelve-Point Speech on Iran highlighted each of these goals.

However, the current approach addresses areas where there are different views on the balance between nonproliferation and broader regional issues, and on whether to resolve the nuclear issue first and address other issues later, or to handle them together.

Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once famously reminded a group that policymaking is done in a reality where we must remember that we are a country and not an NGO. National interests, security, and power drive foreign policy.

Humanitarian goals will be important in our policies, but they won’t be the primary driver. Ours is not the first generation to face the challenge of how far we should go to encourage and militarily support those who courageously stand against tyrants.

Woodrow Wilson faced this dilemma as White Russian armies fought the Bolsheviks in 1918-1920. Several presidents were pressed to respond as Germans, Czechs, Hungarians, and other protestors valiantly stood up against heavily armed Soviet occupiers in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s. It’s easy to say we should do more, but these decisions are never clear. In this case, there have been many calls for military action, and it is easy to understand the rationale, watching the regime’s cruelty against the courage of Iranian protestors. But it is also unclear exactly what we are to attack, for how long, how we would measure success, whether the results would justify the ramifications of dealing with Iran’s military retaliation and lastly, whether the moment for such action has passed. Every presidential advisor would try to address these questions.

But if policy choices regarding Iran involve profound risks, the events of this month show that kicking the can down the road is no less dangerous. Inevitably, the can gets heavier with every kick and the road gets shorter. There is absolutely nothing regarding the Iran threat today that hasn’t been predicted for years. The international community refused to risk the price of hard actions against Iran, and elected to use repeated attempts at diplomacy, corrosive sanctions (which were effective in limiting Iranian capabilities) and until June 2025, increasingly empty threats of military action to constrain Iran.

In terms of opportunities, the Administration has been consistent in its focus on four priorities with regard to Iran. The most recent has been humanitarian and involves the U.S. threat of military action against the regime if it continues using widespread murderous force against Iranian protestors. No one can deny the horrific and bloody crimes committed by this regime during the recent unrest. The violence has subsided along with the protests, albeit widespread arrests and detentions continue. The President has claimed that his threats of military action limited Iran’s use of violence and stopped Iran from hanging large numbers of protestors. Some certainly argue that we should have used military action to aid the protesters, but this raises the question I mentioned earlier and related issues about whether we had sufficient assets in the area to address potential “Day After” consequences. This is a question with no single clear answer. However, our use of diplomatic, economic, and military pressure to prevent regime violence against protesters is appropriate and consistent with our national values.

The Cipher Brief: The White House is now focused on Iran’s nuclear, missile, and regional threats. Talk to us about why this is a priority and whether the current moment is an opportunity.

Roule: Let’s start with Iran’s nuclear program. The June 2025 Twelve-Day War severely degraded – at least for now – Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. But that capability can be rebuilt, and if Iran has any enrichment capacity, especially one not under international supervision, they can try to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. But if Iran doesn’t agree diplomatically not to rebuild these capabilities and to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with the access it requires, we should steel ourselves to the requirement that the Israelis or we will need to repeat the June 2025 military strikes when Iran chooses to rebuild.

Next, we have the Iranian ballistic missile threat. The unclassified May 2025 Defense Intelligence Assessment stated that Iran’s space-launch vehicle program could give it the capability to build as many as sixty intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by 2035.

Iran’s repeated use of ballistic missiles against multiple countries makes it reasonable for Israel to be concerned about the long-term size and direction of this program as well. Iran’s missile program is not currently a threat to Western Europe. If Iran builds ICBMs, this, of course, changes. The idea that anyone would allow a country with Iran’s political, military, and nuclear history to build dozens of potentially nuclear-tipped ICBMs within nine years should not be acceptable. It would also be too easy to imagine a scenario in which Iran and North Korea joined forces to threaten the U.S. Homeland. So, we either compel Iran to change the course of its ballistic missile program, work with Europe to build a costly missile shield, or destroy that program militarily now.

Last, Iran’s Quds Force remains operational and has begun to repeat what will be a several-year campaign to reconstitute its regional proxy program. This is not the first time the Quds Force has been required to rebuild a regional program amid great risk to the regime. In fact, it’s the third time since 2003.

By any traditional measure, the Islamic Republic represents a failed revolutionary state ruling a disillusioned and angry population. In many ways, it resembles the final years of the Soviet Union: an ossified regime whose ideology is dismissed even by its most ardent supporters. The regime retains power through repression, coercion, corruption, and a multi-layered system of lucrative patronage that its most potent supporters would lose in any reformed government.

The administration’s rhetoric and actions make a reasonable case that the current moment should be tested to see whether, with further pressure – which could include military action – the regime would sacrifice these malign activities in exchange for sanctions relief that would allow the Islamic Republic to survive. This won’t satisfy those who seek regime change, but it does parallel Washington’s approach to Venezuela.

The Cipher Brief: How would you assess Iran’s losses to date?

Roule: By any measure, Iran’s losses have been extraordinary, consequential, and unprecedented in modern history for a country of its size, regional influence, and global economic impact in the energy market. The last two years have been crowded with examples of the collapse of its political, economic, and national security architecture.

In terms of leadership, the regime has endured the death of President Ebrahim Raisi, who was highly likely to be Supreme Leader Khamenei’s choice. His passing was followed by a historic low turnout in elections that led to the Pezeshkian presidency. Pezeshkian failed to deliver on his economic promises. His tenure has included the dismissal or resignation of two vice presidents, two cabinet officials, and other senior officials. He spends much of his time apologizing to the Iranian people for the government's failures, hoping this tactic will win him popular support. It’s somewhat understandable in that the economic complaints that ignited Iran’s recent nationwide unrest occurred in a country that has endured months of shortages of water, electricity, natural gas, and refined products, which forces the repeated closure of schools, government offices, and businesses.

The World Bank estimates that one-third of Iranians (25-26 million) are below the poverty line. Annual inflation reached 43 percent in December 2025. The rial, which fell to 1.43 million to the dollar before the unrest, just reached 1.63 million to the dollar and appears to have no bottom. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent’s comments on recent U.S. expanded sanctions in response to Iran’s handling of protests underscores Washington’s intent to use whatever economic tools it can to pressure Tehran.

The Cipher Brief: If you’re looking at this in terms of Iran’s own national security, how does it look?

Roule: In terms of national security, the picture is bleak. Over the past two years, Israel killed the commanders of Iran’s primary proxy partners and destroyed the group's strategic capacity. Russia and China proved to be of no help in the June War, nor could they stop the reimposition of United Nations Security Council Sanctions.

The loss of Syria and Venezuela cost Iran its closest external allies, reducing its regional and global political reach. The June War was a profound defeat for Iran’s air defenses and intelligence services. Israel and the U.S. easily destroyed key elements of Iran’s hugely expensive nuclear program, an effort that has cost billions of dollars and for which Iran has endured decades of political and economic isolation. The conflict cost Tehran many of its most experienced military and nuclear personnel, and left Iran with billions of dollars in damage to its nuclear and missile infrastructure.

Finally, Iran’s murderous killing of protestors and internet shutdown starkly illustrated that the most successful aspect of the regime’s national security investments remains its tools of oppression.

The Cipher Brief: Many have described Tehran today as weak. Yet the regime keeps surviving protests. Its missile programs are considered a potential threat, and policymakers are worried about its capacity to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, impacting energy markets. What’s your take on this?

Roule: The regime is weaker in many areas, but it is more accurate to say that the regime has never been more fragile and is strategically weaker than it has been in decades. All of this is known to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. But they can also list strengths they believe will help them survive. I would rather not list these publicly but suffice it to say that key elites and security elements remain unified, disciplined, and responsive.

If the government’s deep national unpopularity is a fact, it can’t be ignored, as a substantial portion of the population remains uncommitted to its overthrow, and some are committed to its survival rather than supporting the opposition. Externally, it may have no reliable state allies, but nor does it face an international coalition. The U.S. is its primary adversary. What it achieves against Washington will shape its relations with the world.

Iran may not be able to compete with the U.S. militarily, but that has always been the case. Its leaders know that they must be able to threaten an asymmetric response: regional and global economic destruction by missile, drones, and cyber-attacks will immediately begin should the U.S. attack Iran.

This list should leave your readers with the sense that these men believe the best days of the regime are ahead. That would imply stupidity, which is not a characteristic that gets one through Iran’s national security shark pool of political and policy challenges.

They wake every morning, knowing that their domestic political and economic realities make another cycle of nationwide anti-regime unrest inevitable. The Supreme Leader will be 87-years old on April 19. His eventual passing will trigger the final transition to the regime’s post-revolutionary generation and they have had years to prepare for this moment. But his passing, which could occur at any time, could create a new crisis. And of course, if an actual military conflict with the U.S. takes place, the survival of the regime, and the personal survival of those in Iran’s leadership could be in question.

The Cipher Brief: How are you assessing the impact of the Trump administration’s approach right now?

Roule: The structure of the Trump administration’s strategy remains strategically conventional. The administration’s primary goal is a diplomatic outcome that avoids a conventional war or an episode that leaves Iran empowered and U.S. credibility damaged. Hence, the likelihood of a dramatically powerful military attack on Iran remains high.

The administration has made no secret of its buildup of one of the most powerful offensive air, missile, and air defense capabilities in history. Israel has also threatened military action. The President is also reportedly considering dispatching another aircraft carrier task force to augment his offensive capabilities further. The way this force has been deployed thus far shows that it is part of the pressure campaign and that the President has not yet authorized military operations. Of course, this last point could change at any time.

The administration has deployed a senior diplomatic team and urged regional partners to press Iran to engage with the U.S. to reach a deal. The administration has loudly announced new economic pressure on Iran and of course, deployed a massive military force. All of this is meant to pressure Iran’s leaders into making concessions.

This brings us to the subject of timelines. This current process is likely to last until the president and his advisors believe they have exhausted diplomacy. If the administration continues to believe it must strategically change Iran’s nuclear, missile, and Qods Force, then military action becomes a very high probability.

Predicting this timeline is impossible as it is shaped by Iran’s decisions, partner input, U.S. political conditions, and even unexpected events, such as a sudden spike in unrest within Iran, the sudden death of the Supreme Leader, etc.

The Cipher Brief: What about Iran’s response?

Roule: Iran needs to conduct multiple actions simultaneously to reduce the pressure on the regime and improve its chance of long-term survival. These steps include ending the protests, improving its military capabilities, and developing a diplomatic strategy to delay a U.S. military strike. But in the near term, Tehran remains unlikely to give Washington what it wants.

Domestically, Tehran must ensure and demonstrate leadership and unity among security forces. The country’s leadership will continue to comprise a spectrum of trusted actors. Security forces will aggressively seek to locate and detain anyone believed to have been part of the recent unrest and anyone who they believe has engaged in unauthorized contact with Western opposition or media, and expedite trials to show that the regime’s control remains strong. The regime will seek opportunities to project an atmosphere of normalcy and, as we have already seen, organize pro-regime rallies and events to show that it has its own base of support.

Externally, the regime will seek to project defiance and confidence. Its primary diplomatic goal will be to buy time and prevent coalitions from forming, so it will seek negotiations, indirectly whenever possible, and will always focus on the most complicated issue: the nuclear program. Its public comments on the talks will be positive and vague. This has been its usual practice because doing so has a positive impact on the value of the rial to the dollar and supports the regime’s propaganda on diplomacy.

We should expect Tehran to maintain oil production and maybe even try to increase floating storage on shadow-fleet assets in Asia to allow it to meet contracts during any short-term conflict with the U.S. If it feels it needs to close the Strait of Hormuz, it has multiple ways of doing so, but we shouldn’t be surprised if the U.S. military has multiple options for dealing with that.

At the same time, it will prepare missile and cyber operations both to signal deterrence and to survive any U.S. and possibly combined U.S.-Israel attack. In the absence of a credible air defense, its deterrence rests on a public diplomacy narrative that it stands ready to launch broad attacks against every U.S. base in the region, Israel, and to close the Strait of Hormuz and perhaps attack oil export facilities, damaging the international oil market, if the U.S. attacks. Iran hopes these statements will spark debate in the U.S. and diplomatic pressure from the international community against Washington over an attack.

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
From the Monroe Doctrine to Maduro: The Precedent Problem in U.S. https://belimedia.com.ng/from-the-monroe-doctrine-to-maduro-the-precedent-problem-in-us https://belimedia.com.ng/from-the-monroe-doctrine-to-maduro-the-precedent-problem-in-us OPINION — More than a century ago, Elihu Root warned that American power was outrunning the institutions meant to govern it. Root held unique authority on this question. As both Secretary of War and Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt, he helped design the institutions and doctrines that carried the United States from a continental republic into the role of a global actor. He professionalized the Army after the Spanish-American War, imposed civilian and legal structure on an expanding military, and spent much of his career attempting to bind America’s power to durable norms before habit hardened into entitlement.

That project matters again. In January, the Trump administration carried out an operation that resulted in Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro being taken into U.S. custody and transferred to Florida to face federal narcoterrorism charges. The action was legally defensible under existing statutes and drew intense attention at home, dividing domestic opinion. It was also the kind of operation Root would have recognized as dangerous—not because it violated the law, but because it normalized the use of military force as an instrument of policy once legal justification could be established.

Root confronted this problem directly in 1906, when he offered a sentence that has since been quoted far more often than it has been examined: “The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” Read in isolation, the line can sound jingoistic, a blunt declaration of national entitlement. Root intended something narrower and more cautionary. He was describing a condition of power, not endorsing it. The sentence reflected his concern that American dominance exercised without discipline would weaken its own legitimacy. For Root, it always mattered that America acted within the law—but legality could not substitute for judgment. Once law became a post-hoc justification rather than a governing constraint, it would serve power instead of limiting it.

Root understood this danger because he had helped build the system he was warning against. The Monroe Doctrine, as originally conceived in 1823, was framed as a barrier against European intervention in the Western Hemisphere. It was defensive in character. The Roosevelt Corollary, which Root helped construct in 1904, transformed that posture into an assertion of U.S. authority to intervene when Washington judged instability intolerable. The logic was that disciplined American supervision was preferable to either European intervention or regional chaos. In practice, this produced a system of ongoing intervention that stopped short of formal empire while exercising many of its functions—military occupations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, repeated interventions in Nicaragua and Cuba, and coercive diplomacy justified in the language of order and stability.

The consequences of that arrangement soon became visible. Root spent the latter part of his career arguing for international arbitration, multilateral institutions, and legal frameworks that would constrain American power even as the country grew stronger. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912 for that work. But his warning proved easier to admire than to heed. Over time, his diagnosis of American dominance flattened into justification and extended well beyond its original hemispheric frame.

I recognize the appeal of that logic because I once believed in it. In my twenties, working in Washington on national security issues at the end of the Cold War and into the early 2000s, I believed that the freedoms we enjoyed in the United States were a privilege that should not be exclusive, and that American power could and should be used to defend and extend the political conditions that made those freedoms possible. I sometimes imagined an America less burdened by the expectation that every use of power required a moral narrative alongside it—more openly transactional, less apologetic. I was a neocon before it mattered, and perhaps even MAGA before it was born. Iraq forced a reckoning, in part because it revealed how easily power justified by necessity could outrun foresight, legitimacy, and responsibility for what followed.

In the Maduro case, the debate in Washington quickly narrowed to whether the seizure could be defended legally. That question is necessary, but incomplete. The rule of law is the foundation of democratic authority, yet legality alone cannot carry the weight of wise judgment. A government can act within the law and still act unwisely, weakening the norms it depends on once power alone is no longer sufficient. American power should be used to confront injustice, and non-military tools are often preferable to force. The question is not whether to act, but how routinely power is applied once legality becomes its own justification.

The Maduro episode is unlikely to be the last application of this logic. Attention inside the administration has already shifted toward Cuba, where Washington is applying pressure through fuel interdiction, secondary sanctions, and emergency authorities framed as enforcement rather than intervention. These measures are calibrated, legally grounded, and short of war. They represent controlled intervention rather than unconstrained power.

That distinction matters—but it does not resolve the underlying risk. The Caracas operation involved the direct use of military force against a sitting head of state. Cuba involves economic pressure and interdiction. Root would have recognized the difference. He also would have understood how the former creates permission structures that make escalation from the latter more likely. The logic that validates measured coercion in Cuba is the same logic that justified seizing Maduro. Each action establishes precedent for the next. The question is not whether any single measure crosses a line, but whether the accumulation of incremental steps creates a system in which restraint becomes optional rather than structural.

There is a deeper tension at work. If the United States treats spheres of influence as an acceptable norm in its own hemisphere, it becomes harder to reject similar claims elsewhere. Vladimir Putin’s arguments about near-abroad authority rest on a logic the United States weakens when it asserts special prerogatives rooted in power rather than principle. The cases are not morally equivalent. Putin’s interventions in Ukraine and Georgia involve territorial conquest and the erasure of sovereignty in ways American actions in the hemisphere do not. But the structure of the argument is similar enough that adversaries will exploit the parallel and allies will notice the inconsistency.

Root understood that sovereignty without discipline invites decay. The question before us is not whether America can act this way. Clearly, it can. The question is whether doing so strengthens the order it claims to lead or erodes it through accumulated precedent. Power exercised without restraint rarely remains exceptional.

Root’s warning was never about weakness. It was about the difference between authority and dominance, between leadership that endures and power that exhausts itself. A century later, we are testing that distinction again.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Media Literacy Isn’t Enough Anymore https://belimedia.com.ng/media-literacy-isnt-enough-anymore https://belimedia.com.ng/media-literacy-isnt-enough-anymore OPINION — For years, media literacy has been treated as the solution to misinformation. I've advocated that position as well.

Teach people to question headlines. Encourage them to check sources. Help them recognize bias and emotional manipulation.

All of that still matters. In fact, it matters more than ever. I often encourage people to think like intelligence analysts when they encounter information online. Pause. Ask who benefits. Look for what is missing. Compare across sources. Pay attention to emotion. Those skills are essential. They are part of being an informed citizen in a digital world. And yet, they are no longer sufficient on their own.

The information environment has changed in ways that place unprecedented strain on individual judgment. AI-generated content now moves at a scale and speed no human can comfortably keep up with. Synthetic images, audio, and video are increasingly realistic. Recommendation engines quietly shape what we see first, what we see repeatedly, and what we never see at all.

Even people who are informed and motivated can feel overwhelmed. Not because they lack critical thinking, but because the environment itself is engineered for constant engagement and reaction. Volume replaces deliberation. Speed crowds out reflection. This creates a subtle but important shift in responsibility.

When every individual is expected to function as a full-time analyst, constantly verifying and filtering, fatigue sets in. Naturally, people disengage. Or they rely on shortcuts. Familiar narratives feel safer. Emotion becomes a guide. Over time, trust erodes, not only in information, but in the idea that careful judgment is even possible.

This is where the conversation needs to broaden. Individual literacy and critical thinking remain necessary. We should continue to teach people how to evaluate information and resist online manipulation. At the same time, we have to recognize that resilience cannot rest entirely on individual effort.

Healthy societies depend on environments that support human cognition. Spaces that allow for pause. Systems that introduce friction in high-risk moments instead of eliminating it. Norms and designs that make room for judgment rather than constantly competing for attention. Freedom has always depended on those moments when humans decide what matters, rather than being swept along by momentum.

In a world optimized for speed and engagement, protecting those moments may be one of the most important things we can do.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Defending the Homeland: Pentagon Shifts Strategy on Drone Threats https://belimedia.com.ng/defending-the-homeland-pentagon-shifts-strategy-on-drone-threats https://belimedia.com.ng/defending-the-homeland-pentagon-shifts-strategy-on-drone-threats OPINION — “This memorandum consolidates approximately ten separate outdated memoranda that were inadequate to address the current, complex unmanned aircraft system (UAS) threat environment. The new guidance affects a culture shift by empowering commanders to unambiguously apply their authority to mitigate threat UAS. Our message is clear, Department of War (DoW) airspace is off limits, and our commanders on the ground have the discretion to defend our airspace against all manner of UAS threats…Expanding the Defensive Perimeter : Grants commanders the authority to extend defensive actions beyond the physical ‘fence line’ of an installation; allows for the adequate protection of covered facilities, fixed assets, and mobile assets; placing trust in the commander and maximizing their flexibility to defend facilities and assets.”

That’s a quote from last Tuesday’s Defense Department (DoD) press release, Fact Sheet: C-UAS [counter unmanned aircraft systems] Policy in the U.S. Homeland. It was issued just hours before the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) temporarily closed airspace within an 11-mile radius of El Paso International Airport, but after Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel on the day before [Monday, February 9] used a classified Pentagon laser system on nearby Fort Bliss Air Base, to shoot down what they thought were drug cartel UAS systems [drones], but turned out to be metallic party balloons.

According to the Wall Street Journal, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last month had approved lending the 20-kilowatt directed-energy LOCUST [laser] weapon to CBP for use on the Fort Bliss installation, whose fence line is on the Mexican border.

The CBP test was not coordinated with the FAA and the resultant uproar, which subsequently involved the White House and Congress, marks only the beginning of what I believe will be a series of similar episodes related to homeland protection against suspect UAS drone systems.

An interesting sidelight to last week’s events: The Senate Armed Services Committee was scheduled to have a meeting last Thursday morning with two Pentagon drone experts, Owen O. West, DoD Senior Advisor for Drone Dominance, and Travis Metz, Drone Dominance Program Manager. It was called off at the last minute.

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Drones are becoming smarter, more autonomous and more widespread, and as their uses grow the lines get blurry between legitimate and illegitimate, secure and not secure, particularly in metropolitan areas. There are strict FAA rules that govern drones over 55 pounds or any flown for non-recreational purposes. There are even some FAA requirements for outdoor flying of smaller drones for personal pleasure.

Back on June 6, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) called Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty that dealt primarily with UAS. It said of them, “criminals,

terrorists, and hostile foreign actors have intensified their weaponization of these technologies, creating new and serious threats to our homeland. Drug cartels use UAS to smuggle fentanyl across our borders, deliver contraband into prisons, surveil law enforcement, and otherwise endanger the public. Mass gatherings are vulnerable to disruptions and threats by unauthorized UAS flights. Critical infrastructure, including military bases, is subject to frequent — and often unidentified — UAS incursions. Immediate action is needed to ensure American sovereignty over its skies and that its airspace remains safe and secure.”

Trump’s June 2025 EO also said that the United States must have a secure and strong domestic UAS industrial base and that relying on UAS produced in foreign countries as well as foreign-made UAS critical components pose unacceptable national security risks to the U.S.

As one response, the June EO called for, “The Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Administrator of the FAA; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director of OMB; and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall promptly take all appropriate steps…with regard to the creation of the National Training Center for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Center), and, upon establishment of the Center, focus initial training provided by the Center on development of Federal and SLTT [State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial] capabilities to secure major upcoming national and international sporting events held in the United States, such as the FIFA World Cup 2026 and the 2028 Summer Olympics.”

By December 2025, the FBI had established the National Counter-UAS Training Center (NCUTC) at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville Alabama where the Bureau already had cybersecurity, intelligence, and forensic training. Ever since, the NCUTC has been training officers from state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies on how to detect drones using radar, radio frequency sensors, and related technologies. More important, they are trained how to identify whether a drone is authorized or hostile, assess threats, and coordinate responses across various agencies.

During training, the FBI emphasizes that offensive actions against drones only occur when legally authorized, but the rules are complex. The FAA website, to assist law enforcement personnel responding to drone incidents, has created a three-part video series that covers the basics of drone regulations.

An additional response to the Trump June 2025 EO was Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s establishment in August 2025 of Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401) to replace the Pentagon’s then existing Joint C-sUAS Office. Operating under the Secretary of the Army, Hegseth’s order said, “JIATF 401 will be a joint activity and established as a jointly manned organization. The Military Services will support JIATF 401 with timely joint manning…This

new task force is empowered with broader authorities, funding flexibility, and rapid acquisition capabilities. Its mission is to strengthen U.S. airspace sovereignty, protect personnel and facilities, and outpace adversaries’ growing drone threats. With joint manning, interagency collaboration, and streamlined governance, JIATF 401 is designed to deliver innovative, mission-ready solutions at speed.”

As an example of cooperation, last Thursday, Army Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, JIATF 401 Director, visited the FBI's NCUTC in Huntsville yesterday. He met with Mike Torphy, FBI acting assistant section chief for UAS and counter-UAS, and discussed security preparations for this summer's soccer FIFA World Cup activities. Ross and Torphy also met with expert instructors who are teaching a specialized course for local law enforcement in each of the soccer tournament's eleven host cities across the nation.

One of the more unusual steps underway in the drone security field was announced by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) last December 21. It referred to “a [White House] National Security Determination regarding the unacceptable risks posed by UAS and UAS critical components that are produced in foreign countries.”

It added that, “U.S. cybersecurity and critical infrastructure guidance has repeatedly highlighted how foreign manufactured UAS can be used to harvest sensitive data, used to enable remote unauthorized access, or disabled at will via software updates.”

As a result, the FCC has updated its so-called Covered List, which identifies foreign-made communications equipment and services that pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, and thus cannot be imported for sale or use in the U.S. The action, taken by the FCC last December 22, prohibited the future imports of both foreign-made UAS and UAS components, but does not affect any previously-purchased drone, nor does it prevent retailers from continuing to sell, import, or market foreign drone models or parts approved earlier in 2025.

I found one of the best descriptions of the drone security dilemma was in a sales brochure entitled Countering UAV Threats, produced by BAE Systems, a leading defense contractor.

The BAE brochure said, “Detecting small and inexpensive UAVs remains one of the most persistent operational challenges facing today’s militaries. These platforms possess small radar cross-sections, produce minimal acoustic and thermal signatures, and often operate at low altitudes within ground clutter. Many are capable of autonomous flight with little or no radio frequency (RF) emission, making traditional detection methods unreliable. Urban and vegetated terrain further complicate detection, as buildings and foliage create blind spots and signal reflections that mask UAV movement. Adverse weather, restricted lines of sight and interference from birds or civilian activity introduce additional uncertainty.”

Then brochre went on, “A connected challenge is distinguishing between hostile and civilian UAVs. Attribution and intent are major challenges, as it is often unclear who controls a UAV and for what purpose it is being used, particularly in grey-zone or proxy scenarios. The compressed decision timelines of UAV operations further complicate matters, as engagements frequently occur in seconds, leaving little room for deliberation.”

Needless to add, last week the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida awarded BAE a cost-plus-fixed-fee $145 million contract for the development, manufacturing, and delivery of Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems weapon systems.

Along with everything else, the drone problem is worth keeping an eye on.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Who's reading this? 500K+ dedicated national security professionals. Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Washington’s Venezuelan Gamble: The Old Guard’s Continued Grip on Power https://belimedia.com.ng/washingtons-venezuelan-gamble-the-old-guards-continued-grip-on-power https://belimedia.com.ng/washingtons-venezuelan-gamble-the-old-guards-continued-grip-on-power

DEEP DIVE — More than six weeks after United States special forces extracted Nicolás Maduro from Caracas, Venezuela remains under the control of the same intelligence apparatus that ran the regime’s torture networks. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, who oversaw the feared Bolivarian intelligence service under Maduro, now negotiates sanctions relief with Washington while security hardliners who detained political prisoners coordinate their release.

For much of the U.S. intelligence community, however, it is not about whether Venezuela’s system can be repaired, but rather whether the Trump administration has enough leverage to prevent the old guard from rebranding.

Rather than triggering immediate elections as Venezuelan law requires, the Supreme Court declared Maduro’s capture a temporary absence, allowing Rodríguez to govern indefinitely without a popular mandate.

“The regime used a legal mechanism to maintain institutional control while avoiding an immediate electoral process,” Mauricio Vaquero, country coordinator for María Corina Machado’s Vente Venezuela party in Colombia, tells The Cipher Brief. “The Supreme Court decided she would assume as interim president, but a Chavista Supreme Court, not the democratic legal one.”

In other words, the same loyalist judges who helped Maduro stay in power are now using constitutional loopholes to keep his inner circle in charge.

The Intelligence Network Remains Intact

The security apparatus that sustained Maduro’s authoritarian rule continues operating largely unchanged. Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, still wanted by American authorities on a $25 million bounty for narco-terrorism charges, controls Venezuela’s coercive forces and armed collectives. His role in coordinating political prisoner releases illustrates the paradox of the current transition.

Foro Penal, Venezuela’s leading human rights organization that has provided pro bono legal assistance to victims of arbitrary detention since 2002, estimates that approximately 711 political prisoners are detained as of mid-February. Releases often come with severe restrictions. When opposition politician Juan Pablo Guanipa was freed on February 8 after eight months of detention, armed men abducted him hours later. He is now under house arrest with an ankle monitor.

“They were released, they reunited with their families, until the enlightened stupidity of some politicians led them to believe they could do whatever they wanted and stir up trouble in the country,” Cabello stated after Guanipa’s re-arrest.

Luis Bustos, the Bogotá-based spokesperson for the Venezuelan opposition party Primero Justicia, tells The Cipher Brief that his party alone has 61 members imprisoned as political prisoners.

“There is still a high risk of getting arrested if authorities are aware that you are happy about the situation,” Bustos continues.

In Caracas and popular zones, armed collectives demonstrate the regime’s ability to maintain social control outside of formal state structures.

“After Maduro’s arrest, a circular went out saying that opposition supporters would be captured and obviously alluding to actions of justice by these groups,” Vaquero insists. “So repression itself has not diminished, not in a constant way, not in a sustainable way.”

Elections: A Constitutional Impossibility

Venezuelan opposition figures and Washington officials increasingly acknowledge that legitimate elections cannot take place in the near term. The electoral system’s corruption under Chavismo extends beyond fraudulent vote counting to fundamental issues of voter registry manipulation and military involvement.

“This government put deceased people to vote,” Vaquero claims. “This government gave identity cards indiscriminately to Cubans, to Russians, to Chinese, to people from FARC, to people from ELN.”

María Corina Machado, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate leading Venezuela’s unified opposition, estimated in early February that transparent elections using manual voting could take place within 9 to 10 months. However, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, Delcy’s brother and key regime interlocutor with Washington, ruled out elections in the near future, citing the need for stabilization.

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White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt has echoed the administration’s reluctance to commit to an electoral timeline. When pressed on when elections might be held, Leavitt stated: “It’s too premature and too early to dictate a timetable for elections in Venezuela right now.” She emphasized that the administration has “maximum leverage over the interim authorities in Venezuela,” and that “their decisions are going to continue to be dictated by the United States of America.”

The constitutional framework technically allows Acting President Rodríguez to serve 90 days, with a possible ninety-day extension if approved by the Chavista-controlled National Assembly. Temporary absence provisions, however, are interpreted creatively by the Supreme Court, which effectively eliminates any firm deadlines.

A U.S. intelligence official focused on Latin America issues, speaking on background to The Cipher Brief, estimates that credible elections extend well beyond constitutional requirements. The source highlights that comprehensive electoral reform requires dismantling power structures that are still firmly entrenched.

Bustos also underscores that elections might realistically occur as early as next year.

“We need first of all to get a country more stable,” he says. “We need to put our institutions on stronger foundations.”

Without functioning democratic institutions, independent electoral authorities, or international oversight mechanisms in place, any rushed election would ratify the status quo. Under current conditions, elections would not be free or fair because the regime controls voters’ registries and ballots. As long as the same power structure is still in place, cosmetic reforms cannot address this fundamental barrier.

Leverage and Limitations

Despite these obstacles, the Trump administration can drive genuine change by maintaining pressure through its military presence and negotiations over sanctions relief. It appears, however, that the regime is trying to outlast Washington’s attention by complying tactically with American demands while maintaining fundamental power structures.

Paola Salazar, director for Medellín and Antioquia state at Colombia’s government migration agency, Migración Colombia, tells The Cipher Brief that pendular migratory flows between Colombia and Venezuela have remained stable since January 3, suggesting Venezuelans are not yet convinced conditions have fundamentally changed.

Moreover, Alejandro Méndez Hernández, a Venezuelan community organizer in Bogotá, tells The Cipher Brief that trust is still absent, hence migrants are not returning despite Maduro’s removal.

“We have a huge amount of Venezuelans being arrested as political prisoners, who haven’t been released until today, so it’s not building trust,” he continues.

Acting President Rodríguez told NBC News earlier this month that she would hold free and fair elections but declined to commit to a timeline, stating that the schedule would be determined through political dialogue. When pressed about Machado, Rodríguez said she would face legal scrutiny upon any return for calling for military intervention and sanctions.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has publicly outlined a three-phase approach for Venezuela’s future — stability, recovery, and transition to democracy — though he has declined to provide a specific timeline. During his January 28 Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, Rubio emphasized that “the end state here is we want a friendly, stable, prosperous Venezuela, and democratic, in which all elements of society are represented in free and fair elections.”

However, Rubio acknowledged the complexity of the timeline, stating, “We’re not going to get there in three weeks. It’s going to take some time.” In subsequent remarks to reporters, he added that the transition “can’t take forever” and acknowledged there must be progress within several months. However, he cautioned that “this is not a campaign to leave in place the systems currently in place.”

The Diosdado Factor

Interior Minister Cabello represents the most significant obstacle to a genuine transition. With control over security forces, intelligence services, and armed collectives, he possesses the coercive apparatus necessary to maintain regime control independent of formal governmental structures.

“Diosdado Cabello has a price imposed by the United States,” Vaquero explains. “He controls the coercive apparatus and all the internal loyalties. We’ve seen him lately. Every time he appears in Venezuelan media, he looks scared.”

The U.S. intelligence source identifies Cabello as the key figure whose removal or neutralization would be necessary for an authentic democratic opening. As long as Cabello maintains control of security forces, any political transition will be cosmetic rather than substantive.

His control extends beyond formal military and police to encompass armed civilian collectives that intimidate opposition supporters and maintain social control, operating with impunity while allowing the regime to claim official restraint.

Foreign Influence and Regional Implications

The regime’s historical relationships with Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, and China complicate transition planning. Despite keeping a low profile after Maduro’s removal, these actors continue to threaten American national security.

Bustos stresses that the presence of Hezbollah and Iranian-linked entities necessitates an extended transition period.

“The United States certainly knows about it,” he says. “I think that it’s not possible to get them out of the country really quickly.”

The re-extradition of Colombian-Venezuelan businessman Alex Saab in early February, designated by the United States as a key financial operator for Maduro, demonstrates some cooperation from regime elements with American law enforcement.

Saab’s arrest represents a significant test of cooperation with Washington. U.S. authorities accused Saab of moving approximately $350 million out of Venezuela through corrupt contracts, making him central to understanding how the regime financed itself under sanctions. His potential extradition signals Rodríguez is willing to sacrifice even Maduro’s closest financial operatives to maintain Washington’s support.

Nearly 9 million Venezuelans in the diaspora are reassessing their return prospects, yet few are making immediate plans to return. The combination of continued repression, economic uncertainty, and the presence of the same officials who forced their exile creates a wait-and-see dynamic.

Venezuelan passports cost approximately $700 on the black market when available, complicating both legal status abroad and potential return. Embassies and consulates are largely non-functional, creating a documentation crisis that traps Venezuelans in limbo regardless of whether they wish to return home or establish permanent residence elsewhere.

Strategic Implications

There is a fundamental question for Washington intelligence planners: Does the current arrangement represent a genuine transition, or is it simply the regime’s survival under American pressure? Continuing imprisonment of opposition figures and constitutional maneuvers to avoid elections suggest the former.

The official from the U.S. intelligence community notes the regime is maintaining strategic control while ensuring tactical compliance. In the absence of sustained military and economic pressure and clear benchmarks, the current government will likely continue to drag its feet on reforms for as long as possible.

The prisoner release pattern is illustrative. While hundreds have been freed, the process is opaque, reversible, and controlled entirely by Cabello’s interior ministry. As well as gag orders, those released are subject to re-arrest for hypothetical “political activity.”

Meanwhile, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino’s presentation of a golden baton to Rodríguez at a military parade in February symbolized the armed forces’ continued allegiance to Chavista structures rather than any new democratic order.

Venezuela’s situation tests the Trump administration’s approach to authoritarian transitions. Government policy toward Venezuela currently reflects a calculated preference for energy security over democratic reform. Washington views maintaining regional stability and securing oil access as more pressing strategic priorities than the unpredictable outcomes of rapid political reforms.

The Trump administration’s stated objectives for Venezuela emphasize democratic transition. Rubio told the Senate that Washington seeks “free and fair elections” where “all elements of society are represented,” noting pointedly that “you can have elections all day,” but without media access for opposition and the ability for opposition candidates to run freely, “those aren’t free and fair elections.”

Yet the administration’s actions reveal a calculated preference for energy security over rapid political reform. In the same testimony, Rubio prioritized Venezuela becoming “a friendly, stable, prosperous” partner and ending threats from “Hezbollah and Iran in our own hemisphere.”

Washington views maintaining regional stability and securing oil access as more pressing strategic priorities than the unpredictable outcomes of immediate democratic reforms. This pragmatism risks legitimizing a rebranded authoritarianism, retaining the repressive mechanisms of Maduro’s regime.

However, observers caution that this pragmatism may come at a cost in the long run. By prioritizing energy and migration management, the U.S. risks legitimizing a rebranded authoritarianism that retains the repressive mechanisms of Maduro’s regime.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela James Story assessed that Rodríguez will play for time, doing “just enough to make it look as if they are complying” while waiting for U.S. focus to shift.

Venezuela’s post-Maduro transition ultimately reveals limitations of decapitation strategies against entrenched authoritarian systems. While removing Maduro eliminated the regime’s symbolic figurehead, the intelligence and security apparatus is intact.

Elections cannot occur in the short term, at least not elections meeting minimal standards of freedom and fairness. There is corruption in the electoral infrastructure, arrests of opposition figures for political activities, and the ability and leadership of those who would suppress genuine democratic opening is intact.

While the current arrangement provides tactical benefits, it also leaves strategic vulnerabilities regarding oil access and preventing a migration surge. The same figures wanted on U.S. criminal charges coordinate government functions. The same security services that tortured political prisoners manage their conditional release. The same armed collectives that intimidated voters patrol neighborhoods.

“Where Diosdado Cabello has been, obviously repression has not disappeared,” Vaquero adds. “It materializes with collectives, with social pressure, with selective judicialization. And obviously, while Diosdado remains in power, there won’t be profound change but rather tactical changes.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
After New START: America Weighs a New Nuclear Strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/after-new-start-america-weighs-a-new-nuclear-strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/after-new-start-america-weighs-a-new-nuclear-strategy OPINION — “Militarily, the expiration [last Thursday] of New START [2010 Treaty with Russia] enables the United States to take parallel steps. We will complete our ongoing nuclear modernization programs that were initiated while New START entered into force. The United States also retains non-deployed nuclear capacity [some 1,900 stored nuclear warheads and bombs] that can be used to address the emerging security environment, if directed by the President. Such actions include expanding current forces, diversifying our capabilities, developing and fielding new theater-range nuclear forces, and adapting our extended deterrence posture as necessary.”

That was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno speaking in Geneva last Friday at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

One day earlier, in a post on Truth Social, President Trump offered this arms control idea: “Rather than extend ‘NEW START’ (A badly negotiated deal by the United States that, aside from everything else, is being grossly violated), we should have our Nuclear Experts work on a new, improved, and modernized Treaty that can last long into the future. Thank you for your attention to this matter! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP”

Having written about nuclear weapons and covered arms control efforts over the past 60+ years, I thought I would join with others to offer some ideas on where we are now and where we ought to be headed. But rather than doing it alone, I thought I would include some matters raised by former U.S. government nuclear weapons and arms control experts who testified last Tuesday before the Senate Arms Services Committee during a hearing on the post-New START treaty environment.

Let’s start with who is at Trump’s future negotiating table. Trump and other U.S. officials have said China along with Russia has to be there, although so far the Chinese have refused to discuss their nuclear programs. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in response to the Chinese participating idea, said he would then want the United Kingdom and France, two other nuclear powers, also included.

At last week’s Senate Armed Services hearing, Rose Gottemoeller, the lead U.S. negotiator for New START and now Lecturer at Stanford University and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute, gave what I believe would be the best ideas for the way forward.

She said, “I do not support trying to do a trilateral negotiation. I believe that these negotiations [with Russia and China] should be done in parallel. We have 50 plus years of experience limiting and reducing nuclear weapons with the Russians. We can continue that kind of process [to include tactical and hypersonic nuclear weapons] with them.”

Gottemoeller added, “And by the way, I agree that non-strategic nuclear weapons [should be included]. We did not constrain non-strategic nuclear weapons in the New START treaty. It was not designed for that purpose. So to fault it for not controlling those weapons is a bit bizarre, but nevertheless, I agreed with the Trump administration during the first term when they said we need an all-warhead limit in the next negotiation. I think that is definitely the priority we need to proceed on with the Russians.”

Gottemoeller also said, “It's been my recent experience working with them [the Chinese] in track two [non-U.S. Government] settings that they seem very interested in trying to figure out ways to begin a conversation with the United States about nuclear risks… developing better communications, links with them at the strategic level, hotline arrangements, these types of things. I think they are valuable to begin a conversation about the necessity of controlling nuclear weapons at the negotiating table and [for the Chinese] not being so un-transparent about what they're doing with their modernization. That has to be the first and foremost objective talking to them about what their intentions are.”

She added, “I've already spoken about the Chinese. I think they are willing to talk to us now, but it is about risk reduction and the beginning of more predictability and transparency about their nuclear objectives,” matters that up-to-now they have refused to discuss.

Picking up Gottemoeller’s idea for China at the Senate hearing was another witness, retired-Adm. Charles A. Richard, former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and incoming chief executive officer of the Institute for Defense Analysis.

Richard told the Senators, “I think that is an excellent starting point for a conversation with China. There are terms like confidence building and transparency that I would certainly endorse. But fundamentally it comes back to how do you responsibly operate weapon systems with this magnitude of destructive potential. That is to everyone's benefit including China. And I think that makes an excellent starting point for diplomacy.”

The Gottemoeller/Richard approach reminded me of discussions I had had back in the early 1970s with Paul Nitze when he was part of the Nixon team negotiating SALT I. Nitze told me the Soviet negotiators who were Foreign Office diplomats had little knowledge about nuclear weapons thereby leaving most of the negotiations to the Russian hard-line military. As a result, the Americans had to educate the Soviet diplomats about the destructive power of these weapons to get them more active in the negotiations.

Under Secretary DiNanno in his Friday Disarmament Conference Geneva speech said future discussions meant “taking into account all Russian nuclear weapons [strategic and tactical], both novel and existing strategic systems.” DiNanno specifically mentioned Russia’s “nuclear-powered Skyfall cruise missile and its doomsday Poseidon [nuclear strategic] torpedo. New START constrained neither of these systems and Russia has successfully tested both within the last few months.”

Faced with Russia and China, two potentially peer nuclear powers, both Gottemoeller and Richard agreed about the need for the U.S. to increase its nuclear forces.

Gottemoeller said, “I actually agree with the notion that we need to think carefully about the threat that is presented by two nuclear peers by China and by the Russian Federation going forward. And we need to make judicious choices juxtaposed against the other demands on our defense budget. And I mentioned the conventional force posture, but also the new technologies that are coming our way and must be judiciously incorporated into our new weapon systems as well as the whole arena of cyber threats and how we are going to contest the Russians and the China Chinese in that space.”

Richard was much more specific. He said, “I think that the United States needs to immediately start taking steps, steps that are currently precluded by the New START treaty…to include uploading [currently stored U.S. nuclear] warheads to our intercontinental ballistic missiles, removing covers off the four [launch] tubes on our Trident [strategic] submarines that are currently empty [of strategic nuclear sea-launched ballistic missiles], and several other posture steps that should be taken now, and not a year from now.”

At Geneva Friday, Under Secretary DiNanno raised questions about “Russian and Chinese nuclear testing in violation of their respective moratoria on yield-producing nuclear tests.” He said, “The annual U.S. compliance report has previously assessed that Russia has failed to maintain its testing moratorium by conducting supercritical nuclear weapons tests.”

DiNanno also disclosed, “Today, I can reveal that the U.S. Government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons…China has used decoupling – a method to decrease the effectiveness of seismic monitoring – to hide their activities from the world. China conducted one such yield producing nuclear test on June 22 of 2020.”

However, at the Senate hearing, Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), talked about the Nevada National Security Sites where the U.S. has carried out its nuclear testing saying, “Today the site's underground laboratory is undergoing major mining and construction to provide enhanced capabilities for sub-critical experiments [that are allowed because they don’t involve a nuclear yield] and it will host in the near future two of the most capable weapons radiographic systems in the world.”

Rosen added, “Together with other efforts, these machines will provide greater certainty and data about the performance of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Far better data, experts say, than the information that could be gleaned if the U.S. were to break the [1992] moratorium [on underground nuclear testing] and conduct an explosive nuclear test, as the President [Trump] and some in his orbit have advocated.”

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Rosen then got ret.-Adm. Richard to agree that while he was STRATCOM commander four years ago, U.S. sub-critical experiments and robust computer modeling provided data that led him to certify the military effectiveness of our stockpile without the need to resume explosive testing.

Gottemoeller added, “President Putin himself said that they would only resume testing on a

reciprocal basis with the United States. So, I would expect that to be the outcome. And I do expect that it would disadvantage us, you know, because we conducted more explosive nuclear tests than any nuclear weapon state. We have more data available to us with which we are able to do a massive amount of calculation and other activities in order to assure our stockpile is safe,

secure and effective.”

Gottemoeller and Richard both delivered their own views on the advantages of arms control.

“Stable deterrence is driven by predictability and nuclear negotiations done right deliver predictability,” Gottemoeller said. She added, “The effect comes about because restraints on our opponents reached through agreement bolster predictability which in turn supports our nuclear forces in their drive for reliable, stable and effective deterrence. Lack of predictability by contrast feeds uncertainty about the status of the nuclear forces among our adversaries, which means we may end up spending more than we have to on nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles.”

Richard said, “Our entire nuclear deterrence posture is designed to, by threat of escalation, convince your opponent -- have a perception in your opponent's mind -- that restraint, inaction is their least bad course of action. And that has been successful for over 60 years in deterring not only nuclear attack on the United States and our allies, but has made a great contribution to the deterrence of great power war.”

I want to close with a reminder that I often use when discussing nuclear weapons. That is to remind readers the original handful of nuclear weapons were built by U.S. scientists, including Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, as terror weapons, to kill as many people as possible to end a war – not to fight one.

And as ret.-Adm. Richard noted above, despite the much too large a number of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons that have since been built and exist today, none has been used in a war situation since two were used in 1945, and they did end a war.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Who's reading this? 500K+ dedicated national security professionals. Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because national security is everyone’s business.

]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s Foreign Fighter Pipeline: How Moscow Exploits Global Poverty to Feed Ukraine’s Frontlines https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-foreign-fighter-pipeline-how-moscow-exploits-global-poverty-to-feed-ukraines-frontlines https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-foreign-fighter-pipeline-how-moscow-exploits-global-poverty-to-feed-ukraines-frontlines

DEEP DIVE — Moscow has spent nearly four years burning through human resources in Ukraine, and now they’ve found a new way to fill the gaps of loss: exploiting the Global South. Russia is luring in thousands of men with promises of ‘work’ or ‘security,’ only to hand them a rifle. When these guys eventually head home, their own governments are going to be left dealing with the fallout of having thousands of war-hardened veterans they never asked for.

Ukraine’s military intelligence has identified more than 18,000 foreigners from 128 countries who have fought or are currently fighting for Russian forces. At least 3,388 of these fighters have been killed, according to Ukrainian officials. The death toll includes citizens from Cuba, Nepal, India, Kenya, and across Central Asia — men who often arrived in Russia seeking construction jobs or warehouse work, only to find themselves thrust into Ukraine’s grinding war of attrition with minimal training and false promises.

“Russia has no choice but to attempt to continue its foreign recruitment model given Russian military casualties and political realities of a significant mobilization in President Putin’s political bases in Moscow and Saint Petersburg,” Alex Plitsas, nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, tells The Cipher Brief.

For Washington, the pipeline carries implications beyond the immediate battlefield. Combat-hardened fighters from regions where the United States competes with Russia for influence, particularly across Africa and Latin America, will eventually return home potentially equipped with drone warfare expertise, small arms proficiency, and tactical knowledge gained in Europe’s most technologically advanced land war since 1945.

Former AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend warned in 2019 that Russia’s meddling in Africa comprises the “second biggest threat to US security interests” after terrorism.

The Architecture of Exploitation

Moscow has effectively turned its migration system into a trap, routinely building military recruitment offices right beside immigration facilities where beatings and freezing cells are used to coerce signatures. Detention or military service are often the only options for migrants in legal limbo.

Incentives are also used to exploit poverty. Nepali recruits receive 75,000 to 200,000 rubles monthly, or $750 to $2,000, dwarfing local earnings but representing only a fraction of Russian compensation. Cuban networks promise citizenship and generous payments.

The Human Trafficking Pipeline

Several governments now describe these recruitment tactics as outright human trafficking. In Kenya, an investigation revealed that citizens were promised stable jobs only to find themselves on drone assembly lines in active war zones. India has documented a similar pattern, with at least 35 of its nationals sent to the front lines against their will.

Nepal perhaps serves as the most stark example of this human cost. Officially, 14 Nepalis are confirmed dead, but estimates suggest as many as 2,000 may have enlisted in Russian forces. The subsequent outrage in Kathmandu led to Russia and Ukraine’s work permits being denied in early 2024. This proved effective, at least temporarily, as only one known Nepali citizen had signed a contract in the first ten months of 2025.

The situation, however, is harrowing on the ground. Foreign recruits are deployed to frontline assaults after just a week of training, according to Ukrainian prisoners of war. Despite promises of non-combat roles, some of these men signed Russian-language contracts they couldn’t even read.

“The foreign recruits have proven to be less effective as a result of the minimal amount of training and poor equipment that they receive upon joining,” says Plitsas. “Russia is throwing bodies at the problem, so to speak, in terms of trying to fortify the front lines and replacing fallen Russian troops.”

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The political calculus is deliberate. Plitsas highlights that there are far fewer political ramifications for losing foreign fighters than for Russian citizens.

“Many see these foreigners as having volunteered, so if they die in combat, it doesn’t have a significant reflection within Russian society,” he continues.

Central Asian migrants face particular vulnerability.

Moscow has increasingly turned its attention to the four million Central Asian migrants living within its borders to solve its mounting personnel shortages. Since the legal shifts in September 2022, the Kremlin has effectively tied residency and citizenship to military service.

Uzbeks and Tajiks working in Russia face a forced choice: enlist or lose their legal status. It is common for new arrivals’ residency applications to be stalled unless they sign a military contract, making them a prime target for Russian recruiters.

The Manpower Calculus

Moscow’s reliance on foreign recruits reflects an acute strain on its ability to sustain combat operations. Western estimates suggest Russia has suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties — killed and wounded — since February 2022. The UK Ministry of Defense reported Russia lost approximately 415,000 personnel in 2025 alone, the second-deadliest year of the conflict. December 2025 averaged 1,130 casualties daily, marking four consecutive months of rising losses.

The Kremlin maintains a monthly recruitment rate of roughly 30,000 to 40,000 contract soldiers, approximately matching battlefield attrition rates. This pace requires exploiting every available demographic, with provincial governments pressured to meet quotas.

Yet debate exists over the scale’s significance.

“The Russian army does not depend critically on foreign mercenaries,” Oleg Ignatov, Senior Analyst for Russia at the Crisis Group, tells The Cipher Brief. “The exact number of foreign mercenaries in the Russian army is unknown, but it is small compared to the total number of troops.”

Independent estimates hover around 1,500, while Russian officials claim 30,000 total — a fraction of Russia’s roughly 700,000 troops in Ukraine.

“Overall, there is no evidence that foreign mercenaries stand out among Russian soldiers and suffer significant losses compared to other soldiers,” Ignatov insists, noting North Korean forces initially suffered heavy losses because “they were not adapted to the realities of war in Ukraine.”

“All other foreigners serve in Russian units and suffer the same losses as all other servicemen in these units,” he says.

The pattern reflects a broader strategic reality.

According to Ignatov, “both Russia and Ukraine are experiencing a shortage of manpower for this type of war, which explains their efforts to recruit foreigners.”

“In addition, Russia needs to maintain its manpower advantage on the front lines, which it gained by the end of 2023-early 2024,” he points out.

Plitsas frames the imperative more starkly.

“Russia has no choice but to attempt to continue its foreign recruitment model given Russian military casualties and political realities of a significant mobilization in President Putin’s political bases in Moscow and Saint Petersburg,” he notes.

That political risk became clear more than three years ago. Moscow remains wary of the domestic fallout that followed the September 2022 mobilization. The Kremlin thus relies on foreign recruitment to maintain frontline numbers.

The Security Aftermath

The long-term security implications of Russia’s foreign recruitment extend far beyond the battlefield. Combat veterans returning to impoverished home countries bring specialized military skills from Europe’s largest land war since 1945. Historical precedent from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq demonstrates that even small percentages can destabilize regions.

“Foreign fighters returning home often suffer from the same types of combat-related stress disorders as troops but given that they were working for a foreign military, they do not get benefits when they return to their home country,” Plitsas cautions. “They also have sufficient training to be able to conduct attacks at home, even if they are simplistic, involving only small arms.”

The psychological and practical risks compound.

“There is always a risk in having a population of combat-experienced fighters who lack access to benefits and treatment for combat-related issues and their susceptibility to domestic causes that could be problematic for their home governments,” Plitsas underscores, pointing to Syria. “Many foreign fighters returned from Iraq with combat experience and helped to form the base of the armed factions that overthrew the Assad regime.”

Beyond physical combat skills, the technological knowledge poses distinct dangers.

“One concern is that foreign fighters will accelerate the proliferation of drone technologies and tactics used in Ukraine to nefarious groups around the world, some of which have already started adopting them,” John Hardie, deputy director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief.

Ukraine has become a laboratory for drone warfare. Veterans returning with hands-on experience could rapidly advance militant and criminal capabilities from Latin America to Southeast Asia.

Some nations are trying, or tried, to push back.

Kazakhstan opened a record 709 criminal cases in 2025 against citizens who joined Russian formations, with sentences ranging from 4.5 to 5 years. Kyrgyzstan’s attempt to set a legal precedent, however, fell flat when the Kremlin stepped in with pressure to drop charges.

In spite of the death toll of more than 120 Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz fighters by late 2024, accountability remains nonexistent. It is common for recruits to hide behind new Russian passports, which legally place them beyond the reach of their home governments. The real worry now isn’t just the dead, but the survivors; men who stay in Russia with specialized combat training and no clear path except drifting into the criminal margins.

For Cuba, which joined the Russian-led BRICS bloc, estimates suggest up to 20,000 Cubans recruited since 2022, with 200 to 300 killed. El País reported that 40 percent had previously served in the Cuban Armed Forces, suggesting state awareness. Due to the high percentage of active military personnel and ex-military personnel fighting under the Russian banner, Cuba’s government may be tacitly permitting the recruitment pipeline.

Unlike Nepal or India’s aggressive crackdowns, Havana’s muted response raises questions about quid pro quo arrangements with Moscow, particularly as Cuba faces a severe economic crisis and depends heavily on Russian support.

“Travel bans and efforts by governments to stop their citizens from volunteering will have some impact, though the overall numbers are still small in general terms,” Plitsas observes. “Augmenting Russian troops with foreign troops has also proven to be efficient, though poor training and equipment limit overall effectiveness.”

The offensive exploits global inequality while exporting costs to nations with limited pushback capacity. While Moscow claims foreign recruits demonstrate international support for the war, the reality is much bleaker: it’s a trafficking operation that targets the poor and desperate. The same thing happened in Syria and Iraq, demonstrating to the international community that a handful of combat-hardened veterans can destabilize an entire country.

When these men return to Africa or South Asia with expertise in drone strikes and urban warfare, they often don’t just go back to civilian life; they become a ready-made kit for insurgencies or criminal groups.

“Foreign governments have taken some steps to try to stem the flow of foreign fighters supporting Russia, but the populations involved have been relatively small, and it hasn’t been seen as a significant enough problem for home governments to take more significant action to date,” Plitsas explains.

He identifies structural challenges.

“Many of the fighters come from countries that are friendly to Russia, and so banning travel, or things of that nature, becomes more difficult given the status of the relationship between the countries,” Plitsas continues. “Also, when you’re traveling abroad and need a visa, the country you are traveling to has to grant it to you. Russia is incentivized to allow the flow to continue, as the burden is on Russia to grant the visa, not the home country. It makes policing the effort very difficult.”

As battlefield casualties mount and domestic constraints prevent mobilization, foreign recruitment provides a crucial release valve for Moscow. As a result, thousands of people have been channeled into war under false pretenses, leaving survivors scarred and equipped with military skills posing long-term security risks.

Yet Ignatov pushes back against the alarmist framing.

“War is a serious trauma, and all soldiers need psychological help. But I don’t think there are any risks of radicalization beyond this problem,” he contends. “There is no radical ideology in Russia that poses a threat of global spread.”

Whether ideological or not, the pattern is clear: Russia’s manpower crisis shows no sign of abating.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Evelyn Farkas on Alliances, Ukraine, and China’s Growing Challenge https://belimedia.com.ng/evelyn-farkas-on-alliances-ukraine-and-chinas-growing-challenge https://belimedia.com.ng/evelyn-farkas-on-alliances-ukraine-and-chinas-growing-challenge EXPERT INTERVIEW — Evelyn Farkas has spent decades working at the center of U.S. national security and transatlantic defense policy. A former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, she now serves as Executive Director of the McCain Institute, where she focuses on strengthening democratic alliances and confronting authoritarian threats.

Farkas spoke with The Cipher Brief’s Suzanne Kelly from the Munich Security Conference, where global leaders gathered amid continued war in Ukraine, uncertainty about U.S. commitments abroad, and growing concern over China’s long-term ambitions.

Below are highlights from the conversation, lightly edited for length and clarity.

Evelyn Farkas

Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia from 2012 to November 2015 and as Executive Director of the Graham-Talent WMD Commission. 

THE INTERVIEW

Kelly: With everything going on right now from the Middle East to Ukraine to technology and AI and how that’s going to impact global security overall, what is top of mind for you there in Munich?

Farkas: I think it’s the state of the transatlantic alliance and then beyond that really all U.S. alliances. For me, that’s the thing that matters most. And I think that’s what Europeans and others, even those outside of Europe, especially our Asian allies, are going to be listening for. Are we still united?

Kelly: Secretary Marco Rubio is expected to deliver a message here. What are you hoping to hear from him?

Farkas: I’m hoping he gives a speech more like the one Secretary Gates gave when he was exhorting Europeans to do more to carry the burden of our collective defense. Obviously now it’s urgent. Russia is conducting kinetic attacks on European territory every week. Europeans need to step up.

But beyond that, I hope he reasserts the U.S. commitment to the alliance because it’s in the U.S. interest. It undergirds our way of life, our democracy, our security, and our economic prosperity.

Kelly: Are you seeing any shift in how Europeans are thinking about the alliance?

Farkas: I think there’s a bifurcation. The working-level cooperation is still happening. We’re all working together, whether in government or out.

But at the same time, Europeans are much more distrustful of America. They’re not sure whether they can rely on us, and they don’t understand why our president has taken an approach that has at times been quite hostile rhetorically toward the allies.

Kelly: How are you thinking about the Russia-Ukraine war from Munich?

Farkas: Everything depends on us getting this right, meaning the world community. The Ukrainians are fighting and will continue to fight. They have won this war strategically—it’s just a question of when and at what cost.

Russia cannot conquer and rule Ukraine. They’re weak economically and politically. Their military machine is being squeezed and needs to be squeezed more.

We need increased sanctions on Russia, but we also need to sanction China more because China is allowing Russia to continue the war, not just by buying oil but by providing technological dual-use capabilities.

Kelly: How is Europe thinking about China?

Farkas: I’m a little bit concerned. The Japanese have taken a very strong approach. They’re maintaining deterrence and not pretending they share values with China.

But in Europe, we’re seeing leaders travel to Beijing and hedge. Europeans need to be careful because China is not their friend. China will eat their lunch in a minute, and China is not a democracy. You don’t want to be aligned with that kind of government.

Kelly: Looking ahead, what are the most critical issues to get right now?

Farkas: The most important thing is helping Ukraine bring the message home to the Russian elite and the Russian people that they cannot win militarily and that Ukraine will maintain its sovereignty.

Deterring China is equally important. China is pushing the envelope, and we need to maintain our strength against both adversaries.

Kelly: Final thoughts?

Farkas: We must help Ukraine win and maintain sovereignty, and we must deter China. Those are the defining strategic challenges right now.

Read more expert insights into national security in The Cipher Brief. And find out more about The Cipher Brief HONORS Awards happening March 13 in Washington D.C.

]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Alliances, Ukraine, and China’s Growing Challenge https://belimedia.com.ng/alliances-ukraine-and-chinas-growing-challenge https://belimedia.com.ng/alliances-ukraine-and-chinas-growing-challenge EXPERT Q&A — Evelyn Farkas has spent decades working at the center of U.S. national security and transatlantic defense policy. A former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, she now serves as Executive Director of the McCain Institute, where she focuses on strengthening democratic alliances and confronting authoritarian threats.

Farkas spoke with The Cipher Brief’s Suzanne Kelly from the Munich Security Conference, where global leaders gathered amid continued war in Ukraine, uncertainty about U.S. commitments abroad, and growing concern over China’s long-term ambitions.

Below are highlights from the conversation, lightly edited for length and clarity.

Evelyn Farkas

Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia from 2012 to November 2015 and as Executive Director of the Graham-Talent WMD Commission. 

THE INTERVIEW

Kelly: With everything going on right now from the Middle East to Ukraine to technology and AI and how that’s going to impact global security overall, what is top of mind for you there in Munich?

Farkas: I think it’s the state of the transatlantic alliance and then beyond that really all U.S. alliances. For me, that’s the thing that matters most. And I think that’s what Europeans and others, even those outside of Europe, especially our Asian allies, are going to be listening for. Are we still united?

Kelly: Secretary Marco Rubio is expected to deliver a message here. What are you hoping to hear from him?

Farkas: I’m hoping he gives a speech more like the one Secretary Gates gave when he was exhorting Europeans to do more to carry the burden of our collective defense. Obviously now it’s urgent. Russia is conducting kinetic attacks on European territory every week. Europeans need to step up.

But beyond that, I hope he reasserts the U.S. commitment to the alliance because it’s in the U.S. interest. It undergirds our way of life, our democracy, our security, and our economic prosperity.

Kelly: Are you seeing any shift in how Europeans are thinking about the alliance?

Farkas: I think there’s a bifurcation. The working-level cooperation is still happening. We’re all working together, whether in government or out.

But at the same time, Europeans are much more distrustful of America. They’re not sure whether they can rely on us, and they don’t understand why our president has taken an approach that has at times been quite hostile rhetorically toward the allies.

Kelly: How are you thinking about the Russia-Ukraine war from Munich?

Farkas: Everything depends on us getting this right, meaning the world community. The Ukrainians are fighting and will continue to fight. They have won this war strategically—it’s just a question of when and at what cost.

Russia cannot conquer and rule Ukraine. They’re weak economically and politically. Their military machine is being squeezed and needs to be squeezed more.

We need increased sanctions on Russia, but we also need to sanction China more because China is allowing Russia to continue the war, not just by buying oil but by providing technological dual-use capabilities.

Kelly: How is Europe thinking about China?

Farkas: I’m a little bit concerned. The Japanese have taken a very strong approach. They’re maintaining deterrence and not pretending they share values with China.

But in Europe, we’re seeing leaders travel to Beijing and hedge. Europeans need to be careful because China is not their friend. China will eat their lunch in a minute, and China is not a democracy. You don’t want to be aligned with that kind of government.

Kelly: Looking ahead, what are the most critical issues to get right now?

Farkas: The most important thing is helping Ukraine bring the message home to the Russian elite and the Russian people that they cannot win militarily and that Ukraine will maintain its sovereignty.

Deterring China is equally important. China is pushing the envelope, and we need to maintain our strength against both adversaries.

Kelly: Final thoughts?

Farkas: We must help Ukraine win and maintain sovereignty, and we must deter China. Those are the defining strategic challenges right now.

Read more expert insights into national security in The Cipher Brief. And find out more about The Cipher Brief HONORS Awards happening March 13 in Washington D.C.

]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Autonomy on the Battlefield https://belimedia.com.ng/autonomy-on-the-battlefield https://belimedia.com.ng/autonomy-on-the-battlefield THE IRON TRIANGLE — Issue XX: The Buzz Around Autonomy

Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, the Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

This issue explores the monumental push toward autonomy in defense technology and the fundamental shift required in our understanding of command.

The Backdrop: Redefining Control

In its purest sense, autonomy is the condition of self-government. When we overlay that concept onto military machines and armed drones, the immediate fear is that we are outsourcing the moral weight of life and death to an algorithm. I’ve seen the Terminator series, so I know what you’re thinking. No, you don’t need to learn how to make a pipe bomb. It’s not as bad as you think… maybe.

However, the reality of military command is more nuanced. To understand autonomy in defense technology, I want to first be clear about how the military defines command.

Command is composed of three elements: authority, responsibility, and decision-making. Authority is the delegated power to make decisions and use resources. Responsibility is the legal and ethical obligation for everything a unit does or fails to do. And decision-making is the process of translating high-level intent into actionable orders.

Autonomy does not replace the commander; it enables the commander to aggregate and disaggregate aspects of Command and Control (C2). Specifically, autonomy allows a commander to delegate control to a machine while maintaining command. However simple this sounds, it is a monumental mindset shift for many commanders. To be successful, this will require reshaping some commanders’ understanding of technology.

To use autonomous systems appropriately, the commander assigns a framework of authority. This authority might be a benign task, such as "Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in order to identify the enemy within [defined area]."

On the opposite end of the spectrum, such as in high-intensity, peer-conflict scenarios where there is no civilian presence, "Identify and destroy targets in [defined area]." The authorities a commander assigns to autonomous systems will depend heavily on their risk calculations and dozens of other factors.

The Rewards: Why Accept the Risk?

Remember that all responsibility for the mission remains with the commander. Given the potential risks outlined above, why would a commander accept responsibility for an autonomous system’s performance? Because autonomous systems will be required not only for survival, but to fight and win on a modern, transparent battlefield.

Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO). Autonomy denies the adversary the ability to reset during what would otherwise be natural lulls in combat operations. It enables a constant and consistent pressure campaign that human operators, limited by fatigue, cognitive bandwidth, and resources, cannot sustain.

Force Protection and Attrition. We must shift our thinking toward lifecycle protection. Autonomy allows us to project power and achieve effects without putting a human in the loop–where they are most vulnerable.

Cognitive Decoupling. By reducing the pilot-to-platform ratio from 1:1 to 1:Many, autonomy frees the commander’s mind to focus on the strategic rather than the tactical, effectively reducing cognitive load.

The Implications: The Path Forward

To move autonomy to battlefield reality, we must address three critical pillars:

Low-Cost Near-Exquisite Systems. Commanders cannot get comfortable with autonomy if they are afraid to lose their assets. We must continue to move away from high-cost platforms toward mass-producible, near-exquisite systems that allow for the thousands of training iterations required to build trust.

Interoperability. A quadcopter built in a Florida garage must immediately work cohesively with a bespoke system from a big defense prime. If autonomous systems cannot operate across-domains, if they aren’t vendor-agnostic, and if they can’t operate as one element of a swarm ecosystem, they aren’t force multipliers; they are a logistics burden.

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End Vendor Lock-In. Continuous innovation is the only defense against adversarial countermeasures, and rigid multi-year contracts stifle technology iteration. We need a development operations model for hardware, where field feedback is transferred directly to engineers, rapid improvements are made, and systems are re-fielded. Vendors need to be held accountable–by losing profitable contracts–when they fail against this standard.

Summary for the Triangle:

For the Procurement Officer. Stop buying platforms and start buying ecosystems that support delegated authority, scalability, and innovation. Establish criteria for continuously evaluating technology and hold companies accountable. I commend the Department of Defense for acknowledging this need with more flexible contract mechanisms, but more can be done. There are many small, innovative technologies that might make a substantive difference if they are given an opportunity.

For the Investor. Look for companies whose technology is not dependent on specific hardware, and for those who are open to rapidly partnering with other OEMs to overcome technical limitations. There are an unprecedented number of small defense technology firms in today’s ecosystem and there will be a consolidation within two-to-five years. If a company insists that every capability is vertically integrated, there is a strong likelihood that they will be outpaced by an up-and-comer or a conglomeration who is more flexible.

For the Policy Wonk. The debate isn't about whether machines will make decisions, but how we legally and ethically define the authority we give them. Setting conditions that promote and reward innovation will de-risk this transition now. We also need to think about the resources we provide the services for training, and how rules of engagement stack against those of our adversaries. This will all lead to better outcomes when it counts.

Conclusion

The coming years will be a period of creative destruction for the defense industry. The era of proprietary technology is ending, replaced by an ecosystem where the only constant is change. We must reward the agile and hold the stagnant accountable. Whether it’s a garage-born startup or a legacy prime, the winners will be those who embrace the DevOps of hardware and the radical transparency of interoperable swarms. Autonomy is the catalyst; how we choose to fund, buy, and govern it will determine who leads the global order for the next century.

Joey Gagnard is a Cipher Brief columnist who regularly shares his perspective on national security and technology via his Iron Triangle column.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Tracing the Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare https://belimedia.com.ng/tracing-the-evolution-of-russian-hybrid-warfare https://belimedia.com.ng/tracing-the-evolution-of-russian-hybrid-warfare

KREMLIN FILES/ANALYSIS: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 did not emerge from a strategic vacuum. It was the culmination of over a decade of experimentation in hybrid warfare, and of increasingly rigid assumptions inside Russia’s intelligence services.

From Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, through Syria and a series of covert and deniable operations across Europe and the Middle East, Moscow refined a model of conflict built on scripted roles for its security services and their proxies. Yet the same intelligence culture that enabled early gains with hybrid war in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere, also fostered deeply flawed prognostications about the utility of force and Russia’s ability to project power.

This is the second in a two-part series on Russian gray zone, or hybrid warfare. In the first article, Wiswesser analyzes the evolution of hybrid warfare and its practice in the decades leading up to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014.

Russia’s errors ultimately propelled it into a catastrophic all-out war in Ukraine in 2022. This article, which continues a study of Russia’s path to and through the Gray Zone, argues that tracing the evolution of Russian hybrid warfare through the lens of its intelligence services and their miscalculation is not merely an exercise in post-mortem analysis but a critical step toward more effectively deterring future Russian aggression.

With the intervention in Ukraine in 2014, Russia’s so-called “non-contact” or gray warfare doctrine had its first major operational test for Russia, marking it’s most significant use of hybrid warfare. From their perspective, the Russian intelligence services (RIS) and its military succeeded in stunting the actions of Europe and the U.S. when Russia took large portions of the Donbas and Crimea utilizing “little green men." These were Russian GRU (military intelligence elite units), other Russian military units, and intelligence proxies acting in the interests of the state.

For Russian strategists, non-contact war was effective, and these conflicts laid the groundwork for the planning of Putin’s siloviki and “organs” of power—the FSB, GRU, and Russian Armed Forces - for a much larger invasion of Ukraine just 8 years later. Studying the run-up to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, and its hybrid war plan, can help better prepare NATO for the subsequent potential Russian aggression against the Baltics or elsewhere.

2014-2015: Donbas, Crimea, and Syria

In the second decade of this century, as Russia’s debates over non-contact warfare continued within its military and intelligence agencies, planning started to counter what Russia viewed as undue influence from the West in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and most notably, Ukraine. It was the latter that Russia and Putin always considered unfinished business. Russian planners—initially a small group of Kremlin Siloviki and their staff from various ministries—were aware that their military was not prepared for a full-scale war with NATO and the West. Nevertheless, Moscow believed they controlled the narrative and that gaps in reforms of their military and air force could be offset by the RIS conducting sabotage, subversion, cyber warfare, and recruiting key defectors within the Ukrainian government.

The Ukraine interventions and insurgencies of 2014 carried out by Russia in the Donbas and Crimea were classic non-contact operations using reflexive control and malicious influence through the media. Russia’s narrative was circulated among sympathetic European politicians and elsewhere. The story of little green men and whether they “were or weren’t Russian troops” was propagated through active measures. This and other false stories about supposed Ukrainian fascism and atrocities gained significant traction, especially within Central Asian countries and among Russia’s allies. The narrative effectively prevented any unified response by the West and Europe until the occupation of Crimea and large parts of the Donbas became a fait accompli. For Russia, it was a major success.

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At the same time, with a major deployment to Syria to support and back President Assad, the Russian Aerospace Forces (renamed the VKS in 2015) gained valuable experience for its combat squadrons. In Syria, they practiced precision strikes, a key part of non-contact warfare, and demonstrated greater precision (than in Georgia) in the use of air power during strikes. Additionally, in Syria, RIS units like GRU Spetsnaz conducted operations embedded with various factions and partners on the ground.

This deployment gained momentum on the heels of the 2014 Ukrainian operations. It was a classic blend of gray zone operations between intelligence and military units. Syria was also seen as a chance for Russia to bleed green units in preparation for larger wars to come.

In Africa during this same period, Putin’s former cook, then an oligarch, Yevgenniy Prigozhin, used the Wagner Group, a private army, to prop up regimes friendly to Russia. Wagner was one of dozens of private military companies, also known as non-state actors, that Russia was using and continues to use to achieve strategic aims. They acted as mercenaries to repress citizens and dissent, intervening as henchmen for hire across Africa.

Still, there was one overarching strategic goal that Putin and all his services focused on—Ukraine. For Russia and its intelligence services in particular, Ukraine remained unfinished business.

Ukraine War Plans: Prepping the Battlefield

As Russia prepared in the years leading up to the full-scale invasion in 2022, it relied on its version of hybrid warfare, its doctrine of non-contact warfare, and all that it involved: active measures, cyber operations, and efforts to influence the media through reflexive control. In planning, they aimed to combine these measures with a limited air campaign and a significant ground invasion that appeared sufficient on paper but lacked professional soldiers, trained units, and the crucial 3-to-1 (or more) force ratio needed to succeed against Ukraine’s professional military.

Russia’s thinking was enabled by and reinforced from decades of theory on non-contact war, their successes in both Georgia and Ukraine in 2014, and their belief they could pull off an occupation of and complete overthrow of the democratic government of Ukraine. Faulty prognostications by the RIS made Putin sure it would all work.

In the lead-up to the Ukraine invasion in 2022, all three of Russia's main intelligence agencies—the FSB, SVR, and GRU—played prominent roles in Putin's planning and execution of the invasion. These agencies always viewed Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, which they call the “near abroad,” as extensions of Russia. The RIS never accepted its independence and couldn't see Ukraine, in particular, as a separate nation.

The FSB, despite primarily being an internal agency, played an outsized role in planning the "special military operation"—the term they later used to describe the full invasion of Ukraine. The FSB Fifth Service was responsible for “operational information” and was prominent in both 2014 and the invasion eight years later. As the main source of intelligence analysis for President Putin, the FSB Fifth Service provided him with a steady flow of inaccurate reports, which he readily accepted. Many of those same FSB officers were infamously reported in the Russian blogosphere as having “picked out their apartments" in Kyiv before the invasion.

The FSB believed Russia could win in Ukraine. To weaken the battlefield, the FSB used influence operations across Russian-language and international media, working alongside their SVR/GRU colleagues. They were confident it could be effective because, to some extent, they succeeded in 2014 in muddying the waters about the nature of that conflict and how the international community should respond (or unfortunately, not). The West and NATO appeared hesitant to act and were unprepared. For the RIS, they thought it was a "win" they could replicate.

The FSB planned a continuation of these tactics in 2022, aiming to confuse the international focus long enough to ensure a quick victory and regime change in Ukraine. U.S. intelligence sharing and increased NATO awareness thwarted this, at least in part. The Foreign Service (the SVR) supplemented these active measures with its own networks of cooperative journalists, corrupt parties or politicians abroad, and what the SVR calls "useful idiots," whom it could employ as witting or unwitting accomplices to help spread the Russian narrative.

Some experts in the West bought into this narrative, commenting across many media outlets on Russia’s “overwhelming force ratios” along the main axes of advance. Western generals and experts echoed Moscow’s position, repeatedly stating that “unfortunately, Ukraine can’t win.” Early in the war, Russian messaging worked in its favor once again.

Russia’s Military/Intelligence Failures in Ukraine

After practicing Russian military maneuvers in “Zapad” (West in Russian) exercises for several years, in early 2022, Zapad 2022 became the cover for the gathering of forces for the full-scale invasion. But this time, the West—Europe and the U.S.-- were better prepared. U.S. intelligence was shared directly with NATO and Ukraine. Ukraine was readied, and Russia was put on notice that it would not succeed in another gray war followed by an invasion.

This time, and unlike many negative predictions even in the West, the Ukrainians would fight, and Russia would bleed. When the Russians were forced to fight, they fought terribly, incompetently, and it has cost them over a million casualties as the war neared its fourth year.

There are important lessons to learn from Russia’s numerous failures in its operations in Ukraine. This article mainly focuses on intelligence services and hybrid warfare. For the Russian army, however, the widespread use of conscripts and their poor integration into battalion tactical groups with “kontraktniki” (contract soldiers) meant the BTGs were largely effective only on paper. Huge convoys showcasing significant “force ratios” were intended to intimidate Ukraine. Still, their equipment was not ready for combat deployment (for example, the many stories of underinflated tires and trucks running out of gas). The Russian Aerospace Forces lacked sufficient combat-trained pilots with the necessary experience in air campaigns to sustain a prolonged engagement.

For the intelligence services, Ukraine would starkly reveal their shortcomings. Russian Military Intelligence, the GRU planned for substantial roles in what they thought would be a quick victory in 2022. GRU Spetsnaz, or special operations units, were used in the 2022 invasion to a fault, thrown into frontal assaults for which these (claimed) elite elements were not designed. They became cannon fodder literally when the Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) could not carry out their planned roles.

Along with other infamous units, the GRU’s Unit 29155 distinguished itself with assassinations and attempted ones, not only in Ukraine but across Europe. They were also behind the 2018 attack on defector Sergey Skripal. But most of their early operations, including attempts allegedly to carry out a fast coup to overthrow President Zelensky, failed. RIS hit squads and teams from the GRU and FSB were sent in to stage what they planned as a coup, following an airborne assault--which also failed--at Hostomel airport outside Kyiv.

Other such operations in the Donbas were thwarted by Ukrainian intelligence. There were special operations units from the FSB deployed throughout Ukraine, including their teams "Alpha" and "Vympel." These FSB units and others were particularly active in the occupied East. Their crimes, including assassinations of local Ukrainian leaders, atrocities against civilians, and torture, are well documented and continue to the present.

The FSB, SVR, and GRU all promised Putin and his planners that they could conduct successful cyber operations to stun and disrupt the Ukrainian response in early 2022. These attacks were blunted primarily by the Ukrainians' own cyber defense capabilities and by early intelligence warnings from the West about the invasion. One example of attempted but failed Russian gray-zone ops is the FSB's Center 16, which is broadly responsible for signals intelligence and intercept operations.

Center 16 hires criminal hackers for the state, an example again of non-state actors (NSAs). The FSB and other RIS units believed they could bring Ukraine to its knees with heavy cyber attacks on the government, and that these NSAs could play a significant role, including Russian organized crime groups. The planned cyber and criminal-assisted coup against Ukraine, like the broader invasion, failed. The RIS's predictions of success were again overly optimistic.

Conclusions: New Gray Zone War Without End

Since 2022, the Ukrainians have fought heroically and successfully defended their nation. Western support has played a key role, and that support should continue. But studying why Russia thought it could win and their doctrine and experience on the same, is key for our country and our allies preparing for the next war.

Understanding the basis for the 2022 invasion, which includes Russia’s doctrine and history, is crucial. Russian war plans relied on the same concepts developed by figures like Sliphchenko, Gareev, and Chief of Staff Valeriy Gerasimov regarding non-contact warfare (as detailed in the first article of this series): a permanent front engaged in information warfare, sabotage, and other actions just below the threshold of actual war.

In the West, we should study our Russian adversaries in their own language, their military writings, culture, and traditions, so we can better counter them. Herein lie the lessons of Russian non-contact warfare, their understanding of hybrid tactics, and why they believed they could win—and still do. These lessons are critically important to prevent the next aggression by Russia. A recent study by the Center for European Analysis highlights that Russia’s strategy involves constant escalation against Europe and the U.S.

A Russian victory—or even a frozen conflict on Moscow’s terms—would validate a decade-long experiment in revisionism by stealth and force. It would signal to allies and adversaries alike that escalation works, that borders are negotiable, and that democratic societies lack the endurance to defend the order they claim to lead. Helping Ukraine prevail is therefore not an act of charity or sentiment; it is a strategic necessity.

For the United States and its allies, the lesson is clear. Supporting Ukraine through to a just and durable outcome is inseparable from preparing for the next evolution of the Russian gray zone. That means investing in deterrence across domains, hardening democratic institutions against subversion, confronting malign influence early rather than episodically, and abandoning the illusion that stability can be purchased through restraint. A nation founded on the belief that freedom is an inalienable right cannot afford strategic ambiguity about whether it will defend those who fight for the same principle.

The gray zone is already contested terrain. The question is not whether conflict will continue, but whether the West is prepared to meet it with clarity, resolve, and the will to win.

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.
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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Killing Mencho https://belimedia.com.ng/killing-mencho https://belimedia.com.ng/killing-mencho

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING — Exactly who tracked El Mencho, the world’s most wanted and feared drug lord, to a heavily armed safe house in a remote Sierra Madre town is a secret, for now. The Mexican government has revealed only that its air force and special forces commandos descended on a safe house in the quaint Sierra Madre town of Tapalpa early yesterday, encountered gunfire and returned it, killing four cartel gunmen.

El Mencho, whose real name is Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, is the 59-year-old founder and leader of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Cervantes was wounded in the exchange of gunfire, loaded onto a Mexican military aircraft and flown to Mexico City. According to officials, he didn’t survive the flight.

Officials announced that they seized “various weapons and armored vehicles… including rocket launchers capable of shooting down aircraft and destroying armored vehicles” as a result of the raid. Such heavy military-grade weapons don’t just materialize without somebody knowing about them. A lot of people, in fact. Who sold them to Mencho’s paramilitary organization? Where did they originate? Are there others? Officials won’t have the opportunity to interrogate Cervantes about the influential people who were on his payroll as he grew his ultra-violent cartel into a global powerhouse.

But according to DEA intelligence, his cartel is worth billions and has a presence in all 50 American states and 40 countries. Some American agents believe the Mexican government never wanted to take him alive. In fact, for most of his career, as he was consolidating his power, Mexican leaders have told the U.S. that their forces were unable to find and arrest him. What changed? Experts believe at least two things.

First, Mexican leaders finally got fed up with El Mencho’s blood-soaked reign. “The CJNG was public enemy number one” for President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration, Michael Chavarria, formerly the Drug Enforcement Administration’s senior leader in Guadalajara, the Mexican cartels’ original base of operations, told The Cipher Brief. “It’s the one cartel out of favor with President Claudia Sheinbaum, especially as it was responsible for the attempt on the life of Security Secretary Omar Garcia Harfuch, just prior to Sheinbaum’s election.”

Garcia Harfuch, an aggressive, outspoken crime-fighter considered to be Mexico’s second most powerful official, survived a cartel assassination attempt in 2020, when he was Mexico City’s police chief. He became the CJNG’s implacable nemesis.

Second, under pressure from President Donald Trump and the U.S. Congress, Sheinbaum and other top officials started collaborating openly with the U.S. military and intelligence community, an unthinkable event just a few years ago. But that changed with the election of Donald Trump.

The U.S. Navy’s Seal Team 2 arrived in Mexico around Feb. 16, ostensibly for a training exercise with Mexican military counterparts aimed at interdicting Chinese shipments of chemical precursors used to make the deadly opioid fentanyl, which has killed hundreds of thousands of Americans. The timing is noteworthy. According to U.S. officials, Navy SEALs trained elite Mexican navy special forces units that captured, among others, infamous drug kingpins Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman in 2016 and Rafael Caro Quintero in 2022.

For those operations and many others, DEA agents posted to Mexico and along the border provided intelligence gleaned from scores of paid informants recruited over decades. Many operations failed, apparently because they were compromised, but enough succeeded to convince President Trump, who declared drug trafficking and illegal migration top national security threats, to order the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies to step up their intelligence collections aimed at the Mexican underworld. The CIA reportedly added more drone surveillance flights over the border region as a result.

But sharing intelligence with the Mexican government has always been a fraught enterprise. Some plans were slow walked. For others, operational security was compromised by corruption at every level of the Mexican government. Sheinbaum’s predecessor, leftist Andrés Manuel López Obrador, openly disdained U.S. anti-drug efforts and famously said he would treat the crime cartels with “hugs, not bullets.”

“The CJNG established a nation-wide network of corrupt alliances among federal, state, and local police and regional military – sufficient to afford them a degree of protection,” Chavarria told us. The DEA had recruited plenty of human sources inside Mexico over the decades, but agents complained. The problem was getting the Mexican government to use that intelligence to take action against key cartel lieutenants.

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In December 2024, as the CJNG’s power inside Mexico and around the world expanded precipitously, the Biden administration raised the reward for El Mencho from $10 million to $15 million.

As soon as he took office for the second time, Trump designated the CJNG and other Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. Trump himself repeatedly pressed Sheinbaum to allow the U.S. military to mount anti-cartel operations deep in Mexican territory. She always refused. Trump and her team were warned that such incursions would inflame Mexican politicians and likely backfire, damaging Sheinbaum’s ability to work with the U.S.

The compromise seems to have been that all boots visible on the ground and all triggers pulled would be strictly Mexican, while, behind the scenes, U.S. law enforcement, military and intelligence community personnel would provide “intelligence support,” as White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt posted yesterday on X.

Even though El Mencho has been declared dead, U.S. security experts say the war on the cartels is not even close to being over.

“He died like a dog,” Rep. Dan Crenshaw, R-Tex., a Navy SEAL veteran who has led Congressional anti-cartel initiatives, posted on X yesterday. “Cause for celebration – absolutely - but not a victory lap. Now, more than ever, it is critical to keep the pressure on the Mexican cartels.”

DEA veterans say that El Mencho will be quickly replaced by one of his key lieutenants, probably his stepson, Juan Carlos Valencia Gonzalez, 41, known as El R-3, El JP, Tricky Tres or simply 03. He inherits narco DNA, not just from Mencho, a farm boy-turned-enforcer but, even more importantly from the Valencia clan, who are narco royalty.

“El Mencho married into the Valencia family, taking Rosalinda Gonzalez Valencia as his wife,” says Chavarria, an expert on the Valencias and author of the book Junior, about a DEA penetration of the cartels. “This is a common practice among drug trafficking families – designed to solidify loyalty and to protect against betrayal. Narco intermarriages were and are regularly encountered in Mexico’s underworld.”

“The operation against Mencho is more about cracking the idea that powerful cartel leaders operate with impunity than bringing about the downfall of a cartel,” says Carlos Olivo, formerly DEA’s agent in charge in Guadalajara and assistant agent in charge in the key border city of El Paso. “Mencho had near absolute control in that area of Jalisco and for that to be penetrated and successful shows us that a willing partner can indeed turn the tide in Mexico,” he told The Cipher Brief.

Olivo, an ex-Marine who led a DEA team hunting Mencho until recently and is now writing a book about the CJNG, warns that taking down the kingpin and his successors is “just one pillar. Corrupt politicians and banking and business sectors must be next.”

With the stakes in the billions and powerful, respected families involved in the country’s politics, banking and business sectors, can cleaning up Mexico’s institutions will take more than firepower and good intelligence.

“For us Americans, reality won’t change,” says Chavarria. “Same drugs coming across, because of our demand. Same violence in Mexico. Wash, rinse, repeat. It is a small skirmish victory in a prolonged drug war. There will be more Menchos. On a positive note, however, no kingpin can last forever. They can run but they cannot escape their eventuality. Kingpins fall.”

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Cognitive Battlefield is Now Decisive Terrain https://belimedia.com.ng/the-cognitive-battlefield-is-now-decisive-terrain https://belimedia.com.ng/the-cognitive-battlefield-is-now-decisive-terrain OPINION -- Senior policymakers, military leaders, technologists and narrative strategists had one thing on their minds as they gathered in a Reston conference room last week - how decision advantage, psychological leverage, and narrative dominance are increasingly capable of determining strategic outcomes. Cognitive warfare - once treated as an adjunct to cyber or information operations - is becoming a primary instrument of power and the implications are profound.

Clausewitz wrote that the center of gravity in war is the source of an adversary’s strength. In today’s environment, that center of gravity is increasingly ideological and psychological. Unity and will - both domestic and allied - are strategic assets. Information is not merely a supporting function. It’s a weapon.

The contest unfolding in the gray zone is fundamentally about narrative. Not propaganda in the blunt Cold War sense, but sustained, cumulative influence campaigns that shape how populations interpret reality. These efforts operate across media, social platforms, text messaging networks, gaming environments, and increasingly, AI-driven platforms.

Subtle Corrosion Beats Spectacular Attack

One of the most important insights shared last week centered on the cycle of desensitization. Consider the steady drumbeat of cyber intrusions attributed to China or Russia. Each incident sparks temporary outrage, but repetition normalizes the activity. Over time, the public and sometimes policymakers, stop reacting. Strategic corrosion sets in.

This is cognitive attrition. It does not rely on a single catastrophic blow. Instead, it leverages small, atmospheric messages that accumulate. A fabricated report of a measles outbreak in Ukraine, spread via text messages. Repeated claims that Western institutions are corrupt or incompetent. False narratives injected into local conversations. Individually trivial. Collectively transformative.

The cumulative effect resembles what some participants described as a “cognitive supply chain”- disinformation introduced through multiple channels, actors, and devices over time, reinforcing itself until it feels like truth. In this environment, the question is not simply whether a narrative is false. It is whether the repetition of that narrative alters perception faster than truth can catch up.

If traditional principles of war emphasize mass and maneuver, today’s information battlefield demands speed, scale, and persistence. Speed, because narratives form quickly and harden fast. Scale, because digital transport layers allow messages to reach millions instantly. Persistence, because influence is cumulative. It rewards actors willing to repeat, reinforce, and adapt.

Military leaders are increasingly recognizing that communications is not a peripheral function, it is a commander’s business. Every action or inaction is an information operation. Tone, repetition, and secondary amplification matter as much as initial statements. And dominating that narrative requires dominating the transport layers that carry it. That includes terrestrial networks, undersea cables, satellite infrastructure, and increasingly, space-based assets. Space is not peripheral to information warfare; it is foundational.

Another critical component to consider is that of attribution. In the cyber domain, attackers benefit from ambiguity. If malicious actors can hide behind plausible deniability or if governments can shield them, deterrence collapses. Credible attribution raises costs. It narrows safe havens. It signals resolve.

Some countries are beginning to codify this posture. Latvia, for example, has criminalized election-related fake news and deepfakes, recognizing that information manipulation is not abstract speech but a direct threat to democratic integrity. The United States faces a harder question: are our legal and institutional structures optimized for cognitive deterrence? Or are they still calibrated for a previous era of warfare?

The Rise of Agentic Systems

If the cognitive domain is decisive, technology will be central.

The next frontier is not simply artificial intelligence, but agentic architecture - systems capable of augmenting commander decision-making in real time. The goal is not automation for its own sake. It is better recommendations. Faster synthesis. Clearer visibility.

Architecture matters and open, modular systems are essential. Black boxes are strategically dangerous. Defense institutions need plug-and-play capabilities that allow integration of new tools as threats evolve.

Reliability, not feature proliferation, should guide procurement – think more Amazon.com rather than bespoke. Outcome-based acquisition must replace programmatic inertia. A culture of velocity must supplant a culture of compliance.

In Afghanistan, smaller, foreign terrorist organizations were easier to degrade than deeply embedded, locally rooted movements like the Taliban. Structure mattered. Networks with widespread local integration were far more resilient. The same principle applies to narrative ecosystems. Loosely connected but culturally embedded influence networks are harder to disrupt than centralized propaganda hubs.

If adversaries build durable cognitive infrastructure across diaspora communities, digital platforms, and local influencers, countering them requires more than takedowns. It requires building alternative narratives and actions with comparable persistence and legitimacy. Cognitive advantage requires a network of networks approach (think private-public), operating at the intersections of shared security interests.

Cultural Terrain Is Strategic Terrain

Perhaps the most underappreciated shift in today’s information environment is cultural. Gaming now plays a role similar to Hollywood’s influence after World War II. Streaming platforms dominate storytelling. Media consumption patterns are fragmented and algorithmically curated. Stories remain, as one speaker observed, “the fuel of the human soul.”

For decades, institutions like Voice of America succeeded because audiences sought out American content. The positive narrative of opportunity and possibility carried weight. In today’s environment, focusing solely on countering adversaries may be insufficient. Affirmative narratives about democratic resilience, economic opportunity, and alliance strength remain strategic assets. If the center of gravity is ideological, then cultural confidence is not soft power. It is core power.

None of this is executable without human capital. Building a cognitive arsenal requires building a cognitive workforce - professionals who are fluent in AI, media ecosystems, psychology, geospatial intelligence, and policy. Upskilling is not optional. Institutions must cultivate interdisciplinary talent capable of integrating technology and narrative strategy. They must also accelerate collaboration across government, private sector, and research institutions. And Government is looking to the private sector for training, skill development, and use of advanced technology, methods and applications. The adversary does not operate in stovepipes. Neither can we.

The most important question raised at that conference in Reston may have been the simplest: Are we structured to enact our own strategy?

The United States possesses extraordinary technological and intellectual advantages. But advantages unrealized are advantages lost. If cognitive warfare is indeed the new frontier of power, then institutional adaptation- not incremental reform - will determine success. Speed, modularity, reliable attribution, cultural fluency, and decision-centric AI must move from theory to practice. Because in this domain, the battlefield is not a distant theater. It is perception itself. And perception, once shifted, is far harder to reclaim than territory.

The Pinnacle Conference was hosted by The Information Professionals Association, The National Center for Narrative Intelligence and The Cipher Brief at the Carahsoft Conference & Collaboration Center

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Building the Talent Pipeline for America’s Security Future https://belimedia.com.ng/building-the-talent-pipeline-for-americas-security-future https://belimedia.com.ng/building-the-talent-pipeline-for-americas-security-future OPINION – Public service, at its core, is bigger than government service alone. Serving one’s country takes many forms, and in a time when the federal workforce is shrinking, recognizing the breadth of these opportunities is critical.

In my roles as an adjunct at Texas A&M’s Bush School, an alumni council member at the University of Denver’s Korbel School, and a contributing alumnus at the University of Southern California’s Global Policy Institute, I find myself fielding an increasing number of students who are grappling with how to navigate the future.

We have been here before. After the Cold War, the so-called “peace dividend” led to reductions across government, yet the need for talented, dedicated individuals remained. Today, too, the demand is high, and the pool of students and young professionals aspiring to serve their country is deep. The three universities that have invested in me also continue to invest in carving paths for students to serve in a wide range of roles.

Government itself is the most traditional route. Agencies may be smaller than in the past, yet as the senior generation transitions out, opportunities abound. Indeed, a cursory look reveals many are hiring. Working at the state and local level opens the aperture even wider; I worked for the state of Colorado and interned for the state of California well before I landed at the CIA.

Teaching, at any level, is an invaluable public service. Educators cultivate the next generation of thinkers, leaders, and professionals, shaping civic knowledge and analytic capacity that are foundational to democratic governance and national security. By equipping students with “deeper learning,” such as reasoning, problem-solving, and even persistence, teachers cultivate civic-mindedness and ensure that public service endures across generations.

Nonprofits also play a vital role. Whether focused on development, security, human rights, environmental protection, or public health, these organizations employ millions of people to perform roles that neither the market nor the government can fulfill. Serving in the nonprofit sector often requires ingenuity, resourcefulness, and a commitment to mission-driven work—traits that translate well into national security challenges.

International organizations provide a global platform for public service. From the United Nations to regional alliances, these institutions facilitate cooperation, conflict resolution, humanitarian response, and development programs. Working in such settings develops core skills, including diplomacy, cross-cultural communication, and policy expertise, all of which are transferable to domestic roles.

Think tanks offer another avenue for impactful service. Analysts and researchers at these institutions produce rigorous, evidence-based insights that influence government policy, public debate, and strategic planning, particularly in national security and foreign affairs. Think tanks combine scholarship with real-world impact, allowing professionals to shape the discourse on pressing issues.

Industry provides opportunities that are increasingly essential to national security. Since joining Leidos as a Director and Account Manager in our Intelligence Sector, I have been humbled by colleagues who dedicate their careers to advancing technology and capabilities that the government cannot, and should not, develop on its own. Furthermore, public-private partnerships are critical to maintaining US technological and security advantages.

Multiple Attributes Open the Way

Our emerging professionals should cultivate a combination of skills, knowledge, and character to pave the way for any of these careers. Excellence, deep expertise, and technology acumen are pillars, particularly as workplace challenges grow more complex and technologically driven. While opinions vary on the most critical traits for young professionals entering public service, I have consistently found a core set of skills and behaviors that open doors to careers. I call them the Five Cs.

Critical Thinking is perhaps the most foundational skill. Critical thinking is learnable, and educational research shows that structured analysis and disciplined writing are among the most effective ways to develop it. A well-reasoned, well-substantiated paper forces the author to evaluate evidence, challenge assumptions, and construct persuasive arguments—exactly the habits that public service demands.

Communication, both written and oral, is inseparable from professional effectiveness. Studies consistently demonstrate that strong communication skills correlate with leadership, policy influence, and organizational success.13 Today, AI tools can assist with drafting, but understanding what makes communication compelling remains a human responsibility—one that requires being able to explain why something works, not merely that it does.

Creativity enables professionals to solve novel and ill-structured problems. Research on innovation in public organizations shows that creative thinking improves adaptability and problem-solving in complex environments, including national security contexts. Future public servants can nurture creativity through interdisciplinary exposure, experimentation, and tolerance for intellectual risk.

Curiosity drives learning, adaptability, and sustained professional growth. Educational and cognitive research links curiosity to deeper knowledge acquisition, improved performance, and long-term expertise development. In a field defined by evolving threats, curiosity is not optional—it is a professional obligation.

Collaboration is essential in environments where no single individual or institution holds all the answers. Organizational research consistently shows that collaborative teams outperform individuals when addressing complex, high-stakes problems. Collaboration transforms individual competence into collective effectiveness, a cornerstone of public service.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

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Tue, 24 Feb 2026 15:51:06 +0100 FirstHandNews
Coast Guard, Sovereignty, and Homeland Defense https://belimedia.com.ng/coast-guard-sovereignty-and-homeland-defense https://belimedia.com.ng/coast-guard-sovereignty-and-homeland-defense OPINION — U.S. defense planning rests on the assumption that wars are fought abroad, by expeditionary forces, against defined adversaries. For decades, those assumptions held. But today, many of the most consequential security challenges facing the United States violate all three. They occur closer to home, below the threshold of armed conflict, and in domains where sovereignty is enforced incrementally.

The shift has exposed a chronic mismatch between how the United States defines its defense priorities and how it allocates resources and respect. While defense discourse continues to stubbornly emphasize power projection and high-end conflict, many of today’s challenges revolve around the more modest and rote enforcement of U.S. territorial integrity and national sovereignty—functions that are vital to U.S. strategic objectives yet lack the optical prestige of winning wars abroad.

Sitting at the center of this gap between prestige and need is the U.S. Coast Guard, whose mission profile aligns directly with America’s most important strategic objectives—the enforcement of sovereignty and homeland defense—yet remains strategically undervalued because its work rarely resembles the celebrated and well-funded styles of conventional warfighting. In an era of increased gray-zone competition and persistent coercion, the failure to properly appreciate the Coast Guard threatens real strategic fallout.

In the third decade of the 21st century, U.S. defense planning remains heavily oriented toward expeditionary warfighting and high-end kinetic conflict. Budget conversations still revolve around Ford-class supercarriers, F-35 fighters, and A2/AD penetration. This orientation shapes not only force design and budget allocations, but also institutional prestige and political capital. The services associated with visible combat power, with the Ford-class and the F-35, continue to dominate strategic discourse—even as many of the most persistent security challenges confronting the United States unfold close to home, in the gray-zone, without the need for fifth-generation air power or heavy armor.

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At the most basic level, any nation’s military exists primarily to defend territorial integrity, enforce sovereignty, and protect the homeland. Power projection, forward presence, and deterrence abroad are important—but they are secondary functions derived from the primary purpose of homeland defense. Yet U.S. defense discourse often treats homeland defense as a background condition when it should be revered as the first priority. The result is a blind spot in how security resources are evaluated and allocated.

The Coast Guard operates at a unique point where law enforcement, military authority, and sovereign enforcement all converge. On any given day, the Coast Guard may board foreign-flagged vessels suspected of sanctions violations, police maritime borders against illicit trafficking, secure ports that underpin global supply chains, and maintain a persistent presence in contested spaces, like the Arctic, without inviting escalation. The Coast Guard is equipped to intercept illegal fishing fleets, escort commercial shipping through sensitive waterways, and assert jurisdiction in legally ambiguous areas. These activities rarely resemble traditional warfighting, they rarely result in a Hollywood blockbuster, and they can be accomplished without nuclear-powered submarines or intercontinental ballistic missiles. But these are not peripheral activities—they are arguably amongst the most important daily functions the U.S. military undertakes.

Distinct among the military branches, the Coast Guard operates under a legal framework that is uniquely suited to today’s security environment. Under Title 14 status, the Coast Guard falls within the Department of Homeland Security, conducting law enforcement and regulatory missions on a daily basis. Yet, when needed, the service can transition to Title 10 status, under the Department of Defense, and operate as an armed service when required. This agility allows the Coast Guard to remain continuously engaged across the spectrum of competition, whether enforcing U.S. law in peacetime, managing escalation in gray-zone encounters, or integrating seamlessly into military operations. Few other elements of U.S. power can move so fluidly between legal regimes.

Still, despite such strategic relevance, the Coast Guard suffers from a persistent optical problem. U.S. defense culture has long privileged services and missions associated with visible, kinetic combat—those that lend themselves to clear narratives of victory, sacrifice, and heroism. The Coast Guard’s work rarely fits that cinematic mold. Its success is measured not in territory seized or targets destroyed, but in disruptions prevented, borders enforced, and crises that never materialize. Inherently quiet work with outcomes that reflect a force operating exactly as designed, although without generating institutional prestige or political support. In a system that rewards the loudest and the brightest, the Coast Guard’s quiet enforcement of sovereignty is easy to overlook.

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Continuing to overlook the value of the Coast Guard carries strategic consequences. Specifically, persistent underinvestment in the Coast Guard weakens maritime domain awareness, reduces sustained presence in key waterways, and narrows the set of tools available to manage gray-zone competition. As adversaries increasingly rely on legal ambiguity, deniable actors, and incremental pressure to test U.S. resolve, gaps in enforcement become opportunities. In this environment, the absence of credible, continuous sovereignty enforcement invites probing behavior that becomes harder to deter over time.

Advocacy for the Coast Guard does not require reassigning prestige, or elevating one service at the expense of others. It is merely an argument for strategic alignment. If territorial integrity, sovereignty enforcement, and homeland defense are truly core national-security priorities, then the institutions most directly responsible for those missions should be treated accordingly. As competition increasingly unfolds in the gray-zone between peace and war, the United States will need forces designed not only to win conflicts—but to prevent them from starting in the first place.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:30 +0100 FirstHandNews
What U.S. – China Cooperation Means for the World https://belimedia.com.ng/what-us-china-cooperation-means-for-the-world https://belimedia.com.ng/what-us-china-cooperation-means-for-the-world OPINION -- China was very critical of the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro last week. The spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the U.S. action was “blatant interference” in Venezuela and a violation of international law.

Mr. Maduro was accused of working with Columbian guerrilla groups to traffic cocaine into the U.S. as part of a “narco-terrorism” conspiracy. Of all countries, China should appreciate the need to stop Mr. Maduro from smuggling these illicit drugs into the U.S., killing tens of thousands of Americans. China experienced this in the Opium War of 1839-1842, when Great Britain forced opium on China, despite government protestations, resulting in the humiliating Treaty of Nanjing, ceding Hong Kong to Great Britain. Mr. Maduro was violating U.S. laws, in a conspiracy to aid enemies and kill innocent Americans. Fortunately, the U.S. had the political will, and military might, to quickly and effectively put an end to this assault. China should understand this and withhold criticism, despite their close relationship with Mr. Maduro and Venezuela.

The scheduled April meeting of presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will hopefully ease tension related to the South China Sea and Taiwan. The meeting will also offer an opportunity of the two presidents to elaborate on those transnational issues that the U.S. and China can work together on, for the common good.

The National Security Strategy of 2025 states that deterring a conflict over Taiwan is a priority and does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It also states that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea and its implications for the U.S. economy are obvious.

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The April meeting will permit Messrs. Trump and Xi to candidly discuss the South China Sea and Taiwan and ensure that there are guardrails to prevent conflict. Quiet and effective diplomacy is needed to address these issues, and the Trump – Xi meeting could establish the working groups and processes necessary to ensure the U.S. and China do not stumble into conflict.

Also important are the transnational issues that require the attention of the U.S. and China. This shouldn’t be too difficult, given the history of cooperation between the U.S. and China, primarily in the 1980s and 1990s.

Indeed, it was China’s Chairman Deng Xiaoping who approved cooperation with the U.S. on the collection and sharing of intelligence on the Soviet Union.

China opposed the December 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan and worked with the U.S. to provide weapons and supplies to the resistance forces in Afghanistan – who eventually prevailed, with the Soviet Union admitting defeat and pulling out of Afghanistan in 1989. The war in Afghanistan cost the Soviet Union immense resources, lives and prestige, weakening the Soviet Union and contributing to its later dissolution.

After the 1979 normalization of relations, the U.S. and China cooperated on a few transnational issues: nuclear nonproliferation; counternarcotics, focusing on Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle and the heroin from Burma going into China and the U.S.; counterterrorism and the sharing of intelligence on extremist networks.

In 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked China to assist with the denuclearization of North Korea. The following year, China hosted the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program and actively assisted convincing North Korea, in the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, to commit to complete and verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs.

China also cooperated with the U.S. on public health issues, like SARS and the avian flu.

Cooperation on these transnational issues was issue-specific, pragmatic, and often insulated from political tensions. Indeed, even during periods of rivalry, functional cooperation persisted when interests overlapped.

Opportunities to Further Enhance Bilateral Cooperation for the Common Good

Although U.S. – China cooperation on counternarcotics is ongoing, specifically regarding the fentanyl crisis, trafficking in cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines also requires close attention. More can be done to enhance bilateral efforts on nuclear nonproliferation, starting with China agreeing to have a dialogue with the U.S. on China’s ambitious nuclear program. Extremist militant groups like ISIS continue to be active, thus requiring better cooperation on counterterrorism. Covid-19 was a wakeup call: there needs to be meaningful cooperation on pandemics. And ensuring that the space domain is used only for peaceful purposes must be a priority, while also ensuring that there are acceptable guidelines for the lawful and moral use of Artificial Intelligence.

U.S. – China cooperation today is more about preventing a catastrophe. The Belgrade Embassy bombing in 1999, when the U.S. accidentally bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese officials and the EP-3 incident of 2001, when a Chinese jet crashed into a U.S. reconnaissance plane, killing the Chinese pilot, and China detaining the U.S. crew in Hainan Island are two examples of incidents that could have spiraled out of control. Chinas initially refused to take the telephone calls from Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, both hoping to deescalate these tense developments.

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Thus, crisis management and military de-confliction should be high on the list of subjects to be discussed, with a robust discussion of nuclear risk reduction. Stability in Northeast Asia and a nuclear North Korea, aligned with Russia and viewing the U.S. and South Korea as the enemies, should also be discussed, as well as nuclear nonproliferation.

The April summit between Messrs. Trump and Xi will be an opportunity to candidly discuss Taiwan and the South China Sea, to ensure we do not stumble into conflict.

The summit is also an opportunity to message to the world that the U.S. and China are working on a myriad of transnational issues for the common good of all countries.

The author is the former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication or information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:30 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Country’s First ‘Cognitive Advantage’ Chief: Influence Is the New Battlefield https://belimedia.com.ng/the-countrys-first-cognitive-advantage-chief-influence-is-the-new-battlefield https://belimedia.com.ng/the-countrys-first-cognitive-advantage-chief-influence-is-the-new-battlefield

WEEKEND INTERVIEW — In an era when foreign adversaries can shape public sentiment with a well-timed meme and a handful of AI-driven accounts, the U.S. government is racing to redefine what national power looks like in the information age.

At the center of that effort is Shawn Chenoweth, the country’s first Director of Cognitive Advantage - a role designed to help the United States compete in the domain where modern influence, persuasion, and political outcomes are increasingly decided.

What, exactly, does a Director of Cognitive Advantage do? It’s not a title most Americans encounter, and it sits far outside the familiar contours of diplomacy, military force, or economic leverage. But as Chenoweth explains, the contest for influence no longer stays neatly within those lanes either.

His focus is often on the gray space - where information, perception, culture, and behavior collide, and where adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are operating with staggering resources and strategic focus.

In this Cipher Brief conversation, Chenoweth breaks down how cognitive operations actually work, why the U.S. has struggled to keep pace, and what it means to give the President an “information option” that’s not simply kinetic or economic.

He offers rare, candid insight into how technology, AI, and social platforms—from TikTok to algorithmically driven personas—are reshaping the battlespace faster than policymakers can write doctrine.

Our conversation is a deep dive into one of the least understood - but perhaps most consequential - fronts of modern national security. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

Shawn Chenoweth, Director of Cognitive Advantage, National Security Council

THE INTERVIEW

The Cipher Brief: How do you explain the role of the director of Cognitive Advantage?

Chenoweth: When you look at traditional elements of military power, you probably think of the DIME construct. It's not a perfect construct, but it's pretty good. DIME, is broken down into Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic, and it's very clear who owns the Diplomatic, Military, and Economic components. But there hasn't been, at least in several decades, a good example of where people have really come to the president and the administration with an "I" option, for Information. And it's a shame because when you actually look at the DIME construct, you don't want to break it into stove pipes. We should think of it as a cell. Each of those elements acts as part of a functioning cell, and removing any of those elements means you have an imperfect or failing cell.

So, I was asked to help put the "I" back in DIME so that we can provide additional options and advantages across the other elements of DIME to national power and provide the president with opportunities to accomplish the Administration’s objectives that aren't just warheads on foreheads or threatening economics or expending political leverage. We can enhance those things, but we can also gain advantages by using cognitive effects through the information environment.

Kelly: Let’s set the stage a bit further. If you were to explain to the average American what is happening in terms of cognitive warfare in the gray zone – the area where conflict occurs below the level of warfare - how would you describe it?

Chenoweth: I think if you look through your military histories, philosophers, politicians, political science, it's all pretty clear. You can pick out the elements. They all have one underlying thread, which is that political victory is the one that matters at its core. That's really what we're talking about. Nothing's changed. How human beings are connected, how technology is affected has certainly changed. But what we really care about is what people do in the real world and the geophysical world, the world we live in.

So, the point of a cognitive advantage is to leverage that so that human beings are taking behaviors favorable to outcomes, to national objectives, which most of the time are also - in the case of the United States - favorable in their own right. So it's core. And that is what we're driving to get: those advantages in what people do in the real world through their sensing, to make decisions that come back to the real world and have the effects that you want.

Kelly: Can you give an example of what that would look like?

Chenoweth: Let's say you're negotiating for a piece of land or a base that you need for overflight intel collection. You're going to conduct a trade-off in negotiations. Maybe it's going to look like, - if you pay more, you'll get more - based off what the value proposition is. But very rarely is it that blatant and simple. So, what you want to be able to do is understand, what advantage would we need in the negotiation? What's actually driving this other party other than maybe just cost or just danger? What’s the risk calculus?

There are cultural nuances that affect things: their understanding of influence, political implications. So, the point would be to understand why they would be interested in this in the first place? What advantage does it give them? What are the cultural nuances? Why wouldn't they do this in the first place? Why aren't they taking this action and what can we do to make sure that the outcome is what we want?

There are other areas where that applies across the spectrum.

Let's say we're conducting counter-terrorism operations, and we know an objective tends to use a particular cafe. Well, what if they were using a different one that day? What can we do to influence them to go to a place that's more favorable for options to decrease our own risk calculus, either because we want to conduct a kinetic strike or make an arrest? Maybe we can't find them. So, what if we use that for our intel collection and our methods to basically make them come up on comms and change their behavior so it's easier to find them, collect on them, and build the data so that we can conduct physical actions to stop or disrupt them? And you can kind of see how that applies across the board.

If you know more than the person you're dealing with, chances are that you're going to be better at accomplishing your outcome. It’s very similar with the werewolf theory. It's a game where two people are chosen to be the werewolf of the village and everyone else in the group doesn't know who the werewolf is. Most of the time the people who are the werewolves win the game because they have an information advantage over everyone else playing the game. So, it's a human norm.

And again, I point out that nothing's new under the sun. It's just that we haven't really thought through the implications of what it means in the information age that we live in - where everyone is connected through software defined radios. We're a long way away from direct sensing where it's communication and things happening in the real world. Now we have sort of indirect sensing where you're fed data feeds and everything else. We can affect cognitive behavior in ways we never imagined, and we really haven't thought through just as we can reach people and sell items. And if I want to find a person whose favorite color is red, who's a military age male who's really into Magnum PI, I can find that person thanks to their radio, and I can craft messages specifically for someone who fits that demographic and move them in a particular direction. That's the first time in history that that's been the case.

Kelly: You have a background that combines both government and private sector experience. Given that technology is being rapidly developed in the private sector, how do you think that background gives you an advantage in this role?

Chenoweth: There are a lot of people who've served in the military and have been contractors but just by happenstance, I happen to have been in a lot of critical locations at critical times. I think one of the advantages that has brought me is that I saw the frustration within the military when the contracting apparatus didn't work. I was also empowered by industry to go and fix a lot of those structures and enable the government to do it, and now I'm getting afforded the opportunity to work on policy to make the system really hum.

I think the advantage with that is that when it comes to the information space, there's no control. And I try to emphasize this to any policy maker or power broker or decision maker that I can find. You can put an armored brigade in an intersection - fully equipped, fully supported – and a U.S. Armored Brigade could own that intersection. There are things you can control. But when it comes to the information space, there is no control. It is constantly shifting, constantly changing. You have a binary decision. You are either going to participate, preferably at a level that matters, or not, and whatever's going to happen is going to happen.

So, you could find yourself in an advantageous information space in the morning, lose it by the late morning, get a stalemate in the afternoon, and win it back in the afternoon – just to lose it again at the end of the day. And when you wake up the next morning, you're going to have to do it all over again. There is no, "We have information dominance and we're done and we can crack our beers and go on with other things."

That's not how this works because every day new information is being injected into the system. People are changing and developing new opinions. Things are occurring and people are going to react to those things, change their opinions, adapt, age out, age in, so those cultural references may change. It's a constant flux. One of the things that from the U.S. government side we're getting our head around is that we need an information carrier group constantly operating afloat in the information environment, effectively. One that’s engaged 24/7 to affect these changes.

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Kelly: It's not just the United States that has gotten pretty good at understanding the impact of cognitive advantage. We see these tactics from China and Russia being used with stunning success. In this role, how focused are you on their activities when it comes to doing the exact same thing that you're tasked with doing?

Chenoweth: They absolutely practice these activities. I call them the ‘CRINKETT’. Every challenge we're generally dealing with falls in the CRINKETTS. It's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Terrorists and Trans[national] criminals. And particularly for the nation states, this is exactly how they want to compete.

From their perspective, there are two ways to deal with the United States: asymmetrically and stupidly, largely because of our economic and military power. They get that. They're not interested in a kinetic fight; that is an awful prospect. So the way they want to do this is in gray zone activities, in the information space, in the cognitive domain.

And they outspend us. I'm not going to say necessarily outperform, but I'll say if you want to compete at a level that matters, they outspend us, period. Iran probably spends around $1.8 billion plus-minus a year, maybe more with their proxies and everything else they do in this particular space. Russia - post Ukraine invasion, spends about $2.6 billion, something like that. China - 48 plus billion dollars a year. The U.S., if I take all of the activities from the DoD, the State Department and everything else, and you put those together, you might approach $1.2 billion.

It doesn't mean we're executing those funds either. It just means that that's what we've allocated. When you think about how we outspend to have an advantage on the other parts of DIME, we're hideously underperforming here. And again, all props to the administration. They're acutely aware of this and the support I've had at the National Security Council and across the elements of government - the departments and agencies - has been stellar. And we're going to continue to work on this and get it right because we have three and a half more years of President Trump's administration to get this right, do the reps and sets, and make this a durable policy so that the American people can start enjoying those benefits that come when we're really focused on this space.

Kelly: What does success look like for you in this role and how do you measure it?

Chenoweth: Measurement has always been a funny thing. People will constantly tell me how hard it is to measure these activities. And what I’ve found time and time again is that we're actually pretty good at these activities. The issues with the measurements are, again, participating at a scale that matters. We need to measure behavior change, and in order to do that, we need to have clear objectives. What are we after?

The big part of that is who is the target audience that has the agency to do the thing we want? We spend a lot of time making plans and CONOPS [Concept of Operations] on sub-target audiences that don't actually have the agency – in hopes that they affect agency - and that's perfectly fine. But why are we doing assessments against this? We spend a lot of time and money generating assessments to target audiences that don't have the agency you want. So, let's focus on the target audience that has the agency and let's do this at scale.

For example; I'm in the DC area and I can go down to the Potomac River, drop a bucket of water in the river, and I have objectively molecularly increased the amount of water in the Potomac. There isn't a sensor on this planet that is going to detect that molecular change.

The fact is that you might be having an effect, but you don't have a sensor that is going to pick that up. So, you need to increase your scale or customize your sensing system to the effect you're having. That tends to be where the assessments fall apart.

I’ve heard all the time for decades now that assessments are so hard. I don't find that to be true. What I find is that you've sacrificed assessments for effect, which is fine. It's risk calculus. If I had a low amount of resources and I decided to put as much into the effect I've wanted, that's fine. But at the end of the day, you're looking for the real behavior change in the targeted audience that matters. What are the sensors you have on that and what are you doing to collect that data: public opinion, research surveys, building the networks. We're going to see this exacerbate further as the AI revolution continues at pace.

Kelly: How is technology impacting what you're trying to do, your mission, and then how are you also working with the private sector because the private sector is controlling so much of the technology and the innovation that the government needs to work with. So how are you doing that?

Chenoweth: One of the challenges I see emerging from AI is that there's sort of an assumption that AI will fix all your woes. I've seen the best tools out there do one thing: they model the data they have, and that's the core issue. We don't have the data. So again, I'm back to there's not a whole lot of new things under the sun. And the AI models are really good, and it can allow you to find new insights from the data that you have, but new data needs to be created. So, sacrificing collection methodologies and new approaches to gather the data at the foot of a model is terrible.

The AI snake oil salesman I would deal with in industry all the time would come in and say, ‘Oh, you're interested in that? I could absolutely model you the thing.’ Cool. How does that work? ‘Well, all you have to do is provide me the data and we'll put all this together and give you the insights.’ I'm like, whoa. We don't have the data either. No one has the data. That's kind of the problem. So, let's be honest about what we're doing.

AI is going to be a great boon for industry and for the government and everyone else under the sun. It's going to obviously have impact, but I think as that moves forward, we need to start looking at how we actually employ it. Building an agent or a token for every worker so that they're augmented by an AI that does the thing that they themselves may not be good at or saving them time is going to be amazing, but it needs to be undergirded by being able to detect what's actually happening out in the real world. And those two things are not necessarily - not interrelated. As I said, most things are kind of a whole cell that operate in one unit, and we can't necessarily bifurcate these things and then expect good outcomes.

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Kelly: So you have a mission that is difficult to measure, is hugely impactful, adversaries are using it as well against American citizens effectively, and in some cases, those adversaires are dedicating a lot more resources to this. If you could explaine to the average U.S. citizen how they might be targeted by cognitive operations that are conducted by U.S. adversaries, what would you tell them to look for?

Chenoweth: You need to be mindful of sources obviously. When I look at the construct of how we approach cognitive warfare, I think one of the biggest problems I've had for at least the last 10 years has been the construct of dis- and misinformation. My issue isn't the dis- and misinformation construct. It's the overuse of it.

Disinformation and misinformation are things. They have meaning. But they mean something that is true and people use it for things that are not true. For example, disinformation are lies. The person projecting the information knows it's a lie. They're doing it to accomplish an objective. The bigger problem of disinformation is misinformation. Those are people who are sharing those lies, not knowing they are lies, or taking things out of context like satire, et cetera, and propagating as if it were truth. Those are what those are.

But not everything we have to deal with falls into that construct. There are two other portions to this that we have to be mindful of.

One is missing information, which used to mean that the target audience wasn't informed enough to make a correct decision, favorable to them or anyone else. ‘It's a tragedy that your family member died and you should mourn their loss, but stop touching the body. That's how you're spreading Ebola’, right? Pretty straightforward, pretty simple.

Now that we're dealing with nation states with deep pockets, that's been flipped up on its head and they're practicing active missing information, where they will provide wire services into a country saying, ‘Congratulations, you can use our wire service for free and we'll provide you all the stuff, and that's your biggest cost except for labor. Isn't that wonderful? The catch is that you just have to use our wire service’.

If you think [contextual] stories are going to get into the press through those channels, good luck. This isn't happening in the third world. These are happening in major countries and places that would shock you.

Imagine something like, ‘If you run this story, all our connected businesses that are connected through us or other means are going to pull their advertising budget from you.’ So again, good luck talking about the story in your environment. No one's going to touch it. No influencer wants a piece of it because they're going to lose their incentive structure and their revenue stream. It's things like that.

On the other side of the coin, and the bigger problem, is the rhetoric information. These are the things that aren't necessarily true or false. They are framed by your value system, how you view things, what you think truth actually is.

There are people out there who will say, I think a communist socialist form of government that is highly authoritarian is more stable and therefore better than a liberal democracy. There are people who believe that, and just by saying, well, history would prove you otherwise, it's not a good enough argument. You need to engage with those people at a scale that matters and be prepared to win the argument.

We've seen this time again on the counter-terrorism front where we would shut down the comms of a nobody, and suddenly that person would come back with the reputation that was so valuable, and now they're a terrorist thought leader because the Western world thought that they were so dangerous they needed to be shut down instead of just accepting the fact, that maybe we should just engage with this guy because no one's ever heard of him and maybe we should just point out that he's a moron.

There are ways to deal with this, and just because we don't like something doesn't mean it's a lie to the person that's spreading it. They might believe it. Before we just title something disinformation and say, well, it's a lie and we can ignore it — that is not adequate in the modern era where everyone is connected because, again, this person has connective tissue to the internet. They have web platforms. They can be just as connected as a government if they should choose to be and if they have the popularity, because at its core, regardless of whether or not you're a government or a celebrity or anything else, you are fighting for attention.

Kelly: It’s sometimes difficult for busy Americans to navigate the information space today and know what to believe without inviting some serious time into the source. Do you look at part of your mission in this role as helping people understand more of the context they need in order to make good decisions?

Chenoweth: I've been more on the side dealing with foreign audiences. But even in that regard, I think that it really matters to ask what are the things that we know to be what we feel are objective truths and things that matter? Things that we want target audiences to know because we know it would be better for them and better for our objectives?

And then what are the things where we just want to make sure that if a debate needs to be had, we facilitate the debate so that the target audience, particularly with an American target audience - which again, it's not my forte, we don't do that in government or shouldn't — that needs to be facilitated by Americans pointing out to each other that we do need to have these debates and come to kind of consensus, understanding that there will be disagreements.

Kelly: Do you think your job is going to be even more important in the future or maybe less?

Chenoweth: I've never thought the job wasn't important. I think the thing I'm enjoying right now is that everyone's kind of getting their head around what this means. The overused expression that ‘We need to do some things on Facebook,’ when you would have policymakers say, ‘Well, I'm concerned that that would destroy Amazon and internet commerce’ and your head would explode as you're trying to explain, ‘That's just not how the internet works, man.’

We can be comfortable operating on these platforms and doing things that we need to do without destroying internet commerce or the internet. And now I think a lot of policy makers and industry are all connected. They're a lot more comfortable doing these things. Now is the time when we need to get to where the resources and the permissions really match the ability to get us where we need to be.

I've generally not found too many authority problems. I generally find permissions problems. I find that when it comes to authorities, you almost always find that every organization actually has a framework that allows them to do things. It's just that someone somewhere in the chain can say no and is all too comfortable saying no, because, particularly in the past administration, they were very comfortable at avoiding risk and not as comfortable at managing risk. And that is a dynamic that we have to change. The world is a risky place, and we need to be out there participating in it, throwing our elbows around and managing the risk, not avoiding it.

Kelly: How hard of a job is it to give the U.S. the cognitive advantage in today’s world?

Chenoweth: It's hard, tremendously hard because you're talking about changing culture. I don't think the activity itself and the policy and the things that can be done are hard. I think the hard part will be changing the culture and changing people's mindsets.

We've talked about the fact that there used to be three domains: physical domain, information domain and cognitive domain. We have to explore the information domain and actually call it what it is. There is the physical domain, the geophysical domain. But I like the ‘kill web’ approach. A good kill web will constitute a kill chain that is disrupted, and we have to get out of just a kill chain. We need to get into a kill web mentality when it comes to cognitive effects.

Kelly: Explain what you mean by a “kill web”?

Chenoweth: You have your geophysical world where things exist in the real world, the place where we all live. When it comes to the information domain, though, it used to consolidate a bunch of things.

The reality is that when we break that down into a kill web, you're looking from your physical domain up to your logic layer. The internet is not some amorphous cloud that wanders around. It's composed of a system of systems that live in the real world. It's data centers, servers, modems, et cetera. Where does that infrastructure actually exist? Sometimes the files are in the computer. So, we need to be mindful of where does that work? How does the internet, how do these structures work, the mobile networks, et cetera.

From there, it then creates the digital layer, where all the trons are that exist. You can have effects, that's where your real cyberspace comes into play. That's how the mobile devices work, but that is just data.

Then it goes up to the persona entity level. These are the real human beings, sometimes fake human beings, they're personas, organizations but entities that potentially could be targeted or addressed or engaged, et cetera.

And then there's the cognitive space. The trick in the cognitive space is what happens in the mind. And that mind is influenced by the sensing that goes up through that chain when they process it. You're able to interdict on its way up or influence, and you're able to influence on the way down when a decision is made.

For example, when something happens in the real world, it's communicated to a decision maker, but it's going to go through the logic layer transmitted through sensors, computers, emails, phones, et cetera, to people and entities who are going to process it themselves, communicate it to a decision maker who's going to make a decision based off that information, or an individual or a bunch of individuals.

They're all going to make decisions on how to react to that or not react to that. And that's going to go back down to the physical world when they say, ‘I don't really like what is happening’, or maybe ‘I do like what's happening. Let's do the thing’. They're going to communicate that down to ‘Yes, launch the missiles’, or ‘Let's have a protest’. So, you can affect the chain up. You can affect the chain down, but that's how it works.

We as the United States have a pipe that exists inside that kill web structure - so does everyone else. And it doesn't matter if you're a nation state or a family or an individual. You have your sensing sources.

As I mentioned earlier, the direct conversations between people in the real world - even now, you and I are communicating completely over that entire structure - and that structure could be affected on the way up as we're communicating to when this is finally produced and goes back out to the real world where suddenly I have AI effects on me and I'm saying things I never meant to say, but the rest of the world's now interpreting that.

I didn't say that, that wasn't my cognitive decision, but you intercepted on the way down and now you would inadvertently affect everyone else's cognitive approach to what I'm communicating.

Kelly: What does the future from a technology and AI standpoint really look like?

Chenoweth: It's having fundamental changes. It's going to be interesting to see what happens in the entertainment industry as AI takes over and suddenly people can have more access. We've seen how the music industry went through huge change just on streaming music. We're about to witness what this is going to look like from our more traditional platforms. We've seen how things move from streaming. I think there is a level of adaptation that's going to go with that.

One of the things that needs to be addressed is how exactly we're going to engage. There is a point where we need to be comfortable with giving sort of guidance to the AIs - human in the loop - but if you think that you're going to be able to review every single message that needs to go out in an AI-driven world, you're out of your mind.

So, you need to be able to be comfortable generating for your target audience profiles and give sort of thematic guidance and let the AI do some level of engagements against foreign audiences to steer conversations in a particular direction, or at least identify where a conversation might be going so you can intervene when it looks like decisions are being made in a bad way, and then find out if that is an open and honest cultural nuance thing where it is about engagement or if it's being steered by your opponent.

I think that we are not far, and we're probably already in a game, where there are AIs versus AIs as we speak in the information environment.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:30 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia is Targeting Civilians in Ukraine https://belimedia.com.ng/russia-is-targeting-civilians-in-ukraine https://belimedia.com.ng/russia-is-targeting-civilians-in-ukraine OPINION — The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine reported that 14,383 civilians were killed in Ukraine, 673 of them children, as of late 2025. Russia has intensified attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, generating facilities, and heating infrastructure, in efforts to disrupt electricity, heat, and water services – especially in winter. Clearly, Russia is targeting Ukraine’s civilian population.

The mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, recently told Reuters that Kyiv, with a population of 3.6 million people, has only about half the electricity that it needs as it faces its most severe wartime energy crisis, following waves of Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, Ukrainian casualties are estimated at around 400,000, with civilian casualties rising, according to the United Nations.

The Laws of War are clear: intentionally targeting civilians is prohibited; civilians should never be the objective of an attack. Even more specifically, a combatant should avoid or reduce harm to civilian infrastructure.

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The International Criminal Court has accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of war crimes for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia, while a few UN entities, and other civilian organizations monitoring the war in Ukraine, maintain that Mr. Putin is also guilty of the indiscriminate bombing of civilian infrastructure.

It’s clear: Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukraine’s power grid, generation facilities, and heating infrastructure, aiming to disrupt electricity, heat, and water services – especially in winter. These attacks are not isolated to the Kyiv, but, rather, part of a large, coordinated plan to target all regions in Ukraine.

Ukraine has reported tens of thousands of energy infrastructure facilities have been damaged since 2022, damaging generation plants, substations, heating plants, and transmission lines. And at least 18 major combined heat and power plants have been destroyed or seriously damaged, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Russian strikes have left hundreds of thousands of people with no central heating during sub-zero weather, a widespread development throughout Ukraine. Indeed, officials and humanitarian groups are warning that millions of Ukrainians are at heightened risk this winter due to lack of heat, electricity, and water amid the intense cold. UN officials described the situation as a worsening humanitarian crisis.

Russia has systematically targeted civilian energy and heating infrastructure, not just military sites, with repeated missile and drone strikes aimed at power plants, grids, and heating systems, affecting thousands of facilities. The result is widespread blackouts and heating loss for civilians, especially during harsh winter with sub-zero temperatures, creating a serious humanitarian situation.

Mr. Putin’s strategy is to target civilians with the intensification of bombings against Ukraine’s infrastructure that provides heat, water, and electricity to the Ukrainian people. These are violations of the Laws of War, and the International Criminal Court should immediately commence with hearings on Russia’s indiscriminate bombing of civilian infrastructure, resulting in the death of thousands of Ukrainian civilians. Clearly, Mr. Putin is targeting Ukraine’s civilian population, a war crime.

Joseph R. DeTrani

The author is the former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Next FATF Test: Can the West Demand Results from Pakistan? https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-fatf-test-can-the-west-demand-results-from-pakistan https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-fatf-test-can-the-west-demand-results-from-pakistan OPINION — In the shadow of Mexico City's historic Palacio de Bellas Artes, global financial watchdogs will convene in February 2026 for the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Plenary and Working Group Meetings. In conference rooms far removed from South Asia’s violence, Pakistan will once again present itself as a responsible counterterrorism partner, armed with compliance reports, legislative amendments, and assurances of reform. On paper, Pakistan’s financial regulations increasingly resemble those of many developing democracies. On the ground, however, the networks that finance and enable terrorism continue to adapt and operate with troubling resilience. The widening gap between form and function is precisely what Western policymakers must confront as FATF prepares its next round of assessments.

The Compliance Illusion

Pakistan’s removal from the FATF grey list in 2022 was widely portrayed as a success story. Officials pointed to new anti-money laundering laws, terrorist financing prosecutions, and institutional reforms as evidence of a course correction. FATF itself acknowledged technical improvements, yet it also emphasized that effectiveness, not legislation, remains the ultimate benchmark. That distinction has proven critical.

Open-source reporting and documented financial intelligence patterns suggest that terrorist organizations such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) have not been dismantled but rather modernized. Recent documents reveal how these UN-designated outfits exploit humanitarian crises, such as the Gaza conflict, to funnel funds into terror activities. Under the guise of aid appeals and mosque reconstructions, figures like Hammad Azhar, son of JeM leader Masood Azhar, and Azhar’s brother Talha al-Saif orchestrate campaigns using digital wallets like EasyPaisa, SadaPay, and JazzCash, aggregating micro-donations and cryptocurrencies to evade detection. These efforts aggregate micro-donations and cryptocurrency transfers, often employing fragmented wallet structures and chain-hopping across platforms to avoid detection. Funds have reportedly supported militant infrastructure, including the establishment of more than 300 Mosques and the reconstruction of locations historically linked to LeT training facilities damaged during India’s 2025 Operation Sindoor.

This pattern reflects more than opportunism. Pakistan’s legal framework may align with FATF’s 40 recommendations on paper, but operational enforcement remains deeply inconsistent. Sanctioned individuals such as Hafiz Talha Saeed have led public rallies in Lahore under police protection, issuing threats against Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In 2025, senior Pakistani legislature Rana Muhammad Qasim Noon reportedly visited militant-affiliated reconstruction sites alongside local officials, revealing overt collaboration between state and non-state actors. Recruitment drives disguised as religious gatherings, often coordinated with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam networks, have featured speeches praising Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, delivered by JeM commander Masood Ilyas Kashmiri at facilities such as Markaz Shohada-e-Islam in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Together, these cases point to a long-standing “management” model of extremism. Militant groups are not dismantled but rebranded, with political fronts such as the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League contesting elections while violence is normalized as a political instrument. As Greece-based policy analyst Dimitra Staikou has argued, this model exports instability through regional alignments and shields militancy behind formal democratic processes.

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Why Mexico City Matters

The February 2026 FATF meetings come at a moment when Pakistan’s engagement with the United States and Europe is deepening even as its internal security situation deteriorates. Militant violence has surged significantly, driven by attacks from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Baloch insurgent groups. Rather than prompting a clean break with all forms of militancy, this instability risks reinforcing the proxy logic that FATF scrutiny is meant to dismantle. For Western policymakers, the danger lies in conflating cooperation with convergence in security priorities. Intelligence sharing, access agreements, or economic partnerships do not necessarily reflect aligned counterterrorism priorities. As I argued previously in The Milli Chronicle, Pakistan’s strategic incentives continue to reward selective tolerance of militant actors, particularly those oriented toward India. FATF’s effectiveness framework exists to test whether states are willing to disrupt these incentives, not simply mask them with procedural compliance.

FATF’s 2025 Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks underscores the urgency. The report highlights a marked increase in hybrid digital methods, consistent with Pakistan-linked entities shifting from banks to fintech platforms to evade oversight. Although Pakistan exited the grey list in 2022 after four years of economic strain, FATF President Elisa de Anda Madrazo warned in October 2025 that the removal was “not bulletproof,” citing unregulated digital transactions as a continuing vulnerability.

Mexico City should therefore serve as a turning point. US and EU delegations should press for outcome-based evaluations focused on sustained investigations, verifiable asset seizures, and the dismantling of facilitation networks. Particular scrutiny must be directed toward digital payment systems, informal charities, and micro-donation models that exploit regulatory blind spots. Western governments should also coordinate more closely to monitor cross-border flows linked to high-risk jurisdictions, ensuring that Pakistan’s reforms translate into measurable disruption rather than rhetorical reassurance.

Conclusion: Choosing Substance Over Stability Theater

Pakistan will argue that renewed scrutiny risks destabilizing a fragile state. That argument has been persuasive before, and it has failed before. Stability built on tolerated militancy is not stability at all; it is deferred risk. Western capitals should therefore anchor their engagement around two imperatives.

First, international partners should move beyond accepting legislative reforms and instead condition high-level diplomatic, security, and economic engagement with Pakistan on verifiable enforcement outcomes. This means tying cooperation to demonstrable actions such as sustained terrorist-financing prosecutions, asset freezes against UN- and US-designated individuals, and the disruption of digital fundraising networks linked to groups like JeM and LeT.

Second, Washington and Brussels should treat Pakistan-linked terrorist financing as a transnational financial integrity threat, not a regional security issue. This requires enhanced monitoring of fintech platforms, mobile wallets, charities, and micro-donation systems used by diaspora-linked networks in Europe and North America. FATF has repeatedly warned that terrorist groups increasingly exploit digital payments and new financial technologies to evade traditional controls. The EU and US should expand joint typology sharing, require higher due-diligence thresholds for transactions linked to high-risk jurisdictions, and protect activists and journalists targeted by transnational repression tied to Pakistan’s security apparatus.

In Mexico City, Pakistan will speak in the language of compliance and reform. Beyond the conference halls, the true test will be whether the networks that finance violence are finally dismantled or quietly allowed to endure. If Western governments choose substance over symbolism, this moment can mark a turning point. If not, the paperwork will pass, and the risks will return—more adaptive, more opaque, and more dangerous than before.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
They're Coming for Our Kids: How Extremists Target Children Online https://belimedia.com.ng/theyre-coming-for-our-kids-how-extremists-target-children-online https://belimedia.com.ng/theyre-coming-for-our-kids-how-extremists-target-children-online OPINION — September is National Preparedness Month - when we check our emergency kits, review evacuation routes, and prepare for natural disasters. But this year, as I sat in conference rooms at the Eradicate Hate Global Summit in Pittsburgh, I couldn't stop thinking about a different kind of storm brewing in our communities. One that doesn't announce itself with weather alerts or sirens.

It targets our children in their digital third spaces - Discord servers where they chat with friends, Instagram feeds where they scroll for hours, Reddit forums where they seek community, gaming platforms where they unwind, and the sprawling ecosystem of social media where teenagers spend most of their waking hours.

In 2024, teenagers accounted for up to two-thirds of ISIS-linked arrests in Europe, with children as young as 11 involved in recent terrorist plots. But Islamic extremists aren't the only ones hunting in these digital spaces. White supremacist groups, neo-Nazi organizations, and other far-right movements have turned every corner of the internet where young people gather into potential recruitment centers.

What unites these predators across the ideological spectrum isn't their beliefs - it's their understanding that vulnerable children make easy targets. And while they've perfected their hunting techniques, we've dismantled our defenses.

The State Department issued a call for proposals in July 2025 to fund programs preventing terrorists from recruiting young people online. One month later, they canceled the entire initiative due to funding cuts. The very expertise needed to design and manage such responses had been dismantled when my office - the Office of Countering Violent Extremism - was shuttered along with similar prevention teams across the federal government.

We're watching the storm approach, and we're sending the meteorologists home.

The New Hunting Grounds

Every platform where teenagers gather has become a recruitment center for extremist movements. Neo-Nazi groups use gaming chats to spread white supremacist messaging. Islamic extremists exploit social media algorithms to target vulnerable youth. Far-right militias recruit through conspiracy theory forums. Anti-government extremists find followers in survivalist communities.

The tactics mirror those used by online predators - build trust, isolate targets, gradually introduce radical ideas, and exploit vulnerabilities. A teenager struggling with social isolation logs into Discord seeking connection and community. Instead, they find recruiters who validate their frustrations while slowly introducing conspiracy theories, hate-filled content, and calls for violence.

The progression is methodical. First comes the meme that seems edgy but harmless. Then the private message offering "real truth" about current events. Next, the invitation to a smaller, more exclusive group where radical content flows freely. Finally, the encouragement to take action—whether spreading propaganda, targeting individuals, or planning violence.

These aren't random encounters. Extremist recruiters study adolescent psychology, identifying kids who show signs of depression, social anxiety, or family conflict. They understand that teenagers are naturally questioning authority and seeking identity—normal developmental phases that can be exploited.

History's Warning Signs

This exploitation of youth isn't new - only the technology has changed.

The Hitler Youth movement systematically recruited children through youth organizations. The Red Army Faction in 1970s Germany drew from disaffected university students. The Irish Republican Army found fertile recruiting ground among marginalized teenagers in Belfast.

What these historical cases teach us is that extremist movements succeed when they fill voids left by failing institutions. When young people can't find meaning, purpose, or belonging through legitimate channels, they become vulnerable to those offering simple explanations for complex problems.

Today's digital environment amplifies these vulnerabilities exponentially. Where previous extremists recruited face-to-face in specific locations, online recruiters can reach millions simultaneously, test messaging in real-time, and operate across borders with minimal detection risk.

The Programs We Dismantled

The prevention infrastructure dismantled over the past year wasn't theoretical—it was saving lives.

At the State Department, our team worked with tech companies to identify recruitment tactics and develop content policies that protected legitimate speech while removing extremist material. We helped content moderators recognize subtle grooming techniques that avoid automated detection.

The Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships at DHS built relationships with schools and community organizations to identify early warning signs. Their approach was therapeutic, not punitive—providing intervention resources that addressed underlying issues rather than criminalization.

At the FBI, specialized teams tracked recruitment networks and distinguished between teenage edginess and genuine threats. The Department of Health and Human Services funded research into psychological vulnerabilities that informed prevention strategies.

All shared common principles: early intervention beats prosecution; community solutions work better than federal enforcement; understanding radicalization psychology is essential for prevention.

The Disinformation Amplifier

What makes today's threat environment particularly dangerous is how disinformation amplifies extremist recruitment while major platforms fail to enforce their own policies.

As I write this, Houthi-linked arms dealers openly sell weapons on verified X accounts, advertising Kalashnikovs and equipment marked "Property of U.S. Govt." The Tech Transparency Project identified 130 Yemen-based accounts advertising weapons, some with verification checkmarks. X even ran advertisements beneath these posts, generating revenue from terrorist-linked content.

A teenager exposed to election fraud conspiracies becomes more susceptible to political violence messaging. Young people fed disinformation about minority communities become easier targets for white supremacist recruitment. Disinformation serves as a gateway drug to radicalization.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

The Cost of Inaction

At the Pittsburgh summit, I heard from parents whose children had been radicalized online, officers investigating cases without prevention resources, and community leaders watching young people disappear into digital hate.

One mother found extremist content on her 14-year-old son's computer. When she sought help, local resources that might have provided intervention had lost federal funding. A police officer described investigating a high school attack plot that might have been prevented if early warning systems remained operational.

These costs are measured in broken families, traumatized communities, and young lives destroyed by preventable radicalization.

What Preparedness Really Means

We don't wait for hurricanes before planning—we build early warning systems and maintain emergency capabilities. The same logic should apply to extremist recruitment.

We need systems detecting concerning behavioral changes before they become threats. We need intervention addressing psychological vulnerabilities before recruiters exploit them. We need community responses providing support when families encounter these issues.

The good news: we know what works. Community-based prevention programs have demonstrated success in interrupting radicalization. EXIT programs in Germany and Sweden help individuals leave extremist groups through mentorship and psychological support. The Against Violent Extremism network connects former extremists with at-risk youth. Montreal's Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence has successfully intervened in over 1,000 cases through family counseling and community partnerships.

The Path Forward

Rebuilding prevention infrastructure requires immediate action and long-term commitment.

Congress must restore funding for prevention programs at State, DHS, FBI, and HHS. These aren't luxury programs—they're essential public safety capabilities protecting vulnerable citizens.

We must rebuild scattered expertise by bringing prevention professionals back from think tanks, universities, and private companies through sustained investment commitments.

We need stronger partnerships between agencies, tech companies, schools, and communities. Prevention works best at multiple levels simultaneously.

Parents and educators need training to recognize early warning signs. This means providing basic digital literacy and threat awareness to identify concerning behavioral changes.

Finally, we need counter-messaging strategies competing with extremist propaganda for young people's attention—empowering communities to tell better stories about identity, purpose, and belonging.

Field Notes

Prevention vs. Reaction: Preventing one radicalized individual costs approximately $30,000. Investigating, prosecuting, and incarcerating them after violence costs over $3 million—not counting human costs to victims and communities.

Community Resilience: The most effective programs work through trusted institutions—schools, religious organizations, sports teams, youth groups. Federal resources can support but can't replace local relationships and trust.

Reader Challenge

Check Your Circle: Talk with young people about their online experiences—not to interrogate, but to understand their digital worlds.

Support Local Programs: Find prevention resources in your community. School counselors and youth organizations often spot concerning trends before law enforcement.

Practice Digital Hygiene: Model good information consumption. Fact-check claims before sharing them. Ask questions about sources when your teen shows you "shocking" content. Demonstrate critical thinking by saying "That sounds concerning—let's look up where this information comes from" rather than immediately reacting emotionally. Young people learn more from observation than instruction.

As I flew home from Pittsburgh, I thought about my children and their digital world. The threats they face aren't visible from satellites or predictable through models. They emerge from the intersection of human psychology and technology in ways we're only beginning to understand.

But September's preparedness lessons still apply: early warning, community response, and sustained vigilance. The storms targeting our children won't announce themselves with sirens, but they can be detected, understood, and prevented—if we're willing to invest in the tools and expertise necessary to protect what matters most.

Cipher Brief Expert Dexter Ingram also publishes on Substack Code Name: Citizen

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s War Economy Lifeline: Inside the Sanctions Evasion Network https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-war-economy-lifeline-inside-the-sanctions-evasion-network https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-war-economy-lifeline-inside-the-sanctions-evasion-network

DEEP DIVE — Nearly three years into the most comprehensive sanctions regime ever imposed on a significant economy, Russia’s defense industrial base has not just survived — it has expanded at a rate that has stunned Western officials.

In spite of Western import controls, Moscow maintains wartime levels of military production by using shell companies, third-country middlemen, and financial workarounds.

In early 2026, the war will enter its fourth year, and Russia will still have access to critical battlefield technology that was banned by Western authorities. These components power the Lancet loitering munitions hitting Ukrainian positions, Kalibr cruise missiles striking infrastructure, and electronic warfare systems jamming NATO communications.

Throughout 2025, Russia produced an estimated 250,000 artillery shells monthly — 3 million annually — according to NATO intelligence, while manufacturing over 1.5 million drones and more than 2,400 cruise and ballistic missiles per year. President Vladimir Putin claimed in April that Russia’s defense industry more than doubled production of weapons, communications, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare systems over the previous year, with ammunition production increasing more than 22-fold since 2022.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte also assessed in January 2025 that Russia has fully switched to a “war economy” and produces, in three months, the weapons and ammunition that the European Union makes in a year; a production advantage enabled by sanctions-evasion networks spanning three continents.

“Evasion of Western restrictions has helped Russia ramp up production of certain military equipment and munitions, such as cruise and ballistic missiles, to a greater degree than Western governments initially expected,” John Hardie, Deputy Director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief.

The Turkey-UAE-China Triangle

Three countries have emerged as critical nodes in Russia’s procurement network. Over the past year, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and China continued to dominate Russia’s sanctions evasion infrastructure, collectively accounting for 86.2 percent of total battlefield goods shipments and 78.6 percent of critical components shipments to Russia.

The trade patterns reveal how entrenched these channels have become, and how enforcement efforts under the Trump administration have largely stalled. In the first nine months of his administration, President Trump imposed no new sanctions on Russia and declined to join the UK, EU, and other allies in targeting Russian evasion networks. Only in October 2025, after canceling peace talks with Putin, did the Trump team impose its first direct sanctions on Russia, targeting oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil while threatening secondary sanctions primarily against India, despite China being the largest importer of Russian oil globally.

“China is by far the most important enabler of that evasion,” Hardie explained. “China serves as both a direct supplier of critical inputs — such as CNC machines, microelectronics, and nitrocellulose — as well as a jurisdiction for Russian illicit procurement of Western products.”

China remains the dominant supplier, accounting for up to 90 percent of Russia’s microelectronics imports. By August last year, Beijing exported a record 328,000 miles of fiber-optic cable and nearly $50 million worth of lithium-ion batteries to Moscow in a single month. According to Germany’s Foreign Ministry, up to 80 percent of Russia’s sanctions circumvention now involves Chinese entities. Russia is paying the price for this dependence: Chinese suppliers charged Russia an 87 percent markup on sanctioned goods between 2021 and 2024, compared to just 9 percent from other suppliers.

In addition, the UAE has become the primary transshipment hub, with electronic component exports to Russia growing more than fifteenfold since the invasion. Dubai-based companies supply everything from aviation parts to Starlink terminals, which Russian forces buy for around $2,200 each. By mid-2024, UAE imports of EU airplane parts hit 23.6 million euros — a fifteenfold jump — while Turkey’s climbed by a third to 12.7 million euros, even as Russia’s direct purchases fell to zero.

Central Asia’s Shell Company Explosion

Central Asian states have become essential transit corridors, with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan serving as primary hubs. Throughout 2025, these channels have grown more sophisticated rather than diminished. From 2021 to 2022, Kyrgyzstan’s exports to Russia exploded by 250 percent, with machinery exports to Russia spiking by 41,000 percent — a figure that “cannot be attributed to market demand” but represents “economic statecraft hidden in plain sight,” according to analysis published in June 2025.

Russian buyers keep setting up shell companies in Kazakhstan to purchase electronics and drones from Europe, China, and the United States, then ship them home to Russia’s defense industry. Throughout 2025, Kazakhstan became one of Moscow’s primary backdoors for sanctioned goods. Moreover, Russian marketplace OZON has invested significantly in logistics infrastructure across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia to consolidate parallel-import cargo.

The diversions are obvious. Landlocked Kyrgyzstan continues importing EU maritime navigation equipment with no plausible domestic use — equipment destined for Russian naval systems. Over the course of last year, Western authorities intensified enforcement. In June, the UK warned businesses in five countries that those aiding sanctions evasion would face sanctions themselves.

In October, the EU’s 19th sanctions package targeted eight financial institutions in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, the UAE, and Hong Kong for facilitating circumvention, while four banks in Belarus and Kazakhstan were designated for using Russian payment infrastructures. In January 2025, the UK published enhanced guidance identifying 15 high-risk countries, including Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, the UAE, and Turkey, for which exporters must conduct enhanced due diligence.

When asked how difficult it is to distinguish legitimate trade from sanctions evasion in Central Asia, Ambassador Daniel Fried, a forty-year career diplomat and Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council, acknowledged the complexity.

“Such action is labor-intensive but worth the effort,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “We should go after the most impactful technologies and targets.”

The Yuan Lifeline: Russia’s Financial Engineering

Meanwhile, the Chinese yuan props up Moscow’s parallel financial system. As of November 2025, 99.1 percent of Russia-China trade settles in rubles and yuan — up from less than 2 percent before the invasion.

When major Chinese banks like Ping An and Bank of Ningbo stopped accepting Russian payments in mid-2024, smaller regional banks stepped in to fill the gap. These “burner banks” can shut down and reopen under new names if sanctioned.

The workaround was part of a broader effort to rewire Russia’s financial system away from the West.

The share of Western currencies in Russian trade decreased from 87 percent to 18 percent between January 2022 and December 2024. Yuan and ruble filled the gap, eliminating Western oversight from the financial system.

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Energy exports remain the bedrock. Beijing became the anchor buyer for Moscow’s hydrocarbons, with crude oil shipments exceeding 108 million tonnes in 2024 — a 30 percent increase since 2022. The Power of Siberia pipeline is reaching full capacity of 38 billion cubic meters annually.

China-Russia bilateral trade hit $245 billion in 2024, more than double 2020 levels, with 99.1 percent now settled in yuan and rubles as of late 2024, creating a sanctions-resistant corridor completely insulated from dollar oversight. Though trade dipped slightly in early 2025 — Russian officials projected around $220 billion for the year due to market adjustments — the financial architecture remains entrenched, with the yuan accounting for 99.8 percent of Moscow Exchange foreign currency trading after summer 2024 U.S. sanctions targeted the platform.

The Enforcement Challenge

There are structural limitations to Western enforcement. The EU lacks the capacity to check each and every export to a third country. Washington’s secondary sanctions strategy aims to catch violators, but effectiveness is uncertain.

Fried suggested targeted measures to disrupt these supply chains. Western enforcement faces structural limitations.

“Targeted sanctions and penalties from the Commerce Department,” he noted. “These are labor-intensive and only partially successful at best, but partial success can have an impact.”

The January 2025 sanctions package targeted nearly 400 entities across more than 20 jurisdictions. Throughout 2024, 70 percent of U.S. designations were Russia-related, with almost 33 percent targeting entities outside Russia — China accounting for 36 percent of third-country designations.

“This is not to say Western sanctions and export controls are useless,” Hardie underscored. “They do make life harder and more expensive for the Russian defense industry. And they have a greater effect on products with obvious military uses, e.g., radiation-hardened “hips for satellites. Sanctions also hamper Russian defense exports, which are an important source of revenue for the Russian defense industry.”

Chinese compliance is particularly complex. Beijing publicly respects Western sanctions yet operates on a principle of “everything not banned is allowed.” Smaller Chinese companies and regional banks keep supplying Russia while staying just within the letter of Chinese law. Beijing tolerates the arrangement as long as it doesn’t constitute a technical violation.

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Hardie noted that enforcement strategies must be sustained to be effective.

“Aggressive, consistent sanctions enforcement — i.e., designating third-country companies and banks supporting the Russian defense industry — is important and should be coupled with diplomatic pressure on foreign governments to crack down on sanctions busting,” he said.

However, political will appears inconsistent.

“Whereas the Biden Treasury Department routinely issued Russia sanctions enforcement packages, the Trump administration hasn’t issued a single one,” Hardie observed. “The Trump administration is especially reluctant to punish Chinese entities involved in Russia sanctions evasion, as it doesn’t want to strain relations with Beijing.”

Hardie also emphasized the role of the private sector.

“Western companies need to be good corporate citizens and invest in strong due diligence, which isn’t always the case,” he said. “One idea FDD has been working on is to require U.S. companies to perform’ enhanced due diligence for shipments of sensitive goods to countries known to be high-risk jurisdictions for Russian evasion.”

The result is a war economy that has adapted to intense pressure. Russia has expanded its defense industry despite sweeping sanctions, leveraging enforcement gaps, asymmetries in global trade, and non-Western intermediaries that facilitate transactions for profit.

Yet, analysts warn that structural strains are increasing.

“While there is evidence for both trends, the stresses on the Russian economy are becoming larger,” Fried noted. “The Soviet experience is instructive; the USSR managed to continue its priority programs through the end, but the overall economy deteriorated little by little, and then all at once.”

For these gaps to be closed, secondary sanctions risk must be dramatically increased, import quotas must be imposed on third countries, or Russia must be granted access to critical technology at a higher cost and with greater complexity.

Hardie, however, warned against relaxing pressure at a critical moment.

“When you need leverage to get Moscow to accept a peace deal, that’s hardly a smart time to make life easier for the Russian war machine,” he added.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside Trump’s New ‘Board of Peace’ https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-trumps-new-board-of-peace https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-trumps-new-board-of-peace OPINION — “Donald J. Trump shall serve as inaugural Chairman of the Board of Peace, and he shall separately serve as inaugural representative of the United States of America…The Chairman [Trump] shall have exclusive authority to create, modify, or dissolve subsidiary entities as necessary or appropriate to fulfill the Board of Peace’s mission…The Chairman [Trump] shall at all times designate a successor for the role of Chairman. Replacement of the Chairman [Trump] may occur only following voluntary resignation or as a result of incapacity, as determined by a unanimous vote of the Executive Board, at which time the Chairman’s [Trump’s] designated successor shall immediately assume the position of the Chairman and all associated duties and authorities of the Chairman.”

Those are quotes from the charter of the new, so-called Bureau of Peace (BOP) established by President Trump and signed January 22, at Davos, Switzerland by Trump for the United States and the leaders or representatives of 19 other countries.

On January 16, White House announcement of BOP said the organization would provide “strategic oversight, mobilizing international resources, and ensuring accountability as Gaza transitions from conflict to peace and development.”

However, six days later the BOP charter that President Trump released at Davos described its purpose in Chapter I this way: “The Board of Peace is an international organization that seeks to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict.”

No mention of Gaza, as BOP’s sole focus, but rather the far broader “areas affected or threatened by conflict.”

BOP’s expansion to a worldwide peacekeeping role provides President Trump with a new way to involve himself in international affairs, not just while he is U.S. President, but even after he leaves the White House.

I will discuss below how President Trump sees all this happening and what it may mean. First, however, it’s worth seeing how BOP’s charter, gives its Chairman, Trump, total power over the organization even beyond what’s mentioned above.

For example,, the charter says. “Membership in the Board of Peace is limited to States invited to participate by the Chairman…Each Member State shall serve a term of no more than three years from this Charter’s entry into force, subject to renewal by the Chairman…The Executive Board shall be selected by the Chairman…shall serve two-year terms, subject to removal by the Chairman and renewable at his discretion…[and] shall be led by a Chief Executive nominated by the Chairman and confirmed by a majority vote of the Executive Board…Decisions of the Executive Board shall be made by a majority of its members present and voting, including the

Chief Executive. Such decisions shall go into effect immediately, subject to veto by the Chairman at any time thereafter.”

Beyond that, Chairman Trump, under the charter, shall convene BOP meetings, establish their locations, must approve the agendas and the persons from all states attending those meeting.

Individually, the charter says Chairman Trump, “acting on behalf of the Board of Peace, is authorized to adopt resolutions or other directives, consistent with this Charter, to implement the Board of Peace’s mission.”

As Chairman, Trump can also “dissolve [BOP] at such time as the Chairman considers necessary or appropriate, or at the end of every odd-numbered calendar year, unless renewed by the Chairman no later than November 21 of such odd-numbered calendar year.”

The charter says, “The Executive Board shall provide for the rules and procedures with respect to the settling of all assets, liabilities, and obligations upon [BOP’s] dissolution,” but remember, decisions of the Executive Board are “subject to veto by the Chairman at any time.”

In short, the BOP charter gives Trump total control over the organization and all its activities.

At last Thursday’s press conference introducing BOP, Trump said, “This Board [BOP] has the chance to be one of the most consequential bodies ever created and it's my enormous honor to serve as its chairman. I was very honored when they asked me to do it. We had an idea to do it, and then they came. They said, "You be the chairman."

Trump never explained who “they” were.

Although 50 nations had been invited to join BOP, only 19 showed up to attend last Thursday’s announcement. Major Western allies, such as Canada, France and Germany have balked and voiced concerns that the body is designed to replace the United Nations.

Trump, who just recently had the U.S. withdraw from many U.N. organizations, said at last Thursday BOP press conference, “I've always said the United Nations has got tremendous potential, has not used it, but there's tremendous potential in the United Nations and you have some great people at the United Nations, but so far it hasn't.”

He repeated, “There's tremendous potential with the United Nations and I think the combination of the Board of Peace with the kind of people we have here coupled with the United Nations can be something very, very unique for the world, for the world.”

It is worth noting that the Trump approved as the BOP seal something in gold that’s very similar to that of the U.N. seal.

Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who helped put together BOP and is a founding member of its Executive Board, said at last Thursday’s event, he had put together a plan for rebuilding Gaza with the help of the U.N. as the Security Council had originally voted.

But then Kushner added, “We've worked very, very well with them, this is why you need a new organization like the Board of Peace to work with the U.N.”

Kushner specifically thanked U.N.’s Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, who it turns out gave an interview to Sky News at the time of the BOP announcement.

Fletcher insisted, “The U.N. is not going anywhere…We’ve got to get out there, end wars, save lives, and we’re doing that.” Asked if Trump’s organization would replace the U.N., Fletcher responded, “Now I think we’re seeing America wanting to play a part in ending some of these conflicts and they want us [the U.N.] to be as effective as we can be.”

Fletcher then gave a description of what I judge he sees as Trump’s different way of looking at how he, Trump, works with world leaders.

Fletcher said. “There’s a difference between the old school statecraft that’s familiar to many people here at Davos and a sort of real estate craft, which is coming into this conversation now, which is more transactional. It’s very focused on results, not process. It’s focused on personal relationships and not always institutions. Yes, there’s an aspect of cliff-hanger and jeopardy to it. We never quite know what’s coming next, but it is part of the conversation. And if it can save lives and it ends wars then that is fine.”

To me that is roll-the-dice diplomacy – in effect gambling on national security and foreign policy outcomes. Remember, Trump’s Atlantic City ventures that started in the 1980s. By 2004, all three Trump casinos and Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc. were bankrupt.

Trump, has rolled the dice on Venezuela, let’s see how that turns out. And hopefully, BOP won’t be like Trump’s casinos, although right now it does not look to me like a good gamble.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
An Update on Venezuela, Post Maduro Apprehension https://belimedia.com.ng/an-update-on-venezuela-post-maduro-apprehension https://belimedia.com.ng/an-update-on-venezuela-post-maduro-apprehension EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Turmoil in Minneapolis and the unprecedented friction within NATO over President Trump’s effort to secure control over Greenland have, predictably, displaced headlines about Venezuela in much of the daily press. But there have been at least a number of important statements from the U.S. and one disturbing statement, reportedly, by Venezuela’s interim president since the U.S. apprehended Maduro and his wife.

”Now, this is not the end. This is not even the beginning of the end”. Winston Churchill, 1942

On January 20th, in a press conference, President Trump said he was considering a role for Venezuela’s democratic opposition leader, Nobel laureate Maria Corina Machado. This was a very encouraging statement. The opposition has the support of the vast majority of Venezuelans. As has been widely reported and well documented, they won the July 24 national election by an enormous margin despite regime efforts to undermine their campaign.

Maria Corina Machado is the leader of the opposition and a national hero. She is committed to rebuilding her country’s democracy and to reconstructing Venezuela’s dysfunctional and corruption-ridden economy. She is pro-American, pro-private sector and open to foreign direct investment.”

The regime, now being led on an interim basis by Delcy Rodriquez, held on to power after the July 2024 vote through intimidation. The Venezuelan public knows this. And, despite assurances of cooperation to President Trump, there are already signs that the character of this authoritarian regime’s approach to governance has not changed. The regime moved quickly after the U.S. removed Maduro to squelch public expressions of relief that Maduro had been taken into U.S. custody. Left to their own devices, Delcy Rodriquez and company will do everything in their power to consolidate their hold on power. Indeed, this is clear from Rodriguez’s recent public statement that she has had “enough already of Washington’s orders over Venezuelan politicians.”

Integrating Maria Corina Machado into the transition process would reassure her supporters and help to counter the impression that the U.S. is indifferent to the plight of the Venezuelan democratic opposition. It would also contribute to the establishment of the kind of security on the ground that the American oil majors have said must be achieved before they commit to the immense investments necessary to resurrect the country much diminished and dilapidated oil sector.

President Trump says the U.S. will manage the receipts for Venezuelan oil sales and direct some of that money back into Venezuela. Good but these funds should be channeled mostly into the hands of the opposition rather than the regime. Indeed, the last thing that should be done with the oil receipts is giving them to the regime. The regime’s managerial incompetence and corrupt practices are precisely what caused the effective collapse of the economy! As I and others have noted in the past, oil production in Venezuela has shrunk by two thirds since Hugo Chavez was elected. Things got even worse under Nicolas Maduro. The Venezuelan economy contracted by around 70 percent between 2013, when Maduro assumed the presidency, and 2023.

The Trump administration’s decision to work with remaining elements of the Maduro regime’s leadership cadre was and remains understandable. The U.S. wants to avoid the mistakes we made after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The regime’s remaining leaders, however, are never going to be willing partners in the reconstruction of, Venezuela if that means empowering their adversaries – as Delcy Rodriguez’s recent comment makes clear. They are counting on the U.S. losing interest or being distracted by other crises. The United States needs to be prepared to counter this heretofore unstated impression.

The U.S. considered this a criminal regime before Maduro was apprehended. Rodriquez and the ministers of Defense and Interior were all a part of Maduro’s inner circle. They are miscreants who will revert to their previous patterns of repression and malfeasance absent close vigilance by the U.S. and the democratic opposition. This is why President Trump’s decision to get American diplomats back into the country and name a tough, experienced ambassador to lead the Venezuelan interest section presently located in Bogota was so important.

The U.S. has a long list of issues to work through with the Rodriquez team. Following Maduro’s capture, Rodriguez, on behalf of the regime, agreed to work with the U.S. to avoid further U.S. military action. We will need to watch carefully to be assured that commitments are met. We should also communicate persuasively that the U.S. is willing to act forcefully again if the circumstances warrant it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
Signs of Trouble from Venezuela's Regime Could Be Subtle at First https://belimedia.com.ng/signs-of-trouble-from-venezuelas-regime-could-be-subtle-at-first https://belimedia.com.ng/signs-of-trouble-from-venezuelas-regime-could-be-subtle-at-first OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Turmoil in Minneapolis and the unprecedented friction within NATO over President Trump’s effort to secure control over Greenland have, predictably, displaced headlines about Venezuela in much of the daily press. But there have been at least a number of important statements from the U.S. and one disturbing statement, reportedly, by Venezuela’s interim president since the U.S. apprehended Maduro and his wife.

”Now, this is not the end. This is not even the beginning of the end”. Winston Churchill, 1942

On January 20th, in a press conference, President Trump said he was considering a role for Venezuela’s democratic opposition leader, Nobel laureate Maria Corina Machado. This was a very encouraging statement. The opposition has the support of the vast majority of Venezuelans. As has been widely reported and well documented, they won the July 24 national election by an enormous margin despite regime efforts to undermine their campaign.

Maria Corina Machado is the leader of the opposition and a national hero. She is committed to rebuilding her country’s democracy and to reconstructing Venezuela’s dysfunctional and corruption-ridden economy. She is pro-American, pro-private sector and open to foreign direct investment.”

The regime, now being led on an interim basis by Delcy Rodriquez, held on to power after the July 2024 vote through intimidation. The Venezuelan public knows this. And, despite assurances of cooperation to President Trump, there are already signs that the character of this authoritarian regime’s approach to governance has not changed. The regime moved quickly after the U.S. removed Maduro to squelch public expressions of relief that Maduro had been taken into U.S. custody. Left to their own devices, Delcy Rodriquez and company will do everything in their power to consolidate their hold on power. Indeed, this is clear from Rodriguez’s recent public statement that she has had “enough already of Washington’s orders over Venezuelan politicians.”

Integrating Maria Corina Machado into the transition process would reassure her supporters and help to counter the impression that the U.S. is indifferent to the plight of the Venezuelan democratic opposition. It would also contribute to the establishment of the kind of security on the ground that the American oil majors have said must be achieved before they commit to the immense investments necessary to resurrect the country much diminished and dilapidated oil sector.

President Trump says the U.S. will manage the receipts for Venezuelan oil sales and direct some of that money back into Venezuela. Good but these funds should be channeled mostly into the hands of the opposition rather than the regime. Indeed, the last thing that should be done with the oil receipts is giving them to the regime. The regime’s managerial incompetence and corrupt practices are precisely what caused the effective collapse of the economy! As I and others have noted in the past, oil production in Venezuela has shrunk by two thirds since Hugo Chavez was elected. Things got even worse under Nicolas Maduro. The Venezuelan economy contracted by around 70 percent between 2013, when Maduro assumed the presidency, and 2023.

The Trump administration’s decision to work with remaining elements of the Maduro regime’s leadership cadre was and remains understandable. The U.S. wants to avoid the mistakes we made after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The regime’s remaining leaders, however, are never going to be willing partners in the reconstruction of, Venezuela if that means empowering their adversaries – as Delcy Rodriguez’s recent comment makes clear. They are counting on the U.S. losing interest or being distracted by other crises. The United States needs to be prepared to counter this heretofore unstated impression.

The U.S. considered this a criminal regime before Maduro was apprehended. Rodriquez and the ministers of Defense and Interior were all a part of Maduro’s inner circle. They are miscreants who will revert to their previous patterns of repression and malfeasance absent close vigilance by the U.S. and the democratic opposition. This is why President Trump’s decision to get American diplomats back into the country and name a tough, experienced ambassador to lead the Venezuelan interest section presently located in Bogota was so important.

The U.S. has a long list of issues to work through with the Rodriquez team. Following Maduro’s capture, Rodriguez, on behalf of the regime, agreed to work with the U.S. to avoid further U.S. military action. We will need to watch carefully to be assured that commitments are met. We should also communicate persuasively that the U.S. is willing to act forcefully again if the circumstances warrant it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
China’s Stunning Military Purge – and What It Means For Taiwan https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-stunning-military-purge-and-what-it-means-for-taiwan https://belimedia.com.ng/chinas-stunning-military-purge-and-what-it-means-for-taiwan

DEEP DIVE – President Xi Jinping’s latest purge of generals has eviscerated China’s military leadership, drawn comparisons to crackdowns carried out by Chairman Mao Zedong a half century ago, and raised questions about China’s military plans for a takeover of Taiwan.

Xi moved in the past week against China’s most senior military official, General Zhang Youxai, and General Liu Zhenli, who heads the Joint Staff Department, which oversees operations, intelligence and training. Zhang and Liu were members of the Central Military Commission, or CMC, China’s most important military body – and Xi’s campaign has now claimed all but two of the CMC’s six leaders (one of whom is Xi himself). Xi’s earlier purges have ended the careers of dozens of lower-ranking generals.

“The PLA’s core command has been mutilated by these purges,” Dr. Zi Yang, an expert on China’s military at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), told The Cipher Brief. As for the CMC, he said that “this organization…that is supposed to oversee quality military advice is more or less gutted. Who’s giving Xi advice on running an organization of two million military personnel?”

Imagine an American president firing all but one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with several other high-ranking generals, while simultaneously preparing for a major military contingency, and you have some sense of what’s happening in China.

Dennis Wilder, who served as a senior CIA official and a top White House adviser on China, called the moves against Generals Zhang and Liu the “most stunning developments in Chinese politics” since Xi’s rise to power – and said the purges would almost certainly affect any moves against Taiwan.

“If Xi had plans for 2027, I think they’re delayed,” Wilder told The Cipher Brief, referring to Xi’s directive that the military be prepared by 2027 to take taiwan by force. “I don't know for how long but they have to be delayed at this point. There's no way that they're ready to take on a major military confrontation in these circumstances.”

Gen. Zhang was widely considered Xi’s most trusted military aide. Former U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, who attended a meeting with Zhang in 2024, told The New York Times that he “spoke in an unvarnished way that was typical of a military guy, but also reflective of someone who didn’t feel like he had to be cautious.” Now Gen. Zhang is the latest and most consequential casualty of Xi’s widening purge.

“It’s fair to say this is a seismic event,” Sullivan said. For Xi to “take out somebody who he had such a long history with is striking, and raises a lot of questions.”

Anatomy of a crackdown

On January 24th the Defense Ministry announced that Generals Zhang and Liu had been placed under investigation for “suspected serious discipline and law violations”. An editorial in China’s Liberation Army Daily said the two men had “trampled on” Xi’s authority and “severely undermined the party’s absolute leadership over the military.” Their actions, the paper said, had caused “massive damage” to the military’s political strength and combat readiness. The Wall Street Journal reported that General Zhang has been accused of leaking nuclear secrets to the United States.

Experts had assumed that Gen. Zhang would avoid the purges, given his rare combination of attributes: a decades-long close relationship with Xi; and a decorated record during the 1979 border war with Vietnam. Few current commanders in China have experienced combat.

“Zhang matters, both as a combat-tested veteran – which is a very rare commodity within the PLA – but also because he truly understands war.” Shanshan Mei, a China defense expert at RAND and former advisor to the U.S. Air Force on China, told The Cipher Brief. “He truly understands tactics and morale and real combat issues.”

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Since taking power in 2012, Xi Jinping has prioritized a revamping of the military, which was widely seen as beset by corruption and outmoded thinking. He fired dozens of generals and began an overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which was ultimately led by Gen. Zhang. Xi’s purging of the CMC leadership began in 2023 and culminated in last week’s moves against Zhang and Liu.

Last year, Dr. Zi – the RSIS expert – wrote an article about the purges and argued that Zhang Youxia’s removal would likely trigger a crisis within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Now, Zi says, that moment has arrived.

“It's going to have trickle-down effects for sure to the operational level,” Zi told The Cipher Brief. “All of Zhang’s associates are going to be put under suspicion. All of Zhang’s underlings are going to feel the pressure as well.”

What it means for Taiwan – and beyond

Experts told The Cipher Brief that the latest ousters will likely have several immediate effects: a drop in PLA morale; less high-level risk-taking and innovation; a disruption in decision-making – involving everything from procurement to high-tech modernization to actual priorities and battle plans; and an almost-certain delay in any military operations against Taiwan.

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, a former CIA director of East Asia operations, wrote an article for The Cipher Brief in October in which he warned that the high-level upheaval within the PLA might impact decisions involving Taiwan. Now he says that delays are inevitable.

“You’ve got to say this is not going to happen [by 2027],” Amb. DeTrani told The Cipher Brief. “And if it is, you have got to wonder, what sort of planning and what sort of leadership would go in? I just don't see how President Xi Jinping could feel even remotely confident that China’s military would be prepared, or is prepared, to use kinetic means to take over Taiwan.”

Zi said that the purging of the two top generals “has clearly damaged the PLA’s operational capacity,” and he, too, doubted that the military could move against Taiwan until the internal turbulence passes and a new leadership is put in place.

“Any war in the Taiwan Strait is going to be an extremely complex large-scale military operation,” Zi said. “It will require the mobilization of China’s resources in all realms and mobilization of basically all military services and forces. You need people who are capable and talented in positions to plan and lead these operations.”

Wilder said that while China’s basic military readiness is not in question – “pilots know how to fly their planes…(and) naval and infantry commanders know how to lead their units,” he said – the latest purges will compromise the oversight and execution of any major operations in the near term.

“I don’t think this changes the readiness of PLA forces,” he said. “It’s really about the command structure. I think execution is a problem, because your command structure has been so disrupted.”

That “command structure” has been housed within the CMC, whose only remaining uniformed officer is Gen. Zhang Shengmin, who Zi described as a “political commissar with next to no operational command experience.”

“He’s not a combat veteran,” Wilder said of Zhang Shengmin. “You have to find a general in charge, if you're going to go forward with a plan. Who’s your operational commander?”

Beyond Taiwan, Wilder said the purges risk a broader “paralysis” within the military’s top echelons. “You don't know what's safe anymore, and whether you might be investigated,” he said. “Officers will want to keep their heads down. They won’t want to propose anything. They will simply wait for instructions.” That, he added, will render the military leadership “dysfunctional for a while. It becomes incapable of serious decision-making.”

Experts said decision-making wasn’t a problem for Gen. Zhang Youxia, who was seen as a straight-shooting advisor who wouldn’t hesitate to give Xi a less-than-rosy assessment.

“Zhang could give Xi Jinping critical advice and know that Xi would listen,” RAND’s Mei said. “A key question now is: Who is going to give Xi Jinping the Zhang Youxai-style, informed and combat-tested advice, if Xi decides to make any big moves militarily? Who’s going to give him the honest opinion?”

Amb. DeTrani said that morale at lower ranks will be challenged as well.

“It's got to affect the troops,” DeTrani said. “What is the message that Xi Jinping is sending to the troops – that his leaders are all either corrupt or involved in other nefarious activities? It's got to be very demoralizing for the core of the People's Liberation Army.” He said frontline soldiers may go so far as to question their own commitments. “I've been taking orders from these people and told to potentially give up my life to serve the country – and these people are feeding off the trough? They're corrupt and we're hearing that from our supreme leader? How could they expect us to sacrifice so much if they're not invested the same way as we are?”

Who will take their place?

In the near term, all eyes will be on the generals Xi taps to fill the vacancies – and how soon he does so. Wilder said that one of his “best contacts” inside China told him in the wake of the moves against Zhang and Liu that “There’s more coming. There are going to be other generals that go.” Any further bloodletting would suggest an extended period without a fully reconstituted top brass.

Whenever Xi chooses to fill the top-tier positions, he will presumably be looking for loyalists who also bring experience and expertise. But experts said that the trickle-down effect of the purges means that many candidates may be tainted by association to the ousted generals.

“In China, when you take down one person, everything about that person is wrong,” Mei said. “Who is going to replace Zhang? We keep looking one level down, to the theater commanders and political commissars. But many of these people were Zhang Youxian proteges. You take him out, it doesn’t mean that you will have a big collection of qualified, loyal military leaders ready to take over.” She added that among China’s ten theater commanders, “at least 4 or 5 are Zhang Youxian’s people.”

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Several experts referenced Mao’s 1950s “Red” versus “Expert” ideological formula, in which fealty to the Communist Party (i.e., “Red”) was prized above technical skills. The ideal citizens were "Red and Expert" – people who brought both elements to their work.

“The real question is, can he find the loyalists he needs in those jobs?” Wilder said. “Does he have a slate of candidates? I would presume he cannot leave these positions open for too long.”

“My gut feeling tells me that Xi is valuing loyalty over professionalism,” Zi said. “A military professional may tell you things that you don’t want to hear. If he cannot find someone who is both ‘Red’ and ‘expert,’ he is going to choose someone who is loyal.”

Zi and others added that whoever lands in these positions will have to tread carefully.

“They will have to be extremely cautious about their behavior, their words, they must carry themselves in a more subservient way,” Zi said. “Maybe even total obedience to Xi’s will and Xi’s mind. Because you don't want to put yourself in the same position as Zhang. And they won’t have anything like his capital.”

Outside China, watching with interest

Officials in Taiwan said this week that they were closely monitoring what they called “abnormal shifts” within China’s senior military leadership. That said, Defense Minister Wellington Koo projected a nothing-has-changed approach, saying Taipei would not relax its guard, and noting that China’s war games have continued and Beijing has not changed its position vis-a-vis Taiwan.

Mei, Zi and Wilder all raised a concern about another regional flashpoint: The South China Sea. In their view, Xi may seek to quiet domestic concerns about the PLA – and send the rest of the world a message – by initiating a smaller-scale conflict involving those disputed waters.

“I would worry about the South China Sea, because Xi might want to prove that he’s still strong,” Wilder said. “So what do you do? You pick on a small guy. I’d worry about the Philippines. I think we’re going to have to watch for muscle-flexing of some sort.”

Zi voiced the same concern, suggesting Xi might seek a “rally-the-flag” operation in the South China Sea – a “small conflict that might be viewed as easy pickings.”

As for the U.S., the chaos in China’s military leadership offers at least one benefit: the gift of time, as Washington and its Asian allies consider the range of contingencies involving Taiwan.

“You've got a wonderful opportunity,” Wilder said. “Number one, you have time that you didn't have before. We have all these Indo-Pacom plans, we're trying to get AI in the field, drone swarms into the field. It gives us a longer timeline for working with the Japanese, the Philippines, the Australians. That's the good news.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Coast Guard's Mission in the Gray Zone https://belimedia.com.ng/the-coast-guards-mission-in-the-gray-zone https://belimedia.com.ng/the-coast-guards-mission-in-the-gray-zone OPINION — U.S. defense planning rests on the assumption that wars are fought abroad, by expeditionary forces, against defined adversaries. For decades, those assumptions held. But today, many of the most consequential security challenges facing the United States violate all three. They occur closer to home, below the threshold of armed conflict, and in domains where sovereignty is enforced incrementally.

The shift has exposed a chronic mismatch between how the United States defines its defense priorities and how it allocates resources and respect. While defense discourse continues to stubbornly emphasize power projection and high-end conflict, many of today’s challenges revolve around the more modest and rote enforcement of U.S. territorial integrity and national sovereignty - functions that are vital to U.S. strategic objectives yet lack the optical prestige of winning wars abroad.

Sitting at the center of this gap between prestige and need is the U.S. Coast Guard, whose mission profile aligns directly with America’s most important strategic objectives - the enforcement of sovereignty and homeland defense - yet remains strategically undervalued because its work rarely resembles the celebrated and well-funded styles of conventional warfighting. In an era of increased gray-zone competition and persistent coercion, the failure to properly appreciate the Coast Guard threatens real strategic fallout.

In the third decade of the 21st century, U.S. defense planning remains heavily oriented toward expeditionary warfighting and high-end kinetic conflict. Budget conversations still revolve around Ford-class supercarriers, F-35 fighters, and A2/AD penetration. This orientation shapes not only force design and budget allocations, but also institutional prestige and political capital. The services associated with visible combat power, with the Ford-class and the F-35, continue to dominate strategic discourse—even as many of the most persistent security challenges confronting the United States unfold close to home, in the gray-zone, without the need for fifth-generation air power or heavy armor.

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At the most basic level, any nation’s military exists primarily to defend territorial integrity, enforce sovereignty, and protect the homeland. Power projection, forward presence, and deterrence abroad are important—but they are secondary functions derived from the primary purpose of homeland defense. Yet U.S. defense discourse often treats homeland defense as a background condition when it should be revered as the first priority. The result is a blind spot in how security resources are evaluated and allocated.

The Coast Guard operates at a unique point where law enforcement, military authority, and sovereign enforcement all converge. On any given day, the Coast Guard may board foreign-flagged vessels suspected of sanctions violations, police maritime borders against illicit trafficking, secure ports that underpin global supply chains, and maintain a persistent presence in contested spaces, like the Arctic, without inviting escalation. The Coast Guard is equipped to intercept illegal fishing fleets, escort commercial shipping through sensitive waterways, and assert jurisdiction in legally ambiguous areas. These activities rarely resemble traditional warfighting, they rarely result in a Hollywood blockbuster, and they can be accomplished without nuclear-powered submarines or intercontinental ballistic missiles. But these are not peripheral activities—they are arguably amongst the most important daily functions the U.S. military undertakes.

Distinct among the military branches, the Coast Guard operates under a legal framework that is uniquely suited to today’s security environment. Under Title 14 status, the Coast Guard falls within the Department of Homeland Security, conducting law enforcement and regulatory missions on a daily basis. Yet, when needed, the service can transition to Title 10 status, under the Department of Defense, and operate as an armed service when required. This agility allows the Coast Guard to remain continuously engaged across the spectrum of competition, whether enforcing U.S. law in peacetime, managing escalation in gray-zone encounters, or integrating seamlessly into military operations. Few other elements of U.S. power can move so fluidly between legal regimes.

Still, despite such strategic relevance, the Coast Guard suffers from a persistent optical problem. U.S. defense culture has long privileged services and missions associated with visible, kinetic combat—those that lend themselves to clear narratives of victory, sacrifice, and heroism. The Coast Guard’s work rarely fits that cinematic mold. Its success is measured not in territory seized or targets destroyed, but in disruptions prevented, borders enforced, and crises that never materialize. Inherently quiet work with outcomes that reflect a force operating exactly as designed, although without generating institutional prestige or political support. In a system that rewards the loudest and the brightest, the Coast Guard’s quiet enforcement of sovereignty is easy to overlook.

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Continuing to overlook the value of the Coast Guard carries strategic consequences. Specifically, persistent underinvestment in the Coast Guard weakens maritime domain awareness, reduces sustained presence in key waterways, and narrows the set of tools available to manage gray-zone competition. As adversaries increasingly rely on legal ambiguity, deniable actors, and incremental pressure to test U.S. resolve, gaps in enforcement become opportunities. In this environment, the absence of credible, continuous sovereignty enforcement invites probing behavior that becomes harder to deter over time.

Advocacy for the Coast Guard does not require reassigning prestige, or elevating one service at the expense of others. It is merely an argument for strategic alignment. If territorial integrity, sovereignty enforcement, and homeland defense are truly core national-security priorities, then the institutions most directly responsible for those missions should be treated accordingly. As competition increasingly unfolds in the gray-zone between peace and war, the United States will need forces designed not only to win conflicts—but to prevent them from starting in the first place.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
The 2026 National Defense Strategy: No Surprises but Plenty of Mandate https://belimedia.com.ng/the-2026-national-defense-strategy-no-surprises-but-plenty-of-mandate https://belimedia.com.ng/the-2026-national-defense-strategy-no-surprises-but-plenty-of-mandate OPINION — The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) follows closely the 2025 National Security Strategy, as it should. It also falls in line with the Department of Defense’s narrative and the actions they have taken regarding priorities. The NDS has four lines of effort:

  • Defending the U.S. Homeland - Homeland defense is the top priority, with the Western Hemisphere elevated above other regions. This includes border security, open lines of transportation (Panama Canal and Greenland), counter-narcotics operations, and countering adversary influence. This is not a surprise.
  • Deterring China in the Indo-Pacific - The approach focuses on deterrence through military strength rather than confrontation, aiming to prevent Chinese dominance while avoiding conflict. The strategy emphasizes expanded military-to-military communication with Beijing to reduce conflict risks. It still cites China’s predatory behaviors and makes clear that China is the second highest priority.
  • Increasing Burden-Sharing with Allies - The document argues that allies must significantly increase defense spending, pointing to a new global benchmark of 5% of GDP for defense-related expenditures. It also calls on allies to keep watch against threats in their part of the world so that the US can focus on the Western Hemisphere.
  • Revitalizing the U.S. Defense Industrial Base - Described as a once-in-a-century effort essential for military readiness, providing strength to deter the US from getting embroiled in a war, and, if needed, the ability to produce weapons at scale during crises.

Notable Omissions

  • The strategy makes no specific mention of or guarantee to Taiwan, unlike the 2022 Biden era strategy which explicitly supported Taiwan's self-defense. It also omits climate change as a security threat, which the Biden administration had identified.
  • Perhaps, the most concerning issue is that the NDS does not mention Ukraine. It would have been easy to call out Ukraine’s successes against Russia as the example for how the strategy forecasts the behaviors it seeks from our allies. It also characterizes Russia as a persistent but manageable threat, in effect relegating Russia at the end of the day as inconsequential to the US. This underestimates Moscow’s ability to cause havoc beyond Ukraine. It also is much like waving the red flag at the bull. Moscow will not like being considered a minor player on the world stage.

Is Cognitive Warfare Still a Thing?

While the Defense Industrial Base is called out as important as is the need for weapons systems and platforms, there is nothing in the document about increasing activities in the cognitive warfare area. This is an area where the US needs to step up. There are statements throughout the NDS where one can read into the need for cognitive warfare. The NDS talks about providing options in the spaces prior to war and being ready if the US must go to war. These statements support increasing intelligence support and non-kinetic options for decision makers. Specifically, the NDS says:

  • …this Strategy will ensure that we see things and the choices we need to make clearly.
For decisionmakers to “see things” and understand the landscape and to provide them options or choices they will need a strong intelligence community that can collect the information needed to provide warning and articulate the threats we are facing. This same community will then be able to analyze the adversaries’ responses to choices that we make and help inform decisionmakers on what path might work best.
  • ….including by leading efforts to deter or defend against other, lesser threats

Again, to deter adversaries, not only does the adversary have to fear your kinetic response but also what you can do behind the scene. Additionally, cognitive warfare can prep the battle space, even if we do not ultimately resort to a battle space. Influence operations could play a huge role in deterrence.

  • · ….partner with ….other federal departments and agencies to reinvigorate and mobilize our great nation’s unrivaled creativity and ingenuity, re-spark our innovative spirit….

This statement seems to be here to support calls for increased irregular warfare activities. Creativity and ingenuity are the hallmark for cognitive warfare and the Department can best support activities within the cognitive warfare or irregular warfare space by partnering with other federal departments and agencies.

Conclusion

There is nothing surprising in the NDS and that is a good thing. If the NDS had not closely matched the National Security Strategy or the direction we have witnessed the Department headed in the last year, something would have been off. What the NDS does do is provide the military and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise with a strategic framework for priorities. The National Intelligence Strategy should follow next. While the regional priorities in a National Intelligence Strategy should not be surprising, it will be illuminating to see the strategic direction that the Director of National Intelligence sets for how the intelligence community should move forward.

The NDS priorities mean that there will be some adjustments to resources. Reporting indicates that there may soon be changes to the unified command plan whereby US SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM will be combined into an America’s Command. There will also need to be an adjustment to resources, both money and people to be able to fulfill the NDS mandate. Such a change will take time to build. Expertise does not come overnight.

The Department will need to make major changes in acquisition and contracting to be able to develop the capabilities the NDS has called out and in the time frame it demands. It is clear that the Department is moving in that direction.

There are repercussions for our partners and our adversaries. More will be expected of our partners but again, the administration has been clear on that issue and when pressed, our partners have shown that they can step up.

Finally, the NDS is clear that the US is not looking for a fight. However, it is also clear that if our adversaries move in that direction, we will be prepared to push back. We need to make sure that we are and put more focus on cognitive warfare to help us be prepared but also to keep us out of a kinetic fight!

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
New Reports Reveal Years of Unaddressed Osprey Safety Risks https://belimedia.com.ng/new-reports-reveal-years-of-unaddressed-osprey-safety-risks https://belimedia.com.ng/new-reports-reveal-years-of-unaddressed-osprey-safety-risks

DEEP DIVE — It is one of the most lauded defense developments in recent decades, providing preeminent capability to U.S. military personnel worldwide, but that prowess evidently comes with a steep cost that military leadership allowed to grow for years.

Critics have long asserted that the military failed to adequately address a mounting series of safety issues with the V-22 Osprey aircraft, even as service members died in preventable crashes. The Naval Air Systems Command review and Government Accountability Office report paint a scathing portrait of systemic failures by the Joint Program Office overseeing V-22 variants for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

The Marine Corps operates approximately 348 MV-22s, the Air Force 52 CV-22s, and the Navy 29 CMV-22s, with the program of record at around 464 total across services. Japan operates 17 MV-22s, with deliveries complete or near-complete.

The Deadly Track Record

Some 30 U.S. Marines lost their lives in three separate crashes during the testing and development phase throughout the 1990s, giving the Osprey the nickname “The Widow Maker.” Since its introduction in 2007, at least 35 servicemembers have died in 10 fatal crashes.

“Initially, the V-22 suffered from Vortex Ring State, which produced crashes during development. The problem was diagnosed and remediated, and the loss rate went down dramatically,” John Pike, a leading defense, space and intelligence policy expert and Director of GlobalSecurity.org, tells The Cipher Brief. “Subsequent losses have been ‘normal accidents’ due to the usual mechanical and human failings.”

The GAO found that serious Osprey mishaps in 2023 and 2024 exceeded the previous eight years and generally surpassed accident rates of other Navy and Air Force aircraft. In August 2023, three Marines died in Australia. In 2022, four U.S. soldiers were killed in a NATO training mission, and five Marines were killed in California.

Unresolved Problems

The NAVAIR report revealed that “the cumulative risk posture of the V-22 platform has been growing since initial fielding,” and the program office “has not promptly implemented fixes.” Of 12 Class A mishaps in the past four years, seven involved parts failures already identified as major problems but not addressed.

Issues with hard-clutch engagement (HCE) caused the July 2022 California crash that killed five. The problem occurs when the clutch connecting the engine to the propeller gearbox slips and reengages abruptly, causing a power spike that can throw the aircraft into an uncontrolled roll.

There were eight Air Force servicemembers killed in the November 2023 crash off Yakushima Island when a catastrophic propeller gearbox failed due to cracks in the metal pinion gear, and the pilot continued flying despite multiple warnings, contributing to the crash.

This manufacturing issue dates to 2006, but the Joint Program Office didn’t formally assess the risk until March 2024 – nearly two decades later. A NAVAIR logbook review found that over 40 safety-critical components were operating beyond their airworthiness limits, and that 81 percent of ground accidents were due to human error.

A Broken System: Poor Communication Between Services

The GAO also found that the three services don’t routinely share critical safety information. Aircrews haven’t met regularly to review aircraft knowledge and emergency procedures. The services operate with significantly different maintenance standards, with three parallel review processes and no common source of material.

The GAO identified 34 unresolved safety risks, including eight potentially catastrophic risks that have remained open for a median of 10 years. The V-22 has the oldest average age of unresolved catastrophic safety risks across the Navy’s aircraft inventory.

Fixes May Take a Decade

The Navy report indicated fixes won’t be complete until 2033-2034. Officials now say the fleet won’t return to unrestricted operations until 2026 – a year later than planned. The V-22 program plans to upgrade gearboxes with triple-melted steel, reducing inclusions by 90 percent.

Under current restrictions, overwater flights are prohibited unless within 30 minutes of a safe landing spot, severely limiting their use by the Navy and Marine Corps.

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Osprey's Unmatched Capabilities

The Osprey still offers a game-changing advantage for U.S. troops, despite its troubled past, according to its supporters.

As it currently stands, the entire fleet operates under restrictions that prevent overwater flights unless within 30 minutes of a safe landing spot, significantly limiting its utility for Navy and Marine Corps missions.

In 1979 to 1980, American hostages were taken in Iran during Operation Eagle Claw, which gave rise to the Osprey. As five of the eight Navy helicopters that arrived at Desert One were inoperable, it was clear that rapid troop movement in harsh environmental conditions was urgently needed.

After development began in 1985, the Osprey entered service in 2007, replacing the Vietnam-era CH-46 Sea Knight.

Compared to fixed-wing transports, the Osprey can land troops just where they are needed. Airdrops with parachutes tend to scatter paratroops all over the place; see ‘Saving Private Ryan,’” Pike explained. “And compared with other rotary wing aircraft, the Osprey is much faster and has a much longer range.”

The Osprey shifts from helicopter to airplane mode in under 12 seconds, reaches speeds of 315 mph, has an operational range of 580 miles, and carries 10,000 pounds – or 24 troops. It’s used for missions ranging from combat operations to the occasional transport of White House staff. During a dust storm in Afghanistan in 2010, two CV-22 helicopters rescued 32 soldiers in under four hours from a distance of 800 miles.

Chronic Readiness Problems

Yet these performance advantages have been undercut by persistent readiness shortfalls.

The NAVAIR report noted that mission-capable rates between 2020 and 2024 averaged just 50 percent for the Navy and Air Force, and 60 percent for Marines. The Osprey requires 100 percent more unscheduled maintenance than the Navy averages and 22 maintenance man-hours per flight hour versus 12 for other aircraft.

In addition, Boeing settled a whistleblower lawsuit in 2023 for $8.1 million after employees accused the company of falsifying records for composite part testing. Boeing, in its defense, claimed that the parts were “non-critical” and did not impact flight safety.

Conflicting Views on Safety

“The Osprey does not have a troubled safety record. Per a recent press release, the V-22 mishap rate per 100,000 flight hours is 3.28, which is in line with helicopters with similar missions.” a government source who works closely with the Osprey fleet but is not authorized to speak on the record contended to The Cipher Brief. “Like anything measured statistically, there are periods above and below the mean. Just because humans tend to conclude because of apparent clusters doesn’t necessarily mean there is a pattern or connection – think of how some people say that ‘celebrities die in threes.’”

The source vowed that “the design issues, such as certain electrical wiring rubbing against hydraulic and oil lines, were fixed before fleet introduction.”

“The problems with the test plan were a product of pressure applied to accelerate a delayed and overbudget program and were not repeated when the aircraft was reintroduced,” the insider pointed out. “Those mishaps, combined with the distinctive nature of the V-22, mean that any subsequent incident, major or minor, is always viewed as part of the ‘dangerous V-22’ narrative. A U.S. Army Blackhawk crash in November killed five but barely made the news. A Japanese Blackhawk crash killed ten soldiers in April, but the Japanese didn’t ground their Blackhawks.”

That perception, however, has done little to quiet families who argue that known risks went unaddressed.

Amber Sax’s husband, Marine Corps Capt. John J. Sax died in the 2022 California crash caused by hard clutch engagement, a problem the Marine Corps had known about for over a decade. “Their findings confirm what we already know: More needs to be done, and more needs to be done,” Sax said. “It’s clear in the report that these risks were not properly assessed, and that failure cost my husband his life.”

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An Uncertain Future

As the military confronts those findings, the future of the Osprey fleet is not completely clear. In 2018, the Marine Corps Aviation proposal outlined a sustainability plan for the Osprey to at least 2060.

“The quality of maintenance training curricula, maturation, and standardization has not kept pace with readiness requirements,” the report stated. “Current maintenance manning levels are unable to support demands for labor. The current V-22 sustainment system cannot realize improved and sustained aircraft readiness and availability without significant change. Depot-level maintenance cannot keep up with demand.”

Despite extensive recommendations – NAVAIR underscored 32 actions to improve safety – Vice Adm. John Dougherty reaffirmed commitment to the aircraft. Pike believes it’s a matter of when, not if, the Osprey returns to full operations.

“Once the issues are fixed, everyone will resume their regular programming,” he asserted.

Officials and insiders alike expect that process to translate into tangible fixes.

“I would expect that to lead to some type of corrective action, whether it’s a new procedure or replacing a defective part,” the insider added. “After that, I would expect a long career for the aircraft in the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force, as it’s an irreplaceable part of all three services now and gives a unique capability to the American military.”

Whether that optimism proves warranted depends on whether military leadership finally addresses the systemic failures the latest reports have laid bare – failures that cost 20 service members their lives in just the past five years.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Long Arc Of American Power https://belimedia.com.ng/the-long-arc-of-american-power https://belimedia.com.ng/the-long-arc-of-american-power OPINION — “We [the U.S.] began as a sliver of a country and next thing you know we're a continental power, and we did not do that primarily through our great diplomacy and our good looks and our charm. We did that primarily by taking the land from other people.”

That was Michael O’Hanlon, the Brookings Institution’s Director of Research in the Foreign Policy program, speaking January 12, about his new book, To Dare Mighty Things: U.S. Defense Strategy Since the Revolution, on a panel with retired-Gen. David Petraeus and Historian Robert Kagan.

O’Hanlon continued, “Now, this is not a revisionist history that's meant to beat up on the United States for having become a world power, because if we hadn't done that, if we hadn't become this continental power, then we could never have prevailed in the World Wars…The world would have been a much worse place and we could never have played the role we did in the Cold War and at least up until recent times, the post-Cold-War world. So generally speaking, I'm glad for this American assertiveness, but to me, it's striking just how little we understand that about ourselves.”

Listening to that event eight days ago at Brookings, and looking around at what the Trump administration is doing at home and abroad today, I thought elements of what I heard from these three were worth repeating and reviewing.

For example, O’Hanlon pointed out a great amount of U.S. grand strategy and national security thinking took place during historic periods considered times of American isolationism and retrenchment.

O’Hanlon said, “A lot of the institutional machinery, a lot of the intellectual and leadership development capability of the United States began in this period starting in the late 19th century and accelerating into the inner [World] War years [1918-to-1941]. And without that, we would not have had the great leaders like [Gen. Dwight D.] Eisenhower, and [Gen. George C.] Marshall, trained in the way they were. I think that made them ready for World War II.”

He added, “We would not have had many of the innovations that occurred in this period of time -- so whether it's [Rear Admiral William A.] Moffett and [Navy] air power and [aircraft] carrier power, [Army Brig. Gen.] Billy Mitchell and the development of the Army Air Corps, [Marine Maj. Gen. John A.] Lejeune and the thinking about amphibious warfare. A lot of these great military leaders and innovators were doing their thing in the early decades of the 20th century and including in the inner war years in ways that prepared us for all these new innovations, all these new kinds of operations that would prove so crucial in World War II.”

“To me it's sort of striking,” O’Hanlon said, “how quickly we got momentum in World War II, given how underprepared we were in terms of standing armies and navies and capabilities. And by early 1943 at the latest, I think we're basically starting to win that war, which is faster than we've often turned things around in many of our conflicts in our history.”

Kagan, a Brookings senior fellow and author of the 2012 book The World America Made, picked up on American assertiveness.

“Ideologically, the United States was expansive,” Kagan said, “We had a universalist ideology. We got upset when we saw liberalism being attacked, even back in the 1820s. You know, a lot of Americans wanted to help the Greek rebellion [against the Ottoman Empire]. The world was very ideological in the 19th century and we saw ourselves as being on the side of liberalism and freedom versus genuine autocracies like Russia and Austria and Prussia. And so we always had these sympathies. Now everybody would say wait a second it's none of our business blah blah blah blah, but nevertheless the general trend was we cared.”

Kagan went on, “People keep doing things out there that we're finding offensive in one way or another. And so we're like wanting to do something about it. So then we get dragged into, [or] we drag ourselves into these conflicts and then we say, ‘Wait a second, we're perfectly safe here [protected east and west by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans]. Why are we involved in all this stuff?’ And then we want to come back. And so this tension between our essential security on the one hand and…our kind of busy bodyness in the world has just been has been a constant -- and I think explains why we have vacillated in terms of our military capability.”

Petraeus, began by saying, “I'm a soldier not a historian here,” and then defended some past U.S. interventions as “basically when we've been attacked,” citing Pearl Harbor and ships being sunk in the Atlantic. He added, “Sometimes it's and/or when we fear hostile powers especially, if they're aligned as it was during the Cold War with the communists, or now arguably with China and/or Russia or both taking control of again Eurasia, Southeast Asia, East Asia.”

Petraeus admitted, “We have sometimes misread that. You can certainly argue that Vietnam was arguably more nationalist [North Vietnamese seeking independence from France] maybe than it was communist. But that I think still applies. I think one of the motivations with respect to [Venezuelan President Nicolas] Maduro is that they [the Maduro Venezuelan leadership] were more closely than ever aligning with China, Iran to a degree, Russia and so forth. And we've seen that play out on a number of occasions as well.”

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Petraeus, who played several roles in Iraq, said the U.S. had “to be very measured in what your objectives are if you're going to use force, and…try to avoid boots-on-the-ground. If they're going to be on the ground, then employ advise, assist, and enable operations where it's the host nation forces or partner forces that are on the front lines rather than Americans.”

Looking back, Petraeus said, “I think we were unprepared definitely intellectually for these operations after toppling regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan and not just [in] the catastrophically

bad post-conflict as phase,” citing “horrific decisions to fire the entire Iraqi military without telling them what their future was. And then firing the Baath Party down to the level of

bureaucrats. That meant that tens of thousands [of Iraqis] without an agreed reconciliation process are literally cast out. And by the way, they're the bureaucrats that we needed to actually help us run a country [Iraq] we didn't sufficiently understand.”

Describing another lesson learned, Petraeus said, “In looking back on Afghanistan, trying to distill what happened, what we did wrong, what we did right, I really concluded that we were never truly committed to Afghanistan nation building. Rather, we were repeatedly committed to exiting. And that was a huge challenge [for the 20 years the U.S. was there], because if you tell the enemy that you're going to draw down on a given date, during the speech in which you announce a buildup, really undermines the enemy's sense of your will in what is a contest of wills at the end of the day. Not saying that we didn't want to draw down, but to do it according to the right conditions. And of course then the other challenge was that the draw-down became much more based on conditions in Washington than it did on conditions in Afghanistan, which is again another pretty fatal flaw.”

Kagan gave his view on past American interventions with U.S. troops in foreign countries, and tied them sharply to today’s situation, not only in Caracas, but also in Washington.

“You know, the United States did not go to war in Iraq to promote democracy despite the vast mythology that has grown up about that,” Kagan began.

He then continued, “It was primarily fear of security. Saddam was a serial aggressor. He certainly was working on weapons of mass destruction. Rightly or wrongly that was the primary motive [of the George W. Bush administration]. But then Americans, as always the case, and you know, all you have to do is look at what we did in Germany after World War II, what we did in Japan after World War II. Americans never felt very comfortable about moving into some country, taking it over for whatever reason and then turning it over to some dictator. We wanted to be able to say that we left something like democratic governance behind. Until now that has been such a key element of our self-perception and our character.”

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Kagan said the Bush administration then sent U.S. troops into Iraq “was not because we were

dying to send troops into Iraq, but because we had concluded you cannot control countries from the air. And so we're now [with Venezuela] we’re back in that mode.”

But here, Kagan gave his view of an important change from the past.

He said, “So here's what's different. We did not want to leave in Iraq Saddam's number two. Go ahead, take over. In Venezuela, we've gone after a regime head…[but] this isn't regime change. This is decapitation and now we've turned it over to the next, you know, part of the Maduro regime and said you take care of it. We'll run it, but you take care of it. That is a departure from American history and I think it is directly a consequence of the fact that for the first time I can

say without any doubt we do not have a president who believes in the American principles of liberalism, but is actively hostile to them here in the United States as well as internationally. He is on the side of anti-liberalism. He is on the side of authoritarianism, both here and abroad. That, to my mind, it's not do we intervene in Latin America, Yes, we do, but for what purpose? And I think that is the huge break [from the past] that we're witnessing right now.”

To my mind and others, Kagan has it right. President Trump, facing political problems at home – affordability, the Epstein files, the upcoming November House and Senate elections – has tried to show expanding power abroad.

Based on past success in Iran bombing nuclear sites and removing Maduro from Venezuela, Trump wants to absorb Greenland, send U.S. forces into Mexico after drug cartels, and threaten attacking the faltering regime in Iran.

Let me add a final element to Trump’s current eagerness to show power abroad. The one thing he doesn’t want is the death of any U.S. military personnel he sends into harm’s way. Trump and his top aides have repeatedly pointed out, whether it was in blowing up narco-trafficking boats or the Iran bombing or the Maduro snatch, no American lives were lost.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s Intelligence Satellites are Proliferating: Their Protection is Not, With Exceptions https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-intelligence-satellites-are-proliferating-their-protection-is-not-with-exceptions https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-intelligence-satellites-are-proliferating-their-protection-is-not-with-exceptions OPINION — The pace of U.S. national-security launches over the past several months has been staggering. But buried beneath the impressive cadence is an uncomfortable truth: many of the most sensitive intelligence assets now orbiting Earth remain dangerously exposed to enemy action by hostile actors.

These assets are launched primarily by the National Reconnaissance Office and the U.S. Space Force Space Systems Command, operating under the National Security Space Launch program (NSSL). The government’s private-sector partners - SpaceX and United Launch Alliance (a joint-venture by Lockheed Martin and Boeing) provide the lift capacity using Falcon 9, the soon to enter operations Falcon Heavy (SpaceX), and the newly introduced Vulcan Centaur rocket (ULA).

Congress has long recognized the importance of assured access to space. As the Congressional Research Service notes, U.S. law mandates maintaining at least two launch vehicles capable of delivering any national-security payload to orbit. That policy has worked. The problem is what happens after launch.

Over the past four years, most NRO launches fall into three categories. First are signals-intelligence satellites (SIGINT). Second are large, electro-optical imaging satellites (IMINT) - capable of extraordinary resolution, as the public briefly glimpsed when Donald Trump released an undegraded intelligence image in a startling lapse of operational security. Third are the Starshield (the name of the program) satellites.

Proliferated Architecture represents a strategic shift; its goal is to establish “the largest government constellation in history” consisting of hundreds of satellites with launches planned through 2029. There are roughly half a dozen missions planned for 2026. This project replaces the model of few exquisite, irreplaceable satellites, in favor of resilience through numbers.

That logic is sound - but it applies unevenly.

Proliferation ensures continuity if adversaries degrade or destroy some satellites. Yet the most sensitive NRO platforms - large SIGINT collectors and high-resolution imaging satellites - remain singular, expensive, and irreplaceable. They are also increasingly vulnerable. Both China and Russia are fielding counterspace capabilities that include electronic warfare, cyber intrusion, co-orbital inspection satellites, and direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons.

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In other words, America is hardening its communications backbone while leaving its crown jewels exposed.

Deterrence in space no longer comes from secrecy alone. It requires active protection: improved space-domain awareness, on-orbit maneuverability, electronic countermeasures, rapid reconstitution plans, and – ultimately - the willingness to impose costs on adversaries who threaten U.S. space assets.

The United States has demonstrated it can launch fast, often, and at scale. The next challenge is more difficult and more urgent: ensuring that the satellites underpinning American military power and intelligence dominance can survive in a contested orbital environment.

Starshield redundancy is a start. Protection of existing assets must be the next step. if a rival has the ability to blind, deceive, or degrade satellites, then a lack of clarity may emerge exactly when clarity is most needed. A lack of clarity in a crisis is a catalyst. In fact, space is crowded, competitive, and, more to the point, contested. The dangers?

First, kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and debris. Anti-satellite weapons, such as one that was tested by China in 2007 are some of the most threatening because they have the capability to destroy a satellite.

Second, non-kinetic attacks, like dazzling, jamming, cyber-tampering, and spoofing. The greatest threats on a daily basis are also likely to be non-kinetic, meaning they are temporary or reversible, although still potentially operationally decisive. A threat assessment has found categories of threats such as electronic warfare, cyber, and directed-energy effects that are being developed and employed by hostile nations as part of their counter-space capabilities.

Third, co-orbital proximity operations and grey-zone activity. Proximity operations are activities that are legitimate in themselves. However, the same activities can be used for coercion, interference, and “accidents on purpose.” The issue in this regard is one of attribution. This leads to a gray zone in which norms are important in addition to deterrence. In this regard, the U.S. Space Force has described space domain awareness (SDA) as “the ability to perceive and understand the nature of space-based phenomena to inform decisions.”

The policy should be to combine these elite systems with more distributed architectures: more nodes, more paths, and more means of recovery. Resilience is about the need to ensure that the loss of one satellite’s signal does not cause the end of the entire mission. The Proliferated Architecture (Starshield) program is a step towards that direction. But it’s only one NRO project in place and has redundancies set in place. What can be done to protect other multi-billion satellites already in orbit and not part of a constellation of satellites?

First, apply maneuver, unpredictability and mobility in space, which comes down to strong cyber protection for mission systems and ground networks, encryption and authentication to protect command and telemetry, anti-jamming techniques and alternative communication routes and rigorous integrity checks, such that analysts can rely on the data generated.

Second, engage in rapid reconstitution and continuity of operations including: pre-planned fallback modes, alternate tasking workflows, ground processing surge capacity, and alternatives for reconstituting capability with allied or commercial sources if needed.

When the problem is narrowed down to its core, ensuring the protection of single-operated NRO satellites can be achieved via better access to sensor data and faster decision cycles and a resilient architecture (combination of high-end assets and proliferated assets).

Equally important are end-to-end cybersecurity and integrity controls, debris-conscious operations & sustainability in coordination with civilian agencies such as NASA where necessary and proactive deterrence through resilience and consequence.

NRO satellites are strategic tools, as they reduce uncertainties, detect deception, and enable decision advantage. The threats to these satellites, which are both kinetic and non-kinetic, are rapidly increasing in their sophistication and frequency.

The protection of such satellites has nothing to do with making space a battlefield for its own sake. It has to do with being able to see clearly enough to avoid mistakes that could escalate quickly in space.

The best way to ensure such protection is not through a single technology but through a comprehensive approach that involves situational awareness, resilience, secure data communication, sustainable operations, deterrence and dispersion.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Kremlin Files: Russia’s Way to the Gray Zone https://belimedia.com.ng/the-kremlin-files-russias-way-to-the-gray-zone https://belimedia.com.ng/the-kremlin-files-russias-way-to-the-gray-zone

THE KREMLIN FILES / COLUMN — (Note: This is the first in a two-part series on Russian gray zone, or hybrid warfare. In a future article, the author will address the continued evolution of Russian hybrid warfare and its practice in the years immediately leading up to and through Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.)

Russian hybrid warfare, often referred to in the West as “gray zone” conflict, has transitioned from theoretical concept to prominent headlines, particularly following the invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s campaigns of sabotage, disinformation, and targeted intelligence actions across Europe and the U.S. What defines Russian-style gray warfare, or hybrid war? What are its doctrinal roots, and how well do these foundations align with assumptions in Western security discussions? To explore these questions, this article analyzes the writings of Russian military thinkers and the views of Russian military and intelligence agencies—covering their terminology, doctrines, and their evolving grasp of non-kinetic conflict.

Gray zone operations in the West are generally seen as actions that influence the course of a conflict or harm an adversary without crossing into direct kinetic attacks. For Russia, at the core of the gray zone is the concept of “non-contact war” (bezkontaktnaya voina), which is part of a larger doctrinal framework under which gray warfare, also called “new generation warfare” by the Russians, falls. This is not a new concept in Russian military thinking, but it has developed over decades. By examining its evolution over the past thirty years through Russian sources and military thinkers, we can better understand how Moscow uses these concepts today—and how they influence the conflicts we may face now and in the future, enabling the U.S. and our allies to respond more effectively.

There are two main components of Russian gray warfare. Russians rarely use the term hybrid war, which exists in Russian only as a borrowed term from English. The first concept is non-contact warfare—the concept of preparing and softening the battlefield, then minimizing ground engagements for their troops whenever possible. The second concept is Russian intelligence active measures, also known as measures of support. This is also an old idea in Russian intelligence circles, but one that has been expanded and intensified in recent decades, incorporating new elements such as cyber operations and cognitive warfare.

We will briefly discuss each of these concepts below, along with Russia’s gray-zone developments up to its deployments into Ukraine in 2014. In the second part of this series, we will analyze Russia’s doctrine as it was applied in the years immediately leading up to and through the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while also considering another key factor for Russia—their ability to evolve and adapt.

Non-Contact Warfare: Origins and Russian Military Necessities

Non-contact warfare developed from what the Russian General Staff and other military thinkers called sixth-generation warfare. The concept grew from the “reconnaissance strike complex” theory and the so-called “revolution in military affairs” at the end of the Cold War. As the Soviet Union disintegrated and the U.S. demonstrated overwhelming air power with NATO and other allies during the Persian Gulf war, former Soviet and Russian generals were not fools. They understood they could not keep pace with the new advancements in air warfare and the technological edge of NATO weapons systems.

Russian General Staff thinkers recognized that the Russian Air Force could not match TTPs (techniques, tactics, and procedures), the number of pilot training hours, or the advanced systems that the U.S. and NATO could field, especially given their significantly reduced military budget following the Soviet Union's collapse. This operational shortfall was further emphasized by the targeted bombing campaigns and overwhelming force deployed by U.S./NATO forces in the Balkan campaigns of the mid-1990s.

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In short, Russian military planners recognized they could not keep pace. NATO airpower and the reach of the alliance into all sorts of regions and conflict zones posed a significant challenge for the Russian military and its intelligence services. One of the lessons they understood was that massed tank formations alone would not win wars in the 21st century. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, several important writings were produced by prominent Russian general staff figures, such as Generals Slipchenko and Gareev, as well as the future Chief of Staff of the Russian military and currently the commander of the Russian forces in the Ukraine war, Valeriy Gerasimov.

Slipchenko is credited in Russia with coining the phrase “sixth generation warfare” more than twenty years ago. According to Slipchenko, this new form of warfare signified a shift from nuclear-based conflict (which he called “fifth generation”) toward information-enabled, precision-strike, so-called non-contact wars (he authored a book with that same title). These wars would be fought at a distance, relying on airpower, command, control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR), and long-range precision strikes, rather than large ground forces. He and Gareev published a book in Russia in 2004 titled On Future Wars, which became influential in many Russian military circles. In this work, Slipchenko and Gareev emphasized the importance of studying non-contact warfare and firmly stated that Russia must adapt to it, or else “Russia would not survive.”

During that same period, Russia’s Air Force struggled significantly in the 1990s and 2000s to adopt precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Russia never fully integrated them or appropriately trained them on their use, which was evident in its prolonged conflicts with Chechen separatists. Most ground-attack operations during that period, from the mid to late 1990s, relied on “dumb bombs” and massed artillery on the battlefield. This resulted in the Russian air force’s poor performance in the 2008 Georgian conflict, when an outmanned Georgian military embarrassingly shot down several Russian fighter-bombers.

In the summer of 2008, responding to Georgia launching an incursion to retake South Ossetia, Russia responded with overwhelming force, sending an entire army to occupy swaths of Abkhazia, Ossetia, and also northern Georgia from Poti to Gori and the edges of Tbilisi. But while their force ratios led to quick success on the ground, the Russian air force did not perform as well in the air. In addition to air losses to ground-based air defense and friendly fire, Russian precision strikes did not go off as planned. Russia’s performance could be summed up as ineffective from the air. They were not able to project over-the-horizon warfare in the ways that Russian military planners had envisioned for non-contact war.

The first widespread and successful use of Russian PGMs would come still later, mostly during Russia’s involvement in Syria, where Russian squadrons were rotated for training and gained exposure to actual combat. Before that, many pilots had not experienced any combat outside of Chechnya.

Russia’s Air Force underwent a series of reforms due to these failures. It was reorganized and renamed the Russian Aerospace Forces (the VKS) in 2015 as a result of many of these reforms, or what were claimed to be reforms. When the full-scale invasion happened in 2022, Russia’s VKS, like much of its military, was still trying to evolve from its targeted reforms and these earlier developmental challenges. They attempted a limited shock-and-awe offensive but failed miserably in areas such as battle damage assessment and other key aspects of a true air campaign (the second article in this series will touch on these issues in more detail).

However, military reforms and adaptations in the Russian Air Force were not meant to stand alone. Russian kinetic actions were intended to be supported by other elements in non-contact warfare, aimed at softening the battlefield and undermining an adversary’s ability to fight. Prominent among these were active measures focused on information operations.

Active Measures, Measures of Support, and Non-state Actors

Returning to Russian arms doctrine, Slipchenko and other figures on the General Staff argued that, in the post–Cold War world, especially after observing the 1991 Gulf War and the dominance of US airpower, massing military forces was no longer effective. The world saw how Saddam’s large army, with thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, was destroyed from the air. Slipchenko claimed that future wars will focus on disrupting enemy systems, including military, economic, social, and other so-called “information means.”

This was not a new concept for Russia and its intelligence agencies—the FSB, GRU, and SVR (collectively the Russian intelligence services or RIS). The RIS would play a key role by using a well-known Russian technique—active measures, or as the RIS calls them today, measures of support. These tactics aim to weaken the enemy's ability to fight through malign influence, political interference, and disinformation. The Russians use state agencies and means, like their intelligence services, but also so-called non-state actors, like organized crime, private mercenaries, hacker groups, and many others, to carry out these and other hybrid actions as proxies.

The doctrinal approach of gray war, or new generation warfare, was gaining attention in Russia just as Putin's reign started. His rule coincided with the growing influence of the RIS within the government. It was natural for the RIS to take on roles the military was not equipped to perform, and Putin was quick to authorize them. One of the first tests for their active measures and gray war was Russia’s brief war with Georgia in 2008. As noted above, and while their military’s performance was mixed, their intelligence services were very active in the information arena. Russia flooded international media with its version of events. Their still-growing “RTV” news network promoted stories of atrocities they claimed were committed by the Georgian military. Europe and the U.S. were caught off guard and unprepared by the conflict; there was little to no meaningful response to Russia’s military actions, and no high costs or reprisals. It was a lesson Russia would remember.

After Georgia in 2008, while reforms were introduced in the air force in particular, the doctrinal debates continued. Building on Slipchenko’s ideas, writers from the General Staff, such as General Chekinov and General Bogdanov, further developed the doctrine they called “new-generation warfare.” Their work emphasized scripted roles in conflict for the information-psychological struggle, subversion, and cyber operations, while traditional large-scale combat operations became, by comparison, less prominent.

In 2013, the current Russian Chief of Staff, Valeriy Gerasimov, gave a speech in which he also advocated for a constant “second front” of information operations against Russia’s enemies to weaken their ability to wage war. This speech and a later article became known in some circles in the West as the “Gerasimov doctrine,” although it was never officially called that in Russia.

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Gerasimov’s speech and article focused on shifting Russia's attention to countering the so-called “color revolutions” that occurred in the first decade of this century in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. They were, and still are, viewed as a direct threat to Russia’s national security and to Putin’s dictatorship. Russia cannot tolerate functioning democracies and freedom on its borders.

By combining Gerasimov’s contributions with those of Slipchenko, Gareev, and others, the Russian military developed a concept of non-contact warfare that planned for long-range strikes executed after weakening the enemy through non-kinetic means. They de-emphasized large ground formations because, according to the theory, they should not be necessary. Russian measures of support are designed to weaken an adversary through disinformation, misinformation, malign influence on politics, and other methods. This would become the battle plan the Russians would attempt to implement in Ukraine in 2014 (and again, with adjustments, in 2022).

As cyber has taken a greater role in society and the mass media, the Russian grey zone approach has also increasingly included RIS cyber operations and online media manipulation to support “reflexive control,” an old Russian intelligence concept from the 1960s. The term reflects the notion of influencing an adversary to act in a desired way without the enemy’s awareness. Gerasimov and the military, along with leaders of the RIS, knew from Russia’s poor performance in Georgia that they were not ready for war with NATO or any strong peer-level adversary. They needed help to weaken any adversary with a capable armed force before actual war.

Syria and Ukraine would be the new testing grounds for this concept in practice, with a heavy reliance on the intelligence services to help prepare the battlefield before and through the military’s engagement. Their perceived successes in both theaters would, over time, convince the Russian intelligence services, its military, and most importantly, President Putin that Russia was ready for a much larger task— an attack on and seizure of the entire territory of Ukraine.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

]]>
Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
Loosening the Gordian Knot of Global Terrorism: Why Legitimacy Must Anchor a Counterterrorism Strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/loosening-the-gordian-knot-of-global-terrorism-why-legitimacy-must-anchor-a-counterterrorism-strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/loosening-the-gordian-knot-of-global-terrorism-why-legitimacy-must-anchor-a-counterterrorism-strategy OPINION — The global terrorism landscape in 2026 — the 25th anniversary year of the 9/11 terrorism attacks — is more uncertain, hybridized, and combustible than at any point since 9/11. Framing a sound U.S. counterterrorism strategy — especially in the second year of a Trump administration — will require more than isolated strikes against ISIS in Nigeria, punitive counterterrorism operations in Syria, or a tougher rhetorical posture.

A Trump administration counterterrorism strategy will require legitimacy: the domestic, international, and legal credibility that leverages a wide-range of counterterrorism tools, while engendering international counterterrorism cooperation. Without legitimacy, even tactically successful counterterrorism operations risk becoming illusory, politicized, and ultimately self-defeating.

The terrorist threat landscape

Extremist violence no longer conforms to clean ideological lines. Terrorist objectives and drivers are muddled in ways that are hard to understand — but evolving. There’s little ideological purity with those radicalizing in today’s extremist milieu.

At the same time, state-directed intelligence officers increasingly behave like terrorists. Russian intelligence-linked sabotage plots blur the line between terrorism and hybrid warfare. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers provide hands-on training to Lebanese Hizballah commanders. Addressing these kinds of risks requires legitimacy, too, especially among allies whose intelligence cooperation, legal authorities, and public support are indispensable.

Nowhere is this threat picture more tenuous than in the Middle East. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks triggered a profound rebalancing of power in the region. Yet, Syria remains unfinished business. Power vacuums there invite foreign jihadists, threaten Israel's border communities, and create future opportunities for Iranian influence to rebound.

A modest but persistent U.S. presence in Syria with a friendly Ahmed al-Sharaa-led government remains a strategic hedge against an Islamic State resurgence, and is a strong signal of U.S. commitment that helps sustain partner confidence. The U.S. counterterrorism presence and alignment with al-Sharaa is not without its risks, though: in December, three Americans were killed by a lone ISIS gunman in central Syria. The country is, and will continue to be, plagued by sectarianism and terrorism, which means that restoring control over a deeply fractured Syria remains fraught.

Taken together, the current transnational terrorism threat landscape is volatile and difficult to predict, a challenge compounded by resource constraints. In such an environment, legitimacy becomes a force multiplier. A belief that America is a ‘force for good’, credible messaging, and confidence that U.S. government action is perceived as just, can go a long way.

This is not an abstract concern. Terrorism today thrives in contested information environments, polarized societies, and fragile states. In short, transnational jihadist networks now coexist with domestic violent extremists, and online radicalization ecosystems that blur the line between terrorism, insurgency, and hybrid warfare. Terrorist propaganda continues to resonate with individuals in the West, especially younger generations who radicalize online. In this environment, legitimacy is no longer a secondary benefit of sound strategy—it is a core guiding principle.

The Trump administration's counterterrorism approach

We are looking for more clarity on the trajectory of Trump 2.0 counterterrorism efforts. It’s still, premature to consider a strategy that has yet to be formally articulated, as many in the counterterrorism community eagerly await its release. History offers a useful reminder. The first Trump administration did not publish its National Strategy for Counterterrorism until its second year. When it appeared in 2018, critics and supporters alike acknowledged that it reflected professional judgment rather than ideological excess. That document recognized terrorism’s evolution and called for strengthening counterterrorism partnerships within the U.S. government, but abroad as well, with a range of longstanding allies.

What gave that strategy durability was its legitimacy. Authorities were grounded in law, threat assessments were evidence-based, policies were stress-tested for faulty assumptions, and foreign partnerships were treated as strategic assets rather than transactional relationships.

When the Biden administration publicly released a set of redacted rules secretly issued by President Trump in 2017 for counterterrorism operations — such as “direct action” strikes and special operations raids outside conventional war zones — those guidelines explicitly acknowledged the power of legitimacy. Counterterrorism succeeds when allies trust the U.S., and the American public believes force is used proportionately and lawfully.

That legacy of trust matters now more than ever, given signals that a second Trump administration could overcorrect on its counterterrorism priorities by redirecting and focusing resources on far-left extremist groups such as the Turtle Island Liberation Front (TILF) or Antifa, while downplaying far-right extremism—or being distracted from the more dangerous terrorism threats from ISIS and other violent jihadists. As the world recently witnessed during the holidays, from Bondi Beach to Syria, ISIS remains a threat. Far-Left terrorism in the U.S. is on the rise, but far-right terrorism accounts for greater lethality than did the left. And still, after 25 years, it’s ISIS and al-Qa’ida that remain the most persistent and enduring transnational terrorism threat against U.S interests.

The Trump National Security Strategy

It’s concerning that the recently published National Security Strategy (NSS) only tepidly addresses transnational terrorism, but notably links terrorism with cross-border threats and hemispheric cooperation against things like “narco-terrorists,” blurring the traditional separation between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Still, the Trump administration’s emphasis on drug cartels is justifiable, if it does not detract from broader counterterrorism objectives, such as the ISIS or hybridizing terrorist threats that continue to emerge. Commentators claim, however, that the Trump administration is already losing sight of the ISIS and al-Qa’ida threats, though settling that debate here is quixotic at best — only time will tell.

Besides jihadi threats, the U.S. does not need the unintended consequences and risks of triggering a cycle of cartel retaliation – or provoking greater far-left violence – down-the-line in the U.S. homeland.

Contrastingly, the 2017 National Security Strategy saw radical Islamist terrorism as one of the priority transnational threats that could undermine U.S. security and stability. The strategy highlighted groups such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida as continuing dangers, stressing that terrorists had taken control of parts of the Middle East and remained a threat globally.

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Addressing transnational terrorism during the first Trump administration required discipline and steadiness amid predictable frictions at the National Security Council (NSC) among policymakers who wanted a more rapid shift toward other priorities, such as great power competition. Still, terrorist labeling and designations, strategic messaging, and resource allocation for counterterrorism were grounded in evidence rather than politics.

So, overhyping some threats while minimizing others undermines legitimacy, invites backlash, and weakens the very moral authority needed to operationalize a cogent, thoughtful national security strategy. It also erodes trust between the government and the public and leads citizens to second-guess whether they are being told the truth or being led astray. The 2017 NSS carried weight precisely because it was grounded in intelligence, not politics. Moreover, the NSS helped frame the counterterrorism strategy that followed and proved highly effective in keeping Americans safe.

Drawing lessons from the 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism

The 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT) remains a useful foundation for the second Trump administration—not because the world is unchanged, but because it embraced balance. The strategy emphasized foreign partnerships, non-military tools, and targeted direct action when necessary. It recognized a central legitimacy principle: the United States cannot and should not fight every terrorist everywhere with American troops when capable counterterrorism partners can do so in their own backyards, with local consent, and a more granular understanding of the grievances that motivate these terrorist groups and their supporters.

And still, U.S. counterterrorism pressure through direct action remains a necessary tool to disrupt terrorism planning. It seems that the second Trump Administration is following the playbook of the first Trump administration in terms of aggressive counterterrorism kinetic strikes in places like Somalia, Yemen, and Iraq.

President Trump rescinded Biden-era limits on counterterrorism drone strikes, allowing the kind of flexible operational framework used for counterterrorism throughout the President’s first term. Thus far, in the aggressive counter-narcotic campaign in international waters off Venezuela, the standoff U.S. strikes resemble counterterrorism operations in Yemen and Somalia during the first Trump administration. Operationally, direct action remains an indispensable counterterrorism tool for disrupting terror groups overseas, and more U.S. direct action will likely be necessary in West Africa and the Sahel to keep jihadist groups operating there off balance, forcing them to devote more time and resources to operational security.

But pressure without legitimacy is counterproductive. What works against jihadist networks does not necessarily translate cleanly to drug cartels or transnational criminal gangs. So, policymakers must be circumspect that expanding the scope of counterterrorism authorities and terrorist designations to canvas drug cartels, risks the unintended consequences of triggering destabilizing cycles of violence in the future, and straining more traditional counterterrorism resources.

Coming full circle, in light of the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro for narcoterrorism-related offenses, the idea of legitimacy will be fiercely debated in the days and weeks ahead. If the Trump National Security Strategy is the roadmap for focusing on narcoterrorism in the Western Hemisphere, then the need for publishing a clarifying and rational U.S. counterterrorism strategy for the rest of the world takes on even greater sense of urgency.

Pushing a boulder uphill

Drawing on past counterterrorism lessons to find a comprehensive strategy—from the Bush administration’s wartime footing, through 8 years of Obama counterterrorism work, to President Trump’s "war on terror" — is a Sisyphean task. But, in the wake of over two decades of relentless overseas counterterrorism work, a few ideas have come into sharper focus:

After more than two decades of counterterrorism, loosening the Gordian knot of modern terrorism requires balance, far greater clarity, and consistent, predictable national leadership.

Above all, counterterrorism strategy requires legitimacy. Without it, counterterrorism becomes reactive and politicized. With it, a Trump 2.0 counterterrorism strategy can still be firm, flexible, and credible in a far more dangerous world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Sun, 01 Feb 2026 15:01:18 +0100 FirstHandNews
Putin Again Bungles Strategy: Why His War of Attrition will Sink Russia https://belimedia.com.ng/putin-again-bungles-strategy-why-his-war-of-attrition-will-sink-russia https://belimedia.com.ng/putin-again-bungles-strategy-why-his-war-of-attrition-will-sink-russia OPINION — On February 14, 2022, with Russia poised to invade Ukraine, I questioned whether Vladimir Putin’s reign to that point had revealed him to be a strategic master or a strategic failure. Nearly four years later, the verdict is even more apparent. Putin, confident in his strategic calculus that the West would provide only token assistance to Ukraine, which would quickly fold under the weight and violence of Russian military might, fatefully launched his attack days later with disastrous consequences for Russia. The country he leads is now even poorer, more isolated, brittle, and dependent (on China) than before. Putin grossly underestimated Ukrainian will, overestimated the competence of his own military and intelligence apparatus, and misjudged Western cohesion. By the Fall of 2022, it was obvious even to Putin that his expected quick victory was unattainable. This was surely a bitter pill to swallow, but he quickly pivoted to a “wait and win” war strategy of grinding attrition, calculating that through sheer mass and perseverance--and Western impatience--time would be on his side. Most pundits, even those in the West, have tended to agree with him, much as they did in 2022 about the likelihood that Russia would quickly roll over Ukraine. This mindset, however--that time is on Russia’s side--risks a strategic misreading no less profound than his original blunder, because there is a strong argument to be made that Putin’s attrition strategy is eroding key foundations of Russian power faster and more deeply than it is eroding the Ukrainian front lines.

Thus far Russia has managed to sustain a high level of war spending, but there are growing signs of strain. Russia’s numerical troop advantage over Ukraine is maintained almost entirely through extraordinarily high financial incentives, but these are starting to drop steeply due to growing budget shortfalls, particularly in regional budgets on which such spending disproportionately falls. New contracts for soldiers in April-June 2025 were less than half the level of the same period in 2024, signaling a significant weakening in the effectiveness of financial inducements.

And it’s not just the money. The death toll for Russian soldiers is accelerating. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in July of this year that the number of Russian dead for the first half of 2025 alone exceeded 100,000. This has likely contributed to a sharp increase in desertions, estimated to have doubled in 2025 with approximately 70,000 desertions, or approximately 10% of the force in Ukraine. Russia is increasingly reliant on coerced recruits, harsh punishments for desertion, including torture and extrajudicial executions, all signs of a military struggling to maintain sustainable, motivated troop levels. While tactical adaptations have allowed Russian forces to regain some initiative on the battlefield, they rest on a manpower model that burns through human capital, i.e., human beings, at a pace no country with Russia’s demographic profile can long sustain.

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As the war drags on, Russia is also becoming even more dependent on China. Post-2022 trade patterns show a Russia increasingly locked into an asymmetric partnership in which Russia humiliatingly relies on China for critical imports of technology, while Beijing gains leverage through discounted energy purchases and control over supply chains, making Moscow increasingly vulnerable to Beijing’s whims over time. For a leader obsessed with sovereignty, the long-term trajectory Putin has embarked on contains a glaring paradox: the longer he fights to keep Ukraine out of the Western orbit, the more he locks Russia into a subordinate position in China’s. Talk about strategic irony.

These financial strains and deepening dependence on China are compounded by the continued tightening of international sanctions on the Russian energy sector, a general decrease in the price of oil and gas on which Russia is so heavily dependent as the global economy cools, and the heavy depletion of Russia’s “rainy day” sovereign wealth fund, which has dropped by almost 60% and now mostly consists of Chinese Renminbi and gold, having exhausted its hard currency holdings. Maintaining current defense spending will thus increasingly require either higher borrowing from domestic banks or visible cuts in social spending and civilian projects, further eroding living standards and stoking popular war fatigue.

Putin’s war-of-choice with Ukraine has only intensified Russia’s pre-war weaknesses. Russia’s economy, already underperforming relative to its resource base and human potential, must now deal with permanent war spending and sanctions-induced inefficiencies. Its demographics, already fragile, are being further hollowed out by horrific war casualties and the emigration of skilled workers. Russia’s civic life, already stunted, is being further smothered by wartime repression. Finally, Putin’s invasion not only failed to restore a pliant Ukrainian “little brother”, it locked Russia into a costly struggle against the second largest country in Europe, after itself, and one that is moreover more anti-Russian, better armed, and more deeply integrated with the West than before.

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And now, by slow-rolling negotiations to end the conflict, Putin misreads the trajectory of this war in the same way he misread its opening act. He underestimates the cumulative effect of casualties and consequences of economic distortions and social fatigue inside Russia; he overestimates the degree that support of the Western democracies for Ukraine will collapse under the weight of their debates and divisions; and he also, again, overestimates his ability to break Ukraine by military force. In analyzing the arc of Putin’s rule, the war in Ukraine is not an aberration from Putinism, but its logical culmination. In strategic terms, it represents a transition from a condition of chronic underperformance to one of active and acute self-harm. Nearly four years after his decision to invade Ukraine, which more than anything else will define his reign, Putin is not outplaying history on a grand chessboard by doubling down on the war, he is sacrificing Russia’s future for the sake of victories and imperial fantasies that cannot be won, much less sustained. This is the definition of strategic failure.

As a self-proclaimed student of Russian history, Putin would be wise to remember the setting of Russia’s original regime-toppling “color revolution,” the February Revolution of 1917. This was the spontaneous Russian popular uprising that led to the abdication of the Tsar and formation of a Provisional Government, not the subsequent Bolshevik coup d’etat later that year. While popular discontent with the monarchy had long been rising, it was the accumulated privations of war that brought events to a boiling point. As with that war, time in this one is not on Putin’s side.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran’s Protests Expose Deeper Fragility as Leaders Struggle to Contain Crisis https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-protests-expose-deeper-fragility-as-leaders-struggle-to-contain-crisis https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-protests-expose-deeper-fragility-as-leaders-struggle-to-contain-crisis

CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT INTERVIEW -- Economic grievances in Iran have sparked demonstrations for a fifth straight day, with protests surfacing in Tehran and multiple provincial cities as inflation, a collapsing currency, and worsening living conditions fuel public anger.

Reports from state-linked media, local officials, and rights groups confirm new clashes and at least one additional death, though accounts differ over whether the deceased was a member of a pro-government militia or a protester. Several other incidents of violence were reported in western and southern regions, but independent verification remains difficult.

President Masoud Pezeshkian, traveling in southwestern and eastern Iran, has acknowledged mounting public dissatisfaction and urged officials to address the population’s concerns, calling mismanagement - not foreign adversaries - the primary cause of the crisis. His remarks contrasted with harder-line figures who continue to blame unnamed “enemies” for the unrest.

The latest protests began after the Iranian rial plunged to record lows, prompting the resignation of Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin.

The broader economic backdrop is bleak: inflation remains above 40 percent, food and household costs have surged, and nearly every major sector outside oil is contracting.

“The ongoing, still relatively small, economic protests now unfolding in several cities in Iran are the latest indicator of the Islamic Republic's fragility,” Middle East Expert and former National Security Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norm Roule tells The Cipher Brief.

Roule explains in this exclusive Cipher Brief analysis, why he believes the latest protests are likely a sign of what could be waiting for Tehran in the new year.


Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

ANALYSIS -- “Since 2017, Tehran’s domestic oppression, persistent inflation, declining standards of living, international isolation, and weak domestic policy credibility have produced periods of sharp and widespread unrest. Iran’s security forces have responded brutally. But the protests have shattered the Islamic Republic’s political self-confidence. Tehran’s response to the ongoing demonstrations reflects that mood.

A regime that once boasted that its high national election turnout reflected the support of its people is now unable to hide historic low voter turnout and accepts the threat of destabilizing national unrest as an inevitable consequence of life in modern-day Iran. Economic challenges are not the regime’s only concern. Iran’s historic drought and other environmental problems persist. Winter saw a sharp decline in air quality in large areas of Tehran, Khuzestan, and Isfahan provinces. In early December, Iran’s health minister announced that ongoing air pollution problems had sent more than 170,000 Iranians to emergency wards with heart and respiratory problems.

Whether the current unrest expands or dissipates - like prior waves of protest - remains uncertain. What is clearer is that the underlying drivers are durable, making future episodes virtually certain. The more consequential question is whether disillusionment will remain confined to civilians or will begin to test the cohesion and confidence of the security forces the Islamic Republic has relied upon for so many years to contain dissent.

The ongoing collapse of Iran’s currency, the rial, ignited the protests this week. After the currency fell as low as 1.42 million per dollar, Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin resigned. The magnitude of the slide is best understood with some history: In 1979, the Iranian rial stood at 72 to the dollar. On July 14, 2015, the day the Iran nuclear deal was signed in Vienna, the Iranian rial was at 29,500 per dollar. When Farzin entered office in December 2022, the rial traded at about 430,000 to the dollar. Whatever the precise benchmarks, the trend is unmistakable: the rial’s weakness has become both a symbol of policy failure and a driver of unrest.

The currency’s decline has coincided with bleak economic signals. Except for anemic growth in the oil sector, every key sector of Iran’s economy is entering recession, foreshadowing higher unemployment. Industry and mining declined by 3.4%, construction by 12.9% and agriculture contracted by 2.9%. At the same time, inflation is growing. The Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) reported that Iran’s average annual inflation reached 42.2% in December. A close examination of this number indicates the significant impact of inflation on Iranian consumers. Food, tobacco, and beverages rose 72% year over year. This persistent high inflation erodes the purchasing power of Iranians and drives an increasing number into poverty.

Tehran’s options are few. Iran’s problems are deep and structural, and durable improvement would require political and ideological shifts beyond what the Pezeshkian administration is likely able to deliver. Even so, the government will be compelled to act on three fronts.

First, Farzin’s resignation provides the president with a convenient focal point for public anger, but it does nothing to address the issues that precipitated the crisis: fiscal mismanagement, sanctions pressure, and chronic credibility deficits. President Pezeshkian has reportedly selected 64-year-old former economy minister Abdolnaser Hemmati as Farzin’s successor.

Hemmati may at first seem a counterintuitive choice, given that the Iranian Parliament impeached him in March for failing in similar circumstances. However, he has a background that offers potential for stability. First, he is experienced. He led the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) from 2018 until late May 2021, during the Trump administration's earlier sanctions, and his work helped stabilize the foreign exchange market under similar difficult circumstances. He also qualifies as a regime insider with decades of experience with hardliners and more pragmatic conservatives. After beginning his career as an agricultural economist, he moved to Iran’s broadcasting organization, where he rose to become its political deputy and director general of news broadcasting. He then became the Director of Iran’s Central Insurance Corporation. Between 2006 and 2016, Hemmati led Sina Bank and Bank Mellat, banks with close ties to the Revolutionary Guard's Qods Force, to the extent that the U.S. and the European Union designated each. Hemmati attempted to enter the 2024 presidential election on a platform offering economic stabilization, but the Guardian Council rejected his candidacy. He instead became Pezeshkian’s economy minister, a position he held until his impeachment on 2 March 2024, following a spike in inflation and the rial's fall to 950,000 to the dollar. Ironically, that value would be seen as a significant improvement in its status today.

Hemmati will need to work quickly with Pezeshkian to propose measures to decelerate inflation, with an emphasis on protecting low-income and rural households. In the medium term, Hemmati will need to target Iran’s banking sector to strengthen balance sheets and prevent further failures. The downside of this last step is that it will inevitably involve some recognition of bad loans and credit tightening to prevent additional poor loan issuance.

Next, Pezeshkian will focus on budget reform. Details on his latest budget are limited, but we know that security and military entities remain well-resourced, which will constrain his options on the civilian side. He has proposed a 20% salary increase for public workers, but it will not keep up with inflation, and even here, he will struggle to find the funds. The budget debate will continue until 20 March 2026, and will likely remain contentious, given its emphasis on tax collection and subsidy cuts rather than oil revenues as a source of income.

Last, foreign policy will remain the most complicated aspect of Pezeshkian’s economic challenges. His government will do whatever it can to mitigate the impact of sanctions through engagement with Russia, China, and Africa, and will continue to seek talks with Washington. Initiating negotiations with the U.S., even without a prospect of an outcome, has in the past strengthened the rial. But if Pezeshkian would welcome talks with the West, the hardline actors within the regime responsible for Iran’s foreign policy remain focused on aggressive goals that remain one of the primary obstacles to peace in the region. The Quds Force shows every sign of seeking to rebuild its shattered proxies and establish new relationships with the Khartoum and other actors in Africa. The Trump administration’s approach to Tehran has been consistent. It will not waste time on talks that offer sanctions relief without seismic changes in the regime’s approach to nuclear, missiles, and regional issues. Gulf Arabs are willing to maintain a strategy of détente but will not consider rapprochement without an end to Qods Force activity in the region. Absent political rapprochement and a belief that capital invested in Iran will not be subject to terrorism or human rights sanctions, foreign investment for Iran will remain impossible.

Last, Iran’s leaders will inevitably recognize that this unrest is unfolding amid several hallmarks of a pre-revolutionary situation: institutional failure, fragmentation among the ruling elites, generational alienation, persistent fiscal crisis, widespread economic suffering, class antagonism, escalating and chronic protests, and the absence of a unifying state narrative. President Pezeshkian recently stated that his country was “in a full-fledged war with America, Israel, and Europe.” Such rhetoric will play to domestic hardline audiences while reinforcing Iran’s aggressive reputation abroad. During this sensitive period, Iran is unlikely to take actions that would further exacerbate its domestic fragility and instead seeks to gradually test Western red lines while navigating the Islamic Republic through what remains the regime's most sensitive and challenging economic and political period since the 1980s.”

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Trained Eye Sees Strategic Patterns in Venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/a-trained-eye-sees-strategic-patterns-in-venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/a-trained-eye-sees-strategic-patterns-in-venezuela OPINION -- Venezuela presents a long-standing challenge tied to narcotics trafficking and transnational criminal networks. For years, the country has functioned as a major transit hub for illicit drug flows, money laundering, and organized crime, with direct consequences for U.S. domestic security and for stability across the Western Hemisphere. These realities alone justify sustained U.S. attention.

But criminal activity does not explain Venezuela’s full strategic significance. What distinguishes Venezuela today is not only the scale of illicit activity, but the conditions surrounding it: political isolation, economic dependence, weakened institutions, and contested legitimacy.

These conditions are familiar. These are precisely the environments external adversarial powers exploit in the gray zone to embed influence and preserve leverage without crossing the threshold of open conflict.

In such settings, influence is not imposed abruptly. It is embedded gradually, normalized through routine engagement, and retained for use when pressure mounts. That method, rather than any single triggering event - is what places Venezuela squarely within the scope of longer-term U.S. strategic concern.

Assessing Venezuela this way does not require assumptions about covert orchestration or crisis direction by outside states. It requires recognizing a recurring competitive approach that has played out repeatedly in fragile and isolated systems: establish access early, avoid responsibility for governance, and preserve optionality as conditions deteriorate.

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A Pattern Observed Across Multiple Theaters

Recent Cipher Brief analysis has highlighted that strategic competition increasingly unfolds below the threshold of armed conflict. In states facing internal stress or external isolation, influence is rarely asserted through overt coercion. Instead, it is accumulated through sustained presence, access to institutions, and normalization of engagement — creating leverage that can be exercised selectively during moments of crisis.

This pattern is not theoretical. It is consistent across actors and regions, even where tactics differ.

China: Economic and Technical Presence as Strategic Infrastructure

China’s approach relies on economic and technical engagement as strategic infrastructure. Commercial projects, administrative systems, and digital platforms provide access long before crises emerge. Over time, this presence enables intelligence collection, political influence, and situational awareness without requiring overt security commitments or visible military footprints.

The value of this approach lies in patience. By embedding early and remaining engaged through periods of instability, China preserves optionality when political alignments shift or governance weakens. Influence accumulated quietly can later be activated to protect strategic equities, shape outcomes, or constrain competitors’ freedom of maneuver.

This model avoids ownership. It does not require Beijing to stabilize fragile states or assume responsibility for their internal failures. Access is sufficient. Optionality is the objective.

Russia: Security Engagement and Access Without Ownership

Russia applies a more security-centric variant of the same logic. Moscow’s engagement with sanctioned governments or non-recognized actors has repeatedly prioritized intelligence access, operational insight, and regional buffers rather than political alignment or long-term stabilization.

By maintaining relationships across formal and informal power structures, Russia ensures continued relevance during periods of transition or escalation. This posture allows Moscow to influence events without absorbing the costs associated with governance, reconstruction, or economic support.

Here again, the emphasis is not control but access. Engagement is calibrated to preserve leverage while avoiding entanglement — a model designed to expand or contract as circumstances dictate.

Iran: Network Persistence and Crisis Adaptability

Iran’s approach centers on the durability of networks rather than institutions. Elite cultivation, security penetration, and proxy relationships are established early and maintained quietly. When political systems weaken or collapse, these networks remain intact.

The advantage is resilience. Preexisting relationships allow rapid recalibration during crises without the need to rebuild influence under pressure. This approach is particularly effective in environments where authority is fragmented and legitimacy contested.

Across cases, Iran’s method demonstrates how influence survives regime change when it is rooted in people, systems, and incentives rather than formal state structures.

Key Analytic Distinction

Across these approaches, a central distinction applies: Presence and enablement do not equal operational control. But sustained presence creates optionality — the ability to act, influence, or constrain outcomes when conditions shift. That optionality, accumulated quietly over time, is what allows external powers to convert instability into strategic advantage without triggering direct confrontation.

Venezuela as a Permissive Strategic Environment

Venezuela now exhibits many of the conditions that have enabled this form of competition elsewhere. Politically, it remains isolated and internally polarized, with contested legitimacy and eroded institutions. Economically, it is dependent on external partners and vulnerable to leverage through finance, energy, and technology. Strategically, it occupies a sensitive position - proximate to the United States, central to regional migration flows, and endowed with significant energy resources.

Open-source reporting has documented sustained external engagement consistent with these vulnerabilities. Chinese firms maintain long-term financial and energy exposure, while Chinese technology has been linked to state administrative and digital systems. Russia has pursued military cooperation and security ties with the Maduro government over several years. Iran has expanded defense-related cooperation, including activities now cited in U.S. sanctions actions.

None of this establishes direct operational control over events in Venezuela. That distinction matters. Modern competition does not depend on command-and-control relationships. It depends on positioning — ensuring access, protecting equities, and shaping the environment so that options exist when pressure mounts.

From this perspective, Venezuela is not an abrupt escalation point. It is the maturation of a permissive environment.

U.S. National Interests at Stake

Viewed through this lens, the U.S. interests implicated extend beyond narcotics enforcement.

Security and Intelligence Access: Adversarial access or technical presence in the Western Hemisphere creates intelligence and counterintelligence risks. Proximity amplifies the strategic consequences, particularly during crises when early warning and situational awareness are decisive.

Regional Stability: Venezuela’s instability already fuels migration flows, strains neighboring states, and sustains criminal economies. External actors that selectively stabilize the regime — without addressing governance or legitimacy - risk prolonging instability while insulating it from internal pressure.

Energy and Economic Leverage: Venezuela’s energy sector remains strategically significant. External involvement that secures preferential access or shields operations from pressure can distort markets and complicate sanctions, reducing U.S. leverage over time.

Alliances and Credibility: Regional partners watch not only U.S. actions, but their durability. Episodic pressure without strategic continuity reinforces perceptions that U.S. engagement is temporary, a perception that competitors routinely exploit.

The Risk of Tactical Action Without Strategic Effect

Military or law-enforcement action can disrupt illicit networks and impose immediate costs. But disruption alone rarely dismantles the access structures external powers cultivate over years.

When political or economic stress intensifies, those structures often remain intact, allowing competitors to protect their equities and adapt quickly. Pressure that is not paired with a longer-term access-denial strategy risks plateauing or incentivizing deeper external involvement.

In Venezuela, criminal disruption addresses symptoms. It does not, by itself, degrade the political, economic, and intelligence ecosystems that enable adversarial positioning. Without sustained follow-through, tactical success can coexist with strategic stagnation.

Narrative, Legitimacy, and the Competitive Space

Competition below the threshold of war is also a contest over legitimacy. External powers rarely challenge U.S. actions on operational grounds alone. Instead, they exploit ambiguity, sovereignty narratives, and perceptions of disproportion.

These narratives gain traction when objectives appear narrow, temporary, or disconnected from a broader political strategy. Countering them does not require rhetorical escalation. It requires clarity, about purpose, duration, and the outcomes the United States seeks to prevent or enable.

Strategic Implications Going Forward

Venezuela should be assessed as part of a broader competitive environment in which external actors exploit fragility, isolation, and economic dependence to secure enduring access.

Experience from other regions points to several implications:

Denying durable access matters more than disrupting individual activities.

Time favors persistent presence over episodic pressure.

Clarity of purpose constrains adversarial narratives.

Regional confidence and allied coordination reduce competitive space.

In this environment, success is measured not only by disruption, but by whether competitors are prevented from converting instability into lasting advantage.

Venezuela reinforces a familiar reality: in an era of competition below the threshold of war, strategic outcomes are shaped less by single actions than by whether access, influence, and legitimacy are denied over time.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Building U.S. Drone Dominance Brick by Brick https://belimedia.com.ng/building-us-drone-dominance-brick-by-brick https://belimedia.com.ng/building-us-drone-dominance-brick-by-brick OPINION — One of the things I loved about LEGO as a child was the ability to mix and match an endless amount of parts to create unique builds. Children (and some adults) gather around a bin of parts to create something new. Imagine being asked: “Build 10 houses in 30 minutes.” Everyone would come up with unique designs using various parts. Now, imagine a constraint: “You may only use red, 2x4, 2x2, and 1x2 bricks, white windows and doors, and it all has to fit on a green 32x32 baseplate.” Quickly, the limited supply causes a frantic scramble.

This scenario mirrors the recent call by the Department of War to field 300,000 drones over two years. The conflict in Ukraine exposed the U.S.'s lack of preparedness to equip forces with Purpose Built Attritable Systems (PBAS) at the scale of its peer competitors. Further, manufacturers are restricted by the requirement for critical components to be NDAA / BlueUAS compliant and, as of December 22nd, even more restrictions which demand non-critical components be U.S.-manufactured. The defense industrial base is struggling to meet unprecedented demand.

While numerous startups and giants have stepped up, the U.S. supply chain cannot sustain the required pace. Existing suppliers’ manufacturing capabilities are quickly surpassed as companies scramble to design, build, and market the requested systems.

sUAS are fundamentally basic, consisting of a flight controller (FC), electronic speed controller (ESC), motors, propellers, camera, radio/video transmitters, receivers, and a frame. The main problem is the availability of parts and, more critically, sub-components needed to make them. Manufacturers are all reaching into the same scarce “bin,” forcing suppliers to seek materials with increased vigor.

Motors, for instance, require neodymium and copper. The majority of motor production occurs outside of the U.S., where technology is mature, labor costs are lower, and the supply chain exists. However, the sUAS industry accounts for less than 8% of neodymium consumption in the U.S. Returning to the LEGO analogy, if a child asks for more 1x1 red bricks to make houses, LEGO, which (in this scenario) makes over 90% of its money on other parts, has little incentive to retool for large-scale 1x1 brick production.

Similarly, most FC and ESC boards are produced in Taiwan. While this was permissible under the original NDAA and BlueUAS frameworks, the new requirement for U.S. production necessitates standing up domestic manufacturing, likely to ensure production continues in the event that trade with Taiwan is disrupted. However, standing up U.S. companies, sourcing materials, hiring labor, and developing technology all create significant costs that are passed to the consumer. Since PBAS systems must remain attritable (affordable enough to be lost in combat), a higher cost per unit will force warfighters to be more judicious.

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Given the intense demand and additional domestic constraints, how can the U.S. remain competitive? There are a few ways.

Incentivize existing global manufacturers to stand up U.S.-based manufacturing. Companies with existing technology, design, manufacturing, and supply chains should be incentivized to establish domestic production of like products.

Encourage raw material companies to invest upstream. Critical material mining companies (e.g., for lithium and neodymium) currently lack incentive to ensure stable, consistent supply to manufacturers. Encouraging investment upstream offers supply chain guarantees for domestic manufacturing and additional revenue for investors.

Establish a “strategic reserve” of raw materials. The U.S. maintains strategic oil and gas reserves. For future conflicts, a strategic reserve of critical sUAS materials is vital given the global stranglehold countries like China have on the market to enable rapid manufacturing scale-up even if trade is disrupted.

Increase throughput of BlueUAS and NDAA compliant components from outside the U.S. Maintaining U.S. connectivity to the global sUAS marketplace is important. While the restrictions are righteous, isolating U.S. production strains the raw material supply chain, causes allies to follow suit, and increases the overall cost per unit, reducing attritability. The U.S. should use the BlueUAS framework, with increased throughput, to identify compliant vendors across a wide section of allies and trade partners.

Expedite current NDAA compliant components manufactured overseas through BlueUAS processes. As manufacturing shifts to the U.S., the U.S. could provide ‘provisional’ BlueUAS certifications with limited durations to cover companies during the transition.

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Without a temporary easement or an adequate transitional period, the U.S. drone market is likely to shift abruptly. Many companies cannot afford to stand up U.S. production, or the cost of compliance would render their price points untenable. This situation would likely result in defense giants acquiring the IP/technology from smaller companies at a steep discount, leveraging their supply networks, lobbying, and significant capital advantage to continue development and manufacturing under their umbrella, returning the U.S. defense ecosystem to its former exclusive state, prior to the recent tranche of reforms.

The U.S. is at a critical inflection point in its quest for American Drone Dominance. The foundation it establishes will define its final strength and resilience. Care must be taken to avoid supply chain degradation, continue providing affordable solutions for the warfighter, and remain flexible and responsive in future crises. Incentivizing domestic production without isolation will ensure the U.S. has all the pieces it needs to build successfully, brick by brick.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Venezuela was a Surprise. What Could be Next? https://belimedia.com.ng/venezuela-was-a-surprise-what-could-be-next https://belimedia.com.ng/venezuela-was-a-surprise-what-could-be-next CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT Q&A -- Deposed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is scheduled to appear in a U.S. courtroom on Monday for the first time since being brought to New York to face narco-terrorism charges. The brief hearing will formally begin what is expected to be a lengthy legal battle over whether he can be prosecuted in the United States.

This, as intelligence professionals are considering what the seemingly flawless U.S. military operation to detain Maduro could mean for what’s next in the region. Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke with former CIA Senior Executive Glenn Corn about the impact of the Venezuelan operation and what we still don’t know. Their conversation has been lightly edited for length.

Christian: Talk us through how you're reacting to the news of the last 72 hours.

Corn: If I had a hat, I'd take it off to our former partner colleagues in the intelligence community and the special operations community. I mean, great operation. Well planned and executed. I'm sure that the intelligence had to be very good. Honestly, I'm proud because it's good to have a reminder that the U.S. can do this kind of thing. I don't want to go into the international law piece. I'm not a lawyer. But really a great operation and thanks to the people that put it together. You probably remember that we talked recently about the importance of the Western Hemisphere and reasserting some of our influence there and reminding people that, this is our backyard. This administration has made the Western Hemisphere a priority and I think it's a good thing. And here's an example of something that the president is willing to do. I give the president credit - this is a pretty bold move. And the timing was interesting. The other thing I'll say is no leaks, right? Which is also very, very good news because we have a problem in Washington with leaks, and the administration was able to keep this one under wraps. I was completely surprised.

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Christian: What do you think are going to be some of the things that you're going to be watching most closely? President Trump has said that the United States is going to be involved in administering Venezuela in the near term. There's been a lot of talk about reviving Venezuela's oil industry. Obviously, that's not surprising. There's been some reaction from American adversaries, but everyone's still in a watch and wait mode yet for how China and Russia is going to respond to this. What are you paying attention to in terms of signals for this week?

Corn: The president's comments about some type of U.S. administration, at least in some kind of transitory period were interesting. I immediately am reminded of Iraq where the military operation was well done and we removed Saddam Hussein pretty quickly in 2003, but then what came after was not great. So, I hope we've learned that lesson and we're not going to repeat the mistakes we made there. Hopefully there is a plan in place. The president indicated that some people in the administration are going to be giving roles also to help administer.

And it’s interesting that President Maduro and his wife were detained, but it looks like everybody else is still in their roles which may be an indication that they learned the lesson from Iraq and our experience there.

By the way, if you're the Iranian supreme leader, you probably have to be very nervous right now. I went to bed thinking about Iran and what's happening there. And the president's comments that the U.S. will support those people that are coming out to peacefully protest and if they're... I forget his exact words, but basically, "We will punish those who use force against them or who killed protestors."

Christian: The way I interpreted that was that the U.S. was prepared to intervene militarily to protect the protestors.

Corn: And we may still be. Last week, I was very focused on Iran, then all of a sudden over the weekend, this operation went down. Now, whether that's the intent or not, I don't know, but it’s really interesting timing. What comes next will be very important. I've been saying for a while that this administration has had some very good foreign policy successes in the last year, since coming to office. Generally, I think they're doing well on the foreign policy front. They've done some bold things. Syria, Azerbaijan, Armenia. Now what comes next is important, and then consistency is important. Do we have the ability to see it through? We’ll have to see.

Christian: Russia is considered an ally to Venezuela. How might this impact Moscow’s foreign policy in the Western hemisphere, to include their planning and their ongoing operations as it relates to Venezuela or perhaps other parts of the Western hemisphere?

Corn: I think Putin has backed himself into a corner when it comes to a lot of these countries that he's aligned with. We saw that with Syria where he was overspent, and he really didn't have anything to help former President Bashar al-Assad when Assad was in crisis. And one of his main allies in the Middle East is no longer there.

In Venezuela, the Russians have come out with some statements in support of Caracas, of Maduro, but they really haven't done much. There was some reporting last year, that Moscow was shipping more air defense systems and weapons to Maduro and the regime as we were ratcheting up our military activity in the Caribbean. But none of that seems to have made a real difference. Putin has to understand right now that he's been unable to come to Assad's assistance and with Maduro, his ally has just been removed and detained. So, he's got to be watching Iran very nervously because that's his other main ally in the Middle East and they've invested a lot in that relationship, and it seems like the Supreme Leader is in trouble right now. The regime is in trouble.

With the President of the United States making bold comments about what the U.S. will do if the regime goes after protestors in Iran, it’s clear that Putin's influence is waning all over the world and he's eventually going to be unable to stand.

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The Russians used to like to brag that they stand by their allies when the U.S. abandons them. Actually, it's looking now like the Russians are abandoning their allies. And I assess that's partly because of this quagmire that Putin got himself into in Ukraine.

Maybe some of the Venezuelans who are celebrating the removal of their dictator should think about Ukraine and what the Ukrainians have done for them by stopping the Russian military the way they've done so effectively.

It also seems at first blush, that the intelligence services of Russia failed because it looks like this operation went down without any real warning to Maduro. And one would assess that if Putin is an ally of Maduro, he'd have tipped him off about the operation, which the Russians have tried to do in other circumstances in the past.

By the way, the Cuban bodyguards, what happened to them? Someone was telling me last week, that Maduro's main security force was made up of Cubans.

I think Putin has painted himself into a corner because I think he's afraid to really upset Trump because he knows that if Trump comes down hard on him on the Ukraine issue, he's in big trouble.

He's already in trouble. And many of us have assessed for a while that if President Trump decides that it's time to really ratchet up the heat on Moscow and the Kremlin, that will probably be a serious, serious blow to Putin and his power.

Christian: Do you believe that President Putin thinks he's backed into a corner in the way that you describe? And is it likely that there are people around him who may be telling him that?

Corn:. I don't even want to try to put myself in his head space. I've said for a long time, going back 10 years, that he's put himself in an information vacuum or echo chamber. So, who knows what he's thinking. But my guess is that he feels like he's backed into a corner. If you saw when the U.S. announced sanctions on Gazprom and Lukoil, the first thing Putin did was send a delegate to the United States in a rush. That showed me panic and fear. And I'm sure that people around Putin are upset and worried.

Now, let's watch Iran. I think Iran's a big piece on the chess board, and we should see what happens there. I don't think that the Russians are going to be able to help much if the Iranian regime starts to collapse.

Christian: The critics of the operation in Venezuela are saying things like, "This is a bad precedent to set. Other leaders around the world may decide, 'Okay, well, if the U.S. can do something like this...'" And obviously the criticism of this operation is it violates Venezuela's sovereignty. Do you worry about the knock-on effect and the second and third order effects of an operation like this being conducted by the United States, regardless of who's president, and being used in ways that may cause further instability in the world or being used by autocratic leaders or America's adversaries?

Corn: No, I think that ship sailed a long time ago. This is not the first time the United States has done something like this. This is not the first time other countries have done something like this. Countries have made land grabs, have assassinated leaders or tried to remove leaders, overthrow governments. So, there's nothing new here. There's no new precedent here that I see. We've already started down this very ugly road. And to me, now, what's important is to make sure that our national security structure and our intelligence community and armed forces are fully armed and capable of dealing with any threat to U.S. interests and to our allies.

Christian: At our most recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference in October, there was a lot of talk about global conflict. Some people use the phrase World War III. Do you believe it’s started and how are you thinking about 2026 from a national security standpoint?

Corn: Deterrence is critical right now. The U.S. has been deterred too much in the past, and we've been unable to deter our adversaries. It's very important that the U.S. maintains and demonstrates an ability to deter adversaries when they threaten our interests. The president is talking about U.S. oil companies going into Venezuela, rebuilding the infrastructure, reviving the Venezuelan oil industry, energy industry. I think this goes along with the administration's approach with commercial diplomacy, getting the U.S. business community actively involved around the world to help promote U.S. interests, which I support but you have to make sure that happens because you don't want vacuums to be created. A year ago in Syria, everybody was very excited about the opportunities, but those opportunities have been very hard to develop because of the realities on the ground. So, you need sustainment. You need the ability to really sustain and be patient and invest in taking advantage of opportunities and bringing some kind of economic development to regions that have suffered for a long time and are in very bad shape that are producing either jihadists or narco traffickers - probably because a lot of those people have no other choice to survive.

You and I have both served in countries where that is the case, where the majority of people are not bad people, but they have no choice. There's really no option. We want to give them something better, right? But we have to do it. And that's going to be the big challenge.

Again, kudos to the administration. This is part of a bigger game. I go back to the Reagan administration and the kind of rollback approach to the Soviet Union when Russia was challenging us around the world and Reagan finally responded to that by challenging them and calling out the Soviets where they were trying to poke on our interests.

I would say that the Trump administration seems to be doing that, which is good, but we've got to be very, very cognizant of the fact that it's going to take a lot of investment and a lot of persistent attention to do it.

If the Iranian regime collapses tomorrow, that could create a great opportunity or a vacuum. There’s a great opportunity in Venezuela right now. Let's take advantage of it.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
After Venezuela, What Is Next in 2026? https://belimedia.com.ng/after-venezuela-what-is-next-in-2026 https://belimedia.com.ng/after-venezuela-what-is-next-in-2026

CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT Q&A — President Donald Trump said the U.S. is "in charge" in Venezuela after U.S. forces detained President Nicolas Maduro on charges related to drug trafficking. President Trump is also demanding "total access" to Venezuela's oil infrastructure. Venezuela's de-facto leader Delcy Rodriguez said Caracas is seeking "balanced and respectful international relations" with Washington.

Intelligence professionals are reacting to this major development as it will have far-reaching consequences far beyond Venezuela, for the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere amid heightened tensions with adversaries such as Russia and China. Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke with former CIA Senior Executive Paul Kolbe about what Maduro's capture signals for the national security landscape in 2026. The conversation has been lightly edited for length.

Christian: How are thinking about what just happened in Venezuela? What's top of mind for you?

Kolbe: Venezuela has been a problem both for the United States and for the Venezuelan people for over 20 years. For the Chavez years and then the Maduro years, they've driven a country that was once one of the wealthiest in the world, and certainly wealthiest in South America, with unbelievable natural resources, particularly oil, and driven it into the ground through corruption, poor leadership, poor decisions, and oppression of the people. There's a reason eight million Venezuelans have fled the country. So, it's been a series of corrupt, horrible rulers. Not sorry to see Maduro go.

Venezuela has also been a foothold for Cuba. Very important for Cuba in terms of the oil that they get there, but also as a place to plant the flag and spread Cuban revolution throughout South America. It's been a base and source of money and money laundering for Hezbollah and Iran. Russia has had a long-standing relationship with Chavez and with Maduro, supporting them with weapons, with intelligence, with the Wagner Group. So, Venezuela has been both a thorn in the side of the U.S., and has been involved in so many different things that are against our interests — not sorry to see Maduro go.

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Christian: Last year, President Trump had authorized covert activity in Venezuela. There had been talk even recently, just days ago, of the CIA being involved in a strike against a target in Venezuela. We don't often see a military operation of this complexity that goes this smoothly. What does that tell you about the intelligence that was at play here and the level of cooperation with the military?

Kolbe: Clearly it was highly professional and extraordinarily well-executed operation, both by the intelligence community and by the U.S. special operations forces that went in. Very pleased that there were no casualties, that we didn't suffer any losses. But the split that I would make is to ask if this is a very well-executed tactical operation that is without a larger strategy? And if there's a larger strategy, what is it? In particular, what's the follow-on? There's been a number of times where we've gone in and broken things and not done such a great job of fixing them or just leaving. You can look at Libya, at Iraq, and other places where that's not happened. Some folks will point to Panama and Grenada and try to use those as analogies for Venezuela, and they're very different cases. Venezuela's not Panama — much bigger, much different set of dynamics there — and it's certainly not Grenada.

So the follow-on of who's going to rule, what the transition is, how do you maintain stability? The narco-traffickers are still there, the narco-syndicates, the military is still there, the street gangs are still there. The paramilitaries, which have been supported by the military and have acted as the chief arm of oppression and brutality against the people, they're still there. There's a lot of generals that have an awful lot to lose. So, unless there's been a negotiated handover of power, I don't quite understand, yet, how we're going to run the country without boots on the ground or without a clear negotiated handover.

Christian: Russia's been described as a special type of enabler for Venezuela over the years. Russian officials have called the U.S. operation in Venezuela "unlawful'' and a violation of norms. There have been other Russia developments related to Venezuela recently. The ship, Bella 1, that the United States has been pursuing for the last couple of weeks was reported to have painted a Russian flag on it's hull on Dec 31, and Russia reportedly has asked the United States to stop pursuing it. What's your reaction to how Russia has publicly responded to these incidents?

Kolbe: I'll start with the irony of Russia's protestations against what they see as the invasion of sovereignty of another country and how awful that is put out there with no sense of irony. Russia is condemning something that is not analogous to what they've done in Ukraine, but also completely ignoring what they've done in Ukraine and the ongoing war that they continue to pursue against the Ukrainian people, against their infrastructure, against everything that stands there.

So, while Venezuela is going to capture a lot of attention over the next few days, I suspect that's also, perhaps, part of the purpose of it. It distracts from what I think is a far more strategic, far more important issue, i.e., What's going to happen in Ukraine in 2026? Will the U.S. abandon Ukraine? Will we stab them in the back, or will we be able to provide support that lets them fight Russia, preserve their sovereignty?

The story with the ship is a pretty interesting one. It feels like watching a sea-born version of OJ Simpson's escape in his Ford Bronco as this Coast Guard cutter trails this gigantic oil freighter, which is running away at the speed of 11 knots and is now in the North Atlantic and is claiming to have Russian protection. Russia has reportedly put out a diplomatic note dissuading the U.S. from taking any action on that. So it will be interesting to see what actually happens if the ship managed to make good on the escape or if we turn around and say, "Oh, nevermind."

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Christian: At the most recent Threat Conference back in October, there was a lot of talk of global conflict. And some people use the phrase, "World War III." Are we in it? Has it begun? There's been a lot of talk about gray zone, the level of gray zone activity, and the risk of major conflicts breaking out such as Taiwan or the situation in Europe growing beyond the borders of Ukraine. How are you thinking about the world as we start 2026 amid what is truly a dynamic national security backdrop?

Kolbe: I'm thinking about it as we're in a state of conflict without recognizing it. Just a couple of days ago over New Year’s, you saw China mount a blockade exercise, clearly practicing for a coming blockade of Taiwan. The signaling coming out of there is ever sharper and, it’s always been clear, but suggests a narrowing timeline for action on Taiwan. I don't believe anything's imminent, but clearly they're building the capability and then the intent, the decision, once they have the capability, can happen at any time.

Just a couple of days ago, we saw another communications cable cut between Estonia and Finland by a Russian ship that had left a Russian port that continues what is essentially low grade warfare on the European continent by Russia: sabotage, assassinations, misinformation, disinformation, and just a series of things which are clearly preparation of the battlefield, designed both to deter Europe and get Europe to self-deter, but also for the U.S., but also to put into place the capabilities that would be useful or used in conflict.

I think what is clear to me is that we, the US — as stated in the National Security Strategy that came out in December — are basically carving out Latin America as a U.S. area of influence and seeming to leave Europe and Central Asia to Russia and East Asia to China. And for me, that's very disturbing that America First looks to be coming to include South America First.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Human Agency in a Technology&Mediated World https://belimedia.com.ng/human-agency-in-a-technology-mediated-world https://belimedia.com.ng/human-agency-in-a-technology-mediated-world EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Occasionally, a speech does more than mark a leadership transition or outline institutional priorities. It captures, with unusual clarity, the nature of the moment we are living through and the choices it demands.

Blaise Metreweli’s recent inaugural address as Chief (or more colloquially, C) of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service was one of those moments. Rather than offering a conventional tour of threats or capabilities, she chose a more demanding path. She spoke about human agency in a world increasingly shaped by machines. About trust, judgment, and integrity at a time when technology is accelerating every dimension of competition and conflict.

I had the pleasure of working with Metreweli while serving as Deputy Director of the CIA for Digital Innovation. I watched her navigate the intersection of operations and technology with a rare combination of rigor and imagination. Her speech reflects that same sensibility. It is operationally grounded, intellectually disciplined, and quietly ambitious in what it asks of an intelligence service. Just as it should be.

What struck me most, reading her remarks, was not simply their alignment with themes I have been working on for years, both inside government and since my departure in 2024. It was the way she wove those themes together into a coherent vision of intelligence suited to the world as it is, not the world we might wish it to be.

At the center of Metreweli’s speech is a proposition that may sound self-evident, yet is increasingly contested in practice: even in a technology-mediated world, human beings must still decide outcomes.

Artificial intelligence can surface patterns, illuminate possibilities, even accelerate analysis. It cannot decide what matters. It cannot weigh moral tradeoffs. It cannot assume responsibility for consequences. Intelligence, in her framing, remains a human endeavor, even as it becomes ever more technologically enabled.

This is a conclusion I reached years ago while leading digital transformation efforts inside the CIA. As our tools became more powerful, the temptation to treat output as authority grew stronger. We resisted that instinct deliberately. The most effective systems we built were those designed explicitly to support human judgment, not replace it. They forced users to ask better questions or to challenge assumptions, and to understand context before acting.

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I have described this in multiple speeches and articles as human–machine partnering, and Metreweli’s speech reflects the same conviction. The future of intelligence is not technological supremacy alone. Nor is it the return to a romanticized vision of the intelligence mission before the digital revolution. It is the disciplined integration of technology into human decision-making, with clarity about where judgment must reside.

Metreweli is equally clear about the character of modern conflict. We are no longer operating in a world neatly divided between war and peace. Instead, we inhabit a persistent space between the two, where states seek advantage through pressure that is continuous, deniable, and often difficult to attribute.

Cyber operations, sabotage, influence campaigns, and coercive economic measures all live comfortably in this grey zone. They are designed to intimidate and to erode confidence without triggering a conventional response.

One aspect of this competition that deserves particular attention is the emergence of what I have called digital chokepoints. These are points of leverage embedded in digital infrastructure, data ecosystems, platforms, standards, and supply chains. They do not announce themselves boldly as instruments of power, yet they have increasingly come under attack in recent years as a tool of geopolitical competition. In 2024-2025 alone, there were numerous anomalous “incidents” that damaged or cut 13 undersea cables around Taiwan and the Baltic Sea.

Grey-zone conflict, viewed through this lens, is not episodic. It is cumulative. And we will see more of it. Intelligence services must therefore understand not just individual operations, but the architecture of pressure that builds quietly and persistently across domains.

The convergence of artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing, and the way these advances are reshaping both opportunity and risk was featured prominently in Metreweli’s speech. She avoids the dual traps of easy optimism and easy alarmism alike.

I have often framed technology as both shield and sword. It accelerates intent, but it does not generally determine outcomes. Technology itself is neutral. What matters is how it is governed, deployed, and constrained by human choice, as well as which values are encoded into its digital foundations

This distinction is not academic. The same AI system that accelerates medical discovery can enable surveillance at scale. The same digital infrastructure that connects societies can be (and is) used to monitor and control them. Metreweli’s speech is careful to emphasize mastery of technology alongside responsibility for its effects.

That balance is essential. Technological determinism strips leaders of agency and excuses poor judgment. Metreweli’s approach does neither.

One of the most sobering elements of Metreweli’s address is her discussion of trust. Information, once a unifying force, is now routinely weaponized. Falsehood spreads faster than fact. Algorithms reward outrage and reinforce bias. Shared reality seems increasingly elusive.

I have spent significant time in recent years examining the implications of synthetic media, deepfakes, and AI-enabled influence operations. Today, identity itself has become contested space. Voice, image, and presence can be fabricated convincingly and at scale. Seeing is no longer believing.

This presents intelligence services with challenges that extend well beyond traditional counterintelligence or cyber defense. When trust collapses, when one can no longer discern truth from fiction, societies risk losing much more than confidence in institutions. They risk losing the ability to reason collectively about the world they inhabit.

Metreweli’s insistence that defending the space where truth can still stand as a core intelligence mission reflects a deep understanding of what is at stake.

Another strength of Metreweli’s speech is her refusal to treat today’s challenges as isolated problems. She describes an interlocking threat landscape that spans physical and digital domains, from seabed cables to space systems, from code to cognition.

This holistic view is critical. Too often, Western governments have approached cross-domain issues in separate policy lanes. Next-generation communications, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns. All treated as distinct, individual issues. Our principal strategic competitor, the People’s Republic of China, has not made that mistake. These domains are understood as mutually reinforcing components of a comprehensive national digital strategy tied directly to a grand geopolitical ambition.

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I have argued for years that we must respond in kind, not by mirroring authoritarian models, but by approaching this competition in a more holistic fashion and by offering global partners a credible alternative. Countries around the world want to harness new technologies to accelerate development and improve lives. Many also want to protect sovereignty and human freedom. Meeting that demand requires seeing the digital contest as a whole, not as a collection of technical projects about which individual and disconnected policy decisions are made.

Though not stated in such terms, Metreweli’s framing reflects this reality.

As an operational commander who became a technical leader, Metreweli brings unusual authority to her discussion of technology within intelligence tradecraft. She envisions a service where officers are as comfortable using digital tools as they are recruiting and running human sources.

This is not about turning intelligence officers into engineers. It is about understanding technology as both a tool and a terrain. Digital literacy becomes foundational, not because everyone must code, but because everyone must grasp how technology shapes the operational environment and adversary behavior. In modern intelligence, ignorance of technology becomes a vulnerability.

Metreweli also speaks directly to the question of legitimacy. Intelligence services in democracies operate with extraordinary authorities. Their effectiveness ultimately depends on trust.

Her commitment to openness, where it can responsibly exist, is not about transparency for its own sake. It is about sustaining a relationship with the public rooted in shared values. Accountability, in her formulation, is a strength, not a constraint.

This is a principle I championed consistently inside the Agency and since my departure. In democratic societies, trust can never be taken for granted. It must be earned and maintained, especially as intelligence services operate in the shadows, out of view of the citizens they serve.

A particularly powerful portion of Metreweli’s speech focuses on audacity and “hustle,” reflecting a clear understanding of the environment intelligence services face today. In a world defined by exponential change, moving slowly does not preserve relevance. It accelerates decline.

I have spoken often about urgency, about the reality that institutions unwilling to adapt will become obsolete. That does not mean abandoning discipline or ethics. It means recognizing that delay carries its own significant risks. In today’s dynamic, high-threat landscape, inaction is perhaps the biggest risk.

Metreweli closes her speech where she began, with values. Courage. Creativity. Respect. Integrity. She recounts a conversation with a long-term foreign agent who worked with the UK precisely because of these values. This is not a sentimental anecdote. It is a strategic insight into how intelligence services in western democracies must navigate today’s complexity. Leveraging our core strength. Values.

We are living through the rise of digital authoritarianism, where technology is used to monitor, manipulate, and control populations at unprecedented scale. The most profound threat this poses is not technical. It is moral. It erodes human agency incrementally, often invisibly, until freedom becomes difficult to reclaim.

I have warned repeatedly that societies rarely lose freedom in dramatic moments. They lose it through systems that optimize for efficiency or security while stripping away consent, accountability, and choice.

Metreweli’s insistence that none of us have a future without values is therefore a statement of strategic reality, and it gets to the very heart of the issue.

Blaise Metreweli’s speech deserves close reading, not because it is eloquent (though it is), but because it is consequential. It articulates a vision of intelligence that is technologically fluent without being technologically captive, operationally aggressive without abandoning principle, and deeply human in a world that increasingly tempts us to forget what that means.

For intelligence professionals, policymakers, and citizens alike, it is a reminder that even as our tools evolve, the most important choices remain ours to make.

Read the full speech here.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
High Risk in Venezuela—To What End? https://belimedia.com.ng/high-risk-in-venezuelato-what-end https://belimedia.com.ng/high-risk-in-venezuelato-what-end OPINION — “I knew the possible danger. It was a very dangerous operation. It was amazing that we had a few injured, but all are in good shape right now, but I knew there was great danger. You got off a helicopter. The helicopters were being shot out. They got on the ground amazing talent and tremendous patriotism, bravery. The bravery was incredible…They got off the helicopter and the bullets were flying all over the place. As you know, one of the helicopters got hit pretty badly, but that we got everything back. Got everything back and nobody killed,” meaning Americans.

That was President Donald Trump speaking Sunday aboard Air Force One on the way back from Florida about what he observed watching the early Saturday morning U.S. raid in Caracas that captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife.

While events in Venezuela are still unfolding and I will discuss some below, I use that quote because it illustrates that deaths of American service members is one thing I believe is high in Trump’s mind as he has in recent months undertaken a series of worldwide military actions.

Trump almost regularly points out that no Americans have been killed in the four months the U.S. has been blowing up alleged narco-trafficking boats. No Americans were lost in the bombing of Iran nuclear facilities.

And despite Trump’s threat that he could put U.S. boots-on-the-ground if needed to “run” Venezuela, there is no immediate indication he has plans to do that.

Instead, it appears Trump’s plan is to “run” Venezuela using what remains of the corrupt Maduro military/police hierarchy as long as they do what Trump wants. To me it recalls Trump as a builder working with questionable union leaders and construction firms to get jobs done.

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Just why has President Trump spent time and money, first to negotiate with Maduro to get him to leave, and finally to dramatically oust the Venezuelan President from office?

I divert for a moment.

On Friday, the original beginning of this column was, “Most fentanyl and methamphetamine trafficking into the U.S. occurs through official ports of entry along the southwest border, according to DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency).”

That was a quote from a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled, “Illicit Synthetic Drugs: Trafficking Methods, Money Laundering Practices, and Coordination Efforts,” that was sent to Congress and released publicly December 18, 2025.

The GAO’s report, including the finding cited above, focuses attention on fentanyl primarily coming into the U.S. through land ports of entry while the Trump administration made its anti-fentanyl focus on attacking narco-trafficking swift-boats initially from Venezuela, claiming they were headed for the U.S.

More recently, the attacks, and killing of those aboard, have been those in the eastern Pacific.

The New York Times published a story by Carol Rosenberg that discussed what happens when U.S. Coast Guard cutters intercept narco-trafficking boats, seize drugs and capture those aboard – but not kill 115 on 35 speedboats as the U.S. military did last year.

Putting together the December GAO report and the Times story raised some serious questions about the rationality of the Trump administration’s so-called anti-drug program.

Up to that time, interception of drug-carrying boats and interrogation of the crews gave valuable information on drug routes.

However, as The Times noted, “Attorney General Pam Bondi directed [U.S.] prosecutors in February to mostly stop bringing charges against low-level offenders in favor of bigger investigations.” According to The Times, “For the most part, people captured by the Coast Guard in the same smuggling routes the U.S. military is bombing are being repatriated -- either directly, before reaching the United States, or through deportation after briefly being questioned near U.S. ports.”

The Times noted that many earlier captured crew members were “poor, undereducated farmers or fishermen [who] would reach cooperation agreements that offered details of their engagement at the bottom rung of the drug smuggling business in exchange for possible leniency.”

The Times quoted Tampa-lawyer Stephen M. Crawford, who in the past had been assigned to represent defendants captured by the Coast Guard, who said the killing of crew members without prosecution amounted to very dangerous “political theater.”

I could say the same today for what I consider today’s ill-thought-out Trump actions in Venezuela.

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As many others have pointed out, returning democracy to the Venezuelan people was not uppermost in Trump’s mind.

On Saturday, in announcing the raid, Trump told reporters he had not been in contact with Venezuelan Opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado. He then went on to say, "I think it'd be very tough for her to be the leader. She doesn't have the support or the respect within the country. She's a very nice woman but she doesn't have the respect."

What I believe Trump meant was that the Maduro power structure – the Venezuelan Army, Bolivarian National Police and urban paramilitary networks known as colectivos -- remain active and it is they that don’t “respect” Machado.

They are also probably the reason there are no U.S. boots-on-the-ground.

Instead, Trump seems to believe that by keeping major U.S. military forces near Venezuela, he can threaten additional military attacks to keep the ex-Maduro crowd in line.

As Trump put it Sunday on Air Force One, “Venezuela thus far has been very nice, but it helps to have a force like we have. You know, we were ready for a second wave. We were all set to go, but we don't think we're going to need it.”

Apparently it is Venezuela’s oil which is primarily on Trump’s mind.

As with other matters, Trump seems to be living in the past as illustrated when he told reporters over the weekend, “We [the U.S.] had a lot of oil there [in Venezuela]. As you know they threw our companies out, and we want it back.”

Nationalization was the culmination of a decades-long effort by Venezuelan administrations of both the right and the left to bring under government control an industry that an earlier leader had largely given away.

American oil companies, including Exxon and Mobil, which merged in 1999, and Gulf Oil, which became Chevron in 1984, were hit hardest. The Dutch giant Shell was also affected. The companies, which had accounted for more than 70 percent of crude oil production in Venezuela, lost roughly $5 billion in assets but were compensated just $1 billion each, according to news stories from that period.

On Sunday, Trump said, “The oil companies are ready to go. They're going to go in, they're going to rebuild the infrastructure. You know, we built it to start off with many years ago.

They took it away. You can't do that. They can't do that with me. They did it with other presidents.”

According to several sources, major oil companies are not eager to spend the years and money at the present time to revive the Venezuelan oil industry, but as with much about the Venezuelan situation, there’s little yet that is predictable.

One potentially dangerous outcome, looming already, is how Trump reads what he so far considers his military success.

On Sunday he made open threats to both Colombia and Cuba.

He called Colombian President Gustavo Petro “a sick man who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States. And he's not going to be doing it very long, let me tell you?”

And as for Cuba, Trump said, “Cuba always survived because of Venezuela. Now, they won't have that money coming in. They won't have the income coming in.”

He then went on to point out, “You know, a lot of Cubans were killed yesterday. You know that. A lot of Cubans were killed…There was a lot of death on the other side.”

But then Trump quickly added, as I have pointed out before, “No death on our side.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Who's reading this? 500K+ dedicated national security professionals. Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Venezuela’s Key Takeaways for the World https://belimedia.com.ng/venezuelas-key-takeaways-for-the-world https://belimedia.com.ng/venezuelas-key-takeaways-for-the-world

CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT INTERVIEW – While the U.S. operation to detain Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro took just hours to execute, a full assessment of its global impact will take weeks or months to fully understand in part, because of the complicated dynamic connecting the country’s assets, allies and oil.

“Venezuela is what I would call one of those hyphenated accounts,” says Norm Roule, a global energy expert who also served as former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI. “Venezuela in and of itself is important, but it's also Venezuela/oil, Venezuela/Russia, Venezuela/China, Venezuela/Cuba. There are a lot of different accounts and issues that must be taken into consideration.”

Venezuela’s partners depend on it for various strategic reasons: Cuba for economic support, Iran for political alignment in Latin America, and China for a notable share of its oil imports. The United States, meanwhile, is signaling a major shift in how it intends to assert influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian talked with Roule, a leading global consultant on Middle East and Energy issues, about what is likely to happen next as the U.S. signals a major shift in how it intends to assert influence in the Western Hemisphere. Their conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

THE INTERVIEW

The Cipher Brief: The Trump administration recently released an updated national security strategy that weighed heavily on the Western hemisphere. Are we seeing perhaps the first kind of inclination that this is going to actually be something to pay close attention to?

Roule: Absolutely. And I think the national security strategy is something that every one of the Cipher Brief's readers and listeners should pull out today. Look at it again, because I can assure you that policymakers around the world - in both our partner and adversary countries - are certainly doing so. If you look at events in Venezuela and read that national security strategy, a number of themes come forward.

The U.S. will be the dominant power in the Western hemisphere. In Venezuela, we saw a display of massive U.S. power and skill in the form of our military intelligence and technology. This is very similar to the display that the world witnessed in Iran last June. So, this is coming very, very close to two sets of actions. And I think this is meant to be seen also, as the president alluded to in his press conference, as a visible reset of what he described as a previous erosion of U.S. military power in his predecessor's administration.

This is also showing that the U.S. is now capable of executing what was described by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an extraordinarily large and complicated military and intelligence operation, without being leaked. This did not require foreign partners. And it also did not require the disruption of regional commercial air operations. If you listen to what the chairman talked about, this involved 150 aircraft from multiple locations descending upon another country. And other than closing the airspace for a short period of time, commercial air traffic was not disrupted. But you're seeing some other things that are also notable. The U.S. will undertake regime change when it perceives that the existing regime threatens core U.S. national security interests.

This also represents another U.S. blow against a Chinese partner in the Western hemisphere following the Trump administration's actions in Panama. The operation also took place on the anniversary of the killing of Iranian Quds Force leader General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 as well as the surrender of Manuel Noriega in 1990.

These are both examples of the long arm of the U.S. government. And certainly, the United States may have thought that the selection of this date would dampen any commemorations by the Iranian government for Soleimani's death in Tehran. Which would have been difficult enough given the ongoing demonstrations in Tehran. But the ripples from this Venezuela operation will be global. And I think the national security strategy puts some meat on the bone with this operation.

The Cipher Brief: Just looking at the intelligence that was needed to pull off an operations like this for a moment, what do you think this says about U.S. intelligence and what would have gone into that for this particular operation?

Roule: Well, it tells you a couple of things. It tells you that first, the intelligence was exquisite and up to date. But it also tells you that the intelligence was integrated into the military operation with an intimacy, with care, so that our military personnel were able to move with extraordinary speed to get to the location as quickly as humanly possible. We've seen this in the past with the operation against Osama bin Laden. This is just another example of the close integration between the U.S. intelligence communication and our amazing and extraordinary special forces personnel. I can't speak highly enough of those extraordinary and humble operators.

This also shows you the breadth of that intelligence community. The intelligence agencies that were cited included, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). So, you're getting a sense of some very broad intelligence capabilities which were brought to bear and then integrated.

The president, I believe, also mentioned that a house had been built in advance. I mean, you're just watching some incredible intelligence capability that was brought to bear by people on the ground over many months. It shows courage, it shows tenacity, it shows you the resources that were pulled together. And it also shows an ability to compartment this information and to prevent a leak. The U.S. government is doing what it's supposed to do. And in a world where we're often complaining about government, the American people and our partners should be gratified that our tax dollars are being well spent. And that the U.S. intelligence community and the military are performing superbly.

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The Cipher Brief: There's a lot of connective tissue between Venezuela and the rest of the world when you consider the oil industry, including China. As an energy expert, can you share what’s top of mind for you on the broader impact on the oil and energy markets?

Roule: Maybe the best way to answer that is to just explain a little bit about the Venezuelan oil system. First, the operation did not occur near Venezuelan oil production. Upstream oil operations are not located near Caracas, although exports and storage are highly sensitive to obviously, as you correctly put it, a U.S. maritime enforcement of a U.S. embargo.

Most of Venezuela's oil production, about two thirds, is derived from what is known as the Orinoco belt. And oil production from this Orinoco belt had fallen to about 498,000 barrels by the end of December, which is about a 25% drop from just a couple of weeks earlier. And it's been shutting down because they're running out of storage space because Venezuela can't export oil because of the blockade. So, they're trying to put the oil anywhere they can. They've put it in their own storage, they've put it in ships that are docked. They're putting it in almost in teacups at this point because they are running out of space to store the oil that they're producing.

Let's talk about the oil that is produced in Venezuela. They produce it from tar sands. It's extra heavy. It's a heavy type of crude oil and there are relatively few refineries that can process this grade of oil. It's difficult to extract. It's expensive to extract. Chinese refineries in 2025 tended to get a majority of Venezuelan exports. That amount ranged from 75 to 90% depending upon the amount. But even here, the Chinese tended to put much of that oil in their own storage. And China and Russia tend to be the two big players in Venezuela. For China, it is transactional. Chinese buyers look at it as a way to purchase cheap oil that they again put in storage. It's about 4% of China's exports and China again, has used a shadow fleet of intermediaries to purchase this oil. If China were to lose access to this, it's a problem. But because much of this has gone into storage and there are other suppliers out there in Saudi Arabia and other places, they could make this up.

Russia's a different story. Russia is an enabler of the Venezuelan oil industry. Because Venezuela's oil is so tar heavy, in essence, they need to import naphtha from Russia and this dilutes the ore and eco output and makes it blendable and then shippable. So, Russia sends in naphtha, it blends the stuff down and then stuff can then be exported. What would happen if suddenly Venezuela is opened up? Well, a couple of things.

First, because the oil market is relatively well supplied, people would look at it and ask, ‘where are the investment opportunities?’ If you look at the places where the world has changed suddenly and investment opportunities occurred, production didn't dramatically change. Let's take Iraq and Libya for example.

In Iraq, it took about a dozen years to get back to the level of pre-Saddam. And at that point, China was a major player. The U.S. is now returning to Iraq. In Libya, we're now a number of years after the fall of Gaddafi, and they are still about 25% below production levels under Gaddafi.

And again, the U.S. is returning. Much of it does depend upon the security of the country and the stability of the country. So, the president's comments about running Venezuela the right way really does strike at the heart of what happens in the oil industry.

The Cipher Brief: Devil’s Advocate here: how does it compete with Texas’ output? What does the U.S. do with that oil? Is it going to be sold to China?

Roule: The president and the Secretary of State have talked about stolen oil. What does this refer to? Is there a U.S. case there? I'll leave it to others to talk about the amounts and so forth but when this is talked about, this refers to a 2007 Venezuela expropriation of what I believe was then Conoco Phillips or ExxonMobil investments. That Venezuela did indeed expropriate. So, there is indeed a legal case of Venezuela nationalization of U.S. assets for which the U.S. was not compensated. If Venezuela's government did change and if U.S. oil companies were to go in, could the oil industry be dramatically changed? Yes, but it would depend upon security.

Maybe my final comment would be that Chevron has been heavily invested there, and they have maintained a very mature and stable outlook for the country. If you hear Chevron’s CEO speak about Chevron's investments, they've been very levelheaded and unflappable about national security events. So, I think you're going to see them stay there as well. And I think when you listen to the president's comments about how the U.S. would run Venezuela, he seemed fairly confident that the U.S. oil industry would play a role there. Which makes one think that there have been some sort of discussions in this regard playing out in some way in the background.

The Cipher Brief: At the most recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference, there was a lot of discussion around the idea of global conflict and some people believe that we are at the precipice of World War III. Certainly everyone agrees that global disruption is at fairly unprecedented levels. What is your thinking on this?

Roule: We are in a different world, but we're in a world of permanent gray zone conflict. But gray zone is defined and very, very differently. Gray zone was once defined by Iranian militias and it was defined by drone attacks or cyberattacks that were non-attributed. But we now have drone attacks or drone flights in Europe that come from God knows where, but they're Russian. We have Chinese routine harassment for more than a decade in the South China Sea. We have routine theft of intellectual property by China and North Korea, which in and of itself is a type of attack against our economy. But it's not necessarily a traditional gray zone attack. Because the people who are often involved in gray zone operations only see a certain number of colors on the palate. But the theft of intellectual property is just another form of attack.

We're in that kind of a world and the people who are running the countries, they don't need to launch a war per se. They need to launch a series of short, sharp conflicts. Or short, sharp attacks. Now they said these could lead to a war if people believe we don't care about certain areas. And I do think there is the issue of what could happen in Taiwan in 2026. That should be a worry for everyone.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
I've Tracked Terrorist Networks for Decades. I've Never Seen Anything Like 764. https://belimedia.com.ng/ive-tracked-terrorist-networks-for-decades-ive-never-seen-anything-like-764 https://belimedia.com.ng/ive-tracked-terrorist-networks-for-decades-ive-never-seen-anything-like-764 EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In 2021, a fifteen-year-old in a small Texas town started something from his bedroom. He’d dropped out of school. He spent his days online, deep into violence and gore. He found others like him and built a network. He named it after his ZIP code: 764.

Within two years, it had spread to every continent. Members – a lot of them teenagers – were finding kids as young as nine on Minecraft and Roblox. They’d befriend them, earn their trust, then trap them. They forced children to hurt themselves on camera. To hurt animals. To do things I’m not going to describe here. That kid from Texas is serving eighty years now. But 764 didn’t stop. It splintered and kept growing.

The FBI currently has over 300 active cases in the U.S. – investigations running in every single field office across the country. They’re looking at more than 350 people tied to the network. Worldwide, authorities believe there are thousands of victims. Arrests connected to groups like 764 jumped nearly 500% in 2025 compared to 2024.

The FBI ranks 764 as a “tier one” threat. That’s the same level as ISIS. Last year, Canada became the first country to officially call 764 a terrorist organization. Not a crime ring. Not predators. Terrorists.

I ran the State Department’s programs against violent extremism. I’ve studied how terrorist groups find and recruit people for most of my career. Canada got this one right.

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What Canada Did

Calling something a terrorist organization isn’t just a label. It changes what governments can do. In Canada, the designation means that anyone who helps 764 – with money, with recruitment, with anything – is now committing a crime. Banks have to freeze assets. Immigration can block people at the border. Law enforcement gets access to tools they can’t use for regular crimes. It also sends a message. When a country puts a group on the same list as Hezbollah and the Islamic State, it tells allies, tech companies, and the public: this is serious. Pay attention.

Canada’s intelligence service says nearly one in ten of their terrorism investigations now involves a minor. Think about that. We’re not talking about kids as victims – we’re talking about kids as suspects in terrorism cases.

How They Find Kids

764 doesn’t stumble onto victims. They go looking for specific kinds of kids. Depressed kids. Lonely ones. Kids who get picked on at school. Kids who cut themselves or post about wanting to disappear. They hunt for these signs in Discord servers, on Roblox, in Minecraft – places your kid probably hangs out.

When they find someone, they’re patient. They don’t ask for anything. They just show up. They say “I get it” and “you’re not crazy” and “I’ve been there.” If you’re a thirteen-year-old who feels invisible, having someone actually listen? That hits different.

Weeks go by. Maybe months. They share darker stuff. Normalize it. Then they ask for a photo – something the kid wouldn’t want anyone to see. Once they have that, everything changes.

“Send more or we show everyone.”

Most blackmail is about money. Not 764. They want content. They make kids film themselves getting hurt. Humiliated. Some get pushed toward suicide attempts—on camera, while the network watches.

One mother told investigators her daughter carved a screen name into her arm with a razor blade. When she finished, the guy on the other end told her he loved her.

Her daughter said it back.

Victims Become Recruiters

Here’s what turns 764 from a bunch of predators into an actual network. Members earn status by producing “content.” The worse the content, the higher they climb. They keep files on their victims – records of what they made them do—and trade them like trophies. Kids who started as victims become perpetrators because that’s how you move up.

In Connecticut, a former honor roll student got caught up in 764. She ended up making bomb threats against her own school – threats phoned in by someone overseas who she thought was her friend. When police searched her devices, they found abuse images, photos of self-harm, and pictures of her paying tribute to the network. Her mom told ABC News, that “It was very difficult to process, because we didn’t raise her to engage in that kind of activity.” That’s the thing. Nobody raises their kid for this. These children get found, groomed, trapped, and turned. One researcher put it simply, “The most horrendous part is it’s minors doing this to minors.”

This Is Terrorism

I know – it sounds like the worst kind of predator ring. So why call it terrorism? Because it works exactly like the terrorist networks I’ve tracked for years. Find someone in pain. Give them a worldview that makes sense of that pain. Then get them to act on it.

764 finds broken kids and tells them the world deserves to burn. That cruelty is honesty. That hurting people is power. The ideology underneath is simple: chaos for its own sake. No political demands. No territory. Just destruction as the point.

Then they turn victims into recruiters – kids climb the ranks by trapping other kids. The ones who got groomed become the groomers. And it doesn’t stay online.

Last July, a 764 member in Minnesota stabbed a woman twenty times. In Germany, authorities arrested someone connected to the network on over 120 charges — including murder. In Finland, police are investigating whether two teen suicides are linked to 764. The network shares guides on how to plan real-world attacks. This isn’t abuse that sometimes leads to terrorism. It’s a terrorism pipeline that uses child abuse as its on-ramp.

Why the U.S. Hasn’t Moved

So Canada calls this terrorism. Why haven’t we? Our laws weren’t built for this. We’ve got tools to go after foreign terrorist groups. We’ve got tools to prosecute child predators. But 764 started in Texas, spread everywhere, and mixes exploitation with extremism in ways that confuse the system.

Right now, we’re going after these guys one at a time for the abuse. That puts individuals in prison. But it treats 764 like random criminals instead of a network with a shared playbook and a body count that keeps growing. The FBI calls it “one of the most disturbing things we’re seeing.” The Attorney General calls it “one of the most heinous online child exploitation enterprises we have ever encountered.” Meanwhile, kids keep getting trapped. The network keeps growing. And we keep treating each case like it exists in a vacuum.

Canada made a call. We should make the same one.

Cipher Brief Expert Dexter Ingram also publishes on Substack Code Name: Citizen

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Kremlin Files: Russia, the Modern Surveillance State https://belimedia.com.ng/the-kremlin-files-russia-the-modern-surveillance-state https://belimedia.com.ng/the-kremlin-files-russia-the-modern-surveillance-state

EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE — Ask any Russian intelligence officer about “naruzhka,” and you’ll see them nod knowingly. It’s the term for physical, trailing surveillance: watchers on the street who follow targets, track meetings, and report patterns. The Russians are experts at it, and they have been for centuries, dating back to the Tsarist Secret police, the Okhrana, and even further to Ivan the Terrible’s oprichniki, the brutal enforcers of his regime. Surveillance is a subject that dominates Russian society and Russian espionage, and it also dictates how Russian intelligence officers (RIOs) conduct counter-surveillance and surveillance detection. The Russian intelligence services (RIS) still lean heavily on surveillance as both a protective and offensive tool. Given such an all-compassing presence in Russian society, the term "surveillance" and its connotations in Russia are worth exploring to better understand Russia, its state, society, and our adversaries.

Russians have a saying, “the walls have ears,” and sometimes follow it with “and the streets have eyes.” Studying in Russia in the early 1990s as an exchange student, I was repeatedly warned by my friends with this expression. It was their way of telling our group of American students that no matter how welcome we felt— and Russians have some of the best hospitality in the world when you are welcomed by them— the state was still suspicious. We came to understand very quickly that there were minders among us: Russian students and professors who reported on us back to the FSB, the successor of the KGB.

Some of our group of students were even “soft-pitched.” For example, in one case, a fellow student with a military background was asked whether he would like to meet with the FSB to discuss how interesting the Russian internal security service was (not exactly a soft approach, really). These blunt and clumsy attempts went unanswered, but the point was clear: the state was not just watching; they were operationally targeting our group of future soldiers, researchers, academics, and in at least one case, a future CIA officer.

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Anyone who has studied or lived in Russia over the past three decades no doubt has had similar experiences. But the bar of intimidation has risen dramatically in recent years. With dissidents, journalists, and even athletes targeted for intimidation, beatings, arrest, and even murder, there is no safe haven in Russia any longer for foreign citizens. They are used as targets to be entrapped for hostage exchanges with the West. The goal is to swap civilians for RIOs for the latter to escape their failings when arrested and convicted abroad.

Russians live in a state of constant fear, especially with the war in Ukraine, since opposition to the war, in any form, is now threatened by jail time. Anyone who may be a threat to the regime is subjected to overwhelming surveillance of their person, electronic communications, and contacts. The FSB has many resources at its disposal, including access to all ISPs and phone companies by law. In the early 2000s, the Russian Duma quietly passed laws giving the FSB access to all communication companies in Russia without the need for any warrants. It was the first step in creating their modern surveillance state and an early sign under Putin that democracy was dying.
Inside Russia, surveillance teams from the FSB number in the many thousands. Their origins lie in the old KGB 7th directorate. Still, their mission remains the same: monitor diplomats, suspected foreign intelligence officers, journalists, NGO workers, businesspeople, and ordinary Russians who cross the regime’s lines. The teams are, unfortunately, among the very best in the world at surveillance, given their long history of practice.

Surveillance schools in Leningrad (St. Petersburg), in particular, were known as the best in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Young surveillance team members from the KGB, GRU, and other services of the Soviet Union were trained in the art of on-foot and vehicle surveillance, effective radio communications, and spotting intelligence tells of possible espionage operations. Today, it is no different. The FSB, in particular, devotes considerable resources to surveillance work in Moscow and across Russia in every major city of its vast surveillance apparatus. They are increasingly assisted by technology and a vast array of cameras across the country.

In Russia, all universities, think tanks, and defense contractors, have assigned security officers, what the Russians call an “OB,” who monitor the foreign contacts, make Russians report on their foreign friends, and even many of their Russian ones. The OB is usually an FSB officer, but if not, they are a cooptee of the service, reporting directly to a UFSB or a regional office across Russia. The OBs, in turn, enlist networks of agent-reporters who are only too eager to report on the travel, potential misdeeds, disloyalty to the regime, or other offenses of all those they monitor. Russia today has a network of informers to rival Stasi East Germany, Nazi Germany under the Gestapo, or any other despotic regime, including North Korea and China of today (both of whom, admittedly, may also contend for the gold and silver on despotic modern surveillance states, together with Russia).

The all-encompassing nature of the Russian surveillance state, which includes monitoring by city cameras (supplemented by drones now too), communications, and in-person surveillance, makes it clear that RIS surveillance is not confined to diplomats or foreigners suspected of intelligence affiliation. Academics, journalists, and corporate leaders can find themselves under observation or pressure when Moscow sees strategic value in them. Awareness of surveillance indicators—and how to respond—remains essential.

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Unfortunately, for decades, Westerners traveling to Russia as academics, athletes, NGO workers, and others have been naïve on this score. The refrain is frequently that “I am no one of interest, they’ll leave me alone.” The RIS never did and never will. The pressure for the Russian services, in particular the FSB, to prove worthy of their giant bureaucracy and corrupt budget means they will manufacture spy cases when they can’t find real ones.

They map the routines of foreign officials, political or business leaders. Their goal is to decide if those targets are viable recruits, potentially, or targets for other operations, like extortion, “direct action,” or even assassination attempts in Russia and abroad. This leads to another underappreciated aspect of Russian intelligence and espionage that permeates their society: setups, tricks, and double-agent operations, which the Russians call “operational games.” (That will be the topic of a future “Kremlin Files” column in The Cipher Brief.)

On Russian surveillance, the warning remains clear, and the potential risks are stark. Unfortunately, for all the beauty to be found in Russian history, its cultural sites and heritage, and with their people, traveling to the Russian surveillance state under this corrupt and authoritarian regime holds incredible risk for foreigners, and even for Russian citizens themselves. It will not change until the RIS no longer has the dominant role in society. Laws and checks on power don’t exist in the Russian services. Surveillance, in fact, guides the functioning of the Russian state, and the streets continue to have eyes- everywhere.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Agentic AI and the “Human&in&the&Loop” Luxury in Modern Defense https://belimedia.com.ng/agentic-ai-and-the-human-in-the-loop-luxury-in-modern-defense https://belimedia.com.ng/agentic-ai-and-the-human-in-the-loop-luxury-in-modern-defense EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Welcome to the inaugural edition of “The Iron Triangle”, my new Cipher Brief column that serves the three pillars of modern defense: Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors who fund the technology, and Policy Wonks who analyze the impact of technology on the global order.

My first column explores the shift from "Chatbots" to "Agents." In Washington, they call it Agentic AI. In the Valley, they call it Action-Oriented LLMs. In the field, it’s the difference between a system that tells you a storm is coming and one that autonomously moves your fleet to a safe harbor before the first raindrop falls.

The Technology: From "Prediction" to "Agency"

For years, AI in defense has been about Computer Vision, tasks such as labeling tanks in a photo. While Computer Vision has saved countless hours of labor, it doesn't address the challenges associated with overloading analysts with data.

Agentic AI (Agentic) is a generational leap. For clarity, Agentic refers to systems capable of:

  1. Analyzing the commander’s intent.
  2. Identifying and evaluating subordinate tasks.
  3. Executing a sequence of actions across multiple platforms without human prompting.

Agentic processes vast amounts of data into knowledge, exponentially increasing each user’s effectiveness. With Agentic, teams of analysts will no longer pour through volumes of irrelevant information searching for a few key indicators. Agentic will distill torrents of data, a side effect of exponential increases in the number of sensors (drones), down to just the essential elements. In some cases, Agentic may even make decisions without user input.

Several questions come to mind. First, what will my analysts do with this windfall of time? That's a discussion for another article. Instead, let’s make this relevant.

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For the Procurement Officer

Procurement officers should be wary of "Black Box" Contracts. If a vendor claims their agent uses "proprietary reasoning" that’s difficult to audit, walk away. Consider commanders whose primary concern is managing risk. In the inevitable post-accident investigation, "the algorithm made a choice" will not serve as strong legal defense. The Pentagon must demand Chain of Preference Transparency. The software must log why it chose one course of action over another, and the decision tree must be continually refined.

The Pentagon should also move away from Firm-Fixed-Price contracts. Agentic requires Continuous Authority to Operate, not only to remain functional, but in a competitive context (war with a global power). If The Pentagon buys a "static" version, the system will be obsolete by the time the invoice is cleared, especially considering the Pentagon bureaucracy. Procurement Officers should buy the pipeline, not the package.

The Investment Thesis

The challenge for investors is distinguishing between a "thin wrapper" on AI and a foundational defense operating system. Investment firms often hire retired officers to evaluate defense technology. These officers retired years ago, and may not have had first-hand experience with technology while they were active. Now the investment firm expects them to provide advice on emerging technology that many 20-year-old practitioners are just learning about. It’s not a fair expectation, and will lead to investments in irrelevant technologies.

Proximity breeds opportunity. Investors should get involved with practitioners. I’m not suggesting that VCs attend National Training Center rotations, though I do enjoy that mental picture. There are other opportunities to interact with end users; small-scale exercises, trade shows and demonstrations are some.

Beware of the moat. The value isn't in the Large Language Model; it’s in the Action Layer. Investors should look for startups who are building "high-side" integrations—companies that have security credentials to plug into actual data. Only then will it become clear how the technology performs.

Look for the exit. Some "Big Primes" are hardware-heavy and software-poor. They are looking to acquire "Agentic Middleware" to make legacy systems more relevant in an autonomous age. The "Defense Unicorn" of 2026 will be a company that provides the universal brain for antiquated hardware. There are some promising companies focused on exactly this challenge. Whatever is created should be collaborative, to promote and not stifle innovation.

The Policy Wonk’s Warning

In the early days of AI, policy was concerned about AI’s potential effects on strategic stability. If both the U.S. and a peer competitor deploy Agentic to manage strategic command and control–or frontline skirmishes–we might enter a "Speed of Relevance" trap. When AI reacts to AI, the window for diplomatic de-escalation shrinks from hours to milliseconds, effectively disappearing and devolving into a machine on machine conflict where humans suffer the consequences.

To prevent this devolution, there should be a foreign policy shift, a move from Arms Control to Algorithm Control. The next great treaty should not focus on the number of warheads, but the verification of "Human-on-the-loop" safeguards and universal standards.

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My Take. This where I get to discuss what excites me about this new technology.

Military Planning. Agentic AI will fundamentally change “course of action development” during military planning. Military Officers, like everyone, suffer from functional fixedness. Their creativity can be limited by their experiences. Agentic will see thousands of potential pathways for conducting new missions. I like to think that this will lead to more creative solutions being applied to emerging challenges. Look out executive officers, AI is coming for your jobs!

The Risk. There is a chance that our government becomes reliant on Agentic. The Military plans for everything. I’ve seen Staff Officers plan for how and when to make plans. Reducing planning to a button click could diminish critical analysis, a fundamental skill for effective leaders, which will have a compounding negative effect on future generations.

Mission Rehearsals. Agentic will enable warfighters to rehearse missions based on real time intelligence. Imagine flying a drone simulator where the terrain, the targets, and the weather are all precisely the same as those in the target area of interest. What’s more, Agentic will enable simulated adversaries to react more realistically. Combat Training Centers may be the next casualty of Agentic. I don’t think any soldier will be sad to learn that their NTC rotation is cancelled…

The Risk. Agentic might get it wrong, leading to gross overestimations–or underestimations–of adversarial capabilities. And what happens when a commander decides to ignore their AI, then suffers a defeat? Punishing the commander in this situation would encourage future leaders to blindly follow Agentic guidance. The government must build rules which preserve and promote independent decision authority, ensuring that Agentic complements, but does not replace the commander’s judgment.

Agentic is the first technology that I can recall that doesn't just make our weapons better; it makes our decision-makers faster. For the Procurement Officer, it's a liability to manage; for the VC, it's the ultimate "sticky" SaaS play; and for the Wonk, it’s a terrifying new variable in the balance of power. Current international laws of war are based on human intent and accountability. But it remains legally unclear who is responsible—the developer, the operator, or the commander—when an autonomous agent makes an error. The most pressing requirement now is not for the best new technology, but for our legal and policy frameworks to keep pace.

Joey Gagnard is a Cipher Brief columnist who regularly shares his perspective on national security and technology via his Iron Triangle column.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
After Maduro’s Removal, the U.S. Faces Its Hardest Test Yet in Venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/after-maduros-removal-the-us-faces-its-hardest-test-yet-in-venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/after-maduros-removal-the-us-faces-its-hardest-test-yet-in-venezuela

THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW — As Venezuela faces a moment of profound uncertainty following a dramatic U.S. operation that removed longtime strongman Nicolás Maduro from power, policymakers and intelligence professionals are grappling with what comes next for a country long plagued by authoritarian rule, with Washington signaling an unprecedented level of involvement in shaping Venezuela’s political future.

To help unpack what's ahead, Cipher Brief CEO Suzanne Kelly spoke with former CIA Senior Executive David Fitzgerald, a veteran intelligence officer whose career spans decades of operational, leadership, and policy roles across Latin America. Drawing on firsthand experience as a former Chief of Station and senior headquarters official overseeing the region, Fitzgerald offers a sobering assessment of Venezuela’s challenges, from rebuilding its institutions and oil sector to managing internal security threats while navigating the competing interests of China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran. The conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

David Fitzgerald

A 37-yr. CIA veteran, David Fitgerald retired in 2021 as Chief of Station in a Middle Eastern country, which hosted CIA’s largest field station. As a seven-time Chief of Station, Fitzgerald served in numerous conflict zones to include Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia. He also held senior HQS positions that included Latin America Chief of Operations and Latin America Deputy Division Chief. He also served as the senior DCIA representative at U.S. Military’s Central Command from 2017-2020, where he participated in several tier 1 operations as the intelligence advisor to the commander.

The Cipher Brief: How are you looking at Venezuela at this moment through a national security lens? What do you see as the next real challenge the U.S. is likely to face there?

Fitzgerald: As President Trump has said, the U.S. intends to run Venezuela. I'm still waiting for how the U.S. government intends to define 'running Venezuela'. I'm going to assume, and I hate to assume, but I'll assume that the goal will be to work closely with the current Venezuelan government to transition to a democracy and allow elections, something like that. So that will just be my assumption in lieu of any comments or any guidelines coming out of the White House.

The Cipher Brief: You understand the history, the politics, the culture of Venezuela better than most Americans. Where do you think some of the bumps in the road will come as the U.S. tries to figure out and define, as you put it, what running Venezuela really means?

Fitzgerald: It's a very diverse country. It's an incredibly rich resource country. People talk about the oil and the petroleum, but it's not only that. It could be one of the largest gold producers in the world. It's amazing the amount of natural resources that Venezuela has, yet 25 years after President Chávez was elected as president, it's one of the poorest countries in Latin America.

I think one of the hurdles that they're going to have is the brain drain. You don't have a strong cadre. A great example is Pedevesa, [Petróleos de Venezuela], the state run oil company. Back in the 90's, Pedevesa was considered one of the most efficient and best run oil companies in the world. Compared to even the private companies, it was a machine because they owned everything from downstream to upstream. They owned the drilling, they owned the pipelines, they owned the refineries, they owned the oil tankers, they owned the refineries in the U.S., they owned the distribution through their Citco company here. It was just an amazing company, and it was always held up as a model for state run companies. Of course, with the election of President Hugo Chávez, and then in 2002, the general strike when he just fired all of the Pedevesa members - even today, if you look around at the Chevrons, Exxons, the BPs, you'll find a large amount of former Pedevesa employees because they all migrated to the private petroleum companies because they were that good.

So, one of the biggest challenges is that Venezuela's going to need the financial means to really rebuild itself. I was last in Venezuela in 2013, and I'd been there in the early '90s, and it looked exactly the same. The infrastructure was terrible. Nothing had been modernized or built. So instead, what the Maduro and the Chavez government had done, was basically used Pedevesa as their cash cow to really distribute that money to themselves, steal the money, or distribute it to their followers. There was no effort to modernize the infrastructure or to do the necessary maintenance in the oil fields. That's why I think they're producing maybe 10% to 15% of the amount of oil they were at their peak.

So for me, that's really the key. How do you get Pedevesa up and running so it becomes a profitable company again that can actually provide the necessary resources for the country to rebuild itself?

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The Cipher Brief: If you were looking into your crystal ball, and you had to guess, will there be enough political stability with the U.S. involvement to be able to allow for this infrastructure to be rebuilt? How difficult is that political component going to be?

Fitzgerald: I think it's twofold. Not only the political component, but the security component. How do you transition from basically a dictatorship to some form of transparent democracy, which I think is the White House's goal. You do that via Delcy Rodríguez and the current Venezuelan government. As you know, the PSUV, which is the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, which is Maduro's party, they control every apparatus of government, whether it's the Supreme Court, the judicial branch, the legislative branch, the executive branch, it's owned by them. There is no transparency right now. How do you get away from that? How do you rebuild these institutions so they become functional again and in some type of democratic transparent manner? That has to be a principal goal.

Number two, the security situation. You have maybe 20% to 25% of the population supporting Maduro and the PSUV. I would argue most of these people are supporting the party because they benefit from the party. They're either on the payrolls, they have some type of sweetheart deal, or they're able to conduct their illegal activities. The security forces are not hardcore ideologues. I think with the death of Chávez in 2013, he was the last ideologue you had as far as the Bolivarian revolution. My experience working with these people is that they're just in it for their own self-enrichment. Nobody really drank the Kool-Aid and said, "I want to be a Bolivarian revolutionary." I mean, this might have happened during the earlier stages when Chávez was first elected, but through the decades, it's become just an empty suit. Nobody really believes in any type of revolution.

On the security side, getting back to that, you have a disruptive element. You have this organization called the Colectivos, which is kind of a non-official goon squad that is supported by the government, basically comprised of criminals and local bullies. During demonstrations, they're the ones who go out there and start beating people and stuff like that. But you have the security services themselves as well. The rank and file. I think if you can do something like we did maybe in the Haiti occupation and in Panama where we actually formed an interim security force — I can't talk about the Haitian National Police nowadays as an effective force — but at the time in 1994, they became an effective enough security force, which provided security to the populace. That led the whole population to believe that there was hope.

I think that's going to be key along with the political transition. Can you provide security? Can you provide faith that people will adhere to the rules and regulations? How you do that? It's a good question.

Venezuela's a little different than most Latin countries. There is no national police force, other than the National Guard, which currently, if you talk to our DEA colleagues they'd probably say it's one of the largest drug cartels on the continent right now. Like the United States, Venezuela is divided into the state and municipal police forces.

For example, Caracas has two major police forces. You have the city of Caracas Police Force, and then you have the Miranda State Police Force, which is about maybe a third of Caracas, and then the rest is by the city of Caracas. Then you go out to the different states in Venezuela. They each have their own police force, and the large cities all have their police force. Years ago, they tried to form this Bolivarian national police agency. We're trying to incorporate this. It's never really worked because these police forces are all influenced and run by the local politicians.

So, that could work to our advantage as far as being able to work independently of the government and work with these local institutions to not only enhance their capability, but kind of vet them, cleanse them.

The Cipher Brief: How do you think Russia and China are assessing what''s next in Venezuela? What are the losses here and what are the opportunities here for each of them?

Fitzgerald: Let's talk about China first because that's probably going to be the most important for Venezuela. China must be extremely careful about how they handle this because they have literally billions and billions of dollars in loans that they provided the Bolivarian government. And one of their concerns, no doubt is that if you have a new democratic government, they could come in and say, "You know something? These loans that you signed with China, we don't consider them valid. We think they're illegal, and we're going to nullify all the loans." And right now, China's getting paid back in petroleum. So, China's got to be worried.

That means that if you're China, you're going to make nice with any new government because you don't want to be in a situation where they just say, "We consider these agreements you made with former government officials as illegal, and we will no longer honor them." So I don't see China being a spoiler. I see them willing to work with any new government coming into power because they have a lot of financial stake in what happens in Venezuela.

Russia, on the other hand, has very little commerce here. Russia's main trade with Venezuela is in arms. Venezuela's never even been able to pay back the loans or the purchases they made on some of the weapons systems they bought. Iran's another one. Iran's been there for decades now. It's entrenched. They've been allowed to work pretty much without limits in Venezuela, going back to, I think it was 2012, and the assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador in Washington. That was all being run out of, or being facilitated by, the Iranian embassy in Caracas.

So, it's going to affect all of their relationships. Iran's been more important than they realize for their oil industry as far as providing the parts and the 'know how' to maintain the oil fields and some of their refineries. A lot of that's coming from Iran. The big thing here that people don't realize is that there's one ingredient that's important for Venezuelan petroleum and if you don't have this, you really can't produce the amount of petroleum you need. Even at today's rate, you can't produce it. So Iran's been a major provider of this substance.

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The Cipher Brief: How are drug cartels likely looking at this? And what about Cuba?

Fitzgerald: I would love to be in Cuba right now and listen to what they're saying about this. I mean, this really must be a shocker for them. Number one, for their security service. They just had a major failure because it's very well known that all of President Maduro's inner security was being provided by the Cubans. They're the only people he trusted. To a greater extent, they're out of security. Plus all their security services were being managed by the Cuban CI officers. The Cubans don't do it for free. So Venezuela pays the tab for that, and no doubt it's a greatly enhanced bill that they were getting from the Cuban government for President Maduro's security.

On the other end, as you know, Suzanne, the petroleum is just as vital to the Cuban economy. It's not all of it, but it's a major percentage of the petroleum that Cuba uses to include refined products that are provided by Venezuela at incredibly reduced rates that Venezuela knows Cuba will never repay. So, they have billions of dollars in debts to Venezuela and although they're technically selling the petroleum to Cuba, there's pretty much an understanding that it's not going to be repaid. So that's going to be a big blow to Cuba right now.

The Cipher Brief: What are the indicators that you're going to be watching for next that give you some clue as to where things might be headed?

Fitzgerald: Well, my big indicator is what's the plan? I'm sure they're huddling together both in the IC and in the State Department and the White House trying to figure out, 'Okay, how can we transition the current government to some type of viable democratic government and allow for a free election?' And there's probably been a million plans thrown out there. They just haven't figured out which one they're going to use. So I think that's what I'm waiting for is what the administration intends to roll out as their plan and how they intend to run Venezuela.

I think one of the big things here as far as Venezuela goes, is how to actually rebuild the country. It's going to require the private sector. The U.S. government is not going to be some nation builder like we tried to do in Iraq. And the great thing is that Venezuela has the resources that are quite sought after in the world where I think you're going to get a lot of interest from the private sector.

For example, a friend of mine asked the other day about the construction that would be needed. You're going to see some of the major construction companies needed to go in there and just rebuild the cities and the streets and everything. It's just the infrastructure there that hasn't been really modernized or updated in decades. So I think there is going to be a lot of interest in that. I think that interest by the private sector will also encourage the government to become as transparent and as democratic as it can be. So look for that too. And it's just not all about oil — it's minerals, construction, and the electric grid - it's across the board.

The Cipher Brief is your place for expert-driven national security insights. Read more in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
How China Built AI Dominance on Stolen American Silicon https://belimedia.com.ng/how-china-built-ai-dominance-on-stolen-american-silicon https://belimedia.com.ng/how-china-built-ai-dominance-on-stolen-american-silicon

DEEP DIVE — Federal prosecutors in Texas, in December, unsealed charges and related details exposing a sprawling scheme that quietly siphoned some of America’s most powerful artificial intelligence chips into China.

According to court filings, a Houston businessman and his company orchestrated a $160 million smuggling operation that moved thousands of NVIDIA’s top-tier processors overseas, evading U.S. export controls through falsified shipping records and shell transactions.

Hao Global and its founder, Alan Hao Hsu, pleaded guilty on October 10, 2025, to participating in smuggling and unlawful export activities, including knowingly exporting and attempting to export at least $160 million in Nvidia H100 and H200 GPUs between October 2024 and May 2025. Investigators say the operation was funded by more than $50 million in wire transfers originating from China, and the U.S. has seized over $50 million in Nvidia hardware and cash as part of the broader investigation, with the seizures tied to the overall network, not solely this defendant’s operation.

The operation reveals a broader strategy: if you can’t build it, take it. With a blend of state-run espionage and corporate infiltration, China has turned technology acquisition into an art form. Their ‘all-of-the-above’ approach has allowed their AI sector to grow even as export bans tighten. By sourcing the hardware from elsewhere, Beijing has made the lack of domestic chip manufacture moot.

The Corporate Insider Pipeline

The same month that prosecutors announced the NVIDIA chip smuggling charges, the Department of Justice filed a superseding indictment against Linwei Ding, a former Google software engineer accused of stealing over 1,000 confidential files containing trade secrets related to Google’s AI infrastructure. According to the indictment, Ding uploaded the files to his personal cloud account between May 2022 and May 2023 while secretly working for two China-based technology companies.

It is believed that the stolen materials included detailed specifications of Google’s Tensor Processing Unit chips and Graphics Processing Unit systems, as well as the software platform that orchestrates thousands of chips into supercomputers used to train cutting-edge AI models.

Ding allegedly circulated presentations to employees of his Chinese startup, citing national policies encouraging domestic AI development, and applied to a Shanghai-based talent program, stating that his company’s product “will help China to have computing power infrastructure capabilities that are on par with the international level.”

Within weeks of beginning the theft, Ding was offered a chief technology officer position at Beijing Rongshu Lianzhi Technology with a monthly salary of approximately $14,800 plus bonuses and stock. He traveled to China to raise capital and was publicly announced as CTO. A year later, he founded his own AI startup, Zhisuan, focused on training large AI models. Ding never disclosed either affiliation to Google.

After Google detected unauthorized uploads in December 2023, Ding vowed to save the files as evidence of his work. Nonetheless, he resigned a week later after booking a one-way ticket to Beijing. Security footage revealed that another employee had been scanning Ding’s access badge to give the appearance that he was working there during extended trips to China. Ding faces up to 175 years in prison on 14 counts: economic espionage and theft of trade secrets.

Ding has pleaded not guilty to the charges on multiple occasions. He entered a not guilty plea in March 2024 to the original four counts of trade secret theft, and again pleaded not guilty through his attorney, Grant Fondo, in September 2025 to the expanded superseding charges — including seven counts each of economic espionage and trade secret theft. Fondo has actively represented Ding in court proceedings, including a successful June 2025 motion to suppress certain post-arrest statements due to alleged Miranda violations, though no extensive public explanatory statements from the attorney or Ding appear beyond these court actions and pleas.

The federal trial in San Francisco began in early January 2026, with jury selection reported around January 8, and Ding remains presumed innocent until proven guilty.

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AI-Powered Cyber Espionage at Scale.

The threat escalated dramatically in September 2025 when Anthropic detected what it describes as the first fully automated cyberattack using artificial intelligence to breach corporate networks. Chinese state-sponsored hackers conducted the campaign, which Anthropic assessed with high confidence, targeted approximately 30 organizations, including technology firms, financial institutions, chemical manufacturers, and government agencies.

The attackers manipulated Anthropic’s Claude Code tool into executing 80 to 90 percent of the operation autonomously. Claude’s safety guardrails were bypassed by jailbreaking the system, disguising malicious tasks as routine cybersecurity tests, and breaking attacks into small, seemingly innocent steps that conceal their broader objectives. Once compromised, the AI system independently conducted reconnaissance, identified valuable databases, wrote custom exploit code, harvested credentials, created backdoors, and exfiltrated data with minimal human supervision.

“The AI made thousands of requests per second—an attack speed that would have been, for human hackers, simply impossible to match,” Anthropic stated in its analysis.

“This case is a huge concern for other companies that have almost fully adopted AI in their business operations,” JP Castellanos, Director of Threat Intelligence at Binary Defense, tells The Cipher Brief. “Instead of just using AI to draft phishing emails or assist human hackers, the perpetrators gave Claude direct instructions to carry out multi-stage operations on its own.”

The implications extend far beyond technical sophistication.

“An AI operator doesn’t have to sleep or take breaks moving at machine speed; the agent can do the work of dozens or more hackers, tirelessly and even without error, launching constant attacks that even human defenders would struggle to monitor, let alone counter,” Castellanos explained.

Chief Geopolitical Officer at Insight Forward, Treston Wheat, also noted the operational tempo represents a fundamental shift.

“AI-enabled operations can run reconnaissance, exploitation attempts, credential harvesting, lateral movement playbooks, and exfiltration workflows in parallel, iterating rapidly across targets,” he tells The Cipher Brief.

This shift not only changes how operations are conducted but also reveals the hidden supply chains that enable them.

DeepSeek’s Smuggled Silicon

In early 2025, it became impossible to ignore the connection between black-market chips and stolen IP. It was then that DeepSeek dropped the R1 model, claiming it could compete with OpenAI’s o1, but for significantly less. This, however, immediately set off alarm bells: How does a company hamstrung by U.S. sanctions move that fast without some serious ‘outside’ help?

Reports from The Information in December 2025 revealed that DeepSeek is training its next-generation model using thousands of NVIDIA’s advanced Blackwell chips — processors specifically banned from export to China. The smuggling operation reportedly involves purchasing servers for phantom data centers in Southeast Asia, where Blackwell sales remain legal. After inspection and certification, smugglers allegedly dismantle entire data centers rack by rack, shipping GPU servers in suitcases across borders into mainland China, where the chips are reassembled.

NVIDIA disputed the reports, stating it had seen “no substantiation or received tips of ‘phantom data centers’ constructed to deceive us and our OEM partners” while acknowledging the company pursues any tip it receives. The chipmaker is developing digital tracking features to verify chip locations, a tacit acknowledgement that there are enough smuggling concerns to warrant technological solutions.

Castellanos described China’s strategy as deliberately dual-track.

“China has been very open to being the lead in AI and semiconductors and the need for self-reliance in core technologies,” he said. “But also, externally, China relies on partnering with overseas institutions, building on top of Western open-source technologies, and acquiring advanced technologies through illegal means, such as through theft, smuggling, and forced transfers.”

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The FBI’s Losing Battle

Christopher Wray, the former FBI director, testified that the bureau oversees approximately 2,000 active investigations into Chinese espionage operations.

“Chinese hackers outnumber FBI cyber personnel by at least 50 to 1,” Wray testified before the House Appropriations Committee in 2023. “They’ve got a bigger hacking program than every other major nation combined and have stolen more of our personal and corporate data than all other nations—big or small—combined.”

That scale reflects a long-running strategy rather than a sudden surge.

“U.S. officials say China has long relied on a multi-pronged strategy to lie, to cheat and to steal their way to surpassing us as the global superpower in cyber,” he said. “It’s not just cyber intrusions, we are concerned about, but also human insiders stealing intellectual property. In the realm of AI, this can include insiders siphoning source code, research papers, or semiconductor designs for China.”

The Chinese approach exploits multiple vectors simultaneously, according to experts. The Ministry of State Security operates human intelligence networks. The People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force conducts offensive cyber operations.

The Thousand Talents Plan, for example, then offers Chinese researchers financial incentives to transfer proprietary information to American institutions. By investing in and partnering with ostensibly private companies, state-owned enterprises gain access to sensitive technologies.

Export Controls Lag Behind Reality

The export control regime designed to prevent China from accessing advanced chips has proven inadequate in the face of Beijing’s evasion tactics. The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security has repeatedly updated restrictions, most recently imposing sweeping controls in October 2023 on AI chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

The recent Texas case shed light on how these smugglers operate. There was more to it than simply shipping; they used crypto payments and paper-only shell companies to conceal the money trail. To pass customs, they even removed the Nvidia labels from the chips. By the time those processors reached China, they had been bounced through so many different countries that the original paper trail was basically gone.

“Export controls are not a complete solution to IP theft or technology diffusion. They are best understood as a time-buying and friction-imposing tool,” Wheat observed. “If the objective is to prevent all leakage, that is unrealistic; if the objective is to slow adversary capability development, shape supply chains, and increase acquisition cost and risk, they can be effective when paired with enforcement and complementary measures.”

The chip industry, analysts caution, is facing a structural nightmare. We’re restricting technology that’s already been stolen and studied. The $160 million operation out of Texas proved just how easy it is to game the system — they lied on customs forms hundreds of times over several months, and it still took nearly a year for authorities to notice anything was wrong.

Defending at Machine Speed

Security experts are calling this the most significant tech transfer in history, and it isn’t happening by accident. By stacking insider theft, cyberattacks, recruitment programs, and smuggling on top of each other, China has found a way to leapfrog ahead in AI. They don’t have the domestic factories to build high-end chips yet, so they’ve bypassed the need for ‘original’ innovation by taking what they need. It’s a massive operation that’s making traditional defense strategies look obsolete.

“The realistic U.S. approach is not to match China operator-for-operator. It is to win by asymmetry, such as scaling defense through automation, hardening the most valuable targets, and using public-private coordination to reduce attacker dwell time and increase attacker cost,” Wray said in his testimony.

Castellanos emphasized that defending against AI-enabled attacks requires matching the adversary’s capabilities.

“To have any hope to defend against this, we have to multiply effectiveness through automation and AI, so basically fight fire with fire,” he underscored. “Doing this requires significant investment, new skills, and perhaps most challenging, trust in autonomous defensive AI at a time when many organizations are still learning basic cyber hygiene.”

To prevent adversaries from acquiring sensitive technologies, the U.S. Government has, in recent years, implemented targeted responses, such as the Disruptive Technology Strike Force in 2023. Yet, even as FBI investigations increase and new indictments are filed, the fundamental challenge persists. Chinese intelligence services use unlimited resources, legal compulsion over Chinese nationals, and long-term strategic patience to operate in an open society with porous institutional boundaries.

“It’s a challenge for policy makers; a multi-layered response and defense in depth is needed to protect the US AI technology base better,” Castellanos added. “Harden insider threat programs, accelerate public and private intelligence sharing, modernize export controls and enforcement, increase the costs or impose costs for the offenders of these attacks and lastly innovate faster to ensure even if China steals today’s tech, the breakthrough is already in the pipeline for tomorrow.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Now Comes the Hard Part in Venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/now-comes-the-hard-part-in-venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/now-comes-the-hard-part-in-venezuela EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Now comes the hard part in Venezuela. Dictator Nicolas Maduro and his wife are gone but the regime is still in power. Most Venezuelans, particularly in the diaspora, are pleased and relieved. Many are also apprehensive.

The Trump administration has decided to compel the cooperation of Maduro’s Vice President, Delcy Rodriguez, now interim president. It is not at all assured that she will be a reliable partner. The U.S. decision to work with those still in control was logical even if disappointing to some in the democratic opposition which, after all, won the presidential election overwhelmingly in late July of 2024. The opposition’s base of support dwarfs that of the regime but the military, intelligence services and police are all still loyal to the regime - at least for the time being. The Trump administration believes the cooperation of these elements of the regime will be necessary for the Trump administration to implement its plans for the country without further U.S. police and military actions on the ground.

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The Trump administration has said we will be taking over the oil sector and President Trump himself has announced his intention to persuade the U.S. private sector to return to Venezuela to rebuild the sector. Oil production in Venezuela has declined by two thirds since Hugo Chavez, Maduro’s predecessor, was elected in 1998. This unprecedented decline was due to incompetent management, undercapitalization and corruption. Had Chevron not opted to stay in the country under difficult circumstances, the production numbers would look even worse. Resurrecting the oil sector will take time, money and expertise. The return of the U.S. oil companies and the infusions of cash that will be required will only happen if an appropriate level of security can be established — and that will require the cooperation of the Venezuelan armed forces and police. Many senior leaders in those sectors are believed to have been deeply complicit in both the abuses and corruption of a government the United Nations said was plausibly responsible for “crimes against humanity.” Two of the regime figures most widely believed to have been, along with Maduro himself, the architects of the Bolivarian regime’s repressive governance are still in power, Minister of the Interior Diosdado Cabello and Minister of Defense General Vladimir Portino Lopez. They will need to be watched and not permitted to undermine U.S. efforts to rehabilitate the oil sector and orchestrate a return to legitimate, popularly supported and democratic government.

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There are several considerations that the U.S. will need to keep in mind going forward. First, more than 80 percent of Venezuelans now live below the poverty line. Their needs must be addressed . Even the shrinking number of Venezuelans who aligned with the regime are hoping to see their lives improve. Between 2013 and 2023, the country’s GDP contracted by around 70 percent, some believe it may have been as much as 75 percent. As most of Venezuela’s licit economy is essentially moribund and the U.S. will be controlling oil exports, the poor will naturally look to the United States for help. Heretofore, the regime employed food transfers to keep the populace in line. That role should move to the NGO community, the church or even elements of the democratic opposition.

Indeed, it will be important to secure the cooperation of the opposition, notwithstanding the Trump administrations to work with Delcy Rodriguez and company as the opposition represents the majority of Venezuelans inside the country as well as out. It will also be necessary to pay the military and it is not at all clear that the regime elements still in place will have the money to do so once oil receipts are being handled by the United States. If the U.S. is to avoid the mistakes that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein, attending to the needs of the populace and paying the rank and file of the military should be priorities.

The Trump administration should also move as quickly as the security situation permits to reopen the U.S. embassy in Caracas. There is reporting out of Colombia that the U.S. Charge in Bogota has already made a trip to Caracas to evaluate the situation. This is a good thing. There is no substitute for on-the-ground engagement and observation.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Trump’s Power Doctrine: A $1.5 Trillion Military, Greenland Ambitions, and a World Ruled by Force https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-power-doctrine-a-15-trillion-military-greenland-ambitions-and-a-world-ruled-by-force https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-power-doctrine-a-15-trillion-military-greenland-ambitions-and-a-world-ruled-by-force OPINION — “After long and difficult negotiations with Senators, Congressmen, Secretaries, and other Political Representatives, I have determined that, for the Good of our Country, especially in these very troubled and dangerous times, our Military Budget for the year 2027 should not be $1 Trillion Dollars, but rather $1.5 Trillion Dollars. This will allow us to build the ‘Dream Military’ that we have long been entitled to and, more importantly, that will keep us SAFE and SECURE, regardless of foe.”

That was part of a Truth Social message from President Trump posted last Wednesday afternoon and illustrates the emphasis on increasing U.S. military power by him and top administration officials since the successful U.S. January 3, raid in Venezuela that captured its former-President Nicolas Maduro and his wife.

As it should, public attention has been focused on Trump’s apparent desire to project force as he publicly savors the plaudits arising from not only the Venezuela operation, but also the June 2025 Operation Midnight Hammer bombing of three Iranian nuclear facilities.

Most focus this past week has been paid to remarks Trump made to New York Times reporters during their more than two hour interview last Thursday.

At that time, when asked if there are any limits on his global powers, Trump said, "Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.”

Trump added, “I don’t need international law. I’m not looking to hurt people.” Asked about whether his administration needed to abide by international law, Trump said, “I do,” but added, “it depends what your definition of international law is.”

Attention is also correctly being paid to remarks Trump’s Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller made last Tuesday during an interview with CNN.

“We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else,” Miller told CNN’s Jake Tapper, “But we live in a world, in the real world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world.”

It is against that Trump open-stress-on-power background that I will discuss below a few other incidents last week that could indicate future events. But first I want to explore Trump’s obsession with taking over Greenland, which was also illustrated during the Times interview.

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In 1945, at the end of World War II fighting in Europe, the United States had 17 bases and military installations in Greenland with thousands of soldiers. Today, there is only one American base – U.S. Pituffik Space Base in northwest Greenland, formerly known as Thule Air Base.

From this base today some 200 U.S. Air Force and Space Force personnel, plus many more contractors, carry out ballistic missile early warnings, missile defense, and space surveillance missions supported by what the Space Force described as an “Upgraded Early Warning Radar weapon system.” That system includes “a phased-array radar that detects and reports attack assessments of sea-launched and intercontinental ballistic missile threats in support of [a worldwide U.S.] strategic missile warning and missile defense [system],” according to a Space Force press release.

The same radar also supports what Space Force said is “Space Domain Awareness by tracking and characterizing objects in orbit around the earth.”

Under the 1951 U.S.-Denmark defense agreement, the U.S., with Denmark’s assent, can create new “defense areas” in Greenland “necessary for the development of the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and which the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark is unable to establish and operate singlehanded.”

The agreement says further: “the Government of the United States of America, without compensation to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, shall be entitled within such defense area and the air spaces and waters adjacent thereto to improve and generally to fit the area for military use.”

That apparently is not enough freedom for President Trump, still a real estate man. As he explained last week to the Times reporters, “Ownership is very important, because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do with, you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”

This long-held Trump view that he must have Greenland was explored back in 2021. After his first term as President, Trump was interviewed by Susan Glasser and Peter Baker for the book they were writing, and they asked Trump at that time why he wanted Greenland.

Four years ago, Trump explained, “You take a look at a map. So I’m in real estate. I look at a [street] corner, I say, ‘I gotta get that store for the building that I’m building,’ et cetera. You know, it’s not that different. I love maps. And I always said, ‘Look at the size of this [Greenland], it’s massive, and that should be part of the United States.’ It’s not different from a real-estate deal. It’s just a little bit larger, to put it mildly.”

For all Trump’s repeated threats to seize Greenland militarily, it’s doubtful that will happen. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to meet with Danish and Greenland counterparts this week, and afterwards the situation should become clearer.

Context is another test for analyzing Trump statements, and that seems to be the case when looking at his call for a $1.5 trillion fiscal 2027 defense budget.

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Last Wednesday, hours before Trump made his Truth Social FY 2027 budget statement, the White House released an Executive Order (EO) entitled, Prioritizing The Warfighter In Defense Contracting. The EO called for holding defense contractors accountable and targeted those who engaged in stock buybacks or issued dividends while “underperforming” on government contracts. According to one Washington firm, the Trump EO represented “one of the most aggressive federal interventions into corporate financial decisions in recent memory.”

The EO caused shares of defense stocks to fall. Lockheed Martin fell 4.8%, Northrop Grumman 5.5%, and General Dynamics 3.6% during that afternoon’s stock exchange trading in New York. After the stock market closed, Trump released his Truth Social message calling for the $1.5 trillion FY 2027 defense budget and the next day, January 8, defense stocks experienced a sharp rebound. Lockheed Martin rebounded with gains of around 7%; Northrop Grumman rose over 8%; and General Dynamics gained around 4%.

Trump has not spoken publicly about the $1.5 trillion for FY 2027, but in his first message, he said the added funds would come from tariffs. He wrote, “Because of tariffs and the tremendous income that they bring, amounts being generated, that would have been unthinkable in the past, we are able to easily hit the $1.5 trillion dollar number.”

If that were not enough, Trump added that the new funding would produce “an unparalleled military force, and having the ability to, at the same time, pay down debt, and likewise, pay a substantial dividend to moderate income patriots within our country!”

What can be believed?

The nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) said the $500 billion annual increase in defense spending would be nearly twice as much as the expected yearly tariff revenue, and the spending increase would push the national debt $5.8 trillion higher over the next decade. CRFB added, “Given the $175 billion appropriated to the defense budget under the [2025] One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), there is little case for a near-term increase in military spending.”

I should point out that the FY 2026 $901 billion defense appropriations bill has yet to pass the Congress.

One more event from last week needing attention involves Venezuela.

Last Tuesday January 6, 2026, as Delcy Rodriguez, former Vice President, was sworn in as Venezuela's interim president, General Javier Marcano Tabata. the military officer closest to Maduro as his head of the presidential honor guard and director of the DGCIM, the Venezuelan military counterintelligence agency, was arrested and jailed, according to El Pais Caracas.

Marcano Tabata was labeled a traitor and accused of facilitating the kidnapping of Maduro by providing the U.S. with exactly where Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores were sleeping, and identifying blind spots in the Cuban-Venezuelan security ring protecting them, according to El Pais Caracas.

What’s the U.S. responsibility toward Marcano Tabata if the El Pais Caracas facts are correct ?

I want to end this column with another Trump statement last week that stuck in my mind because of its implications.

It came up last Friday after Trump, in the White House East Room, started welcoming more than 20 oil and gas executives invited to discuss the situation in Venezuela.

“We have many others that were not able to get in…If we had a ballroom, we'd have over a thousand people. Everybody wanted. I never knew your industry was that big. I never knew you had that many people in your industry. But, here we are.”

Trump then paused, got up and turned to look through the glass door behind him that showed the excavation for the new ballroom saying, “I got to look at this myself. Wow. What a view…Take a look, you can see a very big foundation that's moving. We're ahead of schedule in the ballroom and under budget. It's going to be I don't think there'll be anything like it in the world, actually. I think it will be the best.”

He then said the remark I want to highlight, “The ballroom will seat many and it'll also take care of the inauguration with bulletproof glass-drone proof ceilings and everything else unfortunately that today you need.”

Who, other than Trump, would think that the next President of the United States would need to hold his inauguration indoors, inside the White House ballroom, with bullet-proof windows and a roof that protects from a drone attack?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran’s Crumbling Revolutionary Facade: How Today’s Protests Could Reshape the Region in 2026 https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-crumbling-revolutionary-facade-how-todays-protests-could-reshape-the-region-in-2026 https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-crumbling-revolutionary-facade-how-todays-protests-could-reshape-the-region-in-2026 EXPERT OPINION — I am closely watching the growing size and momentum of protesters across Iran’s cities, rural areas, and pious communities who are bravely and vocally rejecting the Supreme Leader’s broken policies. They have shined a light on Khamenei’s gross mismanagement of the economy and the severe multi-year drought; his constant agitation and hostile relations with neighbors; Iran’s loss of prestige and influence with coreligionist communities in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria; his failures against foreign attacks; and his misguided alliance with Russia against Ukraine. Even regime loyalists have begun murmuring such complaints.

Regime instability indicators and warnings are blinking. I believe Iran’s revolutionary facade is crumbling, but into an uncertain future.

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As more protesters demand a better future, I am watching for evidence of leniency from their fathers, brothers, uncles, and schoolmates who work in the IRGC, the police, and even in the Basij. If such cracks appear, new non-revolutionary leaders could emerge as quickly as al-Sharaa rose to power in Syria.

Protesters, however, most likely lack experience running cities, provinces, and the federal government. New non-revolutionary leaders therefore probably would look to the U.S. for assurance and support – and right away.

If the protests produce a new Supreme Leader under a revolutionary Velāyat-e Faqih theocracy model, however, the future looks quite dark. Crackdowns would probably be quite harsh and swift, the nuclear program would most likely march on, and Tehran undoubtedly would keep funneling money and arms to trusted proxies that threaten the U.S. and Israel.

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I’ve been working on Iranian issues since 1979 as an academic, diplomat, intelligence officer, and now as a professor of practice. Nothing, in my view, would stabilize the region between the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf faster than a peaceful, non-nuclear and wealthy Iran that recognizes the state of Israel and distances itself from Russia.

Most pendulums eventually swing, and I am watching for this one to swing in support of the Iranian people finally having a chance to rejoin a community of free nations that value peace, prosperity, and democracy. If non-revolutionary leaders were to emerge, the West could finally and quickly work towards restoring a genuinely peaceful future that ends Tehran's nuclear weapons program; breaks its deadly alliance with Russia; terminates its costly support to Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and welcomes Iran into the community of nations as a responsible, wealth-producing global energy partner. May the pendulum swing decisively in these directions in 2026.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Uber Krysha: How Russia Turns Crime into Power—and Poison https://belimedia.com.ng/uber-krysha-how-russia-turns-crime-into-powerand-poison https://belimedia.com.ng/uber-krysha-how-russia-turns-crime-into-powerand-poison OPINION — Current discussion of Russian "hybrid warfare" tends to revolve around concepts like disinformation, proxy militias, cyber operations, sabotage, and psychological manipulation designed to fragment, confuse, and demoralize Russia's opponents—and the respective roles these play in Russian military and national security doctrine. Yet one essential dimension remains underdeveloped in the broader debate: the organic integration of criminal structures and methods into Russia's strategic toolkit. Russia's system does more than merely operate in a "gray zone." It has become a gray state, sustained by an "Uber Krysha," a super-protection racket in which the Kremlin fuses its security apparatus with organized crime to project influence and intimidation both at home and abroad.

The enabling mentality behind this fusion can be directly tied to Russia's pre-revolutionary period. Although no longer ideologically communist, Russia's current ruling elite, led by President Vladimir Putin, has very much inherited the Bolsheviks' comfort with adopting criminal methods in the pursuit of regime objectives. Before 1917, Lenin's Bolshevik Party financed its operations partly through armed robberies justified as the expropriation of bourgeois wealth for the sake of the proletarian struggle. The Bolsheviks were revolutionary in ideology but gangster in practice, rationalizing robbery and violence not as moral lapses, but as necessary transgressions—crime rebranded as virtue in the service of power.

Furthermore, during the early years of the USSR, the communist regime was defiantly, even boastfully, dismissive in its rejection of “bourgeois” legal norms. Its November 1918 decree On Red Terror (yes, it was called that) is a good case in point. It formally authorized the secret police, the Cheka, to summarily arrest and execute perceived opponents of the revolution without trial, which it proceeded to do in the tens of thousands. In doing so, the new revolutionary state openly and unapologetically signaled to its people and to the world that it would not be bound by the ordinary moral limits of civilized life. Terror was not a regrettable excess, but a management tool. This was not moral confusion, it was moral disregard elevated to state policy, with a legacy that has left a deep imprint on the political DNA of contemporary Russia.

Even as the Soviet state engaged in its bloody ideological experiment, common criminality thrived in the workers' paradise. The inefficient Soviet economic system brought chronic scarcity, which, as it does everywhere, spawned smuggling and black-market behaviors. The state imposed tight controls, but the security services did not shy away from making expedient use of criminal gangs as instruments of control to help impose a brutal order among inmates in its sprawling GULAG camp system, or using petty thieves and prostitutes to report on dissidents and foreigners.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, however, these controls dissolved, and the roles suddenly reversed. In 1991 the Soviet security apparatus imploded, and many KGB and GRU officers migrated to the emerging oligarchic and criminal economy left in its wake. There they became security chiefs, "political technologists," oil traders, and gangsters, using their skills and muscle to help these entities provide a "krysha" (roof)—similar in meaning to "protection" in Western mafia parlance—by combining inside connections, intelligence tradecraft, violence, and financial engineering. When Putin—himself a KGB veteran whose purview over foreign trade and city assets as St. Petersburg’s Deputy Mayor brought him into contact with port rackets, fuel schemes, and the Tambov crime syndicate—rose to the presidency in 1999, he re-asserted state primacy not by dismantling this nexus, but by mastering it. Putin's Kremlin in effect became the Uber Krysha, the ultimate protection roof above the oligarchs, security chiefs, and crime bosses. The bargain was clear: enjoy your wealth and impunity, but serve the state—effectively Putin—when called. Loyalty was enforced not by law or shared purpose, but by leverage, fear, and mutual criminal exposure.

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What took place after 1991, however, was more than merely a case of inverted and re-inverted primacy. The unprecedented circulation of cadres that occurred during this period fostered a profound organizational and behavioral cross-pollination between intelligence, oligarchic, and criminal elements resulting in a qualitatively new and insidious mutation that is today’s Russia—Putin's Russia. The 1990s saw an outflow of KGB and GRU officers who "pollenated" the criminal/oligarchic economy with their tradecraft, tools, and government connections. Putin’s reconsolidation of state power in the 2000s then saw a return flow creating a "reverse-pollination" as ex-intelligence officers brought their new underworld relationships, financial channels, and expanded operational flexibility back to the security services.

Among contemporary scholars, the historian and journalist Mark Galeotti stands out as the leading theorist and interpreter of this phenomenon, pointing out how modern Russia's power projection depends on cultivating deniability through criminal intermediaries. Galeotti's concept of the Kremlin as a "political-criminal nexus" and his description of its global "crimintern" offers a crucial corrective to more conventional security studies frameworks. Where others see diffusion of state control as a weakness, Galeotti sees design—a pragmatic outsourcing of coercion and corruption to actors who maintain loyalty through mutual dependence. In this arrangement, the lines between mafia, mercenaries, business, and ministries are blurred.

Russia's asymmetric tactics abroad leveraging smuggling networks, compromising criminal entanglement (kompromat), cyber hacking, illicit financing, and global shadow operations by semi-private mercenary groups, like the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps, extend this logic internationally. Liaisons between the Russian intelligence and crime groups across Europe also give Moscow access to local networks for espionage, intimidation, and assassinations that can act faster, at lower cost, and with more deniability than professional intelligence officers. But while most analysts tend to focus on this as a blending of tools—military, intelligence, cyber, informational— Galeotti’s insight is sharper: the blend itself is criminal in nature, structurally fusing coercion, corruption, and deceit into a governing logic—not as a breakdown of state power, but as its deliberate expression. Yet you will never find this asymmetric dimension acknowledged in Russian doctrinal writings despite its widespread exploitation in Russian actions.

Policymakers in the Western democracies struggle mightily to wrap their minds around this phenomenon. Their siloed agencies—CIA for HUMINT, NSA for SIGINT/cyber, DOD for military, and FBI for crime, etc.—operate under strict legal separations between these domains to protect civil liberties. Effective in their respective arenas, they are vulnerable when adversaries operate across boundaries. Russia’s mafia-state collapses these distinctions and thrives in the weeds, exploiting moral disregard and legal ambiguity to create jurisdictional confusion and cognitive overload that stymie efforts at response.

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And yet for all its advantages, the inherent pathologies of this criminal-state fusion contain the seeds of its own decay. Its reliance on criminal intermediaries corrodes institutional coherence. Loyalty is transactional, not ideological, and emptied of moral meaning. The fates of figures like Yevgeniy Prigozhin and various siloviki-linked oligarchs demonstrate how rapidly beneficiaries can become threats once their ambitions outgrow the tolerance of the Center. Moreover, by incentivizing enrichment over competence, criminal methods undermine professionalism within the military, intelligence services, government bureaucracy, and the private sector. Corruption pervades procurement, logistics, and governance, eroding capacity even as it funds loyalty. This was clearly evident in the shocking underperformance of Russia's military and intelligence operations in Ukraine.

Internationally, what appears cunning in the short term produces isolation in the long term. Russia's growing reputation as a mafia state alienates legitimate partners, of which it now has few, and hollows out whatever moral legitimacy it once had. Putin's Uber Krysha model is unsustainable in the long run because it requires continuous motion. It cannot stand on genuine law or trust, only perpetual leverage and fear, with tools that must be continuously re-coerced. The Russian people and others who are caught in its reach exist in an environment of moral blackmail that breeds cynicism rather than solidarity. Galeotti's moral edge, implicit in his scholarship, lies in showing that the criminal state is not merely a threat to others, it is a tragedy for Russia itself.

To fully understand Russian asymmetric warfare today, we must appreciate its blending of the state and criminal domains and recognize that Moscow hasn't simply rewritten the rules of war for the gray zone, it has blurred the lines between law and criminality and has itself become a gray state. It is the malignant ethos of this new Russian Uber Krysha state—the normalization of moral disregard—that, more than any cyber weapon or troll farm, has become its most dangerous export.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

]]>
Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why Labeling Muslim Brotherhood “Chapters” as Terrorist Groups Is Problematic https://belimedia.com.ng/why-labeling-muslim-brotherhood-chapters-as-terrorist-groups-is-problematic https://belimedia.com.ng/why-labeling-muslim-brotherhood-chapters-as-terrorist-groups-is-problematic OPINION — The White House this past November issued a Presidential action statement designating certain Muslim Brotherhood “chapters” as terrorist organizations. On Tuesday, the U.S. State Department and U.S. Treasury Department announced the designations of the Lebanese, Jordanian, and Egyptian chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations. The Egyptian and Jordanian chapters received a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designation. The Lebanese chapter received both the SDGT designation and a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation.

In the spring of 2019, Washington, responding to mounting pressure by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, decided to brand the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) a terrorist organization. There was no mention of “chapters” outside Egypt.

Having followed the MB and interviewed many of its members for years during my government service, I published an article in 2019 questioning the underlying assumptions of the plan. This article is a revised version of my 2019 piece.

I argued in the 2019 piece that the administration’s decision at the time did not reflect a deep knowledge of the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood and its connection to Muslim societies and political Islam.

In the fall of 2025, the leaders of the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Bahrain, and Lebanon pressured the administration to label the MB a terrorist group.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Context

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was founded by schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in response to two fundamental realities: First, Egypt was under the influence of British colonialism embodied in the massive British military presence near the Suez Canal. Second, under the influence of the pro-Western corrupt monarchy lead first by King Fuad and later by his son King Faruk, the MB’s founder believed that Muslim Egypt was drifting away from Islam. Egypt of course is the home of Al-Azhar University, the oldest Muslim academic center of learning in the world.

In addition, Al-Azhar University represents the philosophical and theological thought of the three major Schools of Jurisprudence in Sunni Islam—the Hanafi, the Maliki, and the Shafi’i Schools. The fourth and smallest School of Jurisprudence—the Hanbali—is embodied in the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine and is prevalent in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Banna’s two founding principles were: a) Islam is the solution to society’s ills (“Islam hua al-Hal”), and b) Islam is a combination of Faith (Din), Society (Dunya) and State (Dawla). He believed, correctly for the most part, that these principles, especially the three Arabic Ds, underpin all Sunni Muslim societies, other than perhaps the adherents of the Hanbali School.

In the past 98 years, the Muslim Brotherhood has undergone different reiterations from eschewing politics to accepting the authority of Muslim rulers to declaring war against some of them to participating in the political process through elections.

Certain MB thinkers and leaders over the past nine decades, including the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, the Syrian Muhammad Surur, and the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, adopted a radical violent view of Islamic jihad and either allied themselves with some Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia or joined al-Qa’ida. The organization itself generally stayed away from violent jihad. Consequently, it would make sense to label certain leaders or certain actions as terrorist but not the entire group or the different Islamic political parties in several countries.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

In the early 1990s, the Egyptian MB rejected political violence and declared its support for peaceful gradual political change through elections, and in fact participated in several national elections. While Islamic Sunni parties in different countries adopted the basic theological organizing principles of the MB on the role of Islam in society, they were not “chapters” of the MB.

They are free standing Islamic political groups and movements, legally registered in their countries, which often focus on economic, health, and social issues of concern to their communities. They are not tied to the MB in command, control, or operations.

Examples of these Sunni Islamic political parties include the AKP in Turkey, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Justice and Development in Morocco, al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait, the Islamic Movement (RA’AM) in Israel, PAS in Malaysia, PKS in Indonesia, the Islamic Party in Kenya, and the National Islamic Front in Sudan.

During my government career, my analysts and I spent years in conversations with representatives of these parties with an eye toward helping them moderate their political positions and encouraging them to enter the mainstream political process through elections. In fact, most of them did just that. They won some elections and lost others, and in the process, they were able to recruit thousands of young members.

Based on these conversations, we concluded that these groups were pragmatic, mainstream, and committed to the dictum that electoral politics was a process, and not “one man, one vote, one time.” Because they believed in the efficacy and value of gradual peaceful political change, they were able to convince their fellow Muslims that a winning strategy at the polls was to focus on bread-and-butter issues, including health, education, and welfare, that were of concern to their own societies. They projected to their members a moderate vision of Islam.

Labeling the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Sunni Islamic political parties as terrorist organizations could radicalize some of the youth in these parties and opt out of electoral politics. Some of the party leaders would become reticent to engage with American diplomats, intelligence officers, and other officials at U.S. embassies.

Washington inadvertently would be sending a message to Muslim youth that the democratic process and peaceful participation in electoral politics are a sham, which could damage American national security and credibility in many Muslim countries.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Reality is that Russia is Signaling Minimal Desire for Peace https://belimedia.com.ng/the-reality-is-that-russia-is-signaling-minimal-desire-for-peace https://belimedia.com.ng/the-reality-is-that-russia-is-signaling-minimal-desire-for-peace

DEEP DIVE — As Russia continues it's brutal bombardment of Ukrainian cities, talks between Moscow and the U.S. to end the war appear on very different trajectories. White House envoy Steve Witkoff is reportedly planning another trip to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin as Moscow's winter attacks continue unabated.

This week, Russia launched hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles on cities across Ukraine, killing at least four people and striking critical energy and heat infrastructure. In the capital, Kyiv, residents are facing temperatures as low as 10 degrees farenheit without electricity or water.

On December 30, 2025, Moscow claimed a Ukrainian drone attack targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatened his country's military would launch "retaliatory strikes" and said Moscow's "negotiating position will be revised” in ongoing talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected the claimed drone attack as “a complete fabrication”, and sources say the CIA assessed that Ukraine was not targeting the Russian leader's residence in the attack.

President Trump said in December that the U.S. was “very close” to a deal. So, what's happening?

Throughout the latest push for peace, Russia seems to conveniently reset the clock, demanding further talks as it continues its bombardments and assaults across Ukraine.

“This Russian strike sends an extremely clear signal about Russia’s priorities,” Zelensky said in a post on X referring to a strike on December 23 that killed three people and injured 12. Zeleneky condemned the attack “ahead of Christmas, when people simply want to be with their families, at home, and safe.”

That strike came just days after Putin told Russian defense ministry officials that Moscow will persist in its mission to “liberate its historic lands” and achieve its war goals “unconditionally” — by negotiations for an agreement in Moscow’s favor, or through continued war.

The continued Russian attacks and Putin’s bellicose language underscore a pattern that has defined Russia’s position on “peace” throughout its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: not budging from maximalist demands, blaming Kyiv for the lack of progress, and leveraging Western fears of escalation to World War Three.

The hardline from Putin comes as Ukraine has offered significant concessions, including Ukraine dropping NATO membership ambitions, for at least the time being, as well as a potential withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the east and the creation of a demilitarized “free economic zone.” The latest reports say Russia still wants more, including more stringent restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military.

“The Ukrainians have been saying for over a year that they are ready to come to an agreement. They are ready to be realistic and compromise,” Glenn Corn, a former senior CIA Officer told The Cipher Brief. “It’s the Russians that are not doing that. It’s the Russians that continue to push maximalist demands and that continue to scuttle the peace process — not the Ukrainians.”

Through the eyes of seasoned intelligence professionals who have studied Putin's actions for decades, the continued attacks despite peace talks are hardly surprising. “Putin has never been sincere about a negotiated solution to his ‘Special Military Operation,’” said Rob Dannenberg, former Chief of CIA’s Central Eurasia Division.

Russia is also continuing offensive pushes on multiple fronts, including in the regions it claimed to annex - Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Donetsk, where the embattled strategic city of Pokrovsk is - as well as in the northern Kharkiv region. Experts warn Putin’s ambitions go far beyond.

“We've got Putin on the other side of it and the reality is he has not taken one single step towards a temporary ceasefire or a peace deal whatsoever,” General Jack Keane (Ret.), who served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and is a trusted advisor to President Donald Trump, told Fox News. “Where he is, he still believes that eventually he's going to break the will and resolve of the United States and the Europeans and the Zelensky government and he will eventually have his way here,” Keane said, adding that Putin’s ultimate war goal is to “topple the government of Ukraine and expand into Eastern Europe.”

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

A Tested Playbook

Russia has long used the pretense of openness to negotiations as a tool to deceive, delay, and fracture Western support for those Moscow is targeting. The pattern was visible in Georgia in 2008 and again in Crimea in 2014, when Moscow signaled willingness to talk even as it consolidated military gains on the ground, buying time and weakening Western responses.

“I always use the example of Syria during the Civil War when they [Russian forces] were killing members of the Syrian opposition while they were drinking wine and coffee with American and European interlocutors in Europe, claiming that they were trying to find an agreement,” Corn told The Cipher Brief.

Indeed, behind any Russian statement of openness to engagement and dialogue, Putin has continued to assert that Ukraine is part of Russia, that the government of Zelensky is illegitimate, and that Russian forces can achieve victory on the battlefield to justify his stonewalling — despite mounting costs for Russia and limited territorial gains.

“Putin’s strategy has been consistent: advance false narratives; adopt a non-negotiable maximalist position and make ever-increasing demands for concessions; take deliberate actions to erode U.S., Ukrainian, and NATO resolve and perceived options; employ implicit and explicit threats and intimidation; and offer false choices,” former CIA Senior Executive Dave Pitts told The Cipher Brief.

“Taken together, these represent Russian ‘reflexive control’—a subset of cognitive warfare and a strategy designed to persuade adversaries to voluntarily adopt outcomes favorable to Russia,” Pitts told us. “In the face of unreasonable sovereignty and territorial demands placed on Ukraine and none placed on Russia, an emboldened and confident Putin will now likely demand even more.”

A Hesitant West

How did we get here? Some experts say a long-running pattern of Western hesitation in keeping Russia in check has emboldened Moscow. It’s not hard to remember that at the start of the full-scale invasion, Western countries were slow to provide full military support to Ukraine, concerned about a possible wider escalation.

Retired General Philip Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, told The Cipher Brief, “We have taken precious little action to stop the fight in Ukraine and we still find ourselves saying, ‘We're not going to do that because we've got to give peace a chance and we don't want to escalate the problem.’ And that formula is not working now and has not worked for 11 years.”

“We have virtually enabled the Russian war on Ukraine by our lack of action in a more severe way. Many of us from military backgrounds say that we have built sanctuary for Russia. From that sanctuary, we allow them to attack Ukraine.”

Experts warn that while the goal should be, as President Donald Trump has said, “to stop the killing,” awarding concessions to a Kremlin that has yet to drop its maximalist war aims is not the solution.

“The Trump Administration’s desire to end the violence in Ukraine is commendable, but not at the price of setting the stage for the next war by giving victory to the aggressor,” Dannenberg told The Cipher Brief.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

The Road Ahead

With peace talks ongoing, it is proving difficult to come up with a deal that does not force Ukraine to give too much while ensuring the proposal does not push Russia to reject the deal outright.

But beyond the negotiating table, experts say there are ways to pressure Putin to peace.

Ukraine is not waiting, continuing strikes on Russian energy infrastructure to curb energy export revenues that fund Moscow’s war machine, and bringing the cost of the war back to ordinary Russians.

For the U.S. and Europe, major sanctions on Russia - including new measures against Russian oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil - are already in place and reportedly starting to take their toll, but experts say stronger enforcement is needed to make them truly bite.

Maintaining military aid to Ukraine is also essential. In mid-December, Congress passed a defense bill that authorizes $800 million for Ukraine - $400 million in each of the next two years - as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which pays U.S. companies to produce weapons for Ukraine's military. President Trump signed the measure into law on December 18. Meanwhile, while Europeans failed to agree to use frozen Russian assets to back a loan for Ukraine, the EU agreed to a 90 billion euro loan over the next two years, backed by the bloc’s budget.

"The Trump Administration should demonstrate its displeasure at Russia’s clear disregard for any so-called peace process by fully enforcing all existing sanctions, providing Ukraine with long-range weapons, and declaring that peace negotiations are suspended until Russia demonstrates it is serious about these negotiations," General Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe, told The Cipher Brief. "Otherwise, the President’s efforts and those of his negotiators are clearly a waste of time and headed nowhere."

European countries have also fortified post-war pledges to Ukraine. Britain and France have committed to sending troops to a peacekeeping mission -- if a peace deal is reached. Experts U.S. intelligence, command and control, and logistics support is needed to give any European effort credibility.

The impact will be felt far beyond Ukraine, and long after the guns there go silent.

“For the United States, the best outcome will come from taking the longer, harder road that denies any reward for Russia’s illegal invasion, forces Putin to make reasonable concessions, and sustains the long-term sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,” Pitts said. “That longer, harder road also leads to stronger U.S. national security.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief.

]]>
Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia Signals Minimal Desire for Peace https://belimedia.com.ng/russia-signals-minimal-desire-for-peace https://belimedia.com.ng/russia-signals-minimal-desire-for-peace

DEEP DIVE — As Russia continues it's brutal bombardment of Ukrainian cities, talks between Moscow and the U.S. to end the war appear on very different trajectories. White House envoy Steve Witkoff is reportedly planning another trip to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin as Moscow's winter attacks continue unabated.

This week, Russia launched hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles on cities across Ukraine, killing at least four people and striking critical energy and heat infrastructure. In the capital, Kyiv, residents are facing temperatures as low as 10 degrees farenheit without electricity or water.

On December 30, 2025, Moscow claimed a Ukrainian drone attack targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatened his country's military would launch "retaliatory strikes" and said Moscow's "negotiating position will be revised” in ongoing talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected the claimed drone attack as “a complete fabrication”, and sources say the CIA assessed that Ukraine was not targeting the Russian leader's residence in the attack.

President Trump said in December that the U.S. was “very close” to a deal. So, what's happening?

Throughout the latest push for peace, Russia seems to conveniently reset the clock, demanding further talks as it continues its bombardments and assaults across Ukraine.

“This Russian strike sends an extremely clear signal about Russia’s priorities,” Zelensky said in a post on X referring to a strike on December 23 that killed three people and injured 12. Zeleneky condemned the attack “ahead of Christmas, when people simply want to be with their families, at home, and safe.”

That strike came just days after Putin told Russian defense ministry officials that Moscow will persist in its mission to “liberate its historic lands” and achieve its war goals “unconditionally” — by negotiations for an agreement in Moscow’s favor, or through continued war.

The continued Russian attacks and Putin’s bellicose language underscore a pattern that has defined Russia’s position on “peace” throughout its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: not budging from maximalist demands, blaming Kyiv for the lack of progress, and leveraging Western fears of escalation to World War Three.

The hardline from Putin comes as Ukraine has offered significant concessions, including Ukraine dropping NATO membership ambitions, for at least the time being, as well as a potential withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the east and the creation of a demilitarized “free economic zone.” The latest reports say Russia still wants more, including more stringent restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military.

“The Ukrainians have been saying for over a year that they are ready to come to an agreement. They are ready to be realistic and compromise,” Glenn Corn, a former senior CIA Officer told The Cipher Brief. “It’s the Russians that are not doing that. It’s the Russians that continue to push maximalist demands and that continue to scuttle the peace process — not the Ukrainians.”

Through the eyes of seasoned intelligence professionals who have studied Putin's actions for decades, the continued attacks despite peace talks are hardly surprising. “Putin has never been sincere about a negotiated solution to his ‘Special Military Operation,’” said Rob Dannenberg, former Chief of CIA’s Central Eurasia Division.

Russia is also continuing offensive pushes on multiple fronts, including in the regions it claimed to annex - Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Donetsk, where the embattled strategic city of Pokrovsk is - as well as in the northern Kharkiv region. Experts warn Putin’s ambitions go far beyond.

“We've got Putin on the other side of it and the reality is he has not taken one single step towards a temporary ceasefire or a peace deal whatsoever,” General Jack Keane (Ret.), who served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and is a trusted advisor to President Donald Trump, told Fox News. “Where he is, he still believes that eventually he's going to break the will and resolve of the United States and the Europeans and the Zelensky government and he will eventually have his way here,” Keane said, adding that Putin’s ultimate war goal is to “topple the government of Ukraine and expand into Eastern Europe.”

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

A Tested Playbook

Russia has long used the pretense of openness to negotiations as a tool to deceive, delay, and fracture Western support for those Moscow is targeting. The pattern was visible in Georgia in 2008 and again in Crimea in 2014, when Moscow signaled willingness to talk even as it consolidated military gains on the ground, buying time and weakening Western responses.

“I always use the example of Syria during the Civil War when they [Russian forces] were killing members of the Syrian opposition while they were drinking wine and coffee with American and European interlocutors in Europe, claiming that they were trying to find an agreement,” Corn told The Cipher Brief.

Indeed, behind any Russian statement of openness to engagement and dialogue, Putin has continued to assert that Ukraine is part of Russia, that the government of Zelensky is illegitimate, and that Russian forces can achieve victory on the battlefield to justify his stonewalling — despite mounting costs for Russia and limited territorial gains.

“Putin’s strategy has been consistent: advance false narratives; adopt a non-negotiable maximalist position and make ever-increasing demands for concessions; take deliberate actions to erode U.S., Ukrainian, and NATO resolve and perceived options; employ implicit and explicit threats and intimidation; and offer false choices,” former CIA Senior Executive Dave Pitts told The Cipher Brief.

“Taken together, these represent Russian ‘reflexive control’—a subset of cognitive warfare and a strategy designed to persuade adversaries to voluntarily adopt outcomes favorable to Russia,” Pitts told us. “In the face of unreasonable sovereignty and territorial demands placed on Ukraine and none placed on Russia, an emboldened and confident Putin will now likely demand even more.”

A Hesitant West

How did we get here? Some experts say a long-running pattern of Western hesitation in keeping Russia in check has emboldened Moscow. It’s not hard to remember that at the start of the full-scale invasion, Western countries were slow to provide full military support to Ukraine, concerned about a possible wider escalation.

Retired General Philip Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, told The Cipher Brief, “We have taken precious little action to stop the fight in Ukraine and we still find ourselves saying, ‘We're not going to do that because we've got to give peace a chance and we don't want to escalate the problem.’ And that formula is not working now and has not worked for 11 years.”

“We have virtually enabled the Russian war on Ukraine by our lack of action in a more severe way. Many of us from military backgrounds say that we have built sanctuary for Russia. From that sanctuary, we allow them to attack Ukraine.”

Experts warn that while the goal should be, as President Donald Trump has said, “to stop the killing,” awarding concessions to a Kremlin that has yet to drop its maximalist war aims is not the solution.

“The Trump Administration’s desire to end the violence in Ukraine is commendable, but not at the price of setting the stage for the next war by giving victory to the aggressor,” Dannenberg told The Cipher Brief.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

The Road Ahead

With peace talks ongoing, it is proving difficult to come up with a deal that does not force Ukraine to give too much while ensuring the proposal does not push Russia to reject the deal outright.

But beyond the negotiating table, experts say there are ways to pressure Putin to peace.

Ukraine is not waiting, continuing strikes on Russian energy infrastructure to curb energy export revenues that fund Moscow’s war machine, and bringing the cost of the war back to ordinary Russians.

For the U.S. and Europe, major sanctions on Russia - including new measures against Russian oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil - are already in place and reportedly starting to take their toll, but experts say stronger enforcement is needed to make them truly bite.

Maintaining military aid to Ukraine is also essential. In mid-December, Congress passed a defense bill that authorizes $800 million for Ukraine - $400 million in each of the next two years - as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which pays U.S. companies to produce weapons for Ukraine's military. President Trump signed the measure into law on December 18. Meanwhile, while Europeans failed to agree to use frozen Russian assets to back a loan for Ukraine, the EU agreed to a 90 billion euro loan over the next two years, backed by the bloc’s budget.

"The Trump Administration should demonstrate its displeasure at Russia’s clear disregard for any so-called peace process by fully enforcing all existing sanctions, providing Ukraine with long-range weapons, and declaring that peace negotiations are suspended until Russia demonstrates it is serious about these negotiations," General Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe, told The Cipher Brief. "Otherwise, the President’s efforts and those of his negotiators are clearly a waste of time and headed nowhere."

European countries have also fortified post-war pledges to Ukraine. Britain and France have committed to sending troops to a peacekeeping mission -- if a peace deal is reached. Experts U.S. intelligence, command and control, and logistics support is needed to give any European effort credibility.

The impact will be felt far beyond Ukraine, and long after the guns there go silent.

“For the United States, the best outcome will come from taking the longer, harder road that denies any reward for Russia’s illegal invasion, forces Putin to make reasonable concessions, and sustains the long-term sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,” Pitts said. “That longer, harder road also leads to stronger U.S. national security.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief.

]]>
Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Ruling Venezuela with a 2,000 Mile Hammer is Not Likely to End Well https://belimedia.com.ng/ruling-venezuela-with-a-2000-mile-hammer-is-not-likely-to-end-well https://belimedia.com.ng/ruling-venezuela-with-a-2000-mile-hammer-is-not-likely-to-end-well EXPERT OPINION — Rule by proxy just isn’t as simple as the Trump Administration wants to make it sound. While the long-term goals of the Administration in Venezuela are unclear, the tools they appear to want to use are not.

First, the Administration seems to want to dictate policy to the Delcy Rodriguez government through threats of force, which President Trump recently highlighted by suggesting that he had called off a second strike on Venezuela because the regime was cooperating.

Second, the Trump Administration has stated that it will control the oil sales “indefinitely” to, in the words of the Secretary of Energy, “drive the changes that simply must happen in Venezuela.”

Leaving aside the legality and morality of using threats of armed force to seize another country’s natural resources and dictate an unspecified set of “changes”, this sort of rule from a distance is unlikely to work out as intended.

First, attempting to work through the Venezuelan regime will drive a number of choices that the Administration does not appear to have thought through. Propping up an authoritarian regime that is deeply corrupt, violent, and wildly unpopular will over time increasingly alienate the majority of the Venezuelan people and undermine international legitimacy.

Regime leaders, and the upper echelons of their subordinates, are themselves unlikely to quietly depart power or Venezuela itself without substantial guarantees of immunity and probably wealth somewhere else. Absent that, they will have every incentive to throw sand in the works of any sort of process of political transition. Yet facilitating their escape from punishment for their crimes with some amount of their ill-gotten gains is unlikely to be acceptable to the majority of the Venezuelan people.

Elements of the regime have already taken steps to crack down on opposition in the streets. The Trump Administration is going to decide how much of this sort of repression is acceptable. Too much tolerance of repression will harm the already-thin legitimacy of this policy, particularly among the Venezuelan people, the rest of the hemisphere, and those allies the Administration hasn’t managed to alienate. Too little tolerance will encourage street protests and potentially anti-regime violence and threaten regime stability.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Opposition leader Maria Corina Machado has announced that she plans to return to Venezuela in the near future, which could highlight the choices the Administration faces. Some parts of the Rodriguez government will want to crack down on her supporters and make their lives as difficult as possible. The Trump Administration is going to have to think hard about how to react to that.

The tools of violence from a distance, or even abductions by Delta Force from over the horizon, are not well calibrated to deal with these dilemmas.

The Venezuelan regime appears to be heavily factionalized and punishing Delcy Rodriguez, which President Trump has threatened, could benefit other factions, for example, the Minister of the Interior or the Minister of Defense, both allegedly her rivals for power.

Unless the Administration can count on perfect intelligence about what faction is responsible for each disfavored action and precisely and directly respond, we are likely to see different factions, and even elements of the opposition, undertake “false flag” activity intended to cause the U.S. to strike their rivals.

Actions to punish or compel the regime also run the risk of collateral damage, in particular civilian casualties which will undermine support for U.S. policy both in Venezuela and abroad and potentially bolster support for the regime. And intelligence on the ground is not going to be perfect and airstrikes or raids will almost certainly cause collateral damage despite the incredible capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community and the U.S. military.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Secondly, assuming that the Administration doesn’t intend to use the proceeds of sales of Venezuelan oil to build the White House ballroom, it’s unclear what mechanisms they plan to use to ensure that those proceeds benefit the Venezuelan people.

The Venezuelan regime is deeply corrupt. Utilizing the Venezuelan government to distribute proceeds from oil sales is just a way of ensuring that regime elites continue to siphon off cash or use that money to reward their followers, punish their opponents, or coopt potential rivals by buying them off.

Assuming that the U.S. could, in fact, somehow track the vast majority of the funds from oil sales and ensure that they are not misused, this would again undermine the unity and inner workings of a regime built on buying off factions and elites. That would likely encourage those factions to find other ways of extracting funds—for example, increased facilitation of drug shipments or shakedowns of local firms supporting the reconstruction of the oil sector.

Yet the U.S. is not at all likely to have a granular view of what happens to that money. The U.S. intelligence community, while capable of a great many things, cannot track where most of these funds go or who is raking off how much.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, where the U.S. had tens of thousands of soldiers, spies, advisors, and bureaucrats and was directly funding large parts of those governments, staggering levels of corruption existed and at times, helped fund warlords and faction leaders who undermined stability. We even managed to fund our adversaries at times.

In Venezuela, by contrast, we might have an embassy.

Unless the problem of how to monitor where the money goes can be solved, the U.S. will be supporting and funding a corrupt regime that feathers its own nest and undermines the transition to democracy.

Ruling from a distance, or even trying to force a political transition from a distance, drives a number of choices that the Administration clearly hasn’t thought through. And the tools the Administration is choosing to use; force from over the horizon and the control over the flow of some funds, aren’t matched well enough or sufficiently nuanced to accomplish the ends they claim to want to achieve.

Given that, it’s unlikely this will end well.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Remembering Aldrich Ames and the Lives He Destroyed https://belimedia.com.ng/remembering-aldrich-ames-and-the-lives-he-destroyed https://belimedia.com.ng/remembering-aldrich-ames-and-the-lives-he-destroyed “I would never wish death upon anyone, but I have read some obituaries with great satisfaction.” - Winston Churchill

OPINION -- I associate myself with at least the latter part of that quote from Winston Churchill with regard to Aldrich Ames. To my knowledge, I met Ames on only one occasion. It was during a cocktail party in 1989 or 1990 when he oversaw the CIA operations group responsible for what was then Czechoslovakia. I have no clear recollection of that event, but I was later told that fellow traitor Robert Hanssen was also in attendance. If so, to paraphrase Shakespeare: ‘Hell was empty and the devils were there’.

While I can recall little about meeting Ames at that party, my colleagues and I lived – and still live – with the consequences of his betrayal. The loss of an agent is a very personal thing for those responsible for securely handling him or her. I saw that impact up close early on in my career.

Toward the end of my training as an operations officer in late 1982, I was summoned to the office of the then-chief of Soviet Division (SE). In that era, a summons to a meeting with any Division Chief - much less the head of what was then the most secretive operational component – could be unnerving for any junior officer. The initial moments of my appointment with then-C/SE, Dave Forden, were appropriately unsettling. He began by asking me whether I had stolen anything lately. Having never purloined anything ever, I was taken aback. After I answered no, he asked if I could pass a polygraph exam. Again surprised, I responded that I could the last time I took one. ‘Good’, Forden said, ‘you are coming to SE to replace Ed Howard in Moscow’. Howard, whom I had met during training, had been fired from CIA for a variety of offenses. He later defected to the USSR, betraying his knowledge of CIA operations and personnel to the KGB.

After completing training, I reported to SE Division. Shortly thereafter, I was told I would not be going to Moscow after all. Instead, I was informed, I would be going to Prague. Initially, I was a bit disappointed not to have a chance to test my skills against our principal adversary. In hindsight, however, that change in plan was fortuitous. While I could not know it at the time, my SE colleagues who went to Moscow would be there during the grim mid-1980’s period in which our agents were being rolled-up by the KGB. Many CIA officers involved with those cases would have to live for years thereafter wondering what had happened to their agents and whether anything they had done had contributed to their arrests and executions. My colleagues’ ordeals would only end with the revelation that one of our own was a spy.

But Ames was more than a spy. He was a killer. His career floundering and burdened by growing debt, Ames decided to solve his money problems by selling the identities of several low-level CIA agents to the KGB. Consequently, on April 16, 1985 he walked into the Soviet Embassy and passed on the following note: "I am Aldrich H. Ames and my job is branch chief of Soviet (CI) at the CIA. […] I need $50,000 and in exchange for the money, here is information about three agents we are developing in the Soviet Union right now.” He attached a page from SE Division's phone list, with his name underlined, to prove he was genuine. Within weeks, fearful that Soviet spy John Walker had been fingered by a CIA agent within the KGB, and worried that he might likewise be exposed, Ames decided to comprise all of the CIA and FBI Soviet sources he knew of. “My scam,” he later said, “was supposed to be a one-time hit. I was just going to get the fifty thousand dollars and be done with it, but now I started to panic.”

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Accordingly, on June 13, 1985, Ames passed the Soviets what he called “the Big Dump.” That tranche of documents contained the identities of at least 11 CIA agents. Brave men who had risked all in deciding to serve freedom’s cause, many of them would be arrested, interrogated and ultimately executed.

Ames’s rationalization of this act says everything about the kind of man he was. “All of the people whose names were on my list knew the risks they were taking when they began spying for the CIA and FBI,” he said, before adding that, "They knew they were risking prison or death.”

He would repeatedly seek to justify his actions by claiming that his espionage for the USSR was morally equivalent to what Western services had long done against their adversaries. Oleg Gordievsky, a British spy within the KGB and one of the few agents betrayed by Ames who escaped, rightly rejected any such equivalency. "I knew,” he said, that “the people I identified would be arrested and put in prison. Ames knew the people he identified would be arrested and shot. That is one of the differences between us.”

Sentenced to prison, Ames would spend almost 32 years of his life behind bars. I like to think that punishment was worse than death. One hopes he whiled away hours in his cell thinking of what he’d done and the lives he took. He expressed contrition during the plea bargain and sentencing process to ensure leniency for his wife, Rosario, saying, for example, that, "No punishment by this court can balance or ease the profound shame and guilt I bear."

But I very much doubt the sincerity of such statements because he showed no signs of having a troubled conscience thereafter. Instead, in statements while incarcerated, Ames was at pains to give his actions a veneer of ideological justification. "I had,” he said, “come to believe that the espionage business, as carried out by the CIA and a few other American agencies, was and is a self-serving sham, carried out by careerist bureaucrats who have managed to deceive several generations of American policy makers and the public about both the necessity and the value of their work.”

“There is an actuarial certainty that there are other spies in U.S. national security agencies and there always will be.” That statement by former CIA Chief of Counterintelligence Paul Redmond in the wake of the Ames and Hanssen cases reflects a grim reality of the intelligence profession.

Nonetheless, when I joined CIA, it was accepted wisdom that the Agency had never had, and could never have, a spy in its ranks. With the benefit of hindsight, it is hard to understand how such a naïve conviction could have taken hold given the repeated penetration of our predecessor organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and our British counterparts by Soviet intelligence. “There will,” as CIA Chief of CI James J. Angleton said, “always be penetrations…it is a way of life. It should never be thought of as an aberration. Anyone who gets flustered is in the wrong business.”

Perhaps the downplaying of such a possibility was a natural reaction to the overreach of Angleton himself with his ‘HONETOL’ spy hunts which hindered the Agency’s ability to mount operations against the Soviets for years at the height of the Cold War. It was certainly a reflection of institutional arrogance.

Whatever the reason, the idea that a foreign intelligence service could recruit a serving CIA officer as a spy was inconceivable to many. That mindset makes the accomplishment of Redmond and the Agency team led by Jeanne Vertefeuille, concluding that reporting from a Soviet mole – ultimately determined to be CIA officer Aldrich Ames – was the cause of the losses, all the more remarkable.

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The years-long hunt for the agent the KGB called “KOLOKOL” (‘Bell’) ended on February 21, 1994 with the arrest of Ames by the FBI. The assessment of the damage that Ames had inflicted on U.S. national security in exchange for some $2.5 million from Moscow was, not surprisingly, extensive. Even in the analogue era, he was able to pass along voluminous documentary and oral reporting to Moscow. This included reporting on his own debriefing of Vitaliy Yurchenko, who defected briefly to U.S. before returning to the USSR.

But it was the review of Ames’s role in compromising our courageous agents that struck home with us. Their sacrifice is commemorated by the CIA ‘Fallen Agent Memorial’ and other memorials within Agency spaces. And one hopes that someday the Russian people, too, will come to realize that Military/Technical researcher Adolf G. Tolkachev (GTVANQUISH); KGB Line PR officer Vladimir M. Piguzov (GTJOGGER); KGB Line PR officer Leonid G. Poleschuk (GTWEIGH); GRU officer Vladimir M. Vasilyev (GTACCORD); GRU officer Gennadiy A. Smetanin (GTMILLION); KGB Line X officer Valeriy F. Martynov (GTGENTILE); KGB Active Measures specialist Sergey M. Motorin (GTGAUZE); KGB Illegals Support officer Gennadiy G. Varenik (GTFITNESS); KGB Second Chief Directorate officer Sergey Vorontsov (GTCOWL); and the highest-ranking spy run by the U.S. against the USSR; GRU General Dmitry F. Polyakov (TOPHAT, BOURBON and ROAM); sacrificed everything for them and for their country.

“The life of the dead,” Marcus Tullius Cicero wrote, “is placed in the memory of the living.” For my part, I will remember Ames as the base traitor he was and the men he killed as the heroes they were.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
The U.S. Says it Will “Run” Venezuela. What Will That Mean? https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-says-it-will-run-venezuela-what-will-that-mean https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-says-it-will-run-venezuela-what-will-that-mean

DEEP DIVE – As audacious and complex as it was for the U.S. to extract Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela – and to do so without a single U.S. casualty – the challenges ahead may be even harder. “We’re gonna run it,” President Donald Trump said Saturday, referring to a post-Maduro Venezuela. The president gave few details and no specific time frame, saying only that the U.S. would “run the country” until a “safe, proper and judicious transition” could be arranged. U.S. oil companies would return to Venezuela, investing “billions and billions” of dollars to reboot the oil sector and the country’s economy. American “boots on the ground” might be deployed in the interim.

It was a remarkable series of statements from a president who has criticized past American nation-building projects, and it raised questions about how exactly the Trump Administration would “run” a country beset by profound challenges. Venezuela, a country twice the size of Iraq, has endured decades of authoritarian rule, corruption, drug-related violence, and economic pain. And for the moment at least, the country’s leader still pledges allegiance to Maduro.

Miguel Tinker Salas, a Venezuelan historian, Professor Emeritus at Pomona College and Fellow at the Quincy Institute, said that when Trump spoke those words – “we’re gonna run it” – he was stunned.

“Initially, my jaw dropped,” Salas told The Cipher Brief. “Even at the height of U.S. influence in Venezuela, in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, they never said they wanted to run the country. And I don't think the Trump administration comprehends the complexity that they're dealing with for a country as diverse and as big as Venezuela.”

Even those who cheered the U.S. military operation warned of the difficulties that lie ahead. Former National Security Adviser John Bolton, who pronounced himself “delighted” by Maduro’s ouster, told NewsNation the mission was “maybe step one of a much longer process. Maduro is gone but the regime is still in place.”

“Maduro’s fall is good for Venezuela and the United States,” Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security, posted on X. “It was a brilliant military operation and the world should be better off because of it. Whether it WILL in fact be better off depends on what happens next. One of the lessons of other regime-change operations is not to topple a government without a plan for what comes next. What comes next in Venezuela seems as vague as the plan for running postwar Gaza under a ‘Board of Peace’.”

The Venezuelans who might lead

At a news conference following Maduro’s capture, Trump said that Delcy Rodriguez, the regime’s vice president, would lead Venezuela as long as she “does what we want.” And he suggested the U.S. would enforce that arrangement at the barrel of a gun.

“We’re not afraid of boots on the ground,” Trump said, adding that the U.S. might deploy “a second wave” of forces if Venezuelan officials or troops don’t go along with Washington’s wishes. The U.S. naval presence near Venezuela remains in place – the largest such deployment in the region since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

A day later, Secretary of State Marco Rubio painted a slightly different picture of the U.S. role. “It’s not running — it’s running policy, the policy with regards to this,” he said.

But Rubio and Trump were clear about the overall approach: in essence, Do what we say, and things will be fine.

“We’re going to make decisions based on their actions and their deeds in the days and weeks to come,” Rubio told The New York Times. “We think they’re going to have some unique and historic opportunities to do a great service for the country, and we hope that they’ll accept that opportunity.”

It’s not clear that Rodriguez, the former Vice President, will be a pliant ally. She was sworn in Monday as interim president, after almost immediately accusing the U.S. of invading her country on Saturday. She called the operation “a barbarity,” and in an address to the nation said that Maduro was still Venezuela’s head of state.

“There is only one president in this country, and his name is Nicolás Maduro Moros,” Rodriguez said, with other senior officials at her side. Venezuela, she said, would never agree to being a U.S. "colony."

A day later she struck a less defiant note, calling on the U.S. to work with her government on an “agenda of cooperation oriented towards shared development.” She added that “we prioritize moving towards balanced and respectful international relations between the United States and Venezuela."

It’s not at all clear that’s what Trump has in mind; he insisted that Rodriguez would comply with his wishes – one way or another. "She had a long conversation with Marco [Rubio], and she said, 'We'll do whatever you need,'” Trump said. “I think she was quite gracious, but she really doesn't have a choice.” On Sunday he upped the ante, telling The Atlantic that if Rodriguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.”

Experts said Rodriguez will have to navigate an almost impossible political tightrope.

“She claims to represent a socialist party opposed to U.S. intervention and to U.S. meddling in her internal affairs – so how does she rationalize this to her base?” Salas said. “This is a very difficult, challenging position for her to be in – to on the one hand promise social change reforms, a continuation of Maduro, and at the same time, now become compliant in providing oil to the United States.”

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Beyond Rodriguez, who serves as both Vice President and minister for oil, other Maduro regime leaders remain in place, including the military chief General Vladimir Padrino Lopez and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello. They have denounced Maduro’s abduction as well – Padrino vowed to resist “the most criminal military aggression” and ordered a mobilization of Venezuelan forces on land, sea, and air.

Experts have warned of splits within the army – between hardliners who may refuse to support anyone who bows to Trump’s demands, and others who will stand with Rodriguez no matter what. Such divides could lead to violence and – if Trump is true to his word – a deployment of U.S. “boots on the ground.”

Michael Shifter, a former president of the Inter-American Dialogue, said that while Rodriguez might be able to deliver on Trump’s demands to open up the oil sector, other critical tasks will prove more challenging.

“It will be exceedingly difficult if not impossible for her to tame the entrenched corruption and widespread criminality in the country while leaving the machinery of Chavista governance intact,” Shifter told The Cipher Brief, using a term for policies begun by Maduro’s predecessor Hugo Chavez. “The risks that chaos, violence and instability will ensue are high, and under that scenario the U.S. would have no choice but to send in troops to stabilize the situation.”

“Control of the military is essential for control of Venezuela, particularly in this unstable moment,” Salas said. “And so far, the commanding general of the military, Padrino, has shown no disposition to break with the PSUV [Maduro’s party].”

Absent in the Trump plans for now is any role for the Venezuelan opposition. The main opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last month, issued a statement urging that her political ally, Edmundo Gonzalez, be recognized as Venezuela’s president. Gonzalez was widely seen as the rightful winner of the 2024 presidential vote. “Today we are prepared to enforce our mandate and take power,” Machado said.

But in his news conference after Maduro’s capture, Trump never mentioned Gonzalez, and threw cold water on the prospects of a role for Machado.

"I think it'd be very tough for her to be the leader," Trump said. "She doesn't have the support or the respect within the country. She's a very nice woman, but she doesn't have the respect."

Those remarks left Machado in the odd position of having won her goal of Maduro’s exit, while failing to win the backing of Washington. Salas said Venezuelans he had spoken with “were disillusioned about the fact that Trump essentially threw her under the bus.”

Asked Saturday which American officials would “run” Venezuela, Trump nodded to Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and General Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who flanked the president during his news conference. “The people that are standing right behind me, we’re going to be running it,” Trump said.

That drew a rebuke from Elliott Abrams, a Senior Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations and longtime hawk in terms of U.S. policy in Latin America.

“Venezuelans wanted Maduro out and voted against him,” Abrams wrote on the organization’s website. “They did not vote for U.S. rule, and pursuing that path will create instability—exactly what Trump does not want.”

The oil factor

In the months-long runup to Maduro’s capture, as the U.S. deployed naval forces to the Caribbean and attacked alleged drug traffickers from the air, the Trump administration justified its actions by invoking the drug trade and the illegitimacy of Maduro’s rule. Oil was rarely mentioned.

Now, as U.S. officials explain their post-Maduro plans, oil is front and center.

Over the weekend, Trump accused Venezuela of seizing U.S. oil assets in the country, and said U.S. companies would return to operate Venezuela’s state-controlled oil reserves, “spend billions of dollars” and “start making money for the country.”

U.S. oil companies have a long history in Venezuela, dating to the early 20th century, when they came at the government’s invitation to explore and develop oil reserves. Gulf, Shell, and Standard Oil were among the early arrivals, in what proved to be a symbiotic relationship: the companies earned billions of dollars, and Venezuela grew rich; by the mid-1970s, oil revenues had helped make it the wealthiest nation, per capita, in Latin America.

In 1976, Venezuela nationalized its oil industry, creating a state-owned company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), that continued to partner with foreign companies. More than two decades later, President Hugo Chavez renegotiated contracts with foreign oil companies to boost Venezuela’s share of the profits, a move that prompted ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips to leave the country.

Ultimately, Venezuela’s oil sector and its broader economy suffered the consequences – a deteriorating oil infrastructure, and U.S. sanctions on Venezuela and the PDVSA. Today, Venezuela produces fewer than one million barrels of oil a day, down from roughly 3.5 million in 1997, and more than 90 percent of Venezuelans live in poverty.

“Venezuela has been a problem both for the United States and for the Venezuelan people for over 20 years,” Paul Kolbe, a former Director of The Intelligence Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, told The Cipher Brief. “For the Chavez years and then the Maduro years, they've driven a country that was once one of the wealthiest in the world, and certainly the wealthiest in South America…into the ground through corruption, poor leadership, poor decisions, and oppression of the people.”

Only one U.S. oil company – Chevron – has remained in Venezuela, operating under joint ventures with the PDVSA. Rubio’s and Trump’s remarks suggest that the U.S. intends to force Rodriguez, the interim leader, to offer favorable conditions to other American companies.

But experts aren’t sure the others will return.

Ali Moshiri, who oversaw Chevron’s operations in Venezuela until 2017, said the big oil firms won’t go back until they clear signs of change.

“Not many companies are going to rush to go into an environment where there’s not stability,” Moshiri told The New York Times. He also said that while Chevron and smaller operators could boost the country’s oil output slightly in the short term, a more robust expansion would take years, given the political situation, the state of the country’s oil infrastructure, and the time needed to reestablish operations in the country.

Salas echoed the point. “Exporting oil from Venezuela is a challenge,” he told The Cipher Brief. “The infrastructure has collapsed. The oil itself that has to be pumped out of the ground is heavy crude, which requires a lot of technology, and billions of dollars of investment. So I'm not convinced that American companies are going to be running in.”

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A long history of regime change

The Maduro mission came exactly 36 years after the surrender of another Latin American dictator – Panama’s Manuel Noriega – to face drug charges in the U.S. That operation had its detractors, but in the history of U.S. regime-change missions, it probably counts as a relative success story. The list of other cases is long – and while each episode had its own specific history, there have been few good outcomes.

To take three very different examples: The 2003 decapitation of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq – which involved a huge force of “boots on the ground” – was celebrated initially by President George W. Bush in a “Mission Accomplished” speech, only to unravel in a fierce domestic insurgency that lasted for years, cost more than 4,000 American lives, and led – indirectly – to the rise of the Islamic State. The Kennedy administration backed a coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963; Diem was later murdered, unrest followed, and in his memoirs, President Lyndon Johnson blamed the coup for the escalation of the Vietnam War. In Iran, the nationalization of the oil industry was at the heart of a coup orchestrated by the U.S. and Britain in 1953 to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. That led to the return to power of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – and ultimately to the revolution that brought an Islamic theocracy to power in Tehran in 1979.

“I immediately am reminded of Iraq, where the military operation was well done and we removed Saddam Hussein pretty quickly in 2003, but then what came after was not great,” Glenn Corn, a former CIA Senior Executive, told The Cipher Brief. “So I hope we've learned that lesson and we're not going to repeat the mistakes we made there.”

Salas noted that one lesson of the Iraq War involved the perils of driving out the remnants of an ousted regime. “The lesson learned in Iraq was when they attempted to expunge the Ba’ath Party, they realized that they had utter chaos because there was no one there to run the government, no one with experience,” he said. “You had the nation fracture into particular sections, regions, strongmen, military individuals, and others. If that happened in Venezuela, it would be chaotic. The country's very big, very diverse. It has oil regions, it has urban areas, it has an industrial base. So you could imagine that happening on a national scale.”

To some, the Maduro operation was reminiscent of an earlier era of American “gunboat diplomacy,” when the U.S. military was deployed regularly to seize territory and resources. The New York Times’ David Sanger noted that Trump installed a portrait of William McKinley in the White House – and it was President McKinley who presided over the U.S. seizures of the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico.

“The U.S. operation, in seeking to assert control over a vast Latin American nation, has little precedent in recent decades,” Sanger wrote, “recalling the imperial U.S. military efforts of the 19th and early 20th centuries in Mexico, Nicaragua and other countries.”

What comes next

Given the uncertainties of the moment, experts said the next phase in Venezuela will hinge on answers to several core questions:

Does the Trump administration have an arrangement with Rodriguez and other Maduro regime officials to do the White House’s bidding? If not, how will the U.S. respond if they fail to oblige? Does the U.S. have a plan to remove those leaders? What might trigger that “second wave” Trump referred to, and the deployment of U.S. forces to the country?

What milestones must be met for the end of the interim period? Would elections follow – and would the U.S. organize or oversee those? What will the major U.S. oil companies do?

“Uncertainties abound in Venezuela about what comes next,” Shifter said. “For now, a framework of coerced cooperation between the Venezuelan regime, now led by Delcy Rodriguez, and the Trump administration, seems to be in effect. But it is far from clear whether that model is viable, much less sustainable.”

Fontaine said that “the default could well be to work with a compliant President Delcy and most of the existing government. It would be a head of state change more than regime change.” But he added that such an arrangement would do little to satisfy the opposition – the same people who have cheered the news of Maduro’s capture. “Many would-be supporters of this move hoped for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela, not just a different approach on drugs and oil.”

He also noted that Trump was hardly the first president to decry nation-building projects, only to wind up taking them on.

“For 25 years, every U.S. president has opposed nation-building abroad and then gotten involved in it,” Fontaine said. “Trump, with the commitment to run Venezuela, appears to be the latest. The welcome fall of Maduro is not the end, or the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
Iran’s Supreme Leader Should Listen to the People https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-supreme-leader-should-listen-to-the-people https://belimedia.com.ng/irans-supreme-leader-should-listen-to-the-people EXPERT OPINION — The Iranian people are saying they want new leadership. And it’s not too hard to understand why so many merchants, university students and young people in Iran are on the streets calling for political change and an end to the current Islamic Republic rule.

It was the merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazar that initially closed their shops because they couldn’t make a living with soaring inflation and the collapse of the national currency, the rial. Merchants in over 32 cities quickly followed suit, with university students and the public joining in protests calling for change.

This is not new for Iran. In 2009, the government ensured that incumbent Mahmood Ahmadinejad was reelected president, despite the popular opposition leader, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, having widespread support from the public, promising hope and change. The government’s heavy hand in ensuring their man was reelected, regardless of what the public wanted and voted for, understandably angered the public, resulting in Iran’s “Green Movement.” Protesters, who adopted green as the symbol of hope and change, claimed the election was rigged. When they demanded greater democracy, the rule of law, and an end to authoritarian practices, the government responded violently. Peaceful protesters were beaten, with thousands arrested and dozens killed.

In September 2022, Jina Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian was arrested for improperly wearing her head scarf (hijab). She died in police custody, with eyewitnesses saying she was beaten and died because of police brutality. The death of Amini resulted in nationwide protests, with Iran Human Rights reporting that at least 476 people were killed by security forces. Amnesty International reported that the Iranian police and security forces fired into groups with live ammunition and killed protesters by beating them with batons. Amini’s death gave rise to the global movement of: Women, Life, Liberty.

Since then, Iran has conducted a war against its own people, with widespread arrests of anyone protesting widespread government corruption and human rights abuses.

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Today’s protests were sparked by Iran’s severe economic crisis and water shortages, but also by Iran’s humiliating defeat by Israel in its 12-day war of June 2025 and the subsequent U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. This was after the people were told that Israel would never dare to attack Iran. But they did, with impunity.

The hundreds of millions of dollars spent on Iran’s nuclear program, building thousands of spinning sophisticated centrifuges, enriching uranium at 60% purity, concealed in deeply buried underground facilities -- and related scientific work— certainly contributed to Iran’s economic collapse. The resultant global sanctions imposed on Iran also contributed to the crumbling of Iran’s economy. Indeed, Iran’s long history of pursuing nuclear weapons and then claiming they ceased such a pursuit, although continuing to enrich uranium while denying IAEA access to suspect nuclear facilities ensured that the global community viewed Iran with deep suspicion and was supportive of the biting sanctions imposed on Iran. Iran’s nuclear pursuits and the resultant sanctions led to Iran’s failed economy. And it was the people who suffered when the rial lost its value.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged the legitimacy of the protesters’ complaints, while announcing the appointment of a new central bank chief.

Reportedly, 36 people have been killed during the demonstrations, with hundreds arrested and thousands on the street saying they want change.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamnei, in an address on Saturday, blamed foreign interference and said that “rioters must be put in their place.”

President Donald Trump had warned Iran that if Iran “violently kills peaceful protesters” the U.S. “will come to their rescue.”

What these and previous demonstrations tell us is that the people have suffered enough. They’ve taken to the street because they want change, hope and a leadership that cares for the people. The protesters carry signs saying, “the mullahs must leave Iran.” It’s clear: the government has mismanaged Iran’s economy; has made Iran a pariah nation. The Iranian theocracy, led by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, apparently no longer has the support of the Iranian people.

Is a democratic secular Iran possible?

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:06:00 +0100 FirstHandNews
The World Leaders to Watch in 2026 https://belimedia.com.ng/the-world-leaders-to-watch-in-2026 https://belimedia.com.ng/the-world-leaders-to-watch-in-2026 OPINION — The recent release of President Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS), with its emphasis on “the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” and its resultant challenges, such as border security, migration, and narcotics trafficking, offer us an opportunity to closely examine leaders to watch in 2026. While previous similar columns in The Cipher Brief by this author had focused on adversaries such as Russia’s Putin, China’s Xi, North Korea’s Kim, and Iran’s Supreme Leader, today’s evolving geopolitical landscape (as described in the new NSS) suggests looking more closely at the motivations and leadership style of Venezuela’s adversary President Nicolas Maduro, Russia’s diplomatic emissary Kirill Dmitriev, and the deeply influential, newly elected Pope Leo XIV. And the gray zone is alive and well --- there are lots of ‘black swans’ flying around!

The influence of Pope Leo XIV, who has already shown himself to be a transformational Pope, is easily misunderstood. When Stalin famously quipped, “How many divisions does the Pope have,” today’s answer would be, 1.4 billion. Observers forget that the Vatican has one of the world’s oldest and formidable diplomatic and intelligence services. Several weeks ago, when Pope Leo visited the headquarters of the Italian Intelligence Service, he spoke eloquently, stating that intelligence professionals are entrusted with “the serious responsibility of constantly monitoring the dangers that may threaten the life of the Nation, in order above all to contribute to the protection of peace.”

Pope Leo – whose first words to the flock upon his appointment to the Papacy were “Peace be with you,” has shown himself to be an adept diplomat. American-born, raised, and educated, he then spent several decades in Peru, as well as 20+ years in Rome. Fluent in English, Spanish, and Italian, he is a true citizen of, and Pope for, this world.

His initial diplomatic meetings and trips, as well as his daily commentaries on Instagram and Twitter, have showcased his nuance, spirituality, faith, and promotion of diplomacy and interfaith dialogue as solutions to the world’s conflicts. In his first overseas trip to Turkey and Lebanon, he met with Turkey’s President Erdogan and emphasized Turkey’s role “as a bridge between East and West, Asia, and Europe.” The Pope’s statement highlights Turkey’s – and Erdogan’s – role (enhanced by his experienced Foreign Minister and former intelligence chief Hakan Fidan) as a potential mediator in conflicts such as Gaza and Ukraine.

Pope Leo has also weighed in on the current conflict between the United States and Venezuela, stating that President Trump should avoid a military solution, and instead utilize diplomatic and even economic pressure to resolve the conflict. Such statements are crucial, as earlier in the year, Pope Leo had met with Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio (both are Catholic) shortly after his election. Given the Pope’s vast influence, President Trump and his national security team should thereby borrow a page from President Ronald Reagan’s 1980s playbook and forge a new ‘Holy Alliance’ with Pope Leo and the Holy See, to seek peace in Ukraine, Venezuela, and the Middle East.

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What most media and think tank commentary has missed with respect to Kirill Dmitriev’s role in diplomatic negotiations between Russia and the U.S., is why Russia’s President Putin would utilize Dmitriev in such a role, and what this portends for Russia’s negotiating posture and future in a post-war Ukraine and Europe. Dmitriev, who is young and Ukrainian-born, spent nearly 20 years in the United States as a high school student and subsequent graduate of Stanford University and Harvard Business School. Later, he worked on Wall Street for Goldman Sachs, McKinsey, and Delta Capital, a U.S. government-funded investment fund, which later became the U.S.-Russia Business Fund. American businessmen whom I know who have worked with Dmitriev, describe him as brilliant, focused, and quite knowledgeable about the United States. In 2011, the latter entity became Russia’s Direct Investment Fund, which Dmitriev heads. It’s fair to say that this fund functions de facto as Putin’s ‘family office.’ This, along with Dmitriev’s closeness to Putin and his inner circle (Dmitriev’s wife and Putin’s daughter Katerina Tikhonova are close friends), along with his prolific use of social media (X), suggests a high level of trust, as Dmitriev has led delicate Ukraine peace negotiations with President Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Putin’s use of Dmitriev in his current diplomatic role may hint at Putin’s aspirations of a renewed, strategic, post-war relationship with Russia and the United States, one focusing on a variety of business deals. I’d argue that it goes further, and that Dmitriev is being groomed for more senior leadership roles in a post-Putin Russia. So, he is most definitely a figure to watch in 2026.

Following America’s recent designation of Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization (as was done earlier with respect to the Venezuelan transnational criminal organization, Tren de Aragua), President Trump has adopted a forceful approach towards Venezuela’s leader, President Nicolas Maduro. With the largest U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean since Panama (1989), as well as a covert action authorization, President Trump has also hinted at the possibility of a diplomatic resolution to the conflict between Venezuela and America; President Maduro has suggested diplomatic talks. This begs the question whether Maduro – the leader of Venezuela since 2013 - can be negotiated with. The answer to this question – yes, in my opinion – requires a keen understanding of Maduro’s leadership style.

Maduro’s history is well-known. As a high school graduate with socialist roots, he came up through party ranks early in his career, working first as a bus driver and unionist. Numerous media reports also note his close association with Cuba and his linkages to Cuban intelligence services. After the late Hugo Chavez’s failed 1992 military coup, Maduro became linked with Chavez, Venezuela’s President from 1998-2013, and was ‘anointed’ by the charismatic, populist Chavez as his successor, winning a narrowly contested election in 2013. Maduro has often been seen as lacking in personality, charisma, or gravitas, as compared to Chavez. And many have missed his ruthlessness, cleverness, cunning, resilience, and cruelty, as he became a dictator, overturning the results of last year’s 2024 election, won by Venezuela’s opposition, led by the courageous Nobel Laureate – known as Venezuela’s ‘Iron Lady’ – Maria Corina Machado. And his incompetent socialist economic and political policies led Venezuela – once the thriving gem of Latin America, with its democratic spirit, oil riches, natural resources, and a thriving middle class - to economic ruin, penury, and a brain drain of over eight million Venezuelans. Maduro now leads a vast ‘narco state’ and criminal enterprise, funded by drugs, rare earths, minerals, gold, and oil, and beholden to criminal elements in the military, intelligence services, and transnational criminal networks, as well as his close ties to America’s adversaries such as Iran, Cuba, Russia, and China. Maduro’s criminality – America has even put a $50 million bounty on him - is what now keeps him in power.

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Maduro’s negotiation skills merit attention. Earlier this year, he showcased his negotiating prowess in releasing six American hostages after meeting with Trump’s special envoy Richard Grenell. Maduro has even written a recent letter to Pope Leo IV (who has called for dialogue and peace in Venezuela), stating, “I have great faith that Pope Leo, as I stated in the letter I sent him, will help Venezuela preserve and achieve peace and stability.”

President Trump has often shown a combination of negotiating flexibility with ‘Reaganesque’ strategic deterrence. Maduro must also be given an absolute deadline to shut down the Iranian drone base and to insist that all Iranian, Cuban, and Russian military and intelligence ‘advisors’ leave Venezuela within 24 hours --- or else! President Trump’s vast military buildup, military strikes on drug boats, seizure of Venezuela’s ‘shadow’ fleet of oil tankers, and designation of Venezuelan criminal organizations as foreign terrorist entities have boxed Maduro into a very tight corner. And America’s bold ‘exfiltration’ of Venezuela’s brave, courageous opposition leader and Nobel Laureate Maria Corina Machado sent a powerful, symbolic message to Maduro: we can get her out, and we can bring her back in, at will.

President Trump, as a former real estate CEO, can appreciate that regime change bears similarity to evicting a difficult tenant. Often, they must be bought out. Fortunately, there is ample precedent in American diplomacy in this regard. In 1991, America, working closely with the late Israeli diplomat Uri Lubrani and Ethiopia’s late Kassa Kebede (a former foreign minister and Ambassador to the UN/Geneva), paid $35 million ($83 million in 2025 dollars) – which was never fully accounted for! - to Ethiopia to allow 15,000 Beta Israel refugees to depart Ethiopia for Israel, and Ethiopia’s dictator Haile Mengistu to go into exile. Similar considerations might be considered with respect to Maduro, especially when America has spent over $1 billion USD in its current military buildup in the Caribbean.

So as 2026 approaches, all eyes are on President Trump. It’s his move. Given his and America’s prestige on the line, there is no margin for error.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Thu, 01 Jan 2026 12:51:43 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Bold 2025 National Security Strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/a-bold-2025-national-security-strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/a-bold-2025-national-security-strategy OPINION — Out with a “rules-based international order” and in with “U.S. core national interests”, according to the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2025. The NSS was not well-received by many of the 32 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Indeed, saying good-bye to the U.S. as the guarantor of global order will be difficult for many of our allies and partners, who will be expected to contribute more to their own defense and security.

Europe and the Middle East received lower priority in the NSS, with minimal criticism of Russia. The Western Hemisphere, however, is the primary security region for the U.S., under a modern “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”, with a focus on border control, mass migration, narco-trafficking and international crime and terrorism as principal threats to our nation’s security.

The NSS correctly in my view focused on the importance of the Indo-Pacific region. It called for expanding commercial and other relations with India to contribute to Indo-Pacific security. The NSS called on the Quad – Australia, Japan, India and the U.S., — to align its actions with allies and partners to prevent the domination by any single competitor nation. The NSS cited the need for the U.S. to invest in research to preserve and advance our advantage in cutting-edge military and dual-use technology, to include undersea, space, nuclear, AI, quantum computing and autonomous systems and the energy to fuel these domains.

The NSS correctly focused on Taiwan and its dominance of semiconductor production and, also, Taiwan’s direct access to the Second Island Chain, splitting Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters, and the one-third of global shipping that passes annually through the South China Sea and its implications for the U.S. economy. The NSS is clear in stating that deterring a conflict over Taiwan is a priority, making it clear that the U.S. does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

The NSS calls on our allies and partners to allow the U.S. military greater access to their ports and other facilities, to spend more on their own defense, and most importantly to invest in capabilities aimed at deterring aggression.

Japan and South Korea are encouraged to increase defense spending, with new capabilities to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain. The NSS says the U.S. will harden and strengthen our military presence in the Western Pacific. Indeed, preventing conflict requires a vigilant posture in the Indo-Pacific, a renewed defense industrial base, greater military investment from us and from allies and partners, and winning the economic and technological competition over the long run.

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The Indo-Pacific is the source of almost half the world’s GDP and will grow over the century. It will be “among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds.”

The conventional wisdom, as cited in the NSS, is that China duped us into believing that by opening our markets to China and encouraging American business to invest in China, starting in 1979 when China was a poor and backward nation, we would facilitate China’s entry into the so-called “rules-based international order.” And as the NSS mentions: “This did not happen. China got rich and powerful and used its wealth and power to its considerable advantage.”

But there were leaders in China in the 1980s and 1990s who believed in democratization and the rule of law and open elections. Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was removed from his leadership position because he, like his predecessor, Hu Yaobang, believed in democracy and the rule of law. Mr. Zhao was removed in June 1989 because he supported the student demonstrators at Tiananmen, and Mr. Hu was removed, also by Deng Xiaoping, for indulging in bourgeois liberalization and advocating democracy. A few years later, Premiers Wen Jiabao and Zhu Rongji, like Messrs. Hu and Zhao before them, were advocates for democratization and free and fair elections. Currently, there may be other senior officials in China who advocate for democratization and the rule of law.

The NSS is a powerful document, focusing on the Western Hemisphere and the security threat to the U.S. emanating from that region. And the U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific region and deterring aggression in the First Island Chain while ensuring no unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait are clear and unambiguous goals of the Trump Administration. Getting the support of regional allies and partners will be an important part of this national security strategy.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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Thu, 01 Jan 2026 12:51:43 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Brave New World of Drone Swarms https://belimedia.com.ng/the-brave-new-world-of-drone-swarms https://belimedia.com.ng/the-brave-new-world-of-drone-swarms

DEEP DIVE – A drone weapon heads behind enemy lines, on a mission to kill troops and destroy equipment. To its left and right are a dozen other armed drones, and as the mission unfolds they compare notes – on enemy positions, the success or failure of their strikes, and their next tactical moves. There are no humans involved – other than the people who programmed the drones and launched them on their way.

It may sound like a wild premise, but swarms of drone weapons that use artificial intelligence to “think” for themselves are no longer a subject for science fiction; they are in the advanced stages of testing and in one instance at least – according to a recent report – they are already operational.

The Wall Street Journal reports that Ukraine has begun deploying AI–powered drone swarms in combat – using software developed by the Ukrainian company Swarmer. Battlefield units have used the system more than 100 times, according to the report, in deployments of between three to eight drones at a time against Russian positions.

“The technology is upon us,” Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mike Studeman, who served as Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, told The Cipher Brief. “There are many miles to go in terms of the most sophisticated swarm abilities, but there are plenty of reasons to fear even where we are today.”

Not long ago, the mere existence of drone weapons was a battlefield game-changer; this latest paradigm shift involves entire units of drones that carry out operations with humans almost entirely out of the loop.

“If there were a battle to go down today, some of the first engagements might be with unmanned systems,” Studeman said. “The most central engagements would involve a lot of them. The race is on.”

It’s a “race” both in terms of offensive “swarm” capabilities and the technologies to counter them.

“It's an absolute game-changer for any campaign,” Joey Gagnard, a former senior Army Chief Warrant Officer, told The Cipher Brief. “It’s a force multiplier for special operations forces or for any military element. Now it becomes incumbent on the defender to figure out a way to down all of those drones, while not also hurting his own capabilities.”

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What’s in a “swarm”?

Experts define drone swarms as coordinated systems of at least three drones that act autonomously and with “swarm intelligence,” mirroring the behavior of birds or insects when they travel in groups. An effective drone swarm will use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to navigate obstacles and communicate changes in the environment to other drones in the group.

Experts draw a distinction between swarms in number only, and those with the ability to operate in dynamic conditions. A 2022 test in China, in which dozens of drones navigated their way through a bamboo forest, demonstrated the difference. The drones were able to move in and around the forest (you can watch the video here), but there was nothing more than the bamboo stalks to stop them – no defense systems, no one shooting at them.

“So we have the components in place such as microchips and microprocessors, we have battlefield experimentation and battlefield data that can enable these groups and swarms to operate,” Samuel Bendett, an adviser to the CNA’s Strategy, Policy, Plans and Programs Center, told The Cipher Brief. “But none of it has really come together yet to form a full picture from that mosaic that would spell a swarm.”

The biggest challenge lies in the dynamism of a battlefield. A static environment – say a military base or airfield, or a bamboo forest – will be easier for a drone swarm to navigate than a moving force. “If something changes, is the swarm intelligent enough to adapt and then attack?” Bendett asked. “How is it going to adapt and attack if there are changes?”

Even Ukraine’s complex June drone strike, dubbed "Spider Web", which deployed more than 100 first-person-view (FPV) drones against Russian air bases, still relied heavily on human direction.

For a swarm to operate successfully, Bendett said, “there needs to be secure communication between members; they need to pass data to each other about their state of being, about their flight to target, about the conditions that affect their flight to target, about any movements or changes on the ground or with a target, obviously communication with ground control stations and those that launched them and so on.”

Studeman noted that in a fluid combat situation, “you have all sorts of other challenges that exist, including somebody who wants to jam you, using a high-power laser or microwave weapons, and you're encountering all sorts of things that maybe were not planned for at launch, may not actually be in the software parameters of the drones.” For complex operational scenarios, he said that true swarms are “probably a bridge too far today,” but he and other experts stressed that the battlefield application is coming soon.

Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn, Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, envisions scenarios in which drones in a swarm display “command and control” capabilities, “not only acting on their own, but coordinating their behavior, without any human involved, with a bunch of other drones.”

In such an operation, “the swarm as a whole makes decisions about how to modify its operations in the best way to achieve its objective,” Pettyjohn told The Cipher Brief. “Another drone might take its place, or the collective might decide that they realized there were air defenses in place and they needed to flush those out and actually send a wave of them to attack the air defenses, force them to engage a few of the targets, which would then create a gap that the others could exploit to hit their actual objective.”

Gagnard said that drone swarms will soon be doing the work of dozens – perhaps hundreds – of drone operators.

“Instead of one guy piloting one drone for a limited duration and being able to go through the entire targeting cycle, you would have a whole swarm of drones doing all of those mission functions simultaneously,” he said. “You’ll have drones conducting reconnaissance, tagging off to other drones that are going to conduct strikes or one-way attacks, tagging off to other drones that are going to do logistics. So they would make decisions on their own, and operate freely on their own, based on the stimulus and the feedback that they're getting in the environment.”

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Coming soon

Whether true AI-driven drone swarms hit the battlefield next month, next year, or three years from now, this much is clear: the technology is already part of the planning for nearly every advanced military, and as a result, it’s a booming business. Everyone, it seems, is training and experimenting with swarm technology – beginning on the battlefield where drone innovation is most apparent.

“Both Russians and Ukrainians are really busy trying to develop swarm technologies,” Bendett said, and both sides are benefiting from outside help – the Russian military from China, the Ukrainians from the U.S. and Europe – to obtain the microprocessors and microelectronics that enable their operations.

Other militaries and defense tech companies have watched the Ukraine theater and entered the drone-swarm “race.”

In the U.S., the Pentagon’s Replicator initiative to fast-track innovation includes multiple drone swarm projects. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) has awarded contracts to Anduril Industries, L3Harris Technologies, and Swarm Aero to produce prototype software for drone swarms. The contracts are part of the DoD’s “Autonomous Collaborative Teaming” (ACT) program, which seeks “automated coordination of swarms of hundreds or thousands of uncrewed assets,” according to the DIU. Meanwhile, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been testing swarms for years, and says that by 2027, the U.S. could deploy swarms of as many as 1,000 armed drones. The DoD has also mandated the creation of dedicated drone testing ranges to support live swarm exercises.

The U.S. hardly has a monopoly in the field, even in the West. One of NATO’s newest members, Sweden, is fast-tracking drone-swarm development, in what Defense Minister Pål Jonson said was a response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. In January, the Swedish Armed Forces unveiled a drone swarm program, developed by defense giant Saab, that would allow soldiers to control 100 drone weapons simultaneously. Elsewhere in Europe, the German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems has conducted tests on AI-controlled drones with the German military; Britain’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) has awarded contracts for “Mixed Multi-Domain Swarms”; the Dutch Research Council has funded an exploration of drone swarm technology; and Hungarian researchers reported the design of a 100‑drone swarm operating without a central controller—based on algorithms inspired by flocking behavior in animals.

Countering the swarms

Every military innovation – from gunpowder to the tank to the stealth bomber – prompts efforts to counter it, and AI-driven drone swarms are no exception.

“We're going to have to be as good on the defense as we are on the offense for how we use drones,” Studeman said. Asked about U.S. counter-drone efforts, he cited partnerships between the Pentagon and the private sector and said, “I think we're moving as fast as we can.”

If the world needed a reminder of the need for counter-drone capabilities, it got a stark one in July from Robert Brovdi, Ukraine’s newly appointed drone boss, who told NATO commanders that his crews could turn a NATO base into “another Pearl Harbor” in 15 minutes, without coming closer than 10km (6 miles). “I’m not saying this to scare anyone,” Brovdi said, “only to point out that these technologies are now so accessible and cheap.”

He went on to warn NATO: you are unprepared.

“I don’t know of a single NATO country capable of defending its cities if faced with 200-300 Shaheds (drones) every day, seven days a week,” Brovdi told the LANDEURO conference. “Your national security urgently requires a strategic reassessment.”

Bendett agreed, citing Brovdi’s warning as well as the damage Hamas inflicted with drones against Israeli forces in the early days of the 2023 Israel incursion into Gaza. “So the question,” Bendett said, “is what would it take for us to realize that we are facing the same threat and what would it take for our military to make these appropriate changes?”

As a starting point, he said that U.S. military facilities will need to guard against what he called the “Ukraine-type threat” of small groups using multiple drones to go after targets. “They only have to be used once, and you only have to be successful once,” Bendett said. “I know the U.S. military is learning, and internalizing these lessons, and people are trying to understand what kind of threats they're facing. Is it happening fast enough?”

The U.S. military has worked for at least three years on counter-swarm defense – mostly involving high-energy lasers and high-power microwave (HPM) systems.

Recently the head of the Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) announced a competition for high-energy laser weapon systems focused on countering drone swarms. The RCCTO has already built several directed energy prototypes; this would be a higher-level weapon, and hopefully one that would move from prototype to operational system.

“We have to continue to work harder,” Lt. Gen. Robert Rasch, the RCCTO director, said at this month’s Space and Missile Defense Symposium. “We have to continue to work with industry to develop our directed-energy platforms and focus on the areas of reliability.”

Among other American swarm-defense projects: The Air Force’s THOR, an HPM directed energy weapon, and the Leonidas HPM system, developed by Epirus and fielded with the U.S. Army, both of which emit electromagnetic pulses capable of disabling multiple drones simultaneously.

On August 26, the Leonidas system defeated a swarm of 49 quadcopter drones in a test conducted at an Indiana National Guard base. Axios reported that “suddenly, all 49 — like a flock of stricken birds — crashed into a grassy field.” Their circuits had been overwhelmed by the system’s electromagnetic waves.

Epirus’s CEO, Andy Lowery, says Leonidas creates an “electronic dead zone” that disables anything that carries computer chips.

“It works for drones, which are like flying computers,” Lowery told Defense One. “It will stop a Tesla in its tracks, it’ll stop a boat motor in its tracks, anything with a computer inside of it.”

Other NATO members are working on counter-swarm technology as well. The German startup Alpine Eagle has developed a system known as Sentinel – a platform that deploys drone swarms against other drone swarms. Sentinel has been tested by the German Armed Forces and in Ukraine against FPV (first-person view) drone threats; Poland has deployed SKYctrl, which sends drones to collide in “non-explosive” fashion with other drones; and the British U.K. Ministry of Defense said recently that its “Radiofrequency Directed Energy Weapon,” mounted on a truck chassis, had successfully “defeated” swarms of drones. Far from Europe, India's Bhargavastra, developed by Solar Defence & Aerospace, used unguided rockets to eradicate swarms of drones at close range.

“The more sophisticated, latest versions are the ones that can actually interfere with the commands inside the unmanned drones,” Studeman said. “This smart neutralization, through a kind of electronic interference that goes after the actual logic and the commands of the UAS unmanned aerial system itself, shows you where this is going.”

All that said, some experts worry that the U.S. military isn’t adequately prepared for the drone-swarm threat.

“The U.S. is not ready,” Pettyjohn said. “It has begun to procure some defenses that were specifically made to counter small drones…and that's good. But you really need these layered defenses, where you have cost-effective interceptors.” She and other experts say that for all the tests and pledges, the U.S. has yet to show that it has an effective multi-layered defense against potential swarm attacks.

“High-powered microwaves are the one emerging technology that the U.S. Army has fielded a few prototypes that hold the promise of actually being able to knock out a true swarm,” she said. “The challenge is it requires a lot of energy. It's a very short-range weapon, so it's like your final force field. You need those longer layers of kinetic and EW interceptors to try to thin out the herd. And you have to figure out how to use the high-power microwave in a way that doesn't fry the electronics of US military equipment that it's trying to defend.”

Gagnard agrees that more work needs to be done.

“I'd say we have weapon systems that can defeat drones on a small scale,” he said, “but on a large scale, right now the aggressor is going to have the decisive advantage if they're incorporating this swarm technology into their repertoire.”

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China’s drone-swarm advantage

Military experts – including the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command – have said that the opening salvos in any Pacific war would almost certainly involve cutting edge drone-swarm technologies. And last November, China unveiled a potentially devastating tool in the drone-swarm ecosystem. Experts called it a "drone mothership."

The Jiu Tian, introduced at the Zhuhai Air Show, China’s biggest aerospace trade fair, is an 11-ton aircraft billed as the world’s largest drone carrier. It is itself a drone, an enormous one, operating without a crew. According to several reports, the Jiu Tian can carry as many as 100 smaller UAVs more than 4,000 miles and unleash them against a target. Essentially, it’s a delivery vehicle for a drone swarm.

“China is going like gangbusters right now” in the drone space, Studeman said. “They have the manufacturing capability. They've built thousands of armed drones, and they’ve built the equivalent of motherships, where the intent is to throw lethal capability forward.”

As The Cipher Brief reported earlier this year, China’s military is in the throes of an innovation and manufacturing boom in drone weaponry to prepare Beijing for a potential war over Taiwan. China already produces some 70% of the world’s commercial drones – and is building a rapidly growing AI industry.

“They have the production, they have large inventory and now they also have the AI,” Dr. Michael Raska, a professor at the Military Transformation Programme at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told The Cipher Brief. “With all these combined, they have been experiencing a leap forward in the quality and quantity of all the drones across the different domains.”

China also has more than 3,000 manufacturers producing anti-drone equipment. In 2024, Beijing issued 205 procurement notices related to counter-drone technology; the figure was 122 in 2023, and only 87 in 2022.

“Our manufacturing is weaker than the Chinese manufacturing in this regard, and scale matters,” Studeman said. “Even with simpler technology. If somebody puts more robots on the front lines, we've got a problem, Houston.”

”This is definitely one area where China has an upper hand with the numbers,” Bendett said. “If Ukraine and Russia can manufacture millions (of drone weapons), then China can manufacture tens of millions, maybe hundreds of millions of UAVs.”

It’s not a stretch, Bendett said, to imagine China launching, in the early hours or days of a conflict over Taiwan, “10,000 mid-range UAVs at a suspected American carrier battle group east of Taiwan. Do we have enough to defend against that group?” he asked. “What do we have in our arsenal?”

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The terror threat

Beyond the military applications for drone swarms, there are important civilian uses. Disaster relief, search and rescue missions, and fighting wildfires are often mentioned, given the ability of drone swarms to map affected areas and conduct support operations in dangerous conditions.

Then there are the nightmare applications – primarily, the fear that as the ease and accessibility of drone-swarm technology grows, so will the odds that it will land in the hands of terrorists.

In March 2025, the U.S. conducted a war game that envisioned multiple drone attacks against U.S. military facilities. The exercise, which involved more than 100 participants from 30 agencies, uncovered deficiencies in response and highlighted the need for coordination among federal, state, and local authorities. A lack of clear rules of engagement across nearly 500 U.S. military installations was identified as a major concern.

Experts also worry about attacks on non-military sites – which as a rule are far less well defended.

“They could be at different sporting events or other large gatherings,” Pettyjohn said. “Obviously, as with any form of terrorism, you're not going to be able to protect people everywhere, but there needs to be a lot more counter-drone defenses for the homeland to prevent terrorist attacks from succeeding in really critical locations, either in terms of infrastructure or where there are large numbers of people.”

“American infrastructure is very vulnerable,” Gagnard said. “We don't have solid defenses that are institutionalized, that are in use everywhere, and American infrastructure is a prime target for that type of attack.”

He added that drone technology – and lax U.S. laws – could allow a would-be terrorist to conduct reconnaissance on a target without being noticed. “In America, we have a relatively free sky,” he said. “You could fly drones all day long over certain things and never really raise anyone's radar.”

In the nightmare scenario for a drone-swarm terror attack, Gagnard said, the target would be assessed, the swarms well “briefed,” and – depending on the target – defenses might be porous.

“You wouldn't need very smart drones in order to do that,” he said. A drone swarm attack, he said, “could be very successful in America.”

Gagnard, who serves as a senior advisor at the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology, has argued for a “national counter-drone doctrine.”

“How are we going to counter drones? What's acceptable, what isn't acceptable? And then we need some sort of unified command. Someone needs to determine exactly how we're going to counter drones.”

Several experts cited Ukraine’s June Spider Web operation as a reason for concern – given how deeply it penetrated Russian territory, even without using the AI tools that might produce a “thinking” drone swarm.

“We should really, really worry” about a drone-swarm terror attack, Bendett said, “because if anything, the Spider Web operation showed that a well-organized effort that is enabled by commercial technologies can be devastating against an unprepared target.”

David Ochmanek, Senior International Defense Researcher at RAND, said that the U.S. has been “a little slow to recognize the magnitude of the threat” of drone attacks, in part because Americans are so far from Russia and Ukraine, where the drone-war realities play out on a daily basis.

“We've seen how clever adversaries can smuggle these kinds of capabilities,” Ochmanek told The Cipher Brief. “So we shouldn't be lulled into a false sense of security that our oceans will protect us, even from attacks by fairly short range. The Houthis have shown us that they can launch these things. One can imagine an enemy loading them onto ships off our coast that would be indistinguishable from merchant ships, and launching from there.”

While this year’s White House executive order for a “Golden Dome” mandated a defense against all air threats, the order specifically referenced sophisticated missiles – not swarms of inexpensive drones.

Pettyjohn and other experts said that for domestic drone-swarm defense, the preference will be for non-kinetic systems – microwaves, lasers and so forth – to avoid shoot-downs that result in explosions or damage from falling debris. “In the homeland, there are a lot more restrictions on how you can take down foreign objects in the sky,” she said. “The FAA gets involved, Homeland Security, local authorities – the U.S. needs to work through all of these issues and figure out bureaucratically how it would respond and what the policies and procedures are that are in place.”

Studeman raised another concern – that drone swarms would be particularly effective if tasked with pursuing an individual.

“You think about protection of senior principals in government – a president, prime minister and on down,” he said. “There could be a swarm of drones coming to simply do one thing: keep pounding until just one penetrates while one principal leader is exposed.”

It’s a collection of worrisome scenarios, few of which can be dealt with by even the most sophisticated “Golden Dome” defense – which of course is years if not decades away.

As Pettyjohn put it, “there is no easy fix to this challenge.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:46 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why Putin Is Losing The War In Ukraine That He Thinks He Is Winning https://belimedia.com.ng/why-putin-is-losing-the-war-in-ukraine-that-he-thinks-he-is-winning https://belimedia.com.ng/why-putin-is-losing-the-war-in-ukraine-that-he-thinks-he-is-winning OPINION — The Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in January 2022 is now approaching its fourth year. The cost for Ukraine has been very high, but the cost for Russia has been astronomical. Russian forces have been pushed back nearly to the territory they controlled at the end of 2021. According to British Intelligence, by October 14, 2025, Russian casualties (killed and wounded) since January 2022 totaled 1,118,000 military personnel. This figure is only slightly lower than the Ukrainian estimate made on the same day of 1,125,150 Russian casualties. Ukraine also estimates Russian losses over the same period of 11,256 tanks, 23,345 armored combat vehicles, and 33,628 artillery systems. The scale of these losses can be compared with Russia’s force structure (FS) at the start of the invasion, which included 900,000 active duty personnel, 3,417 active tanks, 11,000 armored combat vehicles, and 5,000 active artillery systems. In short, Russia has lost more than twice its entire 1992 army force structure since the invasion.

Yet the Russian army continues to engage in desperate efforts to regain limited territory to the west. British intelligence estimates that since the start of 2025 Russia has suffered 332,000 casualties, the highest loss rate since the invasion. Russia has made only marginal gains, which Putin trumpets as victories as he throws more men and equipment into the Ukraine meatgrinder.

Of course, Putin cannot afford to admit failure, but it nonetheless seems as if he actually believes his strategy is succeeding. Why?

The answer lies in the perverse incentives of Russian command and control (C2), which conceal the weaknesses of Russian FS. Russian C2 is concentrated in one civilian with no military training (Putin), and his small circle of advisers.

Putin’s leadership discourages innovation by field officers and welcomes blind obedience. Bad news from field officers of all ranks is punished with demotion or arrest. Good news is rewarded with promotion. As a result, field officers routinely lie about their failures in hopes of promotion and reassignment. There is almost no active search for information by headquarters to correct misinformation sent by field officers.

Russian force structures are notoriously corrupt—a corruption that is expected and tolerated, but also can be an excuse for punishment. Officers steal from their units by exaggerating the size of the unit and pocketing the unused pay. Hence, many Russian units are severely understaffed. Soldiers steal from their units by selling weapons, ammunition, and fuel, leaving their units under-equipped. The vast majority of battle-hardened soldiers are long gone, as are military trainers, who were all sent to the front lines. New Russian recruits are untrained and unaware of the risks they face.

Russia's C2 and FS Problems from the Start of the Invasion

A brief review makes it clear that C2 and FS problems have bedeviled the Russian invasion from the start of the 2022 invasion. Planning for the invasion ignored standard military doctrine, which emphasizes that successful invasions require sufficient scale, speed, and force. The considerable literature on the force differentials needed for an invasion, including Soviet doctrine, agrees on the classic rule that a frontal assault requires a 3:1 force ratio to compensate for the higher casualties suffered by the invaders.

Effective command and control are also essential for the success of an invasion. This includes accurate intelligence about enemy forces, freedom for field officers to improvise as needed, rapid field intelligence upward to inform tactics and strategy as the invasion proceeds, and quick top-down decisions in response to field intelligence.

The 2022 invasion violated all these requirements. In order to conceal its intentions and achieve an operational surprise, the planning of the invasion was limited to a very small group led by Putin. Not even Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was included in this group. The Russian field commanders on the ground in Belarus for military exercises had no idea that they would be leading an invasion. The success of this secrecy came at a high cost: there was no opportunity for critiquing the invasion plan and no consideration of fall-back strategies.

Russian intelligence about the Ukraine’s response was based entirely on faulty assumptions that a high-speed invasion would demoralize the Ukrainian military, the Russian military would easily defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield, the top Ukrainian leaders would be quickly captured and executed, and that the vast majority of Ukrainians would either welcome the Russian invaders or remain passive.

The 3:1 force differential rule should have required an invasion of 590,000 Russian, given that the Russians knew the Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel. Instead, the Russians planned an invasion of 190,000 personnel, actually smaller than the combined Ukrainian armed forces. Even worse, instead of massing its invasion force at one point to achieve a breakthrough, the Russians decided to attack on six different axes: from the Black Sea in the southeast, from Crimea in the south, from Donbas in the east, from Belgorod in the northeast (towards Kharkiv), from Kursk in the northeast (towards Kyiv), and from Gomel, Belarus, in the north (towards Kyiv).

All the Russian invasion routes faced unexpected problems, but the flaws in Russian C2 and FS can be illustrated by the fate of Russia’s most promising attack, coming from Gomel, Belarus, and aimed at Kyiv. This included an airborne assault on Antonov airport, in the Kyiv suburb of Hostumel. The Ukrainians had not expected an attack from Belarus and were unprepared for both the land invasion and the airborne assault.

Why did these attacks fail? Russian secrecy about the invasion had left the Russian ground forces in Belarus completely unprepared. They were informed of their roles in the invasion only 24 hours before the invasion. As a result, they lacked ammunition, fuel, food, and communications. They did not anticipate heavy fighting. Mud forced their armor to use the few roads, causing traffic jams. They encountered entire towns that were not on their maps, requiring them to stop and ask civilians where they were. Residents reported the Russian positions to Ukrainian authorities.

The Ukrainians acted swiftly to confront the Russian assault from Gomel, which was approaching the outskirts of Kyiv. They committed most of their available special forces and special units of other security units, called up all their reserve units, and mobilized the cadets and staff of their military academies into new battalions, supported by two brigades of artillery and one mechanized brigade. Even so, the Russians had a 12:1 troop advantage on the Gomel axis. On 27 February, their advance units were able to capture the suburb of Bucha, just west of Kyiv.

However, the phone calls from residents from towns in the Russian path permitted Ukrainian artillery to target the Russian columns. The Ukrainian forces knew the territory well, giving them a huge tactical advantage, and they were able to assault the slow-moving Russian columns almost at will, causing panic, abandonment of equipment, and blockage of the roads. As the Russian columns stopped moving, their losses multiplied. The Russian advance units that had reached Bucha were short on fuel, ammunition, and manpower. They assumed defensive positions, waiting for reinforcements that never arrived.

In the battle for Antonov airport on the edge of Kyiv, the Russians used helicopters and elite airborne troops. These troops were to capture and execute the Ukrainian leadership. But the Ukrainians surrounded the airport with heavy armor, pounding the Russians. They were able to capture the airport, driving the Russians into the surrounding woods. While the Russians were able to recapture the airport after a couple of days, the Ukrainians had time to destroy the runways, making impossible the landing of reinforcements and preventing the Russians from capturing the Ukrainian leadership.

On March 16th the Ukrainian government announced a counteroffensive in the Kyiv region, and by the end of March, Russian ground forces were retreating north from the Bucha area. By April 2nd the entire Kyiv oblast was back in Ukrainian hands, including the area bordering Belarus.

What was the Russian response to this humiliating defeat? Those Russian generals who were not killed, were mostly cashiered or arrested, as were many of the colonels. The disaster resulted largely from Putin’s leadership, but the defeated units took the blame. This added to the incentive for officers to lie about failure and pretend achievement.

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The First Stalemate

The war has continued through various phases. The second phase, from early April through the end of August, 2022, was marked by active fighting along front lines, with heavy Russian losses, but was a relative stalemate in terms of territorial gains by either side.

The Second Ukrainian Offensive

The third phase began on September 6, 2022, when Ukrainian troops attacked the Kharkiv front near the Russian border. On September 9, Ukrainian mechanized units broke through. Ukrainian forces raced north and east. The cities of Kupiansk and Izium fell to the Ukrainians on 10 September. By the next day the Russian forces north of Kharkiv had retreated over the border, leaving all of the Kharkiv Oblast under Ukrainian control. Pressing on to the east, Ukrainian forces on 12 September crossed the Siverskyi Donets, and on 1 October the Ukrainians recaptured Lyman, a major railway hub, and took as prisoners an estimated 5,000 Russian troops.

As Russian forces rushed to the northeast front, Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in the Kherson region on October 2. By 9 October Ukrainian forces had retaken 1,170 square kilometers of territory, pressing on toward the Dnieper River and the city of Kherson. On 11 November, Kherson was occupied by the Ukrainians.

The Second Stalemate

The second period of stalemate dates from 12 November 2022 until the present. During this three-year period, the war has seen the introduction of drone warfare on a massive scale, first by Ukraine and then by Russia. As a result of the drone warfare, the entire conflict has changed in character. Drones have made assaults by armored vehicles so costly that the war has reverted to trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. Drones now account for two-thirds or more of front-line casualties in the war.

Ukraine’s government discarded Soviet-era regulations to provide tax breaks and profit incentives to independent Ukrainian drone producers, authorizing the Ukrainian military to contract with them. These independent companies have made good use of Ukraine’s large cadre of skilled aeronautical engineers and information technology specialists. About 200 of these companies are officially recognized to receive military contracts, and as many as 300 other groups manufacture drones and donate them directly to military units. However, financial resources remain a limiting factor.

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Russia has rapidly developed its own drone capacity. However, Russia has the resources to outproduce Ukraine, even if its drones are less sophisticated. Russian drone production is limited less by finances than by the search for microchips, smuggled from the west or bought from China. Russia also has ballistic and airborne missile systems that are hard for Ukraine to bring down. Russia has been using massive barrages of drones and missiles to demoralize Ukraine. But this effort is counterproductive. Bombings anger enemy populations and stiffen resistance, as shown in WWII by the Blitz of London and Allied carpet bombings of Germany. Russian barrages may have strained Ukraine’s economy, but they have not lessened resistance.

While the drone/missile war is well known, Ukraine’s other defense industry growth is less known. Ukraine now produces more artillery shells than all of NATO’s 32 members and Europe. Since 2022, domestic production of armored personnel carriers has increased by 400 percent, artillery by 200 percent, ammunition by 150 percent, and anti-tank weapons by 100 percent. By 2025, a single Ukrainian factory was producing 20 Bohdana howitzers each month, similar in specifications to the French Caesar. Ukrainian defense companies deliver howitzers in 60 days for $2.5 million compared to a several-year wait and a cost of $4.3 million in the West.

Russia has had to develop a new tactical approach for the active fronts. Groups of two or three soldiers are forced (by firing squads) to run towards Ukrainian lines and if they live, conceal themselves to fight later. Specialized units such as snipers, artillery spotters, or drone operators try to identify and target the sources of firing at these individuals. Then larger assault units move forward to capture territory. However, these assault units are now poorly trained, and their equipment is obsolete armor or more often simply cars, vans, and motorcycles, often heavily camouflaged. Ukrainian spotter drones are waiting for these assaults, and once the Russian vehicles are in motion and supported by Russian artillery, Ukrainian drones blow up both the vehicles and the artillery. On a typical day in autumn 2025, the Russians were losing 1,000 soldiers, 10 armored units, 25 artillery barrels, and 100 vehicles. By offering increasingly high incentives, Russia was recruiting 30,000 soldiers a month, barely enough to cover losses.

Russian electronic warfare has improved dramatically, with a focus on disrupting Ukrainian drones. As a result, Ukrainian forces are now losing about 10,000 drones per month. Russian air defenses also have improved, reducing the ability of Ukrainian fighter jets to attack. Russian engineers have been effective in designing and building defensive trenchworks, minefields, and tank traps in areas they control.

However, Ukraine air defenses have also improved. Russian airplanes now must launch airborne missiles from Russian territory, with a considerable loss of accuracy. Russian ground to ground ballistic missiles are hard to bring down, but also lack accuracy.

Faced with the hardening of Russian front lines, Ukrainian forces are focused on inflicting high Russian casualties, rather than attacking themselves. The exception occurs when the Ukrainians decide to roll back a Russian salient to prevent it from being hardened. The massive Russian missile and drone attacks deep in Ukraine have required the Ukrainians to invest heavily in missile and drone defenses of all types, which have something like a 90% success rate. Nonetheless, Ukraine suffers considerable damage. This serves as a constant reminder to Ukrainians of what is at stake.

Conclusion

Putin’s war in Ukraine has provided him with a rationale for stifling dissent in Russia, redirecting vast resources to turn Russia’s economy to military production, sponsoring efforts to overturn governments that support Ukraine, and preparing for additional invasions that will re-establish the Russian empire and cement his legacy as a modern Stalin.

In spite of all this, Putin is still losing the war in Ukraine. That conflict is chewing up men and equipment at an unsustainable rate. Moreover, it has been a strategic disaster. The war strengthened Ukrainian nationalism. It energized the European members of NATO and caused Finland and Sweden to join NATO, which doubled the length of NATO’s frontier with Russia. It destroyed the myth of Russian military superiority. It ended Russian natural gas exports to the European Union, which had been carefully cultivated for decades. It led to the emigration of more than half a million of Russia’s best and brightest.

Most NATO countries are now rearming and expanding their militaries. The E.U. countries combined gross domestic income EU GDP of $19.4 trillion in 2024 added to the UK GDP of $3.6 trillion totaled over 23 trillion dollars, whereas the gross domestic income of the Russian Federation RF GDP in 2024 was 2.1 trillion. Over the long run, Russia cannot compete with Western Europe. Europe can afford to support Ukraine’s economy and war effort while European countries ramp up their defense industries and military infrastructure. Putin will eventually lose not only his Ukraine War, but also his dream of a new Russian empire.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:46 +0100 FirstHandNews
Sudan’s War Without Borders: How Global Powers Turned Darfur into a Proxy Battleground https://belimedia.com.ng/sudans-war-without-borders-how-global-powers-turned-darfur-into-a-proxy-battleground https://belimedia.com.ng/sudans-war-without-borders-how-global-powers-turned-darfur-into-a-proxy-battleground

DEEP DIVE — Entire cities in the Darfur region of Sudan have been burned and razed, millions have fled their homes, and unspeakable terror and violence plague those left behind. When fighting erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, few predicted the conflict would become one of Africa’s worst humanitarian disasters.

There is, however, more to this war than just an internal battleground. The war in Darfur is no longer simply a domestic power struggle. It has become a multilayered proxy battlefield involving Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and more — each supporting rival Sudanese actors to secure strategic footholds.

“The current phase has Darfur as a killing field. The Sudanese protagonists have sorted out somewhat the areas each controls. Still, on the political front, both are committed to eliminating the other in a fight to the finish,” United States Ambassador to Sudan during the George W. Bush administration, Cameron Hume, tells The Cipher Brief. “There may be agreement on a time-limited humanitarian ceasefire, but no one is aiming at a durable political settlement between the two main parties.”

Infographic with a map showing areas controlled by the army, the Rapid Support Forces and neutral groups in Sudan as of September 23, 2025, according to the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and the AFP. (Infographic with a map showing areas controlled by the army, the Rapid Support Forces and neutral groups in Sudan as of September 23, 2025, according to the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and the AFP (Graphic by AFP) (Graphic by Olivia Bugault, Valentina Breschi, Nalini Lepetit-Chella/AFP via Getty Images)

United Arab Emirates

Despite official denials, the UAE remains the RSF’s cornerstone patron in Darfur, suspected of funneling advanced weaponry — including Chinese CH-95 and “Long Wang 2” strategic drones for 24-hour surveillance and strikes, Norinco-guided bombs, howitzers, and thermobaric munitions —via a covert air bridge of more than 240 UAE-chartered flights from November 2024, often landing at Chad’s Amdjarass airfield or South Darfur’s Nyala base.

These supplies, additionally routed through Libyan intermediaries like Khalifa Haftar’s networks and Ugandan/Somali airfields, have empowered RSF assaults, such as the latest siege and takeover of El Fasher. Economically, UAE-based firms like Hemedti’s Al-Junaid control Darfur’s Jebel Amer and Songo gold mines, exporting $1.6B in 2024, reportedly laundered via seven sanctioned Dubai entities to fund RSF salaries, Colombian mercenaries and further arms.

“The United Arab Emirates is the key sponsor of the RSF in strategic terms. Its interest is to convert influence in western Sudan into leverage over corridors, gold monetization and logistics, and to prevent an outcome in which Islamists consolidate in Khartoum,” Dr. Andreas Krieg, Associate Professor at King’s College London, tells The Cipher Brief.

Sudan’s gold — its primary export — has also become a lifeline for the UAE, feeding Dubai’s markets with more than ten tons a year from RSF-controlled areas. The trade aligns with Abu Dhabi’s long-term ambitions and its stance against the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its past reliance on RSF fighters in Yemen. Despite Emirati denials and Sudan’s failed genocide case against the UAE at the ICJ, evidence ties the UAE directly to embargo breaches, from passports recovered in Omdurman to Emirati-made vehicles found at RSF sites.

As the UAE expands its influence through RSF control of Darfur’s 700-kilometer Red Sea corridor, reviving stalled DP World and AD Ports projects to rival Saudi NEOM, it effectively uses the militia as a proxy to secure resources and block SAF dominance. Approximately 70 percent of Sudan’s gold production from RSF-controlled areas is smuggled through Dubai, while overall illicit exports account for around 40 percent of the country’s total gold output.

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Turkey

Ankara, seeing the Darfurian conflict as both a threat to its regional ambitions and a challenge to Islamist allies, has backed al-Burhan’s forces with drones worth $120 million, delivered through Egypt. Their weapons supply assisted SAF in retaking Khartoum earlier this year but comes with deeper incentives: ideological ties with Burhan’s Islamist faction and strategic objectives for Red Sea access.

“Turkey’s quiet intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism pacts give it outsized sway over local regimes,” John Thomas, managing director of strategic policy firm Nestpoint Associates, tells The Cipher Brief.

The result, experts say, is a dangerous and growing proxy war between the UAE and Turkey — one now fought with advanced drones and air defenses across Sudan’s skies. The stalemate has fractured the country, spilled instability into Chad and Libya, and left tens of thousands dead, a toll experts warn could further destabilize the Horn of Africa.

Beyond the pace and scale of Turkish arms transfers, the presence of Turkish private military contractors (PMCs) in Africa merits closer scrutiny.

“In addition to the pace and spread of Turkey’s arms flow, I would say the presence of Turkish PMCs in Africa is something policymakers really ought to focus on more closely,” Will Doran, Turkey researcher at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief. “A lot of these PMCs, like Erdogan himself, are warm towards the Muslim Brotherhood and have some questionable ties to Islamist militias on the ground in the Sahel. This isn’t to say Turkey is backing the region’s big names in terrorism. For one, Ankara’s deployed against al-Shabaab in Somalia, but the PMC trend is worrisome nonetheless.”

Egypt

Egypt views Sudan as a vital flank for its national interests. The Nile River flows from Sudan into Egypt, and Cairo has long been vigilant about any instability upstream. Egypt supports General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) because Cairo views them as the most dependable group to safeguard Egypt’s key national interests — namely, the Nile River corridor, which is Egypt’s sustenance for water and trade, and the southern border, which it shares with Sudan.

According to Dr. Krieg, “Egypt is the principal state backer of the army.”

“Its strategic priorities are the security of the Nile heartland, avoidance of an Islamist resurgence, and denial of hostile basing or rival influence along the Red Sea,” he continued.

Egypt, already hosting more than a million refugees, also fears that if Khartoum collapses into chaos, the resulting instability — such as refugee flows, arms trafficking, or militant activity — could spill over the border into its territory. Diplomatically, Cairo has kept direct intervention limited and insists on a Sudan-led solution, yet it retains close military and political ties to Burhan.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh shares a parallel concern: as the Gulf kingdom pursues its Vision 2030 and Red Sea coastal investments, it has an interest in a stable Sudan firmly aligned with its regional agenda. Riyadh has backed the SAF via financial and diplomatic support, while also positioning itself as a mediator.

“Saudi Arabia is perhaps the outside player with potential influence that gets the least attention,” said Amb. Hume.

Dr. Krieg also observed that “Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a convenor and would prefer a unified state that secures the Red Sea.”

“Chad and the Haftar camp in eastern Libya function as corridors and logistics enablers, and their choices directly affect the intensity of fighting in Darfur,” he explained. “Those intermediaries in Libya and Chad are all part of the UAE’s Axis of Secessionists; a network of non-state actors that are all tied to Abu Dhabi directly or indirectly.”

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Iran

Since late 2023, Iran has resumed ties with SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan after a seven-year break, sending Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones, artillery, and intel via seven Qeshm Fars Air flights to Port Sudan from December 2023 through July 2024. This aid helped SAF retake Khartoum in March 2025 and strike RSF in Darfur. In addition, Iran uses Sudan’s Yarmouk arms factory to counter the UAE-backed RSF. Tehran’s overarching goal? Access to Port Sudan to support the Houthis in Yemen and spread Shiite influence — risking wider regional proxy conflict.

“Iran’s military support has helped shift momentum toward the SAF. As one of many foreign actors exacerbating Sudan’s internal tensions, Iran contributes to the country’s unfolding humanitarian disaster,” Jonathan Ruhe, Director of Foreign Policy at the JINSA Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy, tells The Cipher Brief. “And as one of many foreign actors trying to claim concessions from the government and vying to exploit Sudan’s natural resources, Iran helps worsen the country’s already high levels of impoverishment.

Research Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Husain Abdul-Hussain, also underscored that while Iranian involvement in Sudan is still in its infancy, “it will certainly grow as the war grinds on.”

“The more reliant Islamist militias become on Iran, the stronger they become and the more indebted to Tehran,” he explained. “Eventually, relations between Iran and Sudanese Islamist militias will be similar to its relations with Islamist militias in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iraq (Hashd Shaabi), Gaza (Hamas) and Yemen (Houthis). Note that Sudan Islamist militias are Sunni (like Hamas in Gaza), and unlike Shia Iran and its Lebanese and Iraqi Shia militias. The Houthis are their own breed of Islam (Yazidis) but are allied with Shia Iran.”

Russia

Moscow, meanwhile, has played both sides in Sudan’s civil war for profit and power. Before 2024, the Wagner Group, now under Russia’s Defense Ministry, backed the RSF with arms like surface-to-air missiles, in return for gold from RSF-held mines like Jebel Amer — smuggling up to 32.7 tons worth $1.9 billion via Dubai from 2022 to 2023 to skirt Ukraine war sanctions and fund operations. This fueled RSF violence, including the 2023 to 2025 massacres in el-Geneina and el-Fasher.

Around midway through last year, in the aftermath of Prigozhin’s demise, Moscow flipped to bolstering the SAF in its quest for a Port Sudan naval base. Russia subsequently vetoed a UN ceasefire resolution last November to keep up its influence in Khartoum, while reports emerged of Russian mercenaries operating in West Darfur, worsening the fear and displacement.

“Russia linked commercial and security networks remain present around gold flows and in facilitation roles close to the RSF camp,” said Dr. Krieg.

Why So Many Foreign Players?

At the heart of Sudan’s crisis lie three intertwined forces: geography, resources, and regional rivalry. Poised along the Nile, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa, Sudan is pivotal to everything from Cairo’s water security to the maritime goals of Gulf States to the influence ambitions of Moscow and Ankara. Moreover, its ports and resource-rich land have morphed domestic infighting into a lucrative war economy.

“Material backing has lengthened the war and structured its geography,” Mr. Krieg said. “The result is not a decisive victory for either side but a hardening of zones, with the RSF advantaged in a peripheral theatre where it can police corridors and extract revenue, and the army entrenched where the state’s core institutions, population and donor attention reside.”

Why It’s So Hard to End the War

With so many players in the field and a deep distrust among warring parties, ending the war in Sudan has become extraordinarily difficult. The United States, for its part, leads the “Quad” alongside the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, pushing for a three-month humanitarian truce. The RSF agreed to a deal on November 6, and Washington is now pressing the Sudanese army to do the same in hopes of easing the fighting and starting talks on the war’s deeper causes.

If the war in Sudan continues, the U.S. faces a growing humanitarian catastrophe: estimates suggest more than 150,000 deaths and over 14 million people displaced, with nearly 25 million facing acute hunger. Regionally, unchecked control of the RSF in Darfur could destabilize the Red Sea corridor, a vital route for global trade and U.S. allies. Domestically, failure to resolve the conflict would erode U.S. credibility on human rights and genocide prevention, heighten refugee pressures in North Africa and Europe, and contradict the moral precedent set during the 2003 Darfur genocide.

“Washington will be paying more attention,” one White House-connected source tells The Cipher Brief. “It isn’t ignored. It is a conflict Trump wants to see ended.”

Dr. Krieg asserted that Sudan is entering a consolidation phase in which the Rapid Support Forces have turned Darfur into a defensible rear area and administrative base. The fall of El Fasher removed the last significant government foothold in the region. It gave the RSF control of the interior lines across West, South, Central, and much of North Darfur, as well as access to Libya and Chad for resupply and commerce.

He thus asserts that Sudan’s future is likely to go one of two ways.

“The Sudanese Armed Forces still hold the Nile corridor, the capital area and much of the east, which creates a west versus centre geography. That configuration points to two near-term paths. Either the front stabilises into a frozen conflict that resembles an informal partition, or the RSF seeks to push east through North Kordofan and test the approaches to the center,” Dr. Krieg added. “Humanitarian conditions are acute, with siege tactics, displacement and food insecurity now baked into the conflict economy. The political tempo has slowed rather than accelerated, since battlefield gains in Darfur give the RSF reasons to bank advantages before contemplating concessions.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:46 +0100 FirstHandNews
Uncovering the Truth Behind Trump’s Call to Resume Nuclear Testing https://belimedia.com.ng/uncovering-the-truth-behind-trumps-call-to-resume-nuclear-testing https://belimedia.com.ng/uncovering-the-truth-behind-trumps-call-to-resume-nuclear-testing OPINION — “Nearly 1,000 feet below the Nevada desert, [U.S.] scientists and engineers are conducting groundbreaking nuclear weapons research. Subcritical experiments, or ‘subcrits’ for short, play a crucial role in ensuring national security. Subcritical experiments are a key part of the [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)] science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is the way America ensures that our nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and reliable -- without conducting full-scale nuclear weapons tests.”

That was a quote from Don Haynes, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) senior director at the Nevada National Security Sites, from an article published in LANL’s National Security Science magazine just 13 days ago on October 29, 2025.

The article goes on to explain, “Subcritical experiments allow researchers to evaluate the behavior of nuclear materials (usually plutonium) in combination with high explosives. This configuration mimics the fission stage of a modern nuclear weapon. However, subcrits remain below the threshold of reaching criticality. No critical mass is formed, and no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction occurs -- there is no nuclear explosion.”

I’m going to quote more from the LANL article because it shows what subcritical testing the U.S. has been doing for years. For example, I wrote a Cipher Brief column in July 2021 that described subcrits this way: “Put simply, inside a steel container, a chemical high-explosive is detonated around a coin-like, small sample of plutonium [less than eight ounces] to simulate aspects of a nuclear explosion. No actual chain reaction or nuclear explosion occurs. But this contained detonation, with the assistance of computers, has helped scientists determine how plutonium behaves under the extreme pressures that do occur during detonation of a nuclear weapon.”

I further explained four years ago, “The main purpose, up to now, of subcritical experiments has been to identify and decrease uncertainties in the performance of currently deployed U.S. nuclear weapons, at a time when actual testing is not being done.”

I write this to deal with President Trump’s rather confused – and at times inaccurate -- series of recent statements about restarting U.S. nuclear testing. The President’s words have caused varied responses from his own officials – some of whom apparently did not want to appear correcting him. And the President’s words have gone so far as to encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to convene a publicized Kremlin meeting last Wednesday where senior Russian national security officials discussed the possibility of Russia exploring the restart of their own full-scale underground nuclear testing.

To make it clear, the U.S. and Russia, by agreement, conducted their last underground nuclear tests in 1992. China did their last one in 1996. All three were signatories to the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibited “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” However, under the treaty, as the U.S. State Department explains on its website, the CTBT “does not prohibit subcritical experiments to help ensure the continued safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.”

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Russia has conducted at least 25 subcritical experiments at its Novaya Zemlya test site, according to past statements by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Russian authorities. As of May 2024, the U.S. had conducted some 34 subcrits at the Nevada test site, according to DOE.

In 2022, a spokesperson for DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the nuclear program, told Kyodo News that in June and September 2021, the U.S. conducted two subcritical tests, the first under the Biden administration. Three rounds of subcritical nuclear tests were conducted under the first Trump administration, and four rounds under Obama, according to other sources.

Currently, LANL has subcritical experiments scheduled into the year 2032, according to the recent National Security Science magazine article.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is developing several new warheads including the W93, which is intended for deployment on U.S. sub-launched ballistic missiles by 2040, according to NNSA. The NNSA website said of the W93, “Key nuclear components will be based on currently deployed and/or previously tested nuclear designs…The W93 will not require additional nuclear testing.”

Against that background, let’s review what President Trump has been saying, along with some of the responses.

The testing issue began with Trump in Korea on the evening of October 29. He had a meeting scheduled for 11 a.m. the next morning with Chinese Leader Xi Jinping. At 9 p.m., Trump sent off a message on his Truth Social public website that said: “The United States has more Nuclear Weapons than any other country. This was accomplished, including a complete update and renovation of existing weapons, during my First Term in office. Because of the tremendous destructive power, I HATED to do it, but had no choice! Russia is second, and China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years. Because of other countries’ testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately.”

What triggered Trump’s message has not yet been explained. Three days earlier, Putin, dressed in a military uniform, had publicly announced with some fanfare that Russia had successfully tested a nuclear-powered missile over the Arctic Ocean after years of development.

It may have been just competitiveness, but Trump was not clear what he was talking about when he wrote “testing our nuclear weapons.” Was he talking about nuclear delivery systems, as Putin had just been? Or was he talking about testing nuclear warheads or bombs?

If it were the latter, Russia actually has more nuclear weapons than the U.S., primarily because the U.S. has retired most of its tactical nuclear weapons. But if Trump meant strategic nuclear delivery systems, he was correct.

Then there was the ambiguity of what kind of testing Trump was talking about? He mentions instructing the Pentagon to “start testing,” which implied nuclear delivery systems, such as missiles, which the military controls. DOE’s NNSA tests the nuclear portion of warheads and bombs.

The next day, October 30, hours after the Xi meeting, Trump was flying back to the U.S. from Korea aboard Air Force One, and held an impromptu press conference. After 10 minutes of questions about meeting Xi, Trump was asked why he wrote the Truth Social piece about nuclear testing, Trump initially replied, “Well, that had nothing to do with them,” meaning the Chinese.

Trump went on, “It had to do with others.” He paused and then continued, “They seem to all be nuclear testing. We have more nuclear weapons than anybody. We don't do testing. You know, we've halted it years, many years ago, but with others doing testing, I think it's appropriate that we do.”

Since Trump mentioned the U.S. had halted the testing “years ago,” he created the impression at that moment he must have been thinking of explosive underground nuclear testing. When asked a follow-up question on where or when such testing would take place, Trump waved it off saying, “It will be announced. You know, we have test sites. It'll be announced.”

Having given the idea that he had ordered the resumption of explosive underground nuclear tests, it was no surprise that the next day, Friday, October 31, when Trump sat down at Mar-a-Lago with Norah O’Donnell for the 60 Minutes CBS News television program to be aired two days later.

Here I am using the CBS transcript of the entire one-hour, thirteen-minute Trump/O’Donnell interview and not the shorter, edited version shown on Sunday night, October 31.

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Well into the interview, after covering Trump’s Asia trip and meeting with China’s Xi, O’Donnell referred to his October 29, Truth Social message where he mentioned new nuclear testing and asked Trump, “What did you mean?”

Trump initially gave this wide-ranging response: “Well, we have more nuclear weapons than any other country. Russia's second. China's a very distant third, but they'll be even in five years. You know, they're making them rapidly, and I think we should do something about denuclearization, which is going to be some-- and I did actually discuss that with both President Putin and President Xi. Denuclearization's a very big thing. We have enough nuclear weapons to blow up the world 150 times. Russia has a lot of nuclear weapons, and China will have a lot. They have some. They have quite a bit, but…”

At that point, O’Donnell interrupted and asked specifically, “So why do we need to test our nuclear weapons?”

This time Trump answered, “Well, because you have to see how they work. You know, you do have to-- and the reason I'm saying-- testing is because Russia announced that they were going be doing a test. If you notice, North Korea's testing constantly. Other countries are testing. We're the only country that doesn't test, and I don’t want to be the only country that doesn't test.”

As I have pointed out above, other than North Korea’s six underground nuclear tests beginning in 2006 and ending in September 2017, there have been none confirmed, other than Russia’s acknowledged subcritical nuclear tests. So it again is unclear what Trump was mentioning.

Trump actually went on saying, “We have tremendous nuclear power that was given to us largely because when I was President (and I hated to do it, but you have to do it)-- I rebuilt the military during my first term. My first term was a tremendous success. We had the greatest economy in the history of our country.”

Trump then tried to turn the conversation to the economy, but O’Donnell brought him back to the subject by asking, “Are you saying that after more than 30 years, the United States is going to start detonating nuclear weapons for testing?”

This time Trump insisted, “I'm saying that we're going to test nuclear weapons like other countries do, yes,” and went on saying “Russia's testing nuclear weapons...And China's testing them too. You just don't know about it.”

Trump claimed the U.S. is an open society, but “they [Russia, China] don't go and tell you about it. And, you know, as powerful as they are, this is a big world. You don't necessarily know where they're testing. They test way underground where people don't know exactly what's happening with the test. You feel a little bit of a vibration. They test and we don't test. We have to test.”

That same day of the Trump/O’Donnell interview, October 30, Vice Admiral Richard Correll, Trump’s nominee to be head of Strategic Command, was having his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Asked if he knew whether Russia, China or any other country were doing explosive testing of nuclear warheads, Correll answered, “No.”

Asked whether Trump could have been talking about nuclear delivery systems, Correll said, “I don't have insight into the President's intent. I agree that could be an interpretation.”

On November 2, Energy Secretary Chris Wright appeared on Fox News and was asked about the new nuclear tests mentioned by the President. Wright replied, “I think the tests we're talking about right now are system tests. These are not nuclear explosions. These are what we call non-critical explosions.”

Asked whether the tests involve the existing stockpile weapons or new systems, Wright said, “The testing that we'll be doing is on new systems, and again these will be non-nuclear explosions.”

Wright explained that thanks to the nation’s national laboratories “the U.S. actually has a great advantage with our science and our computation power. We can simulate incredibly accurately exactly what will happen in a nuclear explosion. And we can do that because in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, we did nuclear test explosions. We had them detailed and instrumented and we measured exactly what happened. Now we simulate what were the conditions that delivered that and as we change bomb designs, what will they deliver. We have a reasonable advantage today in nuclear weapons design over all of our adversaries.”

On November 3, CIA Director John Ratcliffe came to Trump’s defense on the Russia, China testing issue, writing a Tweet on X saying the President “is right.” To back it up, Ratcliffe cited a May 2019 quote from then-Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley Jr. saying Russia “probably” was conducting low-yield tests although Ashley did not claim to have specific evidence. He stated that Russia had the "capability" to conduct very low-yield nuclear tests.

Ratcliffe also cited a 2020 Wall Street Journal article that said the U.S. believed China may have secretly conducted a low-yield nuclear test based on circumstantial evidence, such as increased excavation, activity in containment chambers, and a lack of transparency at the site.

That same day, Sen. Tom Cotton, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, put out his own Tweet on X saying, “After consultations with Director Ratcliffe and his team, they have confirmed to me that the CIA assesses that both Russia and China have conducted super-critical nuclear weapons tests in excess of the U.S. zero-yield standard. These tests are not historic and are part of their nuclear modernization programs.”

Despite all this Trumpian back and forth, I strongly doubt the U.S. will return to explosive nuclear testing, but rather remain with subcritical experiments as currently planned.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is everyone’s business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:46 +0100 FirstHandNews
How America Can Balance Legal Migration with Strong National Security https://belimedia.com.ng/how-america-can-balance-legal-migration-with-strong-national-security https://belimedia.com.ng/how-america-can-balance-legal-migration-with-strong-national-security OPINION — Zohran Mamdani, a Ugandan-born New York State Assembly member, was just elected Mayor of New York City, the largest city in the U.S. We in the U.S. take this for granted that a naturalized U.S. citizen could aspire to hold prominent federal, state and local positions. But this is unique for the U.S. and a select few countries that welcome legal migration and provide naturalized citizens with the same rights available to natural-born citizens.

I’ve spent almost two decades living in other countries and can assure you that in most countries, there is no clear path for foreign-born inhabitants to acquire citizenship and hold office. In fact, even buying property is problematic in many of these countries.

Except for the president and vice president, who must be natural-born citizens (Article 11, Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution), naturalized citizens can hold offices in the Congress and in federal, state and local governments. Indeed, Madeleine Albright, a naturalized citizen born in Czechoslovakia, was Secretary of State and Henry Kissinger, born in Germany, was National Security Advisor and Secretary of State and Elaine Chao, born in Taiwan, was Secretary of Labor and Transportation. These are just a few prominent Americans who became naturalized citizens and went on to serve our country with distinction.

Currently, Ilhan Omar, born in Somalia, is a member of the House of Representatives from Minnesota and Senator Mazie K. Hirono, born in Japan and representing Hawaii, are two of 30 members of the 119th Congress who were not born in the U.S. The list of naturalized Americans who contributed to our nation’s economic growth, academic excellence, athletic prowess and the arts is awe-inspiring. Indeed, our country’s open-door policy has contributed to making the U.S. the “shining city on a hill.”

This open-door policy of legal migration has served our Republic well. What our elected officials must ensure is that we continue to care for all the people and that we ensure that terrorists, narco-traffickers, criminals and state-supported proxies are prevented from entering our country and causing harm to our people and institutions.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

This is a list of just a few of the domestic law enforcement issues requiring immediate attention from federal, state and local authorities, and the representatives elected by the people to ensure that the proliferation of crime in the U.S. is managed on a priority basis.

  1. Drug Trafficking: There are over 100,000 overdose deaths annually, largely driven by synthetic opioids like fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine and heroin entering the U.S. from Mexico, Columbia and South American cartels.
  2. Human Trafficking and Exploitation: Transnational criminal networks traffic migrants, women, and children for labor and sex across borders, including into the U.S.
  3. Cybercrime and Financial Theft: Russian, Chinese, North Korean and East European cybercriminal groups target U.S. individuals, corporations, and infrastructure with ransomware attacks, identity theft, and bank fraud, costing U.S. companies and consumers tens of billions of dollars annually. Such cyberattacks also threaten critical infrastructure – energy grids, hospitals, and water systems.
  4. Money Laundering and Corruption: Criminal organizations launder billions through U.S. real estate, shell companies, cryptocurrency, and luxury goods.
  5. Threats to National Security: Transnational criminal groups often collaborate with hostile states or terrorist networks, often blurring the line between organized crime and geopolitical conflict.
  6. Economic and Social Costs: Drug deaths, cyber losses, law enforcement costs, and social disruption likely exceed hundreds of billions of dollars annually, with communities suffering from increased violence, addiction, and corruption.

Despite the efforts of the FBI, DEA, DHS and Treasury, the adaptability of criminal groups and the global nature of technology and finance - and the support of countries determined to cause harm to the U.S. -- makes enforcement increasingly difficult.

The U.S. experiment with an “open door policy” for legal migration to the U.S. has been a great success. It is why the U.S. is the “shining city on a hill.” But we should not take this for granted. We and our elected representatives must work even harder to rid the country of organized crime and defeat our adversaries who wish for us harm.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:46 +0100 FirstHandNews
Assessing the Pentagon’s Mission to Rebuild the ‘Arsenal of Freedom' https://belimedia.com.ng/assessing-the-pentagons-mission-to-rebuild-the-arsenal-of-freedom https://belimedia.com.ng/assessing-the-pentagons-mission-to-rebuild-the-arsenal-of-freedom

DEEP DIVE — The Pentagon is waging war against its own acquisition bureaucracy. In a sweeping speech on Friday, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth described the “adversary”, not as a foreign power but as a process: decades-old requirements and procurement rules that reward paperwork over outcomes.

The core argument: if the U.S. wants to deter adversaries in today’s world of fast-moving threats that include gray-zone coercion, contested logistics and AI-enabled systems, it must accept more acquisition risk as a means to reduce operational risk later.

The Pentagon’s new plan pairs rhetorical urgency with specific structural changes. It proposes killing the legacy Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and replacing it with a tighter, more centralized alignment, pushing commercial-first solutions even if they deliver an “85% solution” initially and forcing a cultural shift across both DoD and industry toward speed, volume, and continuous iteration. The plan also signals tougher expectations for primes to invest private capital and for government to send longer demand signals. It’s a tall order.

Here’s a look at the key ideas:

  • “Increase acquisition risk to decrease operational risk”: field good-enough capabilities faster, iterate in production, and stop chasing perfect specs that arrive too late.
  • JCIDS → RRAB / MEIA / JAR: cancel the slow, document-heavy requirements process; stand up a Requirements & Resourcing Alignment Board (RRAB) to tie priorities to funds, a Mission Engineering & Integration Activity (MEIA) to co-design/experiment with industry early, and a Joint Acceleration Reserve (JAR) to bridge the “valley of death.”
  • War-fighting Acquisition System & PAEs: rebrand and reorganize acquisition around Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs) who have end-to-end authority to trade cost/schedule/performance for time-to-field, with embedded contracting and fixed delivery cycles.
  • Modular Open Systems + multi-source: mandate modular architectures, maintain at least two qualified sources on critical components, and enable third-party integration to avoid vendor lock and accelerate upgrades.
  • Commercial-first, 85% solution: accept non-perfect bids that meet the mission faster, then iterate software and components continuously.
  • Wartime Production Unit (WPU): a deal-team model to negotiate across a contractor’s total DoD portfolio, create incentives for on-time delivery, and unlock surge capacity.
  • Workforce & Culture shift: convert the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) into a “Warfighting Acquisition University,” lengthen leader tenures, and evaluate contracting/program teams on mission outcomes rather than compliance metrics.
  • Foreign Military Sales realignment: move DSCA/DTSA under Acquisition & Sustainment to unify planning, contracting, and delivery so allies get kit faster without undercutting U.S. readiness.

Why this matters now

Adversaries are iterating faster, supply chains are brittle, and the U.S. military’s ability to produce and sustain at volume - will decide deterrence credibility. The proposal promises measurable gains in lead times, throughput, and availability, but it also raises hard questions about safety, governance, industry incentives, and the talent pipeline.

In the sections that follow, we pressure-test these claims with former commanders and acquisition leaders: how to set guardrails around “good-enough,” where the new risks are and the impact on the industry.

Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke with General Phil Breedlove (Ret.), Lt. General Mike Groen (Ret) and Silicon Valley Entrepreneur and Stanford Professor Steve Blank, who has recently published a Department of War Program Executive Office directory to help companies better navigate the complicated system for selling to government.

Christian: What was your reaction to last week’s announcement that we heard from the secretary?

General Philip M. Breedlove

Gen. Breedlove retired as the Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, SHAPE, Belgium and Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany.  He also served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff.

General Breedlove: There are things that I really am looking forward to, and there are some things that are a bit worrisome, the way they were rolled out. But you never really know what's going to happen until you start seeing it in action and the changes to the rules for how we do our acquisition.

But make no mistake, our acquisition system to date is moribund. It's horrible. We laugh now about this “Valley of Death” between when something is created in the laboratory and when it gets to the field, six, seven, eight years or more sometimes. And people who are at war and doing this very differently, they're doing it in weeks, sometimes days, but not years. So we definitely have to change.

Part of the reason our acquisition system is so slow is because in our past, maybe even decades and decades ago, people took advantage of the system and they made money in a bad or almost illegal way. And so lawmakers do what lawmakers do, and technocrats and bureaucrats do what they do, and they created layers and layers of oversight to try to protect against some of those bad acts that happened decades ago. And the result is an acquisition system that is completely unresponsive to the needs of the warfighter. And I'm glad that we're starting to change it.

Lt. Gen. Michael Groen (US Marine Corps, Ret.)

Lt. Gen. Groen served over 36 years in the U.S. military, culminating his career as the senior executive for AI in the Department.  Groen also served in the National Security Agency overseeing Computer Network Operations, and as the Director of Joint Staff Intelligence, working closely with the Chairman and Senior Leaders across the Department.

Lt. Gen. Groen: My immediate reaction, like everybody else, when somebody uses the word acquisition, you kind of cringe a little bit. And immediately you get the vent of, it takes too long, it's too expensive, the processes don't work, the people in the processes don't know what they're doing, the long litany of usual complaints. And most of them are actually true. What we have currently, I would articulate, is an unaccountable bureaucracy. It's a professional bureaucracy. They know the process. They build the process. They work the process. But the process doesn't necessarily meet our real war fighting objectives. And I think that is probably the most important thing here.

We'll talk about drones and technology and all these other things, but I think at its core, you actually do have to have a process for this. And just getting the credit cards out and buying stuff at Best Buy doesn't work either, right? So, I think it's a requirement for us. You can't just say, well, we're just gonna blow up all the rules and let people do whatever they want. Because as soon as you do that, you're gonna realize that if we didn't have a system, we wouldn't be able to do all these other things. How do you get to integration? How do you get to common standards? How do you get to the things that actually make weapon systems work effectively and with the caliber of ammunition that they use and the system that produces that and all of the other components? So it's easy, and I've done it probably more than anybody else, to just rant about the acquisition process.

But if you didn't have an acquisition process, you would need to invent one. So, our challenge really today is, okay, the one we have for a lot of reasons is not going to be the one that we will need tomorrow. It does okay on band-aids and making munitions for today. But it is certainly not a kind of process that enables war fighting flow. So I think we are very much at a transformation point, not just in the fact that the way we want to do acquisition must change, but more importantly, the way we do everything, the way we fight must change. And so naturally we have really an incredible opportunity. Let's build the system that enables the kind of fast moving, rapid innovation that we will want on the battlefield: AI driven, data driven. We know what the future looks like. Let's actually build to that and not let unaccountable bureaucracies get in the way.

Steve Blank

Steve Blank is an adjunct professor at Stanford and co-founder of the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. His book, The Four Steps to the Epiphany is credited with launching the Lean Startup movement. He created the curriculum for the National Science Foundation Innovation Corps. At Stanford, he co-created the Department of Defense Hacking for Defense and Department of State Hacking for Diplomacy curriculums. He is co-author of The Startup Owner's Manual.

Blank: It was mind blowing - not because anything the Secretary said was new; they are things that people who are interested in acquisition reform have been asking for the last 10 years. But it was put in a single package and was clearly done by the infusion of people who have actually run large businesses and were used to all the language of organizations that already know how to deliver with speed and urgency.

The part that didn't get said is essentially the Department of War wants to adopt startup innovation techniques of lean iteration, pivots, incremental releases, good enough delivery, and that gets you what the Secretary asked for, which was speed of delivery. But all those are things that we lived with in Silicon Valley for the last 50 years, and it wasn't until we had people who worked outside of buildings with no windows inside the Pentagon to understand that those techniques could actually be applied. And it required blowing up the existing system. And they did that spectacularly well. Very few holes in those proposals.

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Christian: A central piece of the plan as it was explained on Friday is the idea of eliminating the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, which has long been criticized for some of the slow processes and the overly bureaucratic results that we have. The new approach seeks to centralize procurement and funding under the DOD senior leadership. Are you comfortable that this is the right approach?

General Breedlove: So this is one of those, like I opened up with, some good, some bad. There are elements of JCIDS that I think we should hold on to. We shouldn't throw the whole thing out with the bath water. But there are a lot of elements of JCIDS that we need to get rid of.

Much like the rules we just talked about that were created because of people and bad acts for acquisition, the same sort of thing has happened in the process of moving an idea from the lab to the field in that now there are layers and layers of people who can hold up the process or say no. And when they do that, it adds time, schedule delays, more testing, and much more money to the program. And these people bear zero responsibility for their actions. The people that end up getting blamed for the delays and increased costs are the services or the primes. And the people that have this authority now but hold no responsibility for what they do, we've got to get rid of them. We have to ensure that people who have decision authority are held accountable for what they do, to the point of maybe even not charging this off to primes or to the folks who are developing these things. If someone else is out there slowing things down and they don't have to worry about it because they're not accountable to it, we're not in a good place.

Lt. Gen. Groen: One issue is there isn’t a cadre of professionals in DOD leadership that will be able to take this mission on full time. If you consider a broad sweep of what we build and acquire and how we do that, how we innovate, they will just run out of hours in the day and minds to engage in order to build a replacement for what we have today.

The impulse to change the way we do things is the right impulse. Our impulse to be disciplined about the way we go about things, that's also correct. So it's not enough to say “let’s blow it all up, we don't need any rules”. We actually do need rules. Regulation actually is an enabler. It helps you flow. It lets you know how things can be done. That's a really powerful thing.

The problem is with humans involved, there is always a tendency to distort a process through petty bureaucracies, tribalism, ignorance and bad temper. It is really important for leaders to actually lead in this space and create accountability for the people that are actually working. What we have today is a derivative of it. We don't need too many history lessons here, but this is like General Motors in the 1960s, where we started to really do modern industrial design at scale. So if you understand where we’ve come from, you can see how important things like industrial processes and quality checks.

In a digital environment, a transformational environment that is driven by artificial intelligence and data availability, all the notes change. The music changes. And you still need a process for things like money so you can pay people to build things. But we're not building things on a conveyor belt anymore. We're building code. We're building code that changes by the hour. We're building code that builds its own code. This is where we are. So you can't do that in a completely undisciplined way, that says “have at it team and we'll see what we get at the end of the process”. What we’re doing here is too important.

Christian: Part of the new approach will involve increasing acquisition risk, to decrease operational risk with a focus on increased use of commercial solutions and of even fielding 85 % solutions. Where's the red line that you would want as a commander before fielding an 85% solution?

Gen. Breedlove: This is a concept which is extremely hard to criticize. But we have to be pretty serious here because you're saying increasing acquisition risk to decrease operational risk. Well, if the product isn't operational yet and we have increased the purchasing and acquisition risk, and in between that costs us the life of a soldier, sailor, airman, marine or guardian, we have messed it up. So the rules are there for a reason. I completely understand. I absolutely, 100% agree with the fact that we've got to start taking more risk, but we can't do that in a way that is reckless and puts the lives of our troops on the line.

And an example where I think this concept is working well is Ukraine. They get a new drone that is designed to get past a certain capability of the Russian defenses. And why should we do a two-year testing on that thing? If the testing is to fire it into Russia where it's not going to kill any friendlies and see what happens, let's fire it into Russia and get the testing done on the battlefield, where we're less concerned with what happens. So there are ways to shorten and to change the way that we do tests and other things on the acquisition side that gets us faster to the operational side. And if we can do that, again, without raising the risk to our troops, let's go for it. And we're seeing that done well by the Ukrainians, and to some degree by the Israelis.

Lt. Gen. Groen: The first thing that pops in my mind is- What does an 85 % solution look like? What is 85% of a truck? What is 85% of a battleship or a carrier? Pick your system. If you're just doing software, you can do a lot of things in software, but still, software that's 15 % buggy and doesn't work, because you've chosen 85%, that's almost like going right back to the industrial age process flow for code. And I think that the real magic here at its core is transforming the way we do our war fighting. We need new thinking about how to integrate capabilities and new thinking about how to build artificial intelligence modalities and then the systems.

Warfare is changing under our feet right now. Ukraine and drones, I accept that example, but it's so much more than that. We need a complete transformation in the way we understand the enemy, the way we understand our mission, the way we can use autonomy to integrate with humans, the way that we can build robotics, the way that we can now start what I like to call putting the mind of a commander on a pedestal by taking all the data environment and revealing that to a commander and everybody else who is working with the commander so that you have common situational awareness.

The opportunity here is enormous to transform our war fighting to the same degree we're transforming our industries. And you see the transformation every day when you drive through DC or Austin or San Francisco. Transformation is real and it's driving our economy today. What we haven't done is purposefully mapped out how we're going to drive our war fighting capability through this technology. And this is so important because we have to have a plan for how we build operational workflows. Where do we build those? Who builds those? And so I think moving from monitoring a process of manufacturing to really considering war fighting as the core element that the technology springs from.

Christian: Obviously the Pentagon procurement system that we have today is a product of decades of bureaucracy and rules. Are you hopeful that you're going to be able to see the kind of change in the rapid timeline that they've laid forth here?

Blank: Number one, this is a pretty extensive reorganization. Right now the Department of War is siloed between requirements and system centers for testing and prototyping and acquisition, which was the acquisition with a small A with the PEOs and program managers, and then it went to contracts and then it went to sustainment, et cetera. Those were silos. Now we're putting it all underneath a single portfolio acquisition executive. So, instead of making their offices 10,000 people, it's actually a matrix organization, much like a combatant command is. Most of those people will stay in their existing orgs but now be tasked to work on specific portfolios. And instead, the portfolios will no longer be arranged by weapon system. They're going to be arranged, for example, by war fighting concepts or technology concepts, et cetera.

That said, boy, try moving an elephant and making it dance. And at the same time, they recognized - this was one of the genius parts - people won't just get a memo and know what to do. Historically, they've depended on the Defense Acquisition University, which taught them, contracting officers and the rest, how to work with the 5,000 pages of the DFAR and FAR, Federal Acquisition, Defense Acquisition Regulations. One of the unnoticed things was they basically told the Defense Acquisition University, stop teaching that today. You now need to teach people this new methodology. That's not going to happen by telepathy. First of all, we need to train the trainers, then we need to train all the people who've grown up in their career following the paperwork.

So, I predict six months or a year of chaos and confusion. And probably, there's always in a large scale reorganization saboteurs who are angry that their cheese has been moved or worse, their authority has been diminished or the head count went somewhere else. This is going to be no different except maybe at a bigger scale.

In the end, if we pull this off, and I'll explain the only possible reason not to do this, the country will be much better for it. The other obstacle will be if you're on the board of directors and the exec staff of a prime, you're going to go through the 12 stages of denial and grief and whatever because I don't know how many times both Feinberg and Hegseth made it clear that the primes weren't delivering and they weren't investing in the things the country needed and they got used to the system and we were kind of mutually dependent on a broken system - and that's over. Well, you're not going to let your stockholders say you just went home and packed up. Obviously, it's pretty clear that appealing to the Pentagon isn't going to work, but Congress is “coin operated”. This is now going to be a race of lobbying cash from the primes versus lobbying cash for the first time from private equity and venture capital. So it's going to be, who has the biggest pile of cash to influence Congress and the executive branch to keep these rules in place or modify them?

Remember what a disaster this is if you're an existing large company selling to the DOD. It says number one, we're going to buy commercial off the shelf. Number two, we're going to buy commercial off the shelf and then modify it. If and only if either one and two work, we do some bespoke contracting with the existing organization. It's never happened before. Pretty clear, pretty direct. So, the easy thing would be for primes to change their business model. But my prediction is they're going to double and triple down the amount of lobbying and dollars spent.

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Christian: Secretary Hegseth also had some words of warning to the major U.S. defense contractors, the primes, to speed up weapons development and production, invest their own capital to increase capacity, or risk becoming obsolete. This is a relatively complicated issue for these companies. What are your thoughts on this?

General Breedlove: I think that our senior leaders, maybe to include the Secretary of War and others, have sort of allowed the verbiage around this topic to get a little loosey goosey. What happened in the past was that some primes used money out of existing contracts to create excess capacity that then saved them money the next time they had to build new equipment. And our government, Congress and others got tired of that and wrote laws that limit how much money you can spend out of existing contracts to create excess capacity. And the way I understand the laws, most of them are zero. If we pay you to build 100 B-21s and you create a line that could do 120, you're going to jail or you're going to court. And so I think that there's some imprecise language running around and we need to give some of this time to sort out when the dust settles to understand what they're really asking of the primes, because they are limited on one side, fiducially and fiscally, and they're limited on the other side by laws and sometimes regulations that have been created by the regulatory agencies to correct past [behaviors].

I applaud the ideas and the initiative that the Secretary laid out. But to the defense of the primes, they're going to need some regulatory or legal relief to be able to do most of the things being talked about under the new plan. They just can't snap their fingers and say, OK, we're going to do this because then they'll end up in court.

Christian: It's not going to be an overnight process to reboot the Pentagon's procurement system. The Department of Defense is the largest single organization within the US Government. The amount of products and services that flow through that system is enormous. You've clearly laid out the tremendous opportunity that exists to rebuild the system. What are you most worried about? What's the biggest risk that can impede progress as the Pentagon starts this journey?

Lt. Gen. Groen: Tribalism. Tribalism will sink us. We are so horrifically tribal that we can't think like an extended entity. We can't think like a singular organism that is really effective through data and our systems flowing together. Tribalism kills that. And I see it every day. I'm not in the Pentagon every day anymore, but I see it: the tribalism among services, the tribalism among components of services and the tribalism within the department. And all of that tribalism is an afterglow of our industrial might in the 1960s. Now is the time for thinkers that are wearing a uniform, it's not about buying stuff without asking. It's about thinking through the flow that you want to achieve and then building the capabilities that you need to do that. It's a mindset thing, but that’s all about what transformation is. The form changes. And so when we transform, we transform ourselves into this place where we leave that tribalism behind because we have integrated effectiveness.

Working with broad autonomy is gonna help us think that way. I think that there's a broader awareness of what the technology is able to do and how it will facilitate. We just have to be careful to make sure that that's not the end state. Technology is not the end state. It's humans, war fighters who are winning on the battlefield because they understand and they can make the right calls. That's what we're after. And so all of the stuff about acquisition and the rules and why people don't follow the rules and why is it so tribal that we can't get anything to be, I think all of that merits some dynamite, but it also merits some thinking about how do we better integrate our thinking and flows and how do we do that on the battlefield?

Christian: How much of a risk is the next administration coming in and potentially changing everything? And then in particular, if you're one of those big primes, are you baking that into your long-term planning that this might shift in a measurable way in the future? Or do you think these changes are going to be something that is so overwhelmingly positive that future administrations have to stick with it?

Blank: Well, if you were asking me this three years ago, I would have said, well, you should get all this done now because it's going to be flipped back in three years. What's changed now is the amount of capital available for startups, scale-ups, and private equity firms that can match or overpower the lobbying efforts of the primes. So as I said, both the executive branch and Congress are coin operated, even more so now than ever. And for the first time ever, the insurgents have as much or more coin than the incumbents. That's what's going to change this game.

So yes, of course, a Democratic administration or another Republican one might have a different opinion. But in this case, we're talking about piles of money flooding the streets in Washington to try to change the game. Think about who are now sitting in the cabinet. And other places have commercial experience for the first time ever at scale, inside the executive branch for sure and inside the Department of War which changes the nature of the conversation and as we're seeing the types of things they're recommending.

Again, it wasn't that people didn't recognize this before. It was kind of hard to explain this to people who had never run a business or who have been career successful. I've said for years, we had world class organizations, world class people for a world that no longer existed. And finally, we have people who understand what that world should be like because they've been operating in it. Secretary Feinberg has been writing checks of tens of billions of dollars- buying an aircraft carrier, okay, he’s written those kinds of checks before. Tell me who else ever had that position.

And again, it's not that the DOW should run like a corporation or startup, but having that experience sets a bar for what you know is possible for doing extraordinary things. It's what this country knew how to do in World War II and during the Cold War, and we just kind of lost it when Robert McNamara, an ex-chief financial officer of Ford, put in the first version of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE) in 1962. We've been operating on that system for 63 years, or some variance of it. Basically, he imposed a chief financial officer's kind of strategy on budgeting and planning, which made sense at the time. It stopped making sense about 15 years ago, but no one inside the building knew what to do differently. That's changed.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:46 +0100 FirstHandNews
Understanding the U.S. Military Mobilization in the Caribbean https://belimedia.com.ng/understanding-the-us-military-mobilization-in-the-caribbean https://belimedia.com.ng/understanding-the-us-military-mobilization-in-the-caribbean

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — The armada the U.S. has assembled in the Caribbean is more formidable than anything the region has seen in decades. What is going on? The administration says it is targeting drug trafficking through the Caribbean. Is that it? Is that really all we are doing? Trump administration officials insist that it is but also acknowledges that strikes on land targets may be necessary to achieve the administration’s goals. Skeptics suggest that regime change in Venezuela is part of the administration’s plan? Is it?

Early in 2025, shortly after taking office, the Trump administration designated several drug cartels as terrorist organizations. This signaled the administration’s intention to escalate U.S. efforts to fight trafficking beyond the usual efforts of the Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration and Border Patrol. It also presaged the use of the military.

Combating narco-trafficking remains the administration’s declared purpose. Implicitly, the decision to escalate U.S. efforts is based on several key points. First, drug abuse in the United States remains at epidemic levels despite decades of efforts to control it. Second, previous efforts to suppress drug smuggling into the U.S. have not been successful. Third, because the cartels smuggling drugs into the U.S. are not merely drug traffickers but large terrorist organizations, they need to be confronted as forcefully as terrorist groups elsewhere. This, effectively, means employing military force.

The administration contends that Venezuela is the country from which much of the illicit boat and air traffic carrying cocaine emanates and that Venezuela’s long-time strong man is really the head of a cartel and “a fugitive from American justice.” On August 7, the administration announced a 50-million-dollar bounty on Venezuela’s long-time strong man, Nicolas Maduro. It is this view of the Venezuelan regime and its leader, in combination with the size and capabilities of the deployed U.S. military in the Caribbean, that suggests the administration’s goals are more ambitious than just striking alleged traffickers on the high seas.

The question then is, how would the Trump administration define regime change? New leadership or something more extensive? If regime change is a goal, how does the administration hope to achieve that result? Would a combination of intimidation, enhanced economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure from the world’s democratic community convince Maduro to abandon power? Can the Venezuelan military, which in 2002 temporarily removed Maduro’s mentor, Hugo Chavez, be persuaded to act once again? Or is the U.S. administration contemplating military strikes inside of Venezuela? If so, how extensively? Would a targeted attack of regime leadership result in regime change or would the U.S. need to hit various elements of the military plus drug labs? The scope of any U.S. kinetic actions would likely affect the way Venezuelans – who overwhelmingly rejected Maduro in last year’s presidential election, react. It would also affect how the region and the rest of the world regard the U.S. campaign.

If the U.S. were able to oust Maduro what would follow? There is a legitimate government in waiting. Former diplomat Edmundo Gonzalez won last year’s presidential election by a huge margin despite regime efforts to sabotage the democratic opposition. Would anything short of the installation of the democratic opposition be considered an acceptable outcome to Venezuelans or the United States? Would a government of national unity which included some of the Venezuelan dictator’s base and elements of the military be acceptable to the democratic opposition? To the U.S? The Venezuelan military has been deeply compromised by the Maduro regime’s criminal activity and is believed to be complicit at the highest levels in drug trafficking. The Cartel de los Soles is thought to include many high-ranking military personnel. Would the U.S.be prepared to put troops on the ground to prevent criminal elements of the Venezuelan military from regrouping even if current regime leadership were forced out?

Finally, what effect will current U.S. operations in the Caribbean have on U.S. relations with the rest of Western Hemisphere especially if U.S. military strikes Venezuela directly? What effect have U.S. operations already had? The answers to these questions are not all obvious.

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The Trump team has never mentioned regime change as a campaign goal. The size and nature of the deployed U.S. forces, however, make speculation on the U.S. administration’s real intentions inevitable. The number of ships, aircraft, sailors and marines appeared to be substantially greater than required to combat narcotrafficking through the Caribbean and eastern pacific even before the ordered deployment of the U.S.’s most advanced aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R Ford. The messaging from Washington, moreover, focuses squarely on the Venezuelan regime.

What we have been hearing from Washington about operations in the Caribbean is a logical extension of steps taken by the Trump administration prior to the start of current operations. While President Obama first called Venezuela a threat to national security in 2015, it was only earlier this year that the U.S. designated the cartels as terrorist organizations. The designation of the cartels as terrorists was a necessary step to operationalize the shift from a law enforcement effort to a military one.

The new militarized U.S. strategy in the Caribbean has had an effect. Drug trafficking by sea is apparently way down. That said, this new strategy has not diminished trafficking by land nor reduced the flow of deadly fentanyl into the country. It has, on the other hand, generated concern in some countries about the return of American gunboat diplomacy. Domestically, the president’s new approach resonates well in some quarters but has incensed many Democrats in the U.S. Congress and even worried some Republicans. British concern about the legality of the U.S. strikes on the high seas is now so acute that the United Kingdom has ended intelligence sharing on Venezuela. The Trump administration has, however, given no indication that either international concern or congressional criticism will precipitate a change in policy.

President Trump’s change of the U.S strategy for fighting the cartels and maybe for achieving regime change in Venezuela has important implications for U.S. relations with its allies everywhere but especially within the region. The Trump administration has clearly made the Western Hemisphere a national security priority but there are many other vitally important arenas in which U.S. interests are affected by developments in this hemisphere – both positively and negatively.

Accordingly, the administration’s agenda in Latin America must include more than just winning the drug fight and controlling our Southern border. More than 40% of all U.S. manufacturing goods are sold into the Western Hemisphere and the U.S. has a positive trade balance with many countries in the region, including Brazil, Chile, Peru, Panama and others. Millions of American jobs depend on trade with the region. Energy production in the region is also significant; Canada is our largest foreign supplier but there are other key players including Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Trinity and Tobago and, more recently, Guyana. Guyana’s oil production, in fact, is exploding. The country’s GDP grew by over 25% in 2023 and by more than 30% in 2024. On the other hand, China’s influence continues to surge and China is now the largest trading partner for South America in the aggregate. The U.S. clearly needs to do what it can to strengthen the value proposition for the countries of Central and South American to see the U.S. as their commercial partner of choice.

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It is, at this point, not clear what the Trump administration’s end game is in the Caribbean. What is clear is that the U.S. cannot ignore other issues around the region or other views on how challenges should be met. Neither should we naively assume that success in suppressing the trafficking of cocaine out of South America is assured even temporarily, however many go-fast boats the U.S. military sinks. Transit by land, which the Trump administration has indicated it may take on next, is still robust. Demand for illegal drugs is still strong in the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. has recently made progress in engaging Mexico, especially on combating the Mexican cartels, but how effective joint efforts will be remains to be seen. Relations with Colombia, the source of most of the world’s cocaine, on the other hand, have deteriorated dramatically. Colombian President Gustavo Petro has characterized U.S. attacks on the drug boats as atrocities, called President Trump a criminal and encouraged American military personnel to defy his orders. The U.S., for its part, has decertified Colombia for failing to cooperate fully with U.S. counternarcotics efforts and cancelled Petro’s visa.

The U.S. still has partners in Latin America, especially trade partners, but there is also, always, concern over U.S. unilateralism. Moreover, President Trump’s announcement that he has authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to become active in Venezuela inevitably recalls for some an earlier and darker time in U.S. relations with Latin America. That said, criticism of U.S. operations in the region has been surprisingly muted – and some countries have been explicitly supportive.

Still, many in the region have been left wondering where multilateral cooperation, diplomacy, democracy support and human rights, pillars of U.S.-Latin American policy since at least the 1980s, fit in America’s new more muscular policy toward the region. At the same time, most of the region agrees that the cartels are a grievous problem, and recognize that Venezuela is a dictatorship and that it has become an epicenter for a great deal of the most pernicious activity in the region. I expect they are dubious about the likelihood of the U.S. eradicating all drug trafficking from South America because so much of the trafficking is by land. They are also unconvinced that combatting drug trafficking per se is the U.S.’s only goal. They do not wish to see a war in either South or Central America but they are also profoundly tired of living with the consequences of the growing and corrosive power of the cartels.

The Trump administration’s campaign to date has had some success and may have put Russia, China and Iran – Venezuela’s extra-regional allies -- on notice that the U.S. has decided to counter malign activity and actors in the region forcefully. But this is a high stakes game for the U.S. A U.S. escalation to ground operations could catalyze world-wide criticism of the U.S. Success with targeted strikes is not assured. At present, we are left to wrestle with the question of whether the campaign to date is a preamble to even more ambitious operations. And, can what has been accomplished to date be sustained at a time when coca cultivation in source countries like Peru and Colombia is increasing and the head of a cartel – which is how the administration has characterized Maduro – remains in control of the government of Venezuela?

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:46 +0100 FirstHandNews
Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory https://belimedia.com.ng/snatching-defeat-from-the-jaws-of-victory https://belimedia.com.ng/snatching-defeat-from-the-jaws-of-victory EXPERT OPINION – The recently leaked 28-point peace plan to end the war in Ukraine is nothing short of an appeasement that satisfies the maximalist demands of the aggressor in the conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin. This is nothing short of the side on the verge of victory (eg, the free world) conceding to the side on the verge of defeat (Putin, the leader of the anti-west coalition). Sadly, it comes at a time when the situation on the battlefield is more or less a draw, both sides are effectively attacking energy infrastructure, and Russia’s economy is moving toward recession.

According to Russian data, third Quarter GDP growth in Russia was 0.6%. The expectation is that Q4 data will show the beginning of a recession. Sberbank has just decided to let 20% of their workforce go. Russia has for the first time, begun to sell gold reserves, presumably to make up for lost revenue from the recently imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil. Russia’s wartime transition to a command economy is not sustainable with a declining workforce sapped by the loss of young men sacrificed in Ukraine and those who have voted with their feet by leaving Putin’s kleptocracy.

The key points of the 28-point plan amount to nothing less than surrender by Ukraine and make in vain the sacrifices made by their valiant soldiers and citizens in their three plus years of war of full-scale war since Russia’s deadly invasion.

The agreement will be remembered in history with the same ignominy of the Munich Agreement of 1938 and will have the same consequence of setting the stage for a larger war to come.

Perhaps most egregious in the terms of the draft agreement is the re-establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the establishment of Russian as the official language. This indignity on top of the kidnapping of hundreds - if not thousands - of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced conscription into the Russian army of men from Russian occupied territory. Then, of course, there is the massacre of innocent citizens by Russian soldiers in places like Bucha, all of which will go unaccounted for under the draft agreement. No judgement at Nuremberg for Russian war criminals.

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The plan U.S. officials have negotiated is nothing more than cultural genocide against the people of Ukraine. That the U.S. would be part of an agreement that almost certainly would result in the arrest, deportation and incarceration of a generation of brave Ukrainians who have bravely resisted Putin’s aggression is simply unthinkable.

Mr. Trump, every member of your national security team should be required to watch episode nine of the brilliant HBO series Band of Brothers. The episode’s title is “Why We Fight” and the reasons for standing up to autocracy and evil portrayed in that episode are perfectly applicable to the situation today with the free world standing strong against the aggression of a malevolent dictator.

The Trump Administration’s desire to end the violence in Ukraine is commendable, but not at the price of setting the stage for the next war by giving victory to the aggressor. The men who reportedly negotiated the key points of the agreement have no experience dealing with Russia or Russians of the KGB ilk. The promises of “peace” offered by the Russian side are a chimera at best. Putin and the gang of thieves in his government know perfectly well how to manipulate representatives of the character of Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s real estate specialist now in charge of negotiating with Russia over Ukraine. Perhaps those negotiators are working with the idea of “Commander’s intent” that the President believes an agreement can be reached and counted upon with a counter-party like Putin. This is a serious misjudgment with serious consequences.

Those who have studied Putin for decades, understand clearly that he wants nothing but the destruction of the United States, our system of government and the set of ideals for which we stand. This is core to his beliefs. Putin and his security services will do everything they can to undermine the United States. One should not be surprised if the Russian services do not use every opportunity in the context of the Epstein revelations to attack every angle of the political spectrum in the U.S. that they can, including President Trump.

President Trump is now facing the most significant foreign and national security moment of his presidency. It appears the representatives he has chosen to negotiate with the Russian side have left him in a position to be remembered forever in history as the Chamberlain of the 21st century. This will be his legacy and sadly, it will be the legacy of the country that was once the pillar of strength of the free world. For shame.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Human Algorithm: Why Disinformation Outruns Truth and What It Means for Our Future https://belimedia.com.ng/the-human-algorithm-why-disinformation-outruns-truth-and-what-it-means-for-our-future https://belimedia.com.ng/the-human-algorithm-why-disinformation-outruns-truth-and-what-it-means-for-our-future EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In recent years, the national conversation about disinformation has often focused on bot networks, foreign operatives, and algorithmic manipulation at industrial scale. Those concerns are valid, and I spent years inside CIA studying them with a level of urgency that matched the stakes. But an equally important story is playing out at the human level. It’s a story that requires us to look more closely at how our own instincts, emotions, and digital habits shape the spread of information.

This story reveals something both sobering and empowering: falsehood moves faster than truth not merely because of the technologies that transmit it, but because of the psychology that receives it. That insight is no longer just the intuition of intelligence officers or behavioral scientists. It is backed by hard data.

In 2018, MIT researchers Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral published a groundbreaking study in Science titled The Spread of True and False News Online. It remains one of the most comprehensive analyses ever conducted on how information travels across social platforms.

The team examined more than 126,000 stories shared by 3 million people over a ten-year period. Their findings were striking. False news traveled farther, faster, and more deeply than true news. In many cases, falsehood reached its first 1,500 viewers six times faster than factual reporting. The most viral false stories routinely reached between 1,000 and 100,000 people, whereas true stories rarely exceeded a thousand.

One of the most important revelations was that humans, not bots, drove the difference. People were more likely to share false news because the content felt fresh, surprising, emotionally charged, or identity-affirming in ways that factual news often does not. That human tendency is becoming a national security concern.

For years, psychologists have studied how novelty, emotion, and identity shape what we pay attention to and what we choose to share. The MIT researchers echoed this in their work, but a broader body of research across behavioral science reinforces the point.

People gravitate toward what feels unexpected. Novel information captures our attention more effectively than familiar facts, which means sensational or fabricated claims often win the first click.

Emotion adds a powerful accelerant. A 2017 study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences showed that messages evoking strong moral outrage travel through social networks more rapidly than neutral content. Fear, disgust, anger, and shock create a sense of urgency and a feeling that something must be shared quickly.

And identity plays a subtle, but significant role. Sharing something provocative can signal that we are well informed, particularly vigilant, or aligned with our community’s worldview. This makes falsehoods that flatter identity or affirm preexisting fears particularly powerful.

Taken together, these forces form what some have called the “human algorithm,” meaning a set of cognitive patterns that adversaries have learned to exploit with increasing sophistication.

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During my years leading digital innovation at CIA, we saw adversaries expand their strategy beyond penetrating networks to manipulating the people on those networks. They studied our attention patterns as closely as they once studied our perimeter defenses.

Foreign intelligence services and digital influence operators learned to seed narratives that evoke outrage, stoke division, or create the perception of insider knowledge. They understood that emotion could outpace verification, and that speed alone could make a falsehood feel believable through sheer familiarity.

In the current landscape, AI makes all of this easier and faster. Deepfake video, synthetic personas, and automated content generation allow small teams to produce large volumes of emotionally charged material at unprecedented scale. Recent assessments from Microsoft’s 2025 Digital Defense Report document how adversarial state actors (including China, Russia, and Iran) now rely heavily on AI-assisted influence operations designed to deepen polarization, erode trust, and destabilize public confidence in the U.S.

This tactic does not require the audience to believe a false story. Often, it simply aims to leave them unsure of what truth looks like. And that uncertainty itself is a strategic vulnerability.

If misguided emotions can accelerate falsehood, then a thoughtful and well-organized response can help ensure factual information arrives with greater clarity and speed.

One approach involves increasing what communication researchers sometimes call truth velocity, the act of getting accurate information into public circulation quickly, through trusted voices, and with language that resonates rather than lectures. This does not mean replicating the manipulative emotional triggers that fuel disinformation. It means delivering truth in ways that feel human, timely, and relevant.

Another approach involves small, practical interventions that reduce the impulse to share dubious content without thinking. Research by Gordon Pennycook and David Rand has shown that brief accuracy prompts (small moments that ask users to consider whether a headline seems true) meaningfully reduce the spread of false content. Similarly, cognitive scientist Stephan Lewandowsky has demonstrated the value of clear context, careful labeling, and straightforward corrections to counter the powerful pull of emotionally charged misinformation.

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Organizations can also help their teams understand how cognitive blind spots influence their perceptions. When people know how novelty, emotion, and identity shape their reactions, they become less susceptible to stories crafted to exploit those instincts. And when leaders encourage a culture of thoughtful engagement where colleagues pause before sharing, investigate the source, and notice when a story seems designed to provoke, it creates a ripple effect of more sound judgment.

In an environment where information moves at speed, even a brief moment of reflection can slow the spread of a damaging narrative.

A core part of this challenge involves reclaiming the mental space where discernment happens, what I refer to as Mind Sovereignty™. This concept is rooted in a simple practice: notice when a piece of information is trying to provoke an emotional reaction, and give yourself a moment to evaluate it instead.

Mind Sovereignty™ is not about retreating from the world or becoming disengaged. It is about navigating a noisy information ecosystem with clarity and steadiness, even when that ecosystem is designed to pull us off balance. It is about protecting our ability to think clearly before emotion rushes ahead of evidence.

This inner steadiness, in some ways, becomes a public good. It strengthens not just individuals, but the communities, organizations, and democratic systems they inhabit.

In the intelligence world, I always thought that truth was resilient, but it cannot defend itself. It relies on leaders, communicators, technologists, and more broadly, all of us, who choose to treat information with care and intention. Falsehood may enjoy the advantage of speed, but truth gains power through the quality of the minds that carry it.

As we develop new technologies and confront new threats, one question matters more than ever: how do we strengthen the human algorithm so that truth has a fighting chance?

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
Do Oil Sanctions Still Work? https://belimedia.com.ng/do-oil-sanctions-still-work https://belimedia.com.ng/do-oil-sanctions-still-work

DEEP DIVE — On October 22, 2025, in his boldest move yet to force Vladimir Putin back to the negotiating table, President Trump unleashed sweeping U.S. blocking sanctions on Russia’s energy giants — state-controlled Rosneft and privately held Lukoil, the two companies that pump nearly half of Moscow’s crude exports and bankroll the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine.

These aren’t slap-on-the-wrist measures. The designations freeze every asset these firms have in the U.S., ban American companies and citizens from any dealings with them, and put the world’s banks, refiners, and traders on notice: keep helping Rosneft or Lukoil, and you could be next under secondary sanctions.

Putin fired back quickly, branding the move an “unfriendly act” and vowing Russia “won’t bend,” but even he admitted “some losses are expected” as the Kremlin scrambles to shield its oil cash cow.

Markets didn’t wait for the dust to settle: Brent crude rocketed nearly 6 percent in a single day, hitting around $66 a barrel, as traders priced in the chaos. All eyes instantly shifted to the mega-buyers, India and China: would they defy Washington and keep discounted Russian oil flowing?

A month later, the squeeze is tightening: Russian Urals crude now trades at a painful $20 discount to Brent, Indian and some Chinese buyers have hit pause, and Moscow is desperately rerouting through shadowy intermediaries. With the U.S. wind-down window slamming shut on November 21, the big question looms larger than ever.

The sanctions hammer has landed hard — but will it finally cripple Putin’s war machine, or force Russia to get sneakier? And under what conditions do these measures actually bite?

“If you really work on sanctions and make them effective and implement them with rigor and offer a path out, they can be pretty effective. See Iran, South Africa, Libya,” Richard Nephew, a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and a former U.S. sanctions official who served as the lead sanctions expert in the Obama administration’s Iran nuclear negotiations, tells The Cipher Brief. “If you do them as a way of just getting the press or activists to leave you alone, then they don’t work.”

The Theory of Oil Sanctions: Coercion via Crude

At its core, the rationale for oil sanctions is compelling and straightforward: many authoritarian regimes depend heavily on oil exports for a large share of their state revenue. By targeting the oil sector — blocking key companies, choking off trade, and denying access to Western finance — the goal is to slash those export earnings, intensify economic pain, erode the regime’s ability to fund wars or strategic ambitions, and ultimately force a behavioral change.

This logic has long been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy toward oil-rich adversaries like Iran, Venezuela, and now Russia, precisely because petroleum is both a strategic lifeline and a uniquely vulnerable pressure point. Over the past two decades, the overall use of economic sanctions has exploded, with energy sanctions standing out for their rare ability to deliver simultaneous economic and military leverage.

Yet experts caution that Washington often conflates pain with success.

“The U.S. often thinks about sanctions effectiveness the wrong way,” Rosemary Kelanic, Director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, tells The Cipher Brief. “Effectiveness should be measured in terms of whether sanctions could achieve the desired policy outcomes, not just whether they impose costs.”

For Moscow, she stresses, the stakes are existential.

“Historically speaking, sanctions sometimes convince countries to give in on issues of minor importance, but they practically never compel countries to abandon vital national interests,” Kelanic continued. “For Russia, Ukraine is important enough to fight a long, slogging war over.”

In theory, when tightly enforced and backed by genuine international coordination, these measures can severely restrict foreign-exchange inflows, impose steep costs on rerouting exports, strain domestic budgets, curb military spending, and shift a regime’s calculus. In practice, however, the historical record reveals that outright success is elusive — evasion, adaptation, and incomplete coalitions often blunt the blow.

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Why the Record Is Mixed

Even the toughest oil sanctions can falter without ironclad enforcement. Announcing penalties is easy; making them bite requires global banks, refiners, shippers, and buyers to comply. If Rosneft or Lukoil can still sell through opaque brokers, shadow tankers, or non-dollar deals, much of the intended pain evaporates. Treasury recognized this by explicitly threatening secondary sanctions against any foreign entity that continues to deal with the two giants.

Nephew says that the early signs of real pressure will be visible on shipping patterns.

“The biggest macro indicator will be whether we see prices going up, the semi-glut of oil being tapped, and oil coming off of the water,” he observed. “On a more micro level, if we see that there are additional sanctions being imposed on Russian cut-outs, if we’re seeing ports continuing to deny ships with oil, if we’re seeing indications of pipelines no longer carrying this oil into China. Those are the sorts of things that will be indicative of exports drying up.”

Russia, for one, has proven adept at evasion. After earlier measures, it built a vast “shadow fleet” of aging, untraceable tankers and rerouted most exports to Asia. A recent European Council on Foreign Relations report warns that unless Europe fully aligns — closing asset-divestment loopholes and mirroring U.S. measures — the squeeze will remain partial.

Global oil markets themselves have grown more resilient. The dollar’s once-dominant role has eroded; China, India, and others now buy discounted crude and settle in yuan or rupees. Iran’s exports collapsed under “maximum pressure,” then recovered to over 1.5 million b/d through similar workarounds. Russia has followed the same playbook, shifting nearly all seaborne volumes eastward since 2022.

Nephew points out that none of this is new.

“Smuggling has been a feature of sanctions forever,” he said, highlighting that alternative payment networks may look innovative. Still, countries have long relied on hawala-style systems to dodge banking restrictions. “What makes a difference is the commitment of governments to enforce sanctions and to pay costs to do so.”

Sanctions can also backfire. Disrupting supply often spikes global prices, partially offsetting the loss of volumes for the sanctioned producer. Brent jumped 5 to 6 percent the day Rosneft and Lukoil were hit, temporarily boosting Russia’s per-barrel revenue even as discounts widened.

Finally, pain tolerance matters. Oil and gas still fund roughly 25 to 30 percent of Russia’s federal budget, a heavy blow but not a fatal one. With once-huge reserves still significant, domestic repression to shift burdens to citizens, and eager buyers in Asia, Moscow can endure far longer than many Western policymakers expect. History shows that oil sanctions rarely force rapid capitulation; they inflict damage slowly and decisively only when the target is already economically fragile and internationally isolated. Russia, so far, is neither.

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Making Oil Sanctions Work

Experts emphasize that oil sanctions can be far more effective if the U.S. and its allies act as a unified bloc rather than going it alone. The recent sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil explicitly call on Europe and others to join by banning imports, seizing Russian companies’ assets, and closing loopholes that still allow some countries to buy discounted oil. Without this coordination, Russia reroutes its crude to willing buyers. Experts warn that half-measures create safe havens and sharply reduce the pain—true pressure demands everyone play by the same rules.

A second big fix is plugging the leaks in global shipping and finance. The new U.S. measures take a tougher line by directly threatening secondary sanctions against any bank, refiner, or broker that continues to deal with Rosneft or Lukoil. Better satellite tracking of ships and aggressive follow-through on those threats could choke off the underground routes that have kept Russian oil flowing despite years of sanctions.

Nephew argues that enforcement, not the sanctions themselves, was what made the Iran campaign effective. The BNP Paribas case, which carried massive penalties, showed banks that Washington meant business.

“We imposed really stringent sanctions that threatened a lot of people with ruin if they moved Iranian money,” Nephew recalled. “So long as the U.S. has an important economy, we’ll have some measure of economic power that can be used for sanctions power. We just won’t have as much ability to dictate terms; we’ll have to think about who to target and how. But, as for energy sanctions in general, so long as the world needs energy, denying it is going to carry weight.”

Kelanic also pointed out that the global oil system is more shock-absorbent than many assume.

“There’s plenty of oil that can cushion the market if any supply disruptions occur,” she explained.

That flexibility allows it to sustain pressure for longer without triggering global price spikes.

Third, sanctions work best when the goals are realistic and the timing is right. Asking Moscow to end the war overnight is unlikely to succeed; more achievable aims — like making new weapons harder to buy or keeping revenues low long-term — have a better shot, especially when paired with incentives, such as easing some restrictions for good behavior, and help for ordinary people caught in the crossfire. The global oil market has also changed dramatically: trades now happen in yuan or rupees through non-Western networks, so sanctions must constantly evolve to target those new pathways.

Oil Sanctions in Action: Three Big Examples Compared

The impact of oil sanctions depends heavily on the target’s strength, isolation, and resilience. Three recent cases show how different those outcomes can be.

Iran (2012–today): U.S.-led sanctions crushed Iran’s oil exports from 2.5 million barrels a day down to under 500,000 at their peak. It was excruciating and forced Tehran to the negotiating table for the 2016 nuclear deal. Yet once the pressure eased a bit, Iran bounced back; today it quietly ships 1.5 to 2 million barrels a day, mainly to China, using ghost tankers and creative payment tricks. Analysts underscore that sanctions can deliver massive short-term pain, but determined countries learn to live with them.

Venezuela (2019–today): Sanctions hammered the state oil company, PDVSA, and slashed exports, but Venezuela was already falling apart due to corruption, mismanagement, and hyperinflation. The regime lost a lot of cash yet made almost no real concessions — it just tightened its grip and kept surviving. Experts point out that if a country is already in free fall, additional pressure from sanctions doesn’t force significant political change.

Russia (2022–now, sharpened October 2025): Russia is different. It started with substantial cash reserves, a modern economy, and eager customers in China and India. The new direct sanctions on giants Rosneft and Lukoil are the toughest yet. Still, Russia has spent years building shadow tankers and Asian trade routes. Oil prices are down, and the discount on Russian crude is painful, but Moscow keeps exporting almost as much as before. Thus, when the target is big, rich, and has willing buyers outside the West, sanctions hurt but don’t quickly break the Kremlin.

A Tool Under Strain but Not Broken

Oil sanctions can hurt but they rarely force quick political surrender. Iran showed that sustained pressure can shift behavior, yet Russia and Venezuela demonstrate how resilient or already-collapsing regimes can absorb the pain and adapt. The new U.S. measures against Rosneft and Lukoil are the most challenging test yet of whether this tool can still bite in a more multipolar world.

Their impact ultimately hinges on strict enforcement, coordinated allies, closed loopholes, and whether the target is structurally vulnerable. Yet, if buyers keep finding workarounds and Russia keeps rerouting crude through shadow networks, the sanctions may sting without delivering major strategic change. The coming months will indicate whether oil sanctions remain a credible tool or drift into symbolism.

As Nephew puts it, “No tool works if it is applied halfheartedly, mildly or inconsistently.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
Information Warfare The New Frontline https://belimedia.com.ng/information-warfare-the-new-frontline https://belimedia.com.ng/information-warfare-the-new-frontline

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
Hezbollah’s Quiet Rebuild: Iran’s Shadowy Lifeline and the Gathering Storm on Israel’s Northern Flank https://belimedia.com.ng/hezbollahs-quiet-rebuild-irans-shadowy-lifeline-and-the-gathering-storm-on-israels-northern-flank https://belimedia.com.ng/hezbollahs-quiet-rebuild-irans-shadowy-lifeline-and-the-gathering-storm-on-israels-northern-flank

DEEP DIVE — Tucked deep into the cragged hills of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah, the once powerful Iranian-backed militia brought to its knees by a war with Israel, has spent the past year meticulously gouging its way back to relevancy.

For Western and Israeli security forces, the designated terrorist group’s covert but influential resurgence establishes a precarious problem: a persistent, low-level threat that could instantly trigger a wider conflict, critically testing the resilience of any ceasefires and the existing, fragile statehood.

Financial Lifelines and Sanctions

The November 5 announcement from the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted key elements of Hezbollah’s financial network. Two operatives — Ossama Jaber, a Hezbollah financier who personally collected tens of millions via Lebanese exchange houses from September 2024 to February 2025, and Ja’far Muhammad Qasir, a sanctioned terrorist collaborating with Syrian oil magnate Yasar Husayn Ibrahim — were blacklisted for laundering Iranian cash into Hezbollah’s war chest.

These funds, exploiting Lebanon’s cash-heavy, regulation-light economy, bankrolled everything from paramilitary salaries to the reconstruction of terror infrastructure battered by Israeli strikes. Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, John Hurley, didn’t mince words: For Lebanon to emerge “free, prosperous, and secure,” Hezbollah must be “fully disarmed and cut off from Iran’s funding and control.”

Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow and director of the counterterrorism and intelligence program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a former counterterrorism intelligence analyst for the FBI, points out that despite sanctions, Iran’s financial backing is pivotal to Hezbollah’s survival and operational reach.

“We assume Iran still provides about the same amount of money, but Hezbollah is having a harder time getting it through on a timely basis. They can’t just ship it from Iran or Iraq anymore without inspections, so they rely more on diaspora networks in South America and Africa,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “All of this is against the backdrop of severe setbacks. Hezbollah intends to continue positioning itself to not only fight militarily but also assert an oversized, dominant position within Lebanon by virtue of force.”

A Battered Front, But Not Broken

The Israel-Hezbollah war, which ignited in 2023 alongside the war in Gaza, decimated the organization’s leadership, weapons arsenal, and fighting ranks, with more than 3,000 of its fighters killed. The decapitation strikes were surgical: On September 27 last year, an Israeli airstrike flattened Hezbollah’s Beirut headquarters, killing Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s iron-fisted architect of asymmetric warfare. In the ensuing ground incursion, Israeli forces dismantled border launch sites and command bunkers, leaving Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, the elite unit tasked with infiltrating Galilee, reeling.

Yet, as analysts caution, Hezbollah is battered but not broken. A number of its battle-hardened fighters, who cut their teeth supporting the Assad regime in Syria, are now integrating into civilian life, ready to rearm at any time. Furthermore, the group’s Shia base, which comprises roughly 31 percent of the Lebanese population, remains loyal to Hezbollah, upheld by its wide-reaching welfare networks amid a country grappling with a crumbling economy.

These moves indicate that Hezbollah’s military recovery is already well underway.

“Hezbollah is giving much more attention than before the war to its Badr Unit, positioned north of the Litani River, and strengthening it with Radwan forces,” Sarít Zehavi, senior researcher at the Alma Research and Educational Center, tells The Cipher Brief. “They are also shifting from smuggling to local manufacturing of drones and missiles. Even though some brigades are not yet redeployed to the border, they continue training and rebuilding capabilities.”

The Badr Unit, a key element of Hezbollah’s northern forces, has become the group’s tactical spearhead along the Litani River and near the Israeli border. Tasked with reconnaissance, border infiltration, and rapid response, the unit has been reinforced with Radwan-trained fighters and advanced drone capabilities. Badr is central to Hezbollah’s evolving doctrine of “strategic latency,” maintaining a persistent threat without provoking full-scale war, and acts as a bridge between conventional militia operations and the group’s clandestine drone and cyber activities.

Moreover, Lebanon’s political deadlock increases the risk that Hezbollah will maintain its military dominance.

The Beirut government, assembled hastily earlier this year under President Joseph Aoun, is characterized as the least Hezbollah-affiliated in years, with a focus on reclaiming national independence from the dominant insurgents. There is, however, significant skepticism about how such a push is enforced. Hezbollah continues to rebuff key appointments, and its diminished but growing stockpile, estimated at 20,000 remaining rockets, hangs over Beirut’s ambitions.

This hybrid threat presents a national security nightmare for Washington: a non-state actor wielding state power, rendering diplomacy incredibly difficult.

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Iran’s Evolving Logistical Pipelines

Tehran’s shadow looms largest. The IRGC-Quds Force, Hezbollah’s ideological leader since 1982, has poured over $1 billion into the group this year alone, per Treasury disclosures — despite layered U.S. sanctions biting into Iran’s oil exports. However, a source familiar with the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control told The Cipher Brief on background that tracking Iran’s funds has become increasingly challenging in recent months.

“The Treasury and State Departments need more resources to track violations, and the government shutdown left many investigators sidelined,” the source observed. “Congress can help by requiring reports on Iranian weapons shipments and funding enforcement teams.”

The Iranian cash flows through hawala networks and Beirut’s labyrinthine exchange houses, where operatives like Jaber convert petrodollars into untraceable Lebanese pounds. It’s a masterclass in sanctions evasion: Iran’s regime, squeezed by domestic protests and a rial in freefall, prioritizes its “Axis of Resistance” over breadlines at home.

“Assad’s downfall severely crimped Hezbollah’s pipeline from Tehran, but even so, Hezbollah and Iran remain adept at exploiting fragile states. Beirut and Damascus show some interest in interdiction. Still, both are weak governments, and they have other priorities,” Jonathan Ruhe, Director of Foreign Policy at the JINSA Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy, tells The Cipher Brief. “Iran also exploits power vacuums in Sudan and Libya to resupply Hezbollah from the sea, using surreptitious maritime tactics like Iran’s sanctions-busting ‘shadow fleets.’”

Post-war Syria has forced Tehran to improvise. The once-feared land bridge — stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon — has been battered by Israeli airstrikes and rebel attacks, yet parts of it still survive. To bolster its Middle East proxy, the Iranian regime has upped its use of maritime routes. Iranian cargo ships dock at Syria’s Tartus port under civilian manifests, offloading drone kits and rocket fuel disguised as fertilizer. Trucks then traverse the unguarded border into Lebanon’s Qalamoun Mountains, often chaperoned by IRGC advisors.

Domestically, however, Hezbollah is reducing reliance on imports. Clandestine factories in Beirut’s Dahiyeh suburbs and Bekaa orchards churn out refurbished Kornet anti-tank missiles and Ababil drones from scavenged parts. There is a reported network of 50-plus workshops, some powered by smuggled Chinese microchips, slashing reliance on vulnerable sea lanes. Despite its own economic ailments, Tehran continues to give precedence to Hezbollah’s position as a frontline deterrent over short-term financial stability.

Rebuilding the Arsenal: From Ashes to Drones

Israeli assessments estimate Hezbollah has reclaimed just 20 percent of its pre-war precision arsenal, but what emerges is nimbler and deadlier in specific domains. Drones top the list: low-cost Shahed-136 clones, assembled from Iranian blueprints and Syrian-sourced engines, can loiter over Galilee for hours, scouting IDF positions or delivering 50 kg (110pounds) warheads. Short-range Fajr-5 rockets, concealable in olive groves, are proliferating under civilian camouflage — mosques, schools, even UNIFIL outposts.

Smuggling remains vital. Iran’s military equipment, including advanced components for precision-guided missiles (PGMs), is first transported into Syria using an array of methods designed to evade international scrutiny. Non-descript convoys then travel from Syria’s Homs City to the border city of Al-Qusayr near Lebanon. The Syrian-Lebanese border in the Homs/Al-Qusayr area is porous, mountainous, and complex to police. Over the course of this year, Israel has conducted more than 40 strikes intercepting shipments near the southern coast of the city of Tyre. Yet the cat-and-mouse game favors smugglers. Private companies, fronts for IRGC logistics, reportedly run nighttime operations mixing weapons with sacks of flour labeled as aid.

“Even before October 7, Hezbollah tried to make precision munitions with Iranian help,” Ruhe noted. “Tehran is now redoubling these efforts. For all Israel’s successes over the last two years, it struggled to wage a multifront war of attrition, and it struggled to defeat Hezbollah’s drones. Hezbollah and Iran want to exploit this exact weakness by being able to oversaturate Israeli defenses with mass drone swarms, similar to what Iran helps Russia do against Ukraine.”

Indeed, Hezbollah’s rebuilding of its ranks is quieter but no less strategic. After losing an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 fighters, the group now runs “resistance summer camps” in the Litani Valley, teaching teenagers bomb-making and cyber tactics under the guise of community service. Morale has waned, but ideology endures: recruits draw strength from chants of Nasrallah’s martyrdom.

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The Long Game: Shadows on the Northern Border

For Israel, the situation is a high-stakes strategic battle. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s cabinet has stepped up its drone strikes into Lebanon in recent weeks, and preemptive raids to enforce ceasefire arms restrictions are not off the table. Nonetheless, Hezbollah leaders in November rejected talks, and in an official letter to the Lebanese government, insisted that “any attempt at political negotiations with Israel does not serve Lebanon’s national interest.” The statement both rallies supporters and signals Tehran’s firm stance. Iran’s approach is one of “strategic latency” — maintaining a constant, restrained threat to deter Israel without triggering all-out war.

The United States also has global interests at risk. Hezbollah’s networks extend into Latin America and Africa, where they help launder money through drug and diamond trades. Those funds could support operations that reach U.S. soil. Washington’s current strategy — including a $230 million-plus aid package to Lebanon tied to reforms — aims to cut off Hezbollah’s financial base.

This fragile financial and operational landscape underscores that, despite international efforts, Hezbollah’s on-the-ground capabilities remain resilient and difficult to fully contain. A spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State tells The Cipher Brief that while “the Government of Lebanon made a courageous and historic decision to restore state authority by ordering the disarming of Hezbollah and establishing the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces as the legitimate forces for Lebanon, the credibility of Lebanon’s government rests on its ability to transform words into action.”

“The region and world are watching carefully,” the spokesperson continued. “Disarming Hezbollah and other non-state actors, as well as ending Iran’s proxy activities, is crucial to ensuring peace in Lebanon and across the region. The United States of America commends the Government of Lebanon’s efforts to ensure Lebanon is sovereign, peaceful, prosperous, and safe for all Lebanese people.”

Zehavi also pointed to the gap between hopes for disarmament and reality.

“The Lebanese Army is not entering villages and into the private properties where Hezbollah is actually hiding its weapons down,” she explained. “If this continues this way, and it looks like this is where it is going, what we will see is a very unstable situation.”

Lebanon, however, may face the most direct consequences. Hezbollah functions as both a militia and a provider of social services. Several of its clinics are also used as bunkers, and Tehran-financed roads routinely lead to new depots and launch locations. As Zehavi highlights, Hezbollah is rebuilding on two fronts: strengthening its military infrastructure while expanding civilian programs to maintain local support.

The organization, experts say, is not right now preparing for a major offensive but focuses on smaller, ongoing operations — perhaps cyberattacks on Haifa’s ports, sniper fire along the border, and drone swarms testing Israel’s defenses. Iran’s proxy strategy remains intact despite sanctions and setbacks.

Yet, according to Ruhe, if the United States, Europe, and Arab partners enforce UN sanctions on Iran’s rearming of Hezbollah and back Beirut, a better-than-status-quo scenario is possible.

“(But) if Hezbollah and Iran believe Beirut is alone, and that Israel will be isolated for acting militarily, then it’s a matter of when — not if — Hezbollah recovers,” he continued. “And the more successfully it helps Hezbollah rebuild, the more likely Iran will test Israeli and U.S. resolve with its own rearmament.”

For Western policymakers, the objectives are clear: disrupt Hezbollah’s finances, bolster Lebanon’s government, and limit the group’s military power. Otherwise, the risk grows of a wider northern conflict that could draw in larger powers.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
Q&A: Interpol’s Cybercrime Chief on How AI is Driving Borderless Cyber Threats https://belimedia.com.ng/qa-interpols-cybercrime-chief-on-how-ai-is-driving-borderless-cyber-threats https://belimedia.com.ng/qa-interpols-cybercrime-chief-on-how-ai-is-driving-borderless-cyber-threats EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW — Anthropic’s announcement that Chinese state-sponsored hackers used its Claude AI technology for a largely automated cyberattack underscores how cybercriminals are becoming faster, stronger and more organized, driven by advances in technology like artificial intelligence. Criminal networks are now blending phishing, fraud and ransomware with other enterprises like trafficking and money laundering, making this borderless threat even more complex and serious.

The Cipher Brief spoke with Dr. Neal Jetton, the Cybercrime Director of Interpol, to discuss how the world’s largest international police organization is taking on the threat. Speaking from last month’s Global Cybersecurity Forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Dr. Jetton said Interpol-driven efforts like information-sharing, cross-border cooperation and law enforcement training are critical in countering emboldened cybercriminals.

The Cipher Brief: Can you tell us what kind of buzz has been there? Have there been key themes or issues at this very point in time among the cyber experts that you've been talking to?

Dr. Jetton: I think you can't get away from AI here. Every panel, every discussion has an AI focus, and you think, "Ugh, more AI." But, it's here. It does impact probably everything. We have a lot of cyber threat intel companies here from the private sector who are working with it every day for their means.

And then from a law enforcement perspective, we look at it kind of as a double-edged sword. I'm from INTERPOL, so we look at how AI can benefit law enforcement in the long run. But as a cybercrime director, I also see how cyber criminals are also utilizing AI to enhance the effectiveness of their criminal activities.

The Cipher Brief: What can you tell us about the role that INTERPOL plays in countering these threats?

Dr. Jetton: So, just a little bit about INTERPOL because maybe there's some misconceptions about what it is. Even my neighbors sometimes think, "What do you actually do, Neal?" So in INTERPOL, there are 196 member countries. We are focused on law enforcement to law enforcement connections. So what we want to do in the Cybercrime Directorate is understand what our membership is suffering from as far as the type of crimes that they are seeing the most.

So we will send out yearly threat assessments because we think we might have a good idea of what a particular region is suffering from, but we need to hear it directly from the law enforcement officers and experts on the ground. We'll get that information, and then we'll turn that around and we'll try to base our training, our coordination meetings, and then our operations focused on the threats that they, our members, see most commonly.

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The Cipher Brief: When we talk about things like attribution, going after threat actors and bolstering cybersecurity, where do those rank on the priority scale for INTERPOL?

Dr. Jetton: Within the Cybercrime Directorate, we have three goals. I tell my team, what we want to do is we want to build up the capacity for our country. So we have to understand what they need, what they're lacking in terms of tools and training. We then want to provide accurate, useful intelligence to our member countries that they can use and turn into evidence that then helps drive their investigations to be more successful.

But my goal is to increase the capacity for our member countries, to provide relevant intelligence to them so that we have operational success, and we've done that. I think we've done more than 10 operations this year within the Cybercrime Directorate, both global and regional, focused on the threats that our members are seeing most.

What we will do is, in a lot of instances, we will bring the countries that are participating in our operations all together at one point. We'll then bring relevant private sector partners, many of them here at GCF, to come and provide training to them on the ground. We will do tabletop exercises, and then at the end of that week, it's usually a five-day process, we'll kick everybody out and we'll just focus on the operation at hand. We'll say, "We're going after this malware or these threats. These are the types of steps that we think you should take that would help you in your investigation."

So we really do want to benefit our members. I want to say though that the success that these operations have had—we've had some big wins recently—the lion's share of the success goes to our member countries, the law enforcement on the ground who are doing the actual investigations, who are going and making the arrests and seeing those things through. We've done several recently with great success.

The Cipher Brief: We asked Chris Inglis, who is the former National Security or Cybersecurity Director in the United States, about the connections between nation states and cyber criminal groups. How do you see INTERPOL playing a role in this area? Are there both challenges and opportunities when you're talking about cybercrime that may be backed by nation states?

Dr. Jetton: That's one of the misnomers with INTERPOL. The big thing with INTERPOL is neutrality. I came from a task force where we looked at nation state transnational cybercrime. But within INTERPOL, I just have to state that our constitution does not really allow us to focus on investigative matters of a religious, racial, political, or military nature. So we know that that limits the nation state actors, and I'm very aware of that. It's not like I'm naive to understand who's behind a lot of these cyber criminal activities. But to maintain that neutrality and trust with 196 members, there is a limit to what INTERPOL is allowed to do. Countries will reach out to you and they will say, "Hey, our government networks have been breached," and I know automatically this is not your usual financially motivated cyber criminals, there's something there. So I have to work hand in hand with my legal affairs team to say, "Where can we draw the line?" I don't just want to say, "No, we're not doing anything," but can we provide something, at least the starting point, but we don't want to provide attribution or state like, "Hey, it's this person.” But maybe give them a little bit of a head start and then hand off to the countries that provided the intel or are having the issues and then help them along the way.

So I just want to be clear. Nation state actors, there are a lot of organizations that are focused on that, including where I was previously. But INTERPOL, we are really focused on the financially motivated cyber criminals.

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The Cipher Brief: It's such an interesting patchwork of expertise that it is critical for collective defense. What vulnerabilities do you see from your perch at INTERPOL right now in cyberspace, and where do you think defenses are failing?

Dr. Jetton: For us, when we're asking countries, "What are the biggest issues that are preventing you from being more successful in combating cybercrime?" A lot of it is the tools and the training, just having insufficient funds to actually drive up their investigative know-how or expertise. But also I think between countries, it's just the rapid ability to share information.

There are what we call MLATS, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. A lot of times it just takes a long time to ask for information. And we know in cybercrime, we need instantaneous help. So I would always encourage countries to reach out to INTERPOL. We have a 24/7 network. That's why we're there. I can't promise we can do everything in every situation, but we will do our very best to make the connection between which countries you need or if you need a particular company. We can't compel, but we'd put you in touch and at least let you have that conversation.

The Cipher Brief: What are the trends you are seeing right now in cybercrime?

Dr. Jetton: What we're seeing primarily is the use of AI in increasing the efficiency, scope, and effectiveness of emails and the phishing scams. They're using this phishing as a platform. You can just blank X as a platform. So it's these tools that you didn't have to have a really sophisticated technical level of abilities, and you can have these tools that allow you to then go out and commit fraud at scale. And so we are seeing that.

Also, what we're seeing is a convergence of different crimes. So cyber is poly-criminal. I live in Singapore, and one of the big things in Southeast Asia are the cybercrime centers. You hear about that all the time. What happens is you have these organized crime groups that are using cybercrime as fraudulent job applications, the emails, things like that, recruiting, and then the human trafficking aspect of it, and then forcing the people to commit the cybercrime while they're there. So we see that as a huge issue, the poly-criminal aspect of cyberware. It doesn't matter if it's human trafficking, drugs, guns—there's going to be some sort of cyber element to all those crimes.

The Cipher Brief: What are some of the most interesting conversations that you've had on the sidelines there? Has there been anything that's surprised you from some of the other guests and speakers?

Dr. Jetton: We were talking about the use of AI and where we think it's going, whether it's kind of positive or negative. What I was surprised at was, I was on a panel and I was the only person that had the glass half empty. I realized that there are some obvious useful uses for AI, and it's a game changer already for law enforcement. But what I see is these technologies being utilized by criminals at a faster rate than what law enforcement can usually do. So I see it as somewhat of a negative knowing that we're going to have to catch up like with AI-produced malware. I think that will be an issue in the future.

Whereas my other panelists were all from the private sector, and they were all like, "No, no, AI is great. It's going to allow us to use it in these positive directions," which is true, but I'm the negative, the Grinch here talking about it from saying that. So I would say that that was probably the most surprising thing.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
Can a “Flamingo” Cruise Missile Help Ukraine Turn the Tide? https://belimedia.com.ng/can-a-flamingo-cruise-missile-help-ukraine-turn-the-tide https://belimedia.com.ng/can-a-flamingo-cruise-missile-help-ukraine-turn-the-tide

DEEP DIVE – Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky calls it “our most successful missile.” One expert says it’s "Ukraine’s strongest security guarantee.” And former CIA Director and Cipher Brief expert Gen. David Petraeus says it has the potential to be “a game changer” in the war against Russia.

They are talking about the FP-5 Flamingo, a ground-launched, subsonic, made-in-Ukraine cruise missile, built to hit targets deep in Russian territory.

Not since the first salvos of Russia’s 2022 invasion has Ukraine’s defense industry sounded so enthusiastic about a weapon manufactured on its soil. The successes of Ukrainian defense technology are well known; as The Cipher Brief reported last month, the country is now widely believed to have the world’s most innovative defense sector. Its drone technology in particular continues to earn rave reviews from experts and western defense companies alike.

But the Flamingo is something different – a missile with a reported range of 1800 miles and the ability to carry more than 2,000 pounds of munitions, meaning that in one strike it could cause greater damage than even a swarm of drones. Compared to the top-class American Tomahawk cruise missile, the Flamingo is believed to be less accurate but with a similar range and a much heavier payload. And because it is manufactured in Ukraine, the Flamingo can be launched against Russian targets without Western-imposed restrictions.

“The Flamingo may actually be a game changer,” Gen. Petraeus said at the Cipher Brief’s annual Threat Conference last month. “You add that capability to what Ukraine has already done,” he said, referring to the recent drone campaign against Russia’s oil sector, “and [the Flamingo] will extend this dramatically.”

Zelensky said last month that the Flamingos had carried out their first missions, including a three-missile attack on a Russian security base in northern Crimea. Last week, Ukraine’s General Staff said it had used Flamingos as part of a strike that targeted “several dozen” military and infrastructure sites inside Russia and in occupied Crimea.

The Flamingo’s manufacturer, the Ukrainian firm Fire Point, claims to be producing between 1-2 missiles per day, with plans to scale to 7 per day by year’s end, for a 2026 projected total of more than 2,500. "By December we’ll have many more of them,” Zelensky told reporters in August. “And by the end of December or in January–February, mass production should begin."

Experts say every one of those missiles will dwarf the power of a drone weapon.

“With the drone-strike campaign, you have the challenge that they mostly carry fairly small warheads,” John Hardie, Deputy Director of the Russia program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), told The Cipher Brief. “The damage is far less than you could do with a one-time warhead that’s carried by the Flamingo.”

All of which raises the question: Might the Flamingo change the course of the war?

How the Flamingo was born

Even by the lofty standards of Ukraine’s recent defense-tech achievements, the Flamingo’s origin story is an inspiring one. And it dates to the last days of the Cold War.

In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Ukraine agreed to give up not only its nuclear weapons but also its considerable arsenal of Kh-55 cruise missiles. And after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while Zelensky and other Ukrainian leaders pressed constantly – and with mixed success – for western weaponry and security guarantees, they also began turbocharging their domestic defense industry.

“Ukrainians were authors of the Soviet space program and rocket program,” Oleksiy Goncharenko, a member of Ukraine’s Parliament, told The Cipher Brief. “When you have a lot of experience and when your people are smart enough, then the result is obvious. You have technologies which other countries respect.”

For more than three years, however, Ukraine remained largely dependent on Western countries for high-end, long-range strike capabilities. That led to the creation of a made-in-Ukraine cruise missile program.

The result is the FP-5 Flamingo, developed by Fire Point, a former casting agency that spun itself into a defense firm in the summer of 2022. In 2023, Fire Point produced its first FP-1 attack drones, ultimately turning out 200 FP-1s that year; this year the figure is expected to hit 20,000. Its cruise missile project has moved at a similar warp speed: in August, less than a year after it began work on the cruise missile, the company was showing off the prototype; soon after that, the first Flamingos were flying.

“We came up with it pretty fast,” Iryna Terekh, the company's 33-year-old Chief Technical Officer, told Politico. “It took less than nine months to develop it from an idea to its first successful tests on the battlefield.”

Terekh and other Ukrainian defense entrepreneurs speak often about how the Russian invasion has motivated their work – what Goncharenko calls “the unfortunate inspiration of war.” Terekh fled a Russian-occupied village near Kyiv in the early days of the war, and says her car still has a hole from a Russian bullet. She joined FirePoint as a partner in June 2023.

Ralph Goff, a former Senior Intelligence Executive at the CIA, calls the Flamingo production story “combat Darwinism at its best.”

“If the West isn't going to give them the long-range weaponry that they want to carry out their strategic attacks, they'll develop them themselves,” Goff told the October Cipher Brief conference. The Flamingo, he said, “is a serious piece of offensive weaponry.”

As for the missile’s unusual name, that traces to an in-house story at Fire Point, about the day when someone painted a solid rocket booster prototype pink, in a nod to the women involved in the male-dominated world of weapons production. Later, when the missiles were ready for testing, the company needed a bright color to help locate post-launch debris. Pink paint was available – and that led to the Flamingo moniker. The Pink has gone – missiles used in actual strikes are colored less conspicuously – but “Flamingo” stuck.

“You don’t need a scary name for a missile that can fly 3,000 kilometers," Terekh said. "The main goal is for a missile to be effective.”

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Reality check

If Fire Point’s claims are borne out, the Flamingo will have a reach and power on par with western cruise missiles, and an arsenal to match any European nation’s other than Russia.

Experts warn that behind that “If” lie multiple concerns – most of them due to the fact that there has been minimal independent verification of the company’s claims.

“In the defense industry, it’s easier to make statements than to actually implement them,” Ukrainian lawmaker Roman Kostenko said of the Flamingo’s potential, speaking to Radio NV last month.

One issue involves accuracy, which experts say Fire Point had to sacrifice to a degree in its push for a low-cost, fast-to-market weapon. In the Crimea strike, one missile reportedly landed some 100 meters from its target.

“Because it's low-cost, you kind of skimp on some of the more high-end features you might see in a more exquisite missile, guidance and accuracy being one of them,” Hardie said. “It's a relatively inaccurate missile at least by modern standards.” But he added that if the pace of manufacturing ultimately yields the high numbers Fire Point has promised, then “that tradeoff [high volume for accuracy] makes sense.”

Balazs Jarabik, a former European Union diplomat and analyst for RPolitik, has studied the Flamingo project since its early days. He doubts that Fire Point can reach its production goals.

“The Flamingo is real, but the production capacity is overstated, at least so far,” Jarabik told The Cipher Brief. He noted that an earlier Ukrainian-made missile, the Neptune, has yet to reach its promised scale, and that for all its defense-sector successes, Ukraine must contend with wartime supply-chain issues that would bedevil any weapons manufacturers. He and Hardie said that scaling to hundreds of Flamingos per month will require consistent supplies of everything from engines to warheads to electronics for guidance systems.

“I'm a little skeptical, but it's possible the Ukrainians will get there,” Hardie said, and Gen. Petraeus said that the Ukrainians “really need to double down” on the pace of the Flamingo manufacturing. “They're trying to get that into full production.”

Fire Point must do so while Russia targets Ukraine’s young defense companies as well as the country’s energy infrastructure. The latter is critical, given the defense sector’s high demand for energy. For one piece of the Flamingo supply chain, the company has already found a workaround: in September, Fire Point announced that Denmark had agreed to produce fuel for the Flamingo, effectively removing a key production facility from the war zone. The announcement provoked a warning from the Kremlin, which called the Danish plans “hostile.”

That response raises the question of Russian retaliation – a concern that has accompanied the delivery of virtually every new weapons system to the Ukrainian side. Some experts fear that any successful, high-impact Flamingo strike against Russia, carried out with help from Western intelligence – the destruction of a weapons factory deep in Russian territory, for example – would risk a NATO-Russia fight that the West has been desperate to avoid. Others doubt that Vladimir Putin has any interest – at least not in the current moment – in any escalation that might lead to conflict with the West.

“The Russians have been consistently more bark than bite,” Hardie said. “They know that attacking a NATO country in an overt military way – not the sort of gray-zone, below-the-threshold-of-war stuff they've been doing, but an overt military missile strike – that's an act of war. And Putin doesn't want any part of a direct conventional fight with the United States and NATO allies.”

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What to watch for

Even analysts who are skeptical about the Flamingo’s future note that it would take only a few successful strikes to inflict severe damage, and that if Fire Point can get anywhere close to its 2500-missile-per-year pledge for 2026, the battlefield impact could be profound. Beyond the Russian oil refineries and other energy facilities the Ukrainians have attacked lately, the Flamingo will put more military targets in range as well. The holy grail might be the joint Russia-Iran manufacturing facility in Tatarstan that is turning out the deadly Shahed drones, at a scale that the Ukrainians must envy.

Experts say that with hundreds of Flamingos at the ready, Ukraine might achieve what Jarabik refers to as “mass saturation,” an ability to bring a heavy and varied drone-and-missile threat to military and energy targets across all of European Russia.

“If you're Ukraine,” Hardie said, “you'd like to be able to combine these missiles and drones into a complex strike package much as the Russians are currently doing, and keep the Russian air defense on its toes.”

“The Flamingo is heavy, and it’s also relatively easy to shoot down,” Jarabik said. “And so they will need mass saturation – a lot of these missiles, but with drones or other weapons too, to get through to the targets. They're going to have to produce enough that they can have a sustained impact, …and I don't think we're going to be there anytime soon.”

Then Jarabik added: “All that said, you have to acknowledge Ukraine’s innovation and skill. And I think [the Flamingo] is a big thing. Absolutely.”

As for the accuracy concerns, Ukrainian officials noted that while one of the Flamingos fired at Crimea did miss its mark, the two others leveled a barracks and brought a “massive destructive power,” with craters measuring 15 meters in diameter.

No one is touting the Flamingo as a replacement for the array of Western missiles that have been delivered to Kyiv. The Ukrainians will still covet the German Taurus, and the British-French Storm Shadow/Scalp cruise missiles, which are more accurate, though they come with conditions attached to their use. The diversity and volume of weapons systems, experts say, are what could make a real difference. And the Flamingo adds a powerful new element to the Ukrainian arsenal.

“No one system or weapon is going to be the decisive game changer,” Hardie said. “I don't think there's any such thing as a wonder weapon. That being said, for a supporter of Ukraine, it's really encouraging to see Ukraine being able to move out on its own more in terms of long-range strike capabilities. They are taking these steps forward and really taking it to the Russians right now with this campaign against energy infrastructure. That's been impressive to see and I think it kind of augurs more to come. So if I were the Russians, I would be worried about that.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Constitutional Clash Over Trump’s War Powers in Venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/a-constitutional-clash-over-trumps-war-powers-in-venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/a-constitutional-clash-over-trumps-war-powers-in-venezuela OPINION — “The question before the body is, can the Congress stop a military conflict declared by the Commander-in- Chief because we don’t agree with the decision, and without our [Congress] approval it must end? The answer, unequivocally, to me is no. Under the Constitution, the authority to be Commander-in-Chief resides exclusively with the President. The power to declare war is exclusive to the Congress. Now, what could the Congress do constitutionally if they disagree with a military action that is not a declaration of war? We could cut off funding.”

That was Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) speaking on the Senate floor on the afternoon of November 6, when debate was to begin on S.J. Res. 90, legislation that was “to direct the President to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces for hostilities within or against Venezuela, unless explicitly authorized by a declaration of war or specific authorization for use of military force.”

Graham’s remark that Congress could cut off funds to halt a President ordered foreign military action took me back 56 years to December 1969, when I was working for Sen. J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I had in late 1969 been to Laos where the Nixon administration was carrying out a secret bombing campaign in an attempt to limit weapons going from North Vietnam to pro-Communists in South Vietnam.

To halt the at-the-time classified Laos bombing program, Fulbright introduced an amendment to the fiscal 1970 Defense Appropriations Bill that prohibited the use of U.S. funds to send American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. To get his amendment debated and passed, Fulbright had to arrange for a closed-session of the Senate.

That closed session was held on December 16, 1969, with all 100 Senators present, a handful of staff – including me – but no one in the public galleries and no reporters in the press gallery. After a 90-minute debate, the amendment passed. The House accepted the amendment in conference and it was signed into law by President Nixon on December 29, 1969.

Fulbright’s purpose was to assert Congress’ Constitutional role when it came to a prospective military operation amid his concern that the Nixon administration was expanding the Vietnam War into neighboring countries without consulting Congress.

I describe that long-past activity to explain my continuing apprehension over today’s possible Trump administration military action against Venezuela. The Trump administration has already introduced deadly military operations against alleged narco-traffickers working from a secret list of drug cartels using a classified Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel opinion which claims the drugs are to kill Americans and finance arms to terrorists who will destabilize the U.S. and other Western Hemisphere countries.

Last Thursday and Friday, President Trump met in the Oval Office to discuss a host of options for Venezuela with Vice President JD Vance, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller.

Friday night, in remarks to reporters aboard Air Force One as he traveled for the weekend to his Mar-a-Lago estate, the President said he had “sort of made up my mind” about how he will proceed with the possibility of military action in Venezuela. On Sunday, flying home, Trump told reporters the U.S. “may be having some discussions with [Venezuelan President Nicolas] Maduro,” adding that “they [the Venezuelans] would like to talk.”

Although he swings back and forth, it appears clear from President Trump’s point of view, he need not consult with Congress should he decide on any military action that targets the Venezuelan mainland. As Sen. Graham pointed out, “We have only declared war five times in 250 years, and we have had hundreds of military operations -- some authorized and some not.”

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Opening the Senate debate on November 6, Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), a key sponsor of the congressional resolution, pointed out, “On October 31, public reporting shows that many Trump administration officials have told the press that a secret list of targets in Venezuela has been drawn up. All of this, together with the increased pace of strikes in the Caribbean and Pacific [21 attacks on alleged narco-trafficking boats, 83 individuals killed], suggests that we are on the verge of something that should not happen without a debate and vote in Congress before the American people.”

On November 6, after a relatively short debate, the Senate resolution to block the use of U.S. armed forces against Venezuela was defeated by a 49-to-51 vote.

But during that debate some important points were made, and they need some public exposure.

For example, Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), a military veteran herself, said, “Listen, if the Trump administration actually believes there is an ongoing credible threat of armed conflict, then they must bring their case to Congress and give the American people a say through their elected representatives. They must respect our service members enough to prove why war is worth turning more moms and dads into Gold Star parents. And they must testify about what the end state of these military operations would actually look like.”

Sen. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) said, “Maduro is a murderous dictator. He is an illegitimate leader in having overturned the last election by the use of military force. He is a bad actor. But I do not believe the American people want to go to war to topple this regime in the hopes that something better might follow… Let them [the Trump administration] seek an authorization to use force to get rid of Maduro. But let us not abdicate our responsibility. Let us vote to say no to war without our approval. We don’t have to wait, nor should we wait for that war to begin before we vote.”

Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) pointed out, “Of course, we have the capability of overthrowing the Maduro regime, just like we had the power to overthrow Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi. But what comes next? Is anyone thinking about the potential blowback that such a campaign could entail? Overthrowing the Maduro regime risks creating more regional instability, not less. The breakdown of state authority may create a power vacuum that the very drug cartels the administration is ostensibly trying to destroy could exploit.”

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“You cannot bomb your way out of a drug crisis,” said Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. “The demand that motivates drug trafficking is not found in the Caribbean. It is located in communities across America where people are suffering from addiction, where economic opportunity has dried up, where the social fabric has frayed. Military strikes do nothing to address those root causes. Boats have been blown out of the water in videos released by the administration. But has the flow of fentanyl into America decreased? Has a single trafficking network been dismantled? The administration hasn’t provided any evidence that these strikes are achieving anything beyond the destruction they document on camera. This is not a strategy. This is violence without a strategic objective.”

Sen. Reed also pointed out how the Trump administration is expanding its war powers. “The White House is apparently now arguing that these strikes [on alleged narco-boats] don’t constitute ‘hostilities’ under the War Powers Act because American service members aren’t directly in harm’s way while operating standoff weapons and drones. This is ridiculous…They are very much in harm’s way, and to say that this operation is so safe that it doesn’t qualify as ‘hostilities’ is embarrassing…This new interpretation creates a dangerous precedent. If standoff weapons exempt military operations from congressional oversight, we have effectively granted the Executive Branch unlimited authority to wage war anywhere in the world so long as American forces can strike from a distance.”

Taking a different approach, Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) pointed out an irony in Trump’s anti-drug argument. Van Hollen said, “I will tell you what you don’t do. You don’t submit a budget to the U.S. Congress that cuts the funding for the Drug Enforcement Agency and cuts funding for the task forces we developed to go after major organized crime syndicates involved in the drug business.” He added, “I happen to be the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee that oversees the Justice Department. And all my colleagues have to do is take a look at the request from the President of the United States when it comes to resources for fighting drugs coming to the United States. They cut them.”

Raising an additional problem, Sen. Andy Kim (D-N.J.) said, “Letting Donald Trump ignore the law abroad makes him think he has a free pass to do it right here at home. Donald Trump thinks if he can do this in the Caribbean, he can do it on the streets of Chicago. He could use the military for his own political retribution and consolidation of power in and outside our borders. After all, he [Trump] said in his own words: ‘We’re under invasion from within, no different than a foreign enemy but more difficult in many ways because they don’t wear uniforms.’ That is what the President said. We cannot be complacent as he sends troops into our cities as a tool of intimidation against his political enemies.”

While we await President Trump’s decision on what comes next, let me close with another ironic situation, created last Wednesday by Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem.

Giving the keynote address at the Potomac Officers Club’s 2025 Homeland Security Summit, Noem celebrated recent successes in the counter-drug mission. She said that since January, the Coast Guard has stopped 91 metric tons of drugs, confiscated 1,067 weapons and seized more than $3.2 million in cash from terrorist cartels, thanks primarily due to Operation Pacific Viper, which Noem said is strategically designed to seize historic amounts of drugs from smugglers in the eastern Pacific. “Viper has saved millions of lives of individuals and Americans by stopping those drugs before they ever got to the U.S.,” Noem said.

Operation Pacific Viper, according to a Coast Guard press release, also resulted in the arrest of 86 alleged narco-traffickers as of October 15. A needed reminder: Viper was an interdiction program where narco-traffickers were intercepted, arrested and drugs seized – not boats blown up and people killed.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
What to Watch for in Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Visit to Washington https://belimedia.com.ng/what-to-watch-for-in-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salmans-visit-to-washington https://belimedia.com.ng/what-to-watch-for-in-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salmans-visit-to-washington

EXPERT INTERVIEW — President Trump is welcoming Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the White House today with an announcement that he plans to approve the sale of F-35 fighter jets to the Kingdom, signaling a policy shift by the U.S. Administration.

The visit to Washington marks one of the most consequential moments in decades for the U.S.–Saudi relationship. Both governments see the meeting as a chance to cement the expansion of the U.S.-Saudi partnership from one focused on energy and security to include advanced technology, AI, critical minerals and defense cooperation.

The trip follows President Donald Trump’s high-profile visit to Saudi Arabia in May, when both countries announced a multibillion-dollar deal that could potentially give Riyadh access to advanced U.S. AI technology. While sources tell The Cipher Brief that many of the details of those deals remain in various stages of negotiation, the Crown Prince’s Washington visit aims to build off of that momentum.

More widely, the visit comes at the end of a year of rapid geopolitical and technological change for the Middle East. Through these shifts, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf leaders like the United Arab Emirates are positioning themselves as centers for AI infrastructure, diversified cheap energy, and global supply chains.

To help unpack the stakes and expectations behind the Crown Prince’s Washington visit, The Cipher Brief spoke with Norm Roule, who spent more than 34 years in the Intelligence Community and has been following regional developments for 43 years - including his time as a business consultant. Roule is in frequent contact with Gulf leaders on energy, security, finance and technology issues and travels frequently to the region. Cipher Brief CEO & Publisher Suzanne Kelly began by asking Roule to summarize the expectations going into this visit. Our conversation has been lightly edited for clarity and length.

THE INTERVIEW

Roule: The visit of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Washington will likely represent a transformational moment in Saudi-American relations that will stand out among the most important events in the 80-year relationship between the two countries. Each side will likely seek to use this visit to change the traditional relationship from one of oil and security to one that is more of a blend of advanced technology, mining, and energy, which includes nuclear, and defense.

Each side now sees the other as an indispensable partner and views this visit as a way of establishing an architecture that will ensure that periodic political difficulties don't destabilize a critical relationship that needs to last decades. The Saudis seek this more predictable relationship and assets that will allow them to accelerate their evolution toward becoming a global power center.

Washington seeks to revitalize and cement ties with a rising middle power that will certainly have considerably more influence in the Middle East and the Global South and will become an important link in the global energy and supply chain. Regional issues will be discussed during the visit, but I don't think it's likely we're going to see significant shifts outside of the ongoing trends.

Kelly: This visit, of course, does follow the visit by President Trump to Saudi Arabia in May of this year where some signficant deals were announced with regard to technology sharing and investment opportunities.

Roule: That is correct. In essence, what you're looking at is the other side of the coin from those visits. President Trump and a team of unprecedented stature of American cabinet members and highly consequential American business leaders traveled to the Kingdom and concluded a vast array of business deals over the months since that time. American diplomats and business leaders have met to finalize and further expand upon those deals. And now we're looking at a meeting that will, in essence, conclude those agreements or take them to the next stage of developing memorandums of understanding. These are very complicated agreements that in and of themselves will take months, if not years, to play out. But they are indeed transformational for the economies of each of the two partners.

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Saudi Arabia and its neighbor, the United Arab Emirates are drawing on an unprecedented and historic combination of very focused policy decisions, massive domestic and global investment flows that they are developing with themselves and partners, and domestic social engineering that's been something that is unique in the world based upon AI and multiculturalism to redefine themselves from hitherto reliable energy suppliers into world-class members of the global supply chain - architects of the next generation of AI manufacturing and new nodes of political influence in a non-polar Middle East.

Each of these two countries is positioning themselves as models of rule of law, stable governance, and an oasis of multicultural life, open for business, open for boldness. And these two countries have a strategy that relies upon a tight weave of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), chemicals, energy infrastructure, data centers, and finance. But each country also requires a deep, unprecedented and sustained access to the most advanced US AI technology.

So for this to happen, we're watching the Saudi Crown Prince come to Washington to build this new relationship with the United States. They know that this relationship brings tremendous benefits to the United States as well. It not only helps us build out our infrastructure, our employment at a time when we're having our own challenges, but in a way, it also sends a powerful message. They believe in us. They believe in the American future. They know that we will win, and often in ways that we sometimes don't express in ourselves.

Lastly, they're doing all of this in a way that means that they're not having to cut their commercial ties with China or offend Russia. In return for what they will give, they will receive technology that makes them global AI powers. And with the cheap energy that they are able to attach to that AI, they will be incredibly successful.

Kelly: Clearly, we're going through a dramatic shift in the Middle East right now. How important is this relationship to the United States?

Roule: It's critical. The Middle East remains vital to America's interest. The Middle East, as they say, it's in the middle. You look at any map and the Middle East is in the center of global trade, global transportation, multiple shipping routes move through the region, 80% of the data between Europe and Asia transit the region. You have global energy centered in the region. You have several of the world's major religions in the region. You have crossroads of multiple U.S. national interests.

At the same time, you're now looking at the development of an artificial intelligence infrastructure that is starting to blossom. And our ability to partner with that and to ensure that that technology does not threaten America's interests, and indeed sustains America's interest as that region partners with the Global South. It just protects our interest and expands our influence at a time when China would very much like to replace us.

Kelly: You talked about some of the ambitions of the Kingdom and the UAE, both in investment and AI. We've talked a lot in the past about their efforts and trying to lead when it comes to green energy. What do you think is driving their strategy?

Roule: Their strategy is driven by changes in the world that are just inevitable. If we were to go back one year and I were to tell you that knowledge is power, you would agree completely with me. But today, the adage is now, power is knowledge. The artificial intelligence system is inherently an energy system in and of itself. And artificial intelligence requires access to inexpensive, reliable 24-hour energy. And in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and the other Gulf Cooperation Council states have access to tremendously inexpensive energy, and the prospect of additional inexpensive energy through their expansion of solar power and nuclear energy, which they're seeking. Those with access to such tremendous cheap energy and artificial intelligence have access to the benefits of artificial intelligence, which will bring them enormous economic advantage in the future.

Now, look at the other end of that stick. In Sub-Saharan Africa, at least 600 million Africans lack access to a reliable source of electricity. Imagine the social and economic disadvantage of those various societies. But let's go forward, just thinking about where the world is moving. By 2040, data center energy needs will rise fourfold. 1.5 billion people are estimated to move to cities. That means 2 billion new air conditioners will come online. And when you're in Saudi Arabia, a large portion of their oil needs, their oil production, is actually used for air conditioners in the summer. And you see their oil production move up in the summer for air conditioners. Global fleets of aircraft are expected to double from 25,000 to 50,000 aircraft by 2040. Jet fuel demand will be up by 30%. Six million kilometers of electrical transmission lines are needed by 2040. Imagine what that means in terms of copper.

So if you're looking at something like this, we're now looking at $4 trillion of investment needed annually for this energy architecture. We can't do this without partners with capital - like Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates - and the many partners they bring together into their ecosystem.

So now let's look at energy. In recent years, you've had this great contest between the people who correctly talk about the need for us to battle climate change, and those who have talked about the need for more energy. Both issues must be dealt with. Well, now we realize oil demand is not going to drop. In fact, oil demand is expected to remain above 100 million barrels a day through 2040. This demand is going to be needed for materials and petrochemicals. LNG demand is expected to grow by 50%. Renewables will double. In essence, the world needs more energy, not replacement for these other energy sources.

Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and Qatar and Kuwait see themselves as becoming islands of cheap energy working with the United States. They see themselves at this moment in history - where, if they can capture a certain amount of extraordinary technology and a strategic relationship with the United States, and this ecosystem of multicultural partnership with the world - they can become a very different society. It's a fascinating dynamic. It's a very exciting time in history.

Kelly: Do you think falling oil prices are going to impact this strategy?

Roule: Well, we're watching that play out. So in essence, what we've seen is very prudent decision making. They have slowed some of the execution of major projects, but they have not stopped the projects themselves. They have extended timelines. They have delayed the rollout of certain large programs. If it has to do with their visions of Vision 2030 or Vision 2040, they have different visions in the Gulf, the projects remain on track. And it's because those projects are critical to where they need to go. If you look, for example, at the city of Neom that is often talked about, well, the port of Oxagon, which is critical to the infrastructure of trade in the Northwest Arabian Peninsula, that’s still functioning, it’s still out there. They're just going to slow the build out of that city because it's reasonable to say to slow the build out to the city. It's just not reasonable to think that you can slow the build out of trade and infrastructure in the Arabian Peninsula. That's going to happen on a different timeline.

Now, we've also seen reports that the Saudis have withdrawn some of their capital from not less productive, but maybe investments in the United States that aren't as relevant to the core vision of equities as in the past. That I think you may see a little more of, but I don't see a massive withdrawal of those investments unless we saw oil prices drop into say the low $50s or $40s. So what we're watching is prudent focus. We're watching attention to timelines. We're watching attention to anti-corruption. I'm impressed. I've not seen anybody waste money or do anything that is injudicious. And I've not seen anybody make allegations that such things have been noted by others.

Kelly: What will make this a successful visit to Washington, both on behalf of the Saudis and on behalf of the U.S.?

Roule: Architecture. And what you're looking for is something that lasts beyond one month, one deal. You're looking for something that binds us together over time. I think what you're going to hear will be announcements of MOUs. You will hear announcements of deals. And as important as it is to focus on the numbers associated with the deals, and there will certainly be focus on that and questions regarding that, it's really more important to focus on the industries, the sectors associated with those deals, and then the depth that each of those MOUs brings to the various societies.

For example, let's say that we see an aviation deal that might bring employment to the United States but will set up a manufacturing node in Saudi Arabia. If something like that were to happen, that would make Saudi Arabia part of a global supply chain. So 20 years from now, we would have a more reliable source of parts or an alternative source of parts. If mining is developed within the kingdom, well, it takes years to develop a mine, but we will have an alternative source of minerals, and Saudi Arabia is a rich source of multiple minerals that are important to the United States. Or if the Saudis invest in minerals in the U.S., it may take years for those to play out. So the architecture associated with those deals will mean employment but it's the depth and the timelines with those deals that will determine the depth of that relationship.

In terms of defense deals, I don't want to downplay that, but America has always stood with Saudi Arabia. People have often asked, 'If there's a single attack did we respond in as well or to the extent that we should have?' That's open to question. But there is no doubt in my mind, nor in the minds of regional leaders, that if there were a serious attack on Saudi Arabia by Iran or another country, we are absolutely going to be there. And do we need a defense deal to say that? I'll leave that to others, but not in my mind. But in any case, we will see some sort of defense architecture develop.

Should the Saudis have nuclear energy? Why not? Every other country does. They're looking for additional technology and there's no reason we can't provide that to them to assist them. But again, it's that architecture and the relationship over years that you seek, vice one delivery, one deal, and the announcements that go with it.

Kelly: Where do you see the region going in 2026? What will be the big headlines and the big drivers next year in the Middle East?

Roule: There's a lot of good news in the Middle East. The U.S. remains the dominant great power. Americans are not and likely will not be the target of a major military confrontation in the region. But the region itself continues to lack a strong cohesive narrative that pulls it together.

The biggest point in the region is that it remains a non-polar region. There's no reason to believe that this administration will cease its vigorous focus on the region. And we must applaud this administration for, in its first 11 months, having multiple emissaries and making visits and sending many cabinet ministers to the region. If you look at the recent conferences that have taken place in Manama, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, we've had cabinet level representation at all of those events to include during a government shutdown, which is no small thing, with representatives from multiple government departments. America is back and Russia and China are not.

Gaza is going to sputter along, and the U.S. commitment remains and CENTCOM is performing marvelously as a key force bringing things together. I think we're going to see that continuing. Neither side, Israel or the Palestinians, have a reason to return to war, but violence will continue. The largest or most significant political shifts in the region likely would come from a change in the Israeli government.

Iran is fragile. Iran nuclear talks are unlikely to begin until the administration sees evidence that the talks will not be a waste of time. Right now, the Iranians seek talks, but that doesn't mean they want to do anything other than have talks, because if they have talks, the rial will be strengthened and the Iranians don't have to bring anything up. The Quds Force will remain active. They will continue to deliver weapons to the Yemenis. But it's unlikely they're interested in looking for a conflict. We can't rule out a sudden collapse of Iran in case of an environmental disaster such as an earthquake, but the regime appears fragile at present.

Syria continues to make progress and I think we're going to see the progress continue in its current trend. Arab infrastructure investment continues to progress. I would watch for telecommunications and port investment work. And the reason that's important is that you're watching the Biden administration IMEC plan in essence or IMEC cooperation be realized as Gulf states put their lines up through Europe and through Syria.

Lebanon will likely remain a greater challenge. I think we're watching a lot of Saudi quiet diplomacy with Yemen and that will continue. GCC infrastructure will continue to develop. I would be surprised if we didn't see more Saudi work with Bahrain and Saudi work between the GCC and the West.

Oil will remain stable likely and soft in coming months. I think you're going to see a lot more natural gas come online. OPEC will continue to do everything it can to prevent oil from falling into the 50s while maintaining a relatively soft position so they can recapture market share from India and other places lost to Russia.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Two&Front Nuclear Crisis: Iran, North Korea, and a New Era of U.S. Deterrence https://belimedia.com.ng/the-two-front-nuclear-crisis-iran-north-korea-and-a-new-era-of-us-deterrence https://belimedia.com.ng/the-two-front-nuclear-crisis-iran-north-korea-and-a-new-era-of-us-deterrence

DEEP DIVE — While Washington is focused on Iran’s accelerating uranium-enrichment program and increasingly aggressive regional posture, an equally consequential shift is unfolding with seemingly less fanfare: North Korea’s rapid nuclear and missile advancements are quietly reshaping the global threat landscape.

For U.S. policymakers, the danger is no longer a pair of isolated challenges but a converging two-front nuclear problem—one that threatens to push America’s deterrence posture, crisis-management capacity, and alliance coordination closer to a breaking point. To understand how these two fronts could interact, experts emphasize that Iran and North Korea share a long-standing strategic alignment.

“The Iran–North alliance represents a four-decade-long partnership driven by shared hostility toward the United States, economic needs, and strategic isolation,” Danny Citrinowicz, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and former head of the Iran Branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in Israeli defense intelligence, tells The Cipher Brief. “The Iranians need to rearm and prepare for another campaign, which requires additional and fresh thinking regarding the depth of the relationship between Tehran and Pyongyang.”

He also warns that this moment may become an inflection point.

“If Iran seeks to change its nuclear strategy, it could ask North Korea for nuclear bombs or highly enriched material or spare parts for the destroyed nuclear facilities, such as the conversion facility in Isfahan,” Citrinowicz continued. “The potential damage in the event of such an event is so severe that it is essential that the intelligence organizations of the United States, South Korea, and Israel identify signs of this.”

Pyongyang’s Nuclear Threat

Despite UN sanctions and diplomatic efforts, a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) brief underscored that North Korea continues to surge forward with both nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile development. For Kim Jong Un, analysts note, nuclear weapons are a guarantor of regime security, and he has no intention of abandoning them.

North Korea’s nuclear doctrine and capability sets are evolving in troubling ways. The 2025 CRS brief states that a September 2023 law expanded the conditions under which Pyongyang would employ nuclear weapons, lowering what had been a high threshold for use. The same report noted the regime “promised to boost nuclear weapons production exponentially and diversify nuclear strike options.”

On the delivery side, the brief outlines how North Korea is fielding solid-fueled road-mobile ICBMs, sea-based launch systems, and pursuing multiple warheads on a single missile — all elements that raise the question not just of deterrence but of crisis stability and escalation control. In short, Pyongyang appears to be reaching toward a survivable deterrent — or perhaps a warfighting capability — that can impose calculations on the U.S. and its allies in a far more challenging way than before.

“Kim’s investment in new nuclear-capable delivery systems reflects the strategic importance of the country’s nuclear arsenal,” Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, tells The Cipher Brief. “North Korea is better positioning itself to evade and overwhelm regional missile defenses and target the U.S. homeland.”

Treston Wheat, chief geopolitical officer at Insight Forward, reinforces that intelligence picture, stressing that open-source assessments now “frame North Korea as a maturing nuclear-warfighting state,” with doctrine “trending toward first-use options in extreme regime-threat scenarios.” He notes that U.S. intelligence already evaluates Pyongyang as having achieved miniaturization: “A 2017 DIA assessment judged DPRK miniaturization sufficient for SRBM-to-ICBM delivery.”

Taken together, those capabilities point to a shifting threat environment for Washington.

“North Korea has tested missiles with the range necessary to target the continental United States,” Davenport underscored. “U.S. military planners have to assume that North Korea can target the United States.”

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Iran’s Nuclear Surge

Meanwhile, Iran is not standing still. Tehran has begun openly emulating aspects of Pyongyang’s nuclear playbook, indicating that if Western strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure forced Tehran to go underground, it could adapt quickly. That duality matters: Iran can arguably deploy its program overtly, under inspection and diplomatic cover, but at some threshold, it may decide the only path to survival is accelerated weaponization. If that happens while North Korea is already pushing new strategic capabilities, the U.S. is confronted with two simultaneous flashpoints — one in the Middle East, the other in Northeast Asia.

Deterrence, by definition, demands clarity of purpose, credible capabilities, and correctly calibrated signals. When the U.S. must manage a nuclear-armed North Korea and a near-breakout Iran at the same time, the risk is that strategic bandwidth becomes overstretched.

“Despite the failure of that approach, Iran maintains that its nuclear doctrine is unchanged and it does not intend to pursue nuclear weapons,” Davenport noted. “(But) without a pragmatic diplomatic approach that addresses Iranian economic and security concerns, Tehran’s thinking about nuclear weapons could shift.”

That potential shift in Tehran’s calculus becomes even more concerning when paired with broader warnings about Western inattention.

“If Western focus on the Iran threat dwindles, there is a risk the regime could take a new, covert path to nuclear weapons using remaining or reconstituted assets or foreign help,” Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief. “Such a lack of focus is similar to how North Korea became nuclear-armed.”

Tehran, experts caution, still retains deep technical capacity.

“Iran retained enough fissile stock and technical expertise to rebuild quickly, meaning the setback was tactical rather than strategic,” Wheat noted.

From Washington’s vantage point, the real danger is a dual crisis hitting at once — an Iranian enrichment surge or strike on its facilities in West Asia, paired with a North Korean missile volley or nuclear test in East Asia. That scenario forces the U.S. into parallel decision-cycles, stretching military, diplomatic, and intelligence resources, straining alliances, and creating openings that adversaries could exploit.

North Korea’s expanding warfighting delivery systems add another layer of risk: limited, precision escalation meant to test U.S. resolve. As the CRS notes, its ballistic-missile testing is designed to evade U.S. and regional defenses, putting American and allied forces at heightened risk. In effect, Pyongyang is developing not only a survivable deterrent but potential coercive leverage — just as Iran’s enrichment trajectory edges closer to a threshold that could trigger a U.S.-led military response.

“The possibility of Pyongyang providing nuclear assistance to Tehran is increasing,” Citrinowicz said. “The United States will need to focus its intelligence on this possibility, with the help of its allies who are monitoring developments.”

But that intelligence challenge intersects with another problem: mounting questions about U.S. credibility.

“President Trump has dealt a serious blow to U.S. credibility in both theaters,” Davenport asserted. “This risks adversaries attempting to exploit the credibility deficit to shift the security environment in their favor.”

U.S. Intelligence and Strategic Implications

Open-source intelligence paints a worrying picture: North Korea may have enough fissile material for perhaps up to 50 warheads, though the accuracy and reliability of delivery remain questions. It also signals Pyongyang’s development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and multiple-warhead ICBMs. The regime has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing.

The IAEA’s November 2025 report says it can no longer verify the status of Iran’s near–near-weapons-grade uranium stockpile after Tehran halted cooperation following the June 2025 Israeli and U.S. strikes on Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan.

The last confirmed data, from September, showed Iran holding 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent — a short step from weapons-grade and potentially enough for up to 10 bombs if fully processed. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi says most of this material is now entombed in damaged facilities. Moreover, satellite imagery activity around storage tunnels in Isfahan has raised serious red flags. The IAEA further cautions that oversight of this highly-enriched uranium site is “long overdue,” warning that the agency has lost “continuity of knowledge.”

Moreover, before the strikes, the IAEA assessed Iran could produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb in about a week using part of its 60 percent stockpile at Fordow. Damage to centrifuges has likely slowed that timeline. Still, the larger question is political: whether Iran, under renewed UN sanctions and scrutiny, decides that staying within NPT safeguards costs more than openly moving toward a weapon, particularly if work resumes at undeclared or rebuilt sites.

“The U.S. and Israeli strikes have created a window of respite. What happens next depends greatly on Iran’s will to provoke new Israeli strikes,” Stricker said. “North Korea is a wild card and could provide nuclear fuel, facilities, and equipment to Iran.”

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Looking Ahead

For Washington, the takeaway is stark: systems designed to manage one nuclear threat at a time may crumble should two crises flare simultaneously. The U.S. would need tighter allied coordination, faster intelligence sharing, and stronger, more flexible military deployments to cope.

Yet above all, policymakers must anticipate the possibility of simultaneous escalation in different theatres.

In the coming months and years, key indicators will include North Korea’s choice to conduct a seventh nuclear test or field a credible submarine-launched nuclear force, and Iran’s enrichment trajectory or decision to strike a covert breakout path. The U.S. must also watch for signs of cross-coordination between Moscow and Pyongyang, or between Tehran and Pyongyang — though open links remain murky.

From a policy perspective, a dual-front scenario demands updated wargames, an inter-theatre force posture review, and close allied coordination across NATO, the Indo-Pacific, and Middle East partners. Washington must also guard against the “umbrella illusion” — the belief that the same deterrence logic will apply unchanged across two theatres facing two distinct adversaries with differing doctrine, capabilities, and thresholds.

Finally, media and public attention naturally tend to focus on Iran’s progress or North Korea’s missile launches — one at a time. However, deterring two simultaneous nuclear-adversary theatres demands strategic awareness that the world may not be sequentially configured. For the U.S., what happens in one theatre may shape adversary calculations in the other. The risk is that by the time Washington pivots from Iran, Pyongyang — or Tehran — may have forced a new reality.

In this two-front nuclear dilemma, the question is no longer whether to monitor Iran or North Korea, but how the U.S. will deter both at the same time — and whether its strategic framework is ready for that challenge.

Emerging forms of collaboration amplify that challenge.

“More concerning is that North Korea is positioning itself to benefit from Russian expertise and to further refine its missile systems using data collected from Russia’s use of North Korean systems against Ukraine,” Davenport added.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business. ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Downside to Mission Focus: Why the Intelligence Community Should Not Forget to Look Inward https://belimedia.com.ng/the-downside-to-mission-focus-why-the-intelligence-community-should-not-forget-to-look-inward https://belimedia.com.ng/the-downside-to-mission-focus-why-the-intelligence-community-should-not-forget-to-look-inward OPINION — Not long ago, I was talking to an old friend and China analyst about the need for Intelligence Community (IC) analysts to spend significantly more time looking at themselves and their own agencies, processes, procedures, habits, biases, etc.—in other words, to be more introspective. I thought this an uncontroversial assertion as it has been well established in management literature that healthy organizations have robust introspective proclivities. But his response proved me wrong: “Do you have any idea what my read pile looks like? I have no time for navel-gazing.”

The above comment beautifully captures not only the IC’s aversion to introspection but also what is probably the main reason for that aversion—our “mission focus.” In fact, for most of us “mission, mission, mission” becomes a mantra from the day we take our oaths. But that admirable mission focus also comes with a very real downside: we tend to see introspection as a distraction from the mission rather than as a prerequisite to mission success. Add to that another compelling reason for our aversion—our historical and cultural wariness about looking at “blue” (U.S.-related) issues—and the roots of our introspective deficiencies quickly become evident.

That said, our aversion to introspection might well be disputed by some observers. After all, most of us take multiple personality assessments (e.g., Myers Briggs, DISC, etc.) during the course of our service. Additionally, we do have many of the trappings of an introspective community: organizations (e.g., National Intelligence University, Center for the Study of Intelligence, etc.), personnel (e.g., methodologists, tradecraft specialists, historians, etc.), and publications (e.g., NIU’s Research Notes, Shorts and Monographs; CIA’s Studies in Intelligence, etc.) that are specifically dedicated to thinking about the practice of intelligence. Why, then, do I posit that we are not sufficiently introspective?

Well, relative to the IC’s size, the aforementioned trappings are, by any measure, tiny. Moreover, although a sub-community of extraordinarily introspective officers exists, the majority of them are at their most introspective when—and because—they are not working on the line. As part of my research, I talk to many intelligence officers, especially line analysts. And in doing so I never fail to be amazed at how few seem to view routine introspective activities as vital to high performance. Sure, they see value in the occasional class, tradecraft-focused article, or ticking off the boxes on an Intelligence Community Directive 203 (Analytic Standards) checklist. But as a systematic, thorough, and routine activity? Not so much.

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Given this, the IC needs to fundamentally reassess its whole conception of introspection. No longer can it be sufficient to expect introspective initiatives to be carried out mostly by non-line or support entities, although their foundational introspective efforts will remain vital supports to mission. Rather, on top of that foundational work, the IC must start building introspective activity into the regular routines of officers actively and directly working on the mission. Just as practicing doctors and lawyers are required (at least on paper) to engage in self-assessment—”reflective practice”—even as they confront ever-increasing numbers of patients and caseloads, intelligence practitioners too must consciously invest time and thought in regularly reflecting on how we conduct our work and ways in which we could better achieve our mission.

There is no set form this reflective practice must take. It could be conducted in a group, individual and/or hybrid format. The only aspects that are non-negotiable are that it be regular, resourced (particularly with regard to time), and required.

Ultimately, and as mentioned at the outset, healthy organizations have strong introspective tendencies. It is crucial then, that the IC reconceives and incentivizes introspection as a fundamental prerequisite to mission success and not the distraction or “navel gazing” it too often is deemed to be.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s Intelligence Services After the War: Will They Be Held Accountable for their Failures? https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-intelligence-services-after-the-war-will-they-be-held-accountable-for-their-failures https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-intelligence-services-after-the-war-will-they-be-held-accountable-for-their-failures

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) have failed spectacularly in Ukraine: in planning, execution, and analysis, yet they will face no reckoning. Vladimir Putin cannot afford to hold the SVR, GRU, or FSB accountable because they are not merely instruments of the state; they are the pillars of his personal power. The RIS misled the Kremlin into believing Ukraine would fall in days, Europe would divide, and NATO would hesitate. Instead, they exposed the rot at the core of Russia’s national security system: corruption, internecine rivalry, and a profound detachment from reality. Understanding this dynamic matters for the West because it reveals not only how Russia fights its wars but how it fails, and how it will likely fight again.

As the war approaches its fourth year, the front lines have grown static, and speculation about an eventual end has returned. Certainly, the world hopes for peace and relief from the suffering that has defined Europe’s largest land conflict since 1945. Yet even when the drones stop flying, Ukraine’s struggle to rebuild will begin, and within the Russian government another kind of reckoning will unfold. The aggressor’s armed forces and intelligence services will take stock of losses and lessons learned. But unlike in the West, where failure invites inquiry and reform, Russia’s services are more likely to protect the system that failed them and pin any blame on each other.

Russian post-war accounting will not play out like we in the West might imagine. We are accustomed to commissions and legislative investigations after wars and major national security events, often resulting in harsh criticism for various agencies, and sweeping reforms. In Russia, however, Putin will largely give the RIS a pass.

To understand why, it is important to understand the roles the RIS played in the war and in the Russian government more broadly. The SVR (the Foreign Intelligence Service), the GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate - military intelligence), and the FSB (the Federal Security Service), serve first and foremost as Putin’s Praetorian Guard. Their primary responsibility is securing his regime and hold on power. Moreover, Putin rose up through the RIS ranks in the KGB, and later held the post of FSB Director. His feelings toward the RIS are hardly objective. The reputations of Putin and the services are inextricably linked. Anything that significantly tarnishes the highly cultivated myth of RIS omnipotence inevitably damages his own hold on power.

If Putin and the “siloviki” (strongmen) who make up his inner circle try to call the RIS to account for their performance when the fighting stops, the one thing all three services will argue is that the war was an absolute success. Each will extoll their roles with little regard for the number of Russian lives lost and military assets squandered. Going back to Tsarist and Soviet times, casualties and human suffering were never a mark for a war’s success or failure in Russia. The RIS will focus on territory gained, Ukraine’s membership in NATO being halted (from their optic), and the alliance, they will claim, weakened. They will ignore the addition of two capable new members to the alliance (Finland and Sweden), the doubling of the length of NATO’s border with Russia, and the resuscitation of NATO’s military spending and defense industrial base. Facts will not stop the RIS from claiming success with Putin. But it is useful to further break down some of their likely claims, and actual performance, by service.

The SVR: “Speak up Sergey!”

Among the RIS, and especially relative to the FSB, Putin has never been particularly fond of the foreign intelligence service, the SVR. Its claims of success on Ukraine will likely not impress him or the other siloviki much. Recall Putin’s public dressing down of SVR Director Sergey Naryshkin on Russian TV in the days before the invasion for indecisiveness: “Come on Sergey, speak up, speak plainly!” But Sergey did not speak up, nor make much of a difference in the war.

Since they do not have troops or special ops elements in the war (their main Spec-Ops team, ZASLON, is used more for protection abroad), the SVR will likely try to boast of the success of its “active measures” operations. This is the traditional term the Russians have used for covert influence and disinformation activities intended to weaken, confuse, or disrupt their adversaries. Their modern term, however, is to refer to them as “measures of support” (MS). The SVR has an entire “Directorate MS” devoted to this line of operational work: using troll farms, social media, cyber operations, and recruited agents of influence to meddle in the internal politics, public opinion, and elite decision-making of its adversaries to Russia’s advantage. The Russians believe their active measures contributed to their successes in the Georgia invasion in 2008 and occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014. They believed they confused and stunted the West’s response and, to a degree, they were right.

But the SVR will have trouble claiming active measures succeeded in the current Ukraine war. They will perhaps try to sell Putin that the SVR sowed confusion at critical policy decision points when the U.S. and its European allies were not always in sync—hesitation in providing this or that weapons system, unity or lack thereof at times on sanctions, asset seizures, etc. Their efforts, however, did not materially alter Russia’s failure to achieve its war aims. If they were effective at all, it was only in the margins. There will be no dramatic accounting for the SVR but expect to see the SVR’s relative influence decline among the RIS, a continuation of trend since Putin’s rise to power.

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GRU: Plowed into the Grinder, and Re-Special Purposed

The GRU will likely point to the various sabotage acts, conducted in Europe after the invasion, some successful but most not, including exploding packages, industrial arson, cable cuts in the Baltic Sea, and assassinations, or attempts at them. These are the purview of the GRU and its various numbered units, such as Unit 29155, which was behind both the attempted assassination of GRU defector Sergey Skripal in the UK in 2018, and likely also the thwarted assassination plot against the CEO of Germany’s Rheinmetall in 2024. The Lithuanian government is convinced the GRU also was behind the crash of a DHL plane that same year. But these actions failed in their primary mission, to intimidate and deter Europe and NATO from assisting Ukraine. If anything, the actions have only emboldened members to continue support for Ukraine.

Another shocking GRU failure, one heavily criticized in Russia’s pro-war blogosphere but receiving less attention in the West, was its squandering of precious, highly trained Spetsnaz units on the Ukrainian battlefield. There are nine Spetsnaz, or “Special Purpose,” brigades under the GRU’s 14th Directorate (roughly analogous to Tier 1 elements in the U.S. SOCOM). Nearly all were heavily deployed in Ukraine, and all suffered extremely heavy casualties. The planned decapitation strike against the Ukrainian leadership in the first days of the war, spearheaded by Spetsnaz units, was a complete and costly failure (the failed seizure of Hostomel airport was part of this). Many Spetsnaz were also used foolishly in frontal assaults and to plug gaps in forward lines when Russian “kontraktniki” (conscripts) failed. GRU Spetsnaz have a storied history and culture. It will be hard for them to recover the reputation for being “elite” without notable successes to point to in Ukraine. They failed to impact the direction of the war in any significant way.

As with the SVR, the GRU will likely avoid any dramatic negative consequences. There will probably be some modest reorganizations, just as there have been since the collapse of the USSR. In fact, the GRU is technically not even called the GRU any longer. It was formally redesignated the “GU” (Main Directorate), although many stubborn officers still refer to themselves as “GRU-chniki.” One reorganization has already occurred since the war began, the standup of something called the Department for Special Tasks (SSD). Its function and exact composition are still not fully known, but it appears to combine various Russian-termed “direct actions” (e.g., assassinations, sabotage) units, such as Unit 29155, into a unified structure. The SSD is broadly equivalent to the CIA’s Special Activities Center in terms of covert action, but dwarfs it in size (and the CIA is bound by law not to carry out assassinations). The GRU is a mammoth bureaucracy and it will likely only grow more after the war.

FSB: Failed, But Still Putin’s Favorite

Despite their many failures, there will be few significant negative consequences for the FSB, which Putin once ran. In many ways, though, the FSB’s shortcomings in Ukraine were the most egregious and consequential. The FSB was in charge of the war’s planning, particularly the hybrid dimensions, or what Russian doctrine refers to more broadly as “non-contact war.” The FSB's lead for the Ukraine invasion was its Fifth Service, which heads up both operational analysis and reporting to the President on the war. The FSB has organizational primacy for RIS operations in the “near abroad,” i.e., the states of the former USSR, including Ukraine. In the pre-war planning phase, the Fifth Service was wrong about everything: wrong about Ukrainian resilience, wrong about how quickly and substantially Europe and NATO would react, and wrong about the FSB and Russian Armed Forces’ capabilities on the ground.

FSB Spetsnaz units Alpha and Vympel all participated in the war, but like their GRU cousins, they have not distinguished themselves. Still they are still frequently lauded in the Russian press for “actions that cannot be disclosed.” The FSB also has the lead for cyber operations against Ukraine with its 16th Center, but those cyber-attacks have not materially altered the direction of the war in Russia’s favor. The battle over bytes was not won in any way by Russian FSB hackers, whose ranks were bolstered by Russian criminal groups hacking for the state and their coffers.

The FSB will likely be the RIS agency most affected by the war. But instead of accountability for failure, its power and influence will likely only grow. First, because of all the services, the FSB, in its secret police role, is the critical player in securing Putin’s rule. In the bureaucratic pecking order, the FSB sits at the very top and will remain there. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov holds the military rank of full General, and he is treated as such by Russian military generals, despite never having served in the military. Second, if there is a formal investigation or after-action when the fighting stops, the FSB will lead it, just as it did in the investigations of the 2002 Nord-Ost theater terrorist attack, the 2004 school seizure in Beslan, and the more recent Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in 2024, each of which involved breathtaking intelligence and operational failures, but did not have significant negative repercussions for the FSB. The FSB pretends to clean up after it performs incompetently.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

In conclusion, the one thing the West can count on is that the Russian services will continue to relentlessly compete with and back-stab one another. There is no “intelligence community” in Russia remotely similar to the one we have in the United States. The rivalries within our community pale in comparison. This presents opportunities to recruit personnel from all the RIS services, many of whom will have lost colleagues in the war for a cause and for leaders whose competence an increasing number of them will come to doubt. This and the pervasive corruption in Russia are still strong incentives for espionage against those who have led Russia down this disastrous path.

The RIS will not prevent another war for Russia; if anything, they will foment one. Before they do, the US and our allies must understand these failures, but also, and critically, the Russian services’ likely self-evaluation and the lessons they themselves will draw, or fail to draw, from those lessons. When the current war ends, Putin may plan another intervention or aggression--in Europe, again in Ukraine, or elsewhere. Before he does, we need to be ready to counter the next iteration of the FSB, GRU, and SVR tactics to encourage and support war. We can better do so by studying their playbook and some of their attempted actions, and dramatic failures.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s Intelligence Services After the War https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-intelligence-services-after-the-war https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-intelligence-services-after-the-war

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) have failed spectacularly in Ukraine: in planning, execution, and analysis, yet they will face no reckoning. Vladimir Putin cannot afford to hold the SVR, GRU, or FSB accountable because they are not merely instruments of the state; they are the pillars of his personal power. The RIS misled the Kremlin into believing Ukraine would fall in days, Europe would divide, and NATO would hesitate. Instead, they exposed the rot at the core of Russia’s national security system: corruption, internecine rivalry, and a profound detachment from reality. Understanding this dynamic matters for the West because it reveals not only how Russia fights its wars but how it fails, and how it will likely fight again.

As the war approaches its fourth year, the front lines have grown static, and speculation about an eventual end has returned. Certainly, the world hopes for peace and relief from the suffering that has defined Europe’s largest land conflict since 1945. Yet even when the drones stop flying, Ukraine’s struggle to rebuild will begin, and within the Russian government another kind of reckoning will unfold. The aggressor’s armed forces and intelligence services will take stock of losses and lessons learned. But unlike in the West, where failure invites inquiry and reform, Russia’s services are more likely to protect the system that failed them and pin any blame on each other.

Russian post-war accounting will not play out like we in the West might imagine. We are accustomed to commissions and legislative investigations after wars and major national security events, often resulting in harsh criticism for various agencies, and sweeping reforms. In Russia, however, Putin will largely give the RIS a pass.

To understand why, it is important to understand the roles the RIS played in the war and in the Russian government more broadly. The SVR (the Foreign Intelligence Service), the GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate - military intelligence), and the FSB (the Federal Security Service), serve first and foremost as Putin’s Praetorian Guard. Their primary responsibility is securing his regime and hold on power. Moreover, Putin rose up through the RIS ranks in the KGB, and later held the post of FSB Director. His feelings toward the RIS are hardly objective. The reputations of Putin and the services are inextricably linked. Anything that significantly tarnishes the highly cultivated myth of RIS omnipotence inevitably damages his own hold on power.

If Putin and the “siloviki” (strongmen) who make up his inner circle try to call the RIS to account for their performance when the fighting stops, the one thing all three services will argue is that the war was an absolute success. Each will extoll their roles with little regard for the number of Russian lives lost and military assets squandered. Going back to Tsarist and Soviet times, casualties and human suffering were never a mark for a war’s success or failure in Russia. The RIS will focus on territory gained, Ukraine’s membership in NATO being halted (from their optic), and the alliance, they will claim, weakened. They will ignore the addition of two capable new members to the alliance (Finland and Sweden), the doubling of the length of NATO’s border with Russia, and the resuscitation of NATO’s military spending and defense industrial base. Facts will not stop the RIS from claiming success with Putin. But it is useful to further break down some of their likely claims, and actual performance, by service.

The SVR: “Speak up Sergey!”

Among the RIS, and especially relative to the FSB, Putin has never been particularly fond of the foreign intelligence service, the SVR. Its claims of success on Ukraine will likely not impress him or the other siloviki much. Recall Putin’s public dressing down of SVR Director Sergey Naryshkin on Russian TV in the days before the invasion for indecisiveness: “Come on Sergey, speak up, speak plainly!” But Sergey did not speak up, nor make much of a difference in the war.

Since they do not have troops or special ops elements in the war (their main Spec-Ops team, ZASLON, is used more for protection abroad), the SVR will likely try to boast of the success of its “active measures” operations. This is the traditional term the Russians have used for covert influence and disinformation activities intended to weaken, confuse, or disrupt their adversaries. Their modern term, however, is to refer to them as “measures of support” (MS). The SVR has an entire “Directorate MS” devoted to this line of operational work: using troll farms, social media, cyber operations, and recruited agents of influence to meddle in the internal politics, public opinion, and elite decision-making of its adversaries to Russia’s advantage. The Russians believe their active measures contributed to their successes in the Georgia invasion in 2008 and occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014. They believed they confused and stunted the West’s response and, to a degree, they were right.

But the SVR will have trouble claiming active measures succeeded in the current Ukraine war. They will perhaps try to sell Putin that the SVR sowed confusion at critical policy decision points when the U.S. and its European allies were not always in sync—hesitation in providing this or that weapons system, unity or lack thereof at times on sanctions, asset seizures, etc. Their efforts, however, did not materially alter Russia’s failure to achieve its war aims. If they were effective at all, it was only in the margins. There will be no dramatic accounting for the SVR but expect to see the SVR’s relative influence decline among the RIS, a continuation of trend since Putin’s rise to power.

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GRU: Plowed into the Grinder, and Re-Special Purposed

The GRU will likely point to the various sabotage acts, conducted in Europe after the invasion, some successful but most not, including exploding packages, industrial arson, cable cuts in the Baltic Sea, and assassinations, or attempts at them. These are the purview of the GRU and its various numbered units, such as Unit 29155, which was behind both the attempted assassination of GRU defector Sergey Skripal in the UK in 2018, and likely also the thwarted assassination plot against the CEO of Germany’s Rheinmetall in 2024. The Lithuanian government is convinced the GRU also was behind the crash of a DHL plane that same year. But these actions failed in their primary mission, to intimidate and deter Europe and NATO from assisting Ukraine. If anything, the actions have only emboldened members to continue support for Ukraine.

Another shocking GRU failure, one heavily criticized in Russia’s pro-war blogosphere but receiving less attention in the West, was its squandering of precious, highly trained Spetsnaz units on the Ukrainian battlefield. There are nine Spetsnaz, or “Special Purpose,” brigades under the GRU’s 14th Directorate (roughly analogous to Tier 1 elements in the U.S. SOCOM). Nearly all were heavily deployed in Ukraine, and all suffered extremely heavy casualties. The planned decapitation strike against the Ukrainian leadership in the first days of the war, spearheaded by Spetsnaz units, was a complete and costly failure (the failed seizure of Hostomel airport was part of this). Many Spetsnaz were also used foolishly in frontal assaults and to plug gaps in forward lines when Russian “kontraktniki” (conscripts) failed. GRU Spetsnaz have a storied history and culture. It will be hard for them to recover the reputation for being “elite” without notable successes to point to in Ukraine. They failed to impact the direction of the war in any significant way.

As with the SVR, the GRU will likely avoid any dramatic negative consequences. There will probably be some modest reorganizations, just as there have been since the collapse of the USSR. In fact, the GRU is technically not even called the GRU any longer. It was formally redesignated the “GU” (Main Directorate), although many stubborn officers still refer to themselves as “GRU-chniki.” One reorganization has already occurred since the war began, the standup of something called the Department for Special Tasks (SSD). Its function and exact composition are still not fully known, but it appears to combine various Russian-termed “direct actions” (e.g., assassinations, sabotage) units, such as Unit 29155, into a unified structure. The SSD is broadly equivalent to the CIA’s Special Activities Center in terms of covert action, but dwarfs it in size (and the CIA is bound by law not to carry out assassinations). The GRU is a mammoth bureaucracy and it will likely only grow more after the war.

FSB: Failed, But Still Putin’s Favorite

Despite their many failures, there will be few significant negative consequences for the FSB, which Putin once ran. In many ways, though, the FSB’s shortcomings in Ukraine were the most egregious and consequential. The FSB was in charge of the war’s planning, particularly the hybrid dimensions, or what Russian doctrine refers to more broadly as “non-contact war.” The FSB's lead for the Ukraine invasion was its Fifth Service, which heads up both operational analysis and reporting to the President on the war. The FSB has organizational primacy for RIS operations in the “near abroad,” i.e., the states of the former USSR, including Ukraine. In the pre-war planning phase, the Fifth Service was wrong about everything: wrong about Ukrainian resilience, wrong about how quickly and substantially Europe and NATO would react, and wrong about the FSB and Russian Armed Forces’ capabilities on the ground.

FSB Spetsnaz units Alpha and Vympel all participated in the war, but like their GRU cousins, they have not distinguished themselves. Still they are still frequently lauded in the Russian press for “actions that cannot be disclosed.” The FSB also has the lead for cyber operations against Ukraine with its 16th Center, but those cyber-attacks have not materially altered the direction of the war in Russia’s favor. The battle over bytes was not won in any way by Russian FSB hackers, whose ranks were bolstered by Russian criminal groups hacking for the state and their coffers.

The FSB will likely be the RIS agency most affected by the war. But instead of accountability for failure, its power and influence will likely only grow. First, because of all the services, the FSB, in its secret police role, is the critical player in securing Putin’s rule. In the bureaucratic pecking order, the FSB sits at the very top and will remain there. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov holds the military rank of full General, and he is treated as such by Russian military generals, despite never having served in the military. Second, if there is a formal investigation or after-action when the fighting stops, the FSB will lead it, just as it did in the investigations of the 2002 Nord-Ost theater terrorist attack, the 2004 school seizure in Beslan, and the more recent Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in 2024, each of which involved breathtaking intelligence and operational failures, but did not have significant negative repercussions for the FSB. The FSB pretends to clean up after it performs incompetently.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

In conclusion, the one thing the West can count on is that the Russian services will continue to relentlessly compete with and back-stab one another. There is no “intelligence community” in Russia remotely similar to the one we have in the United States. The rivalries within our community pale in comparison. This presents opportunities to recruit personnel from all the RIS services, many of whom will have lost colleagues in the war for a cause and for leaders whose competence an increasing number of them will come to doubt. This and the pervasive corruption in Russia are still strong incentives for espionage against those who have led Russia down this disastrous path.

The RIS will not prevent another war for Russia; if anything, they will foment one. Before they do, the US and our allies must understand these failures, but also, and critically, the Russian services’ likely self-evaluation and the lessons they themselves will draw, or fail to draw, from those lessons. When the current war ends, Putin may plan another intervention or aggression--in Europe, again in Ukraine, or elsewhere. Before he does, we need to be ready to counter the next iteration of the FSB, GRU, and SVR tactics to encourage and support war. We can better do so by studying their playbook and some of their attempted actions, and dramatic failures.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
How Myanmar’s Generals Crushed Democracy — And What Comes Next https://belimedia.com.ng/how-myanmars-generals-crushed-democracy-and-what-comes-next https://belimedia.com.ng/how-myanmars-generals-crushed-democracy-and-what-comes-next OPINION — After decades of military rule in Myanmar, free and fair general elections were permitted in 2015 and the National League for Democracy and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, won by a landslide. In February 2021, a military coup d’etat installed General Min Aung Hlaing as the acting president, and imprisoned Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto head of state and recipient of a Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for her non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights in Myanmar.

The military coup has brought death and suffering to the people of Myanmar. Recent figures from the United Nations estimate that over 6,000 civilians have been killed by the military, including over 1,000 women and 695 children. According to the United Nations, over 62% of verified civilian deaths result from airstrikes and artillery barrages by the military. And more than 3.5 million people have been displaced within Myanmar since the military coup, with hundreds of thousands more seeking refuge in neighboring countries.

Anti-coup resistance forces are active in Myanmar, to include the People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations. The National Unity Government, an exiled government of elected politicians who were ousted in the coup, provides leadership, funding and support to the various resistance groups that often coordinate activities to fight the military junta, to restore democracy to Myanmar.

According to the United Nations, since the February 2021 coup, the military junta has imported over $1 billion in weapons, raw materials, and dual-use goods from several countries, with Russia and China topping the list of suppliers. Russia’s state arms exporter, Rosoboronexorrt, was instrumental in providing the military junta with over $400 million of weaponry: attack helicopters, fighter jets, missiles, drones, and radar systems. And for the world to see, there were joint naval exercises between Russia and Myanmar’s military junta.

China has resumed normal relations with the military junta and its various ministries, in addition to providing Chinese Y-8 transport planes. China is quite open about its political engagement with the military junta and, working with Russia, resists United Nations efforts to condemn the junta.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

What has been disappointing is the inability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to influence Myanmar’s military junta and restore democracy to Myanmar. Indeed, in April 2021 ASEAN adopted a “Five-Point Consensus” to stop the violence, initiate a dialogue and appoint a special envoy to oversee progress in restoring democracy in Myanmar. The military junta has basically ignored ASEAN and the five-point consensus, despite ASEAN’s engagement with the military junta, thus providing legitimacy with a regime committing grave abuses.

Malaysia, as the 2025 ASEAN Chair, has been proactive in pushing for a ceasefire and meaningful dialogue with resistance forces. Indonesia has been supportive and hopefully other ASEAN members will be equally supportive of a cease fire and dialogue with multiple ethnic armed organizations, to include the National Unity Government and the People’s Defense Forces.

The military junta announced phased elections in December 2025 through January 2026. There is understandable concern that this will be a sham election, designed to legitimize the military junta and its leader, General Min Aung Hlaing.

The United Nations, ASEAN and the U.S. should demand that they be permitted to send election monitors to Myanmar to certify that the election was fair and open to all the people.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business. ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
I Was Cheney's CIA Briefer: This is the Dick Cheney I Knew https://belimedia.com.ng/i-was-cheneys-cia-briefer-this-is-the-dick-cheney-i-knew https://belimedia.com.ng/i-was-cheneys-cia-briefer-this-is-the-dick-cheney-i-knew EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — About a week before being interviewed by Richard Bruce Cheney about whether I would be the right person to serve as his national security briefer, I broke a bone in my left foot. While bounding down the stairs at home in a rush not to be late to a meeting at the National Security Council, I missed a step. So, rather than spending the morning at The White House, I spent it at a doctor’s office getting a big, goofy, purple cast on my left leg. Fantastic. How better to exude to the Vice President of the United States that I would be competent as his President’s Daily Brief (PDB) briefer, than hobbling into the interview with a cast? Somehow, I got the job.

During the presidency of George W. Bush, the President and Vice President’s PDB briefers met and traveled with them six days a week, sometimes seven. We would awaken every morning around 1:00am to prepare what is known as the “Book” and accompanying material. The Book was the President’s Daily Brief itself, a brutally concise, relatively short collection of intelligence analyses produced at that time, by just the CIA; it went to a short list of designated policymakers. All who received it also got morning briefers to accompany and expand on the content as needed and to take taskings, but only those for the President and Vice President routinely traveled with them. In addition to the PDB, there was “behind-the-tab” material for all recipients except the President. In Cheney’s case, I decided—with zero supervision or coordination—what he also needed to see, per my judgement. Raw intel, press pieces, book summaries, graphics, and anything else that I thought could be useful.

I generally briefed the then-Vice President at the Naval Observatory, the official residence for U.S. vice presidents. But just a week into the job, I accompanied him on Marine Two to Camp David, where he would attend some meetings. Thus began a rapid, daily learning curve into who this man was - starting with how he treated others.

“Others” fell generally into two categories with little gray area between—those he respected and those he did not. People in both categories usually knew where they stood, and Cheney didn’t manifest different orientations toward people based on their societal stations in life. This was a man whose default setting was to show courtesy and respect toward others unless they convinced him otherwise. Every one of his ushers, central members of the residence staff, told me individually - with zero nudging from me - that they liked the Cheneys much more than they liked their predecessors. Why, I asked. Because the Cheneys always showed respect to them, their time demands, they told me. As for those in the other category? Many of us recall Cheney telling Senator Patrick Leahy to “go f*** yourself” on the Senate floor in 2004. He also bluntly expressed his opinions on a wide range of actors and even nations to me during our time together. Few if any fell into gray area.

Nominations for outstanding leaders in national security and intelligence are now open for the 2026 Cipher Brief Honors Dinner. Find out more here.

Cheney consistently hosted the longest of the PDB sessions across all PDB recipients of that Administration, a reflection of his intellectual curiosity, the endless stacks of books and other things he read, his many years of navigating the U.S. Government and geopolitics, and the fact that on most mornings, he went from his briefings with me to attending PDB sessions with his boss. I always had at least 30 minutes with him, and on mornings when events or travel altered the President’s schedule, my sessions could stretch beyond 90 minutes.

Something that was reflected in his time commitment to those PDB sessions was that, among being many things, Dick Cheney was an overachiever of the world-class order. Whatever task, duty, mission, strategic pursuit that might be in his cross hairs, he would be utterly prepared. This part of him of course helped land his stint as the youngest White House Chief of Staff in history, under President Gerald Ford.

Much has been written about Cheney’s role and actions in the immediate wake of 9-11; I came after, during the run up to and consequences following America’s second invasion of Iraq. Because of when I briefed him and the job I took immediately afterward in July 2003 - Chief of CIA’s Iraq enterprise covering military, political, leadership, and economic analysis - I draw from a unique combination of perspectives to offer context on the Iraq, Dick Cheney story. Some will be surprised by what I saw including during NSC meetings chaired by President Bush and attended by Cheney when I sat in as the 'plus-one' for the CIA Director or for the Director of National Intelligence.

On March 16, 2002, Dick Cheney said on NBC’s Meet the Press, “I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators . . . I think it [the invasion] will go relatively quickly . . . weeks rather than months.” As we now know, he - and other seniors in the Bush Administration - could not have been more wrong.

Not long after we invaded Iraq in March of 2003, violence there began to swell up, and soon thereafter the CIA enterprise I headed gave President Bush and Cheney - their first and highly unwelcome dose of the “I” word: insurgency. Early on, Bush and other Administration seniors explained the sources of the violence as “criminals, regime dead-enders, or trouble-makers” pushed into the country by Iraq and Syria as operatives. But in the summer of 2003, we put a PDB into the Oval Office arguing that an organized and indigenous insurgency was quickly developing. Feedback from Bush’s PDB briefer that morning was “The President was so angry he came off his chair. He wants a memo tomorrow morning recounting when we warned him this was coming.” A lot people worked overnight to produce that 4.5-page piece, which delivered what was asked.

At some point between that initial shock and late summer, fall of 2003, Cheney - whom we had briefed in more detail on the insurgency, told us “The President needs to hear this.” Consider that one of the Administration’s most vocal and influential advocates of invading Iraq, who had been on record saying the effort would be easy and short, had now turned to persuading Bush and his entire NSC that we faced an insurgency in Iraq. Cheney knew that this information, once it entered the public arena, would likely get himself as well as President Bush eviscerated by the media and by critics. But that seemed to matter little to him; the United States was underestimating what it was now facing in Iraq, and Cheney’s focus became aligning policy with reality.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

A few days before Veterans Day in 2003, someone in the CIA Director’s office told me there would be a briefing that day for Bush’s NSC on Iraq that I would lead. Cheney had facilitated this. I also was told I could take one analyst of my choice, but I knew some on the NSC would push back hard and would expect "in the weeds" details of our analysis, so I subbed myself out and sent two senior analysts who knew the weeds - a superlative military expert and a political-analyst counterpart.

It was a PhD and former Marine CIA military analyst in my Iraq enterprise who forced then Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld and others to accept that an insurgency was emerging in Iraq. The analyst’s most persuasive moment came when Rumsfeld argued forcefully that there were several and differing definitions of insurgency, making use of the word confusing at best and inaccurate at worst. That military analyst calmly but firmly summarized the two most widely accepted definitions and illustrated that the CIA’s conclusion was based on the one observed by Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense. The analyst also laid out premises needed to justify that definition, all of which all in the room were seeing. Bush declared acceptance, noted that NSC members had to be square with this reality among themselves, and requested all to avoid the word insurgency in public.

Let me close with an insight that sheds light on Cheney’s near obsession with going into Iraq to find WMD and then showing a level of comfort with enhanced interrogation techniques that many find appalling.

One morning after a PDB briefing with me, Cheney sat back and recounted some history following the Gulf War, during which he was Secretary of Defense. He reminded me with some energy that during interrogations of Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law Hussein Kamel, who defected temporarily, we learned that Iraq’s nuclear-weapons program was further along than we had assessed. Rather than a form of scolding for off-the-mark CIA analysis back then, this perspective he was sharing signaled an acknowledgement that I knew the weight of his role in persuading Bush ’43 to invade Iraq—and in his mind, he had good reason. If we were underestimating Saddam’s WMD program again and Osama bin Laden gained access to any part of it, the consequences for Americans would be catastrophic.

The Economist Magazine recently summarized the unwavering sense of duty to nation felt by Cheney. In the closing words of its obituary in reference to criticism about his posture toward countering terrorism, and on being wrong about WMD in Iraq, The Economist wrote: “He was unmoved . . . He was, as always, just doing his job. Trying to protect America.”

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:38 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why an Unmanned Mission May be Most Effective in Venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/why-an-unmanned-mission-may-be-most-effective-in-venezuela https://belimedia.com.ng/why-an-unmanned-mission-may-be-most-effective-in-venezuela OPINION — Wars are increasingly fought by unconventional means. A recent example is Ukrainian insertion of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to attack Russian airfields, launched from civilian outfitted trucks. The Israeli pager attacks are another example of leveraging unconventional means to achieve an outsized effect. Both examples demonstrate that unconventional methods can not only disrupt enemy forces and destroy key objectives, but also achieve tremendous psychological effects and by saturating the airspace, limit an adversaries ability to mount offensive operations.

While the U.S. continues a conventional military buildup off the coast of Venezuela, the lessons from the Ukrainian and Israeli conflicts may be prescient: the US can achieve most of our policy objectives with limited or no ground forces deployment into Venezuela. The authors assume the current U.S. administration’s objectives are centered on regime change without conventional warfare.

Venezuelan forces may be well-prepared for guerilla warfare. Reports are circulating that Russian “advisors” have been dispatched to Venezuela, and it is likely that the Venezuelan army is incorporating Russia’s lessons from Ukraine into their preparation. American forces meeting a small, well-prepared drone force could lead to unacceptable casualties, a prolonged conflict, unnecessary escalation, and international embarrassment.

We suggest, therefore, that if intervention in Venezuela is forthcoming, the U.S. should adopt a strategy centered on unmanned systems. Modern combat in Ukraine and Israel provide a viable model.

Our proposed strategy suggests leveraging a combination of UAS and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) to weaken the Maduro government’s internal support, and hasten favorable conditions for peace - again, assuming “regime change” or negotiated peace are the desired endstates.

How the U.S. Military Thinks of War

The U.S. Military uses a six-phase planning model to describe the progression of an operation or campaign. This continuum begins with Phase 0: Shape, which involves continuous peacetime activities to influence the operational environment and prepare for contingencies. As an operation develops, the force moves to Phase I: Deter, demonstrating capability and resolve to dissuade, followed by Phase II: Seize Initiative once hostilities begin, gaining access and advantage. The core combat phase is Phase III: Dominate, which involves applying overwhelming combat power to defeat the enemy force. The final stages, often requiring significant force commitment for irregular warfare, are Phase IV: Stabilize, focusing on securing the operating area and providing security, and Phase V: Enable Civil Authority, which transitions security and control back to legitimate local governance to establish a lasting peace. Technologies are used in every phase as a strategic force multiplier.

Proposed Unmanned Systems Strategy

Phase 0 should begin immediately. This phase would be centered on information collection around the capital, Caracas, and the economic epicenters, Venezuela, Maracaibo, Valencia, and Barquisimeto, as well as oil refineries, given their central importance to the Venezuelan economy. Significant real-time intelligence collection could be achieved by leveraging High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) aircraft coupled with pervasive small, ground-based sensors. UGVs would provide long-term, ground-based multi-disciplined intelligence collection capabilities, leveraging commercial off-the-shelf technologies (proven effective in Ukraine) to reduce risk of exposing sensitive or proprietary technologies.

The assessed trigger for escalation would be a breakdown of negotiations over a change of government. Subsequent operations would focus on precision degradation and infrastructure interdiction, designed to be quick, minimize political fallout, and avoid direct engagement with Venezuelan forces. Generally, operations would seek to scale between Phase 1 - Deter, and Phase 3 - Dominate, to apply and then relieve pressure on the Venezuelan government and population as needed to degrade political will and popular support. Operations should be carefully crafted, and targets thoughtfully selected, not just for military effect, but for their psychological and political impact.

Aerial and Electronic Warfare Dominance

The first actions would be entirely aerial, focused on blinding the Venezuelan government and shaping persistent intelligence, all while demonstrating the ability to dominate without causing significant destruction. The U.S. could suppress air defenses using high-altitude, stealth drones, and specialized EW drones to undermine government influence and degrade command and control. Targets would include Venezuela's air defense systems, mostly Russian S-300VM and Buk-M2E missile batteries, and radar networks. Key locations would be targeted with precision-guided munitions or overwhelmed and jammed by EW drones before kinetic strikes to establish air superiority for subsequent UAS waves.

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Targeting Command and Control

The U.S. could leverage loitering munitions and specialized communications relay and jammer UAVs to target key military and government communication nodes, high-frequency transmission sites, and satellite ground stations. Small, inexpensive UAS could be coupled with highly mobile UGVs to extend range, and to achieve precise sequencing, impressing urgency and conveying the message that the Maduro government is inept. By severing communication links between the military high command and field units, the U.S. could cause decentralized chaos, which would degrade the will to fight. Unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) could contain Venezuelan forces, targeting the fleet to deny freedom of movement.

Given instability in Venezuela and the Maduro Government’s demonstrated willingness to enter into discussions, well-sequenced escalation and deescalation may provide the necessary impetus to achieve the desired effect. Minimizing destruction up to this juncture reduces the subsequent burden of rebuilding, which would increase popular support for a replacement government. Minimizing damage would also reduce the likelihood of causing unintended regional instability through large-scale human displacement.

With their extended battery life and ability to recharge with onboard solar panels or from civilian power sources, UGVs provide an ideal baseline for extended operations, providing prolonged ground-based intelligence and surveillance. Information from onboard sensors, long-term intelligence collection, could provide timely battle damage assessments, and would shape planning for subsequent operations.

Well-Timed Precision Strikes

Small UAS loaded with precision explosive and cyber and EW payloads could be loaded onto UGV and transported deep within the country, where they would be staged for well-timed, precision operations to set conditions for negotiations. Disabling power to cause temporary service blackouts, or disrupting and corrupting government information campaigns would allow the U.S. to control the narrative. These precision operations should be choreographed and limited to eliminate harm to civilians.

Precision strikes launched from UGVs could damage government buildings and political headquarters, timed for maximum media coverage, to demonstrate penetration and weakness. Cellular towers could be struck with small munitions to inconvenience and frustrate the population. These limited actions could continue near indefinitely, and would reinforce the narrative that Maduro is weak and incapable, increasing the likelihood of a timely resignation.

UGVs with an explosive payload could be covertly controlled over cellular networks over extended distances, to strike key locations such as bridges, military installations or troop concentrations deep within Venezuela. In the event of a troop deployment, UGV could also be outfitted with weapon platforms such as machine guns or grenade launchers, for force protection.

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Conclusion

With warships off the coast and the airspace over Venezuela “closed”, all signs indicate that the U.S. administration intends to leverage the military to achieve a political objective. There are two options should we choose to proceed. The first is a conventional war, with high financial cost, significant political risk and moderate risk of casualties. The second option is to leverage our growing unmanned systems arsenal, where financial costs will be relatively low, and the risk of casualties will be minimal.

The lessons from modern conflicts in Ukraine and Israel overwhelmingly provide a model for moving towards an agile, unmanned systems-centric strategy. This agile approach, moving from pervasive intelligence collection to targeted electronic warfare and precision kinetic strikes, if choreographed with other effects, would exert maximum political and psychological pressure. It also minimizes collateral damage by avoiding direct military engagement with Venezuelan forces.

This strategy has several advantages: it drastically reduces the risk of unacceptable casualties for American forces, and it minimizes the destructive aftermath that traditionally prolongs conflict and burdens post-conflict reconstruction. An unmanned systems strategy also enables the U.S. to move fluidly between deterring and dominating to maximize effects, and serves as a strong deterrent against countries who might doubt America’s ability to fight and win in modern combat.

Ultimately, the choice to intervene will always be a political one. However, if such action is deemed necessary, adopting a nearly exclusive unmanned strategy offers a path to achieving a political end-state quickly and cleanly. It is a recognition that the future of modern warfare is defined not by the size of a conventional buildup, but by the strategic, ethical, and precise application of unmanned systems to effect change.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia’s is Waging a Sabotage Shadow War on Europe https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-is-waging-a-sabotage-shadow-war-on-europe https://belimedia.com.ng/russias-is-waging-a-sabotage-shadow-war-on-europe

DEEP DIVE — In the darkness of night on November 15, a massive explosion ripped through a stretch of the Warsaw-Lublin railway line close to Mika, Poland, severing a critical logistics route used to ship military equipment and aid eastward from Warsaw toward the Ukrainian border.

The blast, caused by a C-4 explosive device, damaged the tracks and a passing freight train’s wagon floor, halting rail traffic and sending ripples of alarm through Poland, one of Ukraine’s staunchest allies.

Polish authorities quickly confirmed sabotage, charging three Ukrainian nationals — Oleksandr K., Yevhenii I., and Volodymyr B. — with executing the plot under Russian direction. The incident was not a lone act but part of a growing wave of covert operations targeting railways, ports, and pipelines across Europe, aimed at undermining support for Kyiv.

Ivana Stradner, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, characterizes these actions to The Cipher Brief as Russia “waging a long, low-cost pressure campaign that targets not only the battlefield but everyday life across EU countries.”

Polish prosecutors outlined the operation’s chilling precision. In September 2025, Volodymyr B., arrested on November 20 and charged on November 22, drove Yevhenii I. to the sabotage site for reconnaissance, enabling the selection of the explosive placement. Oleksandr K. and Yevhenii I., the primary perpetrators acting on behalf of Russian intelligence, planted the device and a metal clamp intended to derail a train, then fled to Belarus, where Poland’s extradition requests remain pending.

Immediately following the attack, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski characterized it as “state terror.” Warsaw closed Russia’s last consulate in Gdansk, and thousands of soldiers were deployed nationwide to protect critical infrastructure. The Kremlin, nonetheless, rebuffed the accusations as “Russophobia” and vowed to retaliate by severing Polish diplomatic ties. This exchange of moves points, however, to a larger trend: the use of subtle, sophisticated attacks aimed at crippling Ukraine’s supply lines without triggering a full-blown escalation.

Proxies in the Shadows: Recruiting the Unwitting

Moscow’s strategy for sabotage is built on proxies, using local citizens and displaced people to carry out attacks and maintain Russia’s plausible deniability. The situation in Poland is particularly disturbing, where the involvement of Ukrainian nationals exposes an aggressive recruitment campaign aimed at vulnerable youth from their war-torn home country. Ukrainian security services have documented a sharp rise, reporting that Russian operatives have entrapped over 170 minors in the last 18 months, often luring them through Telegram channels disguised as job boards or casual chats.

The recruitment base consists of migrants from Eastern Europe and Russian-speaking citizens of countries where the sabotage operations are carried out. They are often individuals with criminal histories or financial problems. What begins as innocuous tasks — snapping photos of buildings or mailing postcards — escalates to planting bombs or torching vehicles, often with payments that seem too good to refuse.

Head of Ukraine’s National Police Juvenile Prevention Department, Vasyl Bohdan, described the ploy’s subtlety: “For the most part, the children don’t understand what is happening, or that it’s very serious.” Experts note that Russian operatives often begin by masquerading as sympathetic figures to build trust with their targets. Once the relationship is established, they leverage compromising material to secure compliance through blackmail. In one recent instance in Ivano-Frankivsk, two teenagers were promised $1700 each and thus embedded a device that detonated remotely, killing one and maiming the other.

“Russia’s intelligence services use Ukrainians inside NATO states because it blurs the political story and creates deniability, especially since many recruits are young, economically vulnerable, and have no prior ideological profile,” Natalya Goldschmidt, CEO of Lightning Associates LLC, a strategic geopolitical consulting firm focusing on Russia, Eurasia, and Latin America, tells The Cipher Brief. “Most of the initial interactions now happen through encrypted apps and seemingly low‑stakes’ tasks, such as taking photos of infrastructure, moving small packages, or counting vehicles, which makes these pipelines hard to spot before an operation moves from reconnaissance to action."

Ukraine’s countermeasures have gained traction, with police and NGOs flooding schools and camps with warnings, partnering with celebrities like boxer Oleksandr Usyk to drill home the dangers. Reports of attempted recruitments have surged to 74 this year, and successful cases have plummeted, as Bohdan noted: the number of successful child recruitment cases has decreased “exponentially over the past year.”

According to Goldschmidt, Moscow’s hybrid operations and cognitive warfare are most effective against a Europe already fragmented by domestic political crises, economic fatigue, and unresolved debates over migration and identity.

“The most worrying escalation over the next year or so is not one spectacular act, but a carefully timed cluster of incidents that together amount to a strategic shock: rail disruptions and warehouse fires at a critical moment for aid to Ukraine, damage to energy or data links in Northern Europe, and Russian drones killing or seriously injuring someone on NATO territory, all wrapped in enough ambiguity to delay a unified response,” she cautioned.

This proxy model extends well into Europe.

In October, Romanian intelligence smashed a parallel operation by arresting two Ukrainian citizens. The pair had smuggled bomb components — incendiary devices disguised in car parts and headphones — into Bucharest, targeting the Nova Post headquarters, a Ukrainian courier firm moving vital aid. In addition to thermite and barium nitrate, the packages included counter-surveillance measures, exhibiting classic Russian tradecraft. According to investigators, the duo is part of a wider network acting under Moscow’s direction, which has allegedly targeted Nova Post sites in Poland and elsewhere.

The threat became clearer that same week when Poland detained eight suspects tied to planned infrastructure attacks. Officials in Europe attribute these coordinated operations to Russian elite formations, notably GRU Unit 29155. General Andrei Averyanov leads the unit and is part of a dedicated sabotage hub under General Vladimir Alekseev, which marshals over 20,000 Spetsnaz operatives.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Hybrid Echoes: Testing the Article 5 Threshold

The sabotage wave laps at diverse shores, blending old-school explosives with cutting-edge disruptions to fray Europe’s logistical sinews.

There have been several cases of undersea fibre cable damage or destruction in the Baltic under murky circumstances, prompting high-level investigations. From Germany to the Nordic states, prosecutors and security services have reported a pattern of suspected sabotage in fires and parcel-incendiary incidents that have scorched logistics hubs and defense manufacturing sites.

At the same time, GPS and navigation jamming across the Baltic and northeastern Europe has surged — European ministers and national regulators report daily interference that has disrupted flights and aviation operations, and they warn of substantial economic impacts. In September, mass drone overflights and cross-border incursions, including a large wave of drones into Poland and a 19-September violation of Estonian airspace by MiG-31s, prompted NATO consultations and temporary airport closures in the region.

These disruptions, while seemingly tactical, tie directly into a broader strategic calculus aimed at testing NATO’s unity and response mechanisms.

The strategic heart of the issue is NATO’s collective defense clause. Stradner also notes that, “Vladimir Putin has been candid about his desire to discredit NATO’s Article 5 in which members pledge to treat an attack against one ally as an attack against all.” She argues that because Putin, “Trained as a KGB operative, is well versed in so-called ‘active measures,’” his goal is to challenge the alliance.

Alexander Graef, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Leadership Network, however, contends to The Cipher Brief that “the actual impact of these sabotage acts on the flow of aid to Ukraine remains extremely limited.”

In his view, the activities are primarily aimed “less at disrupting logistics than at influencing public opinion in Western societies by trying to convince voters that further support for Ukraine carries unacceptable risks.” He stresses that this strategy “rests on a misreading of Western threat perceptions,” as such actions tend to “reinforce the opposite conclusion: that Russia is a growing danger and that support for Ukraine, as well as investment in defense, must increase further.”

“The Article 5 threshold remains deliberately high. Invoking it requires consensus within the North Atlantic Council. It is hard to imagine such agreement emerging in response to low-level sabotage, ambiguous incidents, or non-lethal disruptions,” Graef said. Therefore, Moscow does indeed appear to be “calibrating its operations to stay well below that line. Still, it is not achieving its intended political effects.”

George Barros, Russia Team & Geospatial Intelligence Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War, concurs to The Cipher Brief that Russia is “boiling the frog and NATO member states have so far elected to not treat Russian acts of war against them as they truly are.”

“Russia has already passed the threshold with its sabotage actions, manned aircraft airspace incursions, and missiles entering the airspace of Poland and Romania. Russia seeks to normalize this activity so that NATO de facto approves a new normal, in which case we don’t treat Russian acts of war seriously,” he noted. “The West has far too long allowed Russia to operate against us with relative impunity. The West must seize the strategic initiative from Russia and begin imposing dilemmas on Russia.”

Yet even as these operations escalate, analysts say Russia is careful to keep them calibrated just below the line that would trigger NATO’s collective-defense clause.

The problem with Article 5, as experts observe, is that the ‘hybrid’ qualities of ambiguity and deniability – which, it is feared, Russia would manipulate to come close to the Article 5 threshold without reaching it – can paralyze the institutional and political mechanisms of collective defense.

“Putin does this all the time. It’s the same pattern — gray-zone hybrid operations run out of the GRU,” former CIA station chief Daniel Hoffman, tells The Cipher Brief. “Operating against enemies on foreign soil with impunity and facing no repercussions. They’re sending a message.”

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Fortifying the Front: Europe’s Counteroffensive

While concerns over Russian interference deepen, Europe tries to fortify its infrastructure. In response to September’s airspace breaches, EU defense ministers accelerated deployment of a “drone wall” along the eastern flank.

To harden against airspace violations, Graef advises that measures must be tailored, noting that while airspace violations require increased internal coordination, harmonized rules of engagement, and improved information sharing, sabotage is primarily the responsibility of “police, counterintelligence services, and judicial authorities.”

He maintains that if Russia’s objective is to weaken European support, then “demonstrating political unity is in itself an important countermeasure.”

Maksym Skrypchenko, nonresident scholar in the Russia Eurasia Program, points out that, from Kyiv’s purview, European governments’ measures to protect infrastructure are catastrophically insufficient.

“Russia is several steps ahead, while Europe is acting reactively rather than proactively. Russian embassies remain operational, and Russian tourists continue to travel, which is being exploited not only for information gathering and influence operations but also for sabotage,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “European countries need to start with basic steps: acknowledge that they have a single major threat. Once this acknowledgment happens, the next step should be decisive action – ceasing the purchase of Russian energy resources, blocking Russia’s shadow fleet, expelling Russian diplomat-spies, strengthening infrastructure protection, and investing in acquiring Ukrainian anti-drone systems, to name a few.”

While some analysts discuss limited, deniable counter-sabotage in response, Graef warns that “such activities carry significant risks.”

“They can easily fuel an action–reaction cycle without generating meaningful deterrent effects,” he asserted, highlighting that the focus should remain on strengthening resilience, improving attribution, and coordinating clear response thresholds rather than “entering a covert tit-for-tat that neither deters nor stabilizes.

In the face of this persistent, multi-layered threat, Stradner believes the ultimate answer lies in deterrence through strength.

“We should not fear escalations as kindness is weakness for Putin, and he only understands the language of power,” she noted, underscoring that the consequences of continued inaction and ambiguity in the face of Moscow’s “new generation warfare.”

“Until NATO resolves the lack of clarity regarding Article 5’s threshold for acts of aggression warranting collective defense, Russia will continue to sabotage without the consequences of all-out war, and the Western response to this hybrid war will remain reactive and insufficient,” Stradner added.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business. ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
Russia is Waging a Sabotage Shadow War on Europe https://belimedia.com.ng/russia-is-waging-a-sabotage-shadow-war-on-europe https://belimedia.com.ng/russia-is-waging-a-sabotage-shadow-war-on-europe

DEEP DIVE — In the darkness of night on November 15, a massive explosion ripped through a stretch of the Warsaw-Lublin railway line close to Mika, Poland, severing a critical logistics route used to ship military equipment and aid eastward from Warsaw toward the Ukrainian border.

The blast, caused by a C-4 explosive device, damaged the tracks and a passing freight train’s wagon floor, halting rail traffic and sending ripples of alarm through Poland, one of Ukraine’s staunchest allies.

Polish authorities quickly confirmed sabotage, charging three Ukrainian nationals — Oleksandr K., Yevhenii I., and Volodymyr B. — with executing the plot under Russian direction. The incident was not a lone act but part of a growing wave of covert operations targeting railways, ports, and pipelines across Europe, aimed at undermining support for Kyiv.

Ivana Stradner, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, characterizes these actions to The Cipher Brief as Russia “waging a long, low-cost pressure campaign that targets not only the battlefield but everyday life across EU countries.”

Polish prosecutors outlined the operation’s chilling precision. In September 2025, Volodymyr B., arrested on November 20 and charged on November 22, drove Yevhenii I. to the sabotage site for reconnaissance, enabling the selection of the explosive placement. Oleksandr K. and Yevhenii I., the primary perpetrators acting on behalf of Russian intelligence, planted the device and a metal clamp intended to derail a train, then fled to Belarus, where Poland’s extradition requests remain pending.

Immediately following the attack, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski characterized it as “state terror.” Warsaw closed Russia’s last consulate in Gdansk, and thousands of soldiers were deployed nationwide to protect critical infrastructure. The Kremlin, nonetheless, rebuffed the accusations as “Russophobia” and vowed to retaliate by severing Polish diplomatic ties. This exchange of moves points, however, to a larger trend: the use of subtle, sophisticated attacks aimed at crippling Ukraine’s supply lines without triggering a full-blown escalation.

Proxies in the Shadows: Recruiting the Unwitting

Moscow’s strategy for sabotage is built on proxies, using local citizens and displaced people to carry out attacks and maintain Russia’s plausible deniability. The situation in Poland is particularly disturbing, where the involvement of Ukrainian nationals exposes an aggressive recruitment campaign aimed at vulnerable youth from their war-torn home country. Ukrainian security services have documented a sharp rise, reporting that Russian operatives have entrapped over 170 minors in the last 18 months, often luring them through Telegram channels disguised as job boards or casual chats.

The recruitment base consists of migrants from Eastern Europe and Russian-speaking citizens of countries where the sabotage operations are carried out. They are often individuals with criminal histories or financial problems. What begins as innocuous tasks — snapping photos of buildings or mailing postcards — escalates to planting bombs or torching vehicles, often with payments that seem too good to refuse.

Head of Ukraine’s National Police Juvenile Prevention Department, Vasyl Bohdan, described the ploy’s subtlety: “For the most part, the children don’t understand what is happening, or that it’s very serious.” Experts note that Russian operatives often begin by masquerading as sympathetic figures to build trust with their targets. Once the relationship is established, they leverage compromising material to secure compliance through blackmail. In one recent instance in Ivano-Frankivsk, two teenagers were promised $1700 each and thus embedded a device that detonated remotely, killing one and maiming the other.

“Russia’s intelligence services use Ukrainians inside NATO states because it blurs the political story and creates deniability, especially since many recruits are young, economically vulnerable, and have no prior ideological profile,” Natalya Goldschmidt, CEO of Lightning Associates LLC, a strategic geopolitical consulting firm focusing on Russia, Eurasia, and Latin America, tells The Cipher Brief. “Most of the initial interactions now happen through encrypted apps and seemingly low‑stakes’ tasks, such as taking photos of infrastructure, moving small packages, or counting vehicles, which makes these pipelines hard to spot before an operation moves from reconnaissance to action."

Ukraine’s countermeasures have gained traction, with police and NGOs flooding schools and camps with warnings, partnering with celebrities like boxer Oleksandr Usyk to drill home the dangers. Reports of attempted recruitments have surged to 74 this year, and successful cases have plummeted, as Bohdan noted: the number of successful child recruitment cases has decreased “exponentially over the past year.”

According to Goldschmidt, Moscow’s hybrid operations and cognitive warfare are most effective against a Europe already fragmented by domestic political crises, economic fatigue, and unresolved debates over migration and identity.

“The most worrying escalation over the next year or so is not one spectacular act, but a carefully timed cluster of incidents that together amount to a strategic shock: rail disruptions and warehouse fires at a critical moment for aid to Ukraine, damage to energy or data links in Northern Europe, and Russian drones killing or seriously injuring someone on NATO territory, all wrapped in enough ambiguity to delay a unified response,” she cautioned.

This proxy model extends well into Europe.

In October, Romanian intelligence smashed a parallel operation by arresting two Ukrainian citizens. The pair had smuggled bomb components — incendiary devices disguised in car parts and headphones — into Bucharest, targeting the Nova Post headquarters, a Ukrainian courier firm moving vital aid. In addition to thermite and barium nitrate, the packages included counter-surveillance measures, exhibiting classic Russian tradecraft. According to investigators, the duo is part of a wider network acting under Moscow’s direction, which has allegedly targeted Nova Post sites in Poland and elsewhere.

The threat became clearer that same week when Poland detained eight suspects tied to planned infrastructure attacks. Officials in Europe attribute these coordinated operations to Russian elite formations, notably GRU Unit 29155. General Andrei Averyanov leads the unit and is part of a dedicated sabotage hub under General Vladimir Alekseev, which marshals over 20,000 Spetsnaz operatives.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Hybrid Echoes: Testing the Article 5 Threshold

The sabotage wave laps at diverse shores, blending old-school explosives with cutting-edge disruptions to fray Europe’s logistical sinews.

There have been several cases of undersea fibre cable damage or destruction in the Baltic under murky circumstances, prompting high-level investigations. From Germany to the Nordic states, prosecutors and security services have reported a pattern of suspected sabotage in fires and parcel-incendiary incidents that have scorched logistics hubs and defense manufacturing sites.

At the same time, GPS and navigation jamming across the Baltic and northeastern Europe has surged — European ministers and national regulators report daily interference that has disrupted flights and aviation operations, and they warn of substantial economic impacts. In September, mass drone overflights and cross-border incursions, including a large wave of drones into Poland and a 19-September violation of Estonian airspace by MiG-31s, prompted NATO consultations and temporary airport closures in the region.

These disruptions, while seemingly tactical, tie directly into a broader strategic calculus aimed at testing NATO’s unity and response mechanisms.

The strategic heart of the issue is NATO’s collective defense clause. Stradner also notes that, “Vladimir Putin has been candid about his desire to discredit NATO’s Article 5 in which members pledge to treat an attack against one ally as an attack against all.” She argues that because Putin, “Trained as a KGB operative, is well versed in so-called ‘active measures,’” his goal is to challenge the alliance.

Alexander Graef, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Leadership Network, however, contends to The Cipher Brief that “the actual impact of these sabotage acts on the flow of aid to Ukraine remains extremely limited.”

In his view, the activities are primarily aimed “less at disrupting logistics than at influencing public opinion in Western societies by trying to convince voters that further support for Ukraine carries unacceptable risks.” He stresses that this strategy “rests on a misreading of Western threat perceptions,” as such actions tend to “reinforce the opposite conclusion: that Russia is a growing danger and that support for Ukraine, as well as investment in defense, must increase further.”

“The Article 5 threshold remains deliberately high. Invoking it requires consensus within the North Atlantic Council. It is hard to imagine such agreement emerging in response to low-level sabotage, ambiguous incidents, or non-lethal disruptions,” Graef said. Therefore, Moscow does indeed appear to be “calibrating its operations to stay well below that line. Still, it is not achieving its intended political effects.”

George Barros, Russia Team & Geospatial Intelligence Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War, concurs to The Cipher Brief that Russia is “boiling the frog and NATO member states have so far elected to not treat Russian acts of war against them as they truly are.”

“Russia has already passed the threshold with its sabotage actions, manned aircraft airspace incursions, and missiles entering the airspace of Poland and Romania. Russia seeks to normalize this activity so that NATO de facto approves a new normal, in which case we don’t treat Russian acts of war seriously,” he noted. “The West has far too long allowed Russia to operate against us with relative impunity. The West must seize the strategic initiative from Russia and begin imposing dilemmas on Russia.”

Yet even as these operations escalate, analysts say Russia is careful to keep them calibrated just below the line that would trigger NATO’s collective-defense clause.

The problem with Article 5, as experts observe, is that the ‘hybrid’ qualities of ambiguity and deniability – which, it is feared, Russia would manipulate to come close to the Article 5 threshold without reaching it – can paralyze the institutional and political mechanisms of collective defense.

“Putin does this all the time. It’s the same pattern — gray-zone hybrid operations run out of the GRU,” former CIA station chief Daniel Hoffman, tells The Cipher Brief. “Operating against enemies on foreign soil with impunity and facing no repercussions. They’re sending a message.”

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Fortifying the Front: Europe’s Counteroffensive

While concerns over Russian interference deepen, Europe tries to fortify its infrastructure. In response to September’s airspace breaches, EU defense ministers accelerated deployment of a “drone wall” along the eastern flank.

To harden against airspace violations, Graef advises that measures must be tailored, noting that while airspace violations require increased internal coordination, harmonized rules of engagement, and improved information sharing, sabotage is primarily the responsibility of “police, counterintelligence services, and judicial authorities.”

He maintains that if Russia’s objective is to weaken European support, then “demonstrating political unity is in itself an important countermeasure.”

Maksym Skrypchenko, nonresident scholar in the Russia Eurasia Program, points out that, from Kyiv’s purview, European governments’ measures to protect infrastructure are catastrophically insufficient.

“Russia is several steps ahead, while Europe is acting reactively rather than proactively. Russian embassies remain operational, and Russian tourists continue to travel, which is being exploited not only for information gathering and influence operations but also for sabotage,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “European countries need to start with basic steps: acknowledge that they have a single major threat. Once this acknowledgment happens, the next step should be decisive action – ceasing the purchase of Russian energy resources, blocking Russia’s shadow fleet, expelling Russian diplomat-spies, strengthening infrastructure protection, and investing in acquiring Ukrainian anti-drone systems, to name a few.”

While some analysts discuss limited, deniable counter-sabotage in response, Graef warns that “such activities carry significant risks.”

“They can easily fuel an action–reaction cycle without generating meaningful deterrent effects,” he asserted, highlighting that the focus should remain on strengthening resilience, improving attribution, and coordinating clear response thresholds rather than “entering a covert tit-for-tat that neither deters nor stabilizes.

In the face of this persistent, multi-layered threat, Stradner believes the ultimate answer lies in deterrence through strength.

“We should not fear escalations as kindness is weakness for Putin, and he only understands the language of power,” she noted, underscoring that the consequences of continued inaction and ambiguity in the face of Moscow’s “new generation warfare.”

“Until NATO resolves the lack of clarity regarding Article 5’s threshold for acts of aggression warranting collective defense, Russia will continue to sabotage without the consequences of all-out war, and the Western response to this hybrid war will remain reactive and insufficient,” Stradner added.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business. ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
Second Strike, No Survivors: The Legal and Political Questions Around Trump’s Narco&Boat Killings https://belimedia.com.ng/second-strike-no-survivors-the-legal-and-political-questions-around-trumps-narco-boat-killings https://belimedia.com.ng/second-strike-no-survivors-the-legal-and-political-questions-around-trumps-narco-boat-killings OPINION — “As we’ve said from the beginning, and in every statement, these highly effective strikes are specifically intended to be ‘lethal, kinetic strikes.’ The declared intent is to stop lethal drugs, destroy narco-boats, and kill the narco-terrorists who are poisoning the American people. Every trafficker we kill is affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization.”

That was part of a message from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last Friday evening on the social platform X, commenting on an earlier Washington Post story that alleged Hegseth had verbally ordered defense officials to “kill everybody” traveling on a narco-trafficking boat September 2. That was the first of 21 boats struck and sunk since then by U.S. military units – actions which have killed 83 people.

According to last week’s Post story, that first September 2, missile strike hit a so-called narco-trafficking boat carrying 11 passengers, but left two survivors clinging to the wreckage. The Post story then reported for the first time that a second strike was ordered by Adm. Frank "Mitch" Bradley, who was at the time, head of Special Operations Command and was the commander in charge of the operation.

In his Friday message, apparently referring to The Post article, Hegseth wrote, “As usual, the fake news is delivering more fabricated, inflammatory, and derogatory reporting to discredit our incredible warriors fighting to protect the homeland.”

Hegseth went on to write that the attacks have been “lawful under both U.S. and international law, with all actions in compliance with the law of armed conflict,” positions already being criticized and questioned before last week’s Post story.

On Sunday, President Trump on Air Force One said, “He [Hegseth] said he did not say that [the order “kill everybody”], and I believe him, 100 percent.”

Yesterday, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, said “Secretary Hegseth authorized Adm. Bradley to conduct these kinetic strikes,” and that “Adm. Bradley worked well within his authority and the law to ensure the boat was destroyed and the threat to the United States of America was eliminated.”

A good question is who was in the room when Adm. Bradley gave that order?

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The second strike issue has also put a spotlight on President Trump’s threat policy toward Venezuela and its leader, Nicolas Maduro.

I describe it as a threat policy because Trump’s been unclear whether he just wants Maduro out, or plans for the U.S. to take over Venezuela and install a new government in Caracas.

Since August, a possible U.S. invasion force has been built up in the Caribbean, and over the past weeks Marine, Navy and Air Force elements have carried out well-publicized military exercises. Trump last week threatened to attack Venezuelan land-based drug facilities, and he disclosed on Sunday, that he had spoken to Maduro.

Press reports claim Trump offered free passage if Maduro left Venezuela, but indications are that the latter did not accept the offer. A Trump-led White House meeting on Venezuela was scheduled for 5 p.m. yesterday with the President’s top national security aides.

Let’s pause for a moment.

President Trump has not yet explained his strategy, or the specific purpose or plan, for the built-up U.S. Caribbean military forces. He has talked about stopping drugs from entering the U.S., often claiming – with no proof – that each narco-boat destroyed saves 25,000 American lives.

It’s no real war on drugs in the U.S. since it has no domestic element, and even the foreign side is flawed as illustrated by Trump’s surprise pardon offer last Friday to former-Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández.

Based ironically on an investigation begun during Trump’s first administration, Hernandez was convicted and sentenced last year to 45 years in prison. Prosecutors described him as a “violent, multi-ton drug trafficker” who allegedly abused his political connections for personal and political gain and at least twice “helped arrange murders of drug trafficking rivals.”

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Meanwhile, up to now Congress has yet to hold a public hearing focused on the Caribbean buildup or the Venezuelan situation. However, this second-strike killing of the two September 2 survivors has brought new attention and concern to the legal questioning of the Trump administration’s killing of narco-traffickers.

Harvard Law School Professor Jack Goldsmith last Friday pointed out in his Executive Functions platform that the Defense Department’s own Law of War Manual says, “it is also prohibited to conduct hostilities on the basis that there shall be no survivors, or to threaten the adversary with the denial of quarter. This rule is based on both humanitarian and military considerations. This rule also applies during non-international armed conflict.”

Last Friday, Sens. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and Jack Reed (D-R.I.), chairman and ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, released a joint statement saying their committee “is aware of recent news reports and the Department of Defense’s initial response regarding follow-on strikes on suspected narcotics vessels in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.”

As a result, the two Senators said, “The Committee has directed inquiries to the Department and we will be conducting vigorous oversight to determine the facts related to these circumstances.”

Their notice comes on top of a letter sent November 24, to Attorney General Pam Bondi and Hegseth by Democratic Senators on the Armed Services Committee, seeking “expeditious declassification and public release of the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel’s [OLC] written opinion, dated September 5, 2025, concerning the domestic and international legal basis for recent military strikes of certain vessels near South America and the Caribbean, with appropriate redactions necessary to protect military personnel and sensitive intelligence matters.”

The 13 Senators pointed out, “Few decisions are more consequential for a democracy than the use of lethal force,” and noted as precedent that “after the United States carried out military strikes in Libya in 2011, and in Syria in 2018, the Department of Justice released the applicable OLC opinion justifying each operation.”

On Saturday, the House Armed Services Chairman and ranking Democrat. Reps. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) and Adam Smith (D-Wash.), issued their own statement saying their committee is “committed to providing rigorous oversight of the Department of Defense’s military operations in the Caribbean,” and “we take seriously the reports of follow-on strikes on boats alleged to be ferrying narcotics in the SOUTHCOM region and are taking bipartisan action to gather a full accounting of the operation in question.”

With both Republican-chaired committees on record opening inquiries into the narco-boat attacks, and President Trump threatening new land attacks on Venezuela, it is not clear what happens next.

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What Trump has done is put out statements on Truth Social such as the one last Saturday, “To all Airlines, Pilots, Drug Dealers, and Human Traffickers.” They are to “please consider THE AIRSPACE ABOVE AND SURROUNDING VENEZUELA TO BE CLOSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.” Most international commercial flights had been cancelled more than 10 days ago after the November 21, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration warning of the risks of flying over Venezuelan airspace,

What is all this Trump messaging supposed to mean? And is this a way a serious U.S. President should be conducting foreign policy?

As I and others have pointed out, there has been unease indicated within the Defense Department since these unprovoked killings began. In mid-October, SOUTHCOM Commander Adm. Alvin Holsey announced his early retirement on December 12 – little more than a year after he assumed the position. Holsey has yet to disclose his reasoning, but the New York Times reported that he had raised internal concerns about the attacks on the boats.

In November, NBC reported that a senior SOUTHCOM Judge Advocate General in August, before the strikes began, had raised whether they would be legal, and that he was later sidelined.

We also have had President Trump’s social media outbursts beginning November 20, against Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) and five other Members of Congress, each of whom had served in the military or CIA, for their video reminding military personnel that they “can refuse illegal orders.” Trump at various times called what they had done “Seditious Behavior” that was “punishable by death.”

Hegseth, last Tuesday in a memo to the Navy Secretary John Phelan, described Kelly’s participation in the video as “Potentially Unlawful Conduct,” and asked for it to be reviewed for “consideration and disposition as you deem appropriate.” As a retired Navy officer, Kelly could be ordered back on active duty and face a court martial trial. But Hegseth, having apparently left it up to Phelan and the Navy to carry out, made it highly unlikely that anything more than an inquiry will ever take place.

While all these activities are taking place today, I want to also record a bit of history surrounding Operation Southern Spear, which Secretary Hegseth announced November 13, “as a new, formal military and surveillance campaign,” with a goal “to remove ‘narco-terrorists’ from the Western Hemisphere and secure the U.S. homeland from illicit drugs.”

In fact, Operation Southern Spear had its roots in the Biden administration and was officially announced by the U.S. Navy 4th Fleet on January 28, 2025, as “a heterogeneous mix of Robotic and Autonomous Systems to support the detection and monitoring of illicit trafficking while learning lessons for other theaters.” In a press release, the 4th Fleet said the operation was an evolution of the Navy’s previous operation dubbed Windward Stack, begun in 2023. It added, the results of Operation Southern Spear “will help determine combinations of unmanned vehicles and manned forces needed to provide coordinated maritime domain awareness and conduct counternarcotics operations.”

In a July 2, 2025, announcement, the Navy said SOUTHCOM and 4th Fleet have launched Operation Southern Spear which “will involve un-crewed surface vessels that can stay at sea for extended periods, small robotic interceptor boats, and vertical take-off and landing un-crewed air systems. These will combine with manned forces to help provide coordinated maritime domain awareness and conduct counternarcotics operations.”

I doubt that the originators of Operation Southern Spear foresaw it as a human killing program.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Strategic Failure on North Korea’s Nuclear Rise https://belimedia.com.ng/the-strategic-failure-on-north-koreas-nuclear-rise https://belimedia.com.ng/the-strategic-failure-on-north-koreas-nuclear-rise EXPERT OPINION — South Korea’s Korea Institute for Defense Analysis recently publicly stated that we underestimated North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. According to their analysis, North Korea has between 127 and 150 nuclear weapons (not 50 to 60 nuclear weapons), and by 2030 they will have 200 nuclear weapons, reaching 400 nuclear weapons by 2040.

At the eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Congress in late 2022, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered the exponential expansion of North Korea's nuclear arsenal and the development of a more powerful intercontinental ballistic missile. Mr. Kim reportedly said: “They are now keen on isolating and stifling North Korea…and the prevailing situation calls for redoubled efforts to overwhelmingly beef up our military muscle.”

During this six-day meeting of the Central Committee, Mr. Kim not only called for an “exponential increase in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal”, but he also called for the mass production of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons targeting South Korea, and a new ICBM with a “quick nuclear counterstrike capability; a weapon that could strike the mainland U.S.”

North Korean leaders usually say what they plan to do. Indeed, this is the case with Mr. Kim. Not only has he apparently done this with his arsenal of nuclear weapons, but in October 2025, at the parade celebrating the 80th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party, the Hwasong-20, a solid fuel, mobile three stage ICBM capable of targeting the whole of the U.S., was introduced to the international community. The Hwasong-20 possibly could also be capable of launching multiple nuclear warheads at different targets, a capability that would challenge any missile defense system. So, the arsenal of ICBMs that could strike the U.S. – Hwasong-18 and 19 – has also grown exponentially with the Hwasong-20, as Mr. Kim said in 2022.

North Korea has also been working on its submarine program, to include a nuclear-powered submarine. This is in addition to its extensive work on hypersonic and cruise missiles, all representing a challenge to any missile defense system.

North Korea is also developing a second-strike capability, with programs to ensure the survivability of some of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the progress North Korea has made with solid-fuel mobile ICBMs and nuclear-armed submarines, providing a mobile launch platform. Moreover, North Korea’s doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons has changed to a preemptive, first use of nuclear weapons if a nuclear attack against the leadership or command and control systems is imminent or perceived to be imminent.

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Russian President Vladimir visited Pyongyang in June 2024, when he and Mr. Kim signed a mutual defense treaty, part of a “Strategic Comprehensive Partnership” between Russia and North Korea, ratified in November 2024. Article 4 of the treaty states that should either nation “put in a state of war by an armed invasion, the other will provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay”

In October 2024, NATO claimed North Korean soldiers arrived in Russian Kursk Oblast to join Russian forces in its war of aggression with Ukraine. Additionally, North Korea was providing Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles. That assistance to Russia continues.

In return, it’s likely that in addition to energy and food assistance, Russia is providing North Korea with assistance with its satellite and ballistic missile programs and, also, with its nuclear program. Indeed, Russia could help with North Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine program, especially with the design, materials and components for such a technically challenging program.

North Korea’s mutual defense treaty with Russia, and its participation in the war with Ukraine, was a major failing of the U.S. and South Korea. We should have seen movement in this direction and did more to prevent it from happening. Of course, there is irony in Russia now saying North Korea should have nuclear weapons when in the Six Party Talks with North Korea, Russia, with China, Japan, South Korea and the U.S., was in sync arguing that North Korea should not have nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are an existential threat to the U.S. and its allies. Our past policy to “contain and deter” North Korea and to be “strategically patient” with North Korea didn’t work. They failed, as evidenced by North Korea’s robust nuclear and ballistic missile programs and their allied relationship with Russia – and China. Indeed, efforts should be made by the leadership in the U.S. and South Korea to get Mr. Kim to reengage, especially with President Donald Trump.

As South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said, North and South Korea are in a “very dangerous situation” where an accidental clash is possible at any time.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
Destroying Boats, Killing Crews, Escalating Risks: The Venezuela Gambit https://belimedia.com.ng/destroying-boats-killing-crews-escalating-risks-the-venezuela-gambit https://belimedia.com.ng/destroying-boats-killing-crews-escalating-risks-the-venezuela-gambit OPINION — “Does the Coast Guard have legal authority to destroy a boat or to kill the crew with lethal force if there has not been a provocation?”

That was Sen. Andy Kim (D-N.J.), last Wednesday, questioning Adm. Kevin E. Lunday during the latter’s confirmation hearing to be the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard last Wednesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Lunday answered, “Well, Senator, we're operating out there under our Coast Guard law enforcement authority as a law enforcement agency, a maritime law enforcement agency. And so that's not within our authority as a law enforcement agency during our Coast Guard operations under the Department of Homeland Security's authority.”

I begin with that exchange because to me, the heart of Lunday’s response – “that’s not within our authority as a law enforcement agency” – showed a senior military officer respecting the law under which he operates.

It also raises directly the question of under what law, or still-secret Justice Department interpretation of the law, is the Trump administration carrying out its destruction of alleged narco-trafficking boats and killing of crews – so far 21 boats and 83 dead crew members?

Before discussing, again, the legal issues surrounding the Trump administration’s military activity in the Caribbean, I want to lay out concerns about what the U.S. military is doing – beyond blowing up speed boats -- and how those actions, along with Venezuela’s reactions, could lead to a war no one wants.

On November 16, with the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group, more than 15 percent of all deployed U.S. Navy warships are now positioned in the Caribbean Sea, a force greater than existed during the 1960s Cuban missile crisis. Remember, the earlier buildup included the USS Iwo Jima and its amphibious ready group with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that has more than 2,200 Marines, MV-22 Ospreys, CH-53E helicopters, and landing craft.

Although U.S. Southern Command has said these forces are focused on counternarcotics efforts with regional partners, it has not commented or disclosed details on any other specific operations,

However, the New York Times reported Friday that “the U.S. Navy has routinely been positioning warships near Venezuela’s coast in locations far from the Caribbean’s main drug-smuggling routes, suggesting that the buildup is focused more on a pressure campaign against Venezuela than on the counternarcotics operation the Trump administration says it’s waging.”

At the same time, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported “multiple B-52H Stratofortress bombers [from Minot Air Force Base, N.D.] flew off the northern coast of South America on November 20,” on a “lengthy, nearly daylong flight, which a U.S. official said was a ‘presence patrol.’” At the same time that the B-52s were operating in the region, the U.S. also dispatched Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets from the Gerald R. Ford who then joined with a U.S. Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft, the magazine reported.

“All the aircraft, including the fighters, switched on their transponders for parts of the mission, making them visible [to Venezuelan radar] on flight tracking data,” according to the magazine.

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From November 16 through November 21, elements of the Marine Corps 22nd MEU along with Trinidad and Tobago Defense Forces held joint training exercises in both urban and rural environments across Trinidad and Tobago, which is just seven miles away from the Venezuelan shoreline. Operations took place during daytime and after dark, and some incorporated 22nd MEU helicopters.

Last Saturday, Trinidad and Tobago Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Barry Padarath said that joint military training with Washington will continue. “We have said, very clearly, that part of our mandate from the nation has been to restore peace and security,” Padarath said, “and therefore we are partnering with the United States and continuing these joint efforts.”

All these past activities, plus President Trump’s threats, have caused Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to mobilize some 200,000 soldiers. With the announcement that the Gerald R. Ford was deploying to the Caribbean, Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López raised the military alert levels in the country, according to El Pais newspaper. That meant, the newspaper wrote, “placing the entire country’s military arsenal on full operational readiness, as well as the massive deployment of land, air, naval, riverine, and missile assets; weapons systems; military units; the Bolivarian Militia; Citizen Security Organs; and the Comprehensive Defense Commands.”

Last week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced Monday’s U.S. State Department designation of Cartel de Los Soles, the Venezuelan criminal group Trump claims Maduro controls, as a “foreign terrorist organization (FTO).” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said, “It gives more tools to our department to give options to the President,” and “nothing is off the table, but nothing is automatically on the table either.”

Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and opponent of the attacks on alleged narco-trafficking boats, told Sunday’s CBS’ Face the Nation, “I think by doing this [naming Venezuela an FTO] they're pretending as if we are at war. They're pretending as if they've gotten some imprimatur to do what they want. When you have war, the rules of engagement are lessened.”

Looking at the political implications, Sen. Paul added, “I think once there's an invasion of Venezuela, or if they decide to re-up the subsidies and the gifts to Ukraine, I think you'll see a splintering and a fracturing of the movement that has supported the President, because I think a lot of people, including myself, were attracted to the President because of his reticence to get us involved in foreign wars.”

A CBS poll released Sunday showed just one in five Americans had heard a lot about the U.S. Caribbean military buildup, but of that knowledgeable group, 70 percent opposed going to war with Venezuela in the first place. In addition, 75 percent said Trump needed Congress’ approval before taking action in Venezuela, including just over half of Republicans.

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As for the legal side, Sen. Paul said, attacking boats “is really going against the rule of law in the way in which we interact with people on the high seas, and it has no precedent.”

At Wednesday’s hearing, Adm. Lunday gave the following explanation of how the Coast Guard legally carries out its non-lethal interdiction operations under maritime and U.S. laws.

“In the Eastern Pacific or the Caribbean or other locations, but principally in those areas,” Adm. Lunday explained, “we normally receive information. It could be from a surveillance aircraft or other means that there is a suspected drug smuggling boat that is headed north and then we will interdict that boat. We use an armed helicopter to disable the boat [by firing at their outboard engines] and then we will go aboard, seize the boat, and typically take a representative or take the samples, the cocaine that's on the boat if we can recover it. We'll destroy the boat as a hazard to navigation. Then we'll take the detainees who were operating the boat and we'll process them and…then arrest and then seek to prosecute.”

Lunday made clear “the helicopter interdiction tactical squadron which are…very specialized crews that do this work and they are trained and they're effective at disabling the engines. The time they would use lethal force was if they were fired upon from the drug smuggling boat under our mode of operating as a law enforcement agency.”

Near the end of last Wednesday’s hearing, Sen. Ben Ray Lujan (D-N.M.) asked Lunday, “Admiral, yes or no. Does the US Coast Guard have a role in these military strikes on vessels in the Caribbean or Pacific?”

Lunday responded, “Senator, thank you for the question. So, under our Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Authority, we're not involved in the Department of War’s operations that you're describing. That's under the Department of War.”

Asked by Sen. Lujan if he had been to meetings about the strikes on vessels, Lunday replied he had “not been involved in meetings regarding those military activities specifically,” and later added, “I have not had a conversation with Secretary Hegseth about these strikes. No, Senator.”

Sen. Lujan closed by saying to the non-present Pete Hegseth: “Mr. Secretary, if you're out there, if you're listening to this…If you've ignored the Admiral, give him a holler, pull him in, have a good conversation, and learn from this wise person.”

That’s not a bad idea.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
Putin Sees “Useful Meetings”, the U.S. Should See a Trap Set for Inexperienced Negotiators https://belimedia.com.ng/putin-sees-useful-meetings-the-us-should-see-a-trap-set-for-inexperienced-negotiators https://belimedia.com.ng/putin-sees-useful-meetings-the-us-should-see-a-trap-set-for-inexperienced-negotiators EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE -- Reports from Moscow suggest that U.S. representatives Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff are “optimistic” about the prospect of results from their discussion with Kremlin officials this week. But after months of fruitless negotiations, if they are optimistic about achieving a negotiated solution to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they have little reason for it, given comments from Russian officials on the Moscow discussions.

If, as has been recently suggested to me, a central priority behind Kusher and Witkoff’s participation in negotiations (instead of relying on more experienced U.S. diplomats with a record of dealing with autocrats like Vladimir Putin) is to secure business deals in Russia following the conclusion of hostilities, then both the negotiations over Ukraine’s future and future business deals in Russia will prove to be fool’s errands, the former first and the latter over time. President Trump should know better and should have selected better representation for U.S. interests.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitriy Peskov described the meeting between Putin and the U.S. representatives as “very useful, constructive, and highly substantive.” At the same time, he said no compromise on a peace plan was reached. He went on to note that Russia wants peace, but only if its objectives are met and reiterated that Moscow insists on achieving the goals of its “special operation.”

Peskov’s remarks are not surprising as they are completely consistent with the narrative that Putin has pushed before and during his ill-fated invasion of Ukraine. As if to emphasize the Kremlin’s rejection of the Kushner-Witkoff mission, Putin launched one of the largest drone and missile attacks on Ukraine, probably while the U.S. representatives were still in the air flying home.

Russia’s position in this “negotiation” is absolutely clear and has been for some time: The complete elimination of Ukraine as an independent nation; the breakup of the transatlantic alliance which has been the bedrock of European security since 1945; the creation and exacerbation of political division in the United States to weaken it as a strategic opponent and create the conditions for the establishment of a multi-polar world order with Moscow and Beijing leading the autocratic anti-democratic poles and a weakened U.S. and Europe, the other pole. Success in Ukraine is key to Putin and Chinese President Xi Jingping’s strategy.

As part of the red orchestra Putin is directing to set the stage for the achievement of his objectives, he is pushing two critical narratives. The first is that Russia can achieve through military conquest the subjugation of Ukraine - the narrative that Kyiv is losing and will inevitably lose the war. Secondly, he is pushing the argument in Washington and elsewhere that Europe is undermining the Trump Administration’s efforts to achieve a negotiated solution to the conflict (however feckless and unrealistic the 28 point peace plan was/is). Putin is also using a combination of “gray zone” clandestine kinetic and lethal operations across Europe to undermine public confidence in their security at home and undermine resolve to support Ukraine and resist Putin’s ambitions. The Russian leader has executed a number of these efforts in recent years with varying degrees of plausible deniability and certainly without any retribution or consequence paid.

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At Putin’s age and at this stage of his regime, he cannot back off his maximalist objectives in Ukraine, at least not until the pain from the war is felt by Russian elites and the Russian public to the point where his house of cards starts to tumble.

Ukraine’s ability to extract maximum casualties from Russia’s marginal territorial advances in Ukraine plus the cost being paid by Ukraine’s long-range strikes against energy infrastructure and military targets in the Russian Federation start to undermine support in those constituencies for Putin’s continued governance. The plan led by Kushner and Witkoff and endorsed by Trump works against undermining support in Russia for Putin’s aggression.

So, where does that leave Kushner and Witkoff with regard to a rumored undisclosed agenda of using the negotiations as cover for post-conflict business arrangements with Moscow? Dealing with business confidence in a kleptocracy is an oxymoron. If Kushner and Witkoff have never heard of Bill Browder, they should look him up.

Browder has consistently and accurately described the risks of doing business in Putin’s Russia. He again recently pointed out these risks in the specific context of warning Trump and his representatives of the risk they are taking on. Browder’s cogent observations and the wreckage of the hundreds of U.S. and western businesses that poured into Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union show that you can put money in but getting it out is another matter entirely.

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Trump and his representatives seem to think they will be the exception to the Russian kleptocratic paradigm. They will not be.

One can be sure Putin and Dmitriev will be whispering all the promises into the ears of their U.S. interlocutors. Kushner and Witkoff will dutifully carry these messages back to the White House and share their pipe dream fantasies of the untold riches of being on Putin’s good side.

The only thing Putin asks Kushner and Witkoff to relay is that Trump stop aiding and supporting the two remaining obstacles to a negotiated settlement, Zelensky and the European members of NATO. End military, intelligence, and economic aid to Ukraine, Putin certainly will have said, and Ukrainian resistance will collapse speedily, and the war will brought more rapidly to its inevitable conclusion. And the U.S. certainly should be able to put enough pressure on its NATO puppets to end their futile support for Ukraine and there will be peace in our time.

The President should engage some sound and experienced counsel to provide more realistic and experienced guidance on Russian realities. The first bit of that counsel would be to remove any illusion that Putin is a man who can be trusted. Putin’s public and private comments as well as his actions over the twenty plus years he has been running the Russian Federation leave no doubt as to where he stands with regard to the West in general and the U.S. in particular.

He believes democracy and capitalism are outmoded and morally exhausted political and economic philosophies doomed to collapse. As President of the country to which Putin refers as the “glavniy protivnik” or main enemy, President Trump should realize in Putin’s mind, HE is the main enemy.

Any promises of business deals that will follow the conclusion of the Ukraine conflict will inevitably be broken by Putin and his representatives. President Trump should understand Putin wants to steal his money the most. What greater victory for Putin than to have the U.S. hand him victory in Ukraine and in the process set up the biggest theft of money from a U.S. entity in history.

A second bit of counsel President Trump might seek to provide his representatives is that it is very difficult to keep secret deals secret when you are represented by someone as manifestly incompetent and compromised as Steve Witkoff. No additional evidence needs to be provided than the leaked transcript of the call with Kirill Dmitriev in which Witkoff provides advice on how to persuade President Trump to accept the Russian proposals for the end of the conflict in Ukraine.

In addition to the naiveté of having such a conversation in the first place, Witkoff should also be advised that undertaking such actions looks a lot like he is acting as an agent of influence for the Russian Federation.

Lastly, President Trump should be reminded of former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s famous remarks to Neville Chamberlain after Munich, “You were given the choice between dishonor and war. You chose dishonor and you will have war.” In the context of the current negotiations Churchill might have added that a fool and his money are soon parted.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Delhi Blast and Pakistan’s Proxy War: Why Another Clash Looks Likely https://belimedia.com.ng/the-delhi-blast-and-pakistans-proxy-war-why-another-clash-looks-likely https://belimedia.com.ng/the-delhi-blast-and-pakistans-proxy-war-why-another-clash-looks-likely OPINION — South Asia has once again returned to the global spotlight after a suicide bombing struck the heart of India’s capital on November 10. The bomber detonated explosives in a car near Delhi’s historic Red Fort, killing 13 and injuring 25 others. This attack—the first major attack in the Indian capital in over a decade—points to the threat of Pakistan-based terrorism beyond the border regions.

According to Indian authorities, the Delhi bombing was part of a broader plot that security agencies disrupted in the days leading up to the attack. The suicide bomber, allegedly recruited by the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), reveals how Pakistan-backed outfits are upgrading their recruitment methods and fundraising tactics following Indian airstrikes in May that destroyed several of their operational centers. These developments highlight the fragility of regional security as both India and Pakistan edge closer to another military confrontation. With this backdrop, the United States must reassess its growing ties with Pakistan’s military establishment, which remains the epicenter of South Asia’s instability.

The Rise of a “White-Collar” Terror Network

Prior to the Delhi attack, Indian authorities uncovered a terror network across three provinces in India, including Jammu and Kashmir. Authorities seized nearly 2,900 kilograms of explosive materials near Delhi, including 360 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, confiscated assault rifles, and arrested at least ten doctors linked to the operation.

The scope of the seizure suggests that the “white collar” terrorist cell planned multiple coordinated attacks capable of mass casualties far exceeding the Delhi bombing. A hypothesis remains that the Delhi suicide bomber, Dr. Umar Nabi, acted independently after authorities preempted the larger plot and detained his associates. Nabi and another doctor from Kashmir were allegedly connected with JeM recruiters via Telegram and met their handlers in Turkey. It can be assessed with high confidence that the duo’s alleged meeting with their handlers overseas likely facilitated access to explosives, funding, and logistical support.

The revelation of the white-collar terrorist network in India marks a shift in Pakistan-based terrorist groups’ recruitment strategies—from radicalizing uneducated youth to mobilizing educated professionals with specialized skills. At the same time, JeM and other groups have shifted their financing from traditional banking channels to fintech platforms, mobile wallets, and decentralized digital payment systems. Together, these trends illustrate a strategic recalibration: a move toward more sophisticated, less detectable forms of proxy warfare aimed at destabilizing India’s internal security and social cohesion.

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The Pakistan Angle

A day after the Delhi bombing, another suicide attack outside Islamabad’s District Court killed 12 people. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Defense Minister Khawaja Asif immediately blamed India, claiming the attacks were “orchestrated from Afghanistan at India’s behest.” However, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) offshoot Jamaat ul Ahrar (JuA) claimed responsibility, contradicting the government’s narrative. Although no direct link has been established between the Delhi and Islamabad attacks, the latter exposes Pakistan’s deteriorating counterterrorism capacity and its flawed internal security policies. Official data from October indicates more than 4,700 terrorist incidents occurred in Pakistan this year alone, killing over 1,000 people despite 62,000 reported counterterrorism operations carried out by security forces. This paradox points to a chronic failure of strategy rather than a lack of effort.

Instead of reinforcing counterinsurgency grids in its northwest, Pakistan has relied on punitive airstrikes and heavy-handed tactics—often targeting civilian areas in Afghanistan. In early October, Pakistani jets carried out an airstrike in Kabul intended to kill TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud. The botched operation, however, damaged civilian infrastructure and provoked international condemnation. Mehsud later released a video clip confirming he remains active within Pakistan, further embarrassing Islamabad. Additional airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Paktia Province killed three athletes, inflaming tensions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and triggering sporadic cross-border shelling. These misdirected operations have played directly into the TTP’s hands, enabling its expansion and emboldening more radical offshoots like JuA, which has increasingly targeted civilians in major Pakistani cities.

Pakistan’s motivations appear less about counterterrorism and more about geopolitical signaling. Its October 9 airstrike in Kabul coincided with Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India—the first such diplomatic outreach since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. The timing suggests Pakistan’s strikes were designed to warn Kabul against strengthening ties with New Delhi. Yet, Afghanistan has refused to yield and continues to deepen cooperation with India in healthcare and infrastructure development.

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Another Conflict Remains Imminent

As domestic terrorism surges, Pakistan’s civil-military leadership has diverted its focus to countering India’s strategic positioning in the region by inflicting punitive strikes on Afghanistan and increasing military cooperation with the interim government of Bangladesh, which is hostile to New Delhi. Simultaneously, Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, recently consolidated power after parliament passed the 27th constitutional amendment, granting him sweeping authority and lifetime immunity from prosecution. This move has sparked widespread criticism within Pakistan. Three senior judges have resigned in protest, and prominent civil society figures warn that the country has entered a new phase of authoritarian rule. Munir’s expanding authority mirrors the military’s long-standing playbook: when legitimacy wanes, external crises—particularly with India—serve as instruments of political survival.

The conditions for another India-Pakistan confrontation are steadily aligning. Pakistan’s military, under domestic pressure, could once again resort to conflict with India to restore its standing. Meanwhile, Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has warned that any future operation would be far more severe than Operation Sindoor—the codename for India’s May 2025 strikes on Pakistani terrorist and military infrastructure. General Dwivedi’s statement that territory remains the “currency of victory” signals India’s willingness to pursue limited territorial gains in Pakistan-occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir in the event of renewed hostilities.

The May India-Pakistan conflict has set a precedent that Pakistan will use nuclear saber-rattling to secure a ceasefire with India. Yet, Indian strategists increasingly regard Pakistan’s nuclear threats as coercive posturing designed to provoke U.S. intervention rather than as credible deterrence. If another conflict erupts, India may not be deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear signaling. The Indian calculus appears to favor limited conventional offensives aimed at degrading Pakistan’s militant infrastructure and securing limited territorial gains while testing Islamabad’s actual nuclear resolve. Such a confrontation would dramatically alter South Asia’s deterrence dynamics and expose the fragility of Pakistan’s “bleeding India with a thousand cuts” doctrine.

Conclusion

For the United States, these developments present a dilemma. As I warned in The Cipher Brief in September, America’s national security priorities cannot align with Pakistan’s objectives in the region. Washington’s growing diplomatic and economic engagement with Pakistan risks undermining long-term regional stability if it fails to address Islamabad’s dual game—presenting itself as a counterterror ally while nurturing militant proxies.

Washington must reexamine the foundations of its Pakistan strategy. The United States should leverage its political influence and aid frameworks to condition engagement on measurable counterterror reforms: dismantling militant networks, enforcing digital financial oversight, and halting cross-border militant activity. Without such conditionality, the United States risks legitimizing a regime that fuels the very instability it claims to combat.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
The U.S. Needs to Restore Deterrence Credibility Against Putin https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-needs-to-restore-deterrence-credibility-against-putin https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-needs-to-restore-deterrence-credibility-against-putin OPINION — President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan is a humanitarian attempt to halt the killing and destruction in Ukraine, although Russia’s President Vladimir Putin may view the peace plan as an attempt to appease Russia. Since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, the U.S. and its NATO allies have not been able to deter an aggressive Russian Federation.

When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, this was a clear signal, especially to NATO, that Russia was prepared to use force in the “near abroad” when their interests weren’t respected. The response from the U.S. and NATO was weak: no military support to Georgia or strong punitive actions against Russia

In 2014, Russia seized Crimea, with minimal consequences. The muted response in 2008 to Russia’s invasion of Georgia no doubt convinced the Kremlin that the U.S. and NATO would not risk a military confrontation with Russia. Although Russia was suspended from the G8 and the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO’s military response – suspending all cooperation with Russia -- was weak:

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021reinforced the Russian view that U.S. and NATO “red lines” were either not clear or not credible. Indeed, Russia viewed the withdrawal as a weakening of U.S. deterrence credibility.

On February 4, 2022, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Mr. Putin met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Beijing Winter Olympics. The joint statement from their discussion was clear in stating a “no-limits” partnership and “no forbidden areas of cooperation” between Russia and China.

And prior to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. publicly stated that they had credible intelligence of Russia’s plan to invade Ukraine. Unfortunately, however, even with this insight, the U.S. could not convince Mr. Putin an invasion of Ukraine would cross a red line and result in sanctions and other consequences for Russia. We failed to deter Russia from this bloody four-year war, with over 400,000 Ukrainian casualties and over one million Russian casualties.

The 28-point peace plan is being reviewed by the leadership in Ukraine and NATO and it’s possible the peace plan will be amended, to secure greater support from Ukraine and NATO.

What’s clear from Russia’s actions in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine is that U.S. and NATO deterrence failed. A credible deterrence strategy would have made it clear to Russia that their aggressive military behavior would have resulted in significant consequences, to include biting sanctions, pariah status and a likely military response.

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China, North Korea and Iran, allies of Russia, are watching closely how the war in Ukraine ends. Indeed, their interest in what’s included in the peace plan and the consequences for Russia, given their invasion of a Ukraine that had security assurances from Russia – and the U.S. and United Kingdom – in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, which pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders.

Hopefully, none of Russia’s allies will view the Ukraine peace plan as license to foment trouble in their region. Clearly, China understands U.S. policy: A peaceful resolution of issues between China and Taiwan, in accord with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. North Korea knows that the U.S. has extended deterrence commitments to our ally in South Korea and Iran should appreciate – - especially since the June 2025 bombing of their Fordow nuclear facility -- that Israel is a close ally of the U.S, with strong security commitments.

Deterrence credibility is important. That’s why the U.S. is providing Taiwan with about $387 million in defensive arms sales in 2024. And that’s why we have a Washington Declaration with South Korea, enhancing the nuclear deterrence alliance. Iran saw clearly, with the bombing of Fordow, how close our allied relationship is with Israel.

These allies of Russia would be making a grievous error if they try to exploit any peace agreement with Russia to end the war in Ukraine. And Mr. Putin would be advised to comply with any peace accord to end the Ukraine war and to refrain from any future attempt to violate the sovereignty of any of the 32 NATO members.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
What China’s ‘World&Class Navy’ Means for the U.S. and Asia https://belimedia.com.ng/what-chinas-world-class-navy-means-for-the-us-and-asia https://belimedia.com.ng/what-chinas-world-class-navy-means-for-the-us-and-asia

DEEP DIVE — On a Wednesday in November, with Chinese President Xi Jinping looking on, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned the 80,000-ton Fujian, the country’s third aircraft carrier and largest to date, in a ceremony that also featured its latest Navy stealth fighters, helicopters and command aircraft. A week later, China’s Ministry of Defense announced that the Sichuan, one of the world’s largest amphibious assault ships, had completed initial sea trials and would be ready for deployment next year. And last week, Shanghai is hosted “Marintec China,” the largest maritime conference in the world.

These are all signs of China’s continued rise as a maritime power and challenger to U.S. supremacy on the seas. And they have happened at a lightning-fast pace.

China now has “a world-class Navy,” retired Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, a former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, told The Cipher Brief. “It's not, ‘Hey, we're going to achieve this in 2049.’ And it's just not in the numbers, it's in the quality. These ships are modern by any standard.”

The recently commissioned Fujian is the first Chinese carrier (and only the second in the world, after the U.S. Gerald R. Ford) to be equipped with electromagnetic catapults for launching aircraft. As for the new amphibious vessel, the Sichuan, experts have been impressed both by its sophistication and the fact that it was built in just over two years.

Top U.S. Navy officials are taking note. On an Asia-Pacific tour last month, Admiral Daryl Caudle, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledged the new carrier and assault ship and the overall “impressive” growth of China’s Navy.

“How they utilize those aircraft carriers globally is, of course, a concern of mine,” Adm. Caudle said in Japan. As for the Sichuan assault vessel, Adm. Caudle said, “We’ll watch that very closely and see what they’re going to do there. That’s a large ship, very capable.”

Experts say the recent milestones are the latest evidence of gains that have seen China’s Navy surpass the U.S. fleet in overall numbers while boosting the quality of its vessels as well.

“It's impressive,” former Rear Admiral, Mark Montgomery, told The Cipher Brief. “They're building a hundred merchant ships for every one we build, and two warships for every one we build. And they have quantitatively exceeded the size of our U.S. naval ship numbers.”

Montgomery was quick to add that China’s advances “don’t mean they have a more capable Navy” than the U.S. In terms of the quality of submarines and destroyers and carriers – “your choice, ship class after ship class,” as he put it – the U.S. remains without peer. But Montgomery and others say that China has rapidly narrowed the quality gap, and already changed the strategic equation for any potential conflict over the South China Sea or Taiwan.

China is “building a lot of ships, but the technological sophistication of those vessels has also significantly increased,” said Matthew Funaiole, Senior Fellow at the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “They're really trying to compete with other countries – and they obviously have their sights set on the U.S. in terms of maritime dominance in the region.”

The Trump Administration issued an executive order in April to jumpstart the U.S. shipbuilding industry and restore “American maritime dominance,” but experts say the U.S. has work to do to match the urgency of the Chinese buildup.

“The shipbuilding capacity in China now dwarfs that of the United States,” Emmanouil Karatarakis wrote in a recent analysis for The Cipher Brief. Citing estimates that China's overall shipbuilding capability (armed and unarmed) is now hundreds of times larger than the U.S.'s, he added, “This imbalance has far-reaching implications for long-term strategy and wartime readiness.”

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China’s maritime rise

As with many elements of China’s rise as a global power, this one began in the early 1990s. At the time, China’s Navy was deployed primarily to guard its coastline – and while precise figures are hard to come by, estimates of its 1990 force range from 350-400 vessels, most of which were small patrol craft. Back then, the PLAN had no modern destroyers or submarines, and when China first put a carrier to water – in 2012 – it was a retrofitted Soviet vessel (the ship had actually been built in the 1980s, in the then-Soviet republic of Ukraine).

Today, China’s Navy boasts more than 1,000 vessels, including roughly 370 warships and submarines in what the Pentagon calls China’s “battle force” capability. The bulk of this rags-to-riches rise in maritime assets has come during the tenure of Xi Jinping.

“Xi Jinping has always been clear-eyed about the fact that a great power is a maritime power,” RADM Studeman said. “He personally understands that China, in order to be the leading power in the world, needs to have a maritime capability bar none. And that's the course they're on.”

Beijing has taken advantage of a booming commercial shipbuilding industry and the fact that – unlike in the U.S. – the civilian and military sectors in China are intertwined. Shipbuilding was included in the 10 core technologies in Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy, a blueprint for competing with global leaders in key industrial sectors.

A CSIS report offered staggering evidence of China’s maritime rise: the country’s share of global shipbuilding has jumped from 5% in 1999 to roughly 50%, while the U.S. now builds fewer than 1% of commercial ships globally. China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder built more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry had built since the end of World War II.

As for warships, China is now on track to have a 425-ship fleet by 2030, while the U.S. Navy currently has fewer than 300 deployable battle-force vessels – a total which experts worry may drop as aging ships are retired faster than new ones are put to water. “The growing size and sophistication of China’s Navy, combined with Beijing’s increasing assertiveness,” the CSIS report said, “poses major challenges to U.S. and allied military readiness and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.”

Strategic implications

Experts say there are two basic strategic aims behind China’s maritime growth: preparing for potential conflict in the region, and adding a critical element for the country’s projection of global power and influence.

For the latter goal, the Fujian adds a major “chess piece,” as RADM Studeman put it, helping the PLAN expand its growing “blue-water” capabilities and extend its reach well beyond China’s Southeast Asian neighbors.

“They have been going up into the Bering Sea and parts of the Arctic and Antarctic,” Studeman said. “And they've been able to expand their footprint and develop their capabilities in an evolutionary way, which has been remarkable to see.”

The new carrier group might also be used in a maritime blockade of Taiwan, global humanitarian missions, and show-of-force deployments far from China’s shores.

“China wants to have the ability to operate globally,” Funaiole told The Cipher Brief. “I don’t think they want to do the same things the U.S. does, which is to have forward-positioned fleets all over the world. But they do want the ability to operate in different regions that are further and further away from the Chinese mainland, and you need to have a blue-water Navy in order to do that. It's the key to power projection.”

As far as a potential Taiwan conflict is concerned, the Sichuan – the newly-minted amphibious vessel, would be the more important “chess piece.” It’s an assault ship built to provide launch platforms for large combat drones, helicopters, and amphibious equipment, according to China’s Ministry of Defense.

“The carriers are less important for a Taiwan contingency than a lot of the other assets,” Funaiole said. “The amphibious ships are critical for that being successful.”

RADM Montgomery echoed the point, calling the new carrier group “a muscle flex and power projection,” while noting that the Sichuan and other assets would bring more concrete benefits in a regional conflict.

“The rest of their Navy [beyond the carrier group] isn't a muscle flex,” he said. “This is actually building a capability and capacity to push the United States farther and farther away from the area of crisis and contingency, whether in the East China Sea around the Senkaku [Islands] with Japan, in Taiwan, or in the South China Sea. The idea is to keep our Navy as far away as possible with a mix of missiles, aircraft, submarines, surface ships, all of that.” Those elements have been developed “at close to breakneck speed,” Montgomery said. “They've done a fantastic job of identifying, developing, resourcing and fielding a Navy air and missile force that places the US Navy and US Air Force at risk.”

U.S. Navy commanders have also warned that in the event of a Pacific war, China would be better equipped to replace lost ships – by virtue of geography and its more efficient shipbuilding. Taiwan war scenarios have shown that China would be able to absorb far heavier warship losses than the U.S.

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Can the U.S. turn the tide?

The White House’s April order, issued under the heading “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” marked a recognition of China’s rise and a high-profile effort to reverse the erosion of U.S. shipbuilding. As The Cipher Brief has reported, the order mandates a whole-of-government push to jump-start the domestic shipbuilding industry.

The order called for the creation of an “Office of Shipbuilding” within the National Security Council, and said that within 210 days, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs “shall submit a Maritime Action Plan (MAP) to the President…to achieve the policy set forth in this order.”

That 210-day deadline has passed (November 5 was the 210th day), and there has been no public announcement of such a plan. The White House did not respond to requests for comment.

RADM Studeman acknowledged that even in the best-case scenario, these goals would take years to achieve, but added that he was disappointed by a slow pace of progress since the order was signed.

“I expected to see more frankly,” he said. “I think that they're incredibly good ideas that were in that directive, and unless it's going on very quietly, I haven't seen enough progress in each of the areas.”

RADM Montgomery agreed.

“I know it's expectation management, but I'm disappointed,” he said, adding that he worries that future U.S. budgets may not provide the funds he believes are needed to kickstart the warship-building industry.

“China has modernized shipyards, as have Japan and Korea, who equally outpace us,” Montgomery said. “We do not have modernized shipyards for a number of reasons. We have not properly invested in that. Our labor costs are significantly higher, and that's particularly true in shipbuilding and defense manufacturing.”

He and others hold out hope that investments and expertise from Korea and Japan will help boost the U.S. output. The authors of the CSIS report urged a blend of punitive measures against China and long-term investments in U.S. and allied shipbuilding capacity. “U.S. Navy leaders have begun intensive outreach to allies like Japan and South Korea to support U.S. shipbuilding efforts,” the report stated, “an effort that President Trump has indicated he supports. However, much work remains to be done.”

“You need basically startup VC capital to get things going on it,” Funaiole said. “And it's not just the technical part or the physical infrastructure. We also have a lack of expertise and shipbuilding in this country. And so there also needs to be personnel training investments and exchange programs with other countries as well and specialization into new areas.”

Experts agree on this much: failure to address these issues risk damage to U.S. national security.

“As tensions rise,” the CSIS report said, “leaders in Beijing may calculate that China’s superior shipbuilding capacity would be a material benefit to outlasting adversaries in a protracted military conflict.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.


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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Real Life Example of Russian Information Operations https://belimedia.com.ng/a-real-life-example-of-russian-information-operations https://belimedia.com.ng/a-real-life-example-of-russian-information-operations EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In January of 2018, I was involved in organizing and supporting the visit of General Aleksandr Bortnikov, and Sergey Naryshkin, the heads of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), respectively, to Washington D.C. to discuss counterterrorism cooperation.

Interestingly, Bortnikov and Naryshkin did not travel at the same time, indicating to me that there was no love lost between the two. The SVR delegation arrived first, spent one day meeting with the leadership teams of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), then departed the next day before Bortnikov and his delegation arrived. Contrary to the wild claims made by some U.S. politicians and journalists after the visit, the head of the Russian Main Directorate of Intelligence (GRU) of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not travel to the U.S. in January of 2018, and the SVR and FSB delegations did not have any other official or unofficial meetings with U.S. officials. Also, the visits were fully coordinated within the U.S. Government’s Interagency.

Because these visits were part of the U.S. Administration’s “Intelligence Diplomacy” efforts, the U.S. and Russian sides both agreed that there would be no public or official statements about the meetings, nor would there be any organized media coverage of the visits.

After meetings with the DNI and CIA, Naryshkin had dinner plans with the then-Russian Ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Antonov. And on the day of his departure from the U.S., Naryshkin advised a representative of the U.S. side supporting the visit that he and Antonov chose to have dinner at a quiet restaurant in Georgetown and that while dining together, a Russian journalist “happened” to be in the same restaurant at the same time, saw Naryshkin, and would “probably write a story” about his visit.

In delivering this news, Naryshkin claimed that he had no control over what the journalist would say or write and, sure enough, soon after his plane departed, there were media reports circulating in the U.S. about Naryshkin’s visit. The initial story came from a source in the Russian media, and was picked up by multiple U.S. and International media outlets. But the reporting included false claims, like “Naryshkin and Bortnikov were joined in the U.S. by the head of the GRU General Igor Korobov." Some reporting implied that the visits were not coordinated within the U.S. Government and suggested that it was possible that the Russians had also met with officials from the White House and the National Security Council (NSC) — all insinuations that were meant to undermine the U.S. President at the time.

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Of course, the SVR was aware of the deep political sensitivities in the U.S. related to all-things Russia at the time and they knew that Trump himself was still dealing with the fallout of the “Russia Collusion” narrative that had been created and promoted by political opponents during the 2016 Presidential election. Naryshkin used the opportunity presented by his visit to “leak” information about the visit itself and to exploit existing domestic problems in the U.S., knowing that would further inflame suspicions about the U.S. President and undermine both the President and confidence in the U.S. system. There is no doubt that Naryshkin’s boss, Russian President Vladimir Putin was aware of this information operation in advance and authorized it.

I refer to this action by the Kremlin as an “information operation” because to my knowledge, the SVR did not disseminate any false or distorted information directly when Naryshkin leaked news of his visit. However, it is very possible that this was part of what the Russians called an “operational combination” in which additional aspects of SVR operations could have involved seeding false information using clandestine sources in the U.S. media space - to amplify the narrative.

For example, it is possible that the Russians would used their sources to pass information to U.S. or Western journalists that led to a lot of the false claims about the GRU Director’s presence in the U.S. at the time and allegations of a "secret meeting" between the U.S. President and Russian Intelligence officials. Of course, it is also possible that the Russians did not have to seed this type of information and instead, simply benefited from the fact that Trump’s opponents were looking to seize on any tidbit of information to attack the President and were not beyond distorting facts or promoting falsehoods to advance their own political agendas.

Information Operations are designed to play on the emotions, fears, prejudices and pre-existing beliefs of their target audiences. They are much more successful when target audiences do not apply critical thinking skills and approach receiving information with a level of objective discipline.


Disinformation is used by U.S. adversaries to fuel divides between Americans. Find out how to spot it in this public service message from The Cipher Brief

In the case cited above, the Russians most likely assessed that “leaking” news of the visit of their Intelligence officials to the U.S. would play to the fears and political biases of certain portions of the U.S. audience and result in an emotional or politically charged response.

Unfortunately, the Russians likely got a great deal of benefit from a small investment of effort because elements of their target audience overreacted, giving the operation greater impact than it would have had if some targets of the effort had simply responded objectively, asked good questions about the news and purpose of the visit and taken the time to understand that the visit had been pre-cleared and coordinated within the U.S. Government “Interagency” system and was not unlike other visits by Russian Intelligence and Security officials to the U.S. during previous presidencies.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
‘Mind&Blowing’ Pentagon Overhaul Will Reshape Acquisition https://belimedia.com.ng/mind-blowing-pentagon-overhaul-will-reshape-acquisition https://belimedia.com.ng/mind-blowing-pentagon-overhaul-will-reshape-acquisition

FEATURED INTERVIEW — As the Pentagon undertakes its most ambitious overhaul yet of how it acquires new warfighting capabilities, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs are weighing in on whether the modernization effort can happen quickly enough to bring the U.S. up to speed with China in a time of rapid technological development.

When the overhaul was announced earlier this month, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said the reforms aims to dramatically accelerate how the Department buys and fields new capabilities and that the changes are specifically aimed at cutting bureaucracy, rewarding rapid development, and pushing defense primes to invest more of their capital in new capabilities.

In the weeks since the announcement, the U.S. Army has shared details on how it will reform its service-level acquisition process. Part of the change involves consolidating the service’s program executive offices (PEOs), which are responsible for buying new weapons, into six new offices called “portfolio acquisition executives” (PAEs). Plans also include the creation of a new office to rapidly field and scale emerging technologies. Similar initiatives are in the works at the other services.

Measures like these have been championed by the private sector, which has traditionally on the cutting edge of innovative capabilities for decades. Cipher Brief COO & Executive Editor Brad Christian caught up with Entrepreneur and Stanford Professor Steve Blank, who recently published a Department of War Program Executive Office directory to help entrepreneurs better navigate the current complicated system for selling to government. Their conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

Steve Blank

Steve Blank is an adjunct professor at Stanford and co-founder of the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. His book, The Four Steps to the Epiphany is credited with launching the Lean Startup movement. He created the curriculum for the National Science Foundation Innovation Corps. At Stanford, he co-created the Department of Defense Hacking for Defense and Department of State Hacking for Diplomacy curriculums. He is co-author of The Startup Owner's Manual.

THE INTERVIEW

Christian: Describe your initial reaction to the Pentagon's somewhat surprise announcement that it was overhauling its acquisition process.

Blank: It was mind blowing. It was mind blowing not because anything the Secretary said was new; these are things that people who are interested in acquisition reform have been asking for the last 10 years. But it was put in a single package and was clearly done by the infusion of people who have actually run large businesses and were used to all the language of organizations that already know how to deliver with speed and urgency.

The part that didn't get said, is essentially that the Department of War wants to adopt startup innovation techniques of lean iteration, pivots, incremental releases, good enough delivery, and that gets you what the Secretary asked for, which was speed of delivery. But all those are things that we've lived with in Silicon Valley for the last 50 years. And it wasn't until we had people who worked outside of buildings with no windows inside the Pentagon to understand that those techniques could actually be applied. And it required blowing up the existing system. And they did that spectacularly well. There are very few holes in these proposals.

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Christian: Obviously the Pentagon procurement system is a product of decades of bureaucracy and rules. Are you hopeful that you're going to be able to see the kind of change in the rapid timeline that they've laid forth here?

Blank: Number one, this is a pretty extensive reorganization. Right now, the Department of War is siloed between requirements and system centers for testing and prototyping and acquisition, which was the acquisition with a small A with the PEOs and program managers, and then it went to contracts and then it went to sustainment, et cetera.

Those were silos. Now we're putting it all underneath a single portfolio acquisition executive. So, instead of making their offices 10,000 people, it's actually a matrix organization, much like a combatant command is. Most of those people will stay in their existing organizations but now be tasked to work on specific portfolios. And the portfolios will no longer be arranged by weapons system. They're going to be arranged, for example, by war fighting concepts or technology concepts, et cetera.

That said, boy are they trying moving an elephant and make it dance. And at the same time, they recognized - this was one of the genius parts - that people won't just get a memo and know what to do. Historically, they've depended on the Defense Acquisition University, which taught contracting officers and the rest, how to work with the 5,000 pages of the DFAR and FAR, Federal Acquisition, Defense Acquisition Regulations. One of the unnoticed things was that they basically told the Defense Acquisition University, to stop teaching what they're teaching today, recognizing that they need to teach people this new methodology. That's not going to happen by telepathy.

First of all, we need to train the trainers, then we need to train all the people who've grown up in their career following the paperwork. I predict six months or a year of chaos and confusion. And there are always saboteurs in a large-scale reorganization who are angry that their cheese has been moved or worse, their authority has been diminished or their head count went somewhere else. This is going to be no different except maybe at a bigger scale.

In the end, if we pull this off (and I'll explain the only possible reason not to do this) the country will be much better for it.

The other obstacle will be if you're on the board of directors and the executive staff of a prime, you're going to go through the 12 stages of denial and grief and whatever because I don't know how many times both Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg and Secretary Hegseth made it clear that the primes weren't delivering and they weren't investing in the things the country needed and they got used to the system and we were kind of mutually dependent on a broken system - and that's over. Well, you're not going to let your stockholders say you just went home and packed up. Obviously, it's pretty clear that appealing to the Pentagon isn't going to work, but Congress is “coin operated”. This is now going to be a race of lobbying cash from the primes versus lobbying cash for the first time from private equity and venture capital. So it's going to be, who has the biggest pile of cash to influence Congress and the executive branch to keep these rules in place or modify them?

Remember what a disaster this is if you're an existing large company selling to the DoD. It says number one, we're going to buy commercial off the shelf. Number two, we're going to buy commercial off the shelf and then modify it. If and only if either one and two work, we will do some bespoke contracting with the existing organization. It's never happened before. Pretty clear, pretty direct. So, the easy thing would be for primes to change their business model. But my prediction is they're going to double and triple down on the amount of lobbying and dollars spent.

Christian: In addition to the lobbying are we going to see consolidation? A major prime, like you said, isn't going to just pack up their bags and go home. Are they just going to start scooping up all of the small commercial providers?

Blank: In the space segment, they were already doing that. And in fact, were told to kind of stand down and that these things needed to flourish. You have to remember that primes and corporations are companies. Their number one priority, at least in their heads, is no longer national interests, it's the shareholders and returns and revenues and profits. That's the nature of capitalism. The problem here is that the Department of War said, 'Well, that's nice, but we're not getting what we need out of that. Send a note to your shareholders that life's about to change'. That's going to create a lot of conflict - with a lot of money involved - in trying to bend the rules back.

And just as an aside, the primes aren't useless. You don't want them to go out of business. No startup is building an aircraft carrier or a joint strike fighter. We can make the argument of whether we should anymore, but that's secondary. That level of complexity and skill set is just not built yet. Maybe the Andurils and others will get there in another five years, but they're not there yet. And so, waving a wand and making the primes go away completely is equally inane as saying we could depend on startups for everything that the Department of War needs.

But the balance of power, at least as the secretary and deputy believe, is that we need to be building things faster and delivering them faster and on time. And we're going to look for alternate sources. That's just a mind blower. So, as I said, I see six months to a year of confusion as this reorganization happens and people come and go as they establish who's in charge, what the rules are, et cetera.

The only good thing about making this happen is in a normal administration, the administration would wait for Congress's approval. I've not seen that happen in many of these cases with this administration. And in this case, it might actually be good for the country. Time will tell.

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Christian: You referenced decades of Silicon Valley's experience with iterating and moving quickly. One of the threats and one of the actual challenges that a country like China poses to America is they have a top-down autocratic government that doesn't change every four years. That presents a unique challenge to the Pentagon that Silicon Valley doesn't know, or the private sector doesn't necessarily have. How much of a risk is there for the next administration to come in and potentially change everything? And then, if you're one of those big primes, are you baking that into your long-term planning that this might shift in a measurable way in the future? Or do you think these changes are going to be something that is so overwhelmingly positive that future administrations have to stick with it?

Blank: Well, if you were asking me this three years ago, I would have said you should get all this done now because it's going to be flipped back in three years. What's different now though, is the amount of capital available for startups, scale-ups, and private equity firms that can match or overpower the lobbying efforts of the primes. So as I said, both the executive branch and Congress are coin operated, even more so now than ever. And for the first time ever, the insurgents have as much or more coin than the incumbents. That's what's going to change this game.

So yes, a Democratic administration or another Republican one might have a different opinion. But in this case, we're talking about piles of money flooding the streets of Washington D.C. to try to change the game. Think about who is now sitting in the cabinet and in other places where we're seeing people with commercial experience for the first time ever at scale, inside the executive branch for sure and inside the Department of War which changes the nature of the conversation and as we're seeing - the types of things they're recommending. It wasn't that people didn't recognize this before. It was kind of hard to explain this to people who had never run a business or who have been career successful. I've said for years, we had world class organizations, world class people for a world that no longer existed.

Finally, we have people who understand what that world should be like because they've been operating in it. Secretary Feinberg has been writing checks for tens of billions of dollars- buying aircraft carriers, okay, he’s written those kinds of checks before. Tell me who else has ever been in that position.

Again, it's not that the DOW should run like a corporation or a startup, but having that experience sets a bar for what you know is possible for doing extraordinary things. It's what this country knew how to do in World War II and during the Cold War, and we just kind of lost it when Robert McNamara, ex-chief financial officer of Ford, put in the first version of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE) in 1962. We've been operating on that system for 63 years, or some variance of it.

Basically, he imposed a chief financial officer's strategy on budgeting and planning, which made sense at the time. It stopped making sense about 15 years ago, but no one inside the building knew what to do differently. That's changed.

There was also one set of announcements that kind of flew under the radar, and that was that the policy organization in the DOW lost three organizations to acquisition and sustainment (A&S). I think Elbridge Colby runs that group and it went to A&S. So all the foreign military sales and all the policy stuff kind of disappeared overnight. I don't know what the talking points will be, but the optics aren't great for policy. That's number one.

The second thing that got buried in the memo and I'm not sure it was in the speech, but this new Economic Defense Unit (EDU) I think has taken over the office of strategic capital. And I think that's good given what the agenda is, which is that we're essentially using the whole of nation approach to decouple from China and not only invest in critical minerals but in the other parts of the ecosystem that we need as well, everything from batteries to drone motors to whatever. So we can operate independently. Scaling that unit up was strategically as important.

This was an acquisition announcement, but watching all these other moves are really smart chess pieces at scale, not just nibbling around the edges, but at scale. And I think paying attention to the other moves that are being made inside the DOW, you'll at least understand the master chess game that they're at least trying to implement. It's pretty smart.

Christian: You've done incredible work recently with helping people understand and navigate his environment in ways that perhaps were difficult for people to understand before. What are you going to be looking for next and what are you potentially going to be working on as a result of these changes?

Blank: I think you're referring to the PEO directory that I wrote, which is about 300 pages long. It’s the first phone book for the Department of War with a 30 page preamble of go-to-market strategies. I literally have started rewriting it and it's now going to be called the Portfolio Acquisition Executive Handbook and now it's going to explain how PAEs work and what the silos looked like before and how each service is reorganizing.

For example, the Army likely will condense 12 PEOs into six portfolios and make major shifts, this month or certainly by the end of the year. And the other services will follow. I think the Army is a little ahead of everybody else. But having a phone book to actually explain who's who and what they're supposed to be doing.

As I said, it will be six months to a year of chaos and I think having some kind of handbook that at least shows you where things are heading and who are the new people to call on would be helpful. So that's what the Stanford Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation is doing.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside the Pentagon IG’s Findings on Signalgate https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-pentagon-igs-findings-on-signalgate https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-pentagon-igs-findings-on-signalgate OPINION — “The [Defense] Secretary [Pete Hegseth] sent nonpublic DoD information [on March 15 at 11:44 EDT] identifying the quantity and strike times of manned U.S. aircraft over hostile [Houthi] territory [in Yemen] over an unapproved, unsecure network [Signal] approximately 2 to 4 hours before the execution of those [U.S. aircraft] strikes. Using a personal cell phone to conduct official business and send nonpublic DoD information through Signal risks potential compromise of sensitive DoD information, which could cause harm to DoD personnel and mission objectives.”

That was one finding from the December 2, Defense Department Inspector General (DoD IG)] report entitled Evaluation of the Secretary of Defense’s Reported Use of a Commercially Available Messaging Application for Official Business that was released last Wednesday.

Another finding was “We [Office of the DoD IG] concluded that the [Defense] Secretary [Hegseth] sent sensitive nonpublic, DoD operational information that he determined did not require classification over Signal on his personal cell phone. Although EO 13526 [Executive Order on Classified National Security Information] grants the [Defense] Secretary the authority to determine the proper level of classification of DoD information, we concluded that the Secretary’s actions did not comply with DoDI 8170.01 [DoD Policy for social media accounts] which prohibits using a personal device for official business and sending nonpublic information over a non-approved commercially available messaging application.”

So in that first finding the DoD IG found Hegseth’s message potentially endangered U.S. military members and their mission, and in the second finding the DoD IG said the Defense Secretary had violated DoD policy.

On Wednesday evening, after public release of the DoD IG report, Hegseth on X messaged, “No classified information. Total exoneration. Case closed. Houthis bombed into submission. Thank you for your attention to this IG report.” At roughly the same time, Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell in a statement said: “Total exoneration of Secretary Hegseth and proves what we all knew – no classified information was shared. The matter is resolved and the case is closed.”

Of course the DoD IG report is the opposite of “total exoneration,” and by no means should the case be closed. In fact, this entire matter should have been an illustration to the Trump administration that it cannot get away with lying about serious matters, but nonetheless they have continued to try.

The history of this DoD IG report shows that Hegseth and others in the Trump administration even failed to cooperate in the IG’s investigation.

For example, the DoD IG report said frankly, “The Secretary declined to be interviewed for this evaluation.” Hegseth did, after four months, supply to the IG Office a July 25, one-page, five paragraph statement. In it, Hegseth used two paragraphs to defend the questioned details in his March 15, Signal chat message, arguing at one point the information was “either not classified, or that I could safely declassify [it].”

Meanwhile, there were other times of non-cooperation. The DOD IG report said, “We requested a copy of the Secretary’s communications on Signal on or about March 15. According to a senior official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Secretary declined to provide us direct access to his personal cell phone.”

At another point, when the DoD IG was trying to get a full transcript of the March 15, Signal chat, it found that OSD had a consolidated version it received from the White House Counsel’s Office, but the request for a copy was declined “because it was not a DoD-created record.”

The DOD IG report, itself, originated from a request back on March 26, by Sens, Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and Jack Reed (D-R.I.), the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The two Senators were reacting to two articles dated March 24, and March 26, on The Atlantic website written by Editor Jeffrey Goldberg, who had described that somehow then-National Security Advisor Mike Waltz had made Goldberg part of a Signal chat group of senior Trump administration officials named the Houthi PC small group. The chat group included Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary Hegseth, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John Ratcliffe, and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard.

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Goldberg’s March 24, Atlantic article alleged that on March 15, the Signal chat group received from Hegseth sensitive war plans about the U.S. air strikes before they took place on Yemen that day. The Atlantic initially chose not to print those war plan details because potentially they contained classified information. Although the White House initially said the story seemed authentic, Hegseth initially said, “Nobody was texting war plans, and that’s all I have to say about that."

By the next day, the Trump administration had settled on their response. Appearing on March 25 before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director Ratcliffe said, “The Secretary of Defense is the original classification authority, and my understanding is that his comments are that any information that he shared was not classified.” DNI Gabbard, appearing with Ratcliffe, echoed him saying, “There were no classified or intelligence equities that were included in that chat group at any time.”

After the denials, The Atlantic on March 26, then published Goldberg’s subsequent article which contained Hegseth’s pre-strike details. They gave the scheduled March 15 time of the first F-18 launch package; the time the first strike F-18s should reach “Target Terrorist;” the time of launch of MQ-9 strike drones; the time launch of second F-18 package; the time “when first bombs will definitely drop,” and the time when F-18 2nd package strike begins; and the time when the first sea-based Tomahawk missiles launched.

Although Hegseth claimed, “there were no details that would endanger our troops or the mission,” anyone who knew where the F-18s were based, their time of departure and the expected time bombs were to be dropped in Yemen might have been be able to determine the targets.

The DoD IG report concluded, “If this information had fallen into the hands of U.S. adversaries, Houthi forces might have been able to counter U.S. forces or reposition personnel and assets to avoid planned U.S. strikes. Even though these events did not ultimately occur, the Secretary’s actions created a risk to operational security that could have resulted in failed U.S. mission objectives and potential harm to U.S. pilots.”

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Another issue raised by the DOD IG report is that Hegseth was involved in other Signal chat groups into which he could have put additional classified information.

For example, the DOD IG reported, “One of the officials we spoke with stated that the Secretary posted the same sensitive operational information concerning the March 15, Houthi attack plans on the ‘Defense Team Huddle’ group chat.” That was a chat group Hegseth established from his personal and professional inner circle in January 2025, before his confirmation as defense secretary, and included Hegseth’s wife, Jennifer, who is a former Fox News producer.

The New York Times reported the Defense Team Huddle chat group also included Hegseth’s younger brother, Phil Hegseth, who has since become a senior adviser to the Defense Secretary and a DoD liaison officer to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Other OSD officials told DoD IG investigators there are “multiple additional Signal group chats in which the Secretary allegedly participated to conduct official DoD business and transmit nonpublic DoD information,” according to the IG report. “Two officials stated that they were part of several group chats, and one of them stated that the Secretary and others used the chats to coordinate meetings, respond to media inquiries, or alert staff to check their official email accounts.”

That was another reason, the report said, “why we [DoD IG] requested copies of messages from these other Signal group chats, as well as access to the Secretary’s personal cell phone,” which so far have been unsuccessful.

I must conclude this article by saying that much credit goes to the DoD IG office, and Acting DoD IG Steven A. Stebbins. They did an admirable job on this inquiry given the lack of cooperation from their top bosses to this inquiry. They showed the professionalism looked for and needed in federal government employees.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
Can Europe Survive the New Multipolar World? https://belimedia.com.ng/can-europe-survive-the-new-multipolar-world https://belimedia.com.ng/can-europe-survive-the-new-multipolar-world EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — For more than three decades after the Cold War, Europe lived under the illusion that history had settled in its favor. Liberal democracy seemed ascendant, global markets expanded without friction, and American military primacy insulated the continent from hard-power competition. Under those conditions, the European Union could focus on enlargement, regulation, and internal integration rather than geopolitics.

That era is finished.

A new multipolar world, shaped primarily by the United States, China and Russia has taken hold, and Europe’s place within it is increasingly uncertain. The EU now faces a destabilizing combination of external pressures and internal constraints that call into question its long-term strategic relevance. The next decade will determine whether Europe becomes a genuine pole of power or resigns itself to being a geopolitical appendage.

The End of Post-Cold War Certainties

The post-1991 Western order rested on three assumptions: U.S. military dominance, deepening globalization, and the notion that political liberalization would eventually spread worldwide. Each of these pillars has eroded.

U.S. primacy is no longer guaranteed. Washington is now stretched between deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, supporting Ukraine, and managing crises in the Middle East. American policymakers—across both parties—increasingly resent Europe’s reliance on U.S. defense guarantees and expect the EU to realign its China policy with America’s priorities. Europe’s security depends on a partner whose long-term predictability it cannot ensure.

Globalization is fragmenting. The pandemic, geopolitical rivalries, and technological decoupling between Washington and Beijing have shattered faith in frictionless global supply chains. Europe, whose prosperity hinges on exports, advanced manufacturing, and access to global markets, feels the squeeze.

Authoritarian resilience has replaced Western convergence. China’s techno-authoritarian model and Russia’s militarized nationalism offer alternatives to liberal democracy. Across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, states increasingly hedge rather than take sides, reducing the EU’s ability to shape norms or export its model. The world is no longer moving toward Europe. It is moving away from it.

The New Power Triangle: Washington, Beijing, Moscow

1. The United States: indispensable, but increasingly impatient

The U.S. remains the only actor capable of deterring Russia on Europe’s behalf, and without American intelligence, logistics, and weaponry, Ukraine’s position would be far more precarious. Yet Washington’s strategic focus is shifting eastward. In every administration, the question recurs: Why should America subsidize European security indefinitely?

Growing U.S. skepticism combined with the possibility of future political shifts exposes Europe’s most dangerous vulnerability: dependence on an ally whose priorities are changing faster than Europe can adapt.

2. China: Europe’s vital economic partner turned systemic rival

China is indispensable to European industries from electric vehicles to renewable energy to pharmaceuticals. Yet Beijing’s industrial subsidies, strategic investments, and political influence operations challenge the EU’s economic model and internal cohesion. As Washington accelerates decoupling, Europe is pressured to follow suit at high cost to its own industry.

China is no longer just a market; it is a shaping force in a global system that Europe struggles to influence.

3. Russia: the security threat that will not disappear

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe’s illusions of a “post-historic” continent. Even after the initial shock, Moscow’s ongoing militarization signals a long-term confrontation. Europe’s sanctions, energy diversification, and support for Kyiv have been substantial but the EU still lacks the military and industrial backbone to sustain a prolonged, high-intensity conflict without the United States.

Russia is not a temporary crisis. It is a structural challenge.

Europe’s Structural Weakness: Power Without Agency

Europe has economic weight, technological capability, and regulatory influence but struggles to convert them into geopolitical power.

1. Fragmented decision-making. EU foreign policy requires unanimity, making coherent action nearly impossible. France pushes for “strategic autonomy,” Germany for economic stability, Poland for deterrence, Italy for flexibility. Diverging priorities fracture the bloc at every major juncture, from China policy to Middle East diplomacy.

2. Military insufficiency. Despite increases in defense spending, Europe remains dependent on the U.S. for intelligence, logistics, command-and-control, missile defense, and advanced weapons. The continent’s defense industry is fragmented into dozens of incompatible national systems that a luxury Europe can no longer afford.

3. Economic vulnerabilities. From semiconductors to critical minerals, Europe relies on external suppliers. In a world defined by technological blocs and industrial rivalry, the EU risks being squeezed between U.S. security demands and Chinese economic dominance.

4. Demographic decline. Aging societies and shrinking workforces reduce the EU’s long-term competitiveness and its ability to project power.

These vulnerabilities do not make Europe irrelevant—but they do make it reactive.

Three Possible Futures

Scenario 1: Strategic Autonomy Becomes Real

Europe could choose to become a coherent geopolitical actor—pooling defense procurement, adopting majority voting on foreign policy, investing heavily in its defense industry, and crafting a unified China strategy. This would give the EU real agency.

But achieving this requires political courage that Europe has rarely demonstrated.

Scenario 2: Renewed Atlantic Dependence

The EU may double down on the U.S. alliance, accepting a secondary role in global geopolitics while focusing on economic and regulatory power. This is the easiest path both politically and financially but it leaves Europe dangerously exposed to America’s domestic turmoil.

Scenario 3: Fragmentation and Decline

If member states continue to pursue conflicting national policies and U.S. attention continues shifting to Asia Europe risks strategic irrelevance. In this scenario, global powers shape Europe’s environment, while Europe merely adapts.

This path is unlikely to be dramatic. Decline rarely is. It is slow, quiet, and comfortable until suddenly it is not.

Europe Must Choose Power Over Comfort

The multipolar world will not wait for Europe to get its act together. The question is no longer whether the EU wishes to become a global actor; it is whether it can afford not to.

Europe’s future is binary:

A genuine geopolitical pole, capable of defending its interests. A subordinate ally, protected but strategically constrained. Or a divided continent, overshadowed by the ambitions of others. For three decades, Europe believed it had escaped history. Now history has returned with force. Whether Europe survives the new multipolar world depends on whether it chooses power over comfort, strategy over complacency, and unity over drift.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:29 +0100 FirstHandNews
2025: 10 Events That Changed the World https://belimedia.com.ng/2025-10-events-that-changed-the-world https://belimedia.com.ng/2025-10-events-that-changed-the-world

SPECIAL REPORT — In a turbulent year, one of the biggest national security stories came in the form of a document.

The administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released earlier this month, upends longstanding U.S. policy toward allies and adversaries alike. It ranks drug trafficking and illegal immigration as top threats to U.S. security, places a heavy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, criticizes Europe and downplays security challenges from China and Russia.

Eight years ago, Trump's first NSS said that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” The new NSS doesn’t name Russia as a threat to the U.S. – stating instead that “strategic stability with Russia” is a goal of American policy. Europe is presented as a bigger challenge; the U.S. should “help Europe correct its current trajectory,” which the NSS says has been damaged by immigration and a risk of “civilizational erasure.”

As for China, the document focuses on economic competition – trade, infrastructure, and technology. References to Taiwan and the South China Sea come later, and they include warnings that other Asian nations must carry a greater burden; “the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone.”

“The north star of great-power competition with China and Russia—around which the first Trump administration built bipartisan consensus—is gone,” Rebecca Lissner, Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote of the new NSS. The objective now, she said, is a “mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.”

Not surprisingly, European leaders were furious about the pivot to a more Russia-friendly posture, and what the European Council President called “political interference” in the affairs of Europe.

Glenn Corn, a former CIA Senior Executive, called the document’s treatment of Europe a “shock.”

“Europeans are not the enemy,” Corn told The Cipher Brief. “And I doubt the Russians will stand side by side with us on the battlefield and support us the way that our European partners have done.”

The new NSS won praise from at least one global capital. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said its emphasis on restoring strategic stability with Moscow “correspond in many ways” to Russia’s own vision.

Infographic with a map of the Americas showing the areas where the United States has carried out attacks against alleged drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean since September 2, 2025, as well as the number of people killed in these attacks, as of December 16 (Graphic by AFP via Getty Images)

Missiles on the Water

While the focus on narcotrafficking was clear from the early days of Trump’s second term, the heavy U.S. military deployments and air strikes in the Caribbean took experts by surprise. The aerial campaign began with a September missile attack on a small boat that killed 11 people; a second strike that day took the lives of two survivors who were clinging to the upturned vessel. The follow-on strike sparked criticism in Congress – including from Republicans – and charges that it might have violated maritime laws.

As of mid-December, at least 25 strikes had followed, including some in the Pacific, resulting in the deaths of more than 90 people alleged to have been smuggling drugs on the water. The Trump administration justified the attacks as necessary to stem a flow of fentanyl – which Trump labeled “a weapon of mass destruction” that has killed tens of thousands of Americans. Legal experts questioned whether passengers in these boats — even if they were found to have been carrying narcotics — could be considered enemy combatants. Others noted that fentanyl and its precursors are sourced primarily from China and Mexico — not Venezuela.

A separate question loomed, as the year wound down: were the strikes a prelude to military action against Venezuela, and its president, Nicolas Maduro?

Beyond the U.S. military buildup, there were several signs in December that a move against Venezuela may be in the offing: reports that the U.S. was exploring “day-after” scenarios in the event of Maduro’s ouster; the seizure of a Venezuelan tanker that was said to be transporting sanctioned oil to Iran; and President Trump’s December 16 announcement of a naval blockade of sanctioned oil tankers from Venezuela.

“Maduro has become the epicenter for a range of activities the U.S. is determined to roll back,” Ambassador Patrick Duddy, Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, told The Cipher Brief. “Seizure of the oil tanker signals that the U.S. has decided to take more active measures to achieve its goals.

Infographic with a map showing the location of strikes carried by Israel against Iran since June 13, 2025, according to data reported by the ISW (Graphic by AFP) (Graphic by VALENTINA BRESCHI,SYLVIE HUSSON,OLIVIA BUGAULT/AFP via Getty Images)

The U.S. and Israel Attack Iran

It would have been unthinkable only two years ago: a U.S.-Israeli war against Iran that provoked almost no meaningful response.

The attacks came in June – Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and military infrastructure that were followed by American airstrikes on three nuclear installations. Iran fired missiles at a U.S. base in Qatar but its overall retaliation was minimal, a consequence of earlier Israeli campaigns that weakened Iranian air defenses and its various militias in the Middle East. The 12-day war damaged elements of Iran’s nuclear program and laid bare a tectonic shift in the region: Iran and its “axis of resistance” had been badly weakened.

For decades, war-gaming scenarios had warned that any attack against Iran would carry risks of a conflagration, given the likelihood of a coordinated response from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthi militia in Yemen. Now the paradigm has shifted.

“The U.S. joined Israel in military operations and people thought that had been a red line in the past,” Norman Roule, a former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, told The Cipher Brief. “For the nuclear negotiations and other talks going forward, Iran now has to deal with a new world where there is this precedent.”

As the year ended, Iran remained a shell of what it had been, and reports suggested its leaders were conflicted about the way forward. Would the country recognize its weaknesses and move towards a rapprochement with the West — a move that might bring sanctions relief and usher in a new security dynamic in the region? Or would hardliners carry the day, resorting to one of the last levers Iran has – its nuclear program?

“If you're in Iran, you have to make a strategic decision,” Roule said. “‘If we restart the program, will the United States and Israel attack?’ They've got to ask, ‘If we do this, will we survive?’”

U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky meet in the Oval Office at the White House on February 28, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

Zelensky’s Oval Office Blowup – and the Rollercoaster that Followed

For Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, 2025 brought wild swings of fortune, on the battlefield and in the global halls of power.

An Oval Office meeting on February 28 marked the low point – the encounter during which President Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelensky for what they saw as insufficient gratitude towards the U.S. and – in Trump’s words – a failure to understand that Ukraine “has no cards” in the war against Russia.

The meeting “was a horrible disappointment and almost a shock to the system,” former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove told us that day. “There was only one winner…and that is Vladimir Putin.”

But fortune’s wheel took turns in Zelensky’s favor. Trump’s subsequent meetings with Zelensky – at the Vatican in April and the June NATO summit – warmed the relationship; the NATO summit itself saw Trump pivot back toward the alliance and its support for Ukraine; and then – in a startling outburst – Trump in July turned his ire towards Russian President Vladimir Putin. “We get a lot of bull**** thrown at us by Putin,” Trump said.

Alas for Zelensky, at year’s end the pendulum looked to have swung back once more. Trump’s envoys were again pushing Russia-friendly peace proposals, which included the surrender of territory beyond what Russia has already occupied. In an interview with Politico, Trump said of Zelensky, “He’s gonna have to get on the ball and start accepting things…cause he’s losing.” It sounded like a gentler version of the treatment Zelensky had gotten on that February day in the Oval Office.

Photo by Wojtek Laski/Getty Images

A Tu-95 bomber aircraft takes off for a night patrol flies out of Engels-2 airbase on August 7, 2008 in Engels, Russia. (Photo by Wojtek Laski/Getty Images)

Operation “Spiderweb” – and What Came After

It was Ukraine’s greatest military success in 2025 – and it happened far from Ukrainian territory. An operation dubbed “Spiderweb” smuggled 117 drone weapons into Russia and unleashed them against several airfields on June 1, damaging or destroying dozens of Russian warplanes. The mission was months in the planning, the drones were smuggled on prefabricated cabins disguised as hunting lodges, and unsuspecting Russians were paid to drive the trucks that moved the cabins.

“Spiderweb” showcased Ukraine's special operations capabilities and was followed by more long-range sabotage. As The Cipher Brief reported, subsequent attacks targeted Russian refineries and other sites tied to the oil sector.

“It’s very impressive,” Balazs Jarabik, a former European Union diplomat and analyst for RPolitik, told The Cipher Brief. The energy-sector attacks, he said, were “making the Russian war effort more expensive, and creating shortages so the Russian people feel the pain of the war.”

By year’s end, Ukraine had carried out an estimated 160 strikes on Russia’s oil sector – the campaign reached as far as the Siberian city of Tyumen, some 1200 miles east of Moscow, and included strikes against vessels alleged to be working in Russia’s so-called "shadow fleet” of tankers carrying sanctioned oil.

“Ukraine’s theory of victory now includes destroying Russia’s energy sector,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, told The Cipher Brief. “They’ve developed capabilities that can reach great distances with precision, exposing Russia’s vulnerability – its inability to protect critical infrastructure across its vast landscape.”

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Palestinians flock to the Netzarim Corridor to receive limited food supplies as hunger deepens across Gaza amid ongoing Israeli attacks and blockade, on August 4, 2025. (Photo by Hassan Jedi/Anadolu via Getty Images)

A Peace Deal for Gaza

It was President Trump’s signature diplomatic achievement: a truce in Gaza reached just days before the two-year anniversary of Hamas’ October 7, 2023 massacre.

The deal’s first phase took hold, albeit in violent fits and starts – the return of hostages, the freeing of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, and a fresh flow of international aid for Gaza. But that may have been the easy part. As the year drew to a close, there were sporadic breaks in the ceasefire, and the fate of the deal’s next phases remained unclear.

The Trump administration’s plan for Gaza included the deployment of an international stabilization force and creation of an international “Board of Peace” (led by Trump himself) to oversee the implementation of the next phases – the transition of governance to Palestinians not affiliated with Hamas, and the beginning of a multi-billion-dollar reconstruction. The deal also included language offering a conditional pathway to Palestinian autonomy over its territories.

But as of mid-December, the announcement of the Board had been delayed, and the New York Times reported that while the U.S. was pressing other nations to contribute troops to a 8,000-member force for Gaza, it had yet to win any commitments. Countries were said to be worried their troops might be ensnared in fresh fighting; and the UN Security Council resolution to deploy the force gave no precise terms of engagement. Nor was there agreement on the makeup of a transitional government.

As these hurdles appeared, reports suggested Hamas was rebuilding its presence in the territory.

“Who’s really calling the shots there?” Ralph Goff, a former CIA Senior Executive, asked at The Cipher Brief’s annual Threat Conference, speaking of the uncertainty inside Gaza. “I remain pretty pessimistic on the idea of any kind of internal governing force being able to compete with Hamas at this point.”

By year’s end, two things were clear: the Gaza ceasefire itself was a welcome achievement after two years of carnage; and uncertainty hung over the truce’s critical next phases. This was one major story that will continue to unfold — with hope but also apprehension — well into 2026.

The commissioning and flag-presenting ceremony of the Fujian, China's first aircraft carrier equipped with electromagnetic catapults, is held at a naval port in Sanya City, south China's Hainan Province, on Nov. 5, 2025. (Photo by Li Gang/Xinhua via Getty Images)

China's Military Boom

China held a “Victory Day” parade in September – its way of marking 80 years since the end of World War II – and it was above all a show of military prowess. 12,000 troops marched alongside an arsenal of newly-minted battle tanks and rocket launchers, drone weapons and hypersonic missiles, and more. It was a fitting symbol for a year in which China turbocharged its military buildup.

As The Cipher Brief reported, China took a “leap forward” in drone weaponry in 2025: a huge new “stealth endurance drone,” mosquito-sized “micro drones,” and the deployment of a new “drone mothership.” The latter, known as the Jiu Tian, was billed as the world’s largest drone carrier – an 11-ton aircraft that is itself an uncrewed aerial vehicle. According to the South China Morning Post, the Jiu Tian can hold 100 smaller UAVs and carry them more than 4,000 miles.

“They have the production, they have large inventory and now they also have the AI,” Dr. Michael Raska, a professor at the Military Transformation Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told The Cipher Brief. “With all these combined, they have been experiencing a leap forward in the quality and quantity of all their drones.”

China also made leaps in maritime power. In November, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned the 80,000-ton Fujian, the country’s third aircraft carrier and largest to date. A week later came news that the Sichuan, one of the world’s largest amphibious assault ships, would be ready for deployment next year.

Retired Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, a former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, told The Cipher Brief that China had achieved its longstanding goal of building “a world-class Navy,” which had surpassed the size of the U.S. fleet.

“It's not just not in the numbers, it's in the quality,” RADM Studeman said. “These ships are modern by any standard.”

“It's impressive,” another former Rear Admiral, Mark Montgomery, told The Cipher Brief. “They're building a hundred merchant ships for every one we build, and two warships for every one we build.”

The Trump Administration issued an executive order in April to jumpstart the U.S. shipbuilding industry and restore “American maritime dominance,” but experts said the U.S. faces an uphill road. As The Cipher Brief reported, China is on track to have a 425-ship fleet by 2030, while the U.S. Navy currently has fewer than 300 deployable battle-force vessels – a total which may drop as aging ships are retired faster than new ones are put to water.

Police cars are seen on November 17, 2025 close to the railways that were damaged in an explosion on the rail line in Mika, next to Garwolin, central Poland, after the line presumably was targeted in a sabotage act. (Photo by Wojtek Radwanski/AFP via Getty Images)

Europe Wakes Up to the “Gray-Zone” War

2025 was the year when Europe formally recognized – and began to respond to – a growing threat from the east: the so-called “gray-zone” war attributed to Moscow.

These attacks mushroomed in 2025 – from cyberattacks to railway bombings, the cutting of undersea cables to drone incursions into Poland and the Baltic states, and more. Experts said they were designed to be difficult to trace, and non-kinetic, so as not to draw a military response; as The Cipher Brief reported, the Kremlin was likely “aiming to create disruption without triggering escalation.”

But there were also signs that European leaders were waking up to the gravity of the threat.

NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte warned repeatedly of the dangers, and the alliance moved to improve detection and deterrence measures.

Nations took steps of their own. Finland acquired hundreds of drone jammers and outfitted border forces with high-end drone detectors; leaders from Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states said they might shoot down Russian aircraft if Moscow continued its provocations; in a September speech to the United Nations, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski went so far as to warn Moscow that “if another missile or aircraft enters our space without permission, deliberately or by mistake, and gets shot down and the wreckage falls on NATO territory, please don’t come here to whine about it.”

Even nations far from the Russian frontier were waking up to the dangers; Ireland unveiled a €1.7 billion, five-year defense plan that included systems to counter drones and protect undersea cables from Russian sabotage. And in her first public speech, MI6 chief Blaise Metreweli described the gray-zone threat bluntly: “The new frontline is everywhere,” she said.

Writing in The Cipher Brief, former Senior CIA Executive Dave Pitts stressed the need “to change the risk calculation.”

“We need to think of deterrence and response as a team sport - an Article 5 mindset,” Pitts wrote. “Gray-zone attacks that go unanswered reward our adversaries and reinforce the idea that there are more gains than risk…and encourage more attacks.”

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Heavy trucks haul earth and rock at the construction site of Wubian Xiangshang Reservoir on the top of Pandao Mountain in Zhangye, China, on March 3, 2025. (Photo by Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

America’s Rare Earth Crisis

Not long ago, rare earth minerals rarely made global headlines. 2025 was the year when that changed. And for the U.S. government, it was also the year in which rare earths took center stage.

Two basic facts underscored the urgency: rare earths are essential building blocks for everything from smart phones to home appliances to cars to all manner of military equipment and weapon systems; and China now produces an estimated 60 percent of the world’s rare earths and processes nearly 90 percent of them. The U.S. Geological Survey said that in 2024, the U.S. imported more than 95 percent of the total rare earths that it consumed.

Those realities spurred multiple U.S. efforts to change the dynamic: deals with Australia and Japan; negotiations with other resource-rich countries, including Congo, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Malaysia; and threats to annex mineral-rich Greenland. Even the negotiations with Russia and Ukraine reportedly included plans for U.S. firms to invest in rare-earth extraction in Russia.

China’s imposition of rare-earth export restrictions only heightened the concerns – and while those were lifted as part of a deal with Washington, the message was clear: China’s rare-earths dominance now poses a huge problem for the U.S., and gives China a powerful lever in any future negotiations with Washington.

Susan Miller, a Former Assistant Director of the CIA’s China Mission Center, called the rare earth access “vital” to U.S. technology and national security.

“We democracies must do more to assure we have continuous access to these metals, and we also need to start producing more,” Miller told The Cipher Brief. “All democracies must focus on this issue; we must act now.”

Intel Chiefs Detail Top Threats \u2013 and Get a Grilling Over Signal Leak

Then-National Security Agency Director General Timothy Haugh, FBI Director Kash Patel, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe, and then-Defense Intelligence Agency Director Jeffrey Kruse appear during a Senate Committee on Intelligence Hearing on March 25, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

The Overhaul of the Intelligence Community

Before his return to the White House, Donald Trump promised to remake the U.S. intelligence community (IC). “We will clean out all of the corrupt actors in our national security and intelligence apparatus,” Trump said soon after the 2024 election.“The departments and agencies that have been weaponized will be completely overhauled.”

In 2025, it was a promise he kept.

There were widespread cuts in staffing at the CIA, FBI, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the biggest reductions appeared to come at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which coordinates the 18 agencies of the IC. Roughly 40% of ODNI staff were cut, including the elimination or consolidation of the Foreign Malign Influence Center and some cyber threat units into other agencies.

Other high-level dismissals drew particular attention: National Intelligence Council acting head Mike Collins was fired after presenting an assessment on Venezuela that contradicted the White House line; and NSA Director Gen. Timothy Haugh lost his job after Trump “influencer” Laura Loomer questioned his loyalty to the administration.

Depending who you asked, the changes were a much-needed streamlining of a bloated intelligence apparatus; a reorganization to focus less on Russia and China and more on border security and drug trafficking; or a Trump-driven retaliation against institutions and individuals he had blamed for investigations or views with which he disagreed.

The high-level firings troubled several experts. Jon Darby, a longtime NSA veteran who served as director of operations, told The Cipher Brief he was “very disheartened” by Gen. Haugh’s ouster. “We need an explanation of the underlying rationale,” he said.

Beth Sanner, a Cipher Brief expert who served as Deputy Director for National Intelligence at ODNI, warned of a broader politicization of the IC.

“The intelligence community is not like asking people to hit the easy button and the ‘I agree with you’ button,” she said. “That's not our role. Our role is to say what we think and why we think it…The intelligence community isn't always right. But when done correctly and behind closed doors, I cannot understand why anybody would say that presenting an intelligence assessment that disagreed with policy needed to stop, or was an example of deep state. It's not. And it's really important.”

All that said, the nature of the IC makes it difficult, even at the end of a tumultuous year for the various agencies, to know precisely what the impact of the “overhaul” has been – or will be in the future.

Fingers on laptop. (Photo by Silas Stein/picture alliance via Getty Images)

A Cybersecurity “Watershed”

It seemed like a headline from a science fiction journal. An artificial intelligence system had conducted a large-scale espionage operation.

But it wasn’t science fiction – or fake news. The AI giant Anthropic confirmed the first real-world case of the use of an AI system to do exactly that.

“Today marks a watershed in cybersecurity,” Jennifer Ewbank, a former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Digital Innovation, told The Cipher Brief. “AI has now crossed from tool to operator,” Ewbank said, “blurring the line between human intent and machine execution...a threshold has been crossed.”

Anthropic said that Chinese state-sponsored hackers had exploited its Claude AI system to carry out cyberattacks on corporations and foreign governments in September, and that the hackers had succeeded with only minimal human oversight. Anthropic’s threat intelligence chief said the campaign had targeted about 30 entities, and represented a new level of AI-enabled hacking. The hackers posed as security auditors and successfully breached several systems, accessing privileged accounts and private data before being blocked.

The good news? The number of breaches and scale of the damage appeared small, and no U.S. government agencies were compromised. But the incident gave ammunition to doomsayers who have warned of AI nightmares – and showed that AI is already a valuable tool for hackers and state-backed cyber operations.

Experts called it the latest code-red warning for securing AI systems and deploying effective cyber defenses. As Ewbank put it, “This is no longer a hypothetical threat being researched in a lab.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Blueprint for Next&Generation Defense Production https://belimedia.com.ng/a-blueprint-for-next-generation-defense-production https://belimedia.com.ng/a-blueprint-for-next-generation-defense-production OPINION — The Pentagon’s push to overhaul its slow, specification-driven procurement system is an overdue acknowledgment that our defense industrial base has become too narrow, too fragile, and too dependent on foreign supply chains. America’s defense establishment is finally waking up to a critical weakness that has metastasized in recent decades: we have drifted away from the industrial might that once formed the bedrock of our economy and allowed us to out-produce any adversary in the world.

While there are many warning signs, one symptom of the problem is unmistakably clear: the United States is not producing what it needs at the speed and scale modern conflict demands. Recent reporting shows the U.S. Army is still struggling to meet its 155mm artillery-shell production goals after years of effort. Across the spectrum—from advanced missile interceptors to something as basic as black powder—we are falling dangerously behind in both production capacity and supply-chain resilience. For now, these shortfalls are appearing in conflicts that don’t directly involve American troops, but the truth is that a major war will see the United States forced to ration materials and munitions, deploying untested prototypes on the battlefield while the defense industrial base races to catch up. We must act now to prevent this from happening.

If we are serious about winning the next war—or better yet, deter it—we must rethink both how we buy military equipment and weapons, and how fast we can make them. We don’t need another half measure or a fully government solution. Instead, the government should leverage the private sector to build a nationwide network of multifaceted, resilient manufacturing nodes that can surge production of everything from drones, vehicles, and body armor to medicine, munitions, and microelectronics in times of crisis, while sustaining production lines for commercial products in peacetime. The power of the U.S. economy can, and should, be leveraged to solve this problem.

This network of production centers, or campuses, would bring together startups and established manufacturers in the same ecosystem, enabling the kind of rapid prototyping, pilot production, and full-rate manufacturing the Pentagon is urgently seeking. Each of these campuses would be designed for flexibility, with modular production capabilities that can be rapidly upgraded, and shared heavy infrastructure such as test beds, utilities, and analytical systems. Furthermore, these facilities would be part of a connected national network, leveraging the regional strengths of each part of the country while avoiding the single points of failure commonly found in today’s highly concentrated manufacturing hubs.

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Today, the gap between a successful prototype and real-world production is often a chasm in the defense industrial base. Major firms are often tied up maintaining legacy systems while cash-strapped startups cannot afford to build compliant, capital-intensive factories without production contracts. These startups are often told that contracts won’t come until they prove they can manufacture at scale. So promising technologies stall in a chicken-or-egg limbo while delays snowball. The Pentagon’s renewed embrace of OTAs helps, but money alone won’t fix a physical bottleneck. We need places where cutting-edge firms can scale quickly, and affordably.

A national network of industrial campuses is designed to fill this gap. Under this model, companies wouldn’t pay construction costs up front; lease payments would begin only after they move in and start generating revenue. Layering into the model a certain number of shared facilities—initially funded by the Pentagon—would reduce risk, accelerate development, and dramatically shorten production timelines. Young companies gain room to grow. Established firms gain access to fresh innovation - and taxpayer dollars go further.

This is not a radical idea. It is an evolution of the model that once made America unstoppable. In World War II, factories across the economy—automotive, textile, consumer goods, and more—transformed to support the war effort. That surge capacity happened because the United States had an existing industrial ecosystem ready to mobilize. Today, we no longer have one.

Decades of offshoring, consolidation, and a fixation on short-term efficiency have left our industrial base brittle and full of holes. COVID-19 made that painfully clear when the world’s largest economy found itself dependent on foreign suppliers for PPE and basic supplies. Semiconductor shortages still slow defense and automotive lines. Meanwhile, our adversaries are turning basic industries into warfighting assets. Russian bakeries are producing drones and China is treating its manufacturing capabilities as a strategic weapon while in America, we’ve been treating our manufacturing base like an accounting exercise.

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The government must shift course. Manufacturing is a strategic asset—every bit as important as ships, planes, satellites, or submarines. Washington should fund shared industrial infrastructure, de-risk private investment, and let market forces drive efficiency.

The math is simple. In some cases, companies piloting these programs have delivered 4:1 to 25:1 returns on tax dollars, generating major gains for minimal government investments. With a defense budget exceeding $800 billion, the Pentagon can easily afford to invest a sliver of that—well under one percent—to send a clear, unambiguous demand signal to the private sector that America is rebuilding its industrial backbone, and doing it now.

History shows what happens when we do. Modest seed capital during World War II and the Apollo program unlocked massive private investment and generated hundreds of innovations that have come to define the modern age. These campuses would be more than factories—they would be hubs where manufacturers, universities, investors, and federal partners build self-sustaining ecosystems capable of accelerating innovation, fostering talent, and producing critical goods at scale. They would restore American industrial depth, innovation, and flexibility—our most reliable, most underestimated tools of deterrence.

America is racing into the next complex era of great-power competition with a defense industrial base limping along from the last era; one that is simply too small, too fragile, and too slow. We can invent extraordinary technologies, but what use are they sitting in a lab if we can’t produce them at scale? If that doesn’t change, the United States risks discovering—too late—that innovation without industrial power is a hollow advantage.

Rebuilding American manufacturing will be difficult. But the cost of inaction is far higher. A nation with a deep, flexible industrial base can surge production, absorb economic shocks, and outlast any adversary, on the battlefield and the home front. A nation without one is forced to ration weapons, delay deployments, and scramble to keep its supply chains functioning.

We can build this network now or we can wait for a crisis to expose, once again, how fragile our industrial base has become. In the next conflict, the world’s strongest military must be able to depend on its factories to keep up.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
Echoes of 1940: Learning from an Ally at War and Preparing the U.S. for the Next Fight https://belimedia.com.ng/echoes-of-1940-learning-from-an-ally-at-war-and-preparing-the-us-for-the-next-fight https://belimedia.com.ng/echoes-of-1940-learning-from-an-ally-at-war-and-preparing-the-us-for-the-next-fight

EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE — Eighty-five years ago, as the United States cautiously explored an expanded alliance with Great Britain, our own population was divided. London was already fighting for its very survival, standing alone after the fall of France; Washington was not yet fighting at all. Public opinion tilted toward isolationism, and President Roosevelt had to proceed slowly to avoid losing the support of both Congress and the U.S. public. Yet a year later, the Atlantic Charter was signed with Churchill, publicly declaring a shared stand against tyranny and an alliance that would stand for the rest of the century. But behind the scenes, the two leaders negotiated a deeper exchange: American weapons for British technology.

Through Lend-Lease, the United States sent destroyers and vital equipment to keep Britain in the fight against Nazi aggression. Less understood was what the U.S. quietly received in return: cutting-edge capabilities that would shape its own success once it entered the war. That historical moment holds lessons for today, with America again questioning its commitments abroad, and for the value of learning from a Ukrainian ally engaged in a war we are not fighting ourselves.

One of Britain’s most consequential contributions in 1940 was the technology behind “Chain Home,” an early, revolutionary radar network. A constellation of radio stations sent out beams whose returns revealed the direction, altitude, and approximate numbers of incoming Luftwaffe aircraft during the Battle of Britain. Integrated with human observers and command-and-control stations, the system allowed RAF leaders to deploy their limited squadrons with precision, conserving fuel, protecting pilots, and preserving the nation’s survival. As Churchill famously said of the RAF, “never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”

That success was not only a triumph of courage but a triumph of rapid wartime innovation and operational learning. And it is exactly the kind of learning the United States must pursue now as Ukraine pioneers new modes of drone warfare against a technologically sophisticated adversary.

Drone warfare in Ukraine today is the chain home radar of our time. Today in Ukraine, that country “owes so much to so few”: drone warrior heroes fighting not only for their country, but for all of Europe and democracy. The drone operators and their innovation are helping Ukraine to stay in the war against overwhelming Russian numbers. The U.S. and other NATO allies have provided large weapons systems like HIMARS, ATACMS, Abrams tanks, and F-16s. All of these systems at one time were supposedly ruled out for Ukraine, only to be provided later. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s own drone industry and innovations have helped it to turn the tide of countless battles.

There has been frustration in the U.S., however, with the support. Many are asking: for all the weapons and funding we have provided to Ukraine, what are we getting back? Defending freedom and fighting Russian aggression for Europe and our allies should be enough for our arsenal of democracy. But it’s a fair question. It is understandable after 20 years of war that the American people want to know what else we are getting if the U.S. is to be so heavily engaged financially and militarily.

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One of the things we are learning, and can learn even more ahead, are incredible lessons about the battlefield for our future force. The Army War College has led a multi-year effort to help in a project called “Call to Action: Lessons for the Future Force”. Others in various military training and testing commands across all our services, and our allies, are doing the same.

There are many more lessons to be learned, and not enough resources are being put into the fight. For years, the U.S. embassy and government were limiting the number of official Americans and contractors allowed into the war zone to work with and learn from the Ukrainians. That should end for good, and we should be flooding our ally with experts ready to help, but also to learn. One of the areas we should be drawing a lot more lessons from is drone warfare.

The Russian military and its intelligence services have learned a lot about drone warfare in Ukraine. They have stood up an entire new service of their troops devoted to drone warfare, as well as a drone center called Rubikon, which is changing the battlefield. The Russians are also using drones in gray warfare against NATO countries, to probe their borders, weaknesses at airports, and other facilities across the continent in what has grown in recent months into a wave of drone incursions. This is hybrid warfare practiced by a country and its intelligence services that have a long history of doing so: testing reactions, looking for weak points, antagonizing the alliance to find soft spots, or partners willing to acquiesce to Russian aggression.

In turn, we in the NATO alliance and in the U.S. are slow to adapt. The United States needs to deploy more personnel, more resources, more engineers, and experts into Ukraine to learn all the desperately valuable lessons about the world’s first truly all-encompassing drone war. It is monumental both in scale and evolution. Just as the United States learned valuable lessons about radar, which saved countless American pilots and other lives throughout World War II, we need to learn these important lessons from the Ukrainians about drone warfare before we may find ourselves engaged in a conflict we are not prepared for.

There are three salient lessons for those who are studying the war and how it has evolved just in the past four years. These are areas the U.S. should focus more resources on. The first lesson that we need to study from the Ukrainians involves the electromagnetic space on the battlefield and electronic warfare (EW). American soldiers have never operated in a battle space so encumbered by all manner of electromagnetic jamming, as is taking place every day across the battlefields of Ukraine. Cyber operations, both enabling and disabling various systems, command and control, and what is called “PNT” or the precision navigational systems of all manner of weapons— all are being jammed and interfered with on an unprecedented scale in the EW space.

The second lesson we need to understand and learn from are the ingenious innovations and adaptations that the Ukrainians, in particular, have carried out with their drones. Ukraine stood up an entire industry to build millions of the very smallest type of drones designed to target an individual Russian soldier in a trench, to much larger mother drones to carry other drones, deliver supplies, and even carry out strategic strikes like those against Russian bombers at airfields, taking off from “conex” shipping containers. These are remarkable operations and feats that we can mine for lessons from our Ukrainian allies. We are well behind their innovation and acquisition curve.

Third and finally, the most important lesson we need to learn from the Ukrainians is how to fight a war where we might be out-manned and out-gunned. That is not something the American people could have imagined for nearly a century. But Russia’s aggression is stark and unprecedented. Add to it the prospect of a potential war with China over the Taiwan Strait looming, which the Chinese are preparing and training for, also at an unprecedented level. They and the North Koreans are sharing weapons’ components and helping Russia evade sanctions. And in the case of the latter, North Korean soldiers are dying for Russia on the battlefield. They are getting the know-how and learning the lessons from Russia.

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We are at a point where all of China’s conventional forces, with very few exceptions - on the land, sea, and air (save for nuclear forces)- outnumber the United States. China has a larger land army, a larger navy now by volume of surface vessels, and a Chinese Air Force that rivals our own and NATO’s airpower. Many will argue correctly that the Chinese do not have the experience of decades of combat, as our pilots do, nor the expertise of our sailors and soldiers on the ground. But as many famous generals have noted in history, “quantity has its own quality.” This is also a lesson from Ukraine, as overwhelming numbers of Russian troops are wearing down the front lines of Ukraine in the east. Overwhelming numbers of drones and artillery, as well as missile strikes combining in multi-vector attacks—all these are also making a significant impact on the battlefield.

We would be wise to engage with and learn more from our Ukrainian partners, just like the United States did 85 years ago from our British allies, before we were forced into war. It forged a “special relationship” that has stood for a century. We can hope for the same with our Ukrainian brothers and sisters fighting now against aggression in no less of a challenge to all of democracy than the Nazis were to Europe. Putin and his Chinese allies are out for world domination; make no mistake, we have to learn the lessons to prepare to fight and support our allies fighting again.

While we, supporters of Ukraine, hope this war will end soon, we also need to prepare for the next war. As Churchill said then, we should: “gather strength for the morning. For the morning will come. Brightly will it shine on the brave and true; kindly upon all who suffer for the cause; gloriously upon the tombs of heroes. Thus will shine the dawn.”

The dawn will come, but so will night again. We should learn from the Ukrainian heroes who have suffered through all the nights of this war, not doubt their commitment to freedom, nor our own obligation to support them.


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
X’s Location Feature Exposes a Real Problem, but Does Not Fix It https://belimedia.com.ng/xs-location-feature-exposes-a-real-problem-but-does-not-fix-it https://belimedia.com.ng/xs-location-feature-exposes-a-real-problem-but-does-not-fix-it OPINION — A new location transparency feature on X is revealing foreign influence on American discourse just as federal agencies designed to deal with such threats are being dismantled.

Toward the end of November, X began listing account locations in the “About this account” section of people’s (or bots’) profiles. X also can list the platform through which users access the social media site, such as the web app or a region-specific app store.

With these new transparency features, X exposed that major MAGA influencers are likely operating from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. And while anti-Trump profiles posing as Americans on X haven’t made headlines, the authors found one listing itself in Charlotte, NC that X indicates connected via the Nigeria App Store.

One factor driving foreign accounts to masquerade as domestic political commentators could be commercial gain. Heated political debate, abundant in the United States, drives engagement, which can be monetized. Account owners posing as Americans may also be funded or operated by America’s adversaries who seek to shape votes, increase social divisions, or achieve other strategic goals.

The problem of foreign adversaries pretending to be American is not new. During the cold war, Soviet KGB agents even posed as KKK members and sent hate mail to Olympic athletes before the 1984 summer Olympics. What is different now is the scale and speed of influence operations. The internet makes it dramatically easier for foreign adversaries to pose as Americans and infiltrate domestic discourse.

The past decade provides countless examples of Russia, China, and Iran targeting Americans with online influence operations. In 2022, a Chinese operation masqueraded as environmental activists in Texas to stoke protests against rare earth processing plants. Iran posed as the Proud Boys to send voters threatening emails before the 2020 elections. In 2014, Russia spread a hoax about a chemical plant explosion in Louisiana.

X’s new country of origin feature is a step in the right direction for combatting these operations. Using it, a BBC investigation revealed that multiple accounts advocating for Scottish independence connect to the platform via the Iran Android App. On first blush, this makes little sense. But Iran has a documented history of promoting Scottish independence through covert online influence operations and a track record of sowing discord wherever it can.

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Disclosing origin alone paints an incomplete picture. Identifying an account’s location does not always tell you who directs or funds the account. For example, Russia has previously outsourced its attempts to influence Americans to operators in Ghana and Nigeria. America’s adversaries continue to leverage proxies in their operations, as seen in a recently exposed Nigerian YouTube network aggressively spreading pro-Kremlin narratives.

Additionally, malign actors will likely still be able to spoof their location on X. Virtual private networks (VPNs) mask a user’s real IP address, and while X appears to flag suspected VPN use, the platform may have a harder time detecting residential proxies, which route traffic through a home IP address. Sophisticated operators and privacy enthusiasts will likely find additional ways to spoof their location. For example, TikTok tracks user locations but there are easy-to-find guides on how to change one’s apparent location.

The additional data points provided by X’s transparency feature, therefore, do not provide a shortcut to attributing a nation-state or other malign actor behind an influence operation. Proper attribution still requires thorough investigation, supported by both regional and technical expertise.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Social media platforms, private companies, and non-profits play a significant role in combatting online influence operations. Platforms have access to internal data — such as emails used to create an account and other technical indicators — that allow them to have a fuller picture about who is behind an account. Non-profits across the United States, Europe, Australia, and other aligned countries have also successfully exposed many influence operations in the past purely through open-source intelligence.

The U.S. government, however, plays a unique role in countering influence operations. Only governments have the authority to issue subpoenas, access sensitive sources, and impose consequences through sanctions and indictments.

Washington, however, has significantly reduced its capabilities to combat foreign malign influence. Over the past year, it has dismantled the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, shut down the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, and effectively dismantled the Foreign Malign Influence Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. These changes make it unclear who — if anyone — within the U.S. government oversees countering influence operations undermining American interests at home and abroad.

X’s new transparency feature reveals yet again that America’s adversaries are waging near-constant warfare against Americans on the devices and platforms that profoundly shape our beliefs and behaviors. Now the U.S. government must rebuild its capacity to address it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
What It Means Now that Fentanyl is Designated a “WMD” https://belimedia.com.ng/what-it-means-now-that-fentanyl-is-designated-a-wmd https://belimedia.com.ng/what-it-means-now-that-fentanyl-is-designated-a-wmd OPINION — “There's no doubt that America's adversaries are trafficking fentanyl into the United States in part because they want to kill Americans. If this were a war, that would be one of the worst wars. I believe they killed over the last five or six years, per year, 200-to-300,000 people. You hear about a 100,000, which is a lot of people, but the number is much higher than that. That's been proven.”

That was President Trump in the Oval Office on December 15, explaining why he was signing an Executive Order (EO) designating “illicit fentanyl and its core precursor chemicals as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).”

Notice Trump’s use of the word “war,” and the vast exaggeration of numbers of fentanyl drug deaths in the U.S. -- actually 48,000 in 2024. Also, does anyone really think that the cartels are pushing fentanyl into this country “to kill Americans?” Or is the real reason they are doing it is to make money – as is the case with most drug dealers.

I am focusing on this rather odd EO because to me it is another sign that President Trump is bringing the U.S. military into yet another essentially domestic American problem, drug use. I also see it as the Trump administration regularizing employment of the U.S. military to be a normal response to control civil issues.

Remember, President Trump has employed some 9,000 active and National Guard service members on the U.S. southern border to block what he termed an invasion of illegal immigrants. He has also federalized National Guard troops in U.S. cities like Washington, D.C. claiming they were needed to combat crime, and required hundreds of Marines and originally 4,000 California National Guard personnel in Los Angeles to put down protests against immigration raids.

There was even a military atmosphere in the Oval Office on December 15, because the President used that same meeting to make the first awards of a Mexican Border Defense Medal to 13 Army and Marine service members who provided military support to the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

In the Oval Office meeting, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth explained that the newly-issued medal exactly replicated the 1918 Mexican Border Defense Medal, but that one went to U.S. troops who patrolled the border during 1916-1917, when fear was of a German-inspired invasion by the paramilitary forces of Francisco "Pancho" Villa as part of the Mexican Revolution.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

While President Trump said that “to kill Americans” was a purpose of trafficking fentanyl, the EO itself said there was a more complex goal. The EO said, “The production and sale of fentanyl by Foreign Terrorist Organizations and cartels fund these entities’ operations — which include assassinations, terrorist acts, and insurgencies around the world — and allow these entities to erode our domestic security and the well-being of our Nation.”

Here, this EO seeks to link up with one of President Trump’s first EOs, signed on January 20, that designated unspecified cartels as Foreign Terrorists Organizations to make them subject to laws Congress passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

The new December 15 EO goes on to say, “The two cartels that are predominantly responsible for the distribution of fentanyl in the United States engage in armed conflict over territory and to protect their operations, resulting in large-scale violence and death that go beyond the immediate threat of fentanyl itself.”

Inexplicably, the EO does not name those two cartels.

However, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in its 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment makes it clear who they are by saying, “The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels, in particular, control clandestine [fentanyl] production sites in Mexico, smuggling routes into the United States, and distribution hubs in key U.S. cities.”

Then both the new EO and 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment carry the exact same following sentence: “Further, the potential for fentanyl to be weaponized for concentrated, large-scale terror attacks by organized adversaries is a serious threat to the United States.”

It turns out that back in the 1990s, a number of countries investigated using fentanyl as part of an incapacitating agent, including the U.S. Defense Department. The U.S. dropped the idea because of a margin of safety issue – the difference between a dosage that would incapacitate and one that would kill a person.

However the Russians did create a fentanyl-based incapacitating agent and used it in October 2002, when 40 Chechen terrorists seized Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater and held some 800 people hostage. Russians finally released the fentanyl-based gas to incapacitate those in the theater and it killed some 130 of them.

Fentanyl is an FDA-approved synthetic opioid used medically as a pain reliever and anesthetic. It is close to 100 times stronger than morphine. Two milligrams of fentanyl -- equivalent to 10-to-15 grains of table salt – can be lethal. Unlike other illegal drugs such as cocaine, wholesale traffickers distribute fentanyl by the kilogram, equal to 2.2 pounds.

The DEA has found wide U.S. usage of illicit, manufactured, counterfeit fentanyl pills ranging from .02 to 5.1 milligrams, the latter more than twice the lethal dose depending on a person’s body size, tolerance and past usage.

Fentanyl illegal drug use has been a major problem in the U.S. since 2021 when overdose deaths reached 71,000. But as shown above overdose fentanyl deaths are on the way down. President Trump even recognized fentanyl use had gone down saying in the Oval Office on December 15, “We've also achieved a 50% drop in the amount of fentanyl coming across the border and China is working with us very closely and bringing down the number and the amount of fentanyl that's being shipped…We've got it down to a much lower number.” But Trump added, “Not satisfactory, but it will be satisfactory soon.”

Subscriber+Members get exclusive access to expert-driven briefings on the top national security issues we face today. Gain access to save your virtual seat now.

The term “weapon of mass destruction” has specific legal definitions, typically tied to nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons that are designed to cause large-scale death or bodily harm.

Under the Trump WMD EO, implementation calls for Defense Secretary Hegseth and Attorney General Pam Bondi to determine if the U.S. military is needed to enforce 10 U.S.C. 282, a post-9/11, 2002 counterterrorism law covering emergency situations involving weapons of mass destruction.

If they agree the military is needed, under 10 U.S.C. 282 Hegseth and Bondi are to “jointly prescribe regulations concerning the types of assistance that may be provided,” and “describe the actions that Department of Defense personnel may take in circumstances incident to the provision of assistance.”

There are provisions in 10 U.S.C. 282 prohibiting the military from authority to arrest individuals, directly participate in searches or seizures of evidence related law violations or collection of intelligence for law enforcement – but those provisions also can also be waived.

In addition, under the Trump EO, Hegseth is to consult with Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem to “update all directives regarding the Armed Forces’ response to chemical incidents in the homeland to include the threat of illicit fentanyl.”

I go into all these details because I believe something other than fentanyl is involved here. Others are questioning the December 15 EO, such as Andrew McCarthy in National Review on December 20.

McCarthy wrote, “President Trump may despise ‘forever wars,’ but he sure seems to like pretend wars. The point of the fentanyl ‘designation’ is to shore up his case for using military force against drug traffickers — although its relevance to high seas around Venezuela is hard to fathom since fentanyl is neither produced nor imported from there. At any rate, fentanyl, a dangerous drug but one with legitimate medical uses, is a narcotic, not a weapon of mass destruction akin to a chemical or biological bomb.”

Yesterday, Military.com pointed out, “The [December 15] Executive Order does not spell out a specific military mission, and Pentagon officials have not yet stated whether the armed forces will take on a direct role under the new designation.”

Nonetheless, the EO creates yet another new, domestic area for military operations within the homeland, and what emerges needs to be watched.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
The U.S. Military’s Newest Enemy: Fentanyl https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-militarys-newest-enemy-fentanyl https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-militarys-newest-enemy-fentanyl

OPINION — “There's no doubt that America's adversaries are trafficking fentanyl into the United States in part because they want to kill Americans. If this were a war, that would be one of the worst wars. I believe they killed over the last five or six years, per year, 200-to-300,000 people. You hear about a 100,000, which is a lot of people, but the number is much higher than that. That's been proven.”

That was President Trump in the Oval Office on December 15, explaining why he was signing an Executive Order (EO) designating “illicit fentanyl and its core precursor chemicals as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).”

Notice Trump’s use of the word “war,” and the vast exaggeration of numbers of fentanyl drug deaths in the U.S. -- actually 48,000 in 2024. Also, does anyone really think that the cartels are pushing fentanyl into this country “to kill Americans?” Or is the real reason they are doing it is to make money – as is the case with most drug dealers.

I am focusing on this rather odd EO because to me it is another sign that President Trump is bringing the U.S. military into yet another essentially domestic American problem, drug use. I also see it as the Trump administration regularizing employment of the U.S. military to be a normal response to control civil issues.

Remember, President Trump has employed some 9,000 active and National Guard service members on the U.S. southern border to block what he termed an invasion of illegal immigrants. He has also federalized National Guard troops in U.S. cities like Washington, D.C. claiming they were needed to combat crime, and required hundreds of Marines and originally 4,000 California National Guard personnel in Los Angeles to put down protests against immigration raids.

There was even a military atmosphere in the Oval Office on December 15, because the President used that same meeting to make the first awards of a Mexican Border Defense Medal to 13 Army and Marine service members who provided military support to the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

In the Oval Office meeting, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth explained that the newly-issued medal exactly replicated the 1918 Mexican Border Defense Medal, but that one went to U.S. troops who patrolled the border during 1916-1917, when fear was of a German-inspired invasion by the paramilitary forces of Francisco "Pancho" Villa as part of the Mexican Revolution.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

While President Trump said that “to kill Americans” was a purpose of trafficking fentanyl, the EO itself said there was a more complex goal. The EO said, “The production and sale of fentanyl by Foreign Terrorist Organizations and cartels fund these entities’ operations — which include assassinations, terrorist acts, and insurgencies around the world — and allow these entities to erode our domestic security and the well-being of our Nation.”

Here, this EO seeks to link up with one of President Trump’s first EOs, signed on January 20, that designated unspecified cartels as Foreign Terrorists Organizations to make them subject to laws Congress passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

The new December 15 EO goes on to say, “The two cartels that are predominantly responsible for the distribution of fentanyl in the United States engage in armed conflict over territory and to protect their operations, resulting in large-scale violence and death that go beyond the immediate threat of fentanyl itself.”

Inexplicably, the EO does not name those two cartels.

However, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in its 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment makes it clear who they are by saying, “The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels, in particular, control clandestine [fentanyl] production sites in Mexico, smuggling routes into the United States, and distribution hubs in key U.S. cities.”

Then both the new EO and 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment carry the exact same following sentence: “Further, the potential for fentanyl to be weaponized for concentrated, large-scale terror attacks by organized adversaries is a serious threat to the United States.”

It turns out that back in the 1990s, a number of countries investigated using fentanyl as part of an incapacitating agent, including the U.S. Defense Department. The U.S. dropped the idea because of a margin of safety issue – the difference between a dosage that would incapacitate and one that would kill a person.

However the Russians did create a fentanyl-based incapacitating agent and used it in October 2002, when 40 Chechen terrorists seized Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater and held some 800 people hostage. Russians finally released the fentanyl-based gas to incapacitate those in the theater and it killed some 130 of them.

Fentanyl is an FDA-approved synthetic opioid used medically as a pain reliever and anesthetic. It is close to 100 times stronger than morphine. Two milligrams of fentanyl -- equivalent to 10-to-15 grains of table salt – can be lethal. Unlike other illegal drugs such as cocaine, wholesale traffickers distribute fentanyl by the kilogram, equal to 2.2 pounds.

The DEA has found wide U.S. usage of illicit, manufactured, counterfeit fentanyl pills ranging from .02 to 5.1 milligrams, the latter more than twice the lethal dose depending on a person’s body size, tolerance and past usage.

Fentanyl illegal drug use has been a major problem in the U.S. since 2021 when overdose deaths reached 71,000. But as shown above overdose fentanyl deaths are on the way down. President Trump even recognized fentanyl use had gone down saying in the Oval Office on December 15, “We've also achieved a 50% drop in the amount of fentanyl coming across the border and China is working with us very closely and bringing down the number and the amount of fentanyl that's being shipped…We've got it down to a much lower number.” But Trump added, “Not satisfactory, but it will be satisfactory soon.”

Subscriber+Members get exclusive access to expert-driven briefings on the top national security issues we face today. Gain access to save your virtual seat now.

The term “weapon of mass destruction” has specific legal definitions, typically tied to nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons that are designed to cause large-scale death or bodily harm.

Under the Trump WMD EO, implementation calls for Defense Secretary Hegseth and Attorney General Pam Bondi to determine if the U.S. military is needed to enforce 10 U.S.C. 282, a post-9/11, 2002 counterterrorism law covering emergency situations involving weapons of mass destruction.

If they agree the military is needed, under 10 U.S.C. 282 Hegseth and Bondi are to “jointly prescribe regulations concerning the types of assistance that may be provided,” and “describe the actions that Department of Defense personnel may take in circumstances incident to the provision of assistance.”

There are provisions in 10 U.S.C. 282 prohibiting the military from authority to arrest individuals, directly participate in searches or seizures of evidence related law violations or collection of intelligence for law enforcement – but those provisions also can also be waived.

In addition, under the Trump EO, Hegseth is to consult with Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem to “update all directives regarding the Armed Forces’ response to chemical incidents in the homeland to include the threat of illicit fentanyl.”

I go into all these details because I believe something other than fentanyl is involved here. Others are questioning the December 15 EO, such as Andrew McCarthy in National Review on December 20.

McCarthy wrote, “President Trump may despise ‘forever wars,’ but he sure seems to like pretend wars. The point of the fentanyl ‘designation’ is to shore up his case for using military force against drug traffickers — although its relevance to high seas around Venezuela is hard to fathom since fentanyl is neither produced nor imported from there. At any rate, fentanyl, a dangerous drug but one with legitimate medical uses, is a narcotic, not a weapon of mass destruction akin to a chemical or biological bomb.”

Yesterday, Military.com pointed out, “The [December 15] Executive Order does not spell out a specific military mission, and Pentagon officials have not yet stated whether the armed forces will take on a direct role under the new designation.”

Nonetheless, the EO creates yet another new, domestic area for military operations within the homeland, and what emerges needs to be watched.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
This is Perhaps Ukraine’s Most Dangerous Time https://belimedia.com.ng/this-is-perhaps-ukraines-most-dangerous-time https://belimedia.com.ng/this-is-perhaps-ukraines-most-dangerous-time EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Each of my eight trips to Ukraine since retiring from the CIA in the summer of 2023 has been filled with unique challenges. Each time I’ve witnessed first-hand the sacrifices the Ukrainians are making on a daily basis to fight for their country’s independence. And while each trip has been physically exhausting, each one has also been highly inspiring because the Ukrainians are fighting to protect many of the traditional American values that I grew up believing in, including the right to self-determination, liberty and national sovereignty.

But my latest visit to Ukraine was by far the most difficult. Not just because the Russians are significantly increasing their air attacks on Ukrainian towns and cities or because Ukraine is once again going through a very cold winter while facing significant power shortages caused by Moscow’s attacks against energy infrastructure targets. But mainly because for the first time, I heard Ukrainians questioning my country’s commitment to helping them defend their country. Because I heard Ukrainian interlocutors conclude that the U.S. was not a reliable partner and because Ukrainians who are fighting to protect their country, questioned whether the U.S. was willing to abandon support for their cause in order to secure potential business deals with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his regime.

Remembering all the Americans I had served with over the years, especially those who made the ultimate sacrifice defending liberty and the honor of our country, it is extremely painful to consider the possibility that my country might choose to placate someone like Putin and, in doing so, turn its back on those who have suffered from Putin’s aggression.

After more than 10 years of being at war, the Ukrainians are clearly fatigued. Russia's constant attacks against civilian targets are taking a toll. Families throughout the country are living without regular access to electricity and are subjected to daily mass Russian drone and missile attacks.

Ukraine's own internal corruption challenges, including the "Operation Midas" investigation, which resulted in the resignation of President Zelensky’s longtime advisor and head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, have raised questions among many Ukrainians about Zelensky and his Administration. The scandal also opened the door for many of the opponents of continued support to Ukraine to claim that Ukraine is a corrupt country led by corrupt leaders.

Of course, these critics forget that the Midas investigation is actually evidence of Ukraine’s efforts to deal with corruption and a development that highlights Kyiv’s determination to create a more transparent government based on “rule of law” principles. And there is no comparison between Ukraine’s efforts to deal with corruption, and Russia’s lack of transparency and complete rejection of “rule of law” governance.

Ukrainian fears about being abandoned by Washington are linked to the perception that the U.S. is going to end its support for Kyiv. Fears that are amplified by the recent leaking of the "28 Point Plan" that was initially presented to Kyiv by the U.S. as part of Washington’s efforts to bring the war to an end and revelations that the bulk of the plan was written by the Kremlin and then delivered to the U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East and Russia Steve Witkoff by Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund head Kiril Dmitriyev.

These leaks bore many of the hallmarks of a Russian disinformation campaign, and whether or not the Kremlin leaked this information, there is little doubt that Moscow is using the leaks to undermine the U.S. internationally; to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies in Europe; to undermine the morale of the Ukrainian population; and to deceive international and domestic audiences into believing Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to find a peaceful resolution to the war that he started.

Moscow has worked relentlessly to create the impression in Washington, Brussels and Kyiv - that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are on the verge of collapse, and it is only a matter of time before Putin achieves his military objectives.

The Ukrainians, on the other hand, are trying to counter this narrative and demonstrate that the Russians continue to make minimal battlefield gains while paying a tremendous price in terms of personnel and resources.

While people are tired, few appear ready to surrender or give up. Many equate surrender to betrayal of the memories of those Ukrainians who have died since 2014 fighting to defend the country from Russia.

Putin’s effort to control the narrative on Ukraine is partially linked to his desire to cover up how bad his own hand is at present. Putin does not want the West to focus on how the Russian military continues to struggle to take small amounts of territory, while suffering high casualty rates. He does not want others to focus on Russia’s own struggles with growing financial, economic and social problems that threaten the long-term stability of his regime and the future of Russia itself.

In recent years, the Kremlin has shifted its limited financial resources to the Military-Industrial complex, resulting in cutbacks to social spending and bringing an end to support of critical civilian infrastructure projects. While this policy has resulted in an increase in defense production, it is bankrupting the country and in recent months even Russia’s defense industry has had to implement spending cutbacks. Many factories and production sites across Russia are unable to pay workers and have been forced to reduce their work week to three or four days per week.

The money that Putin was once able to use to incentivize Russians to join the military and fight Ukraine is drying up, forcing him to once again consider mobilization plans, which will no doubt be highly unpopular with many Russians, especially with the “elites” living in the country’s main population centers.

The war has also drained off workers, resulting in significant labor shortages. Putin’s war is threatening to plunge Russia into the chaotic and painful social and economic conditions that the country faced in the early and mid-1990s.

Before leaving on my latest trip to Ukraine, I was asked to speak at an event in Washington D.C. focused on the future of U.S.-European relations. During that event, one attendee told me that recent polling in the U.S. showed that - since President Trump’s January 2025 inauguration - support for Ukraine among Republicans had risen significantly. This claim was supported by a report published by Defense One based on polling conducted by the Ronald Reagan Institute and a previous report published by the Chicago Institute on Global Affairs. These signs are heartening. In a system where the population’s interests should be considered by elected leaders, this means that the United States Government should be continuing its support for Ukraine.

The growing public support for Ukraine should give Ukrainians some hope that the U.S. is not going to abandon them. But it is hard for the Ukrainians to hear that message when it is often drowned out by much more negative news about alleged backroom deals made between Putin’s couriers and individuals close to President Trump and the very real possibility that those couriers are using their access to actively pursue a whisper campaign to influence the President and his policy decisions. That, combined with targeted leaks and distortions of facts to exaggerate the perception that Washington now prefers Moscow to Ukraine and the Europeans is painting a Russian-preferred narrative.

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It is correct when President Trump says that he inherited a terrible situation in Ukraine. I also agree that as the elected leader of the most powerful country in the world, President Trump has a responsibility to try to end the bloody and senseless conflict.

The President deserves credit for trying, although I do not agree with his periodic claims that the Ukrainians, or their President, are guilty of starting the war - or that Kyiv does not want to end the war. Vladimir Putin is guilty of starting the conflict and despite all of President Trump’s efforts and the Ukrainians willingness to try to find a compromise, Putin has continued to make maximalist demands and drag out the conflict in hopes of stealing more of Ukraine’s territory and feeding Russia’s defense industrial complex, which is now the sole functioning part of Russia’s struggling economy.

It appeared President Trump recognized this reality in October, when he canceled plans to meet with Putin in Budapest and levied new sanctions on the Russian Energy sector. Unfortunately, the President allowed Putin to manipulate the U.S. team into thinking Putin was ready to negotiate in November, opening the door to a lot of Russian disinformation and information warfare designed to undermine the U.S., Ukraine and its allies - but not designed to bring the war to an end.

Over the past year, I have seen the level of political infighting within Ukraine increase. During a discussion with one Ukrainian General in September of 2024, the General opined that historically, Ukraine had never lost a war to Russia but had lost many wars to itself. He warned that internal political struggles in the country allowed the Russians to identify and exploit the political ambitions of some leaders and use these ambitions to divide the country and undermine national unity.

Ukraine is again facing the threat of serious internal divisions that the Kremlin will manipulate and use to achieve its military and political objectives. It appears likely that the Ukrainian government will hold elections in 2026, and the U.S. and the West should be ready to help Kyiv protect those elections from Russian interference. There is also little doubt that Russia itself will not hold fair elections in 2026 or as long as Putin remains in power.

As an American, I pray that our elected leaders will not repeat the mistakes made by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain when trying to deal with Adolf Hitler. The appeasement of Hitler by forcing allies to cede territories to the Nazi regime in Berlin did not lead to “Peace in our Time”. It led to a much greater and more horrific World War that could have been stopped if the English and French had taken decisive action against Hitler at that time.

To “Make America Great Again”, Americans need to stand up for what is right. Right - is not appeasing Putin. Justice is not allowing Putin to get away with stealing large portions of Ukraine’s territory and then benefit from killing more than a million Ukrainian and Russian citizens in a war that was designed to protect Putin’s personal power and re-establish an empire that has collapsed twice in the last 150 years.

As an American, I pray that we find our way through this very confusing and troubled period, hold the aggressor, Putin, accountable for his crimes, and successfully bring this war to an end while protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and America’s reputation in the world.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Push and Pull Between Washington and Beijing in the South China Sea https://belimedia.com.ng/the-push-and-pull-between-washington-and-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea https://belimedia.com.ng/the-push-and-pull-between-washington-and-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea OPINION — China uses a layered approach in the South China Sea that blends military power, paramilitary forces, legal instruments, and political signaling. Beijing has asserted “historic rights” over most of the waterway in the past two decades or so, via the nine-dash line strategy. This strategy overlaps the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of several Southeast Asian states. A 2016 international law tribunal convened under UNCLOS ruled overwhelmingly against these claims. However, China rejected the ruling and continues to behave as before, trying to assert de facto control in the area. This strategy is reinforced by the use of 'official maps', textbooks, and diplomatic statements aiming to slowly set down the notion that the territorial waters there are under a Chinese sphere.

In the Spratly and Paracel Islands, China has transformed reefs since the early to mid 2010s into large artificial islands, where it constructs airfields, ports, radars, and missile sites, dramatically expanding China’s ability to monitor and, if necessary, contest and harass surface and air traffic across much of the South China Sea. They also serve as logistics hubs that support the constant presence of Coast Guard, navy, and militia vessels.

China is testing just how much military risk the United States is willing to face in order to protect its regional allies. Their primary target? The Philippines, an avid American ally in the region.

Chinese coercion directed at Manila is carried out daily not just by destroyers but by white-hulled Coast Guard ships and ostensibly civilian vessels organized as a maritime militia. These platforms ram, water-cannon, block, or sideswipe Philippine vessels and increasingly use tools like signal jamming and close-in maneuvers against Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal and patrols near Scarborough Shoal. Actions are calibrated to be intimidating, sometimes injurious, but still below the threshold of what most governments would label “armed attack.”

These efforts go beyond short-term tactics. They are strategic in nature. China appears less focused on legal recognition than on practical control. If foreign militaries and commercial operators must factor in Chinese reactions for transiting, fishing, or exploration, Beijing achieves much of what formal sovereignty would deliver.

For Beijing, the South China Sea is part of the “near seas” in Chinese maritime doctrine, making it a defensive bastion that must be secured. But by employing artificial island bases and sending out to sea a number of maritime patrols, China seeks to disrupt American and allied activities in the South China Sea while advancing its own power projection further east and south, into the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

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Control over “blue national territory” is tightly linked to Chinese Communist Party narratives of national rejuvenation. By standing firm in the South China Sea, it bolsters PRC leadership legitimacy and makes compromise politically costly internally. Essentially, Xi Jinping appears to be aiming for a Sino-centric maritime order in which neighboring states de facto - if not de jure at some point - accept Chinese rule as a fact of life and where outside powers operate only on terms that Beijing deems acceptable.

Washington’s declared aims in the South China Sea are the preservation of the freedom of navigation and overflight according to international law.

To achieve these goals the United States uses a combination of naval power, alliance creation and military capability development. The United States Navy ships often come close to Chinese-held land and other maritime areas that China or others claim illegally. It does the latter to demonstrate that America will not tolerate any of these claims. These are high-profile but relatively short-lived operations. The above policy is enforced by the U.S. 7th Fleet (based in Japan). There are also more bases throughout the region in partnership with the Philippines.

Big, complicated exercises and joint patrols with the Philippines, Japan, Australia and others build interoperability as well as signal that any serious conflict would not take place strictly on a bilateral basis.

American officials who point out to the 2016 decision, stress that disagreements must be settled in compliance with international law and publicly reiterate that the United States - Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty pertains to American armed forces, public ships or aircraft coming under attack in the South China Sea. This has been a more frequent trend in recent years.

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What the U.S. Should Do

The United States should embed U.S. presence in sensitive missions, when Manila consents. Instead of sending out stand-alone destroyer transits, the U.S. ought to incorporate freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) as part of logistics missions or surveillance patrols and multilateral exercises. Publicly, Washington should continue to declare that significant attacks on Philippine government ships and aircraft comes under the Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. should reiterate privately to Chinese officials what responses it may evoke from the United States - economic sanctions, change in military posture, joint deployments - so that Chinese leaders know where they are headed if they keep these tactics up.

In addition to donating patrol boats, the United States and allies should also assist the Philippines and potentially other claimant states in fielding new coastal defense missiles, unmanned systems and integrated maritime domain awareness networks. Such instruments make it easier for frontline states to detect and respond to incursions with both greater speed and credibility.

China likes to negotiate one on one — and that’s when it has its own leverage. The United States needs to cultivate overlapping coalitions rather than a simple hub-and-spoke model. Institutionalize 'mini-lateral' groupings; U.S. - Japan - Philippines and U.S. - Australia - Philippines patrols, exercises, and intelligence-sharing agreements would make it more difficult for China to pressure any one state without having to face several others.

Communication links with Beijing such as political and operational hotlines should be tested to ensure they will work under stress. The aim is to be predictable and resolute, to minimize the chances that miscalculation leads to uncontrolled escalation.

The South China Sea has turned into a laboratory for the interaction among power, law and norms in an age of strategic contention. China’s use of maritime power looks to transform disputed waters into a zone over which China can make effective, if not legally exclusive, rules and enforce them through militarized outposts, continuous presence, and the narrative fiction of historical rights.

U.S. policy has preserved core principles - freedom of navigation and treaty commitments - but has not prevented Beijing from strengthening its position or normalizing gray-zone coercion. Washington’s task is not to contain China in absolutist terms, but to ensure that coercive changes to the status quo do not become the region’s operating default. That requires more concrete deterrence at key flashpoints, deeper empowerment of frontline states, and a denser web of regional cooperation - combined with realistic crisis planning to manage the risks that come with sustained great-power competition at sea.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business. ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
Modeling the Earth with AI is Now a Strategic Intelligence Imperative https://belimedia.com.ng/modeling-the-earth-with-ai-is-now-a-strategic-intelligence-imperative https://belimedia.com.ng/modeling-the-earth-with-ai-is-now-a-strategic-intelligence-imperative EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE — We are currently witnessing a mobilization of technical ambition reminiscent of the Manhattan Project, a realization that data and compute are the new defining elements of national power. I am deeply energized by recent bold moves in Washington, specifically the White House’s launch of the "Genesis Mission" this past November—an initiative designed to federate vast federal scientific datasets for integrated AI training—alongside the real-world deployment of GenAI.mil.

Yet, when I look at the velocity of the commercial sector—from OpenAI launching its dedicated Science division and NVIDIA attempting to simulate the planet with Earth-2, to Google DeepMind aggressively crossing their AI breakthroughs into the geospatial domain—it becomes clear that we are still aiming too low. These projects are not just modeling data; they are attempting to model reality itself. American technical leadership is paramount, but that leadership is meaningless if it is not ruthlessly and immediately applied to our national security framework. We must take these massive, reality-simulating concepts and focus them specifically on the GEOINT mission.

A perfect example of this is that earlier this year, in July 2025, the geospatial world shifted. Google DeepMind released the AlphaEarth Foundations (AEF) model, and through the hard work of the Taylor Geospatial Engine (TGE) and the open-source community, those vector embeddings are now publicly available on Source Cooperative.

Article content

From Google

The excitement is justified. AlphaEarth is a leap forward because it offers pixel-level embeddings rather than the standard patch-level approach. It doesn’t just tell you “this 256x256 square contains a city”; it tells you "this specific pixel is part of a building, and it knows its neighbors."

But as I look at this achievement from the perspective of national security, I see something else. I see a proof of concept for a capability that the United States is uniquely positioned to build—and must build—to maintain decision advantage.

Google has the internet’s data. But the intelligence community holds the most diverse, multi-physics, and temporally deep repository of the Earth in human history.

It is time for the United States to propose and execute a National Geospatial-Intelligence Embedding Model (NGEM).

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The Proposal: Beyond RGB

The AlphaEarth model is impressive, but it is limited by its training data—primarily commercial optical imagery. In the national security domain, an optical image is just the tip of the spear. We don't just see with light; we see with physics.

I am proposing that we train a massive, pixel-level foundation model that ingests all of its holdings. We aren't talking about just throwing more Sentinel-2 data at a GPU. We are talking about a model that generates embeddings from a unified ingest of:

  • Multi-INT Imagery: Electro-optical (EO), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Infrared/Thermal, Multispectral, and Hyperspectral.
  • Vector Data: The massive stores of Foundation GEOINT (FG)—roads, borders, elevation meshes.
  • The Critical Missing Modality: Text. We must embed the millions of intelligence reports, analyst notes, and finished intelligence products ever written.

The Approach: "The Unified Latent Space"

The approach would mirror the AlphaEarth architecture—generating 64-dimensional (or higher) vectors for every coordinate on Earth—but with a massive increase in complexity and utility.

In AlphaEarth, a pixel’s embedding vector encodes "visual similarity." In an NGA NGEM, the embedding would encode phenomenological and semantic truth.

We would train the model to map different modalities into the same "latent space."

  • If a SAR image shows a T-72 tank (through radar returns), and an EO image shows a T-72 tank (through visual pixels), and a text report describes a "T-72 tank," they should all map to nearly the same mathematical vector.
  • The model becomes the universal translator. It doesn't matter if the input is a paragraph of text or a thermal signature; the output is a standardized mathematical representation of the object.

The Outcomes: What Does This Give Us?

If we achieve this, we move beyond "computer vision" into "machine understanding."

1. The "SAM Site" Dimension In the AlphaEarth analysis, researchers found a "dimension 27" that accidentally specialized in detecting airports. It was a serendipitous discovery of the model's internal logic. If we train NSEM on NGA’s holdings, we won’t just find an airport dimension. We will likely find dimensions that correspond to specific national security targets.

  • Dimension 14 might light up only for Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites, regardless of whether they are camouflaged in optical imagery, because the thermal and SAR layers give them away.
  • Dimension 42 might track "maritime logistics activity," integrating port vectors with ship signatures.

2. Cross-Modal Search (Text-to-Pixel) Currently, if an analyst wants to find "all airfields with extended runways in the Pacific," they have to rely on tagged metadata or run a specific computer vision classifier. With a multi-modal embedding model, the analyst could simply type a query from a report: "Suspected construction of hardened aircraft shelters near distinct ridge line." Because we embedded the text of millions of past reports alongside the imagery, the model understands the semantic vector of that phrase. It can then scan the entire globe’s pixel embeddings to find the mathematical match—instantly highlighting the location, even if no human has ever tagged it.

3. Vector-Based Change Detection AlphaEarth showed us that subtracting vectors from 2018 and 2024 reveals construction. For the intelligence community, this becomes Automated Indications & Warning (I&W). Because the embeddings are spatially aware and pixel-dense, we can detect subtle shifts in the function of a facility, not just its footprint. A factory that suddenly starts emitting heat (thermal layer) or showing new material stockpiles (hyperspectral layer) will produce a massive shift in its vector embedding, triggering an alert long before a human analyst notices the visual change.

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The Intelligence Use Cases

  • Automated Order of Battle: Instantly generating dynamic maps of military equipment by querying the embedding space for specific signatures (e.g., "Show me all vectors matching a mobile radar unit").
  • Underground Facility Detection: By combining vector terrain data, gravity/magnetic anomaly data, and hyperspectral surface disturbances into a single embedding, the model could "see" what is hidden.
  • Pattern of Life Analysis: Since the model is spatiotemporal (like AlphaEarth), it learns the "heartbeat" of a location. Deviations—like a port going silent or a sudden surge in RF activity—become mathematical anomalies that scream for attention.

Conclusion

Google and the open-source community have given us the blueprint with AlphaEarth. They proved that pixel-level, spatiotemporal embeddings are the superior way to model our changing planet.

But the mission requires more than commercial data. It requires the fusion of every sensor and every secret. By building this multi-modal embedding model—fusion at the pixel level—we can stop looking for needles in haystacks and start using a magnet.

This is the future of GEOINT. We have the data. We have the mission. It’s time to build the model.

Follow Mark Munsell on LinkedIn.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.
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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Cipher Brief's Recommended Reads for the Holidays https://belimedia.com.ng/the-cipher-briefs-recommended-reads-for-the-holidays https://belimedia.com.ng/the-cipher-briefs-recommended-reads-for-the-holidays BOOK REVIEWS & RECOMMENDATIONS -- Welcome to our annual holiday book review and recommendations list, where we highlight some of the terrific books that have been reviewed and featured in The Cipher Brief in recent months. Since our summer newsletter, we've covered and reviewed more than 35 books – often sliced and diced by world-class subject matter experts. In this newsletter, we’ve singled out about a dozen that received our highest four out of four “trench coat” rating. As always, the books reviewed in The Cipher Brief represent an eclectic mix of topics ranging from the history of past wars to the prospects of future ones. We’ve included both fiction and non-fiction faves.

FICTION FAVORITES:

Tops on many folks’ list is The Persian: A Novel by veteran CIA analyst David McCloskey. For this one, we turned once again to Joe Zacks, a veteran of four-plus decades of government service, to offer his take. Zacks writes that The Persian may be the finest of McCloskey’s four spy novels to date (high praise given how well the first three were received). For this one, Zacks calls McCloskey’s novel “a sophisticated and multidimensional depiction of human nature and the motivations that propel people to action. It brings the HUMINT discipline to life, vividly portraying how a sophisticated intelligence service identifies, targets, and ultimately recruits and handles an agent while plumbing the depths of the agent’s psyche and inner conflicts.” To learn even more about the book – and its author – Cipher Brief CEO & Publisher Suzanne Kelly did a debrief with McCloskey in this fun-filled Cover Stories podcast.

To review veteran spy novelist Daniel Silva’s 25th book, An Inside Job, we turned to a couple of CIA veterans – Anne and Jay Gruner. The latest Silva book brings back skilled art restorer and former Mossad chief Gabriel Allon, in a fast-paced tale involving art theft, European crime and corruption – and a newly elected Pope. The Gruners’ review declares that Silva has once again demonstrated that he is a master of his craft.

While Gabriel Allon, the hero of Silva’s novel, is a fictional former Mossad officer, a genuine Mossad alumni, Yariv Inbar, is also a prolific novelist. His latest book, Behind the Trigger, was reviewed for us by Dr. Ken Dekleva, a novelist in his own right and a former Regional Medical Officer/Psychiatrist for the State Department. With that background, Dekleva was quick to spot Inbar’s skill in describing the human, emotional, and psychological aspects of espionage. The book features two central female characters and a Middle East canvas.

Not all of the novels that won plaudits on The Cipher Brief came from long-time authors. There was the thriller The Moldavian Gambit by first-time novelist Brad Meslin about a man-portable nuclear device that goes missing at the time the Soviet Union was coming apart in the early 1990s and may have fallen into the hands of a terrorist -- and possibly smuggled into Paris. We asked James Lawler, a former CIA officer with deep experience in thwarting rogue state weapons proliferators and the author of several well-received novels himself to review it. Lawler gave Meslin high marks for technical accuracy and heart-stopping story telling. Meslin also joined us on a Cover Stories podcast to discuss what inspired him to write the novel and his sources and methods for keeping readers on the edge of their seats.

THE NON-FICTION BOOKS THAT ROCKED CIPHER BRIEF REVIEWERS:

With Latin American counternarcotics operations much in the news, a timely read is After Escobar: Taking Down the Notorious Cali Godfathers and the Biggest Drug Cartel in History reviewed by veteran government lawyer Terence Check. Written by former DEA agents Chris Feistl and Dave Mitchell with an assist from Jessica Balboni, the book tells the two-year saga in the mid-1990s of the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of the leading “godfathers” of the Cali drug cartel (aka “Cocaine, Inc.”) one of the biggest multi-billion-dollar drug trafficking enterprises of all time. In his review, Check writes that After Escobar “is really a story about diplomacy, and the power it has as a force multiplier for our law enforcement and military….(showing) the reader the importance of the diplomatic cadre in helping to bring down the Cali Cartel by doing the hard work of negotiating with the Colombian government.”

The criticality of diplomacy was at the forefront of another book this fall. Great Power Diplomacy: The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Kissinger by A. Wess Mitchell. The book was reviewed for The Cipher Brief by retired U.S. Ambassador Gary Grappo. In his review Grappo describes the book as “part history lesson and part instruction manual for national leaders and diplomats, reprising the tactics, strategies, methods and actions of previous major state leaders and diplomats who found themselves confronting similar great power contests.” Grappo lauds the book for being a: “resounding reaffirmation of the value and importance of diplomacy as an indispensable component of national power not just in the past but even more so today. The skills of its practitioners may need rejuvenating. But there is no denying that diplomacy ultimately holds solutions to the problems of today.”

Several books we will highlight here offer fresh looks at past history. Let’s start with one from Yale University Press: No More Napoleons: How Britain Managed Europe from Waterloo to World War One. The book was written by Andrew Lambert and one of our most prolific reviewers, Jean-Thomas Nicole, a Policy Advisor with Public Safety Canada, reviewed it. Nicole praised the book for its reminder of “the enduring utility of maritime power, the virtues of restraint, and the necessity of maintaining influence without overreach.” Nicole notes that these themes resonate strongly with today’s global challenges.

World War II and the events that led up to and followed it are often good fodder for books. Among those that stood out for us this year was “The Spy and the Devil” by Cipher Brief expert Tim Willasey-Wilsey. Journalist and author Michael Smith reviewed it for us and called it “one of the greatest untold stories of the Second World War intelligence.” It is the story of a Lithuanian-born ‘Baltic-German’ who ended up working for British intelligence and managed to penetrate the highest Nazi circles prior to the war including having several meetings with Adolf Hitler himself. Willasey-Wilsey also joined us on a Cipher Brief Cover Stories podcast to talk about this remarkable story.

In October, we published a review of The Traitor’s Circle: The True Story of a Secret Resistance Network in Nazi Germany – and the Spy Who Betrayed Them by Jonathan Freedland. Australian writer Susan Gorgioski reviewed it and told us the book reads like a detective novel but tells the real story of a “little-known group of opponents to the Nazi regime in Germany who were willing to sacrifice careers, social position, money, and ultimately for some, their lives.”

And then there was Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima and the Surrender of Japan by Richard Overy and reviewed by former senior CIA clandestine service officer (and Cipher Brief expert) Sonya Seunghye Lim. In her review, Lim praises Rain of Ruin for being a “thought-provoking and disturbing book” and its explanation for “why armed conflicts will continue to plague the world: dehumanizing the enemy, depersonalizing killings by making attacks as remote as possible, and glamorizing combat serve to palliate our collective conscience and to justify the persistence of jingoism.”

But not all the good stuff came from ancient history. CNN anchor Jake Tapper published a book in October called Race Against Terror: Chasing an Al Qaeda Killer at the Dawn of the Forever War. So, we turned to someone with deep expertise – Joe Zacks who was just wrapping up a 42-year career - half in the Army and half as a CIA officer - and whose final post was Deputy Assistant Director of the CIA for Counterterrorism, to review it for us. Perfect credentials to evaluate Tapper’s book which Zacks describes as “ a mix of detective story and legal drama” about a six-year odyssey of tenacious federal prosecutors trying to bring an al Qaeda terrorist to justice.

Some of our best received books were about future intelligence challenges. For example, there is The Fourth Intelligence Revolution: The Future of Espionage and the Battle to Save America by Anthony Vinci. We tapped Cipher Brief expert and principal with the Cyber Initiatives Group Glenn Gerstell to review that one for us. In his review, Gerstell describes the book as examining “the confluence of increasingly complex geopolitical challenges and of global technological advances” and tells us that the conclusion is that “America’s spy agencies must not merely adapt but also dominate this dynamic if we are to blunt (if not defeat) our adversaries.”

But no matter how good the technology is going forward, you’re gonna need people to make it all work right – and they need to be people who can get a security clearance. So, what do you need to know in order to try and do that? Fortunately, there’s a book for that. Trust Me: A Guide to Secrets: Who Gets Them and Why We Have Such a Mixed Track Record with Them by Lindy Kyzer. We trusted retired CIA Deputy Director for Analysis (and current Cipher Brief Expert) Linda Weissgold to review it. Weissgold is also a professor at Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington, DC and says she now recommends the book to her students who want to understand the opaque yet crucial process of getting a security clearance. The book offers practical and philosophical advice that seeks to demystify the process.

While a little harder to give as holiday gifts, there are some podcasts interviews we highly recommend as well, including:

  • A discussion with Marine and CIA ground branch veteran – and award-winning writer Elliot Ackerman discussing his latest novel Sheepdogs.
  • A deep dive into North Korean matters with Ambassador Joe DeTrani on his memoir The North Korean Threat: Intelligence and Diplomacy.
  • A discussion with journalist and Marine veteran Chas Henry about a devastating Pacific cyclone that triggered a horrendous fire at Marine Corps Base in Japan.
  • And even a book by a publishing expert, Jane Friedman, who offers essential advice on how YOU can write your own book. Get her guide, The Business of Being a Writer, and maybe in a couple of years The Cipher Brief will be carrying a review of your book.

Before we go – we should note that some of our reviewers are really tough graders – and there are dozens of other books we’ve reviewed that came in with slightly under the four trench coat rating that we are certain you would enjoy. So, be sure to check out the complete list of reviews here.

Happy Holiday shopping and reading!

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Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
Winter is Coming to Ukraine as it Faces a New Kind of War and Uncertainty About a Key Ally https://belimedia.com.ng/winter-is-coming-to-ukraine-as-it-faces-a-new-kind-of-war-and-uncertainty-about-a-key-ally https://belimedia.com.ng/winter-is-coming-to-ukraine-as-it-faces-a-new-kind-of-war-and-uncertainty-about-a-key-ally

EXPERT INTERVIEW — Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky was in Berlin on Monday for an intense round of diplomacy with top U.S. and European officials, part of a fast-moving push to find a workable plan to end the war. His meetings follow an unusually long session on Sunday with President Donald Trump’s envoys, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, who claimed significant progress in their discussions.

Meanwhile, a stream of European leaders - including Finland’s president, Britain’s prime minister, France’s president, and NATO’s secretary general are joining the talks. Russia was not invited.

The major sticking point among Western partners remains what concessions Ukraine might be asked to make. Washington has floated the idea of Kyiv giving up some territory Russia has not yet taken, a suggestion Ukraine rejects and most European leaders fear would reward Russian aggression.

Zelensky has signaled a willingness for Ukraine to pause its bid to join NATO if the U.S. provides firm security guarantees against future Russian attacks. European leaders are generally supportive of a deal that allows Ukraine to keep the territory it currently controls while securing long-term protection from Washington.

The mood in Ukraine, meanwhile, is bleak. Former Senior CIA Executives Ralph Goff and Glenn Corn, both of whom are also Cipher Brief Experts, just returned from a 5-day trip in the country. We caught up with them in Krakow, Poland for some on the ground insights about both the mood and maneuvering inside Ukraine, as President Zelensky navigates a harrowing political environment. Our interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

THE INTERVIEW

Kelly: Having traveled to Ukraine with you both in the past, I am imagining that this latest trip must have felt like some of the most difficult days that Ukraine has faced in terms of how this war may come to a conclusion. What is the mood like there? What are people talking about?

Corn: The mood in Ukraine is not great. The Ukrainians are very concerned about a number of issues. One, they feel a lot of pressure from the U.S. to make a deal, which many Ukrainians are confused about. They’re trying to understand what's going on. And of course, they're not pleased with their own internal political situation. The Operation Midas corruption scandal was a blow, so there's a lot swirling around and it's clearly impacting the people that we spoke with. They're trying to keep a brave face, given what they're facing. They’ve been at war since 2014, and since February 2022, they've been in a horrific war, a full scale war, and they're just trying to keep their nose above water right now. And as one Ukrainian officer told me, we just have to get through the winter and survive these dark times.

Goff: There's also disappointment amongst our Ukrainian allies with the United States. Not all of it is unexpected, but at the same time they've got this war to fight, so there's a very business-like attitude like, ‘Okay, we're still going to fight this thing’. And what's interesting is that they're not asking for anything new. They’ve made the same requests over and over. They need air defense weapons. There was a night when the Russians launched 84 missiles at Ukrainian territory and more than 500 drones in one night. We heard air raid sirens every night that we were there. The attacks are spread out across the country. It's clearly a campaign of terror by the Russian side.

And at the same time, the nature of the front - the battle - has changed completely from what it was just six months to a year ago. This is not the same war that was fought in 2022 or 2023 or 2024. This is a new war, and so the Ukrainians are asking for air defense weapons. They're asking for money. We can talk later about the idea of getting reparations money from the seized Russian assets, which they need. But at no point have they said they need troops. At no point have they asked for NATO’S Article Five to be invoked. They still want to fight this thing on their own, but they need help from the West.

Kelly: The battlefront has changed so much just in the past few months. Could you describe what it's like now?

Corn: Every Ukrainian we spoke with, whether it was civilians, military people in the defense industry, they all said that this war is being fought by drones, by FPVs [first-person drones] and some artillery. Intelligence is critical, electronic warfare is critical. But the troops on the ground and the concept of infantry has changed completely. The Ukrainians continue to innovate very quickly, but as they've warned for the last year, the Russians are also innovating very quickly and they're scaling that innovation in a way that the Ukrainians can’t because of a lack of resources and maybe a lack of depth.

Goff: That's correct. It is no longer an infantry man's war. The front is changed considerably. For 20 kilometers on either side of the front line, it’s almost a no-go lethal zone for humans. It's all electronic warfare. All drones and counter drones. I spent a day near the Zaporizhzhia front and even 40 kilometers back from the front lines, you're seeing drone netting set up everywhere and military vehicles using camouflage and taking extra precautions. So it’s completely different from when we visited there just a few months ago. But the losses continue.

For instance, in a single day recently, the Russians lost close to 1,300 soldiers. In one day. So Putin is still using pure raw manpower to his advantage, whereas Ukrainians have a manpower shortage. In one month, they recruited over 30,000 fighters, but out of that number, they're lucky if they can produce even a small percent of that. I'm not going to say the number because it's classified, but they're very lucky if they can get a decent number out of that. So it's tough for Ukrainians and they have to conserve their troops. They have to fight in a combat style that preserves human lives.

Kelly: In another way that we know the battlefield has changed, soldiers are now verifying kills or takedowns of targets, whether they're other drones, whether they're tanks on the ground, and they're using points earned from those drone missions to purchase equipment that is then delivered to them on the front. What can you tell us about the other ways in which the battlefield is evolving?

Corn: Battlefield integration has got to be seamless. The Ukrainians are working on that. We've spoken to a couple of people that are directly involved with that, and they're doing an incredible job. And one thing I was struck by during our last two or three visits is that now, more than ever, almost everyone we spoke with in a leadership position has no prior military experience. They're coming from private industry. Bankers, investment bankers. One guy we spoke with was running a tour agency overseas when he came back to fight. Now it’s computer programmers, IT folks, and they're all in the fight now. I spoke with one guy who was in a very senior government position before the war, and he told that he was 47-years-old before he put on a uniform, and he is leading a lot of the innovation stuff, and it's really impressive to see. We heard last time we were in Ukraine in September that the United States needs to pay attention to this and figure out how to integrate civilians into the military structure very quickly like Ukrainians have had to do.

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Goff: Suzanne, this is all about data integration. This is all about integrating all the information that comes from your airborne sensors, your ground sensors, your human observation, pulling intelligence into that. Tracking the emitters on the Russian side and then putting that all into a combat picture, particularly for the Ukrainians because they're fighting with reduced resources. So like I said, every human life is precious, but every weapon, every shot is also precious. In the old days when an artillery piece could maybe fire a hundred rounds in a day, now because they have to be so careful about being spotted when they're in action, they might fire 30 or 40 rounds. That means those 30 or 40 rounds really have to be on target. So it's all about the data. It's all about data management. And the Ukrainians, as Glenn said, are doing amazing work in that field. The biggest problem is that they're undercapitalized.

Kelly: President Zelensky has been in Europe gathering support from the Europeans as he tries to navigate a complicated series of pressures to end this war. Is the feeling on the ground in Ukraine that that will be enough?

Corn: I would say that the Ukrainians are in a bit of shock to see that the United States seems to be walking away - or their sense is that the United States is walking away. Let's hope that's not the case. But they're concerned that there is a rift between Europe and the United States. I think they appreciate what the Europeans are doing, but almost every discussion we’ve had centers on the fact that they need the United States here. They need the United States to provide some kind of long-term security guarantees. And by the way, the Ukrainians have been saying for over a year that they are ready to come to an agreement. They are ready to be realistic and compromise. It's the Russians that are not doing that. It's the Russians that continue to push maximalist demands and that continue to scuttle the peace process, not the Ukrainians. And the Ukrainians are very frustrated that they seem to be being made the bad guys in this struggle when their country was the one that was attacked. Their cities are being bombed, their children are being killed, their schools are being destroyed, their infrastructure is being destroyed, and they don't really understand what's going on right now. And I hope that we can get back to the position of the United States where we've traditionally been, which is the U.S. standing with people who are fighting for their freedom and their sovereignty against a much larger and more dangerous dictatorship.

Goff: And of course, the recent high-level scandal involving the primary advisor to the President, Andriy Yermak, and his resignation has now been turned around by the Russians who are pointing a finger at this country, and it's resonating within certain circles in the United States. But that's laughable. This is coming from a country - Russia - which is a kleptocracy. Some have said that Ukraine is more corrupt than Russia. That's absurd. Russia is a kleptocracy. It's more like an organized criminal gang than anything else. And the idea that they would accuse Ukraine of being worse than them is crazy. But amongst Ukrainians, I think there's almost this kind of hope that this is some sort of a bad dream that will go away, that America will wake up at some point before it's too late and come riding to the rescue. But at the same time, the pragmatists here realize that maybe that's not going to happen, and it's time for Europe to step up. It's just like Putin gave the Ukrainians their national identity by invading them. The Trump administration is giving Europe the challenge to step up and take charge of their destiny.

Kelly: With Andriy Yermak stepping down as President Zelensky’s chief advisor we know that there's another way of looking at this, which is that Ukraine has set up these independent institutes to investigate and root out corruption at every level and it looks like they’re determined to do that which is an indicator that Ukraine's own anti-corruption efforts are working to some degree, but that message seems to be completely lost.

Corn: Yes. We've heard for a while now, that anyone who knows Ukraine, knows they have a problem with corruption. I've always said that it's baked into their system. The Russians baked this into the system going back hundreds of years, so you have to be realistic. They know it, and they talk about it, and they often talk about it openly. Having worked in Russia, it doesn't happen that way. People don't talk about it. They don't go to the streets and protest without being arrested and basically disappearing or being thrown out of windows. In Ukraine, there is a civil society element here. There is some control over the government, over the presidency, and there has been opposition and resistance to steps that were taken to try and squash the anti-corruption efforts. So, you have to give the Ukrainians credit because they're fighting a war, a horrendous war, and they are also trying to bring the country out of this ugly reality of corruption, which every country has and faces. But to deal with it, when you're in a full-scale war, it's something special. So in my opinion, we need to give 'em credit, and we also need to be clear-eyed and realistic and understand that without the United States' support, they're going to have a hell of a time making the changes that they need to make, and that many, many Ukrainians want to see made. They want their children to grow up in a country which has much less corruption and much more transparency.

Goff: This is a country where national polling has shown that people are more concerned about corruption than they are about the war at present. For the first time, polls have shown that corruption's a bigger problem than the war itself. That shows the awareness of the Ukrainian people. Corruption - we're not trying to downplay it - is a problem, clearly. But there are people who have exaggerated it to the point where if corruption were as bad as some would say it is, they would've lost this war three years ago, because that stuff has to get to the front. It's all going into the pockets of ministers.

Kelly: Has there been anything on this particular trip that surprised you or that you didn't expect?

Corn: Well, I mean for me personally, just I think the shock of the recent release of the National Security Strategy and the sense that somehow Europe is a problem or Europe is the enemy. I don't know if that was the intent of that document, but that worries the Ukrainians, and of course it worries many of our European partners. For those people, I have to say, yeah, we have our differences with Europe, and as an American I've often felt that the Europeans should be doing a lot more, but the Europeans have also done a lot with us over the years, and for all the Europeans out there, for those I've worked with over the years, I am very appreciative of everything that you did to support the United States in many, many hard parts of the world where we served side by side together. So, Europeans are not the enemy, and by the way, we've never done that with the Russians, and I doubt we ever will. I doubt the Russians will stand side by side with us on the battlefield and support us the way that our European partners have done.

Goff: I think my biggest surprise here was the fact that the lights are still on. With all the bombings, like I said, we had air raids every night. Every few nights the pattern seems to be that the Russians husband their missiles and drones so that at least once or twice every five to seven days, they have a massive attack of 50, 60 missiles accompanied by 400, 500, 600 drones. And they're going after the energy infrastructure here. The lights are still on but with reduced power. There are some places that are down to a few hours a day, but you know what? They've still put up Christmas lights. They've still put up decorations. People are still trying to cling to some sense of normalcy for the season to get through this winter, and that just shows that these people are incredibly resilient.

Kelly: What are you sensing will happen next based on who you've talked to and what you've seen since you've been on the ground in Ukraine?

Corn: I think the Russians are not going to make a peace agreement unless they get everything they want, and let's hope that we don't give them everything they want because they don't deserve it, they haven't earned it, and they're not in a position to accomplish it by the means that Putin keeps threatening to do it, which is military force. The Ukrainians have proven that they can hold the line. That's number one.

Number two, I hope that we come around to understanding that basically the right side here is the side of the Ukrainians. The Russians should be ashamed of themselves for what they're doing. They need to stop what they're doing, and we need to stand with the Ukrainians and teach Vladimir Putin a lesson as well as other dictators or potential autocrats like Putin and aggressors, that we're not going to stand on the sidelines, and we're not going to punish those people that try and defend themselves and support those people that aggress other people.

We have common values with the Ukrainians, which I was raised to believe in. I'm not speaking as a former intelligence professional. I'm speaking as an American, whose father served in the Army, whose brother served in the Army, and who dedicated his life to the United States of America. We did that because we believe in the values that the Ukrainians are fighting for right now, every day - in terrible conditions - and we shouldn't abandon them.

Goff: I think we're going to see some type of mobilization, an increased mobilization on the Russian side. Their losses are high while their territorial gains remain low and the Russian economy is faltering and Putin has not been able to browbeat the Ukrainians to give in and come to the table to seek just any deal. Ukrainians will come to the table. This is where I think the administration is making a mistake. The Ukrainians will come to the table if there is a more fair deal. The ideal arrangement will be where both sides are unhappy, but at this point, despite all the negative pressure on the Ukrainians, they're not going to just sign any deal that gets to the table, and that's going to put more pressure on Putin to continue the war. He's got to show some gains. So I think we're going to see some sort of mobilization on the Russian side.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
How the U.S. Military’s Top Officer is Looking at the World’s Hotspots https://belimedia.com.ng/how-the-us-militarys-top-officer-is-looking-at-the-worlds-hotspots https://belimedia.com.ng/how-the-us-militarys-top-officer-is-looking-at-the-worlds-hotspots OPINION — “Our [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] job is to present and my job with the Joint Chiefs and others is to present the range of [military] options that this President or any President should consider with all of the secondary and tertiary considerations that go into those options, so that a President can make whatever decision he wants to make -- and then we deliver.”

That was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine early in a 30-minute “fireside chat” with CNBC’s Morgan Brennan before an audience at the Reagan National Defense Forum on December 6, at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California.

I want to analyze Caine’s remarks, because they received almost no public coverage, and as Joint Chiefs Chairman, his stated views are worth recording – as were his predecessors’ during the first Trump administration.

Caine, who is extremely cautious in his public remarks, was originally asked by CNBC’s Brennan early in the chat, “How are you advising the President on Venezuela?” His first answer was, “Carefully,” which drew a laugh, but then he went on with the serious answer above.

I picked that opening quote because most senior military officers would have answered just that they gave options, but in my experience few would have added the part about “all of the secondary and tertiary considerations that go into those options.” In short, I believe what Caine said in giving military options to President Trump, was that he gave both the upsides and downsides of what could happen with each option.

In giving the above answer, Caine went on to say, “I wouldn't want to share any particular advice or options that we're giving, but we present a lot of them.”

Again I would point out that Caine carefully noted he would not spell out any “advice or option” he has given Trump, but the fact that so far the President has not yet followed through on his threat to attack ground targets in Venezuela may be because of the “secondary or tertiary considerations” Caine said would be the outcome associated with undertaking such overt actions.

The public reactions to the 25 narco-boat attacks with their 95 associated deaths has been bad enough. But they also raise questions about where Caine stood on that issue.

In fact, CNBC’s Brennan started the conversation with Caine asking his views about “these Caribbean strikes and the reporting around them.”

Caine diverted from the question saying he was struck by the “sort of loss of confidence in the American military by the American people and that's deeply concerning to me.” He then said he wanted to add one detail to what Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had earlier told the Reagan Forum about the boat strikes.

That detail, Caine said, was that it was his idea along with Adm. Frank (Mitch) Bradley, the operational commander who ordered the so-called second strike on September 2, “to go up and

share the information that we could share with the Congress.” The two gave classified briefings to leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, as well as military appropriators, on December 4, according to The New York Times.

Caine told the Reagan Forum they had done it “so that we could continue to sustain and scale that trust that we must earn every day from the American people through the Congress.”

Throughout the 30-minute conversation, Caine avoided talking about Trump administration policy, just two days after Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) had been released.

For example, when CNBC’s Brennan asked, “How do you see the alliance with Europe evolving?” – a controversial subject in the Trump NSS, Caine responded, “We don't do policy in the Joint Force. We execute those policies.”

Caine did recognize the NSS’s new policy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere.

“Protecting the homeland is not just a term that we say anymore. It's a real thing and homeland security is national security,” Caine said. “I won't get into the operational matters, but there's plenty of visible examples…on where we are going to protect our neighborhood and do that pursuant to the things that we're able to do to make sure America is a safe and secure country.”

Caine then added, “We have not, if you look back over the arc of our deployment history over the last few years, we haven't had a lot of American combat power in our own neighborhood. I suspect that's probably going to change. We'll see what we're ordered to do and of course we follow that guidance.”

But Caine did focus on traditional threats saying, “From a military perspective, military alone, our relationships are good in Europe, and I'll let my bosses talk about the policy there.”

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Caine was more open when it came to NATO. “Allies and partners are key and critical to us as we fight together,” Caine told the Reagan Forum. “NATO remains a key important ally for us. They are, I think, going to own European security both through NATO and bilaterally and individually. The military leaders that I talked to are encouraged by the defense spending that's happening inside their countries. I would say, and have said to them, the same narrative around their defense and national industrial bases as we try to scale European defense so Europe can own Europe.”

Caine added, “The SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] over there, [U.S.] General [Alexus G.] Grynkewich, is carrying the same message through his EUCOM [U.S. European Command] hat. But that said, allies and partners remain a key part as laid out in the national security strategy.”

When it came to the fighting in Europe, Caine told the Reagan Forum, “I want to be pretty cautious about commenting on Ukraine because of the ongoing negotiations. And I'm mindful that anything that I say could get spun one way or the other. I think, for me, I believe that we always want to be striving for peace and what's happened in Europe there is a tragedy out on the Ukrainian front lines. So I'm going to be pretty cautious given the meetings that are going on.”

He did say, “What the Ukraine industrial base has done to create tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of drones is extraordinary. Those are the kinds of entrepreneurial lessons that we want to take from that fight.”

Caine also talked of a military lesson from Ukraine.

“It's another case study in the importance of the ability to put air power over a battlefield,” he said. “And when you look at the fixed and frozen lines that we've seen out in Ukraine, it's an opportunity for us to learn about the importance of protecting the force on the ground. And having been one of those guys on the ground earlier in my life, I value greatly the ability to have an air force or some kind of capability that can come in there and put an adversary in a particular place of pain. We haven't seen that out there in Ukraine.”

Caine said, “One of the lessons out of Ukraine is going to be mass. And there's a lot of exchanges going on. And when I think about war fighting in the future, I see a lot of exchanges, both in the kinetic and non-kinetic space, that is probably unprecedented. So we're going to need a high-low mix that we've not seen before…but we are also going to need significantly more attritable [loseable] things that can create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for the commanders on another side of a fight than for us.”

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While the Trump NSS hardly mentioned China, Caine did.

“When we look at the rise of the Chinese military,” Caine said, “what our goal in the Joint Force is to create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for all of the adversaries around the world, so that they are very cautious and concerned about doing something that would bring any sense of threat to the American people.”

Caine went on, “I think China's competing on the global scale. I know that from the U.S. perspective we've got an economic relationship now that is looking positive and trending fine. We see China still creating a lot of combat capability and capacity at scale, and as the National Security Strategy says, we owe it to the nation to deliver a free Indo-Pacific and a free and safe and prosperous Indo-Pacific. So when I think about actions in the Pacific, mindful of the President's guidance, that's how we think about it.”

As for the Middle East, Caine called it still “critical,” and said, “It's still I think undecided. I carefully watch through the CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) commander what's happening in Gaza. I remain as always concerned about what Iran's intentions are down there. These are conflicts that have been going on for a long, long, time. I'm hopeful for peace but need to be prepared for any number of eventualities there.”

As for here at home, Caine told the Reagan Forum, “What the American system, as it's been running for a long time now, is really good at is buying behind the technology development curve [emphasis added]. And what we need to do is get in front of the technology development curve. And that's going to require the best of the military, the best of the Congress, the best of the private sector, and the best of not just the defense industrial base, but the national industrial base.

Caine explained, “Back in my life, I ran a small mom and pop machine shop in Denton, Texas, that made parts for America's aerospace and defense industry. And I'll tell you that everybody needs to up their game here.”

He went on, “We have to change the culture inside the [Defense] Department. We have to change the culture inside companies. And I've been in both. So I can see both of these things. We have to create and sustain and maintain competitive forces out there in the market where we are driving innovation in our corporate structures and systems that are going to give better combat capability to the Joint Force.”

In addition, Caine said, “The military and the government need to be better buyers and we have to write better contracts. I am still on step one of my 12-step recovery process from selling to the government when I was a part-timer in the military. I think we have to find a way to share risk between us and the private sector.”

Caine was an unusual choice by President Trump, who had first met Caine back in December 2018 in Iraq. The President claimed during a 2019 political speech he had met an Army officer, “Razin Caine,” who had worn a MAGA hat, said he’d “kill for Trump,” and claimed in Iraq he could defeat the ISIS terrorist group in Syria “in less than four weeks,” three Trump statements Caine later denied in interviews and during his 2025 Senate confirmation hearing.

When I first wrote about Caine last March, I was drawn to the facts that beginning August 2005 he served a year as a White House Fellow at the Agriculture Department and later, from October 2006 to January 2008, was Policy Director for Counterterrorism and Strategy for President George W. Bush’s White House Homeland Security Council. Caine’s last military post before resigning from the Air Force in 2024 was three years as Associate Director for Military Affairs at the CIA.

However, at the Reagan Forum, Caine confessed, “I actually served at the Agency [CIA] twice. One is in my bio, one is not in my bio.” What’s that all about?

Caine clearly is a person the public needs to follow more closely.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
Anti&Semitism is a National Security Issue: It’s Time to Treat it Like One https://belimedia.com.ng/anti-semitism-is-a-national-security-issue-its-time-to-treat-it-like-one https://belimedia.com.ng/anti-semitism-is-a-national-security-issue-its-time-to-treat-it-like-one EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE -- Less than three months ago, two people were killed in a terrorist attack on Jewish people in a synagogue in Manchester, UK, on the most solemn day of the Jewish religious calendar.

Three days ago, a large crowd of Jewish people in Sydney, Australia, celebrated Hanukkah on Bondi Beach. Two Islamic terrorists, father and son, fired at them from a nearby bridge. Sixteen innocent Jewish people were murdered, including a Holocaust survivor and a ten-year-old child.

The point of a terrorist attack is that even a relatively contained engagement spreads widespread fear. This is particularly the case with the Jewish community. The background for Jews is centuries of persecution culminating in the indescribable horror of the Holocaust. Even since then Jews for many years have lived in fear.

I was friendly with an Israeli diplomat in Turkey thirty years ago. He could not travel in his own car, hopping around Istanbul instead by taxi (dangerous enough), and no one knew where he lived.

Synagogues and Jewish schools in the UK have the sort of security I was used to in Kabul. There is even a charity trust, CST, dedicated purely to the security of Jewish people here. When a terrorist incident happens, most Jews ask themselves “Are we safe here?”

So, terrorism is working well against Jewish people and western governments need to show that they are serious about opposing terrorism. You can’t have a democracy when terrorism against one community is tolerated. Not least, because assuredly if we give up on the security of Jewish people others will be next. That is why anti-semitism must be seen as a national security imperative.

When the UK united against Islamic terrorism in the aftermath of the murder of 52 Londoners in 2005, we realised that it was not enough simply to pursue possible terrorists and to be prepared for possible attacks. We realised that we needed to understand and combat the hatred that drove these attacks and to stop it infecting vulnerable people who might be tempted by the Al-Qaeda message.

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Much of the focus on the Jewish community since the Sydney attack – and it has been gratifying to see the media at last seriously focused on anti-semitism – has been about the need to “protect” Jews. That was the message of British prime minister Keir Starmer. That is fine but the solution for Jewish people, as the terrorists know, is not about even more security systems around their synagogues and schools, about armoured cars transporting schoolkids around north London or about how safe it is to be publicly identifiable as Jewish. “Safety concerns” have been used to ban an Israeli football team from playing in Birmingham, and non-political Jewish entertainers from appearing in Edinburgh. Jews are likely to conclude that this is no life, and there must be safer places to live: and you have lost your battle against terrorism.

The only solution to defeat this terror is declaring war on anti-semitism. Lots of people will tell me how difficult this would be. How do you distinguish “legitimate” criticism of Israel from criticism that uses conscious or unconscious anti-semitism? Couldn’t a state-backed campaign against anti-semitism have the opposite effect to the desired one, leading to even more isolation and hatred of the Jewish community?

These are serious risks: no one is saying this is easy. But the status quo is no longer acceptable.

One more mass casualty attack – let's say in some European or American city on Passover, 2026 – and the Jewish community is going to be packing its bags. And you have lost your battle against terrorism. Anti-semitism is a national security priority.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
What Would Follow a Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation? https://belimedia.com.ng/what-would-follow-a-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-designation https://belimedia.com.ng/what-would-follow-a-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-designation

DEEP DIVE — On November 24, 2025, President Trump launched a process to designate Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

Citing fresh intelligence that these specific affiliates provided material support to Hamas after the October 7 attacks on Israel, the White House gave Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent a tight 30-day deadline to produce a formal report. The goal, administration sources say, is to sever the financial arteries — from charitable fronts to hawala networks — that have kept the Brotherhood’s regional machinery alive.

The decision comes at a moment when the Brotherhood’s once carefully cultivated image as the respectable face of political Islam lies in tatters. Days before Trump’s executive order, Texas Governor Greg Abbott made his state the first to label both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as terrorist entities, vowing to target what he called “radical extremists.” Florida Governor Ron DeSantis followed the move by Texas with his own similar executive order. With federal momentum now behind him, the designations threatens to cascade across the region—and potentially beyond.

“Hamas was founded as the Egyptian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood and has made this very clear in its Charter of 1987,” Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director of the Counter Extremism Project, tells The Cipher Brief. “The political statement of Hamas of 2017 did not mention this link specifically, but it also did not state that Hamas would be independent. Hence, Hamas remains part of the Muslim Brotherhood network.”

Roots of a Transnational Shadow

To grasp the stakes, the story must begin in Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928, when schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna founded the Ikhwan al-Muslimin as a movement of Islamic revival and social reform. What started with Quranic lessons and charity work exploded into a mass organization of hundreds of thousands by the 1940s, complete with a secret paramilitary wing, the Special Apparatus, that carried out bombings and assassinations against British forces and Jewish targets. Egypt banned the group in 1948; al-Banna was assassinated shortly afterward, almost certainly by state security.

Heavy-handed crackdowns, periods of accommodation, and notable ideological shifts have defined the Brotherhood’s trajectory since then.

Officially, the Brotherhood renounced violence in the 1970s, and it built an unrivaled network of mosques, clinics, schools, and labor unions. The 2011 Arab Spring briefly catapulted it to power: Mohamed Morsi became Egypt’s first elected president in 2012. Fourteen months later, mass protests and a military coup ended the experiment. Egypt declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2013, killed more than 1,000 supporters in a single day at Rabaa Square, and imprisoned tens of thousands more. Exiled, splintered, and radicalized, remnants went underground or looked to Gaza.

Fernando Caravajal, executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies and an expert in Sudanese affairs, tells The Cipher Brief that the Brotherhood’s ideological flexibility allows it to reemerge in power vacuums, but cautions that the potential United States terrorist designation likely stems from outside interests.

“Notice the timing: these statements came a week after the meeting with Saudi,” he said. “It wasn’t announced during the meeting, so we can’t say Saudis are openly pushing it, but they clearly have a hand behind it because of the timing, because of the content. It mentions Jordan and Lebanon — those are Saudi priorities.”

Riyadh’s priorities center on containing Islamist movements and curbing Iranian influence in the Levant, making Jordan and Lebanon key arenas for Riyadh’s regional security strategy.

Across the region, local chapters adapted in different ways. Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) became the kingdom’s most organized opposition, running hospitals and schools and holding parliamentary seats. Lebanon’s looser network operates in Palestinian camps alongside Hezbollah. Both insist they are peaceful and gradualist.

“It is important to understand that the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and violence is a tactical one,” Schindler said. “It can change at any point if the network feels that violence would be useful for its position and influence.”

Past American attempts to designate the entire Brotherhood collapsed amid pushback from Qatar, Turkey, and some European allies. This time, the White House has chosen a surgical strike. According to Schindler, the White House’s endeavor to focus on individual chapters is an optimal approach because it targets “chapters in countries that have themselves banned and/or designated the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt, Jordan) and on Lebanon, where the distinction between Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas is hard to make.”

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The October 7 Reckoning

The trigger, ultimately, was October 7 and the events that followed. In Lebanon, the most explicit public demonstration came when a Brotherhood-affiliated militia calling itself the al-Fajr Forces fired rockets into northern Israel days after Hamas’s massacre.

“Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Gaza and the West Bank. It calls itself such. However, it operates independently,” Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and Former DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy, Thomas Warrick, tells The Cipher Brief. “Its revenues were derived from control of Gaza’s governance: taxes, donations from outside governments, and criminal activities from which it profited. Other MB chapters are small in budgets and manpower compared to Hamas.”

In Jordan, the IAF organized some of the largest pro-Hamas demonstrations in the Arab world.

“The clearest demonstrated ‘link’ between Hamas and the specified Muslim Brotherhood chapters is that a Brotherhood-affiliated group in Lebanon, al-Fajr Forces, launched rockets into Israel following the October 7 2023 Hamas terrorist attack,” Rose Kelanic, director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, tells The Cipher Brief, stressing that “the Muslim Brotherhood is not a terrorist threat to the United States.”

In Egypt, underground networks — despite Sisi’s repression — funneled money and propaganda into Gaza. Yet Schindler specifically highlights Lebanon’s darker role in Hamas’s external operations.

“According to German court documents, the Hamas cell that was arrested in Germany and the Netherlands in December 2023, which had planned and prepared for terror attacks in Germany, was led by Hamas handlers in Lebanon,” he noted. “Given the close connection between Hamas and the wider Muslim Brotherhood network, it is therefore likely that such contacts also exist in Lebanon.”

The real power of the designation, however, lies in America’s arsenal of financial warfare. Once listed, any bank worldwide that touches Brotherhood money in dollars risks losing access to the United States market.

“Disrupting the ability of large-scale extremist and terrorist networks, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to have unhindered access to the global financial system is, of course, a very effective way to hinder their overall operations,” Schindler explained. “Hence, any country where this access is more restricted is, of course, a problem for such networks as it will increase their operational costs.”

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Allies on the Brink

Jordan is already on edge. Dependent on $1.5 billion in annual U.S. aid and facing street fury over Gaza, King Abdullah II banned the Brotherhood in April 2025 — yet the IAF still functions. While Schindler sees Washington’s possible move as reinforcement that will “aid in the efforts of the Jordanian government in countering Muslim Brotherhood structures in the country,” Kelanic warns of unintended consequences.

“The only scenario I worry about is if the U.S. insists on applying the FTO designation to the IAF, because that amounts to major meddling in Jordanian politics,” she noted. “The last thing the U.S. needs is another failed state in the Middle East.”

Turkey, experts point out, is perhaps the bigger headache. Schinder asserts that Turkey “is indeed an important network hub for Hamas,” in particular when it comes to the group’s financial systems.

“Turkey is in a unique position to pressure Hamas to give up its weapons and power in Gaza and leave the Strip,” he continued. “Unfortunately, so far, the Turkish government does not seem to have done so.”

According to Warrick, “what Turkey will do in response to the U.S. designation is not yet clear.”

“Supporting Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in the region is a core policy of the Turkish government, but President Erdoğan is mindful that his relationship with President Trump is strong and is valuable,” he explained. “The Turkish government is aware of the Trump administration’s hostile attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood but is not likely to change its approach except in countries that the U.S. government has formally designated Brotherhood branches as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”

A senior U.S. intelligence official, speaking to The Cipher Brief on background, described the administration’s delicate balancing act.

“The President comes out with a statement where he’s clearly trying not to offend the Qataris too much, but at the same time satisfying the UAE and the Saudis and the Egyptians,” the insider noted. “He’s riding the fence on this but skewing more to the anti-side.”

Washington is particularly wary of antagonizing Doha because Qatar remains a critical mediator with Islamist movements and an indispensable interlocutor in hostage, de-escalation, and regional crisis negotiations. The Qatar-based Brotherhood chapter formally disbanded in 1999, and Doha has repeatedly denied formal support for the Muslim Brotherhood, despite continued investigations indicating the group’s ongoing financial backing and praise from the likes of Hamas.

That same insider predicted domestic ripple effects: “If we suddenly see a ton of states passing laws against the Brotherhood and CAIR, then we start to have some real domestic impacts.”

CAIR has long faced allegations of historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood because some of its early founders were involved with U.S.-based organizations linked to Brotherhood-affiliated networks, and because it was named as an “unindicted co-conspirator” in the 2007 Holy Land Foundation case. Critics cite these associations as evidence of ideological or organizational overlap. However, no criminal charges were ever brought against CAIR, and no direct operational link to the Brotherhood has been proven. CAIR denies any affiliation, and most of the evidence remains circumstantial, dated, and heavily disputed.

Analysts also point out that Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which already list the Brotherhood as terrorists, are quietly celebrating. But not everyone agrees that an FTO designation is a step in the right direction.

“Doing a blanket listing of ‘the Muslim Brotherhood’ is a huge risk for the U.S.,” Caravajal said. “It allows people to be arrested simply for going to the wrong mosque.”

For a movement that has survived bans, coups, and massacres for almost a century, this is only the latest test.

“The problem with designating the Muslim Brotherhood is that it never was a unitary organization or even a franchise organization like Al-Qaeda or Da’esh,” Warrick added. “This is why the solution the Trump administration came up with is the correct one. By working with partners that have already outlawed or sanctioned the Muslim Brotherhood chapters in their countries, the U.S. government can work cooperatively with those countries. This approach also gives some clarity to people in those countries, which groups they need to avoid in order not to be sanctioned by OFAC.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business ]]>
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 00:41:20 +0100 FirstHandNews
The U.S. Role in a Multipolar World & and the Dangers of Isolationism https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-role-in-a-multipolar-world-and-the-dangers-of-isolationism https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-role-in-a-multipolar-world-and-the-dangers-of-isolationism OPINION — “What should the U.S. role in the world be right now? We're waiting for the [Trump administration] National Security Strategy to come out from the White House, which should come out in the next couple of months, which will be really interesting to see what they have to say. We are in the post-post-Cold War world. You know we had that brief period at the end of the Cold War when it was like, yeah, we won, everything's good -- and then no it's not. So now we're like accepting that it is a complicated world. So what role do we play?”

That was Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) last Wednesday as The Brookings Institution’s keynote speaker at the 2025 Knight Forum on Geopolitics. Elected to Congress in 1996, Rep. Smith has served on the House Armed Services Committee since 1997. He was committee chairman from 2019-to-2023, and today is the ranking Democrat. He has also previously served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Smith, who has focused on national and international security strategy during most of his 28 years in Congress, is someone I believe should be listened to in this controversial time in our history. And during his Brookings appearance, he not only touched on the key issues today, but also put them in an historic context that makes for a better understanding of them.

For example, Rep. Smith said, “We did a masterful job in my humble opinion post World War II of figuring out what is our role in the world and then playing that role to a very effective degree. It's not perfect. Certainly there were mistakes. I think we need to do that again. And the number one biggest theme for me is we have to get rid of the idea that we are going to dominate the rest of the world.”

Instead, he said, “We have to be engaged, but we have to embrace the idea of a multi-polar world that we can influence, but not control. And that I think was the biggest downside to the end of the Cold War -- it gave us grandiose ambition, delusions of grandeur, if you will, and the notion that our mission was to make sure that no pure competitor emerged. You remember that philosophy? That's a really hard thing to do. We're not going to be able to do it, just like we're not going to be able to defeat China.”

So how does Rep. Smith suggest we deal with China?

“We really need to talk with China,” he emphasized last week. “I think the relationship with China is the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world right now and will be for decades to come. The two most powerful economies [and] increasingly pretty close to the two most powerful militaries, as China has ramped up [militarily]. And I think we need to find a way to get along with China.”

However, he said, “The focus in Washington D.C. is very much how do we beat China? And that you see in Congress all the time. You certainly see it from the [House] China Select Committee. What I want to know is what is our plan for coexisting with China? Because that's what we're going to have to do. We're not going anywhere. They're not going anywhere.”

Rep. Smith acknowledged that China, along with what he called the “cringe” people -- Russia, Iran and North Korea – are threats. But, he added, “of that group, China is the most invested in a global order. I mean, their economy is dependent upon it. They have slightly different views for how that global order should be run. But we are a lot closer to aligned in that than we are certainly with Russia or North Korea or Iran or your average ISIS or al-Qaeda [terrorist] group. So I think there was an opportunity there to have a dialogue with China that could bring the tension down and get to a better relationship.”

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At another point, Rep. Smith said, “If China wants those [global order] rules to be changed to help them, they're going to have to show that they're something other than a belligerent aggressive actor just trying to gobble up as much as they can gobble up. Because people forget we had to do a lot of crap that was just helping other people, all right? You know, the Marshall Plan in Europe, we rebuilt Japan, earthquakes, tsunamis all over the world. You know, we've done that. You know, that's part of it. All right, China, you want to be the big global player. Part of it is not just looking at the rest of the world as a resource opportunity. Not that we haven't done that, too, but we've balanced that out with helping people.”

Rep. Smith described something he said “the Biden administration did really, really well… I know there are a lot of people who are critical of a lot of different things the Biden administration did, but the alliances that we built up around China during his Presidency were really consequential and very important. Certainly, the Quad with Japan, Australia, India and the U.S. was important. Japan has become a much better partner. South Korea, the Philippines, these are areas where we built partnerships that strengthened us.”

“China looks at the U.S. and sees us as having three great advantages,” Rep. Smith said. “One, we got partners and alliances that no other nation in the world has. Two, we do research better than anybody. And three, people want to come here. You know, we're damaging all three of those to one degree or another at the moment. But taking advantage of those partnerships and alliances to strengthen ourselves, I think needs to be part of the solution.”

He went on saying, “Maintaining and building on those partnerships is crucial. Obviously, [President] Trump has a slightly different approach, more confrontational. I worry about how that's going to impact it.”

Noting that President Trump “has a slightly different approach, more confrontational,” and was at that moment in Asia “trying to patch that up,” Rep. Smith advised, “I would say figure out how to get along with China, maintain and build alliances with as many other nations in that part of the world as possible.”

“But I would love to see a world 10, 20, 30 years from now,” Rep. Smith said, “where China and the U.S., if there's some disaster in the world, if there's a famine, if there's a natural disaster, if there's just a country that's infrastructure is crumbling, are sitting at the same table talking about how do we handle this? Okay, that is a better world. Now, to get there, we have to get off of this zero sum competition.”

It was in dealing with allies and partner countries that Rep. Smith said, “Trump came in with his uniquely bullying approach to try to get them [allies and partner countries] to do more. And what I worry about there is if you're just trying to get them to do more as part of a collective understanding of what our national security interests are -- great. You know, be as aggressive as you have to be, make it work. But there is considerable concern that isolationism is pushing Trump's viewpoint as much as a desire for greater burden sharing, which is to say, ‘We don't care. We're out. Good luck.’"

“That is where we don't want to go,” Rep. Smith said, “And that's where a lot of the Trumpian rhetoric is troubling to me because on the Trump side…is the argument that somehow the

United States of America has been taken advantage of for the last 80 years. All these European countries, these Asian countries, we provided security to them. I think [Defense] Secretary [Pete] Hegseth had the unique way of saying it, you know, Uncle Sam shouldn't be Uncle Sucker.”

Rep. Smith explained, “Those partnerships, those alliances that we built benefited us more than any other country in the world. We had the biggest, most powerful economy ever because we had a relatively peaceful world. We had a lot of partners and friends. We weren't doing it out of some generosity. We didn't want to be dragged into another world war, which would be costly to us. And we wanted a reasonably prosperous world to do business with. That's what we wanted.

And that's what we got. Now how we divided that wealth back here at home has certainly raised some issues, but the basic point is that we generated a very robust global economy that we benefited from.”

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Pointing out that after WWII, “we didn't want those countries [Germany, Japan] building up their militaries and doing more, because we saw how that had played out over the course of the previous thousand years,” Rep. Smith said. But, he added, “We're right now in the midst of a huge debate over the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe, and are we going to maintain it? A lot of mutterings…[are] that we're going to be pulling out, which can undermine the [NATO] alliance. So, I'm worried about it.”

His worry, he said, “is this administration going to remain committed to the concept of why these alliances are important, not just for our partners, but for us as well?”

But Rep. Smith explained, “Now is not the time to signal weakness to [Russian President] Vladimir Putin in Eastern Europe. Now, that's kind of hard to argue with, so why are they doing it? And that gets back to sort of the concern about their world view. The way they [the Trump administration officials] try to pitch it is we can only do so many things at once. So we're trying to prioritize in different places.”

Rep. Smith went on, “I guess the argument there would be they're prioritizing in Asia. But the world is connected. Sorry, but what's happening in Europe has a profound impact on what's

happening [in Asia]. In fact, you know, if we want to stop China from being overly aggressive in terms of taking the territory of other nations and militarily, the single best thing we can do is make sure that Putin fails in Ukraine, to make it clear that that type of aggression to expand territory doesn't work. So, we're not helping Asia by looking weak in Eastern Europe.”

Rep. Smith also looked at other parts of the world.

He said, “Israel's consistent effort, with our help through multiple administrations, [led to] weakening Hezbollah, you know, weakening Hamas and weakening Iran, certainly put them in a vastly weaker position as a regional player. And [that] has created the opportunity to get a stable government in Syria and a stable government in Lebanon and an increasingly stable government in Iraq.”

He added. “That's where we want to get to. And we've made a large amount of progress on that. Now again, Donald Trump is going to take absolutely 100% of the credit for that. and he deserves maybe five percent of the credit for that. But that puts us in a better position on that.”

Closer to home, Rep. Smith said, “I do worry about the Trumpian Monroe Doctrine approach here. We're spending a heck of a lot of money out of the [U.S.] military to secure a border that Trump says is already secure. That is a distraction financially. Then, picking a war with Venezuela and Colombia and randomly blowing up people down in the Caribbean, in the Pacific -- that's expensive, destabilizing, and I don't see it having the positive impact that they claim it is. And it also undermines our credibility if we are engaging in what most of the world views as extrajudicial killings.”

I must add here as a closing, something Rep. Smith said two days later during an appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations. It’s the best summation I’ve seen of all the issues involved in the Trump administration’s self-started drug war.

“Basically,” Rep. Smith said, “the President of the United States has decided that he will institute the death penalty for drug dealing. Now that’s an interesting policy question. It’s been debated. There are some countries that have gone to different places on it, but it is not a policy question that we’ve had in the United States of America. That’s not legal. That’s not something we’ve decided to do. Not only has the President of the United States decided to circumvent all of that, and say, ‘Yes we’re going to have the death penalty,’ but he’s decided to do it without any due process. He’s appointed himself judge, jury and executioner. And who are they targeting? From what we can glean from the briefing yesterday [last Thursday by Pentagon officials], and what they have said publicly, there are 24 different narco-terrorist groups, as they called them. We have no details on who’s in the 24. But it’s also, not just the people who are part of the 24 drug cartels, but anyone who is affiliated with the drug cartels which also comes with not much of a definition.”

Rep. Smith concluded, “So the President basically empowers himself to use the United States military to do lethal strikes against tens-of-thousands of ill defined people without the oversight [needed]. That is a clear abuse of power and a massive expansion of the power for the President of the United States and I believe that undermines the Constitution and the rule of law to people who care about those things anymore.”

I fully agree.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Ukraine’s Long&Range War: How Drone & Missile Strikes Are Taking the Fight Deep Inside Russia https://belimedia.com.ng/ukraines-long-range-war-how-drone-missile-strikes-are-taking-the-fight-deep-inside-russia https://belimedia.com.ng/ukraines-long-range-war-how-drone-missile-strikes-are-taking-the-fight-deep-inside-russia

DEEP DIVE – By any traditional definition, the city of Ryazan doesn’t belong on a list of battlegrounds in the Ukraine war. There are no Ukrainian soldiers or tanks deployed there, and it’s in western Russia, roughly 600 miles from the active front lines of Pokrovsk or Kupiansk.

But residents and officials in Ryazan – population 550,000 – wouldn’t be surprised to find their city on such a list. Ukraine has attacked Ryazan at least a half dozen times, as part of an escalating drone-and-missile campaign against Russia’s oil sector. Most recently, an oil refinery in Ryazan – Russia’s fourth-largest – was forced to shut down after an Oct. 23 attack by Ukrainian drones.

Ryazan is hardly alone.

Lt. Gen. Vasyl Maliuk, head of the Ukrainian Security Service, said last week that Ukraine has carried out more than 160 successful attacks on Russian refineries and other energy targets this year; an Open Source Centre investigation identified more than 90 strikes between Aug. 2 and Oct. 14. In the last week alone, Ukraine has struck an oil terminal and tanker in Russia’s Black Sea port of Tuapse; energy facilities in Russia's Oryol, Vladimir, and Yaroslavl regions; and the Koltsevoy, or “ring,” pipeline, which links refineries in Moscow, Ryazan, and Nizhny Novgorod, and supplies fuel to the Russian military. Earlier strikes damaged one of Russia's biggest oil refineries near St. Petersburg, and perhaps most impressive – from the Ukrainian point of view – the campaign has reached as far as the Siberian city of Tyumen, some 1200 miles east of Moscow.

Stretching the conventional notion of front lines is clearly part of the Ukrainian strategy; the strikes have forced the Kremlin to worry about drone and missile attacks across a broad swath of Russian territory. But the main aim is to hurt the Russian oil sector – the country’s richest revenue source, and a key reason why the Kremlin has been able to maintain the funding of its war machine.

“Ukraine’s theory of victory now includes destroying Russia’s energy sector,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, told The Cipher Brief. “They’ve developed capabilities that can reach great distances with precision, exposing Russia’s vulnerability – its inability to protect critical infrastructure across its vast landscape.”

Last week Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky vowed to intensify the pace and scope of the campaign. “We must work every day to weaken the Russians. Their money for the war comes from oil refining,” Zelensky said in an Oct. 27 address to the nation. “The most effective sanctions - the ones that work the fastest - are the fires at Russia’s oil refineries, its terminals, oil depots.”

Zelensky also noted that 90 percent of the strikes have been carried out by Ukrainian-made drones and missiles – a not-so-subtle message to Europe and the U.S.: get us more of your long-range weapons, and we can help bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.

“It’s very impressive,” said Balazs Jarabik, a former European Union diplomat and analyst for RPolitik, said of Ukraine’s campaign against the Russian energy sector. In an interview with The Cipher Brief, Jarabik said the attacks have “had an impact in terms of getting headlines, making the Russian war effort more expensive, and creating shortages so the Russian people feel the pain of the war.”

That’s also the aim of the recent U.S. sanctions against energy giants Rosneft and Lukoil, the first American economic penalties imposed on Russia since Donald Trump returned to office. The Treasury Department said the sanctions would “increase pressure on Russia’s energy sector and degrade the Kremlin’s ability to raise revenue for its war machine.”

While Ukrainian officials have welcomed the sanctions, they have also said that their drone and missile attacks pack a more powerful punch.

“Our strikes have already had more impact than sanctions,” Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s head of Military Intelligence, said on Telegram following last week’s spate of attacks.

For their part, Putin and other Russian officials have downplayed the impact of the strikes while at the same time warning that they are dangerously escalatory. The Kremlin has also said that neither the attacks nor the sanctions will move them to change course in the war.

Experts say both sides may be right – that in the short term, the Kremlin can probably ride out the impact of the Ukrainian campaign, but that Russia may feel significant pain if the sanctions are enforced and the oil sector strikes continue.

“Russia’s oil refineries are a bit like a man who is being repeatedly punched,” Sergey Vakulenko, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, wrote in a recent assessment for Carnegie Politika. “He will not die from one punch, or even half a dozen punches. But it becomes harder and harder for him to recover after each subsequent blow. Although no single punch is fatal, he could end up being beaten to death.”


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Assessing the damage

To date, the Ukrainian strikes have hit 21 of Russia's 38 large oil refineries, according to the BBC, and several have been struck more than once. Roughly 20% of the nation’s refining capacity has been damaged or destroyed, and last month the International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that Russia's revenues from crude oil and refined products had fallen to their lowest level in a decade – excluding the period immediately following the COVID-19 outbreak.

"Persistent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure have cut Russian crude processing by an estimated 500,000 barrels per day, resulting in domestic fuel shortages and lower product exports," the IEA said. In an accompanying forecast, the agency said that if the sanctions remain in place and the attacks continue – even without Zelensky’s promised scaling-up of their cadence – the impact to Russia’s refining would stretch to at least mid-2026.

Beyond the macroeconomic impact, the Ukrainian campaign has also been felt by Russian citizens, in the form of higher fuel prices and – in some regions – shortages and long lines for gas.

“The economic impact of strikes against Russian energy infrastructure is beginning to be felt outside of Moscow, as Russia diverts available energy from the regions to keep Moscow supplied,” Rob Dannenberg, a former chief of the CIA’s Central Eurasia Division, wrote last week in The Cipher Brief. “There are shortages and energy price hikes that the Kremlin can no longer conceal.”

And in a broader reflection of Russia’s economic woes, this week the central bank downgraded the country’s growth forecast. Experts say the sanctions and Ukrainian strikes are a big part of the problem for Moscow.

“Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are strategically meaningful and increasingly so,” Jacek Siewiera, a former head of Poland’s National Security Bureau, told The Cipher Brief. He said the strikes are serving three strategic functions: forcing Russia to divert efforts to rear-area defense; raising the overall cost of war by creating new logistical costs inside Russia; and a less tangible, more symbolic impact.

“These attacks send a message to Moscow and its economy that Ukraine – and its backers – can reach deep,” Siewiera said. “That has symbolic as well as material value.”

What comes next

Might the Ukrainian campaign alter the course of the war? Experts are divided on the question.

On the one hand, dozens of Russian oil sector targets are now within reach of Ukrainian missiles and drones – and it’s clear that Zelensky’s vow to expand and intensify the campaign is underway. An already-bruised industry in Russia is surely girding for more punishment.

But several experts said that in order to sustain the tempo and volume of the attacks, Ukraine will need help from the West or a significant boost to its own capabilities.

“Ukraine has made impressive inroads but it’s not yet clear whether the strikes will fundamentally degrade Russia’s war-fighting capacity,” Siewiera said. He and others echoed Zelensky’s point – that the West should support Ukraine’s deep-strike capabilities to boost the impact of the current attacks, and improve the odds that they will effect change in Moscow. Until then, Siewiera said, it’s unlikely that the campaign can deliver “a knockout blow.”

Jarabik agreed, noting that Ukrainian drones typically carry payloads of only 50-60 kilograms (roughly 110-130 pounds); long-range missile systems can inflict far greater damage. He and others said that much will depend on the success of the Ukrainian-made Flamingo missile – which has been touted as a homegrown alternative to western long-range weapons. Officials say the Flamingo is now operational, and that it can carry more than 1,000 kilos (2000+ pounds), with a range of roughly 1800 miles.

“I think we are going to see the Ukrainian strikes increasing,” Jarabik said. “The big question here is whether Ukrainians are going to have the missile capabilities to scale the attack.” At the current rate, he said, Ukraine cannot compel the Kremlin to alter its approach. “So far, neither the sanctions nor this (campaign of strikes) is actually enough to bring the end of the war. Russia has the means to continue.”

All those interviewed for this piece agreed that the success of the Ukrainian campaign will depend on whether Ukraine can hit more targets, more frequently, and with heavier payloads.

“As Ukraine continues to improve its long-range precision strike capability – and if the West adds its own weapons to Ukraine’s arsenal – the impact is going to increase significantly,” Lt. Gen. Hodges said. And that, he said, “could lead to a successful outcome for Ukraine.”

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Trump’s Latest Military Campaign Tests the Limits of Presidential War Powers https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-latest-military-campaign-tests-the-limits-of-presidential-war-powers https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-latest-military-campaign-tests-the-limits-of-presidential-war-powers

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTiVE — According to reports, the Trump administration informed Congress that the ongoing hostilities against alleged narco-terrorist groups does not fall within the scope of the War Powers Resolution (WPR). As a result, the administration does not believe the President’s authority to continue to wage this military campaign is in any way constrained by the law.

Trump is building on an interpretation of the law first advanced by the Obama administration to avoid WPR compliance in relation to the U.S. involvement in the NATO campaign against Libya in 2011. This interpretation posits that the WPR is inapplicable to hostilities that fall below the level of large-scale ‘war’ and involve minimal risk of U.S. casualties. Yet ironically, President Trump’s assertion of inherent constitutional authority to start and continue this military campaign is exactly what the law was intended to cover.

Enacted into law in 1973 over President Nixon’s veto, the War Powers Resolution was motivated by congressional determination to prevent future presidents dragging the nation into a war incrementally. The context was obvious: Vietnam. For a super-majority of legislators, that conflict began and slowly expanded under the same premise: presidential assertions of inherent constitutional authority to commit small numbers of U.S. armed forces to low-level operations with limited risk: first as advisors, then to engage in limited direct action, then through ‘limited risk’ air operations. What evolved was an escalation that most of these legislators believed was inconsistent with both presidential assurances and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution – the statutory use of force authorization Congress enacted in 1965 to empower the President to respond to subsequent North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. assets. From 1964 to 1967, the number of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam had escalated from approximately 25,000 to almost 500,000.

Nothing in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution limited that escalation, and over the years Congress continued to provide presidents with the money and manpower to wage the war. Yet it was a different lesson from that experience that provided the true motivation for the WPR: the undeniable reality that it is far more difficult for Congress to force an end to a war than it is to prevent (or limit it) from inception.

Voting to cut off funding for an ongoing conflict is certainly a tool in the congressional arsenal to check presidential assertions of war power, but in the context of ongoing hostilities it is unrealistic to expect it will be useful. To begin with, restricting existing appropriations would require a veto-proof super-majority in both the House and Senate. But even mustering a simple majority to deny a continuation of appropriations for ongoing hostilities is politically unrealistic as it will be perceived as ‘abandoning’ or ‘betraying’ troops in the field.

The conflict in Southeast Asia proved this. Even after Congress revoked the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, it continued to provide fiscal and human resources in support of hostilities. And when service-members asked federal courts to rule that the President lacked constitutional authority to order them to war, judges consistently ruled that this continued support demonstrated joint action by the President and Congress, satisfying the Constitution’s war powers equation. Even when Congress enacted a Bill to cut off all funding for the bombing campaign in support of the Cambodian military’s struggle against the Khmer Rouge, President Nixon’s veto threat and the accordant compromise that extended that funding was enough to lead a federal appeals court to reach the same conclusion. In short, unless Congress could muster a sufficient majority to override a presidential veto and enact law prohibiting continued operations, a president’s unilateral decision to commit the nation to a conflict would effectively put Congress in a straitjacket.

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It was against this background the WPR was enacted. At its foundation is the assertion that the President’s authority to commit “United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” requires either express statutory authorization (a declaration of war or authorization for the use of military force) or “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” As a result, the law includes several essential provisions:

· The President must report any such commitment to congressional leadership within 48 hours.

· Once reported (or when such a report was required), the President has 60 days to persuade Congress to support the operation by enacting express statutory authority.

· If Congress fails to enact such an authorization, the operation must terminate (unless Congress grants the President a 30-day extension to bring the operation to an end).

· Congress may order termination of an operation at any time by concurrent resolution (a majority vote by the Senate and the House with no opportunity for a presidential veto).

· Congressional authorization may not be inferred from any appropriation or other law unless it expressly authorizes the operation.

· Nothing in the WPR – to include the 60-day grace period provision – may be interpreted as a grant of authority to the President to commit U.S. forces to hostilities or imminent hostilities.

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From inception, presidents (and many experts) have criticized the WPR as self-contradictory, most notably because it also includes a provision that indicates nothing in the law “is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President…” These critics argue the law does just that by unconstitutionally intruding upon the inherent war powers vested in the President and the prerogative of Congress to indicate support for presidential war powers initiatives by implication. And there are other defects. For example, the law omitted the well-established inherent authority of presidents to use military force to rescue U.S. nationals abroad (the Senate version included such a provision but it was removed during conference negotiations). And the provision allowing Congress to order termination of an ongoing military operation by concurrent resolution arguably runs afoul of a subsequent Supreme Court decision invalidating what is known as a legislative veto – use of a concurrent resolution to revoke a delegation of authority to the President enacted by law (although there is a question of whether the WPR concurrent resolution provision falls into that category as it is not withdrawing any prior statutory delegation of authority).

And then there is the so-called 60-day clock, perhaps the most misunderstood and at the same time perplexing provision of the law: misunderstood because it is often asserted as a statutory grant of authority to the President to conduct any military operation for up to 60 days (which contradicts Section 8 of the WPR); perplexing because if it is not a grant of authority, then what exactly did it mean?

The answer to the second question is ironically highlighted by the current counter-narcotic military campaign. Because it may not be interpreted as an express grant of constitutional authority to engage in hostilities (or situations of imminent hostilities), it is best understood as a failsafe – an acknowledgment that presidents will likely initiate combat operations on the belief they are acting pursuant to constitutional authority. If they do so, however, the law requires such an assertion of authority be validated by express congressional endorsement within 60 days. If a President is unable to secure such validation, congressional inaction functions as opposition, requiring termination of the operation.

There are, of course, problems with this equation. First, from a president’s perspective, if he is acting pursuant to valid constitutional authority on day 59, how does it evaporate on day 61? And if it was valid on day 59, a mere statute cannot dictate its invalidity. Second, there is something troubling about allowing Congress to require a president to terminate a military operation by inaction. Finally, as noted above, this provision ignores the frequently utilized congressional practice of expressing its support for a presidentially initiated military campaign by implication – primarily through funding and providing necessary resources (including manpower). Examples include not only the Korean War, but also the two post-WPR campaigns that exceeded 60 days without express statutory authorization: the Serbian air campaign in 1999, and the Libyan air campaign in 2011.

Nonetheless, the process of at least seeking congressional endorsement of a military campaign that extends beyond 60 days acknowledges a critically important premise: that the Constitution diffuses war powers between Congress and the President. While the requirement for express statutory authorization may have been constitutionally overbroad from inception of the WPR, seeking some manifestation of congressional support preserves this important war powers balance between the two political branches. Perhaps more importantly, it acknowledges the Congress’ constitutional authority to impose limits on – or even prohibit – commitment of the nation to hostilities.

Instead of acknowledging this shared constitutional role in authorizing war, the Trump administration is staking a claim of unilateral presidential authority. Because we are told there is little risk of U.S. casualties, Congress ostensibly has no role, and the WPR is inapplicable. But it is precisely because, “From small things, big things someday come” that Congress enacted the WPR. Acknowledging a congressional role now – while perhaps not necessarily express authorization – will advance the necessity that the administration make its case for the necessity, morality, and legality of this campaign before the representatives of We the People; give Congress the opportunity to exercise its constitutional role in war powers; and most importantly protect the nation from being dragged, incrementally, into a war Congress may find near impossible to get us out of.

This is a genuine War Powers Resolution moment.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why Are There No U.S. Offensive Cyber Unicorns? https://belimedia.com.ng/why-are-there-no-us-offensive-cyber-unicorns https://belimedia.com.ng/why-are-there-no-us-offensive-cyber-unicorns OPINION -- I recently had a conversation with senior intelligence community leaders about their desire to build stronger partnerships with private-sector technology companies—the so-called “Silicon Valley” ecosystem. They were asking for advice on how to engage, build relationships, and ultimately establish strategic partnerships.

But the companies they were most interested in? They were largely consumer-facing platforms. Innovative, yes—but not mission-aligned. That conversation highlighted a broader, more fundamental gap I’ve been thinking about for a long time: Why are there no U.S. offensive cyber unicorns?

We certainly have defense contractors who do cyber work—on site, on contract, embedded with the government. And we have standout cybersecurity companies like CrowdStrike, Mandiant, and Dragos focused on detection, response, and resilience. But where are the startups building offensive cyber tools and platforms? Where’s the VC-backed innovation model we’ve seen in drones, hypersonics, and space?

Save your virtual seat now for The Cyber Initiatives Group Winter Summit on December 10 from 12p – 3p ET for more conversations on cyber, AI and the future of national security.

Companies like Anduril and SpaceX have proven that Silicon Valley-style innovation—product-focused, capital-efficient, fast-moving—can thrive in the national security space. So why hasn’t that approach been applied to offensive cyber? Yes, there are legal and secrecy constraints. But those same constraints haven’t stopped commercial companies from building weapons systems or highly classified ISR platforms.

Take a look at the NatSec100 - a curated list of top defense and national security startups. You’ll find companies working on AI, autonomy, sensing, and cybersecurity. But not a single one focused on offensive cyber. Why not?

Shouldn’t we want the best minds at CrowdStrike or Mandiant to spin off and build next-generation offensive platforms? Shouldn’t the DOD and IC be seeding these ideas and building an ecosystem that encourages this kind of innovation?

I believe we should.

Follow Bryan on LinkedIn or right here at The Cipher Brief.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
A New Frontline: How Digital Identity Fraud Redefines National Security Threats https://belimedia.com.ng/a-new-frontline-how-digital-identity-fraud-redefines-national-security-threats https://belimedia.com.ng/a-new-frontline-how-digital-identity-fraud-redefines-national-security-threats

DEEP DIVE — From stolen military credentials to AI-generated personas seamlessly breaching critical infrastructure, digital identity fraud is rapidly escalating into a frontline national security threat. This sophisticated form of deception allows adversaries to bypass traditional defenses, making it an increasingly potent weapon.

The 2025 Identity Breach Report, published by AI-driven identity risk firm Constella Intelligence, reveals a staggering increase in the circulation of stolen credentials and synthetic identities. The findings warn that this invisible epidemic, meaning it's harder to detect than traditional malware, or it blends in with legitimate activity, is no longer just a commercial concern—it now poses a serious threat to U.S. national security.

“Identity verification is the foundation of virtually all security systems, digital and physical, and AI is making it easier than ever to undermine this process,” Mike Sexton, a Senior Policy Advisor for AI & Digital Technology at national think tank Third Way, tells The Cipher Brief. “AI makes it easier for attackers to simulate real voices or hack and steal private credentials at unprecedented scale. This is poised to exacerbate the cyberthreats the United States faces broadly, especially civilians, underscoring the danger of Donald Trump’s sweeping job cuts at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.”

The Trump administration’s proposed Fiscal Year 2026 budget would eliminate 1,083 positions at CISA, reducing staffing by nearly 30 percent from roughly 3,732 roles to around 2,649.

Save your virtual seat now for The Cyber Initiatives Group Winter Summit on December 10 from 12p – 3p ET for more conversations on cyber, AI and the future of national security.

The Industrialization of Identity Theft

The Constella report, based on analysis of 80 billion breached records from 2016 to 2024, highlights a growing reliance on synthetic identities—fake personas created from both real and fabricated data. Once limited to financial scams, these identities are now being used for far more dangerous purposes, including espionage, infrastructure sabotage, and disinformation campaigns.

State-backed actors and criminal groups are increasingly using identity fraud to bypass traditional cybersecurity defenses. In one case, hackers used stolen administrator credentials at an energy sector company to silently monitor internal communications for more than a year, mapping both its digital and physical operations.

“In 2024, identity moved further into the crosshairs of cybercriminal operations,” the report states. “From mass-scale infostealer infections to the recycling of decade-old credentials, attackers are industrializing identity compromise with unprecedented efficiency and reach. This year’s data exposes a machine-scale identity threat economy, where automation and near-zero cost tactics turn identities into the enterprise’s most targeted assets.”

Dave Chronister, CEO of Parameter Security and a prominent ethical hacker, links the rise in identity-based threats to broader social changes.

“Many companies operate with teams that have never met face-to-face. Business is conducted over LinkedIn, decisions authorized via messaging apps, and meetings are held on Zoom instead of in physical conference rooms,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “This has created an environment where identities are increasingly accepted at face value, and that’s exactly what adversaries are exploiting.”

When Identities Become Weapons

This threat isn’t hypothetical. In early July, a breach by the China-linked hacking group Volt Typhoon exposed Army National Guard network diagrams and administrative credentials. U.S. officials confirmed the hackers used stolen credentials and “living off the land” techniques—relying on legitimate admin tools to avoid detection.

In the context of cybersecurity, “living off the land” refers to attackers (like the China-linked hacking group Volt Typhoon) don't bring their own malicious software or tools into a compromised network. Instead, they use the legitimate software, tools, and functionalities that are already present on the victim's systems and within their network.

“It’s far more difficult to detect a fake worker or the misuse of legitimate credentials than to flag malware on a network,” Chronister explained.

Unlike traditional identity theft, which hijacks existing identities, synthetic identity fraud creates entirely new ones using a blend of real and fake data—such as Social Security numbers from minors or the deceased. These identities can be used to obtain official documents, government benefits, or even access secure networks while posing as real people.

“Insider threats, whether fully synthetic or stolen identities, are among the most dangerous types of attacks an organization can face, because they grant adversaries unfettered access to sensitive information and systems,” Chronister continued.

Insider threats involve attacks that come from individuals with legitimate access, such as employees or fake identities posing as trusted users, making them harder to detect and often more damaging.

Constella reports these identities are 20 times harder to detect than traditional fraud. Once established with a digital history, a synthetic identity can even appear more trustworthy than a real person with limited online presence.

“GenAI tools now enable foreign actors to communicate in pitch-perfect English while adopting realistic personas. Deepfake technology makes it possible to create convincing visual identities from just a single photo,” Chronister said. “When used together, these technologies blur the line between real and fake in ways that legacy security models were never designed to address.”

Washington Lags Behind

U.S. officials acknowledge that the country remains underprepared. Multiple recent hearings and reports from the Department of Homeland Security and the House Homeland Security Committee have flagged digital identity as a growing national security vulnerability—driven by threats from China, transnational cybercrime groups, and the rise of synthetic identities.

The committee has urged urgent reforms, including mandatory quarterly “identity hygiene” audits for organizations managing critical infrastructure, modernized authentication protocols, and stronger public-private intelligence sharing.

Meanwhile, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2025 Global Threat Assessment warns:

“Advanced technology is also enabling foreign intelligence services to target our personnel and activities in new ways. The rapid pace of innovation will only accelerate in the coming years, continually generating means for our adversaries to threaten U.S. interests.”

An intelligence official not authorized to speak publicly told The Cipher Brief that identity manipulation will increasingly serve as a primary attack vector to exploit political divisions, hijack supply chains, or infiltrate democratic processes.

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Private Sector on the Frontline

For now, much of the responsibility falls on private companies—especially those in banking, healthcare, and energy. According to Constella, nearly one in three breaches last year targeted sectors classified as critical infrastructure.

“It's never easy to replace a core technology, particularly in critical infrastructure sectors. That’s why these systems often stay in place for many years if not decades,” said Chronister.

Experts warn that reacting to threats after they’ve occurred is no longer sufficient. Companies must adopt proactive defenses, including constant identity verification, behavioral analytics, and zero-trust models that treat every user as untrusted by default.

However, technical upgrades aren’t enough. Sexton argues the United States needs a national digital identity framework that moves beyond outdated systems like Social Security numbers and weak passwords.

“The adherence to best-in-class identity management solutions is critical. In practice for the private sector, this means relying on trusted third parties like Google, Meta, Apple, and others for identity verification,” he explained. “For the U.S. government, these are systems like REAL ID, ID.me, and Login.gov. We must also be mindful that heavy reliance on these identity hubs creates concentration risk, making their security a critical national security chokepoint.”

Building a National Identity Defense

Some progress is underway. The federal Login.gov platform is expanding its fraud prevention capabilities, with plans to incorporate Mobile Driver’s Licenses and biometric logins by early 2026. But implementation remains limited in scale, and many agencies still rely on outdated systems that don’t support basic protections like multi-factor authentication.

“I would like to see the US government further develop and scale solutions like Login.gov and ID.me and then interoperate with credit agencies and law enforcement to respond to identity theft in real time,” Sexton said. “While securing those systems will always be a moving target, users’ data is ultimately safer in the hands of a well-resourced public entity than in those of private firms already struggling to defend their infrastructure.”

John Dwyer, Deputy CTO of Binary Defense and former Head of Research at IBM X-Force, agreed that a unified national system is needed.

“The United States needs a national digital identity framework—but one built with a balance of security, privacy, and interoperability,” Dwyer told The Cipher Brief. “As threat actors increasingly target digital identities to compromise critical infrastructure, the stakes for getting identity right have never been higher.”

He emphasized that any framework must be built on multi-factor authentication, phishing resistance, cryptographic proofs, and decentralized systems—not centralized databases.

“Public-private collaboration is crucial: government agencies can serve as trusted identity verification sources (e.g., DMV, passport authorities), while the private sector can drive innovation in delivery and authentication,” Dwyer added. “A governance board with cross-sector representation should oversee policy and trust models.”

Digital identities are no longer just a privacy concern—they’re weapons, vulnerabilities, and battlegrounds in 21st-century conflict. As foreign adversaries grow more sophisticated and U.S. defenses lag behind, the question is no longer if, but how fast America can respond.

The question now is whether the United States can shift fast enough to keep up.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
From the Caribbean to Jalisco, Trump Takes Aim at Cartels — But Will He Strike the Kingpins? https://belimedia.com.ng/from-the-caribbean-to-jalisco-trump-takes-aim-at-cartels-but-will-he-strike-the-kingpins https://belimedia.com.ng/from-the-caribbean-to-jalisco-trump-takes-aim-at-cartels-but-will-he-strike-the-kingpins

DEEP DIVE — Eight weeks ago, Secretary of State Marco Rubio went to Mexico City, the epicenter of the global illegal drug trade, and declared, “The president of the United States is going to wage war on narco-terrorist organizations.”

Since then, the administration’s military counter-drug offensive in Latin America and the Caribbean has destroyed at least 15 small boats and killed at least 61 people – but none of them were drug kingpins or senior, irreplaceable figures in the transnational organized crime cartels that make and move fentanyl and other lethal opioids that have killed hundreds of thousands of Americans.

“Targeting fast boat operators will not stop major drug trafficking kingpins from sending multi-ton quantities of drugs to our country and around the world,” Michael Chavarria, a former DEA supervisor who spent 26 years investigating drug cartels in Mexico, the Caribbean and the Southwest border, told The Cipher Brief. “The drug trade is the most profitable business in the world, without equal. The minions currently targeted on the high seas will continue risking their lives because kingpins pay them more than they could ever earn pursuing legal options. Now, on the high seas, they’re being extrajudicially murdered, in a campaign that will have no impact on the global drug trade.”

Like other veterans of the DEA, Chavarria suspects that if the boats blown up so far contained contraband, it was likely marijuana or cocaine, a stimulant manufactured in Colombia from coca plants grown in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Many of the small boats plying the Caribbean are believed to be supplying the European market, where cocaine brings double or triple U.S. prices. While hardly benign, cocaine is not considered a major overdose danger, and it has fallen out of fashion among many American drug users, who have increasingly turned to far riskier substances — particularly fentanyl, a synthetic opioid painkiller much stronger than heroin, and the synthetic stimulant methamphetamine. Both are manufactured mostly in Mexico, in cartel “superlabs,” with precursor chemicals imported from China and India.

“I doubt these decisions [to attack small boats] involve input from DEA leadership, who I believe serve the American public as best as resources allow,” Chavarria said. “Instead, let’s focus on the Chinese fentanyl sources responsible for threatening our citizens’ lives. The new deadly triangle is China-Mexico-United States.”

Despite objections from Congress, legal scholars and foreign governments, President Trump has announced he may soon authorize strikes inside Venezuela. Many experts believe his agenda in that country is about forcing President Nicolas Maduro out of office, rather than stopping drugs, because Venezuela is not known for producing massive quantities of illegal drugs. The U.S. government's most authoritative annual intelligence assessments – the Drug Enforcement Administration’s National Drug Threat Assessment and the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – characterize Venezuela as a transshipment hub. Maduro himself and a number current and former Venezuelan officials were indicted in 2020 for conspiring with Colombia’s leftist FARC insurgents to transport cocaine produced in the leftist guerillas’ jungle labs in Colombia.

The problem is in Mexico

The world’s richest, most powerful drug lords are Mexican citizens, with well-armed private armies, dynasties and bases of operations nestled deep in the Mexican countryside. Mexican president Claudia Sheinbaum has absolutely ruled out the idea of American boots on Mexican soil. Will the U.S. defy her wishes by ordering American armed drones or special operations teams into Mexico to conduct unilateral commando raids? So far, Trump and his senior advisors have not signaled that such incursions are imminent – but they’ve never said never. In Ecuador two months ago, Rubio said the administration would continue to target and kill suspected traffickers without their homelands’ consent, if those countries didn’t participate in Trump’s new war on cartels by mounting their own attacks on cartels. “For cooperative governments, there’s no need because those governments are going to help us,” he said. “They’re going to help us find these people and blow them up, if that’s what it takes.”

Mexican security forces have repeatedly tried and failed to arrest El Mencho, real name Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, Mexico’s kingpin of kingpins. Oseguera is the 59-year-old founder and leader of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Mexico’s, and the world's most successful and feared organized crime enterprise. The CJNG, which emerged from the western state of Michoacán, famed for its avocados, is now a multinational billion-dollar business with a presence in nearly every state in the U.S.and at least 40 countries, according to DEA’s National Drug Threat Assessment. The U.S. has put a $15 million bounty on Oseguera’s head.

“The CJNG is probably the wealthiest criminal group in the world, maybe even more than the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] in Iran,” Paul Craine, formerly DEA’s regional director for Mexico, Central America, and Canada, told The Cipher Brief. “It’s the biggest terrorist organization in the Western hemisphere. The CJNG is now right on the border, which no one ever expected. Plus, they have the U.S. infiltrated with their elements for smuggling guns, drugs and other businesses.”

Reward poster for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of “El Mencho”. (State Department)

In second place is the older, fragmented but still powerful Sinaloa cartel. Sinaloa cartel leaders Ivan Archivaldo Guzmán Salazar and Jesus Alfredo Guzmán Salazar, known as the Chapitos, are sons of the infamous cartel founder Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, now serving time in a U.S. prison. They are credited with creating the fentanyl craze by promoting it in their distribution systems, alongside cocaine, meth and marijuana. The U.S. is offering rewards of $10 million apiece for them.

In an interview with The Cipher Brief, Rep. Dan Crenshaw, R-Tex., who recently led the Congressional task force on cartels to Mexico to confer with Sheinbaum’s senior security officials, said he would not advise Trump to try a unilateral incursion on Mexican soil without that nation’s full agreement and active participation. Such an act would explicitly violate the two nations’ joint agreement signed last month pledging “respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Both nations promised to fight drug trafficking and other crimes “each in our own territory,” Mexican foreign secretary foreign secretary Juan Ramon de la Fuente emphasized.

To dismantle the cartels and destroy their sanctuaries in Mexico, Crenshaw, a former lieutenant commander in the Navy SEALs, and other members of Congress are pushing for a massive joint U.S.-Mexico initiative modeled on the U.S.-Colombian military-intelligence relationship in the 1990s and early 2000s. In those operations, Colombian commandos were the point of the spear, with advisors and trainers from U.S. special operations, the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration working behind the scenes, providing training, communications intercepts, human intelligence, tracking technology, financial analyses and other technical assistance. As a result, in 1993, the joint effort tracked signals from a radio phone wielded by legendary Medellin cartel founder Pablo Escobar to the roof of a dingy building in downtown Medellin. A Colombian military marksman shot him dead. The rest of the Medellin cartel crumbled. By 1995, the Cali cartel had fallen. Leftist FARC guerillas soon stepped into the breach by setting up jungle labs and taking over the cocaine manufacturing business. The CIA covertly supplied U.S.-made precision-guided munitions that the Colombians used in a series of air strikes that decimated the FARC leadership. In 2016, surviving FARC guerillas made a peace accord with Bogotá and agreed to demobilize.

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What the fight would look like

Any commando team that tries to take on Mexico’s drug bosses and their large, well-armed paramilitary forces can expect ferocious resistance financed by very deep pockets. CJNG territory covers thousands of square miles in the western Mexican state of Michoacán, where Oseguera was born, and in neighboring Jalisco state. His domain is rugged countryside, dotted with ranches and laced with hidden trails, caves and mines. Oseguera has even built his own hospital, according to DEA intelligence, so he can undergo treatment for chronic kidney disease.

The Chapitos are similarly well-protected in Sinaloa state. Experts warn that a joint Mexican-U.S. special operations assault would raise the specter of possible “blue-on-blue”or “green-on-green” firefight with corrupt elements of Mexico’s security forces defending the narco leaders. “They travel in hordes of security,” says a senior DEA agent who has investigated them for many years. “And not just hordes of security, but you're talking about a paid-off military that's protecting them, paid-off police protecting them. The corruption is just so rampant, and this is why a lot of these people can't get caught.”

“Whether you call it counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, that is what we're dealing with in Mexico,” Crenshaw told the Cipher Brief. “They use terroristic tactics. They terrorize their own people. They are an insurgency, in the sense that they're integrated into every level of society, from government to their own military, to security, to pop culture… The Mexican military has some very, very elite units that I think would be respected anywhere in the world. But there's not many of them. They need more, and additional training, additional pipelines into those elite units. Basic aircraft, ISR [intelligence surveillance reconnaissance], close air support, things that are largely lacking. When they do go into these very dangerous areas and try to go after some of these dangerous kingpins, they're doing so without the kind of support that U.S. special operations would be used to.”

Violence on the Mexico-United States border continues to rise. Just 10 days into the month, nearly 21 homicides are recorded. On Monday, March 10, seven people are shot and killed in separate incidents. Violence on the Mexico-United States border continues to rise. Just 10 days into the month, nearly 21 homicides are recorded. On Monday, March 10, seven people are shot and killed in separate incidents. (Photo by David Peinado/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

The CJNG’s defenses are considered particularly militarized and formidable. According to current and former U.S. officials who have investigated the cartel, Mencho roams about his domain via four-wheel-drive convoys or small aircraft, always surrounded by large numbers of heavily-armed paramilitary fighters who wear insignia identifying them as FEM, Fuerzas Especiales Mencho or Grupo X, which specializes in fighting rival cartels. Like Osama Bin Laden, he avoids using phones and instead uses messengers.

For a commando team, armed drone or precision-guided munition to find Mencho and his party, precise GPS coordinates would be needed, and they’ll be hard to come by.

“He moves pretty often,” a U.S. expert who has recently assessed the kingpin’s vulnerabilities told The Cipher Brief. “So the intelligence on his location would have to be extremely good. Which it’s not.”

Whether surveillance drones could obtain reliable coordinates on Mencho’s position in real time is questionable. “Where Mencho is hiding they can hear drones coming,” the U.S. expert said. “It’s so quiet out there there’s no noise pollution. They’ve been successfully avoiding SEMAR’s drones for years.” SEMAR is U.S. military shorthand for a Mexican navy/marines special operations unit that has trained with the U.S. Navy SEALs and worked closely with the U.S.

The cartel has its own drone unit, called the Operadores Droneros, complete with badges. Cartel operatives also set up security cameras, like hunting cameras, to detect the presence of outsiders.

“They have a lot of early warning capability,” said Chavarria, who used to run the DEA’s office in Guadalajara, the capital of Jalisco, then ran investigations of the Gulf cartel out of Houston. “I don't think that we have the type of precise intelligence that would allow us to effect an operation. And even if it's available, it's time-sensitive, it's perishable. If you're not there on top of your objective, you're going to miss. And then there's going to be gunfights and a lot of innocent people are going to get killed. Mencho hangs out in cities, he bounces around because he's untouchable. He's got police escorts, he's got state cops and municipal cops protecting him. His men have ringed perimeters of security, where they're communicating with one another on various frequencies that are digitally encrypted. So it's very difficult for the U.S. to crack those encryptions, and obviously for the Mexican security forces as well.”

According to Chavarria and other current and former officials, the CJNG has extensive counter-surveillance capabilities. Cartel security officers, known as sicarios, literally, assassins, issue mobile phones with heavily encrypted voice-over-internet and radio-over-internet apps to hundreds of human lookouts, called halcones, meaning hawks, spies, who are under orders to report any any strangers showing up in cartel territory.

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Mexican security forces have been driven back every time they’ve tried to get close to Mencho. Notoriously, on May 1, 2015, a Mexican military helicopter that flew over his convoy in Jalisco state was shot down by the cartel paramilitary force with an Iranian-made rocket-propelled grenade and .50 caliber belt-fed machine gun. Nine Mexican soldiers and federal police died, and others were severely wounded. Rubén Oseguera González, AKA Menchito, Mencho’s California-born son and second-in-command, then 25, was accused of ordering the attack on the helicopter. The Mexican military and police mounted a massive operation to track him to a wealthy suburb of Guadalajara. Menchito was extradited to Los Angeles, prosecuted for violating U.S. drug laws, convicted last September and on March 7, sentenced to life plus 30 years in a U.S. prison.

The U.S. victory was short-lived. Mencho’s stepson Juan Carlos Valencia González, a California-born U.S. citizen who is the son of Oseguera’s wife, Rosalinda González Valencia and has emerged as Mencho’s heir-apparent. A leader in the cartel’s elite commando force, he’s known as R-3. The U.S. is offering a $5 million reward for him. ( His mother Rosalinda, AKA La Jefa, comes from a powerful cartel dynasty, the Valencias. Her uncle is Armando Valencia, AKA El Maradona, founder of the Milenio Cartel, the predecessor of the CJNG. A major player in her own right, Rosalinda spent time in a Mexican prison for money laundering but was released last February, according to news reports in Mexico.)

Sheinbaum has convinced many in Washington that she is sincere in her determination to break the power of the cartels, especially the CJNG, which has menaced her administration unceasingly.

In 2020, Sheinbaum’s trusted advisor Omar García Harfuch, then Mexico City’s chief of police, narrowly survived a CJNG assasination attempt. Sheinbaum was Mexico City’s mayor at the time. When Sheinbaum became president in October 2024, she named Harfuch national security minister and accelerated military raids on CJNG labs and other sites.

But so far, the cartel has proved stronger. Last March, Mexican soldiers and national guardsmen driving in a convoy near CJNG territory on the border between Jalisco and Michoacán states were ambushed, and six security force officers and three CJNG hitmen were killed. Three days later, security forces in the area were again ambushed, two of their number killed and the rest forced to retreat.

On May 1, exactly 10 years to the day after the helicopter downing, Oseguera staged a flamboyant retribution for the incarceration of his son Menchito. Iván Morales Corrales, a Mexican policeman who survived the crash, badly burned, was decorated as a national hero and testified against Menchito in the U.S. trial in Los Angeles, was gunned down with his wife while driving on a quiet street in a town far from the CJNG’s turf. This was an unmistakable statement that the cartel could reach anyone, anywhere, anytime.

JULY 15: David Cristobal Barraza Sainz, known as Commander "Nitro" within the Sinaloa State Police, was shot and killed after an attack that took place on Pedro Infante Boulevard at around 1:00 p.m in Sinaloa, Mexico on July 15, 2025. David Cristobal Barraza Sainz, known as Commander "Nitro" within the Sinaloa State Police, was shot and killed after an attack that took place on Pedro Infante Boulevard at around 1:00 p.m in Sinaloa, Mexico on July 15, 2025. (Photo by Stringer/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Derek Maltz, who served as DEA administrator until June and before that ran the agency’s elite Special Operations Division for a decade, believes that if the Mexican army fails to mount more operations against the CJNG and other cartel strongholds, the Trump team will seriously consider unilateral operations, despite Sheinbaum’s vocal objections. “If the U.S. government doesn't perceive that Mexico has the will or capabilities to literally take them off the playing field, I wouldn't be surprised that the administration is looking at targeted strikes on the [cartel] leadership,” Maltz told The Cipher Brief. “ I would personally encourage it. The president has made it clear that he's going to place American families first, trying to keep everyone safe and secure. So if it means taking out some kingpins in the narco-terrorist world, I would fully support that.”

As a practical matter, a raid or two wouldn’t solve the problem. Mexico’s cartels, like major corporations, could survive the loss of a few key executives. “Killing Mencho would be significant, but it's not going to take out the organization,” Craine said. “You're going to have to have sustained operations against the whole network.”

A global syndicate of evil

The CJNG has built out a complicated and durable executive structure in recent years as it has gone global and diversified.

“Mencho is expanding around the world,” Maltz told The Cipher Brief. He and his allies “have recognized the threat to their business enterprise with the increased attention by the Trump administration. So they're adjusting strategies, realigning, identifying new partnerships, being strategic in some of their global routes and capitalizing on the market in different areas of the world.” Maltz and other DEA veterans say Mencho has cemented international alliances with organized crime syndicates, from motorcycle gangs in the U.S to the Japanese Yakuza. When the profits to be made from human trafficking dwindled due to the Trump administration’s crackdown on the border, the CJNG developed other robust cash streams, including stealing fuel from the Mexican oil company PEMEX and other energy outlets, extorting avocado farmers, and even smuggling mercury, a pricey, poisonous by-product of gold-mining, according to the DEA and news reports.

“The CJNG is the first international criminal conglomerate,” Craine said. “It’s the first ICC to operate worldwide and to have criminal control of legal commodities and services as well, such as oil, gasoline, minerals, chemicals, timber, government funding, infrastructure and resources, armed forces, weapons, politics, police services, judicial systems, international financial services, and so forth.”

What’s most alarming is the significant CJNG and Sinaloa cartel presence in the U.S.

“What we face today in Southern California is a full-scale infiltration by foreign criminal empires, the Sinaloa cartel and the Jalisco New Generation cartel – paramilitary organizations with global supply chains, corporate level logistics, and battlefield tactics,” Matthew Allen, DEA’s chief of operations, told the Senate Judiciary committee last June.

Allen testified that a few weeks earlier, a DEA team had raided an old warehouse in downtown Los Angeles, a few blocks from the agency’s big Southern California office. Hidden inside, the agents discovered, was a luxurious CJNG safe house with places for cartel operatives to lounge, a pool table, polished floors and, presiding over it all, a floor-to-ceiling mural of El Mencho, depicted in a bulletproof vest emblazoned with the CJNG insignia and Mencho’s personal symbol, a bloody cockfight.

It was, Allen said, “a shrine, not hidden in the jungle or some remote compound but right in the heart of the heart of America’s second-largest city. The message was clear: ‘We are here. We are among you’.”

Image of Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación safe house in Los Angeles.(DEA Official)

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Putin’s Strategic Failure: How the Ukraine War Is Eroding Russia From Within https://belimedia.com.ng/putins-strategic-failure-how-the-ukraine-war-is-eroding-russia-from-within https://belimedia.com.ng/putins-strategic-failure-how-the-ukraine-war-is-eroding-russia-from-within And there is one sure thing about the fall of gods: they do not fall a little; they crash and shatter or sink deeply into green muck.

- John Steinbeck, East of Eden

Evil people don’t have songs. How is it, then, that the Russians have songs?

- Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

OPINION -- The war that Russian President Vladimir Putin started in Ukraine may finally be turning in a direction that will result in Russia’s defeat as the strategic tide seems to be turning against Putin.

Russian casualties in Ukraine continue to mount as the Ukrainians are now effectively taking the war to the Russian Federation. Russia’s wartime economy is starting to show signs of strain, and evidence may be emerging that discontent with Putin leadership is starting to grow in some of Moscow’s elite circles.

One hopes that when he returns from his Asia trip, President Trump will turn his focus to the actions of his erstwhile friend Putin. This is a good time to soberly assess Russia and Putin’s current situation and the prospect that Russia might be on a path to losing the war they started.

In recent weeks, there have been a number of reported incidents of Russian drone and aircraft incursions over neighboring states, including the airspace of NATO members. In an escalation of nuclear saber rattling, Putin has tested a Burevestnik cruise missile, a Poseidon nuclear capable “super-torpedo” and conducted large-scale nuclear drills.

These are signs of weakness not strength and are certainly designed to intimidate leaders in the West—including President Trump—to reduce military and economic support to Ukraine. Putin’s strategy with regard to Trump again seems to have backfired with Trump announcing that the U.S. will resume nuclear testing after a pause of more than thirty years.

President Trump also made public the fact that the U.S. has nuclear capable submarines stationed off Russia’s coast. This is not the revelation of a strategic or military secret — just a reminder to Putin (and Russia’s elites) that the U.S. is a strategic nuclear power and Putin’s use of a nuclear weapon would result in the destruction of the Russian Federation and his kleptocracy.

Some Ukrainian leaders believe that there is a number of Russian casualties they can inflict that would bring about the collapse in the fighting effectiveness of the Russian army in Ukraine. While hard data on Russian casualties is difficult to gather, credible estimates put Russian combat deaths at over 200,000 and total casualties at over 1.1 million - many of those killed in 2025 as a result of Russia’s strategy of fighting a war of attrition using outmoded tactics to gain territory that can be measured in tens of kilometers.

Ukrainian leaders also believe that taking the war to the Russian people will have an impact on Moscow’s ability to sustain the invasion. Ukraine has done this effectively in recent months, even without Tomahawks.

Ukraine has used targeting data and weapons supplied by the West (Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles and ATACMs) to strike targets deep inside of Russia. These weapons combined with Ukrainian long-range drone capabilities (and ingenious operations such as SPIDER WEB) are taking the fight to the Russian Federation and making the war visible to the average Russian, despite efforts by Russian state-controlled media to push the false narrative that Russia is winning the war.

The economic impact of strikes against Russian energy infrastructure is beginning to be felt outside of Moscow as Russia diverts available energy from the regions to keep Moscow supplied. There are shortages and energy price hikes that the Kremlin can no longer conceal.

Russia’s economy is also suffering the impact of more effective and comprehensive sanctions on Russian energy production and sales. European purchases of Russian hydrocarbons are diminishing and the U.S. has levied new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil and a number of their subsidiaries. This will have an impact on the network of oligarchs that support Putin. Inflation is also rising at an 8 percent increase year on year. There is scarcity of critical parts affecting the production of things like automobiles, aircraft and consumer appliances. It is only technology provided by China that keeps Russia’s defense industrial base functioning.

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Even this may be less sustainable in the long run if there is any truth to reports that Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping had productive conversations on ending the war. (I’m personally skeptical that Xi will do much to disappoint his partner and friend, Putin.)

There are also unconfirmed reports of growing discontent among Russian elites. A number of media sources now suggest that Mikhail Khordokovsky may be trying to organize a coup to remove Putin from power. It was only about 18 months ago that Yevgeniy Prigozhin launched a rebellion that saw his forces moving with surprising speed and success toward Moscow. Apparently in some circles in Russia, Putin is derisively referred to as the “moth.” And since Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, an estimated one million Russians, mostly youth, have emigrated, creating a brain drain and, together with military casualties, exacerbating a labor shortage.

The situation is increasingly bleak. Finland and Sweden have joined NATO - turning the Baltic into a NATO lake. Ukrainian strikes have driven Russia’s Black Sea fleet from the eastern reaches of the Black Sea undermining Russian naval power. Europe is rearming and defense spending in NATO states is moving toward compliance with Treaty requirements or beyond. The alliance itself has been given new purpose.

Putin has destroyed any possibility of peaceful accommodation with Ukraine and in the process, has created a nation that will move inexorably toward a Western political and economic model. This is a strategic failure of Putin’s that cannot be undone.

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In other areas of the former Soviet Union, Russian influence continues to wane.

Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed to a U.S.-brokered peace agreement. Kazakhstan is showing new political and economic independence. Putin’s ally Iran has suffered significant setbacks at the hands of U.S. ally Israel. Putin’s friend and supporter Bashar al Assad lost his hold on power in Syria and is in hiding in Moscow. The U.S. has led peace efforts in the Middle East as Moscow has been sidelined.

Now is the time for decisive action to end the conflict in Ukraine.

The action needs to take place on three levels: political, economic and military.

As discussed at the recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference in Sea Island, Georgia, the West has yet to meaningfully coalesce international political support behind Ukraine beyond gatherings of European and or NATO leaders. The U.S. should sponsor a global meeting of heads of states from around the world to decisively declare support for Ukraine, brand Russia and Putin as the aggressor in the conflict, and call for Russian withdrawal, payment of reparations for war damage and remand war criminals to justice. The simple message should be, “Mr. Putin, end this war!”

Secondly, the U.S. and the West need to increase further pressure on Russia’s economy to weaken Russia’s ability to prosecute the war.

And thirdly, military support to Ukraine needs to be increased, particularly in air defense technology and the delivery of systems that allow Ukraine to continue to take the war to the Russian Federation and make Russians feel the pain of the conflict. A concerted effort on these fronts will almost certainly lead to Putin’s demise and the end of the war.

Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov constantly talk about the need to address the ”root causes” of the conflict. Quite simply, Putin is the root cause of the conflict and addressing his delusions of empire is the surest way to end it. That can’t come soon enough for the brave people of Ukraine and the world.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Former GCHQ Chief: Cybersecurity, AI, and the New Age of Multilateral Defense https://belimedia.com.ng/former-gchq-chief-cybersecurity-ai-and-the-new-age-of-multilateral-defense https://belimedia.com.ng/former-gchq-chief-cybersecurity-ai-and-the-new-age-of-multilateral-defense EXPERT INTERVIEW — The last few months have seen a series of major cyber incidents which have frozen airports, crippled companies, compromised government systems, and stolen millions from unwitting victims. Cyber leaders are warning that the threat is being worsened as hackers leverage new technology like artificial intelligence for more potent attacks.

The Cipher Brief spoke with Robert Hannigan, who served as Director of GCHQ, the UK’s largest intelligence agency, which provides signals intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance (IA), about the nature of the cyber threat, and why everything from supply chain security to cross-sector cooperation is needed for a strong defense. We caught up with him from Riyadh’s Global Cybersecurity Forum (GCF).

The Cipher Brief: I'm curious if you could tell us right off the top, with so many different countries represented, so many different areas of expertise, what is the buzz there, Robert? What are people really most concerned about?

Hannigan: I think the big cyber incidents happening in the Middle East and Europe in recent months, particularly ransomware as a service, so big names like Jaguar Land Rover and others, have kind of given this meeting an extra buzz just before we met. Quite a few people flew in from airports that have been affected by the supply chain attack on baggage handling software. So it was very relevant and topical.

I think that's touched on a broader theme for the last couple of days, which is about supply chain. This is a global supply chain in many cases. So how do we secure that? It's a challenge, but it's no longer enough for companies or governments to secure their own perimeters. They have to worry about the tens of thousands of suppliers and vendors attached to them, their ecosystem, if you like. So regulators are getting there, and the EU has already regulated this and said we're all responsible. Other countries like the UK are getting there. So I think supply chain has been a big theme.

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The Cipher Brief: Ransomware supply chain has been around forever. They're very difficult in their own right, but now we're looking at a world where AI is impacting everything. How concerned are you about that?

Hannigan: I'm really concerned that we don't repeat the mistakes of the past with AI. So as we rush to adopt AI and to use it in our applications across business and government, can we make sure we do it securely? We learned the lessons of cybersecurity because we're all paying the price in a way for 20, 30 years of building a digital economy on software, particularly, but also hardware that was not designed with security in mind. So again, regulators are getting there. They're mandating Secure by Design in most countries, but that's going to take years to follow through. So can we make sure that when we adopt AI, we're doing it safely and securely? And I think there are some big risks in AI, particularly in data poisoning.

The Cipher Brief: Sam Altman did an interview just recently saying the horse is out of the barn, so to speak. And he's not even sure where this is going when it comes to building in kind of more secure ethical processes into using AI.

You sat on a panel there talking about converging crises, the future of cyberspace and complex global dynamics. And boy, are they complex. I'm really curious to hear how all of these different countries are coming together to talk about working together in cyber when some of the countries have closer relationships to China than other countries do. How are you looking at that complex landscape for both risk and opportunity?

Hannigan: It’s a great question. I think the other theme of these last two days has been multilateralism under pressure. This is not a great time for cooperation between states. And that's a problem for cyber because as you know, from your background, cyber is a team sport. You can't do this within one country. And so we really need to approach this multilaterally. I think on our panel this morning, we weren't pessimistic. Yes, it's difficult in geopolitical terms, but actually it's in everyone's interests to try and secure cyberspace. And there are plenty of initiatives going across countries that are working. Secure by Design is one, trying to improve the standard of secure software development. Some of the security work on AI is going across countries. So I haven't given up hope on that working, but it's really essential and why it's great to have people from all over the world at this kind of meeting.

The Cipher Brief: One of the other things I always love to ask you about because it's always extremely relevant is the relationships with the private sector. As former head of GCHQ, this is something that you're very close to. You have a deep understanding of what needs to happen to make these work. How do you take private sector-government relationships in one country and then sort of scale that, if you will, with other trusted partners?

Hannigan: I think it's a great question. I think The Cipher Brief is a great example of an organization that's tried to bring together government and companies in a really effective way. I've just come from the UK where I've done lots of interviews on our recent big retail, ransomware attacks, Jaguar Land Rover and others. It's striking that people still expect government to be able to defend everybody. We all know that that's just not possible.

Government has very limited resources; it can advise, it can regulate. But actually it's up to the private sector companies to defend themselves and to prepare for resilience. And one of the frustrating things for me is that this is possible, this is an achievable goal. We hear about the failures, but actually there are thousands of companies protecting themselves very well and preparing for resilience in case there is an attack so they can contain it and get back up and running very quickly. So there are a lot of people doing the right thing, some people who aren't, and we need to help them get better.

The Cipher Brief: I think you're absolutely right in saying that some of these larger companies that really have the resources to put into cybersecurity and information sharing have a lot more responsibility on their shoulders than those medium and smaller companies which sort of have to wait to see what comes down to them.

Have you been involved in any conversations there that have surprised you or made you think differently about any part of what you focus on every day when it comes to cybersecurity and all of these complex issues?

Hannigan: I think we've had a really good conversation about the positive lessons coming out of Ukraine. And Chris Inglis, who you know very well, was talking about this on his panel. And I think it's a really good point that there are so many positive things coming out of that terrible situation in Ukraine on the cyber side. So why has Ukraine managed to keep going in cyberspace to resist this avalanche of attacks coming from Russia? It's because they've had a partnership with private sector companies, big tech and small companies, with allied countries, in Europe and the U.S. in particular, and there has been a coalition of defense. And there's something really interesting there about the model for how if you get together, private and public, across different allies, you really can defend. And as Chris and one or two others put it, defense is the new attack. It's really powerful when you do it properly.

The Cipher Brief: That was such an interesting time when the full scale invasion started because you did see it's a volunteer army of all of these companies. And the important thing I think to look at there is it was very values based. That landscape is also changing. Are you concerned at all about that in the future?

Hannigan: I think we're all concerned about polarization and some of those companies being torn between East and West and, as you say, closer to China or indeed closer to Russia. I think what's powerful though in Ukraine is they not only used companies and, as you say, volunteers, they also looked to their own citizens and they used very talented people, whatever their backgrounds, to get involved in this great effort to defend Ukraine. So you can achieve good things if you can organize people together. And it's amazing they're still up and running.

And it’s also a victory for cloud. I remember 10 years ago when governments were very nervous about putting anything in the cloud. Ukraine's a great example of where cloud has saved them essentially by putting stuff outside the country. They've managed to keep going and that's impressive and a great vote of confidence.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Trump’s Trip Was a True “Pivot” to East Asia https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-trip-was-a-true-pivot-to-east-asia https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-trip-was-a-true-pivot-to-east-asia OPINION — President Trump’s meetings in East Asia last week did more to enhance our relationship with a few allies and partners in the region than the past fifteen years of talking about a “pivot to Asia”.

Yes, showing the flag and having the President interact with counterparts is an important part of diplomacy, at the highest level. It has impact because it shows that the U.S. cares about allies and partners, that the U.S. values this relationship and will be there for allies and partners, regardless of the cost.

So, Mr. Trump’s visit to the region was more than tariffs and trade. It was about relationships that principally deal with national security,

Mr. Trump’s meetings with Japan’s new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, and South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung were particularly noteworthy. The U.S. and Japan signed security and economic measures – and a Memorandum of Cooperation – to expand cooperation on shipbuilding and critical-minerals supply chains, an apparent initiative to reduce reliance on China for rare earth and other critical minerals. More importantly, it established a relationship with Japan’s new prime minister that will ensure we remain close allies.

With South Korea, U.S. approval to develop nuclear-powered submarines using U.S. technology and facilities was a major U.S. decision, with South Korea joining a select few states that operate nuclear-propulsion submarines. There are a few particulars related to the fuel and safeguard agreements that will have to be addressed, but the bottom line is that South Korea, within a few years, will have nuclear-powered submarines (with conventional weapons), a major enhancement of their deterrent capabilities. South Korea also committed to purchasing large quantities of U.S. energy – oil and gas – and a $350 billion trade and investment agreement.

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The highly touted meeting of Mr. Trump with Chinese President Xi Jinping was important because it happened, while underwhelming for the substantive progress. Yes, China did agree to resume purchasing U.S. soybeans and agreed to suspend planned export restrictions on rare earth minerals for one year, while also committing to greater cooperation on the trafficking of fentanyl precursor chemicals into the U.S. In return, the U.S. reduced tariffs on Chinese products from 57% to 47%.

The U.S. also said it discussed the possible sale of U.S. computer chips to China, although not the newest AI chips. For many, Mr. Trump’s announcement that he will visit China in April 2026, with a subsequent trip to the U.S. by Mr. Xi was welcomed by many, hoping that a more robust dialogue with China would be in our respective countries’ interest.

Interestingly, there was no mention of Taiwan or potential conflict in the South China Sea. Apparently, the Trump-Xi meeting dealt exclusively with trade and fentanyl-related issues. Or, if these issues were discussed, both agreed that there would be no public statement documenting these discussions.

Mr. Trump’s visit to Malaysia, Japan and South Korea was an important visit of a U.S. president who prides himself on being a peacemaker. In Malaysia Mr. Trump witnessed the signing of a peace accord between Cambodia and Thailand that he personally brokered. Indeed, that’s how Mr. Trump started his five-day trip to East Asia. He ended it with a request that the U.S. and China help end the war in Ukraine. This has been a heavy lift for the U.S. and Mr. Trump personally, who tried to end this war. It’s also a challenge for China, given that China continues to buy Russian oil, and reportedly provides machine tools, semiconductors and other dual-use items that help Russia rebuild its defense industry.

Mr. Trump’s trip to East Asia was a success, especially for what he accomplished in South Korea and Japan.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Can High&Tech “Sensor Fusion” Revolutionize Biosurveillance? https://belimedia.com.ng/can-high-tech-sensor-fusion-revolutionize-biosurveillance https://belimedia.com.ng/can-high-tech-sensor-fusion-revolutionize-biosurveillance

DEEP DIVE – It’s the opening act in a potential public health nightmare: a chicken dies on a farm, for no apparent reason; another perishes at a farm hundreds of miles away; it takes time for the farm owners to notice, more time for tests to be conducted and different anomalies connected, and before the diagnostics are complete, the damage is done – the first wave of a bird flu pandemic has broken.

Beyond natural outbreaks, there are also concerns involving deliberate acts: This week the Department of Justice charged three Chinese nationals with smuggling biological materials into the U.S.; and in June two Chinese researchers were charged with trying to smuggle a fungus into the U.S. that can devastate grain crops.

Some experts are imagining a world in which technology is harnessed to ensure that such biosecurity nightmares don’t happen – or are dealt with much faster and more effectively.

“What we're promoting is a system that can look at things more holistically and on a much larger scale,” Robert Norton, a professor of veterinary infectious diseases and coordinator of national security and defense projects at Auburn University, told The Cipher Brief. “The system is designed to fill gaps in biosurveillance, looking for disease outbreaks, whether they be naturally occurring or induced through bioterrorism.”

That proposed system has a name – BISR, for Biosurveillance Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance – and its backers believe it would revolutionize the field of biosurveillance. The core concept is that sophisticated sensors and other tools used by the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) can be leveraged to improve detection, and that artificial intelligence can be deployed to help fast-track diagnosis. The chicken-farm example is only one scenario; responses to a COVID-19-like outbreak or acts of bioterrorism would be improved as well.

Norton, Daniel Gerstein, a senior policy researcher at RAND, and Cris Young, professor at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Auburn, co-authored an article last year arguing that the creation of a BISR system was “a national security imperative at the crossroads of technology, public health, and intelligence.” The BISR, they wrote, “would be designed to address two mission-critical requirements for biosurveillance: rapid detection and predictive analysis.”

They have taken their plans to Capitol Hill – specifically, to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where they say they have received “good reviews.” The Select Committee wouldn’t comment on the BISR proposal itself but in a statement to The Cipher Brief, a spokesperson said that “The Committee continues to explore various biosecurity initiatives and programs to ensure that the U.S. is postured sufficiently to combat and prevent any future biosecurity threats that could cause widespread harm.” The statement went on to say that the Committee is working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) “to establish an Office of Intelligence within the U.S. Department of Agriculture to address threats to U.S. agriculture.”

The threats are clear, to agriculture and beyond. The U.S. remains vulnerable to biologically driven disruption – be it from another COVID-like pandemic, an outbreak of bird flu that reaches humans, or bioterrorism. Anxiety over the latter has grown as experts worry that AI may be used to create dangerous biological pathogens.

At last year’s Cipher Brief Threat Conference, Jennifer Ewbank, a former CIA Deputy Director for Digital Innovation, warned of “the application of AI in biological weapons by unsavory actors.” And a 2024 report from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security said that the same AI capabilities that might produce medical breakthroughs could – inadvertently or otherwise – lead to the creation of deadly pathogens. AI models may “accelerate or simplify the reintroduction of dangerous extinct viruses or dangerous viruses that only exist now within research labs,” the report found.

How prepared is the U.S. to counter such threats? And might a technology-driven “BISR” system revolutionize biosurveillance, as its backers contend?

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How a “BISR” might work

The crux of the case for a BISR system is twofold: first, that an array of sophisticated data-gathering tools – drones, satellites, hyperspectral sensors and others – can be mobilized to track biosecurity anomalies; and that trained AI models would analyze the data that the system collected. The system’s architects envision a BISR “dashboard” that provides first responders and decision makers in government, the military and business near-real time insight and analysis.

It’s a high-tech effort to gather clues – a change in a community’s waste water, a spike in the sales of certain medications, even the breathing or social behavior of animals – and assess their meaning more rapidly than current systems allow.

“Our system is agnostic,” Norton said. “It doesn’t matter whether it’s a natural disease outbreak or a terrorism event, it’s looking for those changes and then being able to rapidly detect them and rapidly alert the individuals that are responsible.”

To expand on the chicken-farm scenario: at the moment, one animal’s death might lead a farm worker to call the company veterinarian, the veterinarian would take samples, the farm would look at the flock as a whole, and samples would be brought to laboratories for tests. Ultimately the case might go to a national lab to determine whether avian influenza or another condition was present.

Public health officials say the current system works – but can be slow. Advocates for the BISR system say it would at minimum improve the speed of response, gaining valuable time to determine not only whether a virus was present, but also how it might be circulating in the broader environment. Sensors in and around the poultry houses would track not only a dead chicken, but also the emissions and even behavioral anomalies within the flock – “pattern-of-life” behavior, as the experts say. Any anomaly would be flagged and the system “tipped off,” as Auburn’s Cris Young put it, to alert sensors on other farms.

“The sensors would tip and cue other sensors that would then take a larger look at the larger area or even a state,” Young told The Cipher Brief, “to determine if those signatures coming off of that one particular house that's affected are similar to things happening in other houses.”

Given the sheer volume of data generated by a BISR system, AI models would be used to rapidly assess the data – and check anomalies against specific pathogens.

BISR’s proponents say a similar approach could be taken with viruses among humans, providing more rapid early-warning mechanisms and analysis.

“Advances in sensor capabilities, coupled with the use of AI platforms, provide new capabilities that could be applied to the detection of biological events in the early stages of an outbreak,” the authors of the BISR article wrote. “The concept would provide new tools for early detection, response, mitigations, and ultimately, recovery from an outbreak.”

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The tools of a BISR system

The system’s architects say most of its high-tech elements already exist – sensors in place on poultry farms or in public spaces, and various tools of ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) that are currently used across the IC. These might include multispectral and hyperspectral sensors, and many airborne assets – balloons, drones, aircraft and satellites – that have been used to detect concentrations of gases for national security purposes. The International Space Station, for instance, regularly uses hyperspectral imaging to map the earth’s surface, and the Department of Defense uses hyperspectral imaging for several purposes – including detection of chemical and biological hazards.

Norton cited the example of the IC’s use of satellite imagery to monitor concentrations of nitrate in Afghanistan – because high levels of nitrate often indicated the presence of bomb-making facilities. Nitrate is also a component found in animal waste – and so in the public health example, he said, satellite imagery could be used to monitor levels of nitrate and other compounds on a farm.

Ultimately, BISR’s proponents believe the system could also be used to monitor the volatilome (essentially, what humans and animals breathe out) of people at airports or stadiums or other crowded environments, and alert public health officials about anomalies in the data. Young described a scenario in which international arrivals at Atlanta’s Hartsfield Airport – the nation’s busiest – would be watched by hyperspectral sensors to detect anomalies in respiration.

“We might have sensors set up in multiple places as [people] disembark from their flight,” Young said. “There might be several places to take a different scan with multiple sensors, and we might be able to say with some certainty, this person is infected with let's say COVID, and this person is actually shedding the virus.”

The hope is that any anomaly – be it on a chicken farm or at a crowded airport – would tip the system to sweep up other relevant information: Have ER visits spiked in a community? Does social media from that community suggest related anomalies? And so forth. Ideally, a dangerous pathogen would be flagged and identified before it leads to a pandemic, or an act of bioterror would be detected at the earliest possible moment.

Michael Gates, CEO of GDX Development, a company that bills itself as “solving very complex national security challenges,” says he joined the BISR effort “from the technology side of the equation.” GDX has worked previously with the U.S. Special Operations Command. Gates says the key to BISR’s success will involve “sensor fusion” – the linking of a range of data-gathering mechanisms.

“If you think about the world of the Internet of Things, everything's a sensor, and there's not very many systems out there that have the ability to collect off of all of those sensors, bring that data payload in, and then push it into a single pane of glass that can be used for military operations, for intelligence sharing or more tactical things,” Gates told The Cipher Brief.

In the chicken farm example, Gates envisions “sensor fusion” ranging from a hyperspectral scan to “available drone assets” and ultimately “zeroing in down to sensors such as temperature, air purification, even cameras monitoring chicken behaviors.”

Once a problem has been identified, Gates said, “you can use open-source intelligence and other things to mine, let's say, a Reddit form for these things – is anybody talking on the internet about their chicken coops having issues? – and so on, for whatever the issue is.”

“There's already enough sensors out there,” he added. “The data is there. What's happening is that information's not being shared. It's not being centralized, meaning we're getting delayed responses...Nobody has a holistic picture right now on biosurveillance.”

In the early stages of a crisis, the BISR might do a lot of work before humans are engaged, though the Auburn professors stress that the system aims only to provide experts a head start, rather than cut them out of the proverbial “loop.”

“We support human-in-the-loop artificial intelligence systems,” Young said. “We want there to be a person that has to look at this screen at some point and say, okay, I understand what's going on here. Maybe that happens within minutes of an anomaly occurring, but regardless, at some point a person needs to decide, Yes, that's what this is, or No, we need further information.”

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The challenges

Norton and Young say they have presented their plans to the House Select Committee and are prepared to do the same to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). They believe their system can be 80 percent complete in three years and fully functional in five. As for costs, they say the first two years would require a budget of $10 million, and that the system’s operating costs would eventually be $300 million annually. They argue that billions of dollars have been spent in the biosurveillance domain, and that the BISR would be a major upgrade over existing capabilities.

It may sound like a no-brainer – the smart use of technology to guard against myriad biosecurity threats – but questions abound about BISR and its future. And many of the hurdles to its implementation involve, in one way or another, the human element.

Just as the Intelligence Community has struggled at times to share information and assess national security risks, the government architecture in biosurveillance is complex and often siloed. A host of agencies share responsibility for the nation’s biosecurity – the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Health and Human Services Department (HHS), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA), to name a few. Experts say they don’t always communicate effectively with one another – and that states don’t always share critical information effectively with the federal government.

Dr. Tom Inglesby, Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, noted that in the most recent bird flu outbreak in the U.S., some states wanted to handle the information and response without involving the federal government.

“They weren't even very interested in USDA at times,” Inglesby told The Cipher Brief. “So they said, we'll handle this on our own and we'll let you know. Meanwhile, CDC has to wait for states to bring them the data and information. They don't have command authority to say you must deliver it. It's a voluntary basis.”

Norton says the BISR developers are hoping to partner with one “Mother Ship” agency within the IC – he wouldn’t say which one – because the IC controls the government’s most sophisticated satellites and other data-gathering systems. He also said that while the system involves high-tech elements and the building of the BISR “dashboard,” technology isn’t the primary hurdle.

“Biosurveillance is not a technology problem, but rather a permissions and authorities problem,” Norton said. That might involve permission to use a Pentagon satellite for biosecurity purposes, he said, or agreement from a major industrial farm to share its data or house sensors on its property.

Inglesby said that transparency and information-sharing would be critical for a BISR-like system to work – and that in the case of the chicken farm example, key stakeholders might be unwilling to cede control of the analytical process to a BISR “dashboard.”

“You have the farm owner who will want to make his or her own assessment, you have local government that may not want outsiders coming in and making a determination for them, and you might have unwillingness even at the federal level to do this,” Inglesby said. “You’re going to need an across-the-board buy-in that we haven’t always seen.”

There are also questions about technical implementation. In the Atlanta airport example, Norton acknowledged that even a highly sophisticated hyperspectral sensor wouldn’t be able to detect, say, COVID-19, unless passengers were directed to a discrete area close to the sensors – and here again, permissions would be needed to install such sensors. The post-COVID atmosphere has suggested less public appetite in the U.S. for intrusive screening, not more. The House Select Committee, in its statement to The Cipher Brief, included a reference to “ensuring any proposal balances privacy and the need to avoid the abuses of the COVID-19 period.”

Inglesby also stressed the importance of transparency on the global stage when it comes to public health crises. In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, China failed to share the detailed casework of its first 500 patients in the “ground-zero” city of Wuhan – and more than five years later, it still hasn’t done so.

“In Wuhan, the data was very available, there were a lot of people dying, but the data was covered up,” Inglesby said. “And so even if you had installed the most sophisticated systems, if they're being run by people who don't want to share that information, it's not going to change anything.”

Some early-warning biosurveillance systems are already in place, in the world of what’s known as “Syndromic Surveillance” – and experts say many have worked well.

The CDC’s BioSense platform gathers health-related data from hospitals and clinics to detect potential outbreaks or bioterrorism events. As a part of BioSense, "Sentinel Alerts" are generated when reports involve high-concern viruses or diseases. In the case of influenza (the human variant), alerts are triggered when more than 3 % of ER visits are for the flu. Globally, satellites have been used to track dengue fever outbreaks by measuring water levels in the jungle. And wastewater surveillance systems exist to check on levels of bacteria or viruses.

A less positive precedent is the BioWatch program, which was created by DHS in 2001 and billed as "the nation's first early warning network of sensors to detect biological attack." The system tracks the air supply using Environmental Protection Agency air filters, and sends information to the CDC and – if warranted, to the FBI. The system has been blamed for generating dozens of false positives, and in an audit reported by the Associated Press in 2021, BioWatch was said to have failed in detecting known threats.

Norton told The Cipher Brief that today’s technologies are sophisticated enough to ensure that BISR would operate at a higher level than BioWatch. He added that rigorous standards in the AI models would “prevent AI hallucinations” that could cause false positives – or worse, false negatives.

And Inglesby was quick to note that any improvements in early warning and diagnostics would be welcome.

“There is no single system in the country, and people have been talking about building stronger biosurveillance for a long time,” he said. “Anything you can get done in this space would be super-valuable, assuming the costs aren’t prohibitive and you get the buy-in to use this information wisely.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s Next National Security Crisis: A War on Its Own Energy Base https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-next-national-security-crisis-a-war-on-its-own-energy-base https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-next-national-security-crisis-a-war-on-its-own-energy-base

OPINION — Every mission begins with trust. In World War II, the U.S. government trusted private energy producers to deliver aviation gasoline at record scale, and those companies trusted Washington to stand behind them. That compact powered victory. Breaking it now with retroactive lawsuits betrays the trust we need for the challenges ahead.

For more than a century, America’s energy sector has been a vital partner in national defense. During the Second World War, operating under direct federal command, oil and gas companies increased production twelvefold to supply high-octane fuel that carried bombers over Europe, powered the ships that stormed Normandy, and drove the tanks that liberated the continent. As the Trump administration’s Department of Justice later acknowledged, it “was a war of oil,” and American producers supplied the lion’s share. Those barrels were more than statistics. They were the lifeblood of freedom.

Today, those same companies face lawsuits for actions carried out under wartime orders. Louisiana parishes, backed by trial lawyers and supported by Gov. Jeff Landry and Attorney General Liz Murrill, are seeking billions in damages. The theory behind these cases is corrosive. It tells American industry that even if you answer the government’s call in wartime, you may still be punished in peacetime. It tells veterans and workers who built the arsenal of democracy that their sacrifice can be rewritten as a liability.

That message strikes at the heart of the compact that binds our military, our industry, and our government. It also directly undermines President Donald Trump’s second-term priorities. His executive orders link military readiness and energy dominance, making clear that abundant domestic energy is a national security imperative.

A strong domestic energy base keeps costs down for American families and ensures that the Pentagon can surge capacity without relying on foreign suppliers. Deterrence depends not only on ships and planes but also on the affordable, reliable fuel that keeps them moving.

Without trust, the supply chain breaks. If refiners hold back on capacity for fear of retroactive liability, where will the Pentagon turn for jet fuel in a crisis? If contractors doubt that obeying federal orders will later be defended in court, how can America count on its industrial base when the nation is under fire?

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A $744 million verdict in one parish case already shows how these lawsuits could drain the capital needed to expand fuel reserves. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff leaders Adm. Michael Mullen and Gen. Richard Myers warned the Court that “our national security depends on encouraging—not discouraging—such private sector assistance.” If the precedent is set against energy companies, it will not stop there. Shipyards, aerospace firms, and logistics providers could also be targeted, leaving America’s armed forces dangerously isolated.

What makes Gov. Landry’s role especially troubling is that he knows better. Once a defender of Louisiana’s energy workers, he now sides with trial lawyers against the very companies that powered both his state’s economy and America’s victories abroad. At a time when China is racing to corner global oil and mineral supplies, Russia is using gas as a weapon, and Iran is funding terror with oil revenues, Gov. Landry’s choice to undermine Louisiana’s energy base is more than short-sighted. It is a betrayal of trust in his constituents, in America’s veterans, and in the compact that has kept this nation secure.

The Supreme Court will soon decide in Chevron v. Plaquemines Parish whether lawsuits tied to wartime production will proceed in federal or state court. The answer must be federal. Only a federal forum can ensure that decisions made under federal authority are not second-guessed by local juries decades later.

America cannot afford to cripple the public-private partnerships that powered victory in the past. The stakes are too high. Louisiana’s energy workers and America’s veterans have always answered the call when the nation needed them. They deserve leaders who will stand with them – at present, Gov. Landry and Attorney General Murrill stand opposed.

Our armed forces do not run on lawsuits. They run on reliable fuel, trust, and readiness. The sacred contract between America’s industry and its defenders must not be broken.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Dead Drop: Week of November 2 https://belimedia.com.ng/dead-drop-week-of-november-2 https://belimedia.com.ng/dead-drop-week-of-november-2 SLOW BOAT? On Friday October 24, Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell announced on social media that the “Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth had ordered the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group to leave the Mediterranean and head for the U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility to support “the President’s directive to dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and counter narco-terrorism.” Armchair admirals started to calculate how quickly FORD and friends would show up off the coast of Venezuela. The carrier strike group was reported to be off the coast of Croatia when the announcement was made but five days later, there were (unconfirmed) reports that it was still in the Med. A week after the Hegseth announcement, the Miami Herald reported that their sources said an attack on military installations could come “at any moment.” Administration officials including Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the reporting “a fake story.” Some folks think the deployment announcement was mostly saber-rattling while others believe the eventual arrival will signal a big next step in regime change. In any case – the Ford is one of the most capable warships ever built despite having electro-magnetic plane launching catapults that for some reason the President hates nearly as much as he hates windmills.

The Dead Drop is now updating throughout the week. There's just too much good gossip in the national security world for a once-a-week drop.

SOMETHING YOU WANNA SHARE? DROP IT TO US AT thedeaddrop@thecipherbrief.com

NEED TO CATCH UP ON LAST WEEK'S DROP? FIND IT HERE.


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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Sahel’s Terror Surge Signals a New Front in Global Security https://belimedia.com.ng/the-sahels-terror-surge-signals-a-new-front-in-global-security https://belimedia.com.ng/the-sahels-terror-surge-signals-a-new-front-in-global-security

DEEP DIVE — On the night of June 20, 2025, the Nigerien village of Manda became the stage for one of the deadliest massacres in the Sahel in recent memory. As dozens of worshippers gathered at a mosque for evening prayers, militants from the Islamic State’s Sahel Province encircled the village and opened fire without pause. Bullets tore through the congregation, killing at least 71 men, women, and children and wounding dozens more.

Survivors later recalled the horror of lying motionless beneath the bodies of neighbors and relatives to avoid being shot, while houses were torched and families scattered in the chaos. The bloodshed was not only an assault on a remote community in Tillabéri, but a stark signal of how deeply jihadist violence has penetrated this once quiet borderland.

In the span of a few hours, Manda joined the growing list of towns and villages reduced to symbols of terror, underscoring the reality that groups like Islamic State in the Sahel now operate less as rogue insurgents than as entrenched power brokers whose reach stretches across Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. For the United States, the massacre is more than a humanitarian catastrophe — it is a sobering reminder that the doctrine of forward defense faces its most formidable test yet in Africa’s most fragile frontier.

“The threat from Sahelian jihadists is really two-fold,” Caleb Weiss, editor of FDD’s Long War Journal, tells The Cipher Brief. “They are destabilizing wider West Africa, particularly the Gulf of Guinea states, which have been firm U.S. and Western allies. And secondly, there is worry about European security if jihadis in the Sahel are allowed to operate freely. The Sahel can become a base of operations from which to launch or even sponsor attacks into continental Europe.”

Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director of the Counter Extremism Project, frames the problem in similarly stark terms.

“There are two primary terrorist threats that can be identified,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “First of all, the rapid expansion of the al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM as well as the ISIS affiliates ISSP and ISWAP in the Sahel region has destabilized several countries, in particular Burkina Faso, Mali and to a growing extent also Niger, with continuing serious security problems in the North of Nigeria.”

From Margins to Mainstream: The Rise of Sahelian Jihadism

The massacre in Manda reflects a decade-long unraveling of state control. The collapse of Libya in 2011 unleashed vast armories and fighters into the desert, reigniting dormant rebellions and enabling extremist groups to entrench themselves in northern Mali. The Malian state itself fragmented in 2012 following a coup, allowing jihadist coalitions to seize major northern cities.

Over time, groups splintered and reformed. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, emerged in 2017, while the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) evolved into the Islamic State’s Sahel Province. These factions began imposing taxes, adjudicating disputes, and governing their respective territories. According to Vision of Humanity, the Sahel accounted for 51 percent of global terrorism deaths in 2024, with nearly 25,000 conflict-related fatalities — a near tenfold increase since 2019.

Liam Carnes-Douglas of the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) says the rise reflects more than battlefield victories.

“Some of the most urgent threats posed by Sahel-based jihadist groups stem from the destabilization of key regional partners,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “Once among the strongest U.S. allies in counterterrorism, these governments have shifted rapidly from fragile democracies to military juntas, fueled in part by the failures of Western-backed security initiatives. That has sidelined the United States as anti-Western sentiment grows.”

Andrew Lewis, president of the operational intelligence firm Ulysses Group, agrees that the power vacuum extends beyond the battlefield.

“In the truest sense, the U.S. has limited national security interests in the region. But we do have resource and energy interests that underpin our national security strategy — particularly in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “The control of trade routes, ports, and export conduits of critical minerals is a strategic concern. We would like to see JNIM, ISIS, and their affiliates contained before they threaten those supply chains.”

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Tactical Adaptation and Regional Spillover

Over the last eighteen months, jihadist groups in the Sahel have evolved their tactics in ways that suggest a larger ambition. Motorcycles enable lightning raids across ungoverned stretches. Drone warfare — once limited to surveillance — has evolved into an offensive capability. JNIM has carried out more than 30 confirmed drone strikes since late 2023.

“Both al-Qaeda’s JNIM and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province have deployed suicide drones,” Weiss noted. “They’re also utilizing Starlink to stay connected in remote areas. Helping counter drones, exploiting Starlink’s vulnerabilities, and shutting off externally sourced financing would help the region tremendously.”

Carnes-Douglas also warns that “rapid technological advancements are increasingly shaping warfare.”

“Drones and Starlink-enabled communications stand out as particularly transformative, yet both regional security forces and U.S. capabilities lag significantly behind,” he continued, pointing out that lessons from Ukraine “demonstrate how these technologies are quickly adapted for combat,” and their proliferation “signals that warfare in the Sahel is entering a transitional, high-tech phase.”

Schindler underscores a connected, transnational risk.

“The Sahel region is also a key network hub for the international drug transportation pipeline of Hezbollah-linked drugs that are transported from South America via West Africa to Europe for sale there,” he explained. “This pipeline directly funds Hezbollah’s activities in Lebanon. Given the central role that the U.S. is playing in the current negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel, this income stream for Hezbollah will continue to ensure that this terror group will be able to continue to fund its activities both within Lebanon and beyond.”

Across Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, militants are consolidating control.

“Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has long used the tri-border area to evade interdiction,” Carnes-Douglas explained. “That makes coordinated regional responses not just useful but necessary.”

The violence, however, is also spilling outward.

“Sahelian jihadis are now inching closer to Senegal,” Weiss said. “They’re creating a jihadist land bridge between the Sahel, littoral West Africa, and Nigeria — effectively one large area of jihadist operations encompassing a significant chunk of the continent.”

This expansion also has a sectarian dimension. Lewis surmised that more than 50,000 Christians have been murdered in Nigeria since 2009, “with more than 7,000 killed in 2025 alone.”

“It’s difficult to assess the true scale of persecution Islamist militant groups are carrying out,” he underscored. “But it’s happening.”

Schindler also highlights an alarming operational trend: “Currently they are not only able to conduct multi-layered attacks against single targets (such as a military camp) but also to conduct simultaneous and coordinated attacks on multiple targets across relatively large geographic areas.”

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U.S. Policy Today: A Detachment Problem?

For years, the U.S. viewed the Sahel as a key front in counterterrorism, maintaining drone bases and training missions in Niger. But the 2023 coup upended that equation. Washington froze over $500 million in aid and limited cooperation even as the junta expanded ties with Russia’s Wagner Group. The result is a fragile balance between limited engagement and strategic erosion.

“Outside of JSOC, U.S. efforts in the region have been marginal at best. That’s evident in the surge in violence and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States, which pivoted away from the West to Russia,” Lewis said. “None of our 333 programs in the region has dented terror operations. We rely heavily on intelligence-led frameworks but have very little real-time intelligence since withdrawing key assets from Niger.”

Carnes-Douglas echoes that concern. “American counterterrorism efforts have achieved tactical successes but strategic failures,” he observed. “Short-term gains from drone strikes or training are constantly undermined by state fragility, coups, and shifting alliances.”

Moreover, while France’s drawdown from Operation Barkhane — the 2014–2022 French-led counterterrorism campaign across the Sahel that deployed more than 5,000 troops to combat Islamist insurgencies in Mali, Niger, and Chad — created a vacuum, “the U.S. has not yet developed a sustainable replacement strategy,” Weiss stressed. “There are some indications the U.S. has resumed limited intel support to Sahelian juntas, but nothing that matches previous levels of engagement,” he continued.

Schindler argues that the disengagement itself has worsened the crisis.

“Although a lot of criticism has been levied against the UN, EU and US counter terrorism operations in West Africa and the Sahel in the past, the current situation, in which the UN, the EU and the US have largely disengaged from the region clearly demonstrates that overall, the counterterrorism efforts had been successful in stemming the tide of terrorist expansion in the region,” he said.

A Strategic Imperative: What Must Washington Do Next

Analysts emphasize that the path forward requires reimagining engagement. Weiss argues that U.S. support should focus on technology denial and intelligence integration, not just kinetic strikes.

“Helping counter drones, exploiting the use of Starlink and the data vulnerabilities therein, and helping to shut off externally sourced financing would help the region tremendously,” he said.

Washington, Lewis highlighted, must also think pragmatically about force posture.

“If we want to contain JNIM and ISIS, the focus should be on protecting the coastal regions with ISR and targeted strikes where success is measured by territory denied, not by how many host forces we train,” he said. “But that requires basing rights, logistics, and political will, and China and Russia hold significant leverage over potential host countries.”

Indeed, Beijing’s influence looms large.

“China has financed major ports, railways, and industrial projects across Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Senegal,” Lewis explained, noting that this gives it immense leverage to counter U.S. influence and deny access to infrastructure critical for forward operations.

Carnes-Douglas, meanwhile, advocates for a recalibrated diplomacy that acknowledges political realities.

“Although U.S. foreign policy appears to be shifting away from involvement in these conflicts, Washington should recommit pragmatically to directly limit jihadist groups’ ability to threaten American interests,” he asserted. “This, in turn, would form stronger relationships with the newly formed governments and in turn could be an industrial and economic boon, as well benefiting all partners.”

Schindler proposes a containment-first approach, prioritizing direct engagement with the littoral Gulf of Guinea states.

“One primary goal should be containment, ensuring that the expansion of terrorist activities and control in the region does not affect additional countries, in particular the littoral states of the Gulf of Guinea,” he said.

The slaughter at Manda, the border ambushes, the drone blitzes — all are signs of a metastasizing threat.

“Through the increasing influence and power of these terrorist affiliates in the Sahel region, the threat to US interests in the region, as well as potentially to the US homeland, is increasing in parallel,” he added.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
Countering the Kremlin’s Five Most Effective Narratives About Ukraine https://belimedia.com.ng/countering-the-kremlins-five-most-effective-narratives-about-ukraine https://belimedia.com.ng/countering-the-kremlins-five-most-effective-narratives-about-ukraine

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In the summer of 2008, as Russian tanks rolled toward the borders of Georgia, the battle had already begun—shaped decisively by large-scale cyberattacks and cognitive warfare. Weeks before the first shots, cyberspace erupted with coordinated attacks crippling Georgian government and media websites, including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and defacements. Simultaneously, state-controlled and aligned media saturated both domestic and international audiences with fabricated narratives portraying Georgian aggression, warnings of impending genocide in South Ossetia, and accusations blaming the U.S. for encouraging Georgian belligerence through NATO membership promises. These tailored information operations sowed confusion and paralysis, isolating Georgia as Russian forces advanced.

The invasion of Georgia by Russia may have marked the first notable instance in which Moscow simultaneously employed conventional military operations, cyberattacks, and cognitive warfare in a military campaign. Of particular note for this article, Russia’s weaponized narratives before, during, and after the invasion constructed a false reality that attempted to influence—at the speed of global media—and with some success, how the West and a broader international audience understood what was happening in Georgia—and why it was happening—with the goal to manipulate Western views, decisions, and actions. Of the many lessons Russia learned in its invasion of Georgia in 2008, that may have been one of the most important.

If this sounds similar to Russia’s actions against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022; it should. This strategic approach of using persuasive and weaponized narratives is grounded in Russian “Active Measures” and “Reflexive Control”.

Active Measures: Russian actions, most of which are covert and deniable, to achieve its foreign policy objectives through the use of political coercion, espionage, sabotage, assassination, media manipulation, ambiguous forces, and propaganda.

Reflexive Control: Actions by Russia to influence and shape an adversary’s decisions so that the adversary voluntarily makes choices that favor Russia.

These two elements of Russian doctrine embrace cognitive warfare as a comprehensive strategy and the blurring of lines between peace and war to target civilians, military leaders, and policy makers. As evidenced in Georgia, Russia’s goal is to also sustain long-term cognitive impact, or cognitive occupation, according to the Institute of Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), even after fighting ends so that a target state’s people, government, and institutions unconsciously align with Russian interests. “Cognitive occupation”, or the calculated persistent and long-term presence and effects of cognitive warfare on people, institutions, policies, and decision-making, is also a threat to the U.S.

Russia’s use of weaponized narratives has played a foundational role in Russia’s long-standing attempts to subjugate Ukraine and blunt U.S and Western interference. Narratives that criminalize, delegitimize, and “Nazify” Ukraine’s leaders, claim that Russian is protecting vulnerable populations within Ukraine, point to U.S. and Western interference as forcing Russia’s hand, and provide even a thin rationale for illegally annexing territories are now recognized as textbook Russian strategy.

Those narratives and Russia’s use of broader cognitive warfare tools have evolved as conditions change to now include negotiations, and remain in use today against Ukraine, but also against the U.S., NATO, and in fact a global audience. Russia’s intent is to deceive, confuse, fracture, intimidate, and to manipulate decisions that favor Russia both on the ground in Ukraine and in negotiations. Feigned cooperation with the West as well as distractions and delays—while Russia is simultaneously attempting to seize more territory in Ukraine and conducting gray zone attacks in Europe to fracture and weaken NATO support for Ukraine—is part of that same strategy.

This isn’t a new topic—in fact, much has been written by analysts and think tanks on Russia’s use of narratives in its war on Ukraine and the persuasive power of narratives. This article argues that there are five broad Kremlin narratives aimed squarely at the West, and the West’s lack of an effective counter-narrative strategy is inadvertently allowing these narratives to weaken Western resolve toward Ukraine and ceding control of the information space to Russia.

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These are the five broad narratives that Russia is employing today, all of which you will recognize.

1. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was justified—The West/NATO/Ukraine is the root cause of the war in Ukraine

This narrative has been well documented in Russian foreign ministry statements, Russia media, and Vladimir Putin speeches beginning with the Crimea crisis. It is similar to Russian tactics during its 2008 invasion of Georgia. Topics on “protecting Russian speakers,” “de-Nazification,” and “forced into war by the West” feature in almost all Russian communications leading up the invasion of Ukraine and after, particularly Putin’s speech that launched the invasion.

Although the “strategic declassification” by the U.S. in 2022 of Russia’s plan to invade Ukraine helped undermine the legitimacy of these narratives, Russia’s persistence in pushing this narrative extended its influence. Russia has used this narrative to attempt to cast itself more as a victim of U.S. and NATO expansion or even as a reluctant actor in Ukraine.

Most in the West generally dismiss this narrative, but it is still influential within Russia and with pro-Russian voices around the world. It has resonance in the Global South and is amplified by China. It will be difficult to displace globally as it exploits historical grievances and anti-Western sentiments and is still discussed in some Western policy debates.

2. Putin wants peace—but pressure on Russia will collapse talks

This is a constant theme in Kremlin messaging, beginning in 2014, and particularly pronounced from late 2021 onward as Russia massed troops near Ukraine. Russia often stated that it was only seeking negotiations and security guarantees and that pressure from the U.S. and the West would undermine potential talks.

The narrative has particularly manifested itself in the approach to the negotiations. Putin established redlines early as negotiations approached, and the U.S. team offered concessions to get Putin to the table, to test his commitment to real negotiations and a ceasefire, and to prevent him from walking away. Putin instead offered to stop fighting and freeze battle lines if Ukraine turned over all the territory in its Donetsk and Luhansk regions that remains in Kyiv’s hands. Putin basked in the warm reception in Alaska but continued to resist making any concessions or move toward a ceasefire.

This narrative appears to be weakening in influence today, in part because of Putin’s maximalist demands, delaying tactics, and very visible resistance to a ceasefire and concessions.

3. Ukraine will have to give up territory—Ukraine’s intransigence prolongs the war

This has become one of the more normalized, and I think potentially persuasive, narratives employed by Russia, and it is often presented as the “only reasonable solution” to the war in Ukraine. Russia began demanding territorial concessions in 2014, with greater intensity in 2022, when Russia raised Ukraine’s “inevitable” need to cede land for peace. Within months of the invasion, discussions began to appear in some Western media about “difficult compromises” facing Ukraine. Over time, this narrative managed to replace “Russia must withdraw its forces”, demonstrating the influence of narratives in countering geopolitical realities.

Ukraine finds itself in an odd place. There must be a term that describes how an invading aggressor (Russia) is not asked to give up illegally-seized territory because of the perception that it is irreversibly entrenched in its negotiating position, while the defending country under attack (Ukraine) is asked to concede more, to give up more, merely because it is more cooperative.

Of course, this also reflects the power imbalance and the perceptions of strength and weakness in the negotiations. The U.S. does not believe it can compel Putin to make concessions—even the most obvious ones, like withdrawing from Ukraine or paying reparations—so it doesn’t demand them or put them on the negotiating table. Conversely, the U.S. believes it can persuade Ukraine to make concessions because Ukraine needs U.S. support, so it expresses more expectations for Ukraine, including to sacrifice its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This narrative is rising in influence. War fatigue, Russian intransigence, the perception of a lack of real options, and the desire for a settlement are increasing the discussions for “realistic outcomes.” If this narrative prevails, it could result in an outcome that directly rewards Putin's aggression and signals to global authoritarians that invasion is a viable long-term strategy

4. Ukraine joining NATO is off the table—Russia must be involved in security guarantees

Russia has been long opposed NATO membership for Ukraine. Going back to the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Moscow has strongly stated that Ukraine joining NATO aspirations was unacceptable. This intensified after 2014 and this became a core Russian talking point after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including the stated requirement of the involvement of Russia in any future security arrangements. Today, Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have explicitly advanced this narrative since the first phases of negotiation, particularly when discussing alternatives to NATO membership for Ukraine.

The question of NATO membership for Ukraine has also been debated within Western policy circles for years. Discussions of possible security guarantees involving Russia surged in early 2022 as policymakers sought alternatives to NATO membership. Russia’s insistence on being part of those security guarantees continues to complicate these discussions.

It is fair to say that this narrative continues to be influential. A hold on Ukraine’s NATO prospects is essentially U.S. and NATO policy for now. Russia continues to strongly state the requirement for its involvement in future security guarantees—essentially a Russian veto on the implementation of those guarantees—as essential to any agreements.

5. A Russian victory is inevitable—Ukraine can never win

This is less about a single speech and more about a recurring theme in Russian state media and propaganda since the bleak outlook at the beginning of the war when it looked like Ukraine could fall within days or even hours. Russian propaganda of “unstoppable” Russian forces contrasted with Ukrainian weakness and futility was a persistent theme. Some Western analysts and so-called experts also predicted a quick Russian victory. Russian propaganda about the strength and power of its forces had effectively influenced a global audience.

I believe it is fair to say that a theme of Russian invincibility and inevitable victory regardless of actions by Ukraine and the West can and has undermined some support to Ukraine. It can create a defeatist attitude and risk aversion in some Capitals. It may also cause some countries to question the value of continued investment in Ukraine. Many nefarious actions and statements by Putin, including his own deliberately-crafted strong-man image, are meant to support this narrative.

Today, this narrative is far less credible than in 2022 from a battlefield perspective. Ukraine, with the support of the U.S. and NATO, shattered the myth of Russian battlefield dominance. However, this narrative has shifted to Russia’s ability to use political maneuvering, manipulation of the negotiations, bypassing of sanctions, support by China, and exploiting division within the West to achieve its goals. This narrative still influences many in the West and has the potential to undermine negotiations to the favor of Moscow.

These five narratives gain strength and persistent influence when repeated throughout traditional and social media. They are significantly enabled by Russia media and its proxies. They are also strengthened when discussed or even supported by U.S. and Western public officials. I have not heard official in the West having a real discussion about Nazis in Ukraine, but there have certainly been numerous discussions about a NATO role in Russia’s invasion, the “need” for Ukraine to give up territory, the challenges of Ukraine joining NATO, and if Ukraine can win at all even with U.S and NATO support.

I am not implying that U.S. and Western officials are intentionally using Russian narratives, but the alignment of Russian narratives with views already held by some in the West extend the life and influence of these narratives.

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Although these Kremlin narratives have been somewhat successful, particularly when used in unison, they are also somewhat fragile because they are false and not anchored in reality. If we compare a narrative to a flame, a narrative needs oxygen to grow and spread; without that oxygen, narratives can weaken and lose relevance.

Oxygen for narratives come from their continued use in social and traditional media, in legitimate public discourse, and by legitimate public figures. These narratives are also persistent and persuasive when they are unopposed by equally persuasive and persistent narratives. For example, narratives, such as “Ukraine will have to give up territory” or “Ukraine joining NATO if off the table”, which are based on the evolving positions of the involved parties will remain persistent and legitimate with continued use and in the absence of alternative narratives.

Let’s look at the five narratives that can undercut and replace the Kremlin’s five false and manipulative narratives. These five new narratives don’t require complex explanations. They are principled, grounded in facts and international law, speak directly to sovereignty and territorial integrity for all nations, and are based on a commitment to accountability and to deny reward to authoritarian invaders. We’ve heard them all before: yet as Kremlin narratives have spread, these have faded from prominence and influence.

1. The invasion of Ukraine was an illegal and unprovoked military action by Russia.

This narrative grounds the conflict in international law and strips away Russian efforts to justify its invasion. It’s a reminder that Russia alone is the “root cause” of the war in Ukraine.

2. Russia must withdraw all forces that invaded Ukraine in 2022 and pay reparations to Ukraine. Crimea remains sovereign Ukraine territory illegally occupied by Russia.

This narrative addresses accountability of Russia’s actions and undermines Russian efforts to normalize its presence in Ukraine. Further, it puts pressure on Russia to explain why it isn’t withdrawing from Ukraine instead of Ukraine explaining why it should not give up territory to an invader. It is also a strong statement that invasion and occupation by aggressive authoritarians will not be rewarded.

3. Ukraine is a free, independent, and sovereign state. A decision to join NATO is a decision between Ukraine and NATO.

This narrative reinforces the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and autonomy of nations, including Ukraine. It undermines any efforts by Russia to undermine the legitimacy of Ukraine as a nation and to control discussions over Ukraine’s future.

4. Russia is attempting to delay and undermine the negotiations. It must come to the negotiating table willing to make concessions or face consequences.

This puts the burden squarely where it belongs—on Russia—to engage in meaningful negotiations to end its occupation of Ukraine and the war, or face real and sustained consequences. This narrative is strengthened by US and NATO publicly planning and implementing measures, such as energy and banking sanctions, secondary sanctions, redirection of seized assets to Ukraine, expulsion of Russian diplomats, and other persuasive actions directed at Russia.

5. The U.S and NATO stand together to support Ukraine.

This narrative emphasizes the unity and shared commitment to the security of Ukraine that Russia has worked so hard to undermine. It is also a signal that Putin’s efforts to charm America and increase its gray warfare on Europe has failed. It is strengthened by an increase in arms and sustained support to Ukraine by the U.S. and NATO as a strong signal of unity to Russia.

These replacement narratives simply need oxygen—in public discourse, global media, and statements by Western public figures about Ukraine, Russia, and the negotiations, particularly from the U.S. negotiating team. Now is the time to use these narratives—persistently and in unison—to replace the Kremlin’s false and manipulative narratives and to undermine the hold Putin wants to have on the discussions on Ukraine and the negotiations. Displacing entrenched narratives isn’t easy, particularly in parts of the world where Russian influence is high, but repetitive use of these narratives by U.S. and Western officials can begin to erode the Kremlin’s narratives and send strong signals to Russia itself.

Finally, it is clear that the U.S. is dissatisfied with the pace and outcomes to date of the negotiations. This is, in part, because we have been losing the battle in the information and influence space to these Russian narratives. The goal of Russian “reflexive control” is to persuade Russia’s adversaries to make decisions voluntarily that support Russia. Russia’s weaponized narratives play a role in achieving that outcome. It is certainly not too late to change the course of the dialogue and the negotiations in a way that favors the U.S., Ukraine, and our allies. Putin believes he is in control and can dictate the outcome. Advancing these narratives will show him that he’s wrong.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

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Fri, 07 Nov 2025 18:04:16 +0100 FirstHandNews
BREAKING: China Backs Nigeria, Condemns US Interference Amid Trump’s Military Threat https://belimedia.com.ng/china-backs-nigeria https://belimedia.com.ng/china-backs-nigeria The Chinese government has voiced strong support for President Bola Tinubu’s administration while sharply criticizing what it described as foreign interference, following a recent threat of military action against Nigeria by former US President Donald Trump.

At a press conference on Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning reaffirmed Beijing’s position, emphasizing respect for Nigeria’s sovereignty and developmental path.

“As Nigeria’s comprehensive strategic partner, China firmly supports the Nigerian government in leading its people on the development path suited to its national conditions. China firmly opposes any country using religion and human rights as an excuse to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, and threatening other countries with sanctions and force,” Mao stated.

Mao Ning’s remarks came in direct response to questions concerning the growing diplomatic tension between Nigeria and the United States. The rift intensified after President Donald Trump, over the weekend, made inflammatory remarks threatening potential US military action against Nigeria.

President Trump alleged a “mass slaughter” and persecution of Christians in Nigeria, claiming that Christianity faces an “existential threat” in the country. He said he had instructed the US “Department of War to prepare for possible action,” threatening to go into what he described as “that now disgraced country, guns-a-blazing.”

The Nigerian government swiftly dismissed the allegations, describing them as false and provocative. Officials, including President Tinubu, stressed that while Nigeria faces complex security challenges from insurgents and bandits, violence in the country is not driven by religion, affecting both Christians and Muslims alike.

Nigeria reaffirmed its commitment to national sovereignty, maintaining that it remains open to dialogue to clarify any misconceptions about its internal security situation.

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Tue, 04 Nov 2025 12:44:24 +0100 Jan Bulo
Former CIA Station Chief on the Trump Administration’s Caribbean Strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/former-cia-station-chief-on-the-trump-administrations-caribbean-strategy https://belimedia.com.ng/former-cia-station-chief-on-the-trump-administrations-caribbean-strategy

EXPERT INTERVIEW — Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced today that the U.S. has carried out three additional strikes on four sea vessels, bringing the total number of attacks on boats to 13, resulting in more than 57 deaths. The Secretary said 14 people were killed and one person survived yesterday’s attacks targeting drug traffickers.

The Secretary posted on X that, “The Department has spent over TWO DECADES defending other homelands. Now, we’re defending our own. These narco-terrorists have killed more Americans than al-Qaeda, and they will be treated the same,” warning of more strikes to come. “We will track them, we will network them, and then, we will hunt and kill them.”

The strikes come amid a major U.S. military buildup in the region, most recently bolstered by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s order last week for the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier and its escorts to deploy from the Mediterranean to Latin America. President Trump says he is also considering military action against land targets in Venezuela, a sentiment echoed recently by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham.

Experts on the region believe part of the counternarcotics campaign is aimed at pressuring Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to step down. The U.S. has recently suspended diplomatic efforts with Maduro’s government and the Venezuelan president has been directly accused by the U.S. of involvement in drug trafficking. And in a highly unusual move, President Trump publicly announced recently that he has authorized the CIA to conduct covert action in Venezuela.

Maduro has condemned the U.S. military activity, accusing Washington of “fabricating a new war” while vowing to defend national sovereignty.

The Cipher Brief spoke with former CIA station chief David Fitzgerald, who served in Latin America, at the 2025 Cipher Brief Threat Conference about the implications of the strikes and other forms of pressure on both the cartels and Maduro. Fitzgerald joined the conference live from Panama. Our interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

THE INTERVIEW

Kelly: Dave, you have deep expertise in the region and in understanding the drug cartels. With everything going on in the region right now, what's top of mind for you?

Fitzgerald: Regarding Venezuela specifically, it's an interesting situation and I think President Maduro feels like the pincer movement is coming in on him right now. He's feeling the pressure, no doubt, from the military actions in the Caribbean, and also from some of the declarations by President Trump. He doesn't have the support of his neighboring Latin countries that he would like, specifically Brazil - if you remember back when he was elected during the last time, his main ally in Latin America, President Lula, never recognized the election. So theoretically, none of his counterparts other than the ones from the countries everybody suspected would - Nicaragua, Cuba, and, at the time, Bolivia - had recognized the election and President Maduro as the president elect and now the president.

So he understands very well that if push comes to shove, if there's some type of military action vis-a-vis Venezuela, Russia, China, Cuba, even Iran is not going to come to his assistance. He's going to be out on his own and he's going to be very outgunned and outmatched by the U.S. military. [He has a] decrepit air force and a decrepit army. He also claims to have rallied 4 million militia members that are undergoing training to help defend Venezuela.

Kelly: President Trump has openly said that he has authorized covert activity in Venezuela. What does this mean? If you're Maduro, what is that message that you're taking from that? How does it change the situation?

Fitzgerald: I think we're all a little surprised by that announcement, which is very out of character for the IC to have a covert action finding actually being announced by the president of the United States. I guess on one hand he's just circumventing what would eventually happen, and that's having it leaked, which I think has happened to all of the other covert programs. On the other hand, I think it's part of that pressure campaign that Trump is putting on Maduro and I think he's really feeling squeezed. There have been recent media reports that Maduro has offered to provide natural resources to the United States to try to find a way out of the situation by accommodating President Trump by providing oil and some of the other rich resources that Venezuela has. But I think he [Maduro] understands that his plan B is going to get on a plane and go to Cuba, much as President Chavez was back in 2002 when he had a short-lived coup d'état attempt in Caracas. There are not many options for him at this time.

Kelly: This administration has made clear that part of the policy towards Venezuela is applying pressure which includes the targeting of suspected drug boats off the coast of Venezuela. With your decades of experience understanding what motivates the drug cartels and what doesn't, how do you think these attacks might shift their thinking, if at all? And I also want you to explain to us how the cartels are technology, reportedly, better than most other groups in the world. Is this true?

Fitzgerald: They're very sophisticated and vis-a-vis Venezuela, you actually have kind of a, I hate to use the word state-sponsored, but I will say state-approved cartels working in Venezuela. I don't know if we remember the days of Cartel de los Soles, which in English means the cartel of the generals, and that was so true back in the 90’s. The then head of the National Guard was under indictment [for involvement.] He's still under indictment. He has never left Venezuela since then.

Hugo Carvajal, who was General Carvajal, the head of military intelligence, fled to Spain around 2020-2021 because he had a falling out with Maduro. He was extradited to the U.S. back in ‘23. He pled guilty [to involvement in narcoterrorism and drug trafficking] in June of this year and is going to be sentenced at the end of this month. I know the guy personally, and I remember having these conversations with him and telling him, Hugo, one day this house of cards is going to come crumbling down and there's going to be a price to pay, right? He says, ah, no, no, no, no. And I think it's kind of that same atmosphere in Venezuela right now with the senior military officers. Maduro has done a good job of handling the military in the sense of the stick and the carrot, and they all understand that as long as they're true and loyal to Maduro, they're going to benefit from it, from their illegal activities, either allowing trafficking or corruption to take place or participating in it. So there's going to be more indictments, I think. There's no doubt Carvajal is making a plea with the U.S. attorney right now in order to lower his sentence.

You have that combined with what you see now in Colombia. Trump had called President Petro a narco trafficker and said he's cutting all narcotics assistance to Colombia. That's a blow to him, but it's also a blow to our efforts in the region because Colombia, as everybody knows, has been our strongest ally in this fight, both in the Counter-terrorism fight in the region and also in the counter-narcotics fight. So we're going to watch how this plays out.

Elections in Colombia are in May of next year. All polls indicate Petro really doesn't have a chance. I'm not sure whether this announcement will help him or not. Colombia's not doing well right now. The United Nations just last month announced that they have record cultivation of coca now in Colombia. They're producing more than they ever did even before we started our Plan Colombia back in the 90’s. So it's a worrisome situation.

Kelly: I'm glad you brought up Colombia because I was going to ask you about that.

I’ve also heard recently that the epicenter of the drug problem is in Mexico. Talk to us a little bit about that and about what you have seen work or not work, against drug cartels in Mexico.

Fitzgerald: The question has always been how do you declare victory? Okay, narcotics traffic is going to exist for the rest of time. It always has, right? So the question is how do you define victory over that target? Years back, I had a conversation with [former Colombian] President [Alvaro] Uribe and I said, “we’ve made great strides, a lot of great things have happened. How do you define victory over these trafficking and terrorist groups?” Back then it was the FARC and the ELN where they were a two for one, or both trafficking and terrorist groups.

He looked at me and said victory is when these problems stop being a national security problem, a threat to our national security, and just basically turn into a regular criminal problem. I think he nailed it on the head. In countries like Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, all through Central America, these are national security problems. The corruption that it entails, the penetrations that the traffickers have made through all society. It is a threat to the region and a threat to national security of all of those countries, and indirectly a threat to our national security, especially along the border and especially with some of the violence that comes with it.

In Mexico, I think President [Claudia] Sheinbaum has done a fairly good job. You've seen all the newspaper articles about the ICS (Integrated Country Strategy) participation in Mexico. It has been a successful program, but again, flying under the radar, you really can't broadcast this. Colombia was very effective at taking out the heads of the cartels. Extradition was key. We have extradition with Mexico, but again, you have pockets of immunity within Mexico. The corruption is rampant. How to get past the corruption? Venezuela is that kind of dark hole where you really can't do much. But there has been some success, and I can't take that away from the Mexican services, to a lesser extent, the Colombian services and all through Central America, but we're not where we need to be right now.

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Question from NBC Reporter Dan DeLuce (in the audience): Let's say Maduro does get on a plane and fly to Cuba. What does he leave behind? What are the scenarios you see unfolding? I know it's highly speculative, but I'd like to hear your thoughts.

Fitzgerald: First of all, he wouldn't be the only one on the plane. He would be joined by his wife, probably half of the general staff and anybody else who could get on that plane. They will all understand that if he goes, they go and that they're going to be left to the hoards to try and figure out their survival. So I think right now that is option B, because militarily, he understands the Russians are not going to come to his assistance. The Chinese look at this as a transactional relationship with Venezuela. They are making money off Venezuela’s oil and the loans they provide. They just want to be paid back. Maduro is pretty weakened right now. Nobody is likely to come to his aid. So I think for him right now, it's a very serious consideration as far as plan B, how to get out of Venezuela and how to get out of Venezuela fast.

Kelly: How do you measure the impact of these strikes against these boats?

Fitzgerald: In two ways. The first impact is the psychological impact, and the second is the actual counter-narcotics effort impact. I think the impact of stopping the drugs from reaching [destinations], whether they're going to San Domingo or Dominican Republic or some other Caribbean island as a transit, that's minimal. The Coast Guard has been doing that for decades. It helps, but in many ways it's a drop in the bucket. The psychological impact, however, is far greater. I doubt there's very few volunteers or crewmen, both from Venezuela and from Colombia, who are happy about getting on some of these fastboats or the submersibles to crew them out to the Caribbean. I think what you're going to see, it's probably already started, is a shift to the Pacific side. This situation is kind of a pendulum and it’s been like this for decades. The US and our allies would focus on the Caribbean. They'd switch to the Pacific. We'd focus on the Pacific. They go back to the Caribbean. They would just change their routes, change their modus operandi of how they traffic drugs.

Kelly: Thank you so much, Dave. I really appreciate you taking the time. I know you don't do a lot of interviews like this.

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
The U.S. Coast Guard’s Quiet Drug War Wins Amid Trump’s Caribbean Strikes https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-coast-guards-quiet-drug-war-wins-amid-trumps-caribbean-strikes https://belimedia.com.ng/the-us-coast-guards-quiet-drug-war-wins-amid-trumps-caribbean-strikes OPINION / FINE PRINT —

As last Tuesday’s Coast Guard press release explained, “Detecting and interdicting narco-terrorism on the high seas involves significant interagency and international coordination. U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM’s) Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS), based in Key West, Florida, detects and monitors both aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs. Once interdiction becomes imminent, the law enforcement phase of the operation begins, and control of the operation shifts to the U.S. Coast Guard throughout the interdiction and apprehension.”

I should point out that SOUTHCOM’s JIATFS is a Defense Department (DoD) command that uses the capabilities of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, allies and partner nations to detect, monitor, and support interdiction of illicit narcotics movements in the air and maritime throughout the Western Hemisphere – meaning both the Pacific and Caribbean areas.

Let me emphasize, SOUTHCOM directs what takes place both in the eastern Pacific and the Caribbean areas.

In the case of last June’s narco-trafficker speedboat in the above photo, the boat was initially detected by a U.S. Navy maritime patrol aircraft. Then the Hamilton’s own Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron aircrew took over and provided airborne tactical support. Among their special weapons are helicopter-mounted, long-range rifles that can hit and disable the engines mounted at the rear of narco-trafficker speedboats. The result is the speedboats in the eastern Pacific are being halted, the crews arrested, and seizure of more than 4,475 pounds of cocaine, according to the Coast Guard.

In the Caribbean, the U.S. has Coast Guard cutters similar to the Hamilton, but also other U.S. Navy vessels that I believe would have permitted seizure of the five speedboats that instead were blown up. While the first Caribbean-located speedboat destroyed September 1, was moving, perhaps heading back to where it came from, videos of the next four that were destroyed showed they were not moving in the water before they were struck and exploded.

Why had those four stopped?

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Last Thursday, Defense Secretary Hegseth announced a sixth strike, this time against a slow-moving semi-submersible submarine-type boat used by narco-traffickers in both the Caribbean and eastern Pacific.

On Friday, in an Oval Office press availability, President Trump said, “We attacked a submarine, and that was a drug-carrying submarine built specifically for the transportation of massive amounts of drugs.” The semi-submersible was destroyed, but while two crew members were killed, two survived.

Here I should note that under Operation Pacific Viper, the Coast Guard has also released recent video showing its personnel capturing a semi-submersible narco-trafficking vessel in the eastern Pacific, arresting its crew and seizing its drugs.

On Friday, President Trump tried to rationalize the Caribbean policy of blowing up narco-trafficking vessels, with no mention that in the eastern Pacific under Operation Pacific Viper similar narco-traffickers are stopped, boarded, crews arrested and drugs seized.

Trump on Friday defended the Caribbean destruction/killing policy saying, “We had tremendous amounts coming in by boats, by very expensive boats. You know, they have a lot of money, very fast, very expensive boats that were pretty big. And the way you look at it is every boat that we knock out, we save 25,000 American lives. So every time you see a boat [destroyed] and you feel badly, you say, ‘Wow, that's rough.’ It is rough. But if you lose three people and save 25,000 people -- these are people that are killing our population. Every boat is saving 25,000 lives.”

On the other hand, Rear Adm. Jeffrey Novak, deputy commander of the Coast Guard Pacific Area, whose Operation Pacific Viper since August has carried out 34 interdictions and arrested 86 suspected narco-traffickers, said last Tuesday, “Our maritime fighting force is scouring drug smuggling routes in the eastern Pacific and dismantling narco-terrorist networks. We are complementing the Coast Guard’s unique law enforcement authorities with cutting-edge capabilities to stop the flow of deadly drugs that threaten U.S. communities.”

Why a killing policy in the Caribbean and an interdiction policy in the eastern Pacific?

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On Thursday, the same day that Secretary Hegseth announced the striking of the semi-submersible, Adm. Alvin Holsey, commander of SOUTHCOM, unexpectedly announced he was retiring after less than a year into what normally is a three-to-four year assignment. Holsey gave no reason.

However, The New York Times reported last Thursday that one current and one former U.S. official said Adm. Holsey “had raised concerns about the mission and the attacks on the alleged drug boats.”

The Trump administration has argued that drug cartels are Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Transnational Criminal Organizations and it is the policy of the U.S. “to ensure the total elimination of these organizations’ presence in the United States and their ability to threaten the territory, safety, and security of the United States,” according to an Executive Order signed by President Trump on January 20, 2025.

This has led to the Trump administration’s legal justification for using military force against narco-traffickers in the Caribbean, classifying them as "unlawful combatants." This policy shift has been highly controversial and has triggered debate among lawmakers and legal experts.

Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.), appearing Sunday on CBS’ Face the Nation, said, “This [Caribbean] operation, which is clearly, traditionally a law enforcement operation, now escalating to something maybe, as the President talks about, regime change. I think this is the wrong move for this President. The Coast Guard has the resources to do this.”

A Navy pilot for more than 20 years who flew 39 combat missions during Desert Storm, and later three space flights as a NASA astronaut, Kelly added, “I do worry about the legal authorities or lack thereof that the United States military has to conduct these kinds of strikes… Those admirals and generals, they need to speak truth to power. I have had conversations with the most senior members of our military about this specific thing. They cannot be breaking the law.”

Kelly went on, “[It] doesn't matter if the President or the Secretary of Defense tells them to do something. If it's against the law, they have to say no. They're not required to follow an unlawful order. So we expect that from them.”

When it came to Adm. Holsey’s surprise retirement, Kelly said, “I don't know the exact circumstances, why the admiral quit. He hasn't said publicly yet. I expect, in time, we're going to find out more.”

Let us hope so, from Adm. Holsey or some other military personnel involved in the Caribbean killing operations.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
AI&Powered Adversaries Require AI&Driven Defenses https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-powered-adversaries-require-ai-driven-defenses https://belimedia.com.ng/ai-powered-adversaries-require-ai-driven-defenses OPINION — The use of artificial intelligence by adversaries has been the subject of exhaustive speculation. No one doubts that the technology will be abused by criminals and state actors, but it can be difficult to separate the hype from reality. Leveraging our unique visibility, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has been able to track the use of AI by threat actors, but the pace of change has made it challenging to even forecast the near future. However, we are now seeing signs of new evolutions in adversary use, and hints at what may lie ahead in the near future. Most importantly though, there are opportunities for defensive AI to help us manage these future threats.

Evolution Thus Far

Over the course of the last eight years, GTIG has observed AI-enabled activity evolve from a novel party trick to a staple tool in threat actors’ toolbelts. In the early days, we detected malicious actors embracing the nascent technology to enhance their social engineering capabilities and uplift information operations campaigns. The ability to fabricate fake text, audio, and video was quickly abused by threat actors. For instance, several adversaries use GAN images of people that don’t exist to create fake personas online for social engineering or information operations campaigns (this negates the use of real photos in these operations, which could often be foiled when the photo was researched). A poor deepfake of Volodymyr Zelensky was created in an effort to convince Ukrainians that he had capitulated in the early hours of the full scale Russian invasion in 2022. Additionally, deepfakes have been reportedly used in state and criminal activity.

By investigating adversary use of Gemini we have some additional insight into how AI is being leveraged. We have observed threat actors using Gemini to help them with a variety of tasks like conducting research and writing code. Iranian actors have used it for help with error messages and creating python code for website scraping. They have also used it to research vulnerabilities as well as the military and government organizations they are targeting. North Korean actors have also tried to use Gemini for help with scripting, payload development, and evading defenses. Additionally, DPRK IT workers use AI to create resumes and fake identities.

One of the most interesting uses of Gemini by threat actors has been enabling deeper access during intrusions. In these cases, China-nexus cyber espionage actors appear to reach a certain juncture in an intrusion where they need technical advice on how best to execute the next step. To that end, they have sought guidance on problems like how to record passwords on the VMware vCenter or how to sign a plugin for Microsoft Outlook and silently deploy it from their position inside a network.

Gemini is not an ideal tool for threat actors, however, since guardrails are in place to prevent its abuse, foiling many of their use cases. Unfortunately, the criminal marketplace now offers their own models and related tools that are unhindered by guardrails and purpose-built for malicious activity. There are now several mature tools that offer help with tasks like malware development, phishing, and vulnerability exploitation. A common theme in these tools is the ability to boost the efforts of less technically skilled actors.

While some of these AI use cases are novel (like deepfakes) most were previously available through other means or could be obtained with sufficient resources. Pictures could be edited, social engineering emails could be translated, and skills could be learned the old fashioned way. Until recently, we had not seen many potentially game changing use cases.

While we had previously seen some experimental samples, AI-enhanced malware has only just begun to be adopted by threat actors, and there is some evidence it may be a useful means of avoiding detection. Nevertheless, there is also reason to be optimistic about the prospects of using AI to prevent this type of activity. This August, malware that leverages an LLM was used in Ukraine by the Russian cyber espionage actor APT28. It called out to an open source LLM through API to create commands on the fly and evade static detection. We saw a variation on this theme recently by another actor as part of the NPM supply chain incidents. That malware used LLM command line interfaces on the victims machine to stay beneath the radar. In the latter case, no security vendors flagged the malware as malicious in VirusTotal, but interestingly it was flagged as a “severe security threat” by VirusTotal’s Code Insight feature, an LLM capability itself. As AI-enhanced malware becomes more commonplace we will get a better understanding of what it takes to stop it and how relevant AI will be to addressing it.

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Imminent Capabilities

In addition to AI-enhanced malware there are two additional AI use cases that we expect threat actors to adopt imminently: novel vulnerability discovery and automated intrusion activity. While there are still scant signs of adversary use of these capabilities, there are corresponding capabilities in use and under development by defenders that prove they are possible. Furthermore, we do not expect the use of these capabilities to be wholly transparent. Due to constraints, adversaries are unlikely to use mainstream public models for these purposes, denying us a means of observing their adoption.

AI’s ability to discover previously unknown vulnerabilities in software has now been well-established by several defensive efforts designed to identify these flaws before adversaries. Google’s own BigSleep, an AI agent purpose-built for this task, has uncovered over 20 vulnerabilities leading to pre-emptive patching. In two cases Big Sleep was used in conjunction with intelligence to uncover zero-day vulnerabilities as adversaries staged them for attacks.

Unfortunately BigSleep and similar efforts offer tangible proof of a capability that can and will almost certainly be abused by adversaries to discover and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities. Zero-days are a boon for threat actors who will target researchers, infiltrate tech companies, and spend lavishly to uncover them. The clear opportunity to use LLMs will not have been lost on state actors who have the resources to carry out research and development in this area.

Another prospective use of agentic AI is the automation of intrusion activity. This capability was presaged by the aforementioned China-nexus cyber espionage operators who asked Gemini during active intrusions for help. The application of agentic technology to this use case is somewhat obvious: an agent that can leverage this help automatically to transit targeted networks and accomplish the intrusion’s objectives without the operator’s direct intervention. There are already numerous efforts to build these capabilities for defense and at least one related open source effort has been the subject of discussion in the criminal underground.

These developments could radically change the challenge facing defenders. Without compensating with proactive use of AI to find vulnerabilities, we can expect the scale of the zero-day problem to grow significantly as adversaries adopt the technology for this purpose. Automated intrusion activity will likely affect the scale of activity defenders are facing as well, as humans are replaced by multiple agents. This activity will be faster as well. Agents will be able to react more quickly to zero-days or discover short-term weaknesses in defenses.

In both cases, AI offers the clearest solution for defenders. BigSleep and similar solutions will be necessary to uncover vulnerabilities faster than adversaries, seizing the initiative. In the same vein, Google has just released details of an agent called CodeMender that can automatically fix vulnerabilities and improve code security. Agentic solutions may also be the best solution to automated intrusion activity: without this technology we will struggle to move as quickly or handle the deluge of attacks.

Implications

The pace of AI adoption by adversaries will be determined by resources at their disposal and the opportunity the technology enables. The most sophisticated actors will not dawdle in adopting these capabilities, but their activity, as always, will be the most difficult to observe. To prepare wisely we will have to anticipate their activity and begin taking action now. Cyberdefenders will have to reach the same conclusion that has already been reached in other fields of conflict: the solution to an AI-powered offense is an AI-powered defense.

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
The War You Can’t See: Gray Zone Operations Are Reshaping Global Security https://belimedia.com.ng/the-war-you-cant-see-gray-zone-operations-are-reshaping-global-security https://belimedia.com.ng/the-war-you-cant-see-gray-zone-operations-are-reshaping-global-security

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE -- In the middle of the night, with no witnesses, a single ship flagged out of Hong Kong drags its anchor across the Baltic Sea. In silence, it severs a vital gas pipeline and the digital cables that link northern capitals. By morning, millions lose connectivity, financial transactions stall, and energy grids flicker on the edge.

The culprit vanishes behind flags of convenience, leaving blame circulating in diplomatic circles while Moscow and others look on, exploiting maritime ambiguity and the vulnerabilities of Europe's lifelines.

Meanwhile, in Warsaw and Vilnius, shoppers flee as flames engulf two of the largest city malls. Investigators soon discover the arsonists are teenagers recruited online, guided by encrypted messages, and paid by actors connected to hostile state agencies. The chaos sows fear, erodes social trust, and sends shockwaves through European communities—proxy sabotage that destabilizes societies while providing plausible deniability to those orchestrating the acts.

Thousands of kilometers away, Chinese dredgers and coast guard vessels silently transform disputed reefs into fortified islands in the South China Sea. With no declaration of war and no pitched battles, new airstrips and bases appear, steadily shifting maritime boundaries and economic interests. Each construction project redraws the strategic realities of an entire region, forcing neighbors and distant powers alike to reckon with incremental, shadowy coercion and efforts to change the status quo.

In early 2024, Chinese state-sponsored hackers, known as "Volt Typhoon," penetrated U.S data repositories and embedded themselves deep within the control systems of U.S. critical infrastructure, including communication networks, energy grids, and water treatment facilities.

Then-FBI Director Christopher Wray described it as a pre-positioning of capabilities by China that can be turned on whenever Beijing wanted - wreaking havoc and causing real-world harm to American citizens and communities. China has denied any connection to these attacks on U.S. sovereignty.

And just weeks ago, around 20 Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace. Russia’s denials were predictable and since then, Russian drones and jets have violated airspace in Romania, Estonia, and over the Baltic Sea.

Were these threats, tests of capability and resolve, provocations, or demonstrations—or maybe all of the above? Just as NATO will develop a set of lessons-learned for future incursions, it’s also likely that Russia learned from these episodes and will recalibrate future incursions.

Threaded almost invisibly through all of these gray zone activities, and countless others like them, is cognitive warfare—a persistent tool of our adversaries. It is an assault on cognition. The information and decision spaces are flooded with weaponized narratives, AI-powered disinformation, synthetic realities, and the coercive use of redlines and intimidation.

The goal is clear—deceive, change how we see the world, fracture societies, destroy faith in institutions and partnerships, erode trust, challenge and replace knowledge and belief, coerce and intimidate; and perhaps most importantly; undermine decision autonomy. It is here, in the crowded intersection of AI; cyber; traditional tools such as narratives and storytelling; and cognition; that today’s most urgent battles are fought.

These are all operations in the gray zone. We all use somewhat different terms for this, but let me share the definition of the gray zone that I think works well.

The gray zone is the geopolitical space between peace and war where adversaries work to advance their own national interests while attacking and undermining the interests of their adversaries and setting the conditions for a future war without triggering a military response.

We might refer to attacks in the gray zone as gray warfare. It is the domain of ambiguity, deniability, and incremental aggression calculated to limit deterrence and discourage persuasive response.

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Today, it is the space where global competition, particularly great power competition, is playing out.

Why are we seeing more gray zone activity today?

First, great power competition is intensifying. This includes great powers, middle powers, and impacts almost every other nation. Almost every nation has a role to play, even if involuntary: competitor, ally and supporter, enabler, spoiler, surrogate, or innocent bystander and victim. Like the African proverb says, “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.”

But great powers will go to great lengths to avoid 21st Century superpower conflict, primarily because of the fear of unintended losses and damage to national power that could take decades to recover. The catastrophic damage to nations and militaries from WWII are distant—but still vivid—reminders of the impact of a war of great powers.

Today, just look at the unprecedented loss of national power by Russia in indirect superpower conflict. Superpower conflict has consequences. Given these strategic considerations, the gray zone and gray warfare provide an effective strategic alternative to conventional war. Our adversaries have calculated that there are more gains than risks in the gray zone, and that any risks they do face are acceptable.

Second, technology levels the playing field, creating new opportunities for gray zone attacks. Cyberattacks, even those that are disrupted, lead to more effective cyber capabilities by our adversaries. AI-driven cognitive warfare now delivers persuasive content with unprecedented global access and immediacy. Small kinetic drones can be wielded by state and non-state actors to pose both kinetic and cognitive threats. Technology also enables adversaries to conceal their operations and increase non-attribution. Even simple technologies have the potential to generate strategic effects in the gray zone.

Third, surrogates and proxies offer expanded reach, ambiguity, and impact

Little Green Men, hired criminals, ghost ships, unknown assassins and saboteurs, and shadowy companies that help evade sanctions blur attribution, providing bad actors with a veneer of deniability while increasing their reach, impact, and lethality. On a broader scale, Houthi attacks on global shipping and North Korean soldiers fighting Ukraine elevate the effects of this ambiguous warfare to a higher level. This trend is likely to intensify in the future.

Fourth, it is important to address the direct impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine on an increase in gray zone attacks. Russia’s significant loss of national power and limited battlefield gains have created pressure on the Kremlin to reassert relevance, project power, and potentially punish antagonists. This dynamic almost certainly means a continued escalation of gray zone activities targeting Europe and aimed at destabilizing the continent. Many experts believe the Baltics and the Balkans may be particularly vulnerable.

That Russian gray bullseye is crowded—the U.S. is also a traditional target, and more Russia activity to undermine and weaken the U.S. is coming, despite Putin’s offers of renewed diplomatic and economic cooperation.

Finally, there are more gray zone attacks because real deterrence and persuasive responses to gray attacks are challenging, and our adversaries know it. In other words, gray zone attacks in most cases are relatively low cost, often effective, provide a level of deniability, and frustrate efforts at deterrence and response.

Our adversaries have calculated that they can hide behind ambiguity and deniability to violate sovereignty, ignore national laws and international norms, and engage in activities such as political coercion, sabotage, and even assassinations without triggering an armed response.

This “no limits” approach exploits the openness, legal norms, and ethical standards of democratic societies, making coordinated, timely, and effective response more difficult.

So, what can we do?

The most important outcome of our actions is to change the risk calculation of our adversaries. Gray zone attacks that go unanswered reward our adversaries and reinforce the idea that there are more gains than risk in the gray zone and encourage more attacks. Further, our adversaries calculate, often accurately, that our reasonable concerns for avoiding escalation will lead to indecision, weak responses, or the acceptance of false choices.

We need improved and shared gray zone intelligence to see through the fog of disinformation, synthetic realities, false risks and threats, and an overload of information by our adversaries to understand what is taking place in the gray zone. This not only strengthens our operations to counter gray zone attacks but it helps our citizens, communities, and countries to understand, recognize, reject, and remain resilient in the face of gray zone attacks.

We have to employ “strategic daylighting” to expose and put into context the gray zone activity by our adversaries—stripping away deniability and laying bare nefarious and illegal actions—knowing that our adversaries will go to great lengths to conceal, defend, and attack our efforts to expose their activities.

We have to speak frankly and convincingly to our adversaries and of course, we have to back up our words with persuasive action. Empty warnings and rhetoric will fall short. Changing the risk calculation of our adversaries means real consequences across a broad spectrum—public, diplomatic, economic, legal, informational, or even kinetic. It means a strategy on how to respond - not just a series of hasty responses. Real deterrence will result from planning and strategy; not decisions in the moment based on immediate circumstances.

Finally, we need to think of deterrence and response as a team sport - an “Article 5 mindset.” Our adversaries will seek to divide and isolate. Collective, unified action and resolve can form a powerful deterrent.

Of course, none of this is new. All of us need a solid understanding of the problems and the likely best solutions and implementation remains the greatest challenge.

We can go a long way with a good strategy, good partners, and resolve which seems like a reasonable place to start.

This Cipher Brief expert perspective by Dave Pitts is adapted from a speech he recently delivered in Sarajevo. Comments have been lightly edited for clarity. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are my own and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in my remarks should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Fragile Truce at the Durand Line: Will the Afghanistan–Pakistan Ceasefire Last? https://belimedia.com.ng/a-fragile-truce-at-the-durand-line-will-the-afghanistanpakistan-ceasefire-last https://belimedia.com.ng/a-fragile-truce-at-the-durand-line-will-the-afghanistanpakistan-ceasefire-last

OPINION — One of the most enduring security issues in South Asia has been rekindled by the recent border conflicts between the Taliban-led Afghanistan and Pakistan military regimes. Diplomatic efforts by Qatar and Turkey have resulted in a tenuous ceasefire after days of fierce fighting that claimed scores of lives on both sides, offering a little respite from the rising violence. However, talks for a lasting peace have since collapsed. The crisis reveals long-standing structural tensions along one of the most volatile frontiers in the world that have their roots in militant activity, historical enmity, and disputed sovereignty.

Escalation and Triggers of Conflict

Intense fighting broke out along several stretches of the 2,600-kilometer Afghanistan-Pakistan Durand line in early October 2025, especially close to Spin Boldak–Chaman and the Kurram tribal areas. Each side accused the other of starting the conflict. The Taliban-led government denounced Pakistan's retaliatory bombings as a violation of national sovereignty, while Pakistan asserted that militants connected to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were conducting cross-Durand line attacks from Afghan territory. According to reports, Pakistani air raids in the provinces of Kandahar and Paktika killed dozens of civilians. Taliban members retaliated by attacking a number of Pakistani military installations, with the opposing side suffering heavy losses. Afghan traders are losing millions of dollars every day as a result of the conflict's rapid disruption of humanitarian and commercial routes, which led to the closure of important Durand line crossings.

This breakdown was not the first. Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban of harbouring the TTP, a group committed to destroying Pakistan's government but philosophically linked with Kabul's leadership. The Taliban have refuted these claims, stating that Afghanistan forbids the use of its territory against other countries. However, the Durand Line, from the colonial era, continues to function as a political and geographic fault line, trapping both sides in a never-ending blame game.

The Doha-Istanbul Ceasefire Agreement

An emergency ceasefire agreement was reached on October 19, 2025, following nearly a week of fighting, thanks to intensive mediation by Qatar and Turkey. Both parties committed to immediately stopping offensive operations, prohibiting cross-Durand line attacks, and setting up systems for ensuring compliance under the agreement. To address implementation and verification procedures, a follow-up meeting was planned for October 25 in Istanbul. The deal was heralded as a diplomatic victory, particularly since Turkey and Qatar, who both have comparatively open lines of communication with the Taliban leadership, were instrumental in facilitating communication between two regimes which do not trust one another.

Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the defence minister for the Pakistani military dictatorship, underlined that Islamabad would evaluate the truce based on the Taliban's capacity to control the TTP. "This agreement will be broken by anything coming from Afghanistan," he cautioned. The Taliban's stated position that Afghanistan "will not allow its soil to be used against any country" was reaffirmed by Zabihullah Mujahid, the regime's spokesperson. Although these declarations show official dedication, they conceal more profound disparities in ability and perspective. The Taliban government sees the threat as a matter of border integrity and sovereignty, whereas Pakistan primarily sees it through the prism of counterterrorism. It will take more than diplomatic words to bridge different viewpoints.

Istanbul Talks

The follow-up talks in Istanbul — intended to turn the Doha truce into an enforceable framework—ended without a resolution after four days of negotiations. Reporting from multiple outlets indicates that mediators could not bridge the gap over concrete action against TTP networks allegedly operating from Taliban controlled soil and over how to verify any commitments. Pakistani regime’s officials briefed that Kabul was unwilling to accept binding steps to rein in or relocate the TTP; Afghan sources countered that the Taliban does not command or control the TTP and rejects responsibility for cross-Durand line attacks.

On the eve of, and during, the Istanbul round, Pakistan’s defence minister publicly warned that failure would risk “open war,” underscoring how narrow the window is for diplomacy if violence resumes along the frontier. While he acknowledged the ceasefire had broadly held for several days, he framed the talks’ success as contingent on Kabul’s verifiable curbs on the TTP.

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Key unresolved issues

First, TTP-focused measures: Islamabad sought explicit commitments (dismantling safe havens, detentions/relocations, or handovers of wanted militants), while Kabul insists it won’t allow Afghan territory to be used against neighbours but resists operations that might trigger internal backlash or fracture ties with sympathetic factions. No binding text on TTP was agreed.

Second, a verification and incident-prevention mechanism: negotiators discussed joint hotlines, third-party monitoring, or liaison teams stationed in cross-Durand line hubs to investigate incidents in real time. Talks stalled over scope, authority, and who would adjudicate disputes.

Third, the Durand Line: Pakistan has fenced large stretches and wants coordinated patrols and recognized crossing protocols; the Taliban does not formally recognize the Durand Line as an international boundary, making technical fixes politically sensitive. This gap persisted in Istanbul.

Fourth, trade and crossings: business lobbies on both sides pushed for a timetable to reopen Spin Boldak–Chaman and other checkpoints for normal commerce and humanitarian flows, but negotiators did not finalize sequencing (security steps first vs. parallel reopening).

Fifth, refugees and returns: Islamabad raised concerns around undocumented Afghans and cross-Durand line facilitation; Kabul pressed for humanitarian safeguards. No durable arrangement was announced.

Obstacles to Durable Peace

The structural issues threatening Afghanistan-Pakistan ties are still mostly unaddressed in spite of the truce. First, the ceasefire does not include militant organisations like the TTP. Their independence severely restricts the enforceability of the agreement. According to analysts, the Taliban are reluctant to use force to fight the TTP because of ethnic and ideological ties that make internal Afghan politics more difficult.

Second, monitoring is quite challenging because of the porous nature of the Durand-line. Pakistan has unilaterally fenced off significant portions of the Durand Line, whereas Afghanistan does not formally recognise it as an international border. Recurrent conflicts are exacerbated by this lack of mutual recognition, especially when it comes to security patrols and cross-Durand line trading.

Third, there is still an imbalance of interests. Attacks by militants coming from Afghanistan are the problem for Pakistan. Pakistan's repeated airstrikes and backing of anti-Taliban groups are the source of Kabul's resentment. Joint security coordination is hampered by these conflicting narratives.

Fourth, pressure from within both governments is increasing. While the Taliban in Afghanistan must strike a compromise between meeting external demands and preserving their credibility among nationalist and tribal factions, public annoyance in Pakistan has increased due to an increase in attacks on security forces. Internal resentment could result from any impression of giving in.

Last but not least, the economic aspect introduces another level of complication. Afghanistan relies significantly on cross-border trade through Pakistan for imports and transit to global markets. Significant financial losses and humanitarian difficulties have resulted from the bridge closures. Unless trade flows restart fully, the truce will have limited practical effects.

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The Strategic and Regional Implications

There are wider ramifications for South and Central Asia from the crisis and the resulting truce.

Stability and militancy in the region: Should the truce fail, transnational militant networks, such as IS-K and al-Qaida elements, may gain more confidence. Resuming hostilities might destabilise the entire region, as these organisations flourish in uncontrolled border areas.

Taliban governance: The truce also serves as a litmus test for the Taliban's ability to govern. Global opinions of its legitimacy as a ruling power will be influenced by its capacity to maintain territorial control, interact diplomatically, and quell militant groups.

Realignments in diplomacy: The participation of Qatar and Turkey demonstrates how regional diplomacy is changing. Both nations have established themselves as go-betweens that can interact with the Taliban government without granting official recognition. Their mediation highlights a changing power dynamic in South Asia, where non-Western actors are having a greater impact on resolving disputes.

Economic and humanitarian impact: The conflict's humanitarian effects go beyond its security implications. Food and medical supplies have been disrupted by the closing of the Cross-Durand line, and the situation for displaced people on both sides of the frontier is getting worse. Maintaining peace will depend on reopening trade channels and making sure help is delivered.

The Road Ahead

The establishment of cooperative verification systems, a quantifiable decline in militant attacks, and the resumption of trade are important markers to keep an eye on. If any party breaks the agreement, the area can quickly revert to hostilities. It will be a careful balancing act for Pakistan to keep pressure on the Taliban without inciting escalation. The ability of the Taliban to control militant organisations while maintaining internal unity and sovereignty will be put to the test in Afghanistan. Supporting monitoring, communication, and de-escalation procedures is essential for regional partners, especially Qatar and Turkey, to continue their mediation efforts beyond symbolic diplomacy. As of October 28, the Istanbul process has adjourned without a deal, leaving these markers unmet and the ceasefire’s durability uncertain until verifiable steps are negotiated.

In the end, the ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan serves as an example of the potential and vulnerability of regional diplomacy in a post-Western security context. In addition to bilateral discussions, broad regional collaboration tackling the interconnected problems of militancy, Durand-line governance, and economic interdependence will be necessary for a lasting peace. The willingness of both regimes to turn promises into tangible, verifiable action will determine whether this armistice develops into long-lasting stability or just serves as another brief break in a lengthy history of antagonism.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
‘Show Us the Video’: Lawmakers Seek Transparency in Anti&Drug Boat Strikes https://belimedia.com.ng/show-us-the-video-lawmakers-seek-transparency-in-anti-drug-boat-strikes https://belimedia.com.ng/show-us-the-video-lawmakers-seek-transparency-in-anti-drug-boat-strikes OPINION / FINE PRINT — “We have asked the Mexican government to also step up their involvement in stopping these cartels and stopping the huge amount of drugs that are coming across. If the Mexican navy saw a group of American fishermen that they thought were suspicious of potentially moving drugs and they moved in to kill the 15 American citizens without contacting you, without going through any normal procedures, would you be okay with that?...What we do in combat there is reciprocity, and we are concerned about what other militaries will do to us because we have opened the door on this.”

The was Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.) speaking back on September 18, during a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing for Derrick M. Anderson to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Platte B. Moring III to be the Defense Department Inspector General.

Three days earlier, the U.S. had carried out the second of its attacks on speedboats it said were trafficking drugs in the Caribbean that were destined for the U.S. killing three individuals. The first such attack, on September 1, killed 11 occupants.

Because the jobs both Anderson and Moring were up for would involve them dealing with the Trump administration’s new policy of attacking alleged narco-trafficking boats in international waters, Sen. Slotkin and other Senators raised questions at this hearing that are highly relevant today as these deadly Trump administration attacks have continued in the Caribbean and since Tuesday began in the eastern Pacific.

So far, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has reported nine such attacks resulting in the deaths of 37 individuals.

As I will explore below, last month, Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) at the close of this hearing made a pledge that remains unfulfilled – in effect to hold oversight hearings on the attacks.

Before that happened, Sen. Slotkin made clear, “I have no problem with these groups being designated foreign terrorist organizations. Fentanyl is killing just as many people, if not more, as any terrorist group we have ever seen. But I do have a problem with the lack of transparency and potential violations of international law.”

The Senator then pointed out, “The U.S. government has a way of interdicting ships. You know this. The U.S. Coast Guard uses patrol boats and helicopters. They are able to shoot out a motor and disable the vehicle, board it, and then indict all those people, grab all those people. Show everyone all the drugs that they have secured.”

As I wrote in my column three days ago, the U.S. Coast Guard announced October 14 that it has seized more than 100,000 pounds of cocaine in the eastern Pacific Ocean since launching Operation Pacific Viper in early August, averaging over 1,600 pounds interdicted daily. These drug seizures, and the apprehension of 86 individuals suspected of narco-trafficking, were the result of 34 interdictions since early August.

I also pointed out in that column, that on the day after the Coast Guard release of the success of Operation Pacific Viper, during an Oval Office press conference President Trump said that Coast Guard interdiction “had been ineffective” for 30 years because “they have faster boats.”

As Sen. Slotkin noted above, and I mentioned in my column, the Coast Guard has helicopter-mounted special long-range rifles that can hit and disable the engines mounted at the rear of narco-trafficker speedboats.

While Trump and Hegseth have publicized videos each time a boat has been blown up, I agree with Sen. Slotkin who at the September 18 hearing said, “I would love it if the Trump administration showed us the full video from that encounter, showed us that these men did not have their hands up, that they were not waving a white flag, that they were not turning around and getting out of there, and then show us the drugs. The President said that there were all kinds of drugs that were in that ship. Show it. Show us the video that he is apparently alluding to.”

Hegseth did show what he said were packages of drugs floating on the water after yesterday’s eastern Pacific action, but then the drugs appeared to have been blown up.

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Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) followed Slotkin and brought up a series of questions he and 24 other Democratic or Independent Senators had sent to the White House on September 10, and had not received answers. In fact, they have not yet received an answer.

The questions are worth reviewing: “Give us the evidence that these boats were carrying drugs. Tell us who was on the boats. Tell us what your legal authority was to take a military strike that had not been authorized by Congress? The question that I really want to know is why did you decide to attack rather than interdict? If you interdict a drug boat you get evidence. You seize the drugs but you also get evidence by having access to people and often it is that evidence that leads you to be able to go after the kingpins and the real, you know, muscle behind these operators.”

Kaine added, “If you attack a boat and destroy it makes an impact, but you do not get the evidence. It may actually be counter-productive in fighting narco trafficking.”

As I noted above, when Chairman Wicker closed the September 18 hearing, he said, “The questions about what happened in the Caribbean [and now eastern Pacific] are going to have to be answered. This committee has congressional oversight responsibility.”

Earlier, Sens. Wicker and Slotkin had an exchange about what might occur at any future oversight hearing.

Chairman Wicker reminded Slotkin that “each witness has answered in the affirmative to this question, ‘do you agree to provide records, documents, electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this committee, et cetera.’ So that is on the record.”

Sen. Slotkin asked, “Do you understand that as video? Just to clarify for me, Chairman.”

Chairman Wicker responded, “Documents, records. I think each witness has answered in the affirmative there…and they will be obligated to follow that.”

“Great,” Sen. Slotkin said at one point, “I look forward to the video.”

I think we all do.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
Tehran’s Espionage Network in the U.S. Is Bigger and Bolder Than You Think https://belimedia.com.ng/tehrans-espionage-network-in-the-us-is-bigger-and-bolder-than-you-think https://belimedia.com.ng/tehrans-espionage-network-in-the-us-is-bigger-and-bolder-than-you-think

DEEP DIVE — Front companies, campus networks, diaspora recruits — Tehran’s espionage push on U.S. soil is bigger, bolder, and harder to track than many realize.

On July 31, a coalition of Western governments led by the United States publicly warned of a wave of Iranian intelligence activity they said was aimed at “killing, kidnapping, and harassing” dissidents, journalists and officials across Europe and North America. The unusually blunt joint statement, signed by Washington, London, Paris, Berlin and more, said Iranian services were increasingly collaborating with criminal networks and called for coordinated defenses.

That diplomatic alarm was echoed in criminal courts and federal filings in recent months. In Oslo over the summer, prosecutors put a former security guard at the U.S. Embassy on trial after accusing him of offering building floor plans and security routines to both Russian and Iranian operatives in return for euros and cryptocurrency; an example of how even low-level hostile services can monetize perimeter jobs.

In the United States, a more concrete case played out in federal court this spring when a former Federal Aviation Administration contractor, Abouzar Rahmati, pleaded guilty in April to acting as an unregistered agent of the Iranian government after allegedly seeking aviation and solar-energy technology and passing non-public data to Iran. Prosecutors said the activity combined procurement, intelligence collection, and network building — classic gray-zone tradecraft that can be lethal in aggregate even if individual acts appear isolated.

Moreover, the FBI has publicly sought information on an Iranian intelligence officer it says recruited intermediaries for surveillance and for plots intended as retaliation for the 2020 killing of Qassem Soleimani — showing Tehran remains willing to task operatives to target current or former U.S. officials.

Together, these cases illustrate a pattern more than a single conspiratorial plan.

“Iran’s espionage efforts in the U.S. and allied countries are perhaps increasing, in both frequency and sophistication,” Colin Clarke, a senior research fellow at The Soufan Center, tells The Cipher Brief. “But it goes beyond mere espionage and extends to surveillance and active terror plots.”

Three recurrent patterns

Recent public cases and multiple intelligence assessments indicate three recurring lines of operation.

First: access and mapping. Low-level staff, contractors and service providers have proximity to sensitive facilities. The U.S. embassy case underscores how seemingly peripheral access can be valuable to foreign services. Even information that is not classified—floor plans, guard rotations, contractor lists—can be stitched together into operational value.

Second: procurement and sanctions evasion. Tehran has long sought aviation, dual-use and energy components through front companies and covert procurement channels. The Rahmati plea demonstrates how U.S. contractor credibility can be leveraged to facilitate the movement of goods, knowledge, or lists of potential collaborators. “Sanctions evasion and procurement are treated more as a ‘legitimate’ business opportunity in their eyes,” Matthew Levitt of The Washington Institute noted, distinguishing those networks from strictly human intelligence operations.

Third: transnational repression and violent plotting. The FBI’s public notice about Majid Dastjani Farahani made clear that some taskings included surveillance of religious sites and recruitment for attacks framed as revenge for Soleimani’s killing. That is the line where intelligence collection and terrorism blur—a mixing of objectives that, several experts warned, raises the stakes.

How they recruit — the blunt and the subtle

Recruitment, the experts said, follows both old and new playbooks.

“Recruitment inducements are the same as always: family pressure, financial, ego, gradual approaches, honey traps,” a former senior U.S. intelligence official tells The Cipher Brief on the condition of anonymity. “Tehran has enjoyed the cyber world like everyone else.”

The explicit lever — threats to family back home — is a recurring thread in dozens of post-incident reviews. Historical cases such as the 2013 Manssor Arbabsiar plot are helpful reminders of old patterns; Arbabsiar’s prosecution remains a touchstone for the limits and dangers of outsourced plots.

Clarke also noted that Iran’s services have broadened their toolkit in recent years to “outsource activities to a range of criminal entities, including gangs,” reflecting a hybrid strategy that mixes ideological operatives with transactional cut-outs.

Beth Sanner, the former deputy director of national intelligence for mission integration, stressed the diaspora angle: Iran has stepped up harassment and plotting against exiles and communities abroad in countries like Australia and across Europe, since the Soleimani strike and increasingly relies on local criminal networks to carry out deniable tasks, making the work of drawing connections incredibly difficult for investigators.

“We have not seen Iran be as successful with this in the U.S., that we know of,” Sanner tells The Cipher Brief, “but I think it is only a matter of time.”

Matthew Levitt, senior fellow and director of counterterrorism and intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, described the human-cyber fusion that makes modern tradecraft effective. Once operators can access email or scheduling systems, they can combine that intrusion with social engineering to track or manipulate targets.

“Once they had an interest in people like Ambassador Bolton or Secretary Pompeo, they’d want to know where Bolton would be next Tuesday,” he tells The Cipher Brief.

Levitt recounted being spoofed in a recent European operation — emails and ProtonMail contacts posed as him, and an operator even used an American-accented voice on WhatsApp to reinforce the ruse.

The tactic is simple, low-cost and scalable.

The murky middle — law, attribution and the limits of remedies

Part of the problem is structural: Western legal systems punish the actors who are caught, but they often struggle to hold accountable the shadowy operators who task them.

“We punish those involved in operations, not those behind operations,” the anonymous official said. “We handle Iran’s work as a legal issue, not as a state warfare issue.”

That legal framing shapes the available responses — criminal prosecutions, sanctions, diplomatic expulsions — while stopping short of kinetic or overt state-level countermeasures.

That framework, such experts caution, often leaves gaps in deterrence, creating space for Iran to continue experimenting with plots that may appear clumsy but still carry real risk.

Clarke warned that Tehran may have been “amateurish” in some plots. Still, it learns from failure and retains motive: revenge for Soleimani, pressure over nuclear setbacks, and the strategic aim of deterring dissidents.

“It would be a mistake to dismiss the severity of their intent,” he said.

What’s being done — and what should change

Governments are moving earlier in the threat lifecycle. In late June and July, U.S. authorities announced targeted immigration and enforcement actions against Iranian nationals in operations that officials said were designed to disrupt suspected networks and procurement channels. Those arrests, often filed as immigration or export-control violations, signal a preference for prevention over public prosecutions alone.

Experts recommended layered, practical reforms: universities and research centers should bolster insider-risk training and clear reporting pathways; contracting agencies need tighter vetting and monitoring of supply-chain access; allied services must share watchlists and technical indicators more rapidly; and communities vulnerable to transnational repression deserve coordinated consular and protective measures.

Clarke urged more realistic briefings for students and visiting scholars about the risks of coercion and family leverage, while Levitt emphasized the importance of basic cyber hygiene and multi-factor authentication checks that can mitigate social-engineering campaigns.

The longer arc

Iranian intelligence, however, is not a mirror of Russia or China: its budgets, technological reach and bureaucratic sophistication differ.

“The Iranians aren’t as advanced as the Chinese or the Russians,” Clarke noted. “Tehran’s plots have been a bit more amateurish and cumbersome.”

But intent matters. Levitt put it starkly: “Just because some of their operations look like Keystone Cops doesn’t mean they won’t succeed eventually. We have to get it right every time; they only need to succeed once.”

And Sanner warned that a shift toward criminal proxies makes attribution harder and response slower — fueling a permissive environment.

Historically, Tehran has combined state actors and proxies — most infamously through Hezbollah in the 1990s in Latin America — and the pattern of outsourcing persists. The task for U.S. policy is not only to prosecute and sanction when possible, but to harden the soft targets: campuses, contracting pipelines, and diaspora communities that Iran can pressure or co-opt.

Bottom line

Iran’s external operations are diverse and adaptive. They mix old tools — family coercion, diasporic leverage — with modern techniques, including cyber intrusion, online social engineering, and the purchase of deniable cut-outs.

The July 31 allied statement signaled an unusual diplomatic consensus; the public cases in Oslo, Washington and beyond show why that consensus has teeth. However, experts caution that the work to blunt Tehran’s pressure must be sustained, technical and community-level as much as legal and diplomatic.

As the one former U.S. intelligence official put it: Iran’s intelligence activity remains “the only threat that is simultaneously urgent, lethal, and strategic.”

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.


]]>
Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
Washington’s New Frontline: The Caribbean Emerges as a Test of U.S. Power https://belimedia.com.ng/washingtons-new-frontline-the-caribbean-emerges-as-a-test-of-us-power https://belimedia.com.ng/washingtons-new-frontline-the-caribbean-emerges-as-a-test-of-us-power

DEEP DIVE — U.S. military forces this week carried out yet another strike on a vessel in Caribbean waters off Venezuela, marking the sixth such lethal operation since September. For the first time, two survivors were rescued and taken into U.S. custody aboard a navy ship.

President Trump also confirmed that he has authorized covert CIA operations inside Venezuela, dramatically broadening the theater of confrontation. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro appealed to the U.N. Security Council, demanding the body denounce the strikes as violations of sovereign rights — a motion the U.S. is poised to veto.

These actions are the latest installments in a mounting campaign the U.S. launched in early September, signaling a shift from isolated interdictions into sustained military pressure.

On September 2, U.S. forces struck a vessel in international waters, killing 11 people, and claimed that it belonged to the Tren de Aragua gang and was laden with narcotics. Just over a week later, Washington unveiled an extensive naval deployment comprised of eight warships, a submarine and thousands of troops and launched a second attack against another alleged smuggling vessel, sending a clear message that the operation is systematic rather than episodic.

Then, in early October, the administration formally alerted Congress that the United States was in “armed conflict” with regional drug cartels, and promptly followed with another strike off Venezuela’s coast, killing four.

What began as maritime interdictions has evolved into a strategic escalation — combining naval power, aerial presence, covert action, and legal redefinition of cartels — in what appears to be an intensifying, long-term confrontation.

Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells The Cipher Brief the strikes “represent a paradigm shift in how the United States conducts counternarcotics.”

“Previously, the United States would board and search vessels and make arrests. Driving much of this paradigm shift is the foreign terrorist designations on more than a dozen organizations,” he continued. “The administration wants to send the message that this is not just a rhetorical shift, but that this is a shift with meaning. We deal with terrorists differently than we deal with criminals.”

From Quiet Waters to Strategic Theater

For decades, the Caribbean was viewed in Washington as a quiet, if troubled, backyard, important for migration and commerce, but hardly central to global competition. That calculation has changed. Today, the region is framed as a frontline of American power, where the U.S. confronts a convergence of transnational threats — from drug trafficking and irregular migration to external influence from China, Russia, and Iran — that unfold just off its own shores.

Michael Shifter, adjunct professor at Georgetown University and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue, tells The Cipher Brief that the strikes “will have a critical impact on the Caribbean security situation.”

“For the first time since the Panama invasion in 1989, the U.S. has carried out combat operations against assets allegedly connected to a Latin American government,” he noted. “That the strikes were conducted without regard to international law has unnerved other regional governments and made them wonder if they might be the next target.”

For much of the post-Cold War era, the Caribbean was not a primary theater for U.S. grand strategy. Policymakers often focused on the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, leaving the islands and waterways between Florida and South America to languish in relative neglect. The U.S. presence was episodic and reactive — providing disaster relief after hurricanes, conducting occasional counternarcotics patrols, and offering modest development aid.

But adversaries were not idle. China deepened infrastructure investments, secured port access, and trained regional military officers in its academies. Russia provided defense diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and symbolic shows of force. Iran, though less prominent, found opportunity through Venezuela and proxy networks. These activities chipped away at U.S. primacy, testing whether Washington’s absence created a strategic vacuum.

“The presence of the expanded array of U.S. surveillance assets, cruisers, destroyers, amphibious ships, F-35 fighters, and other forces, in conjunction with the demonstrated use of force and reported planning for strikes inside Venezuela, are visibly driving panicked reactions by the Maduro regime,” Evan Ellis, research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, tells The Cipher Brief. “This demonstrates that the U.S. is willing to go beyond traditional law enforcement interception protocols to use lethal force against suspected drug boats.”

A Renewed U.S. Deterrent Strategy

The Trump administration has reframed narcotics networks as “narco terrorists,” a label that blurs the line between law enforcement and national defense. This allows for military strikes against what once would have been considered criminal targets. The Venezuelan boat destroyed on September 2 is the most vivid example yet, and it sparked immediate backlash from governments in Caracas, Bogotá, and across the Caribbean.

Venezuela condemned the strike as a violation of sovereignty, with Nicolás Maduro mobilizing civilian militias and promising to defend territorial waters. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro went further, calling for international investigations into U.S. officials for what he termed unlawful killings. Fishermen in Trinidad and Tobago expressed concern about being caught in the crossfire, as expanded naval patrols threatened their livelihoods and heightened the risks to civilian vessels.

From Washington’s perspective, these costs are tolerable compared to the benefits of deterrence. Deploying advanced assets — such as F-35 fighters to Puerto Rico — signals that the U.S. views the region as strategically vital. The administration is also seeking to highlight the deterrent value of its strikes, suggesting they could disrupt smuggling operations and complicate adversaries’ strategic planning.

Still, questions loom about legality and proportionality.

“Unilateral U.S. military operations in Latin America have a long and often unhappy history,” Shifter said. “They remain extremely sensitive and touch a nerve in the region.”

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

The Policy Evolution: From Reactive to Strategic

The idea of a sustained U.S. Caribbean policy, however, is not new. The 2020 U.S. Strategy for Engagement in the Caribbean outlined plans for expanded diplomacy, development, and security cooperation. Yet progress was limited by competing priorities and budget shortfalls.

What has changed in 2025 is the scale and framing of U.S. involvement. Rather than treating the Caribbean as an ancillary focus of counternarcotics or disaster relief, the Trump administration now casts it as a frontline of national defense. The deployment of warships and high-tech aircraft, the aggressive legal redefinition of cartels, and the diplomatic outreach led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio all point to an institutional pivot.

Congress is also being drawn into the mix. The reintroduced Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act would allocate $88 million annually through 2029 for security cooperation. The measure reflects recognition that sustained resources, not episodic funding, are necessary to compete with external powers.

Risks, Imperatives, and What Comes Next

The road ahead carries both promise and peril. On the opportunity side, elevating the Caribbean to a strategic priority acknowledges geographic fact: the region sits on America’s doorstep, with busy sea lanes and chokepoints that have often been overlooked in U.S. defense planning. A credible deterrent posture, paired with investments in governance and development, could help steady fragile environments and blunt the appeal of rival powers.

Yet the risks of escalation are considerable. Misidentifying a civilian vessel, overreaching in the use of force, or neglecting consultation with regional partners could provoke backlash that undermines U.S. legitimacy.

“It is doubtful that the U.S. strikes will be effective in stopping the flow of narcotics,” Shifter cautioned. “Traffickers will adapt, alter their routes and try to minimize risks. Retaliation by criminal groups cannot be ruled out.”

Ellis warned of another danger: the aftermath of regime change in Venezuela.

“The biggest risks of such an operation would be whether Maduro could be captured alive. The other risk is that, in the absence of a more enduring U.S. force, the legitimate government of Edmundo González would not be able to establish order and control over the military,” he pointed out. “A post-Maduro Venezuela could degenerate into a free-for-all between criminal factions, guerrilla groups, sindicatos, and pranes — with Cuban and Russian elements fueling instability.”

Berg, by contrast, argued that regional cooperation has been robust.

“What has been great to see is the regional support for the United States’ deployment. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana have been vocally supportive,” he said. “The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Argentina have all declared the Tren de Aragua to be a foreign terrorist organization in the last month. Countries in the region appear open to a different approach, and some are even synchronizing their approaches with the United States on counternarcotics.”

The strike that killed 11 people was both a tactical hit on a trafficking network and a symbolic declaration of intent. What follows will decide whether this marks the start of a durable doctrine — or an overreach that produces more instability than it resolves.

“More consistent presence in the region will be key to ensuring that the United States can secure its interests,” Berg added.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

because National Security is Everyone’s Business. ]]>
Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Caribbean Emerges as a Test of U.S. Power https://belimedia.com.ng/the-caribbean-emerges-as-a-test-of-us-power https://belimedia.com.ng/the-caribbean-emerges-as-a-test-of-us-power

DEEP DIVE — U.S. military forces this week carried out yet another strike on a vessel in Caribbean waters off Venezuela, marking the sixth such lethal operation since September. For the first time, two survivors were rescued and taken into U.S. custody aboard a navy ship.

President Trump also confirmed that he has authorized covert CIA operations inside Venezuela, dramatically broadening the theater of confrontation. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro appealed to the U.N. Security Council, demanding the body denounce the strikes as violations of sovereign rights — a motion the U.S. is poised to veto.

These actions are the latest installments in a mounting campaign the U.S. launched in early September, signaling a shift from isolated interdictions into sustained military pressure.

On September 2, U.S. forces struck a vessel in international waters, killing 11 people, and claimed that it belonged to the Tren de Aragua gang and was laden with narcotics. Just over a week later, Washington unveiled an extensive naval deployment comprised of eight warships, a submarine and thousands of troops and launched a second attack against another alleged smuggling vessel, sending a clear message that the operation is systematic rather than episodic.

Then, in early October, the administration formally alerted Congress that the United States was in “armed conflict” with regional drug cartels, and promptly followed with another strike off Venezuela’s coast, killing four.

What began as maritime interdictions has evolved into a strategic escalation — combining naval power, aerial presence, covert action, and legal redefinition of cartels — in what appears to be an intensifying, long-term confrontation.

Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells The Cipher Brief the strikes “represent a paradigm shift in how the United States conducts counternarcotics.”

“Previously, the United States would board and search vessels and make arrests. Driving much of this paradigm shift is the foreign terrorist designations on more than a dozen organizations,” he continued. “The administration wants to send the message that this is not just a rhetorical shift, but that this is a shift with meaning. We deal with terrorists differently than we deal with criminals.”

From Quiet Waters to Strategic Theater

For decades, the Caribbean was viewed in Washington as a quiet, if troubled, backyard, important for migration and commerce, but hardly central to global competition. That calculation has changed. Today, the region is framed as a frontline of American power, where the U.S. confronts a convergence of transnational threats — from drug trafficking and irregular migration to external influence from China, Russia, and Iran — that unfold just off its own shores.

Michael Shifter, adjunct professor at Georgetown University and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue, tells The Cipher Brief that the strikes “will have a critical impact on the Caribbean security situation.”

“For the first time since the Panama invasion in 1989, the U.S. has carried out combat operations against assets allegedly connected to a Latin American government,” he noted. “That the strikes were conducted without regard to international law has unnerved other regional governments and made them wonder if they might be the next target.”

For much of the post-Cold War era, the Caribbean was not a primary theater for U.S. grand strategy. Policymakers often focused on the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, leaving the islands and waterways between Florida and South America to languish in relative neglect. The U.S. presence was episodic and reactive — providing disaster relief after hurricanes, conducting occasional counternarcotics patrols, and offering modest development aid.

But adversaries were not idle. China deepened infrastructure investments, secured port access, and trained regional military officers in its academies. Russia provided defense diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and symbolic shows of force. Iran, though less prominent, found opportunity through Venezuela and proxy networks. These activities chipped away at U.S. primacy, testing whether Washington’s absence created a strategic vacuum.

“The presence of the expanded array of U.S. surveillance assets, cruisers, destroyers, amphibious ships, F-35 fighters, and other forces, in conjunction with the demonstrated use of force and reported planning for strikes inside Venezuela, are visibly driving panicked reactions by the Maduro regime,” Evan Ellis, research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, tells The Cipher Brief. “This demonstrates that the U.S. is willing to go beyond traditional law enforcement interception protocols to use lethal force against suspected drug boats.”

A Renewed U.S. Deterrent Strategy

The Trump administration has reframed narcotics networks as “narco terrorists,” a label that blurs the line between law enforcement and national defense. This allows for military strikes against what once would have been considered criminal targets. The Venezuelan boat destroyed on September 2 is the most vivid example yet, and it sparked immediate backlash from governments in Caracas, Bogotá, and across the Caribbean.

Venezuela condemned the strike as a violation of sovereignty, with Nicolás Maduro mobilizing civilian militias and promising to defend territorial waters. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro went further, calling for international investigations into U.S. officials for what he termed unlawful killings. Fishermen in Trinidad and Tobago expressed concern about being caught in the crossfire, as expanded naval patrols threatened their livelihoods and heightened the risks to civilian vessels.

From Washington’s perspective, these costs are tolerable compared to the benefits of deterrence. Deploying advanced assets — such as F-35 fighters to Puerto Rico — signals that the U.S. views the region as strategically vital. The administration is also seeking to highlight the deterrent value of its strikes, suggesting they could disrupt smuggling operations and complicate adversaries’ strategic planning.

Still, questions loom about legality and proportionality.

“Unilateral U.S. military operations in Latin America have a long and often unhappy history,” Shifter said. “They remain extremely sensitive and touch a nerve in the region.”

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

The Policy Evolution: From Reactive to Strategic

The idea of a sustained U.S. Caribbean policy, however, is not new. The 2020 U.S. Strategy for Engagement in the Caribbean outlined plans for expanded diplomacy, development, and security cooperation. Yet progress was limited by competing priorities and budget shortfalls.

What has changed in 2025 is the scale and framing of U.S. involvement. Rather than treating the Caribbean as an ancillary focus of counternarcotics or disaster relief, the Trump administration now casts it as a frontline of national defense. The deployment of warships and high-tech aircraft, the aggressive legal redefinition of cartels, and the diplomatic outreach led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio all point to an institutional pivot.

Congress is also being drawn into the mix. The reintroduced Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act would allocate $88 million annually through 2029 for security cooperation. The measure reflects recognition that sustained resources, not episodic funding, are necessary to compete with external powers.

Risks, Imperatives, and What Comes Next

The road ahead carries both promise and peril. On the opportunity side, elevating the Caribbean to a strategic priority acknowledges geographic fact: the region sits on America’s doorstep, with busy sea lanes and chokepoints that have often been overlooked in U.S. defense planning. A credible deterrent posture, paired with investments in governance and development, could help steady fragile environments and blunt the appeal of rival powers.

Yet the risks of escalation are considerable. Misidentifying a civilian vessel, overreaching in the use of force, or neglecting consultation with regional partners could provoke backlash that undermines U.S. legitimacy.

“It is doubtful that the U.S. strikes will be effective in stopping the flow of narcotics,” Shifter cautioned. “Traffickers will adapt, alter their routes and try to minimize risks. Retaliation by criminal groups cannot be ruled out.”

Ellis warned of another danger: the aftermath of regime change in Venezuela.

“The biggest risks of such an operation would be whether Maduro could be captured alive. The other risk is that, in the absence of a more enduring U.S. force, the legitimate government of Edmundo González would not be able to establish order and control over the military,” he pointed out. “A post-Maduro Venezuela could degenerate into a free-for-all between criminal factions, guerrilla groups, sindicatos, and pranes — with Cuban and Russian elements fueling instability.”

Berg, by contrast, argued that regional cooperation has been robust.

“What has been great to see is the regional support for the United States’ deployment. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana have been vocally supportive,” he said. “The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Argentina have all declared the Tren de Aragua to be a foreign terrorist organization in the last month. Countries in the region appear open to a different approach, and some are even synchronizing their approaches with the United States on counternarcotics.”

The strike that killed 11 people was both a tactical hit on a trafficking network and a symbolic declaration of intent. What follows will decide whether this marks the start of a durable doctrine — or an overreach that produces more instability than it resolves.

“More consistent presence in the region will be key to ensuring that the United States can secure its interests,” Berg added.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

because National Security is Everyone’s Business. ]]>
Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside Zelensky’s “Mega&Drone Deal” with the U.S. https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-zelenskys-mega-drone-deal-with-the-us https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-zelenskys-mega-drone-deal-with-the-us

DEEP DIVE – Often lost in the Trump administration's on-again, off-again offer to deliver Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine is the proposed deal that would see Kyiv supply military technology to Washington, rather than the other way around. It’s a potential military and political boon to Ukraine, and a reflection of the remarkable speed and quality of Ukraine’s defense-sector innovation.

“Ukraine now has technologies that have been proven to be effective against a peer adversary – namely Russia,” Samuel Bendett, a Russia expert at the Center for Naval Analyses Russia Studies Program, told The Cipher Brief. “These are not just concepts. These are not just prototypes. These are actual proven, battlefield-tested technologies. And they are in demand.”

President Volodymyr Zelensky first proposed what he called the “mega-drone deal” with the U.S. in July, calling it a “win-win” arrangement under which the U.S. would gain Ukraine’s battlefield‑tested drones and technology, and his country would get a new stream of American military aid. The Tomahawks were to have been part of the deal, but while the Oct. 17 Trump-Zelensky White House meeting appeared to close the door on that possibility, Zelensky said he had held talks on the broader deal with U.S. officials and leaders of Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.

Back in Kyiv, Zelensky said he had made the case that the war has provided an unparalleled testing ground for Ukraine’s arsenal of new drone weapons. “The U.S. has a large industry,” he said, “yet the industry itself says: ‘We don’t have your practice today, and undoubtedly your drones are the best today’.”

Defense tech and security experts have raved for years about the scope and speed of Ukraine's defense innovation. At last week’s Cipher Brief 2025 Threat Conference, former CIA Director Gen. David Petraeus spoke of the “staggering” scale of Ukraine’s drone production, and a gap between Ukraine’s pace of innovation and U.S. defense preparedness.

“We're not responding rapidly enough to that in the United States,” Gen. Petraeus said. “Keep in mind we're manufacturing maybe 300,000-400,000 drones in the United States. The Ukrainians alone are manufacturing 3.5 million.”

Zelensky’s challenge now is to leverage that success to get his “mega-drone deal” done – and to turn his country from a recipient of U.S. military aid to a defense industry trading partner of Washington’s.

The Ukrainian Edge

In the three and a half years since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has vaulted to the top tiers of global defense technology innovation – a warp-speed evolution from what Ukrainian member of parliament Oleksiy Goncharenko called “garage-scale” to “battlefield-scale” production of sophisticated, cutting-edge weaponry. An October Jamestown Foundation report says Ukraine now has "the world's most innovative defense sector."

The country’s greatest successes have come with drone weaponry. In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Ukraine welcomed deliveries of Turkish Bayraktar drones – what some called the saviour of Ukraine’s initial resistance – but from the start, the country’s tech and defense sectors went to work to boost their own UAV production.

“Drone factories cropped up in every garage across Ukraine once people started realizing the utility of drones and how important they would be,” Retired Chief Warrant Officer Joey Gagnard told The Cipher Brief conference.

Today the made-in-Ukraine arsenal features the FPV (“first person view”) attack drones, long-range strike UAVs, and an array of interceptor and underwater drones. On Oct. 22, Ukraine’s Security Service unveiled a new generation of “Sea Baby” naval drones that can travel nearly 1,000 miles and carry 4,000 pounds of cargo.

Goncharenko believes it was the underwater drones that first captured broad attention in the West, following sea-drone attacks that damaged or destroyed nearly a dozen Russian ships.

“It was an absolutely new chapter in maritime warfare and there was a lot of interest,” Goncharenko told The Cipher Brief. “It was clear that no other nation has this, and when you have something new and really effective, others will be interested.”

Certainly the U.S. is interested. In June, the White House issued an Executive Order aimed at boosting the American drone sector, and Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll has spoken often of the need for the U.S. to learn from the Ukrainian experience.

“When you look at Ukraine and how the battle is being fought, it is no longer sufficient to have a long procurement process that takes two and a half years to get the first prototype, two more years to get it at scale, and then four years to get it in the hands of soldiers,” Driscoll told The War On the Rocks podcast. “Those eight years, contrasted with the two weeks right now that drones are being updated in Ukraine, have made it an imperative that either we do this now or we do it in the first six months of a conflict when American soldiers are losing their lives.”

Driscoll and others have highlighted Ukraine’s June “Spider Web” operation in which 117 FPV drones damaged more than 40 fighter jets at five Russian bases. “At a cost of a mere tens of thousands of dollars,” Driscoll said, “Ukraine inflicted billions in damage, potentially setting back Russia’s bomber capabilities for years.”

Beyond the weapons themselves, Western defense officials have taken note of Ukraine’s “Brave1,” a platform that encourages innovation and includes a digital procurement system under which frontline commanders can offer feedback on weaponry, and order drones directly from manufacturers, with delivery in as little as a week. That would be a stunningly fast rate of response for any military.

“Ukraine has created a very fast innovation cycle and one which I think is different from the typical approach both in the U.S. and other NATO countries” Andrew Radin, a Senior Political Analyst at RAND, told The Cipher Brief. “That quick-turn, decentralized approach is quite different and one that I think U.S. leaders are learning from. There's clearly an idea to draw inspiration from Ukrainian practices.”

According to several reports, senior U.S. military officers in Europe have studied the Brave1 system, which lists hundreds of Ukrainian drone weapons for sale. Ukrainian repair shops also provide rapid emergency help, keeping battlefield systems operational — another capability U.S. officials are hoping to replicate.

“We’re going to have to be more agile,” Randy George, the Army Chief of Staff, said in June. “Drones are going to constantly change…We’re going to need a lot more agility in how we buy things.”

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Anatomy of a deal

The essence of the proposed “mega-drone deal” is simple – an exchange that brings high-demand weapons and technology to both sides.

The U.S. would acquire a range of Ukrainian drone weaponry — low‑cost “attritable” systems (i.e. drones that are expendable without great financial loss); cutting-edge counter-drone technologies; and above all, systems that have been tested and proven in ways that cannot possibly be replicated in the U.S.

“Ukraine has resources and education that the U.S. and other partners have not had,” Radin said. “And Ukraine, because of its wartime incentives, is pursuing products for the immediate current technology and challenges that they're facing, whereas Western industry and Western MODs [ministries of defense] have been trying to think forward and predict how we operate.”

“All the technology and weaponry that Ukraine brings to the table is combat proven, and that’s not something that can be said for a lot of American systems,” Bendett said. “The U.S. defense sector is very adaptable, but we don’t have that sense of urgency. Our back is not against the wall.”

Among the benefits for Ukraine are help in scaling its drone production, greater profits for its growing defense industries, and a more reliable supply of American air-defense and long-range weaponry. And – perhaps as important as anything — the less tangible benefit of a long-term defense partnership with the U.S.

“This deal is not just military, it’s political, because Ukraine needs U.S. support,” Bendett said. “You’re not just buying a weapon or a system. You’re buying political will, you’re buying alliances.”

“Every piece of our cooperation with the United States is valuable because for us, cooperation with the United States means building a relationship,” Goncharenko said. “We need this cooperation. So for us it's absolutely win-win.”

Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials have put the potential value of the U.S.-Ukraine defense trade in the tens of billions of dollars. In early October, a delegation led by Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Minister Serhii Boyev traveled to the U.S. to work out “technical” implementation details, and by the time of Zelensky’s visit, the two sides were said to be “finalizing a framework.” But officials on both sides have said it may take several months to bring a deal across the finish line.

Among details and questions to settle: Whether the U.S. would buy existing weapons or license Ukrainian designs — and if the latter, would the drones be manufactured in a joint partnership with Ukrainians? There is precedent for such partnerships; on Oct. 20, AIRO and the Ukrainian defense company Bullet announced a joint venture for the production of high-speed interceptor drones. Any U.S. purchase of existing Ukrainian drones would require vetting for any Chinese‑origin components, to satisfy U.S. export‑control protocols.

Meanwhile, the overall relationship – and President Trump’s own vagaries – hang over any potential arrangement. In the last month alone, the administration has swung repeatedly from seemingly pro-Ukraine views (i.e., the proposed Tomahawk delivery) to greater sympathy for Moscow (the proposed Budapest summit between Trump and Vladimir Putin) and back again. Among the Ukrainian hopes is that the drone-tech-for weapons deal would offer some insulation, the next time the pendulum of U.S. policy swings back towards Moscow.

“The drones are one of the ‘cards’ we do have,” Goncharenko said, a reference to the disastrous Feb. 28 Oval Office meeting at which Trump castigated Zelensky and told him, “You don’t have any cards.” He added that while he never doubted the skill levels in his country’s high-tech sector, he also could never have fathomed that Ukraine might one day produce weaponry that the U.S. would wish to buy.

“I couldn't imagine that Ukrainian defense technologies will be one of the most prominent on the planet. All of this was quite unimaginable,” Goncharenko said. And then he added, with a smile, “I think now Trump would not say you don't have any cards. We don't have many cards, but we do have some.”

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
America’s Drug Crisis: Why the U.S. Must Fight Traffickers Abroad—and Addiction at Home https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-drug-crisis-why-the-us-must-fight-traffickers-abroadand-addiction-at-home https://belimedia.com.ng/americas-drug-crisis-why-the-us-must-fight-traffickers-abroadand-addiction-at-home OPINION — It is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to ensure that illicit drugs do not enter the U.S. and to ensure that those countries and narcotraffickers involved in the illicit drug business are prevented from bringing these illicit drugs into the U.S., for the sole purpose of inflicting harm on our people and enriching themselves.

In 2024, about 73 million Americans aged 12 and above reported using an illicit drug, with 28.2 million Americans having a drug use disorder. In 2023, over 587,000 Americans in this age group had a heroin use disorder and by 2024, about 1.3 million Americans had a cocaine use disorder. Clearly, the U.S. has a drug problem that’s principally affecting our younger generation.

Heroin, Fentanyl (using precursor chemicals and equipment largely from companies in China) and Methamphetamine comes principally from Mexico, with Colombia producing most of the cocaine, smuggled into the U.S. via maritime routes or overland through Central America and Mexico into the U.S.

Venezuela does not produce large quantities of cocaine, but it is in key air and sea routes (to the Caribbean or Atlantic coast) used by the Colombian trafficking organizations, like the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group) and other dissident groups and independent drug cartels. This has made Venezuela a significant hub for drug trafficking, principally for Colombian cocaine destined for the U.S., Europe or West Africa.

In 2005, then President Hugo Chavez expelled the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) from Venezuela, claiming DEA was using counter-narcotics for intelligence collection purposes. This allegation was obviously false, but it then permitted Venezuela to traffic in drugs with literally no U.S. oversight.

The U.S. Government has indicted several Venezuelan generals and other high-ranking military officials deeply involved in international drug trafficking, primarily facilitating cocaine shipments from Colombia through Venezuela. The U.S. Government has named these military affiliated groups the “Cartel of the Suns” and designated it a terrorist organization in 2025.

As of October 24, a tenth vessel was attacked by the Trump administration. The vessel allegedly was carrying illicit narcotics and drug smugglers from the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, a terrorist organization.

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The U.S. works with Mexico and Columbia – and others -- on several counternarcotics programs, to include monitoring and eliminating the organized criminal groups (narcotraffickers) that deal with these drugs and (coca) plant eradication efforts, to name just a few counternarcotic joint efforts with partner countries. The DEA is the principal U.S. agency responsible for these programs, aided by the State Department, the military and the Intelligence Community, working closely with host country law enforcement and military entities.

The U.S. works closely with Mexico, Columbia, Peru and Bolivia, and the Central American countries that these illicit drugs transit as they find their way to the U.S. These countries – and others -- have an obligation to ensure that these drugs are not moved to the U.S. via air or sea routes.

Indeed, that is what we are witnessing with the Venezuelan vessels the U.S. has destroyed. It was Venezuela that expelled the DEA in 2005 to ensure there was no cooperation with the U.S. on counternarcotics programs; and it should now be clear that a number of Venezuelan generals – Cartel of the Suns – were and are complicit with these drug shipments to the U.S. Their apparent goal is to enrich themselves and weaken our society.

The U.S. must do more to ensure that these drug cartels are defeated. The Trump Administration’s emphasis on counternarcotics operations is commendable. Hopefully, we will continue to make counternarcotics a high priority for the U.S.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
Winning the Innovation Race: Why America’s Allies Are the Key to Beating Beijing https://belimedia.com.ng/winning-the-innovation-race-why-americas-allies-are-the-key-to-beating-beijing https://belimedia.com.ng/winning-the-innovation-race-why-americas-allies-are-the-key-to-beating-beijing OPINION — Precision U.S. airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear program last June demonstrate American technological prowess built on decades of 20th Century Cold War Era investment and innovation. Today, the U.S. continues to originate new technology, yet it finds itself in a race with rivals such as China and Russia to dominate AI, quantum computing, robotics, semiconductors, cyber, and other frontier technologies poised to define global leadership in the 21st Century.

To prevail and prosper in this new geopolitical struggle, the U.S. must build and maintain networks of investors, customers, and collaborators among allies with common values and interests. By forging such networks, the U.S. can accelerate the technology innovation and implementation velocity crucial to outpacing its rivals and their formidable manufacturing capacity, human talent base, and financial resources.

Opportunities (and Risks) of Buyer Alliances

Much of Washington’s bipartisan consensus on the necessity of American technology leadership has rightly focused on the nation’s capacity to “build the future” at home, safely beyond China’s sphere of predation in East Asia, creating American jobs and national wealth, and on terms that ensure these technologies reflect American values.

National innovation initiatives, such as the CHIPS Act, support domestic production of advanced semiconductors, and the Trump and Biden Administrations have rightly advocated robust domestic AI innovation initiatives within our own borders.

But the other side of the 21st Century innovation race is a sprint to forge strong alliances abroad, with buyers who will accelerate domestic efforts by investing in, buying, deploying, and fine tuning U.S. innovations at a greater scale and profit than would ever be possible were U.S. builders limited to merely selling to U.S. government agencies and corporations at home.

Numerous U.S. allies and potential allies in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and beyond share security concerns about aggressive states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and many share U.S. concerns related to the economic, intelligence, and security implications of future dependence on technologies developed in China.

While Chinese-based technology builders such as Huawei and DeepSeek have potential to outpace U.S. competitors in the coming years, the Western innovation ecosystem continues to produce the finest and greatest variety of technology solutions. By leveraging allied investments in new digital infrastructure and national security, U.S.-based technology builders can assert their industrial advantages over Chinese competitors in quality, variety of options, and open standards to enable these states to implement the technologies they require to modernize, while protecting themselves from aggression and maintaining their digital sovereignty.

Should the U.S. fail to forge these essential partnerships, Chinese rivals will outflank America’s technology builders, penetrate and gain permanent footholds in foreign markets, and establish global technology hegemony over the world’s frontier technologies, and the future.

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A Common Defense of Buyer Alliances Strengthens US National Security

These technology buyer partnerships are not merely about hardware and software sales, market penetration, technology jobs, and reinvestment of newly created wealth at home. By deploying U.S. national security technologies across a wide range of allies abroad, the cost of building, maintaining, and enhancing them at home will decline as their efficacy, lethality, and capacity to deter aggression will surge.

It was the open markets of globalization that enabled Chinese firms to build up tremendous commercial manufacturing capacity in everything from electric cars to computing and telecommunications systems, robotics, ships, pharmaceuticals, and drones. The CCP has leveraged this manufacturing capacity and technical expertise to build new military technology capabilities to threaten the U.S. and its allies. China’s dual-use manufacturing capacity is on vivid display in Ukraine, where the country’s warfighters favor inexpensive, highly-functional drones built with components manufactured in China.

U.S. cybersecurity, AI, and defense tech software technologies are only as impactful as their feedback loops—their capacity to ingest massive amounts of threat and performance data in order to learn and improve their defensive capabilities moving forward.

In the same way U.S. drone technologists are observing and learning how drones are performing (and under-performing) in contested Russia-Ukraine battlefield environments, deploying American security technologies along all fronts of geopolitical conflict will make U.S. defenses at home smarter, faster, more creative, more autonomous, and more lethal based on their ability to learn how our adversaries are operating and understanding the weapons and tactics they are likely to use against America’s military and homeland.

Finally, establishing U.S. technologies’ dominance in more countries ensures the U.S. will define technology standards as they are adopted more broadly. As they are adopted, the U.S. and its allies are in a better position to collaborate, surge resources as needed, and execute to resolve threats faster in times of tremendous crises.

The Race Ahead

We applaud the Trump Administration’s efforts to build on existing domestic “technology builder” initiatives by opening new markets for buyers of American frontier technologies. This “technology buyer” diplomacy was on display in April when President Trump, accompanied by leading technology executives from OpenAI, Nvidia, and others, visited members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to establish substantial technology partnership deals. We strongly support the Administration’s efforts to negotiate sector-specific partnerships in AI, semiconductors, cybersecurity, and rare earths supply chains with NATO, the EU, Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan, Ukraine, Australia, and others.

Winning the 21st Century innovation race will ensure America's long-term national security, economic prosperity, and freedom to determine its own destiny. Policymakers have achieved a rare consensus that existential geopolitical rivalries demand the US maximize the unique strengths of its private sector with public sector advocacy and investment at home. But because the geopolitical struggle with China and others is global and the stakes of the competition so high, America must forge partnerships that accelerate its investments and efforts at home to effectively meet the challenges confronting her abroad.

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The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
Trump’s National Guard Plan Faces Legal Pushback and Constitutional Questions https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-national-guard-plan-faces-legal-pushback-and-constitutional-questions https://belimedia.com.ng/trumps-national-guard-plan-faces-legal-pushback-and-constitutional-questions

OPINION — “I'm not going to answer particulars on something that may be in the planning process, but we definitely do have multiple layers of National Guard response forces, whether it's in each state, whether it's regionally, whether it's Title 10 active duty, whether it's Washington D.C. We've got a lot of different ways that constitutionally and legally we can employ Title 10 and Title 32 forces, and we will do so when necessary.”

That was Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in the Oval Office this past Friday, after a meeting of the Trump administration’s Homeland Security Task Force, responding to a reporter’s question about whether the establishment of multi-state National Guard rapid response forces “that's going to be trained in crowd control and civil unrest and deployed in all 50 states by April of 2026” is underway.

It’s worth remembering that buried as part of “Operational Actions” called for under an August 25, Trump Executive Order (EO) entitled, “Additional Measures To Address the Crime Emergency in the District of Columbia,” there is a section that reads: “The Secretary of Defense shall immediately begin ensuring that each State’s Army National Guard and Air National Guard are resourced, trained, organized, and available to assist Federal, State, and local law enforcement in quelling civil disturbances and ensuring the public safety and order whenever the circumstances necessitate, as appropriate under law.”

That EO section goes on to say. “In coordination with the respective adjutants general, the Secretary of Defense shall designate an appropriate number of each State’s trained National Guard members to be reasonably available for rapid mobilization for such purposes. In addition, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure the availability of a standing National Guard quick reaction force that shall be resourced, trained, and available for rapid nationwide deployment.”

Before Trump signed the August 25 EO, his assistant Will Scharf described it as “an executive order that contains a number of additional measures relating to crime and law enforcement in Washington, D.C. It charges, for example, your Secretary of Defense with establishing specialized units in both the D.C. National Guard and the National Guard units around the country specifically trained and equipped to deal with public order issues.”

Hegseth added about the response teams, “And at your direction as well, sir, [meaning Trump] it's just common sense to make sure they're armed as well.”

Under Title 10, the President can federalize any state’s National Guard if the country “is invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign nation,” if there’s “a rebellion or danger of a rebellion” against the federal government’s authority, or if the president “is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” Such an order “shall be issued through the governors of the States,” Title 10 says.

Under Title 32, state National Guard units can be deployed for federal purposes, but they remain under state control. Since the troops are under state control, they are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act’s restriction against engaging in civilian law enforcement.

On August 26, retired-National Guard Maj. Gen. Randy Manner said on PBS: “I think this is unneeded and also very dangerous. It's setting a new precedent.”

He went on, “When I was the acting vice chief of the National Guard Bureau, we absolutely already put into place the ability of having quick reaction forces in every state, depending on the size…They were at the time, of course, targeting the ability to respond to emergencies in the state such as floods, hurricanes, forest fires, earthquakes, and so on to be able to save lives. The difference here is that it's focused on ‘public order.’ That's very disturbing.”

Manner added, “Also, the idea of creating a unit whose primary mission is to deploy anywhere in the country to deal with potentially demonstrations or civil disorder, as the President sees fit…that is not in keeping with the mission of the National Guard as a strategic reserve for our military and for our nation.”

Manner then made an important point, relative to what has happened since: “This is something where the President is imposing the armed military to go into American cities. That is the most significant difference. And it's very important to remember that civil disturbance deployments by governors is actually the smallest amount of missions that have ever been done by the National Guard. It is a rarity, whereas now the President is elevating it to be a significant capability for the National Guard.”

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Over the objections of the Governors of California, Oregon and Illinois, President Trump has ordered Title 10, federalized Guard units deployed – deployments which are all undergoing judicial tests.

In Illinois, U.S. District Judge April Perry on October 9, issued a temporary order that barred the Trump administration “from ordering the federalization and deployment of the National Guard of the United States within Illinois.”

Perry said in her opinion that there was “insufficient evidence of rebellion or a danger of a rebellion,” as required by Title 10, nor was there “sufficient evidence that the President was unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” The Trump administration immediately appealed and moved for a stay of the order pending appeal.

On October 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Judge Perry, writing that in their opinion “the facts do not justify the President’s actions in Illinois under [Title 10], even giving substantial deference to his assertions. The Circuit Court did, however, allow Presidential federalization of a National Guard unit, while prohibiting its deployment.

In its opinion, the Circuit Court made points about the “rebellion or danger of rebellion,” that are worth reviewing since it’s clear the Trump administration sees Title 10 allowing them to use military troops freely.

The Circuit Court wrote: “Political opposition is not rebellion. A protest does not become a rebellion merely because the protestors advocate for myriad legal or policy changes, are well organized, call for significant changes to the structure of the U.S. government, use civil disobedience as a form of protest, or exercise their Second Amendment right to carry firearms as the law currently allows.”

The Court added, “Nor does a protest become a rebellion merely because of sporadic and isolated incidents of unlawful activity or even violence committed by rogue participants in the protest. Such conduct exceeds the scope of the First Amendment, of course, and law enforcement has apprehended the perpetrators accordingly. But because rebellions at least use deliberate, organized violence to resist governmental authority, the problematic incidents in this record clearly fall within the considerable daylight between protected speech and rebellion.”

I quote the Circuit Court opinion because the Trump administration from the start has claimed in this case before the District and Circuit Courts and elsewhere, that the President’s federalization of the Guard under Title 10 “is not judicially reviewable at all. Alternatively, it contends that the factual predicates of [Title 10] are satisfied in light of the deference due the President’s decision to federalize the Guard.”

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On October 17, the day after the Circuit Court opinion, Trump’s Solicitor General D. John Sauer filed an emergency motion with the Supreme Court seeking to block the Perry order that prevents deployment of the federalized Illinois National Guard units.

In seeking that order, which would also overrule the Seventh Circuit Court opinion, Sauer argued, as he had done unsuccessfully in District Court, “As a threshold matter, both the statutory language and historical tradition make clear that the President’s decision whether to federalize the Guard is not subject to second-guessing by the State of Illinois or a federal district court.” He then quoted Title 10 with respect to “rebellion or danger of rebellion.”

Sauer also wrote, to support the argument for deployment, that “The President has express statutory authority to ‘call into Federal service’ the National Guard, after which the Guardsmen serve under the command and control of federal military officials and ultimately the President as Commander in Chief.”

The Supreme Court has not yet acted on this emergency motion.

But as writers in Just Security said last Friday, “The government’s interpretation suggests that a President may deploy military forces anywhere in the United States for any reason, and that courts would have no authority to determine its legality. This assertion runs counter to U.S. history, the structure of powers related to the military in the U.S. Constitution, and the theory of checks and balances.”

Or as New York Attorney James D. Zirin wrote yesterday in The Washington Monthly, “If the Court grants Trump relief in Chicago, what will stop Trump from deploying National Guardsmen nationwide to supplement the ICE program in enforcing immigration laws? And then, based on some pretext that there is a rebellion, posting troops at select polling places nationwide to intimidate voters during the midterm elections?”

It is Zirin’s second fear, for the 2026 midterm congressional elections, that first drew my concern over Trump’s August proposal for all 50 states to have National Guard rapid reaction forces prepared to ensure “the public safety and order whenever the circumstances necessitate, as appropriate under law.”

There has been no public report I know of from the National Guard Bureau or Defense Department as to how many such units have been formed so far under the Trump administration, despite the April 2026 deadline. It is one of many things to watch for.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
Ukraine’s Winter War Is the World’s Test — and America Can’t Afford to Blink https://belimedia.com.ng/ukraines-winter-war-is-the-worlds-test-and-america-cant-afford-to-blink https://belimedia.com.ng/ukraines-winter-war-is-the-worlds-test-and-america-cant-afford-to-blink OPINION — Two weeks ago, my colleagues and I stood in Dnipro while warning sirens cut across the city and Shahed drones screamed overhead. We had come as a medical-humanitarian delegation to inspect trauma centers that receive the worst of the front’s casualties; instead, we found ourselves in a strike zone, sifting through a debris field that included drone fragments and watching medics pull the wounded from an improvised triage line. A United Nations car park across from the drone strike had been shattered; buildings for two city blocks were heavily damaged; more than thirty civilian casualties were reported.

We traveled with a security team of veteran U.S. special operations personnel made up of Green Berets, former SEALs, and allied SOF veterans who have been fighting and advising in Ukraine since 2019 and earlier. Their presence allowed us safe, rapid access to hospitals, strike sites, and frontline briefings, and their frontline experience provided critical context to what we observed. I mention them not to publicize operations but to make a point: American veterans who have been embedded here for years see the same patterns we do — a war accelerating in tempo and technological reach, but one that could still be won both for Ukraine and the free world.

What we saw that day in Dnipro was not a local catastrophe. It was a live demonstration of how modern, networked war is metastasizing beyond the battlefield and how quickly it could remap the global order unless the West acts now.

The tactical picture in Donbas is of immediate strategic urgency. Russian forces are mounting coordinated pincer operations, advancing from Pokrovsk through Kramatorsk to Slovyansk, designed to encircle and absorb the Donbas region, then push west to take Zaporizhzhia and threaten Dnipro. The fall or isolation of Dnipro would sever east–west logistical and medical corridors, producing a catastrophic collapse in Ukrainian operational tempo and resilience. That outcome would not merely alter front lines; it would force a recalibration of Europe’s entire defense posture. Moreover, Moscow’s likely playbook is predictable: secure territorial gains, press for an immediate ceasefire on favorable terms, and use the pause to move seasoned forces into Belarus to stage further aggression against NATO’s vulnerable Suwałki corridor and the Baltic states.

Holding the frontline in Donbas against those pincer movements requires urgent, concrete material and logistics support. The immediate tactical needs are specific and time-sensitive: Lancet-equivalent loitering munitions in quantities sufficient to strike armor and artillery beyond FPV range; thousands of FPV frames and spares for tactical units; higher-payload fixed-wing drones with enhanced electronic-warfare modules; long-range fiber-optic drones for secure, EW-resistant target acquisition; ISR quadcopters such as DJI Mavic models; heavy-bomber quadcopter drones and Shark and RAM-X systems; additional M119 105 mm howitzers and tens of thousands of rounds (including laser-designated munitions); tons of C4 or Cemtex explosives and initiators; smoke grenades; Starlink terminals and hardened communications kits to keep command-and-control functioning under jamming; unmanned ground vehicles for casualty evacuation under fire; thermal winter clothing for tens of thousands of soldiers; and precision munitions and laser target designators to convert targeting into effect. Rapid delivery of these items before winter is not an optional improvement. It is the single most important determinant of whether Ukrainian units can blunt the pincers and maintain cohesive defense lines.

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The operational challenge is only part of the problem. The more profound danger is industrial and doctrinal: the battlefield is being remade by a global axis of authoritarian actors and by grassroots innovation that together change the tempo of war.

On the state side, China, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and shadow networks tied to Wagner, the GRU, the FSB, proxy forces and criminal cartels are not acting independently; they are converging. China supplies much of the critical electronics powering the drone systems we see on the front. Iran provided the Shahed design architecture. North Korea supplies ammunition and manpower. Venezuela and other nodes proliferate systems and tactics across regions. Wagner remnants, clandestine elements and proxy contractors conduct psychological operations, sabotage, and hybrid warfare to stoke fear, hesitation, and distraction to destabilize the West and blunt coordinated timely response. The result is a horizontally linked industrial and doctrinal ecosystem that accelerates lethal innovation on a timeline far faster than Western procurement cycles can match.

Compounding the danger, Ukraine’s defenders have taught us something brutal and clear: the frontline is now a maker space. Volunteer workshops and unit-level innovation labs crank out field-adapted FPV and fixed-wing drones assembled from 3-D-printed parts. Fighters become engineers, iterating designs in days rather than years. Low-cost airframes, priced in the hundreds to low thousands of dollars, are proving operationally decisive. Within two years many of those platforms will be semi- or fully autonomous and capable of swarm behaviors. That combination of authoritarian mass production on one side and decentralized battlefield innovation on the other yields a force-multiplying effect that threatens to swamp Western advantage in both kinetic and non-kinetic domains.

There is also a human reality behind the hardware. While much popular discussion focuses on Ukrainian mobilization shortfalls, the manpower problem may, in fact, be deeper and more structurally damaging for Russia. Moscow’s mobilization has produced a manpower pool that is larger on paper but qualitatively hollow: many conscripts recruited under debt and inducements, reports of chronically ill or terminally ill soldiers sent to the front, widespread morale collapse, and systematic reclassification of killed personnel as missing to avoid payouts. Russia may be hemorrhaging men while failing to sustain unit cohesion and effective rotations. That weakness creates opportunities for Ukraine, if the West supplies the means to exploit it.

Casualty numbers for the Russians are sobering. From January through August 2025 battlefield data indicate more than a quarter million personnel losses and a cumulative toll since 2022 that exceeds one million killed, wounded or missing. Reported kill ratios in some sectors range from three-to-one to fifteen-to-one in favor of Ukrainian forces. Those ratios, while indicative of tactical success, mask the strain: Ukraine’s advantage is sustained only by speed of thinking, of logistics and of resupply. Medical systems are stretched, evacuation chains fray, and field hospitals operate at or beyond capacity. Yet Ukrainian medical practice preserves far more wounded who can return to the fight or to wartime industry than the Russians, whose KIA:WIA ratio is reported abysmally as 1:1.3. Ukrainians value life. Russians do not.

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All of this yields a stark policy imperative: there is a two- to three-month window this winter in which Western action, or inaction, will disproportionately shape outcomes. If the West moves decisively now, Ukraine can stabilize the Donbas, increase pressure on Kremlin command and possibly force fissures within the Moscow-Beijing axis. If the West hesitates, Russia could consolidate gains, demand a favorable ceasefire and use the lull to redeploy and reconstitute forces for broader escalation.

What should America and its allies do?

First, address the immediate tactical needs to hold Donbas through the winter and spring. Prioritize delivery of the specific items listed above and ensure Dnipro’s bridges and trauma centers remain operational. These are the lifelines that keep supplies, casualties, and command flowing to and from the front.

Second, treat this tactical issue in Donbas, Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro as a strategic emergency for Europe and allied forces. Otherwise, Russia will push its advantage to secure a bad faith ceasefire and shift its aggression towards Europe and beyond.

Third, institutionalize the agility we see on the ground. Create micro-procurement authorities, rapid-fielding channels, vetted modular kits and secure surge logistics so that front-line innovation can be turned into operational capability within days, not months.

Fourth, mount a coordinated counter-industrial campaign to choke the supply chains and machine tools that fuel authoritarian drone production. That means targeted sanctions, export controls on critical components and GNSS substitutes, and diplomatic pressure on transshipment nodes. It means using financial and law enforcement tools to disrupt proxy financing and criminal exploitation of battlefield lessons.

Fifth, broaden our conception of the battlefield. Hybrid operations are global — from psychological operations in Europe to proxy sabotage across the globe and the potential adaptation of FPV tactics by criminal/extremist networks in the West. Defense planning must be whole-of-government and whole-of-hemisphere, integrating intelligence, law enforcement, financial mechanisms and coalition logistics.

Finally, make the moral case plainly: this fight is not simply about Ukrainian territory. It is a contest over whether the global commons — maritime lanes, satellite-enabled logistics and cyberspace — will be sustainably weaponized by authoritarian states and their proxies. If we cede initiative in the technology of war, we will forfeit the strategic initiative in peace. Stated plainly: this is a war for the preservation of the free world.

From a shattered car park in Dnipro to a makeshift techlab where a combat drone takes shape, two realities are obvious: the war is changing, and it is changing fast. We cannot afford to be outpaced. The choice this winter is stark: enable Ukraine to hold the frontline against the pincer offensives in Donbas, support Ukrainian strategic efforts against the Russian war machine on its home soil, and stymie the global strategic battle against the axis of authoritarians. Or watch the battlefield’s innovations be converted into instruments of wider, harder-to-control global conflict.

This is not easy. It is, however, solvable, if we treat it with the urgency, specificity and imagination it requires. The future of war is now. The time to prepare was yesterday. The clock is running fast."

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The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

]]>
Fri, 31 Oct 2025 14:09:22 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Next Revolution in U.S. Intelligence: Leaner, Smarter, Technology&Driven https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-revolution-in-us-intelligence-leaner-smarter-technology-driven https://belimedia.com.ng/the-next-revolution-in-us-intelligence-leaner-smarter-technology-driven EXPERT OPINION — It is time to reimagine the US intelligence community (IC). The 1947 National Security Act established the CIA which arguably had the biggest impact on the modern age of U.S. intelligence. Subsequent changes to the National Security Act and the Intelligence Community (IC) were mere tweaks in comparison:
  • In 2003, the Department of Defense established the Under Secretary for Intelligence (amended in 2020 to the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Security); the office acts as a chapeau for Defense Intelligence. Its role in oversight of the Military Intelligence Program arguably could give it influence over the defense intelligence agencies and services, if the office leaned into its leadership role.
  • In 2004, Congress amended the 1947 National Security Act and created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), taking the role of manager for community intelligence from the Director of the CIA. This move did not reengineer how the IC is organized.

For nearly eighty years, we have been tinkering and adding to the IC but we have not fundamentally redrawn or refocused it. Now is the time to do that. Three critical junctures make it imperative that we rethink how the IC is organized and functions. Important technological advancements need to be the heart beat of how the IC does its work. Global conditions are emphasizing the need for gray zone work/cognitive warfare which currently is a side hustle of the IC and needs to become a focus. Finally, the IC has become too unwieldy and dispersed to have the impact it should.

Congress is proposing changes to the DNI, legislating procurement, and legislating definitions of covert warfare versus irregular warfare, but that remains piecemeal and not far reaching enough. As a whole, the IC has been directed to downsize. This is sorely needed as the overlap and bloated bureaucracies help to develop the go it alone mindset. A leaner IC will force integration.

Now is the time to go back to the drawing board and reimagine what our intelligence community should look like:

  • Technology forward.
  • More emphasis on publicly available information.
  • More integrated and driven by USG foreign policy strategies that have clear goals.
  • Closer ties between the Department of Defense and the rest of the intelligence community.
  • Focus on irregular warfare, cognitive warfare, and gray zone activities.

A Technology-Driven IC

The heart of the new IC should be embodied in two new organizations that are retooled from existing structures: one that is an Open Source Center that curates all Open-source data; and one that is a technology hub that oversees and develops technology for the entire IC—a one stop shop.

The Open Source Center would be the heart of analysis for the new IC. It would be loosely modeled after the old Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) that procured important open source articles and books and provided translations for the entire government during the Cold War era. Individuals working in this new agency would range from those without clearance to those with high clearance levels but the data would be all unclassified—until merged into a comprehensive story board. The data and tools would be accessible to the entire IC. The center would include the latest AI technology to help highlight anomalies. It would include data analysts from government, tech companies, and companies that are already working commercial data open source analysis.

The Open Source Center currently housed at the CIA and DIA’s Open Source organization would be the nucleus of the personnel for this work. Analysts and technology specialists would work together to gather the latest trends to feed the rest of the government. The center would work with partners and allies to bring in their data and share patterns. Eventually, the patterns and anomalies procured in this center would be merged with U.S. exquisite intelligence, but more routinely, this publicly available or procured unclassified data would be used to provide warning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels across government agencies, to partners, and when appropriate, to the American people. This data would feed the U.S. IC and military watch centers across the world as a first notice of concerning anomalies.

In order to speed up technology procurement and ensure that leading-edge technology is being used by the IC, we need an IC technology center or hub. Much like the parts and pieces of IARPA, DARPA, and IN-Q-TEL that compete, this unit should bring in all the technology experiments and investments so that the successes can be shared across the IC more quickly. This would allow government and industry to focus on the IC’s technology priorities, make pricing of new technologies more competitive, and cut down on boutique answers to requirements that cannot be scaled IC wide. It would also speed up technology acquisition by bringing in some of the authorities for quick procurement that the above agencies have. This Center would support both Defense and civilian intelligence organizations and be manned by personnel from across the entire IC.

Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter, delivering expert-level insights on the cyber and tech stories of the day – directly to your inbox. Sign up for the CIG newsletter today.

DNI for All

Turn the DNI into the organization that it was made to be—the leader focused on oversight, guidance, and integration of the entire IC. This does not need to happen with a lot of bureaucracy. The right leaders and experts can do this work.

The DNI has never been given the powers that it needs to fulfill its mandate. To do this, the DNI must have say over the entire National Intelligence Program budgeting. Currently, the DNI’s oversight is watered down by having little budget decision making authority. If they do not like the direction that the DNI is providing, the other intelligence agency Directors go directly to Congress who will earmark specific funds and the DNI, who answers directly to the President, is thwarted. This needs to change.

Defense intelligence makes up the largest part of the intelligence community with each service having its own intelligence unit, each COCOM having its own, and the collection support agencies technically being under the Secretary of Defense. To oversee this enterprise, the Office of the Secretary of Defense created the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Security (OUSDI&S) in 2003. This office continues to struggle to find its footing in the IC. As stated previously, it has some power that the DNI does not in that it has sway over the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) budget. However, the CSA Directors have their own avenues of communication to the Secretary of Defense, the DNI, and Congress. To fix this issue, the I&S Under Secretary simultaneously should act as the DNI Deputy. The Director for Military Affairs at the DNI should be the Department’s and I&S’ in-house consultant on a day-to-day basis and act as conduit between DNI and OUSDI&S. This arrangement would streamline the multiple meetings that CSA Directors are invited to attend separately with I&S and DNI—they could be held at the same time. It would also make it clear that OUSD I&S brings the rest of the defense intelligence agencies to the table and sets joint IC priorities.

A key issue in the IC is that there is no comprehensive strategy for countering our adversaries. While the NSC sometimes tries to play the role of the strategy developer, most NSC Directors do not thoroughly understand the capabilities of each of the intelligence agencies and IC agencies are not compelled to follow the direction of such strategies, especially when the NSC provides competing priorities. Either the IC is left out or there are multiple IC entities who compete with each other to try to develop the strategy. It makes most sense to have the DNI embrace its integration role and represent the entire IC to the NSC to develop the IC portion of strategic competition strategies. The DNI, with its National Intelligence Managers, would lead IC strategic competition teams so that these teams could be prioritized by resources and personnel.

By retasking and focusing the DNI workforce, the above work can be accomplished without growing the workforce and with more streamlined personnel numbers. The IC also needs to entice the best and brightest to work at the DNI. The IC needs those individuals who truly are experts both in their functional area and as intelligence professionals. Agency directors must recognize the importance of interagency work and reward that work. Over time, the real IC experts and leaders no longer go to DNI on rotation because they have seen their home agencies shut them out upon return.

All Source Agencies Should Double Down on Core Competencies

CIA and DIA have spread into each other’s lanes so that there is now a duplication of analysis and, in some cases, collection. CIA should focus on nonmilitary issues such as political stability and economics, and DIA should focus its workforce on military and military technology issues. Of course, there will be a gray area but that should be worked out between the Directors of the two agencies. Some would say that we should have only one all-source analytical organization. The issue with that is that the needs of the Department of Defense for niche military analysis would overwhelm the economic, medical, and political stability issues that CIA focuses on. Both need to be done and both have their customers.

During my time as a young analyst at CIA, my focus was on political stability and when I had to brief or write on a specific military issue that required anything more than basic knowledge, I would call my DIA counterpart to provide his/her expertise. That individual would be able to discuss all aspects of a weapon system, military personalities, and readiness, etc. When DIA analysts were asked to discuss stability issues, they would bring me with them and together we could paint a holistic story.

Single Source Agencies

The National Geospatial Agency and the National Security Agency are both U.S. treasures. We need to keep them focused on their core competencies by feeding them commercially available data—do not make them go out and develop analytics, buy data sets, etc. We also need to keep them focused on their genre. They should not be doing all source analytics.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Emphasizing Irregular and Cognitive Warfare

Irregular warfare must be a focus of U.S. national security policy going forward. This concept needs to include cognitive warfare as a regular tool for national security leaders. Instead of the steel-eyed focus on dominating an opponent’s military, with the covert and clandestine arts as a small subset of our national security, we must focus on positively influencing governments and populations as much as we focus on overcoming an adversary’s weapon system. We must excel at denial and deception and information operations that give our adversaries pause during peacetime and make them think hard about any offensive engagement with the U.S.

We also must use all the gray zone tactics to be prepared in case the worst happens and we are in a kinetic fight. This gets accomplished through the use of irregular warfare and well thought out strategic campaigns. This requires a "whole-of-government" approach. No single government entity can win an irregular war on its own. With a DNI that is truly leading the IC and partnering with the Department of Defense, the DNI’s, National Intelligence Managers would work with COCOMs to help develop these irregular warfare or competition strategies and bring in intelligence units from all the agencies to include state, treasury, energy, military services, etc.

To further support a whole of government effort in this area, we need to develop an OSS-like agency that has oversight of CIA HUMINT and covert capabilities with DoD HUMINT and clandestine capabilities. This small but mighty organization would focus on deconfliction and training. It would respond to gaps and requirements using the best athletes from the appropriate agency or department. The current office of Community HUMINT could be the nucleus for this new entity but it must move from CIA to DNI so that DNI can play its leadership/integrator role.

Defense Intelligence

DIA began as an all-source agency to support the warfighter. It has developed into a large bureaucracy. DIA headquarters needs to be refocused and slimmed down to a staff that provides support to the Pentagon (OSD and Joint Staff) and to the COCOMs. Headquarters should only provide those supporting functions such as training, resources, personnel, infrastructure, and data. They should also deconflict and integrate the work of the individuals in the field and at the COCOMs. COCOMs, OSD, and Joint Staff should be plussed up with analysts and collectors currently at DIA headquarters. They would work on the issues that the operators and military decisionmakers need to be worked on.

Conclusion

This new IC would have a clear leader and be refocused on technology, publicly available information, and developing strategies for gray zone competition. The other proposed changes clean up ongoing issues that add to some dysfunction and distraction in the IC. This focus on technology and publicly available information leaves the most sensitive activities that any global power must perform to a smaller, more focused group of individuals who would be experts in the field of covert and clandestine activities. The plan also stops some of the redundancies across the three important areas of analysis, technology, and sensitive activities. It clarifies leadership roles and allows enough overlap to encourage some internal IC competition while providing for better oversight.

Who’s Reading this? More than 500K of the most influential national security experts in the world. Need full access to what the Experts are reading?

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

]]>
Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Future of US Intelligence: Leaner, Smarter, and Tech&Focused https://belimedia.com.ng/the-future-of-us-intelligence-leaner-smarter-and-tech-focused https://belimedia.com.ng/the-future-of-us-intelligence-leaner-smarter-and-tech-focused EXPERT OPINION — It is time to reimagine the US intelligence community (IC). The 1947 National Security Act established the CIA which arguably had the biggest impact on the modern age of U.S. intelligence. Subsequent changes to the National Security Act and the Intelligence Community (IC) were mere tweaks in comparison:
  • In 2003, the Department of Defense established the Under Secretary for Intelligence (amended in 2020 to the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Security); the office acts as a chapeau for Defense Intelligence. Its role in oversight of the Military Intelligence Program arguably could give it influence over the defense intelligence agencies and services, if the office leaned into its leadership role.
  • In 2004, Congress amended the 1947 National Security Act and created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), taking the role of manager for community intelligence from the Director of the CIA. This move did not reengineer how the IC is organized.

For nearly eighty years, we have been tinkering and adding to the IC but we have not fundamentally redrawn or refocused it. Now is the time to do that. Three critical junctures make it imperative that we rethink how the IC is organized and functions. Important technological advancements need to be the heart beat of how the IC does its work. Global conditions are emphasizing the need for gray zone work/cognitive warfare which currently is a side hustle of the IC and needs to become a focus. Finally, the IC has become too unwieldy and dispersed to have the impact it should.

Congress is proposing changes to the DNI, legislating procurement, and legislating definitions of covert warfare versus irregular warfare, but that remains piecemeal and not far reaching enough. As a whole, the IC has been directed to downsize. This is sorely needed as the overlap and bloated bureaucracies help to develop the go it alone mindset. A leaner IC will force integration.

Now is the time to go back to the drawing board and reimagine what our intelligence community should look like:

  • Technology forward.
  • More emphasis on publicly available information.
  • More integrated and driven by USG foreign policy strategies that have clear goals.
  • Closer ties between the Department of Defense and the rest of the intelligence community.
  • Focus on irregular warfare, cognitive warfare, and gray zone activities.

A Technology-Driven IC

The heart of the new IC should be embodied in two new organizations that are retooled from existing structures: one that is an Open Source Center that curates all Open-source data; and one that is a technology hub that oversees and develops technology for the entire IC—a one stop shop.

The Open Source Center would be the heart of analysis for the new IC. It would be loosely modeled after the old Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) that procured important open source articles and books and provided translations for the entire government during the Cold War era. Individuals working in this new agency would range from those without clearance to those with high clearance levels but the data would be all unclassified—until merged into a comprehensive story board. The data and tools would be accessible to the entire IC. The center would include the latest AI technology to help highlight anomalies. It would include data analysts from government, tech companies, and companies that are already working commercial data open source analysis.

The Open Source Center currently housed at the CIA and DIA’s Open Source organization would be the nucleus of the personnel for this work. Analysts and technology specialists would work together to gather the latest trends to feed the rest of the government. The center would work with partners and allies to bring in their data and share patterns. Eventually, the patterns and anomalies procured in this center would be merged with U.S. exquisite intelligence, but more routinely, this publicly available or procured unclassified data would be used to provide warning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels across government agencies, to partners, and when appropriate, to the American people. This data would feed the U.S. IC and military watch centers across the world as a first notice of concerning anomalies.

In order to speed up technology procurement and ensure that leading-edge technology is being used by the IC, we need an IC technology center or hub. Much like the parts and pieces of IARPA, DARPA, and IN-Q-TEL that compete, this unit should bring in all the technology experiments and investments so that the successes can be shared across the IC more quickly. This would allow government and industry to focus on the IC’s technology priorities, make pricing of new technologies more competitive, and cut down on boutique answers to requirements that cannot be scaled IC wide. It would also speed up technology acquisition by bringing in some of the authorities for quick procurement that the above agencies have. This Center would support both Defense and civilian intelligence organizations and be manned by personnel from across the entire IC.

Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter, delivering expert-level insights on the cyber and tech stories of the day – directly to your inbox. Sign up for the CIG newsletter today.

DNI for All

Turn the DNI into the organization that it was made to be—the leader focused on oversight, guidance, and integration of the entire IC. This does not need to happen with a lot of bureaucracy. The right leaders and experts can do this work.

The DNI has never been given the powers that it needs to fulfill its mandate. To do this, the DNI must have say over the entire National Intelligence Program budgeting. Currently, the DNI’s oversight is watered down by having little budget decision making authority. If they do not like the direction that the DNI is providing, the other intelligence agency Directors go directly to Congress who will earmark specific funds and the DNI, who answers directly to the President, is thwarted. This needs to change.

Defense intelligence makes up the largest part of the intelligence community with each service having its own intelligence unit, each COCOM having its own, and the collection support agencies technically being under the Secretary of Defense. To oversee this enterprise, the Office of the Secretary of Defense created the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Security (OUSDI&S) in 2003. This office continues to struggle to find its footing in the IC. As stated previously, it has some power that the DNI does not in that it has sway over the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) budget. However, the CSA Directors have their own avenues of communication to the Secretary of Defense, the DNI, and Congress. To fix this issue, the I&S Under Secretary simultaneously should act as the DNI Deputy. The Director for Military Affairs at the DNI should be the Department’s and I&S’ in-house consultant on a day-to-day basis and act as conduit between DNI and OUSDI&S. This arrangement would streamline the multiple meetings that CSA Directors are invited to attend separately with I&S and DNI—they could be held at the same time. It would also make it clear that OUSD I&S brings the rest of the defense intelligence agencies to the table and sets joint IC priorities.

A key issue in the IC is that there is no comprehensive strategy for countering our adversaries. While the NSC sometimes tries to play the role of the strategy developer, most NSC Directors do not thoroughly understand the capabilities of each of the intelligence agencies and IC agencies are not compelled to follow the direction of such strategies, especially when the NSC provides competing priorities. Either the IC is left out or there are multiple IC entities who compete with each other to try to develop the strategy. It makes most sense to have the DNI embrace its integration role and represent the entire IC to the NSC to develop the IC portion of strategic competition strategies. The DNI, with its National Intelligence Managers, would lead IC strategic competition teams so that these teams could be prioritized by resources and personnel.

By retasking and focusing the DNI workforce, the above work can be accomplished without growing the workforce and with more streamlined personnel numbers. The IC also needs to entice the best and brightest to work at the DNI. The IC needs those individuals who truly are experts both in their functional area and as intelligence professionals. Agency directors must recognize the importance of interagency work and reward that work. Over time, the real IC experts and leaders no longer go to DNI on rotation because they have seen their home agencies shut them out upon return.

All Source Agencies Should Double Down on Core Competencies

CIA and DIA have spread into each other’s lanes so that there is now a duplication of analysis and, in some cases, collection. CIA should focus on nonmilitary issues such as political stability and economics, and DIA should focus its workforce on military and military technology issues. Of course, there will be a gray area but that should be worked out between the Directors of the two agencies. Some would say that we should have only one all-source analytical organization. The issue with that is that the needs of the Department of Defense for niche military analysis would overwhelm the economic, medical, and political stability issues that CIA focuses on. Both need to be done and both have their customers.

During my time as a young analyst at CIA, my focus was on political stability and when I had to brief or write on a specific military issue that required anything more than basic knowledge, I would call my DIA counterpart to provide his/her expertise. That individual would be able to discuss all aspects of a weapon system, military personalities, and readiness, etc. When DIA analysts were asked to discuss stability issues, they would bring me with them and together we could paint a holistic story.

Single Source Agencies

The National Geospatial Agency and the National Security Agency are both U.S. treasures. We need to keep them focused on their core competencies by feeding them commercially available data—do not make them go out and develop analytics, buy data sets, etc. We also need to keep them focused on their genre. They should not be doing all source analytics.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Emphasizing Irregular and Cognitive Warfare

Irregular warfare must be a focus of U.S. national security policy going forward. This concept needs to include cognitive warfare as a regular tool for national security leaders. Instead of the steel-eyed focus on dominating an opponent’s military, with the covert and clandestine arts as a small subset of our national security, we must focus on positively influencing governments and populations as much as we focus on overcoming an adversary’s weapon system. We must excel at denial and deception and information operations that give our adversaries pause during peacetime and make them think hard about any offensive engagement with the U.S.

We also must use all the gray zone tactics to be prepared in case the worst happens and we are in a kinetic fight. This gets accomplished through the use of irregular warfare and well thought out strategic campaigns. This requires a "whole-of-government" approach. No single government entity can win an irregular war on its own. With a DNI that is truly leading the IC and partnering with the Department of Defense, the DNI’s, National Intelligence Managers would work with COCOMs to help develop these irregular warfare or competition strategies and bring in intelligence units from all the agencies to include state, treasury, energy, military services, etc.

To further support a whole of government effort in this area, we need to develop an OSS-like agency that has oversight of CIA HUMINT and covert capabilities with DoD HUMINT and clandestine capabilities. This small but mighty organization would focus on deconfliction and training. It would respond to gaps and requirements using the best athletes from the appropriate agency or department. The current office of Community HUMINT could be the nucleus for this new entity but it must move from CIA to DNI so that DNI can play its leadership/integrator role.

Defense Intelligence

DIA began as an all-source agency to support the warfighter. It has developed into a large bureaucracy. DIA headquarters needs to be refocused and slimmed down to a staff that provides support to the Pentagon (OSD and Joint Staff) and to the COCOMs. Headquarters should only provide those supporting functions such as training, resources, personnel, infrastructure, and data. They should also deconflict and integrate the work of the individuals in the field and at the COCOMs. COCOMs, OSD, and Joint Staff should be plussed up with analysts and collectors currently at DIA headquarters. They would work on the issues that the operators and military decisionmakers need to be worked on.

Conclusion

This new IC would have a clear leader and be refocused on technology, publicly available information, and developing strategies for gray zone competition. The other proposed changes clean up ongoing issues that add to some dysfunction and distraction in the IC. This focus on technology and publicly available information leaves the most sensitive activities that any global power must perform to a smaller, more focused group of individuals who would be experts in the field of covert and clandestine activities. The plan also stops some of the redundancies across the three important areas of analysis, technology, and sensitive activities. It clarifies leadership roles and allows enough overlap to encourage some internal IC competition while providing for better oversight.

Who’s Reading this? More than 500K of the most influential national security experts in the world. Need full access to what the Experts are reading?

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

]]>
Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Ukrainian Delegation Heads to Washington as Tomahawk Decision Looms. https://belimedia.com.ng/ukrainian-delegation-heads-to-washington-as-tomahawk-decision-looms https://belimedia.com.ng/ukrainian-delegation-heads-to-washington-as-tomahawk-decision-looms

DEEP DIVE – A senior Ukrainian delegation will travel to Washington D.C. this week for talks that are expected to include the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine, air defense challenges and increased sanctions on Moscow. The decision on whether or not the U.S. will provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles is also expected to be front and center.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says he believes that the Israeli-Gaza ceasefire announced late last week, is proof that a resolution to his country’s fight against Russia is also possible.

In a congratulatory phone call from Zelensky to Trump on Saturday, Ukrainian officials said the two leaders talked about Russia’s latest strikes targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, as well as the possibility of Kyiv obtaining U.S. made Tomahawk missiles. In a post on X, Zelensky said “If a war can be stopped in one region, then surely other wars can be stopped as well - including the Russian war”.

The missile request is the latest in a long-running series of high-profile requests by Ukrainian officials for more powerful and sophisticated western support.

President Trump says he has “sort of made a decision” about giving Tomahawks to NATO for supply to Ukraine, but says he wants to know Ukrainian plans for them before sending them.

Moscow is pushing back against the possibility of providing U.S. Tomahawks to Ukraine, which could provide the capability for even deeper strikes inside Russia, something that wouldn’t play well for the Russian President at home.

President Vladimir Putin said recently that sending Tomahawks to Ukraine would significantly damage U.S.-Russia relations, and that the weapons would "mean a completely new, qualitatively new stage of escalation, including in relations between Russia and the United States".

Ukraine has already shown impressive tenacity in striking targets on Russian soil. Kyiv’s domestic drone campaign against Russian oil and gas facilities, aimed at cutting Russia’s energy export revenues that fund its war machine, has been remarkably successful. Moscow has publicly acknowledged that it is facing domestic fuel shortages, but has not publicly attributed the Ukrainian strikes as the cause. In June, Ukraine smuggled over 100 drones into Russia and launched Operation Spider Web, a drone attack that resulted in the loss of a third of Moscow’s fleet of strategic bomber aircraft.

And, Ukraine has already successfully employed advanced western supplied missiles like the US-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the European-made Storm Shadow. The ATACM has a range of around 300 KM, while the Storm Shadow has a range of 250KM. Kyiv is also producing and testing its own long-range missile, the FP-5 Flamingo that has a stated range of 3000KM. Recent media reports indicate that Kyiv may have started using the Flamingo in an operational capacity, but details on the operations remain scarce.


An infographic titled "Range of ATACMS missiles" created in Ankara, Turkiye on November 19, 2024. (Photo by Murat Usubali/Anadolu via Getty Images)

The Tomahawk would be a significant improvement in long-range strike capability for Ukraine’s military. The missiles, capable of being launched from ships, submarines and ground launchers, have a range of 1,500-2,000KM, and are capable of hitting targets accurately even in heavily defended airspace. The Tomahawk would give Ukraine the ability to hit most of European Russia, west of the Ural Mountains. That puts key political and military hubs like Moscow and St. Petersburg in range, as well as significant military assets and energy infrastructure.

A Tomahawk cruise missile flies toward Iraq after being launched from the AEGIS guided missile cruiser USS San Jacinto March 25, 2003 in the Red Sea. (Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images)


CONTEXT

  • President Trump says he “sort” of has made a decision on supplying Ukraine with Tomahawks
  • Foreign Minister of Estonia told Trump that Tomahawks could help Ukraine “push Russia back”
  • The Tomahawk missile is made by Raytheon and has a range of 1,500-2,000kms (around 930-1,550 miles)
  • It is approximately 750 Kilometers from Kyiv to Moscow
  • Tomahawks are primarily launched from maritime platforms and are currently deployed on all U.S. ships and submarines equipped with vertical launch systems (VLSs).
  • Ground-launched Tomahawks are launched from the Typhon, a new vertical launch system developed by Lockheed Martin to enable the U.S. military to launch Tomahawks from the ground. This system would likely be required by Ukraine.
  • Since the 1990s, the U.S. Navy has purchased about 9,000 Tomahawk units at an average price of $1.3 million each. It is unclear where the U.S. stockpile stands currently. U.S. allies armed with Tomahawks include the Netherlands, Australia, the UK, and Japan.
  • The Trump administration in late August approved the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) missiles to Ukraine. They have a range of 250 miles. The purchase is being funded by Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and U.S. Foreign Military Financing.

    Experts and analysts are watching closely for developments coming out of Washington this week. Some notable questions remain regarding the potential use of Tomahawks by Ukraine such as:

    • If approved, will they represent a significant increase in capability for Ukraine?
    • What quantities and how quickly would Tomahawks be supplied to Ukraine?
    • How is Russian President Vladimir Putin likely to respond?
We spoke with two Cipher Brief Experts to get their take on these questions:

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior director at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He directs CSC 2.0, which works to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.  Montgomery is a principal member of the Cyber Initiatives Group.


Glenn Corn

Glenn Corn is a former Senior Executive in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who worked for 34 years in the U.S. Intelligence, Defense, and Foreign Affairs communities.  He spent over 17 years serving overseas and served as the U.S. President’s Senior Representative on Intelligence and Security issues.  He is an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of World Politics.

The Cipher Brief: Is sending Tomahawk missiles going to enable Ukraine to do a lot more than it's already capable of doing now? Would it make a difference?

Rear Admiral (Ret) Mark Montgomery: I'm going to caveat this. I'm not opposed to Tomahawks. But I think it's “Tomahawks and.” And then how many Tomahawks? Ten Tomahawks won't make a difference. 100 Tomahawks won't make a difference. But 400 or 500 would. Is the U.S. willing to part with 400 or 500? Can Europe take a deep breath and pay for 400 or 500? And what are the Tomahawks going to look like? Are we going to strip them of certain capabilities and capacity? Then it becomes a slow land attack cruise missile. So I'm not sure.

Tomahawks would be helpful. What I'm sure would be much more, I think, operationally game-changing is the provision of the ERAM (Extended Range Attack Munition). And I'm thrilled with what the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Department of Defense writ large have done with the ERAM, which is effectively a small cruise missile with extended ranges well beyond ATACMS, but less than the Tomahawk. There's multiple variants of it. And when it begins to deliver, it'll be 10 here, 20 there, but eventually it should get up to about 100 a month for 20 months. And you can fire it from MiG-29s or Sukaloys or F-16s. This weapon is going to stretch the battlefield for the Russians and will force logistics and command and control and troop aggregation sites farther and farther from the front line.

And I don't think the Russians have demonstrated the ability to properly control and support forces at long range and distances. So, if the Russians are stretched out like that, combined with the operational and strategic pressure from the long range unmanned Ukrainian UASs strikes, and maybe the addition of Tomahawks, particularly to target the refineries, I think all of this can really cause Putin to readjust his thinking.

So from my perspective, things could get better. It's not “Tomahawks alone” or “Tomahawks or.” It's “Tomahawks and”, and the “and” is the big thing. And that “and” to me is the ERAM.

Glenn Corn: I think that what Ukrainians are doing is great. The Tomahawks would just increase their ability and increase, I'd say, the volume of the attacks and deep strikes that they could conduct inside of Russia.

And of course there's a symbolic and kind of political message here too. If the United States agrees to provide these weapons systems, it just shows that we're not backing down and we're not going to be intimidated by Moscow, which I'm sure the Ukrainians want to see because that's a sign of political support. That's important for them.


The Cipher Brief: Moscow is obviously rattling the sabers over the potential US Tomahawk decision. How do you assess Russia's escalation threats to the U.S.?

Glenn Corn: I find it ironic when the Russians say they're going to retaliate. They're already launching attacks. They're already targeting Ukraine and now also NATO countries, and I would say even U.S. interests. They've been doing it for years. So my own belief is it's a lot of saber rattling. It's a full court press right now in Moscow to try and deter Washington and Brussels from taking certain steps that will be extremely painful and costly for Moscow.

I'm sure that [talk of Tomahawks] increases Moscow’s level of concern. They definitely do not want the Ukrainians to have these weapon systems, and they're making all kinds of threats. They're looking for potential sore points with the U.S., for example, suggesting they will deploy new weapons systems to Nicaragua or Cuba. They're going back to the Cold War playbook that led to the Cuba missile crisis.

So I’m not surprised. Experience has shown that the Russians make a lot of threats, but those threats tend to be empty. Let's go back to all the threats they made over the F-16s, over the ATACMS, over Finland and Sweden joining NATO. I don't think that they followed through on a lot of those threats, not in the near term, not on an immediate basis or not in an obvious way. They may, of course, respond in the future, but so far they have not followed through on threats to use nuclear weapons, which they’ve previously implied as a potential scenario. So, they haven't followed through on previous threats. It doesn't mean they won’t do it in the future, but my assessment is they will not. .

Rear Admiral (Ret) Mark Montgomery: Russia and China practice a similar provocation principle. We democracies bend and capitulate to the fear that an authoritarian regime might do something because they announce that they've got a red line or they've got an issue. And they provoke us. They tell us that the provocation will cause them to overreact and therefore we should stand down. At no point ever do they have the same sense of decorum or restraint, right? But apparently we're supposed to practice that restraint. Enough of that. We need to do what we think is right. If it's Tomahawks, fine. If it's Tomahawks and ERAM, which is what I think it is, great. If it was E-RAM alone, I think it’d be great.

What I say is, I would not back off. One reason I support sending Tomahawks now is because the Russians oppose them so much and I feel compelled to support the decision, if it's made, to send them. But the Russians are going to learn that they were complaining about the wrong thing. And by the time they learn that lesson, I think they're going to be in a lot of pain.

In Summary:

The coming decision on Tomahawk cruise missiles is a true inflection point for both Ukraine and the U.S.: it could materially expand Kyiv’s ability to conduct deep-strike operations, but only if supplied in sufficient quantities and paired with the right launch and logistical support. US and Western leaders must weigh that operational upside against difficult questions - platform and delivery constraints, the need for complementary systems like ERAM, funding and NATO cooperation, and the very real risk of Moscow escalating its response. Whatever Washington decides will test U.S. resolve, reshape NATO burden-sharing conversations, and have consequences that reverberate across the battlefield in Ukraine and Russia.

Follow The Cipher Brief for more timely analysis and updates as this critical story develops.

Ethan Masucol, Ian Coleman and Connor Cowman contributed to this article.

]]>
Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Ukrainian Delegation Heads to Washington as Tomahawk Decision Looms https://belimedia.com.ng/ukrainian-delegation-heads-to-washington-as-tomahawk-decision-looms-60714 https://belimedia.com.ng/ukrainian-delegation-heads-to-washington-as-tomahawk-decision-looms-60714

DEEP DIVE – A senior Ukrainian delegation will travel to Washington D.C. this week for talks that are expected to include the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine, air defense challenges and increased sanctions on Moscow. The decision on whether or not the U.S. will provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles is also expected to be front and center.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says he believes that the Israeli-Gaza ceasefire announced late last week, is proof that a resolution to his country’s fight against Russia is also possible.

In a congratulatory phone call from Zelensky to Trump on Saturday, Ukrainian officials said the two leaders talked about Russia’s latest strikes targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, as well as the possibility of Kyiv obtaining U.S. made Tomahawk missiles. In a post on X, Zelensky said “If a war can be stopped in one region, then surely other wars can be stopped as well - including the Russian war”.

The missile request is the latest in a long-running series of high-profile requests by Ukrainian officials for more powerful and sophisticated western support.

President Trump says he has “sort of made a decision” about giving Tomahawks to NATO for supply to Ukraine, but says he wants to know Ukrainian plans for them before sending them.

Moscow is pushing back against the possibility of providing U.S. Tomahawks to Ukraine, which could provide the capability for even deeper strikes inside Russia, something that wouldn’t play well for the Russian President at home.

President Vladimir Putin said recently that sending Tomahawks to Ukraine would significantly damage U.S.-Russia relations, and that the weapons would "mean a completely new, qualitatively new stage of escalation, including in relations between Russia and the United States".

Ukraine has already shown impressive tenacity in striking targets on Russian soil. Kyiv’s domestic drone campaign against Russian oil and gas facilities, aimed at cutting Russia’s energy export revenues that fund its war machine, has been remarkably successful. Moscow has publicly acknowledged that it is facing domestic fuel shortages, but has not publicly attributed the Ukrainian strikes as the cause. In June, Ukraine smuggled over 100 drones into Russia and launched Operation Spider Web, a drone attack that resulted in the loss of a third of Moscow’s fleet of strategic bomber aircraft.

And, Ukraine has already successfully employed advanced western supplied missiles like the US-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the European-made Storm Shadow. The ATACM has a range of around 300 KM, while the Storm Shadow has a range of 250KM. Kyiv is also producing and testing its own long-range missile, the FP-5 Flamingo that has a stated range of 3000KM. Recent media reports indicate that Kyiv may have started using the Flamingo in an operational capacity, but details on the operations remain scarce.


An infographic titled "Range of ATACMS missiles" created in Ankara, Turkiye on November 19, 2024. (Photo by Murat Usubali/Anadolu via Getty Images)

The Tomahawk would be a significant improvement in long-range strike capability for Ukraine’s military. The missiles, capable of being launched from ships, submarines and ground launchers, have a range of 1,500-2,000KM, and are capable of hitting targets accurately even in heavily defended airspace. The Tomahawk would give Ukraine the ability to hit most of European Russia, west of the Ural Mountains. That puts key political and military hubs like Moscow and St. Petersburg in range, as well as significant military assets and energy infrastructure.

A Tomahawk cruise missile flies toward Iraq after being launched from the AEGIS guided missile cruiser USS San Jacinto March 25, 2003 in the Red Sea. (Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images)


THE CONTEXT

  • President Trump says he “sort” of has made a decision on supplying Ukraine with Tomahawks
  • Foreign Minister of Estonia told Trump that Tomahawks could help Ukraine “push Russia back”
  • The Tomahawk missile is made by Raytheon and has a range of 1,500-2,000kms (around 930-1,550 miles)
  • It is approximately 750 Kilometers from Kyiv to Moscow
  • Tomahawks are primarily launched from maritime platforms and are currently deployed on all U.S. ships and submarines equipped with vertical launch systems (VLSs).
  • Ground-launched Tomahawks are launched from the Typhon, a new vertical launch system developed by Lockheed Martin to enable the U.S. military to launch Tomahawks from the ground. This system would likely be required by Ukraine.
  • Since the 1990s, the U.S. Navy has purchased about 9,000 Tomahawk units at an average price of $1.3 million each. It is unclear where the U.S. stockpile stands currently. U.S. allies armed with Tomahawks include the Netherlands, Australia, the UK, and Japan.
  • The Trump administration in late August approved the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) missiles to Ukraine. They have a range of 250 miles. The purchase is being funded by Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and U.S. Foreign Military Financing.

    Experts and analysts are watching closely for developments coming out of Washington this week. Some notable questions remain regarding the potential use of Tomahawks by Ukraine such as:
    • If approved, will they represent a significant increase in capability for Ukraine?
    • What quantities and how quickly would Tomahawks be supplied to Ukraine?
    • How is Russian President Vladimir Putin likely to respond?
We spoke with two Cipher Brief Experts to get their take on these questions:

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior director at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He directs CSC 2.0, which works to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.  Montgomery is a principal member of the Cyber Initiatives Group.


Glenn Corn

Glenn Corn is a former Senior Executive in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who worked for 34 years in the U.S. Intelligence, Defense, and Foreign Affairs communities.  He spent over 17 years serving overseas and served as the U.S. President’s Senior Representative on Intelligence and Security issues.  He is an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of World Politics.

The Cipher Brief: Is sending Tomahawk missiles going to enable Ukraine to do a lot more than it's already capable of doing now? Would it make a difference?

Rear Admiral (Ret) Montgomery: I'm going to caveat this. I'm not opposed to Tomahawks. But I think it's “Tomahawks and.” And then how many Tomahawks? Ten Tomahawks won't make a difference. 100 Tomahawks won't make a difference. But 400 or 500 would. Is the U.S. willing to part with 400 or 500? Can Europe take a deep breath and pay for 400 or 500? And what are the Tomahawks going to look like? Are we going to strip them of certain capabilities and capacity? Then it becomes a slow land attack cruise missile. So I'm not sure.

Tomahawks would be helpful. What I'm sure would be much more, I think, operationally game-changing is the provision of the ERAM (Extended Range Attack Munition). And I'm thrilled with what the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Department of Defense writ large have done with the ERAM, which is effectively a small cruise missile with extended ranges well beyond ATACMS, but less than the Tomahawk. There's multiple variants of it. And when it begins to deliver, it'll be 10 here, 20 there, but eventually it should get up to about 100 a month for 20 months. And you can fire it from MiG-29s or Sukaloys or F-16s. This weapon is going to stretch the battlefield for the Russians and will force logistics and command and control and troop aggregation sites farther and farther from the front line.

And I don't think the Russians have demonstrated the ability to properly control and support forces at long range and distances. So, if the Russians are stretched out like that, combined with the operational and strategic pressure from the long range unmanned Ukrainian UASs strikes, and maybe the addition of Tomahawks, particularly to target the refineries, I think all of this can really cause Putin to readjust his thinking.

So from my perspective, things could get better. It's not “Tomahawks alone” or “Tomahawks or.” It's “Tomahawks and”, and the “and” is the big thing. And that “and” to me is the ERAM.

Corn: I think that what Ukrainians are doing is great. The Tomahawks would just increase their ability and increase, I'd say, the volume of the attacks and deep strikes that they could conduct inside of Russia.

And of course there's a symbolic and kind of political message here too. If the United States agrees to provide these weapons systems, it just shows that we're not backing down and we're not going to be intimidated by Moscow, which I'm sure the Ukrainians want to see because that's a sign of political support. That's important for them.

The Cipher Brief: Moscow is obviously rattling the sabers over the potential US Tomahawk decision. How do you assess Russia's escalation threats to the U.S.?

Corn: I find it ironic when the Russians say they're going to retaliate. They're already launching attacks. They're already targeting Ukraine and now also NATO countries, and I would say even U.S. interests. They've been doing it for years. So my own belief is it's a lot of saber rattling. It's a full court press right now in Moscow to try and deter Washington and Brussels from taking certain steps that will be extremely painful and costly for Moscow.

I'm sure that [talk of Tomahawks] increases Moscow’s level of concern. They definitely do not want the Ukrainians to have these weapon systems, and they're making all kinds of threats. They're looking for potential sore points with the U.S., for example, suggesting they will deploy new weapons systems to Nicaragua or Cuba. They're going back to the Cold War playbook that led to the Cuba missile crisis.

So I’m not surprised. Experience has shown that the Russians make a lot of threats, but those threats tend to be empty. Let's go back to all the threats they made over the F-16s, over the ATACMS, over Finland and Sweden joining NATO. I don't think that they followed through on a lot of those threats, not in the near term, not on an immediate basis or not in an obvious way. They may, of course, respond in the future, but so far they have not followed through on threats to use nuclear weapons, which they’ve previously implied as a potential scenario. So, they haven't followed through on previous threats. It doesn't mean they won’t do it in the future, but my assessment is they will not. .

Rear Admiral (Ret) Montgomery: Russia and China practice a similar provocation principle. We democracies bend and capitulate to the fear that an authoritarian regime might do something because they announce that they've got a red line or they've got an issue. And they provoke us. They tell us that the provocation will cause them to overreact and therefore we should stand down. At no point ever do they have the same sense of decorum or restraint, right? But apparently we're supposed to practice that restraint. Enough of that. We need to do what we think is right. If it's Tomahawks, fine. If it's Tomahawks and ERAM, which is what I think it is, great. If it was E-RAM alone, I think it’d be great.

What I say is, I would not back off. One reason I support sending Tomahawks now is because the Russians oppose them so much and I feel compelled to support the decision, if it's made, to send them. But the Russians are going to learn that they were complaining about the wrong thing. And by the time they learn that lesson, I think they're going to be in a lot of pain.

In Summary:

The coming decision on Tomahawk cruise missiles is a true inflection point for both Ukraine and the U.S.: it could materially expand Kyiv’s ability to conduct deep-strike operations, but only if supplied in sufficient quantities and paired with the right launch and logistical support. US and Western leaders must weigh that operational upside against difficult questions - platform and delivery constraints, the need for complementary systems like ERAM, funding and NATO cooperation, and the very real risk of Moscow escalating its response. Whatever Washington decides will test U.S. resolve, reshape NATO burden-sharing conversations, and have consequences that reverberate across the battlefield in Ukraine and Russia.

Follow The Cipher Brief for more timely analysis and updates as this critical story develops.

Ethan Masucol, Ian Coleman and Connor Cowman contributed research for this report

]]>
Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
High&Stakes Talks in D.C.: Frozen Assets, Air Defense, and Tomahawks https://belimedia.com.ng/high-stakes-talks-in-dc-frozen-assets-air-defense-and-tomahawks https://belimedia.com.ng/high-stakes-talks-in-dc-frozen-assets-air-defense-and-tomahawks

DEEP DIVE – A senior Ukrainian delegation will travel to Washington D.C. this week for talks that are expected to include the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine, air defense challenges and increased sanctions on Moscow. The decision on whether or not the U.S. will provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles is also expected to be front and center.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says he believes that the Israeli-Gaza ceasefire announced late last week, is proof that a resolution to his country’s fight against Russia is also possible.

In a congratulatory phone call from Zelensky to Trump on Saturday, Ukrainian officials said the two leaders talked about Russia’s latest strikes targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, as well as the possibility of Kyiv obtaining U.S. made Tomahawk missiles. In a post on X, Zelensky said “If a war can be stopped in one region, then surely other wars can be stopped as well - including the Russian war”.

The missile request is the latest in a long-running series of high-profile requests by Ukrainian officials for more powerful and sophisticated western support.

President Trump says he has “sort of made a decision” about giving Tomahawks to NATO for supply to Ukraine, but says he wants to know Ukrainian plans for them before sending them.

Moscow is pushing back against the possibility of providing U.S. Tomahawks to Ukraine, which could provide the capability for even deeper strikes inside Russia, something that wouldn’t play well for the Russian President at home.

President Vladimir Putin said recently that sending Tomahawks to Ukraine would significantly damage U.S.-Russia relations, and that the weapons would "mean a completely new, qualitatively new stage of escalation, including in relations between Russia and the United States".

Ukraine has already shown impressive tenacity in striking targets on Russian soil. Kyiv’s domestic drone campaign against Russian oil and gas facilities, aimed at cutting Russia’s energy export revenues that fund its war machine, has been remarkably successful. Moscow has publicly acknowledged that it is facing domestic fuel shortages, but has not publicly attributed the Ukrainian strikes as the cause. In June, Ukraine smuggled over 100 drones into Russia and launched Operation Spider Web, a drone attack that resulted in the loss of a third of Moscow’s fleet of strategic bomber aircraft.

And, Ukraine has already successfully employed advanced western supplied missiles like the US-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the European-made Storm Shadow. The ATACM has a range of around 300 KM, while the Storm Shadow has a range of 250KM. Kyiv is also producing and testing its own long-range missile, the FP-5 Flamingo that has a stated range of 3000KM. Recent media reports indicate that Kyiv may have started using the Flamingo in an operational capacity, but details on the operations remain scarce.


An infographic titled "Range of ATACMS missiles" created in Ankara, Turkiye on November 19, 2024. (Photo by Murat Usubali/Anadolu via Getty Images)

The Tomahawk would be a significant improvement in long-range strike capability for Ukraine’s military. The missiles, capable of being launched from ships, submarines and ground launchers, have a range of 1,500-2,000KM, and are capable of hitting targets accurately even in heavily defended airspace. The Tomahawk would give Ukraine the ability to hit most of European Russia, west of the Ural Mountains. That puts key political and military hubs like Moscow and St. Petersburg in range, as well as significant military assets and energy infrastructure.

A Tomahawk cruise missile flies toward Iraq after being launched from the AEGIS guided missile cruiser USS San Jacinto March 25, 2003 in the Red Sea. (Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images)


THE CONTEXT

  • President Trump says he “sort” of has made a decision on supplying Ukraine with Tomahawks
  • Foreign Minister of Estonia told Trump that Tomahawks could help Ukraine “push Russia back”
  • The Tomahawk missile is made by Raytheon and has a range of 1,500-2,000kms (around 930-1,550 miles)
  • It is approximately 750 Kilometers from Kyiv to Moscow
  • Tomahawks are primarily launched from maritime platforms and are currently deployed on all U.S. ships and submarines equipped with vertical launch systems (VLSs).
  • Ground-launched Tomahawks are launched from the Typhon, a new vertical launch system developed by Lockheed Martin to enable the U.S. military to launch Tomahawks from the ground. This system would likely be required by Ukraine.
  • Since the 1990s, the U.S. Navy has purchased about 9,000 Tomahawk units at an average price of $1.3 million each. It is unclear where the U.S. stockpile stands currently. U.S. allies armed with Tomahawks include the Netherlands, Australia, the UK, and Japan.
  • The Trump administration in late August approved the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) missiles to Ukraine. They have a range of 250 miles. The purchase is being funded by Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and U.S. Foreign Military Financing.

    Experts and analysts are watching closely for developments coming out of Washington this week. Some notable questions remain regarding the potential use of Tomahawks by Ukraine such as:
    • If approved, will they represent a significant increase in capability for Ukraine?
    • What quantities and how quickly would Tomahawks be supplied to Ukraine?
    • How is Russian President Vladimir Putin likely to respond?
We spoke with two Cipher Brief Experts to get their take on these questions:

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior director at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He directs CSC 2.0, which works to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.  Montgomery is a principal member of the Cyber Initiatives Group.


Glenn Corn

Glenn Corn is a former Senior Executive in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who worked for 34 years in the U.S. Intelligence, Defense, and Foreign Affairs communities.  He spent over 17 years serving overseas and served as the U.S. President’s Senior Representative on Intelligence and Security issues.  He is an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of World Politics.

The Cipher Brief: Is sending Tomahawk missiles going to enable Ukraine to do a lot more than it's already capable of doing now? Would it make a difference?

Rear Admiral (Ret) Montgomery: I'm going to caveat this. I'm not opposed to Tomahawks. But I think it's “Tomahawks and.” And then how many Tomahawks? Ten Tomahawks won't make a difference. 100 Tomahawks won't make a difference. But 400 or 500 would. Is the U.S. willing to part with 400 or 500? Can Europe take a deep breath and pay for 400 or 500? And what are the Tomahawks going to look like? Are we going to strip them of certain capabilities and capacity? Then it becomes a slow land attack cruise missile. So I'm not sure.

Tomahawks would be helpful. What I'm sure would be much more, I think, operationally game-changing is the provision of the ERAM (Extended Range Attack Munition). And I'm thrilled with what the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Department of Defense writ large have done with the ERAM, which is effectively a small cruise missile with extended ranges well beyond ATACMS, but less than the Tomahawk. There's multiple variants of it. And when it begins to deliver, it'll be 10 here, 20 there, but eventually it should get up to about 100 a month for 20 months. And you can fire it from MiG-29s or Sukaloys or F-16s. This weapon is going to stretch the battlefield for the Russians and will force logistics and command and control and troop aggregation sites farther and farther from the front line.

And I don't think the Russians have demonstrated the ability to properly control and support forces at long range and distances. So, if the Russians are stretched out like that, combined with the operational and strategic pressure from the long range unmanned Ukrainian UASs strikes, and maybe the addition of Tomahawks, particularly to target the refineries, I think all of this can really cause Putin to readjust his thinking.

So from my perspective, things could get better. It's not “Tomahawks alone” or “Tomahawks or.” It's “Tomahawks and”, and the “and” is the big thing. And that “and” to me is the ERAM.

Corn: I think that what Ukrainians are doing is great. The Tomahawks would just increase their ability and increase, I'd say, the volume of the attacks and deep strikes that they could conduct inside of Russia.

And of course there's a symbolic and kind of political message here too. If the United States agrees to provide these weapons systems, it just shows that we're not backing down and we're not going to be intimidated by Moscow, which I'm sure the Ukrainians want to see because that's a sign of political support. That's important for them.

The Cipher Brief: Moscow is obviously rattling the sabers over the potential US Tomahawk decision. How do you assess Russia's escalation threats to the U.S.?

Corn: I find it ironic when the Russians say they're going to retaliate. They're already launching attacks. They're already targeting Ukraine and now also NATO countries, and I would say even U.S. interests. They've been doing it for years. So my own belief is it's a lot of saber rattling. It's a full court press right now in Moscow to try and deter Washington and Brussels from taking certain steps that will be extremely painful and costly for Moscow.

I'm sure that [talk of Tomahawks] increases Moscow’s level of concern. They definitely do not want the Ukrainians to have these weapon systems, and they're making all kinds of threats. They're looking for potential sore points with the U.S., for example, suggesting they will deploy new weapons systems to Nicaragua or Cuba. They're going back to the Cold War playbook that led to the Cuba missile crisis.

So I’m not surprised. Experience has shown that the Russians make a lot of threats, but those threats tend to be empty. Let's go back to all the threats they made over the F-16s, over the ATACMS, over Finland and Sweden joining NATO. I don't think that they followed through on a lot of those threats, not in the near term, not on an immediate basis or not in an obvious way. They may, of course, respond in the future, but so far they have not followed through on threats to use nuclear weapons, which they’ve previously implied as a potential scenario. So, they haven't followed through on previous threats. It doesn't mean they won’t do it in the future, but my assessment is they will not. .

Rear Admiral (Ret) Montgomery: Russia and China practice a similar provocation principle. We democracies bend and capitulate to the fear that an authoritarian regime might do something because they announce that they've got a red line or they've got an issue. And they provoke us. They tell us that the provocation will cause them to overreact and therefore we should stand down. At no point ever do they have the same sense of decorum or restraint, right? But apparently we're supposed to practice that restraint. Enough of that. We need to do what we think is right. If it's Tomahawks, fine. If it's Tomahawks and ERAM, which is what I think it is, great. If it was E-RAM alone, I think it’d be great.

What I say is, I would not back off. One reason I support sending Tomahawks now is because the Russians oppose them so much and I feel compelled to support the decision, if it's made, to send them. But the Russians are going to learn that they were complaining about the wrong thing. And by the time they learn that lesson, I think they're going to be in a lot of pain.

In Summary:

The coming decision on Tomahawk cruise missiles is a true inflection point for both Ukraine and the U.S.: it could materially expand Kyiv’s ability to conduct deep-strike operations, but only if supplied in sufficient quantities and paired with the right launch and logistical support. US and Western leaders must weigh that operational upside against difficult questions - platform and delivery constraints, the need for complementary systems like ERAM, funding and NATO cooperation, and the very real risk of Moscow escalating its response. Whatever Washington decides will test U.S. resolve, reshape NATO burden-sharing conversations, and have consequences that reverberate across the battlefield in Ukraine and Russia.

Follow The Cipher Brief for more timely analysis and updates as this critical story develops.

Ethan Masucol, Ian Coleman and Connor Cowman contributed research for this report

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Inside the Secret War: Senate Concern Over U.S. Military Strikes in the Caribbean https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-secret-war-senate-concern-over-us-military-strikes-in-the-caribbean https://belimedia.com.ng/inside-the-secret-war-senate-concern-over-us-military-strikes-in-the-caribbean OPINION — “Currently, the administration is waging a secret war against a secret list of unnamed groups that they will not tell us about. There have been four lethal strikes against [alleged Venezuelan narco-trafficking] boats in the Caribbean. The administration wrote us [the U.S. Senate] a letter…about what they were doing in September. They said they considered themselves to be in a ‘non-international armed conflict’ -- that means a war -- against a secret list of ‘designated terrorist organizations.’ I received a briefing last week on the administration’s strikes in the Caribbean. During that briefing, Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, from both sides of the aisle, asked a Senate-confirmed official whether the Department of Defense could produce a list of the organizations that are now considered terrorists by the United States. They said they could not provide that list.”

That was Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.), speaking on the Senate floor last Wednesday during the debate on a War Powers resolution that would have blocked U.S. military strikes in the Caribbean. It lost 48-to-51.

Slotkin, a former CIA analyst who also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, gave a clear analysis of the several steps the Trump administration has taken that could eventually lead this country to a situation which, as Slotkin put it, “creates an excuse [for President Trump] to unilaterally use the military inside our cities, similar to the way he used them in the Caribbean.”

Other Senators provided additional information about today’s current extraordinary situation, which I will discuss below, but it was Sen. Slotkin who put it in the clearest context.

First, she established her own credentials, saying, “I am a CIA officer. I am a former Pentagon official. I did three tours in Iraq – armed -- alongside the military. I participated in the targeting of terrorist groups. I actually have no real problem going against [drug] cartels, given what they have done in their inserting drugs in our community and with the death of so many Americans. But as a nation, I think we should have as a basic principle that you can’t have a secret list of terrorist organizations that the American public and, certainly, the U.S. Congress don’t get to even know the names of.”

She referred back to the 2001 Global War on Terror saying it was, “kind of my era,” and spoke about how new foreign terrorist organizations were declared to Congress and then “our intelligence community, the military, and law enforcement would spin up to go after information about that group and prosecute -- you know, target against that group.”

Slotkin went on to explain how the Trump administration had late last month expanded the terrorist threat to include individuals and groups in this country.

Speaking about Trump’s September 22, Executive Order, “Designating Antifa As A Domestic Terrorist Organization,” Slotkin said the administration was “going to, again, make secret lists of ‘terrorist groups’ inside the United States and send the full force of the U.S. Government against those terrorist organizations. They are not telling anyone the name of these organizations, but they are authorizing law enforcement and the intelligence community to double down and come up with that list.”

This is a problem, Sen. Slotkin said, “because the Trump administration in that document [the Executive Order] defined ‘terrorist organization’ or ‘domestic terrorism’ incredibly broadly. It suggests that any group that talks about anti-Christian values, views they don’t like on migration or race, differing views on the role of the family, religion, or morality could all be grounds for labeling an organization ‘domestic terrorists.’’’

In fact, the reference to anti-Christian values appeared in a little-publicized follow-up to the September 22 Executive Order -- a September 25, National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-7. An NSPM is a presidential directive that specifies and communicates national security policy to executive departments and agencies.

Citing “the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,” and signed by Donald J. Trump, NSPM-7 gives directions to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Homeland Security as well as the Attorney General on “Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence.”

Building on the assassination of Charlie Kirk and attempts against Trump and others, NSPM-7 unites “this pattern of violent and terroristic activities under the umbrella of self-described ‘anti-fascism,’” or Antifa. NSPM-7 goes on to say, “Common threads animating this violent conduct include anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, and anti-Christianity; support for the overthrow of the United States Government; extremism on migration, race, and gender; and hostility towards those who hold traditional American views on family, religion, and morality.”

NSPM-7 gives responsibility to the National Joint Terrorism Task Force and its local offices (JTTFs) to “coordinate and supervise a comprehensive national strategy to investigate, prosecute, and disrupt entities and individuals engaged in acts of political violence and intimidation designed to suppress lawful political activity or obstruct the rule of law.” In addition, JTTFs are to investigate “institutional and individual funders, and officers and employees of organizations, that are responsible for, sponsor, or otherwise aid and abet the principal actors engaging in” the above criminal conduct.

In addition, NSPM-7 says that the Attorney General “may recommend that any group or entity whose members are engaged in activities meeting the definition of ‘domestic terrorism’…merits designation as a ‘domestic terrorist organization.’ The Attorney General shall submit a list of any such groups or entities to the President through the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor [Stephen Miller].”

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In her Senate speech, Sen. Slotkin continued, “If this administration is not telling us who is on their secret designated terrorist list for groups in the Caribbean, they are definitely not going to tell us who is on their list of domestic terrorist organizations.”

Finally, Sen. Slotkin spoke out about her future fear -- that President Trump may claim in some American city “if the violence has gotten to a level of an insurrection, it means that the U.S. military can now be used [under the Insurrection Act] as law enforcement in our cities. It means the U.S. military can raid; they can arrest; they can detain. You can easily see a world where the President of the United States labels protest groups ‘terrorists,’ doesn’t tell anyone, and creates an excuse to unilaterally use the military inside our cities, similar to the way he used them in the Caribbean.”

I agree Trump is headed in that direction, and past and present members of the military must also be aware of what’s going on.

Meanwhile other Senators during last Wednesday’s debate raised other issues needing public consideration.

For example, Sen. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) said, “There is no question that drug traffickers, criminal gangs, and other criminal enterprises engage in horrific and violent acts. Murder is murder, whether committed by a human trafficker, a drug trafficker, or a member of al Qaeda. But there are fundamental differences in their motivation, which legally distinguishes a drug trafficker from a terrorist. It is common knowledge that a drug trafficker’s purpose is financial enrichment, while the definition of a ‘terrorist’ is a person who uses violence or the threat of violence to instill widespread fear to achieve a political or ideological goal.’’

Schiff raised another point related to the current situation. He said, “Other governments are using the label ‘terrorist’ to defame and criminalize social activists, political opponents, and journalists who engage in peaceful dissent. This is common practice in Iran, Russia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, where dissidents are imprisoned and even executed for being so-called ‘terrorists.’’’

In a challenge to Republicans, Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) said, “If my [GOP] colleagues, as they have stated, believe we should be at war in the Caribbean or at war with nations in the Americas or with the narco-traffickers, they have had the ability the entire time to bring a resolution before us and have that debate in front of the American public. I have a feeling that debate would produce some positive votes if it were limited enough, but to allow a President to do it by secret, without Congress having the guts to have the debate and vote about whether the war is worthwhile, is contrary to everything this country stands for.”

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Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) raised a broader issue. “The notion that we can bomb our way out of a drug trafficking crisis is not a strategy,” Reed said, “it is wishful thinking. Using the U.S. military to conduct unchecked strikes in the Caribbean risks destabilizing the region, provoking confrontation with neighboring governments, and drawing our forces into yet another open-ended conflict without a clear mission or exit strategy.”

Reed continued, “Conflict in the Caribbean or with Venezuela is entirely avoidable, but the risk that we stumble into war because of one man’s impulsive decision-making has never been higher. Our troops deserve better—much better.”

President Trump has been after Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro since 2018, including a failed, White House-driven, 2019 regime-change attempt to restore democracy in that country by replacing Maduro with opposition leader Juan Guaidó. John Bolton, National Security Advisor at the time, said in his book, The Room Where It Happened, that Trump assured Guaidó that he (Trump) would, in Bolton’s words, “pull off Maduro’s overthrow.”

Who knows what Trump is saying privately today about Maduro and planning for Venezuela?

But the Caribbean activities are but a sideshow to what the Trump administration has quietly underway in this country.

Again I refer to Sen. Slotkin’s words on the Senate floor last Wednesday: “The President is looking for an excuse to send the U.S. military into our streets, to deploy the U.S. military against his own people, to prompt confrontation, and to hope that confrontation justifies even more military force and military control. This is a well-worn authoritarian playbook. It is one that quite literally the United States of America was founded on rejecting -- the idea that British soldiers, when they occupied American cities, abused American citizens to the point where Americans turned against them.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Viktor Orban’s Russia Problem Is Becoming Hungary’s Disaster https://belimedia.com.ng/viktor-orbans-russia-problem-is-becoming-hungarys-disaster https://belimedia.com.ng/viktor-orbans-russia-problem-is-becoming-hungarys-disaster OPINION — Hungary’s prime minister does not seem to grasp the gravity of the moment. His ally, Russia, is bleeding by a thousand cuts from Ukrainian drones, while Vladimir Putin’s former pal, Donald Trump, is now calling Russia a “paper tiger” and providing Kyiv with intelligence for long-range strikes.

For months, the U.S. president tried to play peacemaker, but Viktor Orban’s friend in Moscow ignored him – escalating missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and expanding hybrid warfare across Europe. Putin’s resolve to escalate only makes Trump look weak, and Trump does not tolerate looking weak. Now he appears to be bringing a stick to the negotiations. If Ukraine is indeed receiving Tomahawk missiles, things will only get worse for Putin. And for his friend in Budapest.

Orban appears to be sleepwalking into a crisis of his own making. His love affair with Putin has isolated him in Europe. His reliance on Russian oil threatens to result in an economic catastrophe if and when the oil stops flowing through Ukraine. His revanchist claims on Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Province has angered Kyiv, without winning Ukraine’s Hungarians to his side. And if he continues to provoke the drone superpower in Kyiv by violating Ukrainian airspace with Hungarian drones, he may one day find himself on the receiving end of a heavy stick.

How different things were in 1989, when more than 200,000 Hungarians gathered in Budapest’s Heroes’ Square for the reburial of Imre Nagy, the executed leader of the 1956 Revolution. The ceremony culminated in a bold seven-minute speech by a young Viktor Orban, who called for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops still stationed in Hungary. It was that same Orban who during Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, condemned it as an “imperialistic action of pure power politics.” But by 2022, he was captured by Russian money.

Whether Orban harbors imperial ambitions or simply covets the totalitarian control exerted by a corrupt Kremlin, Hungary has become a bastion of Chinese and Russian influence in the heart of Europe and has actively supported Putin’s war and provoked Kyiv.

In May 2025, Ukraine’s Security Service exposed a suspected Hungarian military intelligence network, marking the first time an EU state had been caught spying against Kyiv.

Then in September 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that reconnaissance drones likely belonging to Hungary had violated Ukraine’s airspace, the first such reported breach. Kyiv accused the aircraft of scouting Ukraine’s industrial capacity along the border.

Orban even shrugged off the violation while speaking on a talk show, saying that Hungarian drones “either crossed or not” into Ukraine’s skies, before adding that “Ukraine is not a sovereign country” and Hungary was not its enemy, so there was no problem. This reckless attitude is reflected within his own government. In a leaked 2023 recording, Defense Minister Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky spoke of “breaking with the peace mentality” and entering “phase zero of the path to war.” This was the kind of language you’d expect from Moscow, not from the capital of a NATO ally.

That arrogance carries risks. In August 2025, Ukraine struck the Druzhba oil pipeline, cutting flows of Russian crude to Hungary and Slovakia – the only EU states still addicted to Moscow’s energy. Kyiv had little reason to spare countries that blocked aid in Brussels, and the strike showed that Hungary’s dependence on Russian pipelines is a vulnerability Ukraine can easily exploit. That Hungary signed a deal with France’s Engie to buy liquefied natural gas changes nothing, since Orban says he has no plans to stop importing gas and oil from Russia.

What’s the point of Orban’s provocations? Does he really believe that Russia is winning a war that’s cost it over 1 million casualties? Does he truly believe that Hungary can reestablish the borders it had during the Habsburg Empire and help Russia dismantle Ukraine? Does he not see that he’s compelling the EU and NATO to adopt measures that will ultimately isolate Hungary and negate its baneful influence?

A rational politician in a small, landlocked country that’s benefited inordinately from its neighbors’ largesse would certainly sing a different tune. Instead, Orban is, like Putin, driving his country toward disaster.

It’s possible that the erstwhile Hungarian patriot has become a Hungarian imperialist who models himself on Moscow’s dictator. More likely, Orban and his legitimacy are trapped in the revisionist ideology that helped him consolidate power. According to him and his propaganda apparatus, Hungary was victimized in both world wars, whereas the reality is that it happened to ally with the wrong side, thereby bringing its troubles upon itself.

That narrative, and Orban’s dictatorial pretensions, appear to have outlived their purpose. His opponent, Peter Magyar, leads Orban by around 10 percentage points and is likely to win the parliamentary elections in April 2026. Investors are already betting that a change of government would unlock as much as €18 billion in frozen EU aid, roughly a tenth of Hungary’s GDP, fueling a rally in the Hungarian forint.

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Orban would be wise to change course and return to being the man who inspired thousands in 1989. He should stop pushing the Ukrainians, if only because that makes him look ridiculous. As Szabolcs Panyi, a Hungarian investigative journalist, has said, “Hungary’s army is wholly unprepared for any type of conflict with anyone. Ukraine’s army is so superior that it’s completely unrealistic that Orban would engage in direct fighting.”

Orban also declared that Hungary was “not afraid” to shoot down Russian drones if they violated his country’s airspace. Perhaps what he truly fears is cutting off the payments from Moscow that keep him loyal. In any case, Budapest would be the weak link in any European “drone wall,” should it soon be built. Still, the Russians seem to have been launching drones from ships, which would weaken any future drone wall.

As to the EU and NATO, Orban should realize that it makes no sense to bite, again and again, the hand that feeds you. Alas, Orban still has a long way to go. On October 1, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reportedly clashed with Orban at an EU summit in Copenhagen after the Hungarian leader disrupted talks on the bloc’s security strategy and aid for Ukraine.

His hostility has only sharpened since. On October 6, Orban accused Zelensky of using “moral blackmail” to push Ukraine’s EU bid, claiming Hungary had “no moral obligation” to support it.

Unless a miracle happens, Orban will lose and be thrown out of office. Hungary could then become what it was in 1956 and 1989: a beacon of hope for democracy and human rights.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Afghanistan Is Becoming India and Pakistan’s Proxy Battlefield—Again https://belimedia.com.ng/afghanistan-is-becoming-india-and-pakistans-proxy-battlefieldagain https://belimedia.com.ng/afghanistan-is-becoming-india-and-pakistans-proxy-battlefieldagain OPINION — On Oct. 15, 2025, Islamabad and Kabul announced a 48-hour ceasefire after days of shelling and cross-border clashes around Spin Boldak/Chaman and in Kurram. That same week New Delhi hosted Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, the highest-profile Taliban visit to India since 2021. These two parallel events are not accidental. They are the visible symptoms of a strategic pattern that has, for decades, made Afghanistan an arena for India–Pakistan competition. If left unchecked, that competition will once again turn Afghan territory, institutions, and people into collateral damage.

The recent clashes underscore a simple truth: kinetic escalation along a porous frontier is a multiplier. Airstrikes, artillery duels, and intermittent border closures do not remain local nuisances. They force displacement, interrupt trade and humanitarian access, and create openings for transnational violent actors to regroup and expand. At the same time, high-level diplomatic gestures, like India’s reception of a Taliban foreign minister—help normalize engagement without demanding verifiable commitments from Kabul on terrorism, human rights, or governance. The result is a dangerous two-track dynamic: escalation on the ground and normalization in the capitals.

A brief history of the rivalry on Afghan soil

Pakistan’s footprint in Afghanistan is old and deep. From the anti-Soviet jihad to the 1990s civil war, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) cultivated proxies, trained fighters in madrassas and camps, and hosted Taliban decision-making bodies in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miramshah. By the time I led Signals Intelligence at NDS, the material flows, explosives, trainers, and fighters—were a familiar pattern. As U.S. forces drew down after 2014, Islamabad’s public posture shifted; in private and in some diplomatic forums, Pakistan presented the Taliban as a political reality to be accommodated. That accommodation was always transactional, however, and it produced deep leverage inside Afghanistan—from provincial commanders to elements inside Kabul.

India’s engagement followed a different logic but with equally transactional ends. Delhi invested heavily in infrastructure, education and development—roads, power projects, scholarships that sent Afghans to Indian universities. Those investments built goodwill and administrative capacity. But India also positioned itself as a counterweight to Pakistan. New Delhi’s network of consulates, including two on Pakistan’s border, provided both soft-power reach and strategic insight. My colleagues and I at NDS were aware that New Delhi’s intelligence service (RAW) cultivated contacts in border provinces and maintained links that could be used against Pakistan. At the time the Afghan republic rationalized these partnerships: the enemy of our enemy was a useful ally. That pragmatic logic blinded us to a harsher reality—India’s support for Afghan institutions was, ultimately, calibrated to New Delhi’s competitive needs, not an unconditional commitment to the Republic’s survival.

Two anecdotes illustrate the corrosive effect of external rivalry on Afghan sovereignty. First, while intercepting communications as head of Signals Intelligence I once heard General Dostum pleading on the phone with Pakistan’s ambassador—an exchange that revealed how quickly even vocal opponents could seek patronage. Second, a private meeting with the RAW station chief in Kabul—held months before the Republic collapsed—left me with a hollow certainty: Indian intelligence was preparing contingency plans for the Republic’s fall rather than mobilizing to prevent it. Those were not betrayals born of malice but of strategic realism: both Delhi and Islamabad were optimizing for their own survival and leverage.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Why this rivalry matters now

Three features make the current moment particularly risky.

First, even when attacks originate with state-adjacent actors inside Afghanistan, their effects are interstate: whether Islamabad acknowledges strikes in Kandahar or Taliban-aligned groups carry out violence, the result is cross-border harm — civilians killed, infrastructure damaged, and humanitarian access disrupted.

Second, diplomatic gestures without conditionality distort incentives. India’s public reset—receiving a Taliban foreign minister—grants political space to a movement whose internal policies remain deeply repressive. If major regional powers normalize ties without demanding verifiable changes, they risk entrenching a governance model that enables radicalization and denies basic rights, particularly for women and minorities.

Third, Afghans pay the price. External competition saps Afghan agency. Political elites are incentivized to cultivate foreign patrons rather than build domestic coalitions. Former security personnel, civil servants and vulnerable communities are either abandoned or become leverage for outside actors. The human cost—displacement, loss of livelihoods, shrinking civic space—is the clearest metric of failure.

A three-part policy approach: sovereignty, de-escalation, and conditional engagement

If Washington and its partners are serious about stability in South and Central Asia, they should adopt a compact focused on three priorities.

Prevent Afghanistan from becoming the battlefield. The U.S. should lead a regional security initiative—narrow in scope but backed by monitoring and consequence mechanisms—bringing together India, Pakistan, Iran, China, and key Central Asian states. The initiative would pledge non-use of Afghan territory for hostile proxy activity, create impartial border monitoring mechanisms, and establish rapid-response channels to defuse incidents before they spiral.

Push India and Pakistan back to bilateral dialogue. The most durable way to remove Afghan soil from the rivalry is to reduce the rivalry itself. Washington should use calibrated incentives and diplomatic leverage to get Delhi and Islamabad into issue-specific talks—starting with confidence-building measures on border management, refugee handling, counter-narcotics cooperation, and a hotline for counterterrorism incidents. These are pragmatic, tradeable commitments that build reciprocity without demanding grand concessions.

Condition engagement with Kabul on verifiable benchmarks. Engagement with the de facto authorities will continue for humanitarian and security reasons—but it must not reward predation. Bilateral ties should be tied to transparent, public benchmarks: demonstrable counter-terrorism cooperation, protections for civilian populations (especially women and minorities), and steps to prevent Afghan soil from being used by transnational violent actors. Parallel support must be scaled for civil society, independent media, and the Afghan diaspora—networks that preserve the political capital needed for a future inclusive order.

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Realism with consequences

Some will argue that Delhi’s and Islamabad’s actions are driven by existential fears and that external pressure has limited purchase. That is true. But realism also recognizes that incentives, reputational costs, and monitoring can alter strategic calculations. The goal is not to force idealism but to make proxy strategies less profitable—politically, economically and reputationally—than cooperation.

Conclusion

The recent ceasefire and high-profile diplomatic activity are warnings more than signals of resolution. Afghanistan’s sovereignty must not be treated as negotiable currency in a broader regional rivalry. If the international community fails to act, Afghans will continue to suffer as their country becomes the chessboard for others’ strategies. The path forward is straightforward, if politically difficult: prevent kinetic escalation, push India and Pakistan toward practical dialogue, and condition engagement with Kabul on measurable protections for Afghan people. For the sake of Afghanistan—and for regional security—that is the responsible, pragmatic choice.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Defiance Meets Desperation as Iran Faces Fresh UN Sanctions https://belimedia.com.ng/defiance-meets-desperation-as-iran-faces-fresh-un-sanctions https://belimedia.com.ng/defiance-meets-desperation-as-iran-faces-fresh-un-sanctions

EXPERT INTERVIEW – The United Nations has reimposed sweeping economic and military sanctions on Iran, ten years after lifting them under the 2015 nuclear deal.

Britain, France, and Germany triggered the “snapback” mechanism, accusing Tehran of nuclear escalation and blocking inspections. Iran had already halted oversight after U.S. and Israeli strikes in June damaged several nuclear sites and military facilities.

President Masoud Pezeshkian insists Iran has no intention of building nuclear weapons, calling the sanctions “unfair and illegal.” But the move marks another blow to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the deal meant to cap Iran’s enrichment and research while allowing civilian nuclear energy.

Iran accelerated banned nuclear activity after Trump pulled the U.S. out of the deal in 2018, repeatedly dismissing the accord as flawed.

The latest sanctions cut Iran off from global banks, reimpose arms and missile restrictions, and revive asset freezes and travel bans on key officials. Analysts say the measures hit Iran at a fragile moment with its economy shrinking, inflation surging, and the rial collapsing to record lows. Oil sales, foreign investment, shipping, and manufacturing are all expected to take a hit.

The Cipher Brief spoke with longtime Middle East and Energy Analyst Norm Roule, who formerly served as National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI. Roule continues to travel regularly to the region for meetings with high-level officials throughout the Middle East.


Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

The Cipher Brief: Why are snapback sanctions different from other sanctions already imposed on Iran?

Roule: First, we should touch on what this means for the regime. The sanctions hit Iran at one of its most fragile moments since the late 1980s. The government remains unpopular to an unprecedented degree. Virtually every economic indicator in Iran is poor. Its national security architecture of militias, foreign proxies, Russia, China, and the Revolutionary Guard failed during the recent conflict with Israel and the U.S. The main driver of the regime is to maintain stability as it completes transitions to the post-revolutionary generation of leadership. Despite the absence of large-scale protests, destabilizing national unrest could occur at any time.

Over the past few months, Iran’s diplomats have used the prospect of a nuclear deal and the possibility of sanctions relief as a source of hope for the Iranian people. The return of UN sanctions strips Tehran of one of its few remaining political assets.

The primary difference between the latest sanctions and U.S. sanctions is that these measures are binding on all 193 member states of the United Nations. Iran will, of course, do everything it can to evade sanctions. Russia, China, North Korea, Venezuela, and other Iranian partners who already have a history of violating Iran sanctions are unlikely to enforce these sanctions with enthusiasm.

However, unlike U.S. sanctions, which they have argued could be ignored because they were imposed only by Washington, these sanctions are imposed by the United Nations. This will make it harder for these countries to involve other countries in their own violations. Likewise, it makes it much easier for the U.S. government to seek compliance worldwide due to the legal and reputational risks associated with countries and businesses that we might approach on this issue.

The Cipher Brief: Can you discuss the specific sanctions and your assessment of their likelihood of success?

Roule: First, and most damaging for Iran, these sanctions isolate Iranian banks from a large part of the global financial system and require that UN members prevent the use of their banking systems on sanctioned trade. Hence, Iran has lost the ability to manage its oil revenues through international banks. Instead, it will need to engage in oil bartering or use intermediaries, which is a slower and more expensive process. It will likely reduce its oil sales at a time when Saudi Arabia is trying to reclaim some of the market share lost to Iran in recent years.

Banks understand that Iran will seek to defy sanctions. They also know that there are expensive legal consequences if they fail to undertake due diligence operations to examine transactions and shipments, thereby demonstrating that they have fulfilled their sanctions obligations.

Next, there is the restoration of the conventional arms embargo: This bans traditional arms transfers to or from Iran. This should make it harder for Iran to acquire advanced weapons from Russia and China, but also to sell its weapons systems to Russia, Sudan, and other countries. I will admit that I am not sanguine on the last point.

Third, we have nuclear and missile restrictions: This includes a prohibition on uranium enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water activities, and ballistic missile technology transfers or tests capable of delivering nuclear weapons (beyond 300 km range). Iran is likely to ignore most of these restrictions and will test the international community as it does so. But I think it will also try to do so in a way that avoids sparking a regime-destabilizing war with Israel or the U.S.

Snapback also restores restrictions on dual-use goods, materials, and technologies that could aid nuclear or missile programs. These sections require increased inspections of Iranian ships and aircraft to prevent the transfer of prohibited materials or goods. For governments and businesses, this requirement will be among the more intrusive and time-consuming, and thus expensive. At the same time, Tehran will game the system by introducing complicated, multi-country layers of shell companies to obtain critical materials. This is where international legal and intelligence partnerships will play an essential role in identifying and neutralizing these networks.

Next, snapback returns asset freezes and travel bans on designated Iranian individuals. This is a rather long list and includes Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officials, nuclear scientists, and officials related to their programs, as well as their assets worldwide. Travel bans should be successful. Asset bans are less so, primarily due to the small number of such assets located abroad. These restrictions, however, serve as a powerful reminder to businesses of the reputational impact of doing business with Iran.

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The Cipher Brief: Let’s go deeper. Can you break this down by sector? Is there any part of Iran’s economy that will be hurt more than another? Oil seems most likely.

Roule: We should keep in mind that, following the negative impact of the initial sanctions announcement, the effect of sanctions should be understood as corrosive. Further impact is shaped by how seriously and loudly we enforce sanctions, as well as how vigorously and successfully Tehran develops countermeasures.

To begin, Iran started the year in challenging economic conditions. The IMF’s projection for Iran’s GDP was dismal, 0.5%, so negative growth in the coming months would be far from surprising. Indeed, one wonders how it will be avoided.

The snapback announcement caused the Iranian rial to plummet to a new record low of 1.12 million to the dollar. Tehran will have little choice but to inject precious hard currency into the market to sustain its failing currency. I also expect more enthusiasm for the effort to cut some of the zeros from the Iranian currency. Iran’s leaders likely worry that the coming months will see a further weakening of the rial and a spike in inflation, which currently hovers around 43%.

Foreign investment, such as it is, will also take a hit. In 2024, Iran claimed – and probably overstated – that it attracted around $5.5 billion in foreign investment. That minuscule figure will shrink even further.

Let’s talk about sectoral impacts.

Shipping costs for Iran are likely to increase substantially. A significant portion of Iran’s seaborne trade will face new cargo inspections, bans on dual-use goods shipments, insurance difficulties, and possibly even port servicing complications.

Manufacturing and mining will be impacted in terms of both imports and exports as they face new pressures on supply chains and financing. This impact will affect trade with Europe, but it will also dampen Iran’s efforts to establish trade with Africa and complicate its trade relations with Iraq.

Although Iran’s defense industry may not be participating in trade shows, one suspects that its existing trade in drones and light arms will continue. Its current clients – Russia, Sudan, and other African countries, and reportedly Venezuela and Bolivia – may choose to ignore sanctions given their lack of alternative suppliers and animosity with the West.

The impact of sanctions on Iranian oil sales to China will be the most significant, if difficult to assess, in the coming months. Beijing and Tehran have deliberately obscured the payment relationship, and the former has imposed tough terms on Iran. China will view this new phase as an opportunity to offload more goods, machinery, and technology onto the Iranian market, and possibly to negotiate a larger price discount for the oil it acquires.

The use of intermediaries, smaller banks that are outside the scope of international monitoring, and shell firms will also increase costs for Tehran. Last, it isn’t unreasonable to think that Chinese oil sales could contract. Beijing – likely seeing the writing on the wall on this issue – has been building its reserves, and the Saudis and Emirates can fill the missing production, although they won’t discount their oil to match Iran’s prices.

The Cipher Brief: What are Iran’s likely next moves? Is diplomacy dead? What do you say to those who believe military action is expected?

Roule: Iran’s playbook is unlikely to be a surprise. Tehran’s leaders used Western media to issue their side of the story, projecting a blend of confidence, defiance, and dismissal of the impact of sanctions. Once home, Iran’s leaders will show that they won’t stop their nuclear work.

It is likely that even within Iran, the program's future remains under debate, with several options being considered. Tehran’s efforts to maintain close relations with Moscow and Beijing make it likely that it will seek to involve these capitals in its programs. One could imagine Iran dangling IAEA access at some point to gain international acceptance. Three possible programs could emerge in the coming months.

The most likely option is that Iran will seek to rebuild a modernized version of the enrichment and even the conversion facilities destroyed in the Twelve-Day War. This process would be expensive, and, depending on the number and location of facilities, could take years to complete. This option would be consistent with Iranian policy rhetoric but would risk a military attack and an extension of sanctions. The problem with lengthy construction is that this also delays benefits to Iran’s economy.

Tehran could reduce the likelihood of an attack by allowing the IAEA access to the sites or involving Russia or China in the operation and construction of the sites. Such an option, if involving advanced centrifuges, would allow Iran to retain the capability to produce highly enriched uranium, including weaponization levels, in the future should it wish to do so.

A far less likely option is to select a foreign fuel source for domestic reactors to provide power. Since this would mean abandoning a domestic enrichment program, this option is thus improbable in the foreseeable future.

Least likely for now would be weaponization. Such a decision would require Iran’s leadership to believe it could undertake and execute such an activity without discovery by Israeli or Western intelligence and, if discovered, would not face devastating military action similar to the June 2025 war.

In any case, activity at the recently reported Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province is sufficient to be observable to the West, and as we have recently seen, to draw the attention of Western media, thereby sending a message. I expect construction at the site won’t be very fast until Tehran sees how Israel and the U.S. respond to this announcement and until Iran comes to a conclusion as to what direction it wishes to go in its nuclear program.

Diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program is far from over, with low-level conversations perhaps taking place in Vienna and European capitals. The international community will remain – and should remain- insistent that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gain access to Iran’s nuclear enterprise as soon as possible. Such a return cannot be achieved without engagement and diplomacy. However, it will take time for the politics to cool and a new paradigm of proposals to emerge.

Washington, Europe, and the Gulf will entertain serious proposals from Iran that it will accept a nuclear program that allows the IAEA access it requires. More broadly, Washington is looking for a deal that means Iran won’t have the capacity to build nuclear weapons, or accept constraints on its missile program, and end the regional operations of the Quds Force.

Iran’s current leadership is unlikely to make such a decision until sanctions begin to erode the economy. The death of the Supreme Leader could pave the way for a new generation of leadership, which – while no less assertive and potentially even hostile – might be more willing to be more accommodating on these issues to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Extreme caution should be exercised when discussing the possibility of military hostilities. The U.S. certainly doesn’t seek to start a war in the region. Israel may conduct military operations in Iran over Quds Force actions. Still, it is hard to see why Israel would argue it needs to undertake a costly military operation simply because Tehran is denying the IAEA access to rubble at Natanz.

Moving to Tehran, it is hard to see what benefits military action brings to Tehran. Iran is operating under some harsh realities. The Twelve Day War made it clear that Israel’s intelligence capabilities within Iran are extraordinary, and there is no reason to believe the capabilities aren’t still in place. If so, any plan would likely be discovered and perhaps neutralized before it could take off. Further, Iran’s air defenses continue to be no match for Israel or U.S. air and missile systems.

Iran’s missiles and drones not only had no strategic impact on the course of the Israeli attack but were significantly reduced in number by Israeli attacks. Iran fought alone in June: neither Russia nor China showed the slightest interest or capability in helping Iran during the June war. A conflict that spread to the region risks costing Iran its détente with the GCC and potentially jeopardizing its support from China. Iran’s population remains disillusioned, and testing their willingness to endure a conflict would be quite the risk. Much depends on specific events and drivers, but current conditions don’t seem to lean towards a regional conflict.

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why the U.S. Is Losing the Cognitive Competition https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-us-is-losing-the-cognitive-competition https://belimedia.com.ng/why-the-us-is-losing-the-cognitive-competition EXPERT OPINION — In order for the U.S. to successfully compete for global influence against its adversaries and to avoid a kinetic fight, we must excel at cognitive warfare; that is military activities designed to affect attitudes and behaviors. This type of warfare is a subset of irregular warfare (IW) and combines sensitive activities to include information operations, cyber, and psychological operations to meet a goal. To develop these kinds of operations, the U.S. needs intelligence professionals who are creative and experts in their field. Additionally, the U.S. intelligence and operations sectors need to be comfortable working together. Finally, the U.S. needs decision makers who are willing to take risks and employ these methods. Without these components, the U.S. is doomed to fail in competing against its adversaries who practice cognitive warfare against us on a regular basis.

U.S. focus on IW and its subset, cognitive warfare, has been erratic. The U.S. struggles with adapting its plans to the use of cognitive warfare while our leaders have consistently called for more expertise for this type of warfare. In 1962, President Kennedy challenged West Point graduates to understand: "another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin, that would require a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, forces which are too unconventional to be called conventional forces…" Over twenty years later, in 1987, Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment that established Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Department’s Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) office. Another twenty years later, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that DoD needed “to display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.”

After twenty years of best practices of IW in the counter terrorism area, the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy emphasized the need to institutionalize irregular warfare “as a core competency with sufficient, enduring capabilities to advance national security objectives across the spectrum of competition and conflict.” In December 2022, a RAND commentary pointed out that the U.S. military failed to master IW above the tactical level. I submit, we have failed because we have focused on technology at the expense of expertise and creativity, and that we need to balance technology with developing a workforce that thinks in a way that is different from the engineers and scientists that create our weapons and collection systems.

Adversaries Ahead of Us

IW and especially cognitive warfare is high risk and by definition uses manipulative practices to obtain results. Some policy leaders are hesitant to use this approach to develop influence strategies which has resulted in the slow development of tools and strategies to counter our adversaries. U.S. adversaries are experts at IW and do not have many of the political, legal, or oversight hurdles that U.S. IW specialists have.

Chinese military writings highlight the PRC’s use of what we would call IW in the three warfares. This involves using public opinion, legal warfare, and psychological operations to spread positive views of China and influence foreign governments in ways favorable to China. General Wang Haijiang, commander of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Western Theatre Command, wrote in an official People’s Republic of China (PRC) newspaper that the Ukraine war has produced a new era of hybrid warfare, intertwining “political warfare, financial warfare, technological warfare, cyber warfare, and cognitive warfare.” The PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road are prime examples of using economic coercion as irregular warfare. Their Confucius Centers underscore how they are trying to influence foreign populations through language and cultural training.

Russia uses IW to attempt to ensure the battle is won before military operations begin and to enhance its conventional forces. Russia calls this hybrid war and we saw this with the use of “little green men” going into Crimea in 2014 and the use of the paramilitary Wagner forces around the world. Russia also has waged a disinformation campaign against the U.S. on digital platforms and even conducted assassinations and sabotage on foreign soil as ways to mold the battle space toward their goals.

What Is Needed

U.S. architects of IW seem to primarily focus on oversight structures and budget, and less on how to develop an enduring capability.

Through the counterterrorism fight, the U.S. learned how to use on-the-ground specialists, develop relationships at tribal levels, and understand cultures to influence the population. The U.S. has the tools and the lessons learned that would enable a more level playing field against its adversaries, but it is not putting enough emphasis on cognitive warfare. A key to the way forward is to develop SOF personnel and commensurate intelligence professionals to support the SOF community who understand the people, the geography, and the societies they are trying to influence and affect. We then must go further and reward creativity and cunning in developing cognitive warfare strategies.

The Department of Defense and the intelligence community have flirted with the need for expertise in the human domain or social cultural sphere for years. The Department of Defense put millions of dollars into socio cultural work in the 2015-time frame. This focus went away as we started concentrating more on near peer competition. Instead, we focused on technology, better weapons and more complex collection platforms as a way to compete with these adversaries. We even looked to cut Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to move toward what some call a lower risk approach to collection—using technology instead of humans.

SOF personnel are considered the military’s most creative members. They are chosen for their ability to adapt, blend in, and think outside the box. This ingenuity needs to be encouraged. We need a mindful balancing of oversight without stifling that uniqueness that makes IW so successful. While some of this creativity may come naturally, we need to ensure that we put in place training that speaks to inventiveness, that pulls out these members’ ability to think through the impossible. Focused military classes across the services must build on latest practices for underscoring creativity and out of the box thinking. This entrepreneurial approach is not typically rewarded in a military that is focused on planning, rehearsals, and more planning.

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Focusing on Intelligence and Irregular Warfare

An important part of the equation for irregular warfare is intelligence. This foundation for irregular warfare work is often left out in the examination of what is needed for the U.S. to move IW forward. In the SOF world, operators and intelligence professionals overlap more than in any other military space. Intelligence officers who support IW need to have the same creative mindset as the operators. They also need to be experts in their regional areas—just like the SOF personnel.

The intelligence community’s approach to personnel over the past twenty or so years works against support for IW. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the intelligence community has moved from an expertise-based system to one that is more focused on processes. We used to have deep experts on all aspects of the adversary—analysts or collectors who had spent years focused on knowing everything about one foreign leader or one aspect of a country’s industry and with a deep knowledge of the language and culture of that country. With many more adversaries and with collection platforms that are much more expensive than those developed in the early days of the intelligence community, we cannot afford the detailed expert of yore anymore. The current premise is that if you know the processes for writing a good analytical piece or for being a good case officer, the community can plug and play you in any context. This means, we have put a premium on process while neglecting expertise. As with all things—we need to balance these two important aspects of intelligence work.

To truly understand and use IW, we need to develop expert regional analysts and human intelligence personnel. Those individuals who understand the human domain that they are studying. We need to understand how the enemy thinks to be able to provide that precision to the operator. This insight comes only after years of studying the adversary. We need to reward those experts and celebrate them just as much as we do the adaptable plug and play analyst or human intelligence personnel. Individuals who speak and understand the nuances of the languages of our adversaries, who understand the cultures and patterns of life are the SOF member’s best tool for advancing competition in IW. Developing this workforce must be a first thought, not an afterthought in the development of our irregular warfare doctrine.

CIA Director William Casey testified before Congress in 1981:

“The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. No photo, no electronic impulse can substitute for direct on the scene knowledge of the key factors in a given country or region. No matter how spectacular a photo may be it cannot reveal enough about plans, intentions, internal political dynamics, economics, etc. Technical collection is of little help in the most difficult problem of all—political intentions. This is where clandestine human intelligence can make a difference.”

Not only are analytical experts important in support of IW but so are HUMINT experts. We have focused on technology to fill intelligence gaps to the detriment of human intelligence. The Defense Intelligence enterprise has looked for ways to cut its HUMINT capability when we should be increasing our use of HUMINT collection and HUMINT enabled intelligence activities. In 2020, Defense One reported on a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) plan to cut U.S. defense attaches in several West African countries and downgrade the ranks of others in eight countries. Many advocate for taking humans out of the loop as much as possible. The theory is that this lowers the risk for human capture or leaks. As any regional expert will tell you, while satellites and drones can provide an incredible amount of intelligence from pictures to bits of conversation, what they cannot provide is the context for those pictures or snippets of conversation. As Director Casey inferred, it is only the expert who has lived on the ground, among the people he/she is reporting on who can truly grasp nuances, understanding local contexts, allegiances, and sentiments.

While it is important to continue to upgrade technology and have specialists who fly drones and perform other data functions, those functions must be fused with human understanding of the adversary and the terrain. While algorithms can sift through vast amounts of data, human operatives and analysts ensure the contextual relevance of this data. Technologies cannot report on the nuances of feelings and emotions. The regional experts equip SOF operators with the nuanced understanding required to navigate the complexities that make up the “prior to bang” playing field. This expertise married with cunning and creativity will give us the tools we need to combat our adversary in the cognitive warfare domain.

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Conclusion

The need for contextual, human-centric understanding for being able to develop plans and operations for cognitive warfare that can compete with our adversaries and keep us from a kinetic fight is paramount. Those who try to make warfare or intelligence into a science miss the truth, that to be proficient in either, art is a must. We need expertise to be able to decipher the stories, motives, and aspirations that make cognitive warfare unique. Regional intelligence experts discern the patterns, motives and vulnerabilities of adversaries; key needs for developing IW campaigns and for influencing individuals and societies. We need seasoned human intelligence personnel, targeters, and analysts who are experts on the adversary to be able to do this. We also need to develop and reward creativity, which is a must for this world.

We also have to be upfront and acknowledge the need to manipulate our adversaries. U.S. decision makers must concede that to win the next war, cognitive warfare is a must and it is essential for these leaders to take calculated risks to mount those campaigns to influence and manipulate.

The cost of cognitive warfare is but a rounding error when compared to the development of new technical intelligence collection platforms and the platforms’ massive infrastructures. This rounding error is a key lynchpin for irregular warfare and irregular warfare is our most likely avenue for avoiding a kinetic war. Human operatives, out of the box thinking, and expert analysts and human intelligence personnel are the needed bridges that connect data into actionable insights to allow our SOF community to practice the type of irregular warfare we have proven historically that the U.S..S. can provide and must provide to counter our adversaries and win the cognitive war we are currently experiencing.

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Hidden National Security Risk in Smart Cities https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hidden-national-security-risk-in-smart-cities https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hidden-national-security-risk-in-smart-cities OPINION — It is worryingly easy to get hold of personal and sensitive data on American military and intelligence personnel. Earlier this year investigative journalists reported that a Florida-based data broker had marketed 3.6 billion location coordinates from devices belonging to U.S. military and intelligence staff stationed in Germany, with the data allegedly sourced through a Lithuanian advertising technology company. The dataset reportedly tracked movements in and around U.S. military installations and even recorded alleged visits by military personnel to German brothels. Academic research, including a 2023 study funded by the U.S. Military Academy, has documented how advertising supply chains can expose sensitive information, such as financial and health records of the military and intelligence communities.

The vast amounts of data collected from phones and other internet-connected devices—and traded globally through the multi-billion-dollar data brokerage industry—have rightly drawn growing concern from national security professionals. Yet the parallel surge in data collection through smart-city technologies has received far less attention. Around the world, cities are deploying advanced information and communications systems to optimize everything from energy use and traffic management to policing and environmental performance. The data emerging from these systems is qualitatively different: continuous, infrastructure-linked, and often directly tied to identifiable individuals and critical sites. Even without commercial resale, such data can easily flow—intentionally or inadvertently—into the hands of U.S. competitors and adversaries, posing a distinct national security risk.

While phone apps and advertising data are gathered at certain moments and often with delays, smart-city sensors capture information in real time, around the clock. This gives the data greater spatial precision, accurately mapping activity to specific roads, entrances, and choke points, whereas device-centric GPS or Wi-Fi signals from typical data-broker sources are noisier and less reliable. Moreover, smart-city data is tightly bound to real-world identities, linking information such as license plates, transit cards, vehicle identifiers, facial imagery, or utility meters directly to people and places. In contrast, data brokers typically rely on trackers and identifiers that require additional “enrichment” to infer who someone is. This makes smart-city data inherently more identifiable—and therefore more sensitive—from the moment it is collected.

Smart-city operations inherently generate vast datasets that reflect the rhythms of daily life. On a typical morning commute through a connected metropolis, an individual leaves behind a dense trail of digital traces detailed enough to reconstruct their routine. License plate readers track vehicle movements; traffic cameras and transit cards log each stop and transfer. Smart parking meters, toll sensors, and even networked streetlights record times and locations. By the time the commuter arrives at the office, building access systems, facial-recognition cameras, and smart elevators have verified and stored their presence—all producing data that may be processed, shared, and sold far beyond city borders.

What begins as an ordinary commute can pose risks. The same streams of data that keep cities running efficiently can compromise covert or clandestine urban infrastructure—such as safe houses. Even when an individual’s identity remains unknown, long-term data retention allows for after-action attribution. With sufficient archives, authorities—or anyone who gains access to the data—can retrospectively reconstruct vehicle routes, recurring digital patterns, and anomalies in utility use, effectively linking an individual to a dwelling that was invisible in real time. For the intelligence and special operations communities, this means that the longer a safe house remains active, the greater the chance that archived urban data will eventually reveal its connection to past activity.

In most smart cities, local governments team up with private tech companies to run the networks of sensors, cameras, and apps that keep the city smart. While municipal authorities collect data to improve services—like managing parking space—vendors often handle the technical side, storing and analyzing that information on their own systems. Along the way, some of this data is shared with third-party partners for analytics, advertising, or “service optimization”—a catch-all term for improving device performance and adjusting how services are delivered. From there, data can flow into the vast ecosystem of data brokers, who combine it with information from other sources and resell it on the open market. The result: data that began as part of a city service can eventually be bought across countries and jurisdictions with little trace of its public origins.

Even without commercial resale, smart-city data can find its way into the hands of U.S. competitors and adversaries. Take Chinese vendors, for example. Huawei and other companies have aggressively marketed smart-city technologies worldwide. According to a 2022 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China’s Digital Silk Road has served as a major channel for exporting smart-city systems. The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission has documented hundreds of such exports by Chinese firms across 106 countries. More recently, researchers have noted that through these projects, Beijing gains intimate knowledge of urban operations. This is because under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, Chinese companies are legally obligated to cooperate with state intelligence services. As a result, Beijing does not even need to purchase the information through data brokers. Ultimately, smart-city data can provide Chinese intelligence networks with tools to influence—or pressure—municipal authorities.

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For an adversary, access to extensive smart-city data archives offers at least four key advantages: the ability to reconstruct patterns of life for U.S. intelligence and military personnel, map their organizational networks, trace and attribute past events, and shape narratives in information warfare. Consider the last one, for example. Extended retention periods of smart-city datasets act as a generally overlooked force multiplier for information operations. For example, the same repositories that enable urban planning can be weaponized to construct convincing deepfakes: By fusing authentic time and location data with fabricated content, an adversary can produce false narratives that appear highly credible.An adversary could depict military personnel or public officials at sensitive sites, discrediting leadership or triggering diplomatic crises.

Addressing the challenges of smart-city data may benefit from structured “red team” exercises. Such exercises could involve legally acquiring commercially available datasets that encompass embassies, military bases, or other national security installations, followed by analysis of what information can be inferred across different time windows. Where appropriate, host ministries and municipal authorities could be engaged to adopt protective measures. Supplementary agreements—such as annexes to the Status of Forces Agreement or local memoranda of understanding—might establish short retention periods for data collected in designated military-adjacent zones. Such agreements could also mandate signed deletion attestations and prohibit vendors from exporting copies without explicit government approval.

Smart-city data—and the duration for which it is retained—deserves strategic scrutiny, not just technical management. These municipal datasets are living maps of how nations decide, adapt, and function. They mark another intelligence frontier—one we have yet to secure.

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Rising Lion Shows the U.S. Needs More Allies Like Israel https://belimedia.com.ng/rising-lion-shows-the-us-needs-more-allies-like-israel https://belimedia.com.ng/rising-lion-shows-the-us-needs-more-allies-like-israel OPINION — Israel’s Operation Rising Lion will go down as among the most impressive military campaigns in history. Military academies, military planners, and the Intelligence Community will study it for decades. More urgent, however, is that policymakers understand the importance of U.S. support in enabling Israel to advance our shared interests.

In less than a fortnight, Israel brought to its knees a major regional adversary, geographically nearly 75 times its size and 1,000 miles away. As we learned on a recent trip to Israel with the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, Israel—with crucial U.S. support—crippled Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities, dismantled its air defenses, and decapitated its command and control. At the Pentagon’s request, Israeli pilots cleared the way for U.S. B-2 bombers.

Since first exposing Iran’s nuclear weapons program in 1994, Israel knew that it might need to take military action. Yet, June’s attack was only seven months in the making. At the end of 2024, a narrower plan based on precision strikes against a few nuclear facilities was shelved and a far broader campaign was developed from scratch—targeting not only the entirety of Iran’s nuclear supply chain, but its ballistic missiles, top generals, and leading nuclear scientists as well.

What made that sweeping operation feasible was an extraordinary string of Israeli successes since the brutal Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Israel defeated Hamas, decimated Hezbollah, defended itself against hundreds of Iranian-launched ballistic missiles and thousands of drones, eliminated Syrian anti-air batteries, and knocked out Iran’s advanced Russian S-300 air defenses, opening an unimpeded corridor to Iran.

Suddenly, Iran was more exposed than at any point in the last forty years. The regime responded by accelerating both its nuclear weapons research and missile production. Israel now had both the opportunity and urgent need to act quickly and comprehensively against myriad Iranian targets.

Rapidly expanding its war plan required Israel to gather intelligence on hundreds of additional targets, develop new capabilities and operational concepts, and ready large numbers of personnel for new and unfamiliar missions. It wasn’t until earlier this year, for example, that Israel decided to use its full fleet of combat aircraft - including older F-16s - against Iran. And it was just days before the June 13 “go” date that the operation’s final pieces were put in place.

The extraordinary agility and ingenuity of Israel’s planning was exceeded only by the excellence of its military execution. The campaign started with a surprise attack that combined exquisite intelligence with perfectly synchronized operations—including stand-off weapons, forward-deployed drones, and clandestine ground teams—to eliminate Iran’s top military command and leading scientists in the war’s first minutes.

Drawing on the full-range of its advanced capabilities - including indigenously developed air launched munitions and complex cyber operations - Israel systematically neutralized Iran’s air defenses, establishing total air superiority from the Iraqi border to Tehran in just forty-eight hours. For the rest of the war, Israeli jets owned the skies over their greatest enemy’s capital. Operating without challenge, Israeli UAVs blanketed Iranian missile sites, providing persistent intelligence and hunting missile launchers before they could fire.

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Essential to Israel’s success were its two squadrons of F-35 fifth-generation fighters. Every strike package had several of them in the lead. F-15 pilots told us they felt less safe without an F-35 nearby. The aircraft’s next generation avionics allowed pilots to detect and defeat Iranian defenses that intelligence had not previously identified—even when they obscured their position by keeping sensors turned off until Israeli jets were near.

Israel’s achievements are extraordinary. For the first time, a U.S. ally has taken the lead, utilizing American weapons, in achieving a decades-long, bipartisan U.S. national security objective - preventing a nuclear Iran - and has dealt a serious blow to our most dangerous enemy in a part of the world that has long been deemed vital to U.S. interests, and, in doing so, has almost single-handedly transformed the Middle East’s balance of power in favor of the West.

This success was enabled not by the United States joining the fight, vital though that was, but by the decades-long U.S. investment in Israel’s ability to defend itself - through weapons sales, joint training and intelligence sharing. Not to mention Israel’s fierce determination to fight back.

The lessons for policymakers from Operation Rising Lion are clear: Israel is a U.S. national security asset and we need more allies equally determined and capable.

The Iran war is not yet over; if left unchecked, Iran may well reconstitute its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, or terrorist network. Russia remains an aggressor and China the pacing threat. The United States should find and support regional partners, like Israel. Provide them with the weapons, intelligence, advanced technology, and political support needed to address these threats.

That’s real burden sharing—a local partner prepared to carry the lion’s share of the responsibility, not to mention the fighting and dying, to counter shared threats.

General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.), served as the deputy commander of U.S. European Command. Lieutenant General Robert P. Ashley, USA (ret.), was the 21st Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Vice Admiral Mark Fox, USN (ret.), served as Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command. All three are members of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) Iran War Assessment.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Ukraine’s Great Cyber Heist https://belimedia.com.ng/ukraines-great-cyber-heist https://belimedia.com.ng/ukraines-great-cyber-heist

DEEP DIVE -- For more than a decade, Moscow honed a shadow playbook — blending disinformation, ransomware, supply-chain sabotage, and quiet cyber theft to steal technology and weaken its rivals. That model once gave the Kremlin an edge. But today, in a striking reversal, Kyiv is flipping the script.

In the past year, Ukrainian state and proxy cyber actors have shifted from primarily defensive disruption to strategic intelligence collection. They have breached Russian military networks, leaked operational files on high-end platforms, and even broadcast battlefield realities inside Russia itself. The result is a palpable asymmetric inversion: Russian tools of statecraft are being used against Moscow, stripping the Kremlin of secrecy and, crucially, generating intelligence that informs Western militaries and policymakers about vulnerabilities in Russia’s most sensitive capabilities.

“Cyberspace espionage is nothing new,” JP Castellanos, Director of Threat Intelligence at Binary Defense and a former cyber operator at U.S. Central Command, tells The Cipher Brief. “However, this is the first time it has been publicly reported that a country such as Ukraine is taking the offensive. These recent operations yielded troves of classified information, from submarine schematics and crew rosters to aircraft design documents and staff records, suggesting that Kyiv is expanding the war into cyberspace to erode Moscow’s military advantage.”

Latest: Submarine Secrets and the Erosion of Strategic Sanctuaries

The most consequential public instance of this trend came in early August, when Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR) published documents it says were extracted from Russian naval systems tied to the newly commissioned Project 955A submarine Knyaz Pozharsky.

According to reporting based on HUR’s release, the cache included technical diagrams, crew manifests, and operational procedures — material that, if authentic, could diminish the survivability and operational security of a platform that sits at the apex of Moscow’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. If genuine, the leak not only undermines the Kremlin’s confidence in the operational security of its strategic assets, but it also demonstrates Kyiv’s intent to target the symbolism and substance of Russia’s nuclear posture.

But Emily Otto, an Alperovitch Fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, warns that some of the press coverage of what HUR was able to directly access, may be exaggerated.

“It’s highly unlikely the Ukrainians reached directly into a submarine’s network,” she said. “Far more plausible is that the data originated from external systems, such as contractors, shipbuilders, or onshore networks tied to deployments and crew management. To penetrate hardened systems, hackers often pivot through softer targets in the supply chain or exploit individuals with legitimate access through social engineering techniques.”

The distinction matters, but the national security implications are clear. Cyber operations that expose nuclear-capable platforms create new friction points in deterrence dynamics. States base much of their escalation calculus on the opacity of their most lethal systems. When that cloak is torn open in cyberspace, adversaries — and allied planners — gain a clearer sightline into vulnerabilities and potential avenues for non-kinetic exploitation. That kind of de-mystification can alter decision-making timelines in crisis scenarios and complicate strategic signaling that historically relied on uncertainty.

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Disrupt, Denude, Broadcast: The Multi-Pronged Ukrainian Approach

Ukraine’s cyber campaign is not monolithic. It consists of several layers of actors: formal intelligence operations, state-aligned volunteer groups known as the “IT Army,” and independent hackers targeting media and communications systems.

The IT Army has been a central feature of Ukraine’s approach since 2022. It has drawn in civilians, ethical hackers, and members of the diaspora to carry out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, data leaks, and influence operations. This open, crowdsourced model has expanded Ukraine’s list of targets and made attribution more challenging for Moscow.

Alongside these volunteers, trained operators from Ukraine’s military intelligence agency have executed precise intrusions against Russia’s defense industry and logistics hubs. These operations have included breaches of companies tied to strategic bombers and drone supply chains. Rather than simply disrupting activity, they are designed to collect valuable information — blueprints, procurement networks, maintenance records — that can help Ukraine, NATO planners, and defense analysts protect allied systems and identify weak points in Russian resupply lines.

Another element has been politically symbolic “cyber partisan” operations, in which actors hijack Russian TV or radio broadcasts to show images of battlefield casualties and other content that state media normally censors. The goal is to puncture the Kremlin’s information monopoly and raise the domestic political costs of sustaining the war.

Castellanos notes that the reliance on volunteers is not unique to Ukraine.

“The U.S. Marine Corps has a Cyber Auxiliary, a volunteer organization aimed at increasing cyberspace readiness,” he explains. “U.S. policymakers might consider, under appropriate legal frameworks, expanding this concept to find ways for skilled civilians to aid national cyber defense or intelligence in wartime. Clear guidelines would be needed, since Western governments have generally discouraged freelance hacking due to legal risks and escalation concerns.”

Why This Matters for U.S. and NATO Planners

Ukraine’s cyber operations carry implications well beyond the battlefield. First, they generate intelligence Western services might not otherwise obtain. Breached documents and leaked technical data provide insights into Russian systems, from undersea platforms to air defenses, that sharpen NATO’s planning. The recent Knyaz Pozharsky disclosures are just one example.

Second, these operations can alter the pace of conflict. By exposing vulnerabilities in strategic systems, they shorten the period in which adversaries can operate in secrecy. That often forces Moscow to adjust its deployments or harden its defenses more quickly — moves that can, in turn, expose new weak points.

However, compressed timelines also carry risks.

“These operations do raise the risk of Russian retaliation,” Castellanos warns. “Western officials have been vigilant since the war’s outset, with CISA even activating a ‘Shields Up’ posture to brace for possible attacks. Moscow has stated that it views major hacks on its systems as part of the broader conflict. But so far, the expected all-out Russian cyber onslaught has not materialized. The best approach for the U.S. and NATO is to continue strengthening cyber defenses and clearly signaling deterrence, including through Article 5.”

Otto is somewhat more sanguine.

“Cyber operations don’t spark the same visceral reaction as bombs or missiles, so they rarely drive escalation upward in intensity or sideways into new domains,” she explains. “This hack-and-leak operation looks aimed at embarrassing Russia, not provoking it, and Moscow is already fully committed to its war aims. At most, it might spark some retaliatory hacking, but that’s unlikely to shift the trajectory of the wider conflict.”

Limits and Risks: Fragility of Attribution and the Mirror of Counter-Escalation

Ukraine’s cyber tactics are not without hazards. Crowdsourced operations can be imprecise, raising the risk of hitting civilian infrastructure and undermining international support. They also increase the possibility of Russian retaliation against allied networks, critical infrastructure, or global systems, such as shipping and undersea cables — escalations with broader security consequences.

Another concern is exposure. Each operation risks revealing tools and techniques that adversaries can study and therefore adapt. Cyber advantage is inherently temporary: gains depend on how quickly each side can exploit discoveries before the other closes the gap.

Otto underscores that cyber power should not be overstated.

“Russia’s cyberattacks were meant to break Ukraine, but they ended up strengthening it. Each wave of attacks forced Ukraine to harden its defenses, deepen partnerships with the West, and build resilience — so Russia now gets less and less payoff,” she says. “But cyberspace is not where wars are won: you can disrupt systems online, but you can’t take and hold land.”

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Forward Posture: How Allies Should Respond

For U.S. and NATO planners, Ukraine’s cyber operations create both opportunities and responsibilities. Intelligence should be shared quickly, say experts, but with rigorous forensics to manage risks and track collateral effects. Priorities include strengthening critical systems, such as undersea cables, satellites, and industrial networks, as well as developing cyber tools that can convert intelligence into precise effects when needed.

The growing role of volunteer actors also requires updated rules — clearer engagement standards, coordination mechanisms, and oversight when leaks involve strategic assets.

Finally, cyber-derived data should be integrated into traditional defense planning, from anti-submarine warfare to electronic warfare and force deployment, where it can shape outcomes without direct kinetic action.

Looking beyond the war in Ukraine, Castellanos sees permanence.

“It’s clear that cyber operations are the new normal,” he says. “Governments should prepare by investing heavily in both capabilities and resilience. On the defensive side, this means hardening critical infrastructure, conducting regular cyber drills, and cultivating public–private partnerships, as much of the vulnerable infrastructure, such as power grids, telecommunications, and finance, is privately owned. Additionally, the international community needs to work toward norms and agreements on cyber warfare.”

A Future of Persistent Cyber Contest

Ukraine’s cyber campaign demonstrates how a smaller state can turn decentralized technical talent into a strategic advantage, using stolen data not only for disruption but for intelligence and influence. The implications extend far beyond Kyiv and Moscow: any country that depends on secrecy to protect key systems is vulnerable.

Cyber operations are not a substitute for tanks or artillery. But as Ukraine shows, they can tilt the balance of intelligence, shape the tempo of conflict, and erode an adversary’s confidence in its most sacred capabilities.

“Cyber is on equal footing with air, land, sea, and space, but it plays by different physics,” Otto added. “It rewards persistence over battles, code over platforms, and teams that fuse operators, intel, and developers. Governments should organize to that logic. In the U.S., this means reorganizing for a dedicated Cyber Force that aligns resources, processes, and values to continuous competition, rather than relying on force generation organizations built for episodic conflict.”

For the U.S. and NATO, the lesson is clear: cyberspace is not just a tool for disruption but a permanent source of intelligence and competition. The task ahead is to harness that intelligence responsibly, reinforce exposed allied systems, and adapt to a future where stolen secrets can spread faster than they can be contained.

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Talking to Kim Jong Un Could Help Freeze His Nuclear Ambitions https://belimedia.com.ng/talking-to-kim-jong-un-could-help-freeze-his-nuclear-ambitions https://belimedia.com.ng/talking-to-kim-jong-un-could-help-freeze-his-nuclear-ambitions OPINION — North Korea’s Kim Jong Un publicly announced that he’s prepared to meet with President Donald Trump: “If the US drops its hollow obsession with denuclearization and wants to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the recognition of reality, there is no reason for us not to sit down with the US. Personally, I still have a good memory of US President Trump.” The Korean Central News Agency published Mr. Kim’s comments, made a few days ago at a parliamentary meeting in Pyongyang.

I’m not surprised by Mr. Kim’s comments. When the Six Party Talks with North Korea commenced in 2003, North Korea’s principal representative to the Talks often mentioned that North Korea wanted nuclear weapons as a deterrent, never to be used for offensive purposes. They asked to be treated as we treated Pakistan, a country that has good relations with the U.S. The North Korean representative said North Korea wanted a good, normal relationship with the U.S., promising to be a good partner. with the U.S.

North Korea has consistently been told that the U.S. would never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. But with complete and verifiable denuclearization, North Korea would receive security assurances, sanctions relief, economic development assistance, to include the provision of Light Water Reactors for civilian purposes and eventual normalization of relations with the U.S. Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Jong il, seemingly accepted this U.S. offer and in September 2005, North Korea did agree to a Joint Statement committing North Korea to complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

That was 2005. The situation has changed profoundly over the past twenty years. North Korea now has a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons; some estimates are between 50 and 60 nuclear warheads, reportedly with sufficient fissile material to annually produce 15 to 20 nuclear warheads that can be miniaturized and mated to ballistic missiles.

North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017 was assessed to be a test of a thermonuclear weapon. And in 2024, North Korea successfully launched the Hwasong/19, a mobile, solid fuel ballistic missile capable of targeting the whole of the U.S. In addition to advances in nuclear weaponization and ballistic missiles, North Korea has made significant progress with Hypersonic and cruise missiles and advances with its nuclear submarine program.

Of note is North Korea’s new mutual defense treaty with the Russian Federation and the 12,000 combat troops North Korea sent to Russia for its war with Ukraine. In addition to the troops, North Korea has provided Russia with large quantities of artillery shells and ballistic missiles. In exchange, Russia has provided North Korea with considerable technical support for its satellite and nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

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We are now dealing with a different North Korea. Mr. Kim is more self-confident, given his new relationship with Russia and his continued close allied relationship with China. Having two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council ensures that North Korea no longer must be concerned with UN sanctions. And the pictures of Mr. Kim at the parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two in Beijing, standing next to China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, gave Mr. Kim significant international credibility, especially with the Global South.

A meeting of President Trump with Chairman Kim could develop into a series of meetings that could result in North Korea halting the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, with no additional nuclear tests and a moratorium on ballistic missile launches. This would be a major success for Mr. Trump and the U.S. It would also lessen tension with South Korea and Japan.

The “eventual” U.S. goal should continue to be complete and verifiable denuclearization. However, this doesn’t have to be up front. It’s an eventual goal that should be pursued as relations with North Korea improve, with an action-for action process: As North Korea halts the production of fissile material and stops producing more nuclear weapons and refrains from ballistic missile launches, UN sanctions imposed subsequent to 2016 could be lifted with security assurances and economic development assistance and a discussion of liaison offices in our respective capitals. North Korea should be encouraged to rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT).

Mr. Trump entering talks with Mr. Kim could develop into a relationship with North Korea that could prove beneficial for the U.S. and its allies and partners.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Here’s Why the Next Clash Between India and Pakistan Could Be Even More Dangerous https://belimedia.com.ng/heres-why-the-next-clash-between-india-and-pakistan-could-be-even-more-dangerous https://belimedia.com.ng/heres-why-the-next-clash-between-india-and-pakistan-could-be-even-more-dangerous EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION — The initial phases of the India-Pakistan conflict in May followed a familiar incremental escalatory path. But in the final phase, the Indian use of BrahMos and other missiles against multiple Pakistani air bases represented a massive change of approach. In an ongoing rivalry where the final action of the previous conflict becomes the baseline for the next clash, this carries significant risk for the future.

Rarely has it been so difficult to discover what happened than with the latest India-Pakistan clash. The perceived need to deliver a positive narrative to each population, deliberate campaigns of disinformation and the requirements of operational security have cast a thick fog over the events which began with the terrorist attack at Pahalgam on 22nd April and ended with the ceasefire on 10th May.

The picture is still not crystal clear but enough is now known to analyse what happened and assess the implications for the future. What emerges is deeply worrying and it edges the subcontinent several steps closer to an ever more dangerous conflict, one in which the use of nuclear weapons could be contemplated.

There were four distinct phases.

Phase One. The attack on Pahalgam was another appalling act of terrorism against innocent tourists reminiscent in nature (if not in scale) of the 7th October Hamas-inspired atrocities in Israel. The group which claimed responsibility, The Resistance Front (TRF), has been linked to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) which (along with Jaish-ul-Mohammed - JuM) has long been associated with Pakistan. LeT is based in Muridke near Lahore and JuM’s main centre is at Bahawalpur. Pakistan has repeatedly been accused of being the sponsor of both groups and has (at least twice) promised the United States that both groups would be dismantled.

The Pahalgam attack was almost certainly conceived as a direct response to the attack by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) on the Jaffar Express train between Quetta and Peshawar on 11th March which involved 400 passengers. The Pakistani army is convinced that India provides covert support to the BLA (and the Pakistan Taliban - TTP) in their bases inside Afghanistan. Pakistan could not, of course, make the connection between the two events because such a claim would imply complicity in the Pahalgam attack.

Certainly it would be extremely difficult for LeT and JuM (both based in Pakistan’s Punjab) to cross the Line of Control (LoC) between Pakistan and Indian Administered Kashmir (PAK and IAK respectively) without Pakistani army knowledge. Indeed Pakistan’s ability to control militant crossings of the LoC in Kashmir was graphically demonstrated in 2004 when the government decided to stop them after the two assassination attempts against President Musharraf in December 2003. Since then the level of insurgency-related fatalities in IAK has dropped off a cliff from 4,011 in 2001 to 84 in 2025.

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Phase Two. India’s response followed a playbook which has been developed along cautious but incremental lines since the terrorist attack on Uri in 2016. Nineteen Indian soldiers were killed by JuM terrorists at Uri and Prime Minister Modi responded with what he described as “surgical strikes” in PAK. In truth these were underwhelming attacks against suspected terrorist launching sites. Three years later, at Pulwama in 2019, JuM struck again killing 40 police reservists. This time Modi’s response was not confined to PAK but to Pakistan itself. Indian jets bombed an alleged terrorist camp on a hilltop near Balakot barely 5 miles inside Pakistan. In a brief subsequent conflict Pakistan shot down an Indian aircraft and returned the uninjured pilot to India.

After the Pahalgam attack it was evident that Modi would again escalate his cautious but incremental approach. An article for The Cipher Brief predicted that he would attack Muridke and that he would seek to avoid killing too many civilians and would stress that the attack was against terrorism and not Pakistan itself. On 7th May the attack was launched against nine terrorist-related targets.

It is unfortunate that his commendable caution led to disastrous results for Modi. By failing to destroy Pakistan’s radar sites and air defences the attacking aircraft were all too easily visible to Chinese sensors and Pakistan’s Aerial Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. Pakistan too had predicted that India would attack Muridke and Bahalwalpur. The result was the loss of up to 5 Indian aircraft including one of its cherished new Dassault Rafales. Although India had successfully bombed key sites in Pakistan and avoided extensive civilian casualties, the self-imposed restrictions on the operation gifted Pakistan (and China) a propaganda victory with much talk about the performance of the jointly built J-10C aircraft and the Chinese PL-15 missile.

Phase Three. In deciding how to respond, Pakistan was left with a quandary. The public required a retaliation but there were no obvious sites to strike. There are no known terrorist training sites in India. So, in trying to avoid civilian casualties, Pakistan decided to hit Indian air force bases. To avoid losing aircraft, Pakistan, aware that India’s new S-400 air defence system had been installed, made extensive use of drones. The 8th and 9th May saw a rather chaotic drone war between the two sides accompanied by claims and counterclaims.

Phase Four. The decision by India to launch cruise missiles at eleven key Pakistani air bases during the night of 9th/10thth May represented an enormous step-change compared to what had gone before. The Indian Air Force Chief has recently suggested that there were no political restrictions imposed but the choice of air force bases was doubtless founded on the same logic which Pakistan had used 48 hours earlier; low risk of civilian casualties and the chance of hitting valuable aircraft and facilities. This time India took out key air defence sites. The strikes were completely successful in sending a political message to Pakistan and reasonably successful in terms of damage inflicted. NDTV has since provided some satellite analysis of the attacks.

The attack took Pakistan by complete surprise because the traditional game of cat and mouse had been abandoned in favour of a prodigious statement of Indian intent, probably caused by India’s irritation and embarrassment at losing aircraft during phase two, thanks to self-imposed limitations on the rules of engagement.

A shocked Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was woken by a call from the army Chief General Asim Munir at 2:30 in the morning and there was nothing to do other than agree to a ceasefire suggested by Washington. By promoting Munir to Field Marshal and declaring the 4 days of conflict a success, Sharif put the best gloss on events. China and Pakistan trumpeted the performance of their weapons and, by nominating President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, Pakistan turned military calamity into diplomatic success and was rewarded with a lunch at the White House for the new field marshal.

India, as so often, was caught flat-footed diplomatically. A delegation sent to London to focus on Pakistan’s continuing links to terrorism was outperformed by a younger and better briefed Pakistani team led by former foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari which received more airtime on TV. New Delhi was also very slow to release details of the successful missile strikes until General Chauhan, India’s Defence Chief, after some missteps talking about losses, revealed the full extent of the successful events of 10th May. India has a lot to learn from Pakistan’s slick Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR).

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Conclusion

For all Pakistan’s public relations and military successes there can be little doubt that India’s massive attack on 10th May has redrawn the nature of conflict on the Subcontinent. Delicate, finely-calculated and incremental moves have been replaced by a substantial Indian statement of dominance which showed the vulnerability of Pakistan as a long thin country in which everything is within easy range of India (compared to Pakistan facing the vastness of India).

India’s suspension of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty until Pakistan completely abandons the use of terrorism was another weighty decision. That the treaty has survived for 65 years is testament to its importance and effectiveness. Pakistan is so dependent on Indus waters that some Pakistani observers see the Indian move as a casus belli in its own right.

In its inevitable and urgent review of its defensive architecture, it is likely that Pakistan will review its nuclear doctrine. And recalling the night of 9th/10th May and the matter of seconds Pakistan had to decide whether any of India’s air-launched missiles might have been nuclear-armed, there is an equal inevitability that Islamabad will explore autonomous response mechanisms driven by Artificial Intelligence. If the 10th May now becomes the template for Day One of the next conflict the world will have good reason to worry.

One very practical measure which the international community should propose is the reestablishment of the high-level political backchannel which played such a crucial role in ending the Pulwama/Balakot episode in 2019. The military back-channel (operated by the two DGMOs-Directors General of Military Operations) is no substitute.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Sat, 18 Oct 2025 08:29:59 +0100 FirstHandNews
Eighty Years On, Can the UN Meet Its Mission? https://belimedia.com.ng/eighty-years-on-can-the-un-meet-its-mission https://belimedia.com.ng/eighty-years-on-can-the-un-meet-its-mission OPINION — The 80th ordinary session of the United Nations ended on September 8, 2026. During this year, the UN will have an opportunity to help resolve a few conflicts requiring immediate attention: Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Haiti, Myanmar, Yemen, and Libya. Indeed, this is the UN’s core responsibility, in line with the theme of the 80th session: Better together; 80 years and more of peace, development and human rights.

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza must stop. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a sovereign nation with 1994 security assurances from Russia, has killed or maimed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians. Efforts by President Donald Trump to end this war have failed, with an emboldened Vladimir Putin escalating hostilities in Ukraine, while probing the credibility of NATO, flying drones into Poland and Romania and recently violating Estonia’s airspace. This is the Putin who lamented the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and vowed to recreate the Russian Empire. And that’s what he’s doing. Georgia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014 was a prelude to his invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are next, on Putin’s quest to recreate the Russian Empire.

It's obvious what Putin is doing. He got away with Georgia and Crimea and Putin is confident he’ll prevail in Ukraine with minimal consequences. So, what could the UN do to sanction Russia for its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty? Indeed, there should be an outcry from the UN demanding that Mr. Putin halt his invasion of Ukraine and enter negotiations with Kyiv.

Iran’s continued refusal to permit UN nuclear inspections and refusal to resume nuclear talks with the U.S. resulted in the reimposition — on September 28 — of sanctions lifted in 2015. So, given that Iran has not changed its attitude and in fact has become more defiant, “snap back” sanctions ban nuclear enrichment, establish an arms embargo and ban tests and transfers of ballistic missiles. It’s clear that Iran wants the option to acquire nuclear weapons capability. A nuclear-armed Iran will be an existential threat to Israel -- an adversary Iran wants to annihilate – and the region.

But for Iran it’s more than acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, working with its proxies – Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis -- to destabilize and terrorize the region. On September 17, the Department of State also designated three Iraqi militia groups aligned with Iran as terrorist organizations. These terrorist groups have attacked the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and bases hosting U.S. and Canadian forces.

Indeed, the human rights situation in Iran is equally dismal. The 2009 presidential election protests and the 2022 killing of Mahsa Amini by the so-called morality police for incorrectly wearing her head scarf sparked national protests that were brutally suppressed by the ruling theocracy. Nationwide arrests and executions were conducted by a weak and corrupt theocracy that was threatened by the public and its outcry for justice and liberty.

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Ensuring that food and water are available to the people of Gaza is a priority objective, as is ending this bloody war. The onslaught in Gaza was caused by Hamas’s October 7 attacks that killed approximately 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and the abduction of 251 hostages. This was the bloodiest day for Israel since its independence on May 14, 1948. Indeed, Hamas is a terrorist organization closely affiliated with Iran, which provides Hamas with the weaponry and support needed for its acts of terrorism.

The situation in the South China Sea could escalate quickly between China and the Philippines. The irony is that a 2016 ruling by a UN-backed arbitration tribunal invalidated China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, ruling overwhelmingly with the Philippines. The ruling was deemed final and binding, although China has rejected the ruling and continues to defy it.

These are just some of the national security issues the UN should openly discuss and attempt to resolve. The wars and turmoil in Myanmar, Sudan, Yemen, Haiti and Libya also require immediate UN attention. This is the mission of the UN.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Terror Comes Back to Manchester https://belimedia.com.ng/terror-comes-back-to-manchester https://belimedia.com.ng/terror-comes-back-to-manchester OPINION — In 2017 an Islamic suicide bomber detonated at a pop concert in Manchester, killing 22 people and injuring over a thousand others.

Now another terrorist has struck the same city, this time targeting a synagogue on the most solemn of Jewish holy days, Yom Kippur. Two people have been murdered and others are reported to be seriously injured. Police responded quickly to the incident. They killed the terrorist, who seemed to be wearing a suicide belt, within ten minutes of the incident starting.

Political leaders of all parties have denounced the terrorist act. Prime Minister Keir Starmer cut short a visit to Copenhagen so that he could get back to Britain and chair a meeting of the cross-government emergency committee, COBRA, earlier this afternoon.

Intensive police investigations have been launched. Who committed the attack? Jews have learned to fear attacks from all corners, extreme left, extreme right, extreme Islam. No details of the terrorist have been released though a photograph suggests that an Islamic male was responsible. Was anyone else involved? We gather that two arrests have been made, but how they were connected with the attack, whether there was a plot, training, funding, we do not know. It is important not to jump to conclusions before more is known. My hunch, for what it’s worth, is that the attack was not well planned or coordinated and the terrorist could have been acting alone. But we’ll see.

Disturbing questions are already being asked, however, including about British counter-terrorism policy. A central part of that policy has been counter-radicalisation, trying to offer an alternative to the “single narrative” of Muslim oppression, which underpinned Islamic extremism in the early days of Al Qaida and ISIS, and to conspiracy theories of extreme right and left. But has counter-radicalisation been successful? Some surveys of Islamic attitudes to Jews here have produced disturbing results. The British Jewish community, as elsewhere in Western Europe and North America, has seen an upsurge of violence since 7 October 2023 – not all of it Islamic: online attacks, excrement smeared on synagogues, physical attacks on Jewish people and buildings. Most Jews feel less confident here than they felt two years ago, less happy to be identifiably Jewish in public.

Prime Minister Starmer has promised more police protection for the Jewish community. “We will do everything to keep our Jewish community safe”, he said today. Fine except that anti-semites here – Islamic, far right, far left – know that that is unsustainable. Jews do not want to worship or go to school behind barbed wire with armed police round the corner. Chillingly, two non-political Jewish entertainers were prevented from appearing at the Edinburgh festival this summer because of “concerns over staff safety”. While some protective measures are appreciated, they represent a dead end for the Jewish community. Who wants this sort of life?

The only long-term hope is that attitudes towards Judaism will change. 2000 years of anti-semitism are not going to be eradicated by a government initiative. But a bolder and sustained push against anti-semitism should be seen not as a luxury. It is needed as integral to a successful, holistic counter-terrorism strategy. Terrorism cannot be defeated as long as the ideologies behind it are unchallenged.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Hidden Leverage of Digital Chokepoints https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hidden-leverage-of-digital-chokepoints https://belimedia.com.ng/the-hidden-leverage-of-digital-chokepoints EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — When we think about the arteries of global power, images of oil pipelines or shipping lanes often come to mind. They are visible, tangible, and easy to picture on a map. The digital world has its own arteries, equally vital but far less visible: undersea cables, satellites, and semiconductor supply chains. These systems allow our economies to function, our militaries to coordinate, and our societies to remain connected.

We rarely stop to consider how very fragile they are. A fiber-optic cable lying quietly on the seabed, a satellite orbiting high above, or a single Dutch firm making the machines that build the world’s most advanced chips? Each represents a potential point of failure. And when one of them falters, whether by accident or design, the consequences ripple instantly across the globe. What makes this even more concerning is that adversaries understand their potential value. They have studied the geography of our digital world with the same intensity that past powers studied maritime routes. Increasingly, they are testing ways to hold these chokepoints at risk, not in open war, but in the murky space called the gray zone.

Consider the seabed. Nearly all intercontinental internet traffic runs not through satellites, as many imagine, but along the ocean floor. The “cloud” is, in truth, anchored to the seabed. These cables are resilient in some respects, yet highly vulnerable in others. Russia has long deployed specialized vessels (such as the Yantar) to loiter near critical routes, mapping them and raising concerns about sabotage. The People’s Republic of China has taken subtler approaches. On several occasions, cables linking Taiwan’s outlying islands have been cut by Chinese vessels in incidents they described as accidental. Taipei viewed them, by contrast, as deliberate acts of pressure that left communities offline for weeks.

Nature has been no less disruptive. A volcanic eruption severed Tonga’s only international cable in 2022, cutting off connectivity entirely. A landslide off Côte d’Ivoire in 2024 damaged four cables at once, leaving more than a dozen African states scrambling to restore service. These episodes remind us that chokepoints need not be destroyed to reveal their importance.

For China, the issue is a strategic one. Through its Digital Silk Road initiative, Beijing has financed and built cables across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Chinese firms now sit at landing stations and repair depots. In times of peace these investments look like connectivity. In times of crisis, they can become instruments of leverage or coercion.

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The same logic applies in orbit. Satellites and global navigation systems act as the nervous system of modern life. They time banking transactions, guide aircraft, and support military operations. Disrupting them unsettles the rhythms of daily existence. Russia previewed this dynamic in 2022 when it launched a cyberattack against the Viasat KA-SAT network on the first day of its invasion of Ukraine. Thousands of modems across Europe went dark, cutting off critical communications. More routinely, Russian jamming and spoofing around Kaliningrad and Moscow have disoriented navigation systems, with civilian pilots suddenly reporting the loss of GPS mid-flight.

China has created its own path through BeiDou, a rival to GPS that is already woven into infrastructure and commerce across large swaths of the world. Countries adopting BeiDou for civilian uses also create dependencies that, in a crisis, could become channels of influence. China’s so-called inspector satellites, capable of shadowing Western systems in orbit, serve as a reminder that the domain is contested and difficult to police. Jamming, spoofing, or orbital surveillance are rarely attributable in real time. They can be dismissed as interference or technical glitches even when deliberate. That ambiguity is precisely what makes them effective tools of gray-zone leverage.

Vulnerability also extends to the factories that produce the silicon chips powering the digital age. No chokepoint illustrates fragility more starkly than semiconductors. Advanced chips are the foundation of artificial intelligence, modern weapons systems, consumer electronics, modern automobiles, and more. Yet their production is concentrated in very few hands. One company in Taiwan manufactures most of the world’s leading-edge chips. A single Dutch firm produces the extreme ultraviolet lithography machines needed to make them. And China has demonstrated repeatedly how control over upstream minerals can be wielded as leverage. Restrictions on gallium, germanium, and graphite have caused immediate price spikes and sent Western companies scrambling for alternatives.

The global chip shortage during the pandemic provided a glimpse of how disruption can have cascading impacts. Automotive plants shut down, electronics prices soared, and entire supply chains stalled. That was the result of market forces. In a geopolitical crisis, disruption would be intentional, targeted, and likely more devastating.

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None of these vulnerabilities exist in isolation. Together, they form part of a broader and comprehensive strategy, particularly for China, where digital infrastructure has become a deliberate instrument of national power. Through the Digital Silk Road, through export controls on critical minerals, through investments in semiconductor capacity, through an ambitious national AI strategy, and BeiDou’s global adoption, Beijing is systematically building positions of leverage.

Is this preparation for an open assault on global systems? Maybe not, but it is a strategy designed for options in the gray zone. By holding digital chokepoints at risk, China can complicate allied decision-making and cast doubt on the reliability of critical systems, thereby slowing or obstructing responses at moments when speed is decisive. The ambiguity of each incident – whether it appears to be an accident, a policy choice, or something more calculated – becomes a tool of coercion.

The reality is that these risks cannot be eliminated. The very efficiency of the digital age depends on concentration. A single company leads in chipmaking, a limited set of satellites provides global timing, and relatively few cables carry the world’s data vast distances across the open ocean. Efficiency brings tremendous capability, but it also brings fragility. And fragility invites exploitation.

The counterweight must be resilience. That means redundant routes and suppliers, pre-positioned repair capacity, diversified supply chains, hardened infrastructure, and rehearsed recovery plans. The point is to recover and regain capacity as quickly as possible. To do so requires deeper public-private partnerships and closer coordination among allies, since no nation can protect these domains on its own. Resilience is not a one-time investment but a cultural shift. A culture that assumes disruption will come, prepares for it, and ensures that no single outage or shortage can paralyze us.

History offers some perspective. Nations once fought to control straits, canals, and oil fields. They still do so today, but increasingly our chokepoints are digital, hidden from sight yet just as consequential. Whoever shapes them, shapes the balance of global power.

Global stability today depends on foundations that are often invisible. Fiber-optic cables under the sea, satellites crossing the skies, and factories producing chips with microscopic precision form the backbone of our digital age. They showcase human ingenuity while highlighting profound vulnerabilities. Recognizing the duality of innovation’s promise alongside its fragility may be the most important step toward protecting what matters most in the digital age. And, yes, we must defend these technologies. But it’s about something bigger. It’s about ensuring that the digital world we depend on remains a source of strength, and not a lever of coercion.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Witness to a Sea Change in the Middle East: Jack Keane Says Israel Has a Window to Break Iran’s Proxies https://belimedia.com.ng/witness-to-a-sea-change-in-the-middle-east-jack-keane-says-israel-has-a-window-to-break-irans-proxies https://belimedia.com.ng/witness-to-a-sea-change-in-the-middle-east-jack-keane-says-israel-has-a-window-to-break-irans-proxies

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – Israeli forces pushed deeper into Gaza City on Monday, advancing near major hospitals as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu prepared for White House talks with President Donald Trump, who has hinted at a breakthrough ceasefire deal.

Washington’s 21-point plan reportedly calls for a permanent truce and the release of hostages, but Israeli officials are expressing concerns over postwar security arrangements, particularly the role of Palestinian security forces. President Trump is calling the plan the most significant effort yet to secure peace in the region.

Cipher Brief Expert General Jack Keane (Ret.), a trusted advisor to President Trump who declined multiple overtures to serve as U.S. Secretary of Defense during the president’s first administration, met recently in the region with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Isaac Herzog and Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer as well as senior IDF leaders.

After those meetings, we asked Gen. Keane for his assessment of the situation on the ground, whether he believes Israel is capable of sustaining wars on three separate fronts (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen), and whether he believes Hamas will ever accept a deal that requires them to surrender power. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length.

THE INTERVIEW

Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.)

General Jack Keane (Ret.), a four-star general, retired after 37 years of military service culminating in his appointment as acting Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army. General Keane is president of GSI Consulting and serves as chairman of the Institute for the Study of War. In 2020, Gen. Keane was presented with the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Donald Trump.

Kelly: As you’ve just returned from the Middle East where you engaged in a number of high-level meetings with senior Israeli leaders, what is your raw assessment of events on the ground?

Gen. Keane: There's a major paradigm shift strategically taking place in the Middle East as a result of Israel’s - supported by the United States - domination of Iran and its proxies. And it's hard to overstate the significance of it. The reality is that it's a sea change that's going to be felt for decades, and there is such huge opportunity here - once and for all - to stabilize the Middle East. But it’s an opportunity that requires follow-up with the Iranians to keep the pressure on economically and diplomatically. Iran is so much more vulnerable now after the defeat that Israel has handed to them.

Israel also needs to stay focused on the proxies - obviously Hamas, and hopefully, we will see a deal here pretty soon. Either they surrender or Israel will force them to give up power and get the hostages back as well.

Israel also must continue to push back on the Houthis. While we were there, there were three attacks in the vicinity where we were staying, during a nine-day trip. The Houthis are launching individual missiles or drones, but not in volleys. These are more - in military terms - harassment attacks, but Israel is pushing back hard on Houthis by destroying their valuable infrastructure.

Hezbollah has been completely decapitated, and every time Hezbollah tries to move into Southern Lebanon, Israel conducts airstrikes as they just absolutely refuse to let them rebuild in that area. Israel has conducted over a thousand airstrikes to make sure they don’t reconstitute in the South without much media coverage. When I met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, I told him that I think there are two major lessons learned here for Israel. One is that you can never, ever again, permit Iran's proxies to build up capability on your border. And that is obviously significantly for Hamas, as well as Hezbollah.

And the second is that you've got to work yourself into a position where you're much more independent of the United States. I said, "You can't afford, going forward, to go through these political swings that we have now in national security and foreign policy in America where one Administration fully supports with everything you need and another Administration holds back what you need.

During the Cold War, the U.S. had a fairly consistent policy whether the Democrats or Republicans were in charge. For sure, some of the methods were changed from one administration to the next, but the objectives were pretty much the same: contain the Soviet Union.

Recently, we’ve gone through major swings. The previous administration - much more so than the American people realize - pulled the plug on a lot of the vital ammunition and weapons that Israel needed, and then they micromanaged how they conduct a war and this was being led by civilians out of the White House who had absolutely no competence in doing something like that, and Israel can't afford to go through another swing like that.

So, my advice is to get as close to being completely independent of the United States for weapons and ammunition but not independent of the United States in terms of geopolitical support or moral support, to be sure.

But the opportunities today are pretty significant and they're already taking place.

There is now work toward normalization of relations with Lebanon and Lebanon is talking about disarming Hezbollah. Who would've thought that something like that could have taken place just a couple of years ago?

Bashar al-Assad is gone in Syria and in Israel, Ron Dermer, the Minister of Strategic Affairs in Israel, who I spoke to at length, is working very hard to develop a security agreement with Syria and the new regime. They have their eyes wide open. They know that Ahmed Al-Sharaa is former al-Qaeda and that organization is still supporting him, but he's trying to consolidate all the different factions in Syria. And Israel doesn’t want any of those factions coming south and interfering with their security.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) took me into Syria to show me their defensive positions that they've established there. That makes some sense. I doubt if they will give any of that up in this security agreement, but the fact that there are serious negotiations going on is pretty significant.

In Gaza, hopefully we will get a deal here pretty soon, and that will certainly enable a lot of other things to happen once the fighting stops. But the Abraham Accords, despite the attack on the Qataris, despite the prolonged and protracted war in Gaza, the feedback that I got from Israeli leadership is that the Arabs are still interested in normalizing the relationship. They know that it's going to add to peace and stability in the region. It’s not necessarily easy, but it's something that has huge strategic potential for the future.

I think Turkey is a real challenge. President Recip Tayyip Erdogan had great influence on Al-Sharaa seizing power. I think he wants to control Syrian leadership and he's anti-Israel, he's pro-Hamas, he's Muslim Brotherhood, and he has been a thorn in the side of Democratic and Republican administrations for years, despite the fact that he's a member of NATO. I think when we're dealing with Erdogan, even though he's been there longer than we would like to see, we have to look beyond him and look at the strategic place that Turkey holds in the Middle East and in Europe. They're the second-largest military in Europe, after Russia. The largest military member of NATO in Europe, obviously the United States is more powerful than them. So, they have huge capability, and while Erdogan frustrates us quite a bit, I think we need to figure out a way to work with him in our interest and Israel's interest despite his anti-Israel attitude.

And as much as that may be an opportunity, it's probably more of a challenge. President Trump is cutting the deal with him in the memorandum of understanding to build small modular nuclear reactors and the large nuclear reactors in the future. Turkey has one that was built by Russia and the fact that we're trying to pull him away from Russia, that's a good thing and could create some balance. If we just shut him down and don't want to deal with him because we don't like his attitude on a number of things, he'll just turn to Russia and China and that doesn't make any sense, strategically.

My overall take on this, is that if we continue to stay engaged and really finish Iran’s ability to be a destabilizer in the region, then the potential for stability and growth in the region - in the way that everybody's been hoping for, is really on the horizon.

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Kelly: Prime Minister Netanyahu was just in New York at the United Nations saying that Israel must finish the job in Gaza. You mentioned an agreement on the table. Do you have anything that makes you think Hamas would agree to it?

Gen. Keane: I don't know. I have great skepticism. We have been here so many times, where the United States, Israel and the Qataris have said, "We're really close to a deal." And then at the last minute, Hamas finds some reason to reject it. Hamas' real issue is that they want to stay in control of Gaza. Israel does not want that to happen, the United States does not want that to happen, and usually they foreclose on not making the deal because they don't want to give up control. Hopefully this time they're willing to, and that control would turn over to some representation of the Palestinians and Arab authorities and would allow for some kind of a stabilization force. Prime Minister Netanyahu has said time and time again, "I don't want to occupy Gaza. That's not in Israel's interest.”

Kelly: Yeah. Let's switch for just a moment to Russia. There’s been a change in the relationship between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin over the last several months. President Trump has shown his growing frustration with Putin's lack of interest in actually ending the war in Ukraine. Where do you see the path forward there?

Gen. Keane: Just as you say, it's been eight months, and the president has admitted that he thought this was going to be easier than how it has turned out because he had such a positive relationship with Putin. But Putin's strategic objectives are very clear. He wants to take control of Ukraine, put in place a stooge government and expand into Eastern Europe, and he's dead set on that. Nothing to date has convinced him to change those objectives. In other words, he believes continuing the war is in his national interest so that Moscow can achieve those objectives, and nothing we have done has dissuaded him from that. So, what the president has done, I think, is to be patient with him, despite the fact that Putin delays, obfuscates, tries to confuse, et cetera. The Alaska Summit was a pivotal moment. There is no doubt that Putin made an overture to President Trump that he was willing to meet with President Zelensky following the summit, not immediately, but in a short period of time and that he was also willing to have a three-party meeting to include President Trump. The very next day, Putin’s spokesperson said that there are no plans for a meeting between President Zelenskyy and President Putin, and if there were going to be plans, there would have to be some conditions established and negotiated before there would ever be a meeting such as that.

I think based on that, the president realized that Putin continues to lie consistently and especially during the last couple of months of the negotiations. And even post Alaska Summit, Putin has done what? He has militarily escalated the war, not a little bit, but quite significantly and his attacks are largely focused against the Ukrainian people with hundreds and hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles a night, raining down on them and hitting their energy infrastructure. He knows winter is coming and he wants the lights to be out and the heat to be off and for them to suffer.

And as of right now, there is somewhere in the neighborhood of 11,000 to 15,000 kidnapped Ukrainian children who are still in Russia's hands. We know this from multiple international sources and that, in of itself, is a war crime and really horrific. So, when you put all of that together; the delay tactics, the lies that he's been telling the President, and the military escalation, even as the president is trying to bring him to the negotiating table, he can’t be trusted.

Russia is weak economically, weak militarily, and they can be stopped. Not only can they be stopped, but they can be overtaken by the Ukrainian military. That is not a new thought process for the president. What's new now is that he is talking about it publicly. I can tell you for a fact that he's known for some time how weak Russia is economically and how weak they are militarily. Moscow is conducting a massive narrative that they're succeeding on offensive operations. “They're overwhelming the Ukrainians. It's just a matter of time. This is a war of attrition. The West, the United States and the Europeans, I can outlast them. They will eventually give in and we will win.” That has been his narrative. And now the president, I think, has made the decision to give up on Putin, and he's obviously talking to the public more about his perception of Putin, his perception of Russia, and the status that they have. That's step one. He hasn't changed any policy, but he's changed the narrative.

What remains to be seen is step two, and is the president going to continue what he said he would do, which is increase military and economic pressure on Russia? Military pressure could stop Russia cold from taking any more territory. And by the way, in the last two years, they've only increased the territory under their control by only 1% out of the 20% they control. And the president could also permit Ukraine to attack deep into Russia with increased long-range weapons and remove any restrictions on the use of those weapons. That would be significant military pressure.

We've been talking about economic pressure for weeks. Europeans must stop buying oil and gas from Russia. It’s shameful that they're still doing it, and very hypocritical. As the president says, "You are fueling Putin's war at the same time that you're supporting Ukraine. It makes no sense."

And then the United States needs to do the same in terms of sanctions and tariffs. That would be a part of a step two that makes the most sense. The sooner we get about that, the better. The president has said that in the past, and I believe that is what should be done. It's his decision, certainly, and we'll see what's going to happen next.

Kelly: As you mentioned, winter is coming, and Vladimir Putin knows how to take advantage of that time. How have you seen Russia expand military actions over the past few weeks?

Gen. Keane: We saw within the last week, Russia’s military activities escalating into violating Poland's airspace with war-like instruments. In this case, 19 drones penetrated Polish airspace and there was a smaller incursion in Romania and fighter jets violating Estonia's airspace as well. NATO must come to the conclusion that this activity is an Article 5 violation, and they have every right to shoot at those aircraft if they do it again. If they don't do that, if they wring their hands and continue to talk about it and push back rhetorically on Russia, what they'll see next is not a handful of drones but hundreds of drones and eventually a thousand drones that would absolutely overwhelm all of their air defense systems. These are acts of war, and they should be responded in kind. That doesn't mean that Poland's going to declare war on Russia, but I am suggesting they have every right to shoot at somebody who violates their airspace with warplanes. And that will get Putin's attention. Otherwise, if we don't do it and we just continue to use rhetoric, Putin will expand to other countries and increase the scale of the attack to weaken NATO and force the Europeans to focus more on their defense and less on Ukraine’s.

Putin is not reckless. He's a killer. He's a thug. He's ruthless, but he's not reckless. He's actually quite deliberate and methodical. We've been watching him for 25 years. Those of us who know him can almost call his plays because he's so predictable. Push back on him with strength and he will shut it down.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Telecom Bust Near the UN Reveals New National Security Vulnerability https://belimedia.com.ng/telecom-bust-near-the-un-reveals-new-national-security-vulnerability https://belimedia.com.ng/telecom-bust-near-the-un-reveals-new-national-security-vulnerability

DEEP DIVE — When Secret Service agents swept into an inconspicuous building near the United Nations General Assembly late last month, they weren’t tracking guns or explosives. Instead, they dismantled a clandestine telecommunications hub that investigators say was capable of crippling cellular networks and concealing hostile communications.

According to federal officials, the operation seized more than 300 devices tied to roughly 100,000 SIM cards — an arsenal of network-manipulating tools that could disrupt the cellular backbone of New York City at a moment of geopolitical tension. The discovery, officials stressed, was not just a one-off bust but a warning sign of a much broader national security vulnerability.

The devices were designed to create what experts call a “SIM farm,” an industrial-scale operation where hundreds or thousands of SIM cards can be manipulated simultaneously. These setups are typically associated with financial fraud or bulk messaging scams. Still, the Secret Service warned that they can also be used to flood telecom networks, disable cell towers, and obscure the origin of communications.

In the shadow of the UN, where global leaders convene and security tensions are high, the proximity of such a system raised immediate questions about intent, attribution, and preparedness.

“(SIM farms) could jam cell and text services, block emergency calls, target first responders with fake messages, spread disinformation, or steal login codes,” Jake Braun, Executive Director of the Cyber Policy Initiative at the University of Chicago and former White House Acting Principal Deputy National Cyber Director, tells The Cipher Brief. “In short, they could cripple communications just when they’re needed most.”

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How SIM Farms Work

At their core, SIM farms exploit the fundamental architecture of mobile networks. Each SIM card represents a unique identity on the global communications grid. By cycling through SIMs at high speed, operators can generate massive volumes of calls, texts, or data requests that overwhelm cellular infrastructure. Such floods can mimic the effects of a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, except the assault comes through legitimate carrier channels rather than obvious malicious traffic.

“SIM farms are essentially racks of modems that cycle through thousands of SIM cards,” Dave Chronister, CEO of Parameter Security, tells The Cipher Brief. “Operators constantly swap SIM cards and device identifiers so traffic appears spread out rather than coming from a single source.”

That makes them extremely difficult to detect.

“They can mimic legitimate business texts and calls, hide behind residential internet connections, or scatter equipment across ordinary locations so there’s no single, obvious signal to flag,” Chronister continued. “Because SIM farms make it hard to tie a number back to a real person, they’re useful to drug cartels, human-trafficking rings and other organized crime, and the same concealment features could also be attractive to terrorists.”

That ability to blend in, experts highlight, is what makes SIM farms more than just a criminal nuisance.

While SIM farms may initially be used for financial fraud, their architecture can be easily repurposed for coordinated cyber-physical attacks. That dual-use nature makes them especially appealing to both transnational criminal groups and state-backed intelligence services.

Who Might Be Behind It?

The Secret Service, however, has not publicly attributed the network near the UN to any specific individual or entity. Investigators are weighing several possibilities: a transnational fraud ring exploiting the chaos of UN week to run large-scale scams, or a more concerning scenario where a state-backed group positioned the SIM farm as a contingency tool for disrupting communications in New York.

Officials noted that the operation’s sophistication suggested it was not a low-level criminal endeavor. The hardware was capable of sustained operations against multiple carriers, and its sheer scale — 100,000 SIM cards — far exceeded the typical scale of fraud schemes. That raised the specter of hostile governments probing U.S. vulnerabilities ahead of potential hybrid conflict scenarios.

Analysts note that Russia, China, and Iran have all been implicated in blending criminal infrastructure with state-directed cyber operations. Yet, these setups serve both criminals and nation-states, and attribution requires more details than are publicly available.

“Criminal groups use SIM farms to make money with scams and spam,” said Braun. “State actors can use them on a bigger scale to spy, spread disinformation, or disrupt communications — and sometimes they piggyback on criminal networks.”

One source in the U.S. intelligence community, who spoke on background, described that overlap as “hybrid infrastructure by design.”

“It can sit dormant as a criminal enterprise for years until a foreign government needs it. That’s what makes it so insidious,” the source tells The Cipher Brief.

From Chronister’s purview, the “likely explanation is that it’s a sophisticated criminal enterprise.”

“SIM-farm infrastructure is commonly run for profit and can be rented or resold. However, the criminal ecosystem is fluid: nation-states, terrorist groups, or hybrid actors can and do co-opt criminal capabilities when it suits them, and some state-linked groups cultivate close ties with criminal networks,” he said.

The Broader National Security Blind Spot

The incident during the United Nations General Assembly also underscores a growing blind spot in U.S. protective intelligence: telecommunications networks as contested terrain. For decades, federal resources have focused heavily on cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and physical threats. At the same time, the connective tissue of modern communications has often been treated as a commercial domain, monitored by carriers rather than security agencies.

The Midtown bust suggests that assumption no longer holds. The Secret Service itself framed the incident as a wake-up call.

“The potential for disruption to our country’s telecommunications posed by this network of devices cannot be overstated,” stated U.S. Secret Service Director Sean Curran. “The U.S. Secret Service’s protective mission is all about prevention, and this investigation makes it clear to potential bad actors that imminent threats to our protectees will be immediately investigated, tracked down and dismantled.”

However, experts warn that U.S. defenses remain fragmented. Carriers focus on fraud prevention, intelligence agencies monitor foreign adversaries, and law enforcement investigates domestic crime. The seams between those missions are precisely where SIM farms thrive.

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Hybrid Warfare and the Next Front Line

The rise of SIM farms reflects the evolution of hybrid warfare, where the boundary between criminal activity and state action blurs, and adversaries exploit commercial infrastructure as a means of attack. Just as ransomware gangs can moonlight as proxies for hostile intelligence services, telecom fraud networks may double as latent disruption tools for foreign adversaries.

Additionally, the threat mirrors patterns observed abroad. In Ukraine, officials have reported Russian operations targeting cellular networks to disrupt battlefield communications and sow panic among civilians. In parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, SIM farms have been linked to both organized crime syndicates and intelligence-linked influence campaigns.

That same playbook, experts caution, could be devastating if applied in the heart of a global city.

“If activated during a crisis, such networks could flood phone lines, including 911 and embassy hotlines, to sow confusion and delay coordination. They can also blast fake alerts or disinformation to trigger panic or misdirect first responders, making it much harder for authorities to manage an already volatile situation,” Chronister said. “Because these setups are relatively cheap and scalable, they are an inexpensive but effective way to complicate emergency response, government decision-making, and even protective details.”

Looking Ahead

The dismantling of the clandestine telecom network in New York may have prevented an imminent crisis, but experts caution that it is unlikely to be the last of its kind. SIM farms are inexpensive to set up, scalable across borders, and often hidden in plain sight. They represent a convergence of cyber, criminal, and national security threats that the U.S. is only beginning to treat as a unified challenge.

When it comes to what needs to be done next, Braun emphasized the importance of “improving information sharing between carriers and government, investing in better tools to spot hidden farms, and moving away from SMS for sensitive logins.”

“Treat SIM farms as a national security threat, not just telecom fraud. Limit access to SIM farm hardware and punish abuse. Help smaller carriers strengthen defenses,” he continued. “And streamline legal steps so takedowns happen faster.”

Chronister acknowledged that while “carriers are much better than they were five or ten years ago, as they’ve invested in spam filtering and fraud analytics, attackers can still get through when they rotate SIMs quickly, use eSIM provisioning, or spread activity across jurisdictions.”

“Law enforcement and intelligence have powerful tools, but legal, technical, and cross-border constraints mean detection often outpaces confident attribution and rapid takedown. Make it harder to buy and cycle through SIMs in bulk and strengthen identity verification for phone numbers,” he added. “Require faster, real-time information-sharing between carriers and government during traffic spikes, improve authentication for public alerts, and run regular stress-tests and red-team exercises against telecom infrastructure. Finally, build joint takedown and mutual-assistance arrangements with allies so attackers can’t simply reconstitute operations in another country.”

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Special Report: Nat Sec EDGE 2025 https://belimedia.com.ng/special-report-nat-sec-edge-2025 https://belimedia.com.ng/special-report-nat-sec-edge-2025

The Cipher Brief's Special Report on Nat Sec EDGE 2025

The Nat Sec EDGE 2025 conference took place June 5–6, 2025 in Austin, Texas.

Foreword

The 2025 Nat Sec EDGE Conference brought together a diverse coalition of leaders from government, industry, investment, and innovation to confront a shared reality: America’s national security advantage is eroding-and our ability to adapt at speed will determine the outcome of future conflicts.

Across two days of discussions, senior officials, technologists, operators, and investors delivered a clear message: the U.S. is engaged in an unprecedented strategic competition with near-peer adversaries who are moving faster, with fewer constraints, in an effort to achieve dominance in emerging domains. While the U.S. still holds an innovation edge, our traditional systems for acquisition, classification, and risk management are too slow, too fragmented, and too siloed to respond to the velocity of today’s threats.

What emerged from this gathering in Austin, TX was not just urgency-but clarity. The U.S. needs a new model for national security innovation-one built around speed, trust, integration, and mission-first execution. This means enabling “new primes” that can move at the pace of technology, equipping the defense industrial base with secure pathways to scale, and empowering operators and decision-makers with the tools to bridge policy, procurement, and operational need.

It also means recognizing that the problem is no longer technological- it’s sociological. The innovation exists. The capital exists. The threat is clear. What’s missing are the connective tissues: the incentives, partnerships, and trust frameworks that can accelerate solutions from concept to deployment.

This report captures the most critical messages and moments from Nat Sec EDGE. It is intended as both a record and a roadmap-for those shaping the future of American security.

Download the Report Here

Suzanne Kelly, Brad Christian, Ethan Masucol and Connor Curfman contributed to this report.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Why Nuclear Negotiations with Russia Are Worth It https://belimedia.com.ng/why-nuclear-negotiations-with-russia-are-worth-it https://belimedia.com.ng/why-nuclear-negotiations-with-russia-are-worth-it FINE PRINT / OPINION — “In order to prevent the emergence of a new strategic arms race and to preserve an acceptable degree of predictability and restraint, we consider it reasonable to maintain at this turbulent time the status quo established under New START. Accordingly, Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty’s central quantitative restrictions for one year after February 5, 2026. Following that date, based on a careful assessment of the situation, we will make a definite decision on whether to uphold these voluntary self-limitations. We believe that this measure is only feasible if the United States acts in a similar spirit and refrains from steps that would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence.”

That was Russian President Vladimir Putin speaking to members of his Security Council in the Kremlin on September 22, 2025, in the Kremlin.

Later that day, when White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt was asked about Putin’s offer, she said, “The President is aware of this offer extended by President Putin, and I'll let him comment on it later. I think it sounds pretty good, but he wants to make some comments on that himself, and I will let him do that.”

One day later, 22 minutes into his long, rambling speech before the U.N. General Assembly, President Trump departed from his prepared remarks and said, “We want to have a cessation of the development of nuclear weapons. We know and I know and I get to view it all the time — Sir, would you like to see — and I look at weapons that are so powerful that we just can’t ever use them. If we ever use them, the world literally might come to an end. There would be no United Nations to be talking about. There would be no nothing.”

I want to believe that was President Trump beginning to respond, extemporaneously, to Putin’s offer, and serious talks will soon begin to extend the New START limits on U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

Let me suggest a reason why Putin made the offer and more reasons why Trump should go along.

In calling for the New START extension, Putin made reference to “U.S. plans to expand strategic components of its missile defense system, including preparations for the deployment of interceptors in outer space.” That was a reference to Trump’s so-called Golden Dome, space-based, missile defense plans of which Putin said, “practical implementation of such destabilizing measures could nullify our efforts to maintain the status quo in the field of strategic offensive arms.”

It reminded me of 1984, when then-President Ronald Reagan started his own space-based missile defense program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which also drew complaints from Moscow. However, three years later, Reagan and then Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which at that time did away with a whole class of nuclear weapons.

Eventually, when SDI proved unworkable, in 1991 then-President George H.W. Bush and Gorbachev agreed to the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

At the time, the was a belief that Gorbachev sought negotiations that led up to START because Russia could not afford to match the costs the U.S. was putting into space-based missile defense.

Back then, I believed that was the case and today I think that Putin, faced with continued fighting in Ukraine, cannot afford a space-based missile defense competition with the U.S. -- and neither can Trump, although the latter does not know it yet.

The Ukraine war costs are dominating Russia’s economy.

After raising personal income taxes sharply at the start of the year, Putin had pledged there would be no more big changes to the tax system until 2030. But the Russian Finance Ministry last week said it intends to raise the country’s value added tax (VAT) by two percent to 22 percent, to help meet the growing deficit. Russia’s VAT applies to the sale of goods and services within Russia, the import of goods, and the provision of electronic services by foreign companies, much like a U.S. excise tax.

The Russian budget deficit increased to 4.9 trillion rubles ($58 billion) in the January-July 2025 period, up from 1.1 trillion rubles ($13 billion) the year before. Russia has already revised its 2025 deficit projection upward from 1.7% to 2.6% of GDP. Russia’s oil and gas revenues fell 19% compared with the year earlier, in part due to lower global oil prices, but also thanks to lower world purchases, such as Moscow’s loss of most of its natural gas sales to Europe.

At home, inflation is around 8 percent as wholesale gasoline prices in Russia have surged in part because of Ukrainian drone attacks that have damaged oil refineries and shut down some major facilities. In August, the government introduced a temporary gasoline export ban and last week Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the plan is to extend that ban through the end of the year.

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On Friday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Russia had not yet received signals from the American side via secure channels in response to President Putin’s proposal to extend New START. But, when asked about the timing of a Washington reply, Peskov said, “We’ll wait this week,” noting Trump’s busy schedule during the United Nations meetings. “Understandably, these have been difficult days for him [Trump],” Peskov added.

Trump’s most immediate problem this week is the looming shutdown of the government. But when he gets around to dealing with Putin’s offer to extend New START, he faces some new U.S. nuclear weapons cost problems that he needs to recognize, along with serious technical issues facing his Golden Dome program.

For example, on September 18, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported to Congress that the modernized, uranium processing facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee that was originally to be operational in 2026 to ensure uranium for nuclear weapons and to fuel U.S. Navy ships will not be ready before 2034. Meanwhile, the original cost has ballooned from $6.5 billion in 2018 to $10.35 billion.

More concerning, the GAO said the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which runs the nuclear complex, said its contractor has said that it will cost about $463 million to safely continue uranium processing operations until 2035 for current needs in the 80-year-old Building 9212 at Oak Ridge.

At the same time, the U.S. is in the midst of modernizing its three major strategic nuclear delivery systems – B-52 long-range heavy bombers with the B-21; Ohio class strategic nuclear submarines with Columbia class submarines; and Minuteman III land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with the Sentinel system.

This ambitious program, which the Congressional Budget Office this year said may cost nearly $946 billion to operate and modernize over the next ten years, has shown some troubling problems. While the B-21 bombers seem to be on schedule, the Columbia submarines are running about one year behind schedule. Although the Navy claims the first one will go on patrol in 2030, the Navy is planning to extend the service lives of up to five Ohio-class SSBNs to hedge against potential delays in the deliveries of Columbia-class boats.

Problems with the Sentinel ICBM system are much more serious.

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The Defense Department (DoD) earlier this month estimated the Sentinel program, which involves replacing 450 Minuteman IIIs, currently based in silos in three different states, will cost more than $140 billion and be delayed by years.

Because of the Sentinel delay, the Air Force “must continue to operate and maintain the aging Minuteman III system over the next decade and beyond to meet strategic deterrent requirements until Sentinel is fully fielded,” according to a September 10, GAO report. Air Force Global Strike officials told the GAO that “operating two weapon systems simultaneously while executing a massive military movement to convert the old system to the new system,” would be “a very complex operation.”

Another issue: “As part of Sentinel restructuring, the Air Force is reassessing all aspects of its plan to field Sentinel, including the extent to which Sentinel will use the existing Minuteman III launch facilities. The Air Force has yet to finalize the design for Sentinel launch facilities,” the GAO said.

I have to add to the current strategic nuclear issues facing the Trump administration, serious doubts remain as to whether the President’s space-based Golden Dome missile defense will ever reach fruition.

I have in past columns quoted Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, as explaining the complications with the idea of space-based interceptors killing enemy ICBMs during their boost phase, which is a key element of Golden Dome. As Harrison has explained it, you have only two-to-three minutes to target and shoot during the enemy ICBM’s boost phase, and then because your orbiting interceptors need to be in range, there’s a requirement that at least 500 interceptors would be needed for each target.

During a September 16, interview at the Council on Foreign Relations, Harrison added a Golden Dome price when he said, “If you want to do boost-phase intercept from space, we're talking something if you really want to do the scale of protection they're talking about for a Russian or a Chinese or a Russian Chinese simultaneous launch, Worst case, you are talking something that's going to go into the trillions of dollars over the next twenty years or so.”

I lay out these details to show that Trump, as well as Putin, has a financial incentive to do the right thing and together renew the New START agreement.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Europe Must Prepare for the Long War https://belimedia.com.ng/europe-must-prepare-for-the-long-war https://belimedia.com.ng/europe-must-prepare-for-the-long-war OPINION — Russian drones are forcing airports to close and fighter jets are breaching NATO airspace – clear signals of Moscow’s widening hybrid campaign. The cost imbalance is stark, with Europe spending hundreds of thousands to destroy drones worth a fraction of that. Emboldened by this asymmetry, Vladimir Putin is escalating with growing confidence, betting that the West will stop short of real retribution, like giving Ukraine long-range missiles to destroy his drone factories.

Russia began its escalation on Sept. 9 by sending drones into Polish airspace, followed by an incursion into Romania. Days later, a Russian fighter jet breached Estonian airspace. In recent weeks, drones have been shutting down airports in Denmark and Norway.

Moscow is intensifying its hybrid warfare campaign against Europe in the hope of pressuring governments into concessions. At the same time, Putin depends on a state of constant confrontation to sustain his regime.

Months of U.S. diplomacy with Moscow under the Trump administration have also achieved little. President Donald Trump insists he is always “two weeks” away from a decision, but the Kremlin calculates it can outlast Ukraine on the battlefield, fracture European unity, and sap American interest. Russia remains defiant, refusing meaningful negotiations.

As Le Monde observed, Russian diplomacy follows familiar Soviet patterns: table maximalist demands, stage symbolic talks, issue threats, then offer only token concessions. George Kennan, the American diplomat who defined early Cold War strategy, once noted that the Soviets “will ask for the moon, demand the moon, and accept nothing less.”

John Sullivan, U.S. ambassador to Moscow from 2020 to 2022, echoed the same view, describing Russian negotiations as “maximalist demands, surrender nothing, paranoia to the nth degree.” Europe must strip away all false illusions that the war will end anytime soon.

Any sort of peace agreement that resembles the Budapest Memorandum or Minsk agreements will surely bring a much bigger war to Europe in the future. And the Trump administration has shown itself to be an unreliable ally. But that’s not necessarily a bad thing, if Europe can take advantage and scale its own capabilities and European defense firms.

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At the same time, Washington’s own priorities are shifting. According to POLITICO, The Pentagon’s new draft defense strategy places homeland and Western Hemisphere security above countering China or Russia.

To Trump’s credit, in just a few months he has pushed Europe to take the Russian threat more seriously than some capitals managed in three years of full-scale war. Germany, the continent’s largest economy, had announced sweeping ambitions to rebuild its military after the invasion. But once it became clear that Ukraine would not collapse, Berlin grew complacent, and much of its investment drive – including the much-touted €100 billion “special fund” – faltered.

However, Washington’s retreat also presents Europe with a chance to take greater ownership of its security and lessen its reliance on the United States. In our new Henry Jackson Society report, European Defence Autonomy: Identifying Key Companies and Projects to Replace U.S. Capabilities, my co-author Mykola Kuzmin and I argue that Europe now has a strategic opportunity to leverage its own European defense sector to prepare for a future war with Russia if it comes to that. It is better to be prepared than left scrambling when the moment of crisis arrives.

Europe cannot afford to rely on the U.S. for its core defense capabilities – nor on the whims of individuals like Elon Musk, shown by his restricting of Starlink access in Ukraine in Kherson and occupied-Crimea. Starlink’s unrivaled 8,000-satellite constellation highlights Europe’s dependence, with alternatives like Eutelsat OneWeb far smaller and prohibitively expensive. At the same time, Russia is developing a $5 billion satellite internet system called Rassvet, intended as an alternative to Starlink, with plans to launch nearly 300 satellites by 2030.

This technological push comes alongside its aggressive use of drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Russia has been overwhelming Ukrainian cities with nightly drone attacks and has flown over 530 surveillance drones across Germany this year to monitor Western arms shipments, including near Bundeswehr bases. Yet German forces cannot shoot them down due to legal limits.

If Moscow is already doing this with its hybrid war, the scale of a full-scale war will be far greater. The economics of war are quickly being transformed in Ukraine. That is why Europe must invest in low-cost drone interceptors and other scalable technologies. Relying on million-dollar American Patriot interceptor missiles for every drone attack is simply unsustainable.

Russia and China have a booming drone-alliance and the Axis of Evil is helping one another grow technologically. Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela are all gaining technologically through cooperation with one another.

Deborah Fairlamb, co-founder of Green Flag Ventures, a venture capital fund for Ukrainian startups said, “Chinese components continue to be found in downed Russian drones, and a number of Chinese nationals have been documented alongside Russian troops – indicating that tactical and technological lessons are being shared between Russia, China, and North Korea.”

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The continent also has a booming defense tech sector, and I have embedded with frontline units using European technologies like the Vector drone. As the Financial Times noted, “Europe now boasts three defence start-ups with a ‘unicorn’ valuation of more than €1bn: drone makers Helsing, Quantum Systems, and Tekever.”

Lyuba Shipovich, CEO of Dignitas Ukraine highlighted that Estonia has multiple companies now working on robotics. “We don’t have many of their systems here because they’re expensive, but some are comparable to Ukrainian designs,” said Shipovich.

Estonia-based Milrem Robotics has found success in Ukraine, and its THeMIS unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) is being used on the front. Milrem’s THeMIS UGVs are proving their worth in Ukraine – so much so that Russia offered a bounty for capturing them intact.

Crucially, Europe has Ukraine on its side, which is now a global drone superpower. “What does carry undeniable value for the West, however, is the experience and insight of Ukrainian engineers,” said Vitaliy Goncharuk, CEO of A19Lab and former Chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine.

But Kyiv urgently needs more funding to scale weapons production, and Europe should focus on fully integrating Ukraine into its broader defense sector. The tempo of war is accelerating, with innovation cycles now measured in mere weeks and months. As one European diplomat put it: “The speed of innovation is so quick: It’s a six-week cycle and then it’s obsolete.”

The war is now a technological race and Ukrainian engineers are at the forefront. Oleksandra Ustinova, a Ukrainian member of parliament said, “Ukraine has developed technologies under real battlefield conditions that the rest of the world will want in the next five years.”

In fact, Kyiv has the capacity to produce millions of drones, but money remains the limiting factor. “Ukraine can produce 8–10 million FPVs annually but can only afford to buy about 4.5 million in 2025,” said Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center and former Ministry of Defense adviser. “Scaling requires European and international investment, via direct funding or joint ventures.”

Together with Ukraine, Europe can become an AI superpower and prepare for the future of automated warfare. It is Kyiv that is now educating the Europeans on how to build a “drone wall” to defend itself. But technology alone won’t decide the war, as will power is needed. The larger geopolitical stakes remain clear for the European alliance.

When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014 and the world failed to stop the seizure of Crimea, it fractured the international order that had held for decades. The longer Moscow wages its current war and if it secures any permanent gains, the more emboldened it will become. Russia sees itself as an empire, and empires expand. Europe must prepare accordingly, ready to fight alone if necessary.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
The Funds from the ‘One Big Beautiful Bill’ Powering Pentagon Operations During the Shutdown https://belimedia.com.ng/the-funds-from-the-one-big-beautiful-bill-powering-pentagon-operations-during-the-shutdown https://belimedia.com.ng/the-funds-from-the-one-big-beautiful-bill-powering-pentagon-operations-during-the-shutdown OPINION — “The [Defense] Department [DoD] will continue to defend the nation and conduct ongoing military operations. It will continue activities funded with any available budgetary resources that have not lapsed (e.g., funds made available in Pub. L. 119-21), as well as excepted activities such as those necessary for the safety of human life and the protection of property. Significant activities that will continue during a lapse are summarized in this planning guidance document. Activities that are determined not to be excepted, and which cannot be performed by utilizing military personnel in place of furloughed civilian personnel, will be suspended when appropriated funds are no longer available. The Secretary of War may, at any time, determine that additional activities shall be treated as excepted.”

That is a quote from the DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance For Continuation Of Operations In The Absence Of Available Appropriations, issued “For Planning Purposes Only - Do Not Implement Until Direction from the Deputy Secretary of War or his Designee.”

This document, it states, “provides guidance for identifying those missions and functions of the Department of War (DoW) that may continue to be carried out in the absence of available appropriations.”

I must point out, because it’s the reason I’m writing this column, that the Public Law referred to above, Pub. L. 119-21, is none other than the so-called One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), passed by Congress July 3, and signed by President Trump into law on July 4.

A bit of history: The OBBBA was designed by the Republicans to enact all of Trump’s second-term tax and spending policies in a giant, 1,100-page piece of legislation. The Congressional Budget Office said the measure would result in a decrease in direct spending of $1.1 trillion, but also a decrease in revenues of $4.5 trillion, increasing the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over the 2025-to-2034 period.

To get the OBBBA passed, the Trump White House and Republicans in Congress used the fiscal 2025 budget reconciliation process, which allowed them to avoid the 60-vote Senate filibuster. With universal Democratic opposition, it passed the House by a 218-to-214 vote, and the Senate by a 51-to-50 margin, with Vice President J.D. Vance casting the tiebreaking vote.

As I wrote last June, the OBBBA was “extending Trump’s 2017 tax cuts and reducing Medicaid spending – [and] also contains authorization and appropriation for an additional $150 billion for fiscal 2025 defense spending.”

That additional $150 billion for defense spending, because it was considered part of 2025 appropriations, is available to be spent during the current shutdown and through 2029, according to the terms of the OBBBA.

Credit for anticipating the need to put that $150 billion in the 2025 reconciliation measure, and not in the fiscal 2026 budget request, must be shared by Director of the Office of Management and Budget Russell Vought, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, and Republican members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Late last April, without much publicity, the Hill Republicans added the $150 billion to the OBBBA reconciliation bill with White House support.

They also added another $170 billion for the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies that I will discuss below.

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Back in June, I wrote that the Congress in the reconciliation bill called for the Defense Secretary “to deliver to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees within 60 days of the bill passing Congress” a plan detailing how the added $150 billion appropriated to DoD would be spent. Whether Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth did or not is unclear.

However, DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance said, “As of September 2025, the [Defense] Department considers efforts to the support the following among its highest priorities: Operations to secure the U.S. Southern Border; Middle East operations; Golden Dome for America; Depot Maintenance; Shipbuilding; Critical Munitions.”

No surprise, that section adds, “As in every case, efforts supporting these activities may occur during a lapse when resourced with funds that remain available -- to include those provided in Pub. L. 119-21,” the OBBBA.

It turns out, the OBBBA had a section entitled, “Improving Department of Defense Border Support and Counter-Drug Missions.” That section provided an additional $1 billion for fiscal 2025 to be used “for the deployment of military personnel in support of border operations, operations and maintenance activities in support of border operations, counter-narcotics and counter-transnational criminal organization mission support.”

The need for U.S. southern border money for DoD was obvious. But back in July, who publicly was thinking of using DoD assets for “counter-narcotics and counter-transnational criminal organization mission support?” It was not until late August that the public learned of a U.S. Navy buildup in the southern Caribbean to combat drug trafficking, and the first so-called Venezuelan narco-boat was destroyed September 2.

Yet back in early June, it appears, the Trump administration sought and got Congress to approve fiscal 2025 funds to finance what have become these current Caribbean counter-narcotics military operations in the OBBBA. And the same words, “counter-narcotic and counter-transnational criminal organization” were used to describe the targets in justification letters sent the Congress after narco-boat destructions.

Three other of the “highest priority” elements mentioned in the DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance were also singled out in the OBBBA for allocation of funds from the extra $150 billion added to fiscal 2025 defense spending.

A section entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Shipbuilding” was allocated $29 billion. This included $750 million for additional supplier development across the naval shipbuilding industrial base; $500 million for advanced manufacturing techniques in the shipbuilding industrial base; $500 million for additional dry-dock capability; and $450 million for additional maritime industrial workforce development programs.

Another section for Trump’s Golden Dome missile defense program entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Integrated Air and Missile Defense,” was allocated $25 billion. This included $7.2 billion for the development, procurement, and integration of military space-based sensors; $5.6 billion for development of space-based and boost phase intercept capabilities; $2.55 billion for the development, procurement, and integration of military missile defense capabilities; and $2.2 billion for acceleration of hypersonic defense systems.

A third section of the OBBBA entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Munitions and Defense Supply Chain Resiliency,” also got $25 billion. This included $5 billion for investments in critical minerals supply chains; another $2 billion for additional activities to improve the U.S. stockpile of critical minerals; $1 billion for the creation of next-generation automated munitions production factories; $688 million for the development, production, and integration of long-range multi-service cruise missiles; and $300 million for the production of Army medium-range ballistic missiles.

As I mentioned above, there was another $170 billion for the Department of Homeland Security added to OBBBA and it is money available to be spent during the shutdown.

For example, there was $46.5 billion for elements for the new border infrastructure and border wall system; $45 billion for single adult alien detention capacity and family residential center capacity; and $6.2 billion for procurement and integration of new inspection equipment to combat the entry or exit of illicit narcotics at ports of entry and along the southwest, northern, and maritime borders.

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On the personnel side, there was $4.1 billion to hire and train additional Border Patrol agents, Office of Field Operations officers, Air and Marine agents, rehired annuitants, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection field support personnel; and another $2.1 billion to provide recruitment bonuses, performance awards, or annual retention bonuses to eligible Border Patrol agents, Office of Field Operations officers, and Air and Marine agents.

Another OBBBA provision provided $10 billion “to remain available until September 30, 2029, for reimbursement of costs incurred in undertaking activities in support of the Department of Homeland Security’s mission to safeguard the borders of the United States.”

Three other items need no explanation.

In the OBBBA there was $625 million for security and other costs related to the 2026 FIFA [Soccer] World Cup, and $1 billion for security, planning, and other costs related to the 2028 Olympics.

Finally, there was $300 million included for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to reimburse state or local law enforcement personnel “for protection activities directly and demonstrably associated with any [non-governmental] residence of the President.” That would cover, at a minimum, Mar-A-Lago in Florida, Bedminster Golf Club in New Jersey and Trump Tower in New York. According to one news story, Trump during his first four years in office traveled to his properties nearly 550 times.

Under this OBBBA provision, the reimbursement would be available only for costs that a state or local agency incurred or incurs on or after July 1, 2024; demonstrated to the FEMA Administrator as being in excess of typical law enforcement operation costs; and was directly attributable to Presidential protection requested by the U.S. Secret Service.

One has to admit that Trump and key members of his staff clearly did some advance planning when they put together the OBBBA – maybe they even foresaw a government shutdown.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Lawmakers ‘Bullseye and Bait’ in AI&Driven Deepfake Campaigns https://belimedia.com.ng/lawmakers-bullseye-and-bait-in-ai-driven-deepfake-campaigns https://belimedia.com.ng/lawmakers-bullseye-and-bait-in-ai-driven-deepfake-campaigns OPINION — Elected officials are both the bullseye and the bait for AI-driven influence campaigns launched by foreign adversaries. They are targeted with disinformation meant to sway their opinions and votes, while also serving as the raw material for deepfakes used to deceive others. It’s a problem so widespread that it threatens our faith in democratic institutions.

Even seemingly trivial posts can add to divisions already infecting the nation. Over the summer, a deepfake video depicting Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) discussing the perceived racist overtones of a jeans commercial went viral. At least one prominent news commentator was duped, sharing misinformation with his audience. While the origin of the fake is unknown, foreign adversaries, namely China, Russia, and Iran, often exploit domestic wedge issues to erode trust in elected officials.

Last year, Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) was deceived by a deepfake of Dmytro Kuleba, the former foreign minister of Ukraine, in an attempt to get the senator to reveal sensitive information about Ukrainian weaponry. People briefed on the FBI’s investigation into the incident suggest that the Russian government could be behind the deepfake, and that the Senator was being goaded into making statements that could be used for propaganda purposes.

In another incident, deepfake audio recordings of Secretary of State Marco Rubio deceived at least five government officials and three foreign ministers. The State Department diplomatic cable announcing the deepfake discovery also referenced an additional investigation into a Russia-linked cyber actor who had “posed as a fictitious department official.”

Meanwhile, researchers at Vanderbilt University’s Institute of National Security revealed that a Chinese company, GoLaxy, has used artificial intelligence to build psychological profiles of individuals including 117 members of Congress and 2,000 American thought leaders. Using these profiles, GoLaxy can tailor propaganda and target it with precision.

While the company denies that it — or its backers in the Chinese Communist Party — plan to use its advanced AI toolkit for influence operations against U.S. leaders, it allegedly has already done so in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Researchers say that in both places, GoLaxy profiled opposition voices and thought leaders and targeted them with curated messages on X (formerly Twitter), working to change their perception of events. The company also allegedly attempted to sway Hong Kongers’ views on a draconian 2020 national security law. That GoLaxy is now mapping America’s political leadership should be deeply concerning, but not surprising.

GoLaxy is far from the only actor reportedly using AI to influence public opinion. The same AI-enabled manipulation that now focuses on national leaders will inevitably be turned on mayors, school board members, journalists, CEOs — and eventually, anyone — deepening divisions in an already deeply divided nation.

Limiting the damage will require a coordinated response drawing on federal resources, private-sector innovation, and individual vigilance.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

The White House has an AI Action Plan that lays out recommendations for how deepfake detection can be improved. It starts with turning the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Guardians of Forensic Evidence deepfake evaluation program into formal guidelines. These guidelines would establish trusted standards that courts, media platforms, and consumer apps could use to evaluate deepfakes.

These standards are important because some AI-produced videos may be impossible to detect with the human eye. Instead, forensic tools can reveal deepfake giveaways. While far from perfect, this burgeoning deepfake detection field is adapting to rapidly evolving threats. Analyzing the distribution channels of deepfakes can also help determine their legitimacy, particularly for media outlets that want to investigate the authenticity of a video.

Washington must also coordinate with the tech industry, especially social media platforms, through the proposed AI Information Sharing and Analysis Center framework to build an early warning system to monitor, detect, and inform the public of influence operations exploiting AI-generated content.

The White House should also expand collaboration between the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, FBI, and the National Security Agency on deepfake responses. This combined team would work with Congress, agency leaders, and other prominent targets to minimize the spread of unauthorized synthetic content and debunk misleading information.

Lastly, public figures need to create rapid response communication playbooks to address the falsehoods head on and educate the public when deepfakes circulate. The United States can look to democratic allies like Taiwan for inspiration in how to deal with state-sponsored disinformation. The Taiwanese government has adopted the “222 policy” releasing 200 words and two photos within two hours of disinformation detection.

Deepfakes and AI-enabled influence campaigns represent a generational challenge to truth and trust. Combating this problem will be a cat-and-mouse game, with foreign adversaries constantly working to outmaneuver the safeguards meant to stop them. No individual solution will be enough to stop them, but by involving the government, the media, and individuals, it may be possible to limit their damage.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Despite the Shutdown, Pentagon Has Billions from the 'One Big Beautiful Bill Act' https://belimedia.com.ng/despite-the-shutdown-pentagon-has-billions-from-the-one-big-beautiful-bill-act https://belimedia.com.ng/despite-the-shutdown-pentagon-has-billions-from-the-one-big-beautiful-bill-act OPINION — “The [Defense] Department [DoD] will continue to defend the nation and conduct ongoing military operations. It will continue activities funded with any available budgetary resources that have not lapsed (e.g., funds made available in Pub. L. 119-21), as well as excepted activities such as those necessary for the safety of human life and the protection of property. Significant activities that will continue during a lapse are summarized in this planning guidance document. Activities that are determined not to be excepted, and which cannot be performed by utilizing military personnel in place of furloughed civilian personnel, will be suspended when appropriated funds are no longer available. The Secretary of War may, at any time, determine that additional activities shall be treated as excepted.”

That is a quote from the DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance For Continuation Of Operations In The Absence Of Available Appropriations, issued “For Planning Purposes Only - Do Not Implement Until Direction from the Deputy Secretary of War or his Designee.”

This document, it states, “provides guidance for identifying those missions and functions of the Department of War (DoW) that may continue to be carried out in the absence of available appropriations.”

I must point out, because it’s the reason I’m writing this column, that the Public Law referred to above, Pub. L. 119-21, is none other than the so-called One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), passed by Congress July 3, and signed by President Trump into law on July 4.

A bit of history: The OBBBA was designed by the Republicans to enact all of Trump’s second-term tax and spending policies in a giant, 1,100-page piece of legislation. The Congressional Budget Office said the measure would result in a decrease in direct spending of $1.1 trillion, but also a decrease in revenues of $4.5 trillion, increasing the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over the 2025-to-2034 period.

To get the OBBBA passed, the Trump White House and Republicans in Congress used the fiscal 2025 budget reconciliation process, which allowed them to avoid the 60-vote Senate filibuster. With universal Democratic opposition, it passed the House by a 218-to-214 vote, and the Senate by a 51-to-50 margin, with Vice President J.D. Vance casting the tiebreaking vote.

As I wrote last June, the OBBBA was “extending Trump’s 2017 tax cuts and reducing Medicaid spending – [and] also contains authorization and appropriation for an additional $150 billion for fiscal 2025 defense spending.”

That additional $150 billion for defense spending, because it was considered part of 2025 appropriations, is available to be spent during the current shutdown and through 2029, according to the terms of the OBBBA.

Credit for anticipating the need to put that $150 billion in the 2025 reconciliation measure, and not in the fiscal 2026 budget request, must be shared by Director of the Office of Management and Budget Russell Vought, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, and Republican members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Late last April, without much publicity, the Hill Republicans added the $150 billion to the OBBBA reconciliation bill with White House support.

They also added another $170 billion for the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies that I will discuss below.

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Back in June, I wrote that the Congress in the reconciliation bill called for the Defense Secretary “to deliver to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees within 60 days of the bill passing Congress” a plan detailing how the added $150 billion appropriated to DoD would be spent. Whether Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth did or not is unclear.

However, DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance said, “As of September 2025, the [Defense] Department considers efforts to the support the following among its highest priorities: Operations to secure the U.S. Southern Border; Middle East operations; Golden Dome for America; Depot Maintenance; Shipbuilding; Critical Munitions.”

No surprise, that section adds, “As in every case, efforts supporting these activities may occur during a lapse when resourced with funds that remain available -- to include those provided in Pub. L. 119-21,” the OBBBA.

It turns out, the OBBBA had a section entitled, “Improving Department of Defense Border Support and Counter-Drug Missions.” That section provided an additional $1 billion for fiscal 2025 to be used “for the deployment of military personnel in support of border operations, operations and maintenance activities in support of border operations, counter-narcotics and counter-transnational criminal organization mission support.”

The need for U.S. southern border money for DoD was obvious. But back in July, who publicly was thinking of using DoD assets for “counter-narcotics and counter-transnational criminal organization mission support?” It was not until late August that the public learned of a U.S. Navy buildup in the southern Caribbean to combat drug trafficking, and the first so-called Venezuelan narco-boat was destroyed September 2.

Yet back in early June, it appears, the Trump administration sought and got Congress to approve fiscal 2025 funds to finance what have become these current Caribbean counter-narcotics military operations in the OBBBA. And the same words, “counter-narcotic and counter-transnational criminal organization” were used to describe the targets in justification letters sent the Congress after narco-boat destructions.

Three other of the “highest priority” elements mentioned in the DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance were also singled out in the OBBBA for allocation of funds from the extra $150 billion added to fiscal 2025 defense spending.

A section entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Shipbuilding” was allocated $29 billion. This included $750 million for additional supplier development across the naval shipbuilding industrial base; $500 million for advanced manufacturing techniques in the shipbuilding industrial base; $500 million for additional dry-dock capability; and $450 million for additional maritime industrial workforce development programs.

Another section for Trump’s Golden Dome missile defense program entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Integrated Air and Missile Defense,” was allocated $25 billion. This included $7.2 billion for the development, procurement, and integration of military space-based sensors; $5.6 billion for development of space-based and boost phase intercept capabilities; $2.55 billion for the development, procurement, and integration of military missile defense capabilities; and $2.2 billion for acceleration of hypersonic defense systems.

A third section of the OBBBA entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Munitions and Defense Supply Chain Resiliency,” also got $25 billion. This included $5 billion for investments in critical minerals supply chains; another $2 billion for additional activities to improve the U.S. stockpile of critical minerals; $1 billion for the creation of next-generation automated munitions production factories; $688 million for the development, production, and integration of long-range multi-service cruise missiles; and $300 million for the production of Army medium-range ballistic missiles.

As I mentioned above, there was another $170 billion for the Department of Homeland Security added to OBBBA and it is money available to be spent during the shutdown.

For example, there was $46.5 billion for elements for the new border infrastructure and border wall system; $45 billion for single adult alien detention capacity and family residential center capacity; and $6.2 billion for procurement and integration of new inspection equipment to combat the entry or exit of illicit narcotics at ports of entry and along the southwest, northern, and maritime borders.

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On the personnel side, there was $4.1 billion to hire and train additional Border Patrol agents, Office of Field Operations officers, Air and Marine agents, rehired annuitants, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection field support personnel; and another $2.1 billion to provide recruitment bonuses, performance awards, or annual retention bonuses to eligible Border Patrol agents, Office of Field Operations officers, and Air and Marine agents.

Another OBBBA provision provided $10 billion “to remain available until September 30, 2029, for reimbursement of costs incurred in undertaking activities in support of the Department of Homeland Security’s mission to safeguard the borders of the United States.”

Three other items need no explanation.

In the OBBBA there was $625 million for security and other costs related to the 2026 FIFA [Soccer] World Cup, and $1 billion for security, planning, and other costs related to the 2028 Olympics.

Finally, there was $300 million included for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to reimburse state or local law enforcement personnel “for protection activities directly and demonstrably associated with any [non-governmental] residence of the President.” That would cover, at a minimum, Mar-A-Lago in Florida, Bedminster Golf Club in New Jersey and Trump Tower in New York. According to one news story, Trump during his first four years in office traveled to his properties nearly 550 times.

Under this OBBBA provision, the reimbursement would be available only for costs that a state or local agency incurred or incurs on or after July 1, 2024; demonstrated to the FEMA Administrator as being in excess of typical law enforcement operation costs; and was directly attributable to Presidential protection requested by the U.S. Secret Service.

One has to admit that Trump and key members of his staff clearly did some advance planning when they put together the OBBBA – maybe they even foresaw a government shutdown.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
A Deniable Attack with Strategic Precision: Why the Red Hat Breach Looks More Like Statecraft Than Mere Crime https://belimedia.com.ng/a-deniable-attack-with-strategic-precision-why-the-red-hat-breach-looks-more-like-statecraft-than-mere-crime https://belimedia.com.ng/a-deniable-attack-with-strategic-precision-why-the-red-hat-breach-looks-more-like-statecraft-than-mere-crime EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — The timing was no coincidence.

As the U.S. federal government ground to a halt at 12:01 a.m. EDT on October 1, 2025, a cybercriminal group calling itself the Crimson Collective chose that precise moment to publicly disclose one of the most significant supply chain compromises in recent memory. The breach of Red Hat's consulting division, affecting approximately 800 organizations, including critical defense contractors and government agencies, represents more than just another data breach; it demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of how to weaponize American politics for maximum strategic impact.

The stolen data from Red Hat’s repositories reads like a VIP list, including the Naval Surface Warfare Centers, SOCOM, DISA, Raytheon, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and even the House of Representatives. But what’s most concerning isn’t just who was targeted; it’s the precision of when the breach occurred.

With large portions of the federal workforce furloughed and key cybersecurity teams across the government operating with sharply reduced staffing, America’s cyber defense apparatus is running at a fraction of its normal capacity. The normal channels for incident response, DIBNet reporting, cross-agency coordination, and threat intelligence fusion have been significantly slowed.

According to the attackers, the breach itself occurred in mid-September. Yet they waited. They established their Telegram channel on September 24th, tested their capabilities with attacks on Nintendo and Claro Colombia, then synchronized their disclosure with the exact moment of maximum U.S. Government incapacity.

Customer Engagement Reports (CERs) are the crown jewels of consulting, providing detailed blueprints that contain network architectures, authentication tokens, API keys, and infrastructure configurations. Red Hat's consultants held the keys to the kingdom for hundreds of organizations. Now those keys are for sale, with an October 10 deadline that arrives while the government may remain partially paralyzed.

The Belgian Centre for Cybersecurity has already issued warnings about the "high risk" to organizations, but the real concern extends far beyond Belgium. The exposed data includes projects with cryptic references that represent not only a compromised project but also a potential entry point into critical defense systems.

What makes this particularly concerning is the nature of consulting engagements. Unlike product vulnerabilities that can be universally patched, consulting deliverables are custom configurations with unique implementations and specific architectural decisions. There's no single patch to fix this. Each affected organization must carry out its own forensic investigation and reestablish the integrity of its security architecture.

The involvement of ShinyHunters, operating their extortion-as-a-service platform, adds another dimension, making this a confederation of cybercriminal groups that share infrastructure, capabilities, and stolen data. The business model is evolving from ransomware-as-a-service to something more insidious: ecosystem exploitation-as-a-service.

ShinyHunters is simultaneously extorting companies and now joining forces with Crimson Collective to monetize the Red Hat breach. They're not attacking individual companies. They're targeting entire supply chains, betting that the interconnected nature of modern IT infrastructure expands their leverage.

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For adversarial nation-states watching from Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang, this incident provides a masterclass in asymmetric warfare. The shutdown didn't cause the breach, but it created the perfect conditions for maximum impact.

The timing also suggests potential nation-state involvement or direction, even if it is indirect through cutouts. The targets selected, from defense contractors, government agencies, and critical infrastructure, align too perfectly with strategic intelligence collection priorities. Whether Crimson Collective is a pure criminal enterprise or a deniable asset, the effect is the same: America's defense industrial base is exposed at a moment of maximum vulnerability.

The Red Hat breach isn’t a new kind of threat; it’s a familiar playbook executed through new modalities. Our adversaries have long understood how to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. What’s changed is their precision and timing. They’ve learned to weaponize not only our technical gaps but also our political divisions, striking not when they’re strongest, but when we’re distracted, and increasingly, we’re signaling exactly when that will be.

The October 10 deadline isn't just about ransom payments. It’s about whether America can safeguard its critical infrastructure when government operations themselves are constrained. The answer to that question will extend well beyond Red Hat’s customer base, sending signals to allies and competitors alike about the resilience of America’s digital ecosystem.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Seizing a 21st Century Cognitive Advantage. https://belimedia.com.ng/seizing-a-21st-century-cognitive-advantage https://belimedia.com.ng/seizing-a-21st-century-cognitive-advantage OPINION — In 1943, a body washed up on a beach in Huelva, Spain. It was the body of a Royal Marine officer, Major William Martin. Martin was carrying papers, cuffed to his wrist in a briefcase, suggesting that the Allies would invade Greece and Sardinia, not Sicily. Spain was officially neutral, but a few Spanish officials sympathetic to the Nazis allowed German agents to discreetly photograph the documents before Spain quietly passed the documents to the British. Those British officials appeared to be in a state of panic over the lost briefcase.

Would this opportunistic espionage expose a critical Allied operation? In reality, Major William Martin never existed. The body was that of Glyndwr (“Glendure”) Michael, a Welsh drifter who died from consuming rat poison. You probably recognize this as Operation Mincemeat. British intelligence developed this incredible ruse, with American approval, and painstakingly developed a plan for the body to wash up near Huelva Spain and provided background and a personal story for Michael that allowed the body to pass convincingly as a Royal Martine officer who perished at sea while delivering sensitive documents.

The Germans took the bait. Convinced by this fabricated narrative, Hitler diverted significant forces away from Sicily. When the Allies landed in Sicily, they encountered far less resistance than expected, saving countless lives and accelerating the collapse of Axis defenses in southern Europe.

Beyond innovation and sheer audacity, this was a master class in story-telling, in knowing the pressures facing the target audience (Hitler), in creating a believable altered reality, in understanding how information moved through Nazi circles and among those who enabled them and, most importantly, in persuading our adversaries to make consequential decisions that advanced our interests over theirs. It was cognitive warfare on the offense, it represented a cognitive advantage during a perilous period, and it remains a reminder of the timeless power of cognitive persuasion.

History has many other examples of where commanders and leaders have stepped beyond traditional thinking and conventional operations into the information and cognitive space to confuse our adversaries, to win the day, and, at times, to change history.

Is this important today? Let us put cognitive warfare in strategic perspective.

First, great power competition is intensifying and the stakes are high.

The U.S is now facing the most significant global challenges than at any time in our history. We face more capable peer adversaries, more aspiring regional nations, and more proxy threats than ever before. The global environment is more uncertain than ever, and our place in it is not guaranteed. If we are to remain the global leader, we’ll have to be ready for today’s and tomorrow’s rapidly evolving competition and warfare. We must look to prioritize and commonly orient our Nation’s capabilities toward actively maneuvering and gaining advantage across the cognitive landscape to help ensure our security interests, and to actively deny any adversary their own advantage.

Second, great powers will go to great lengths to avoid direct military engagement that could have catastrophic consequences. Russia has lost the equivalent of what would be one of the world’s largest militaries and it has experienced a massive reduction in national power in the war with Ukraine. We also know the examples from WWII when nations and great militaries were defeated and even decimated as a result of great power conflict.

China has advocated winning without fighting for decades, and it still does. Khrushchev famously said “We will take American without firing a shot. We do not have to invade the U.S. We will destroy you from within.” Putin is a believer and practitioner in that approach.

Their approaches are not a mystery. Our adversaries have telegraphed how they plan to attack us, and to defeat us, without direct military engagement.

Third, given those considerations, our adversaries are increasingly relying on operations in the gray zone, or gray warfare, to advance their national interests and to take steps to undermine and weaken the United States, without risking a superpower conflict. They have prioritized their resources, decisions, and actions toward this end.

China and Russia, and even Iran and North Korea, believe there are more gains than risks in the gray zone, and any risks they do face are manageable, so we should expect them to expand their activities. If we solely maintain an unblinking stare at the conventional military capabilities of our adversaries, we might miss the real war already well underway in the gray zone.

Finally—cognitive warfare stands as the most prevalent and consequential activity our adversaries conduct in the gray zone.

This is not your grandfather’s Cold War disinformation. This is an assault on cognition, powered by advanced technology and enabled by an information environment that provides camouflage, infrastructure, and operational resources for our adversaries. Ultimately, cognitive warfare is a contest for truth and knowledge—a struggle to shape perception, control understanding, and influence both the decision-making process and its outcomes.

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Never before in history have individuals, organizations, societies, and nations faced such a sustained assault on our ability to make our own decisions—our autonomy to think, decide, and act in our own best interests. From our adversaries’ perspective, controlling perceptions, manufacturing realities, steering decision-making, intimidation as persuasion, decision fatigue, and manufactured false choices make for persuasive and effective strategy.

In this global information landscape, where technology levels the playing field, any individual or group, and state or non-state actors can reach global audiences almost immediately. Thousands of internet sites, fake users, fabricated organizations, bots, and willing surrogates, managed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, wage cognitive warfare against the U.S., our allies, and our partners at unprecedented scale and velocity. Artificial intelligence now serves as a force multiplier—amplifying reach, supercharging deception, automating the manipulation of public opinion, and constricting time in the information maneuver space.

As individuals and groups within America, this is everything from how we see the world, how we vote, how we invest, whom and what we trust, which policies we support or oppose, and who we believe are our friends and partners—locally, regionally, and globally.

For national security leaders, policymakers, and corporate and military decision-makers, our adversaries seek to influence consequential decisions on issues like Ukraine, Taiwan, trade, military posture, supply chains, alliances, participation in international organizations, technology development, and a host of other issues that could tip the balance in our adversaries’ favor.

For China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, this is integrated national strategy where the instruments of national power—government, private sector, and surrogates—are combined to achieve strategic impact. Further, the willingness of our adversaries to defy international law; challenge economic interests, and violate the sovereignty and laws of every country including the U.S.; engage in bribery, political coercion, sabotage, and assassinations—essentially a “no limits” approach” to cognitive warfare—gives them considerable leverage—made more effective by our lack of focused emphasis on recognizing, prioritizing and taking action to mass and commonly orient our great national strengths.

If we are to make consequential decisions with confidence, we must have high certainty in the information we receive, value, and share. In the cognitive domain, truth is a strategic asset—precious, powerful, and fragile. To endure, it must be shielded from the relentless assault of manipulation, coercion, and altered realities initiated by our adversaries to shape the strategic landscape and create influence attack vectors intended to undermine and disable our ability to do the same.

Churchill recognized both the strategic value and fragile nature of truth in a time of conflict. He famously said, “In wartime, the truth [is] so precious that it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” The lesson is clear. Today, just as in 1943, we must seize and defend the cognitive advantage if we are to navigate these equally perilous times.

What do we need to do to achieve a cognitive advantage?

- First, we need to reassert a strong U.S. national narrative.

In the cognitive domain, our national narrative is both sword and shield. It projects power, influence, and advances our interests. It tells the story of our values, our history, our aspirations, our view of the world, and our resolve and is reinforced by actions and deeds. Our military and economic strength and our global leaderships are strong parts of this narrative. It supports confidence in our actions, our institutions, and our commitments. It also counters adversary narratives and actions that seek to undermine America within our own borders and across the world. We all know today that our national narrative is being questioned by some at home and abroad. Regardless of how we see the political environment, we must articulate and advance a strong seamless U.S. national narrative as foundational to a cognitive advantage. We must take this on.

- Second, we need to empower our master storytellers.

Our master storytellers are not just communicators; they are architects of persuasion. We all know this; we read, we watch movies, and we listen. Facts are fleeting, but stories remain with us—they shape how we feel which in turn drives how we behave. In the cognitive domain, well-crafted stories—including those tailored to navigate today’s hyper-technical environment and chaotic information environment—shape threat perceptions, influence our perception of reality, sustain resolve, and can tip the balance in competition or conflict.

Adversaries recognize the power of narrative and weaponize it; even the truth is more persuasive when it is delivered as part of a compelling story. History proves the advantage: in cognitive warfare, facts alone rarely shift outcomes—compelling narratives and persuasive storytelling do. As in 1943, our edge will be defined by those who can craft and deliver the stories that influence minds and shape events. Yes, we need our master storytellers as much today as we did in 1943.

- Third, we need to see and understand our adversaries’ capabilities and intentions in the cognitive domain—where perception, knowledge, and decision-making are contested. Our adversaries, of course, go to great lengths to mask and conceal their activities. It is time for cognitive intelligence—intelligence in and about the cognitive domain and our ability to reliably understand how, where, and why adversaries seek to shape our thinking and decisions—to emerge as a priority.

- Fourth, we need a sustain a technological edge in AI, Cognitive Science, Cyber, and other technologies that force our adversaries to go on the defensive. China in particular is working to take that advantage from us by its own means but also by stealing U.S. data, technologies, and intellectual property to use against us. We must safeguard the extraordinary capabilities of U.S. technologies—including those small, bold startups—that not only provide a critical national security advantage but are also relentlessly targeted by our adversaries.

- Fifth—and critically important—we need to plan, organize and drive designed strategies and actions across our governmental institutions, international partners, and private sector at the intersections of shared security interests to defend against adversary tactics that target our economic, military, infrastructure, informational and Cyber pillars of security each fueled by human perception, reasoning, and effective decision-making. If you remember anything from this article, please remember this. As a priority, we need a strategy and a commitment to play offense in a quiet but relentless manner that confuses our adversaries, shatters their confidence, and forces them—not us—to deal with the uncertainties of cognitive warfare.

- Finally, if all of this is to work, we need to harness the incredible intellectual power, critical thinking, and collaboration among government, private sector, academia, and in many cases, our allies. We need to work at the nexus of shared interests. In this collaboration; we need leaders; not to overly prescribe or to build bureaucracy, but to inspire, convene, add clarity of purpose, and to enable the incredible capability this community offers. We must use the power to convene to commonly inform and set conditions for mutually beneficial action and outcomes, and to help close the relationship seams used by our adversaries as attack vectors.

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For our leaders, a reminder that when relegated to small tasks and small thinking, influence operations in the cognitive domain will achieve small results. This is a time for vision, for big thoughts, innovation, and audacity. With those attributes, and thinking back to the remarkable achievements of 1943, today’s operations in the cognitive domain can and will do remarkable things.

Those elements, we believe, are the foundation of a cognitive advantage. If we are successful, it means we have a sustained ability to protect our decision-making autonomy at all levels; we preserve domestic and allied social cohesion; we retain global influence, credibility and narrative power; we expose and undermine adversary efforts at cognitive warfare; and we achieve U.S. objectives without resulting in direct conflict. Challenging?—Yes. Attainable?—Certainly.

A final word. Last June, Dave Pitts visited Normandy for the 80th Anniversary of D-Day—which was our last conventional war of great powers. It was a war that resulted in a devastating loss of human life and unprecedented destruction. Omaha Beach, the Drop Zones around St. Mere Eglise, and the American Cemetery were vivid reminders. That war established the U.S as a global superpower and established a world order that has lasted 80 years. It also enshrined in history the “Greatest Generation.”

Today, authoritarian rule is on the rise, national sovereignty around the world is being undermined, and the global order as we know it is under attack. Once again, our preeminence, leadership, and resolve are being challenged. Let’s be clear, the next war—a quieter war, a gray war—is already underway. The outcome of that war will be as consequential as conventional war.

Cognitive warfare may very well be the defining contest of this era—a generational challenge—given the threats it poses to U.S. national security, our place and influence in the world, and our commitment to our own self-determination. If you are a professional in this space—government, private sector, academia, and ally—this is clearly your time.

Today, we are surrounded by threats, but we are also surrounded by opportunities, by extraordinary expertise, and by willing partners. The challenges ahead are formidable, but so are our experiences and capabilities as a nation. The incredible resolve, sacrifice, and refusal to fail—hallmarks of the Greatest Generation—are woven into the fabric of America and will continue to serve us well. Securing our future now demands leadership, collaboration, a bias for action, and adaptability—the hallmarks of this generation. We have what it takes.

Yes, confidence is clearly justified—but we must just as clearly match that confidence with decisive action. Time is not on our side as others have already decided to prioritize cognitive related strategies. It is time to take a bold step forward in the cognitive domain and to seize the cognitive advantage.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Can Western Sanctions Stop Putin’s War? https://belimedia.com.ng/can-western-sanctions-stop-putins-war https://belimedia.com.ng/can-western-sanctions-stop-putins-war

DEEP DIVE – Looking at the recent headlines from Russia, this much seems clear: the West’s sanctions against the country are finally working.

Oil revenues have fallen dramatically. Growth is anemic – official forecasts for this year have dropped from 2.5% to 1%. The budget released this week cuts military spending for the first time since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and while Vladimir Putin had promised no tax increases, the Kremlin now plans to raise the value-added tax to a staggering 22% and boost levies on businesses as well. Meanwhile, Russia has drained its rainy-day National Welfare Fund; the fund’s liquid assets have dipped by two-thirds since the war began.

President Donald Trump’s claim last week that Russia was in “big financial trouble” looks only slightly hyperbolic – and it also looks like evidence that after more than three and a half years of war, the sanctions are punishing Russia’s economy and the Kremlin’s war coffers.

But then there is the other news.

In the past week, Moscow has won fresh pledges from India and China to keep buying Russian oil and other sanctioned goods; China actually vowed to “elevate” its energy cooperation with Russia. A September report found that Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers has proved a highly effective sanctions workaround. And for all of Trump’s threats of fresh sanctions, his administration has yet to pull the trigger.

For its part, Moscow says no sanctions will alter the course of its war against Ukraine. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said last month that sanctions had been “absolutely useless” in changing Russia’s stance.

So which is it? Are sanctions having the desired effect? Or are they a fundamentally weak lever unlikely to change Russian behavior?

“The question is, what did you want sanctions to do?” Thomas Graham, a long-time Russia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, told The Cipher Brief. “If the goal was to cause Russia to rethink what it's doing in Ukraine to pull back from its aggression, the short answer is no… That said, it's also clear that the sanctions have raised the cost (for Russia) of continuing the conflict.”

“Sanctions are a slow-burn tool,” Gonzalo Saiz, a Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told The Cipher Brief. “They aren’t bringing about the collapse of the Kremlin or the Russian economy, but Russia is suffering quite significantly.”

What 6,000+ sanctions have accomplished

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it was met with an early beating on the battlefield and a raft of economic penalties from a surprisingly unified group of western nations. As early as the summer of 2022, experts were forecasting a Russian economic meltdown.

The U.S. alone sanctioned some 6,000 individuals and companies with links to the war effort. The European Union has implemented 18 sanctions packages; last week it proposed a 19th round. The measures have targeted Russia’s financial, military and energy sectors.

Some of the impact is clear and quantifiable. Since the February 2022 invasion, more than 1,300 international companies have scaled back operations in Russia and some 500 have left entirely, according to the Kyiv School of Economics. The firms that left represented about $109 billion in annual revenue. Several Russian banks were barred from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the interbank messaging service that processes international payments.

“The investment community has outright abandoned Russian assets, and foreign capital investment is essentially gone at this point,” Daniel Tannebaum, a former U.S. Treasury official who leads anti-financial crime efforts at Oliver Wyman, told The Cipher Brief. “20 years ago, Russia was growing its economy, becoming more of a global player – that day really is done.”

The U.S. and Europe also went after Russia’s energy sector – a source of at least $240 billion in revenues in the year before the invasion. The EU imposed an embargo on most Russian crude oil, and the U.S. and its G-7 allies capped the price other countries could pay for Russian crude oil. Earlier this year, the EU pledged to fully end its imports of Russian gas.

While Russia has found several workarounds, its oil revenues have fallen. The latest forecast for this year is $200 billion.

The oil sector has also been hurt by the war itself. Last month, as Ukraine stepped up drone attacks against Russian energy infrastructure, Reuters reported that the damage had cut Russian oil refining by almost a fifth, and reduced shipments from key ports. The Kremlin has responded by banning some diesel fuel exports and extending a gasoline export ban through the end of 2025. Sanctions have also cut Russian access to advanced drilling tools and other oil industry technology – all part of what the Wall Street Journal referred to as “The Slow Demise of Russian Oil.”

Beyond the oil sector, the Russian economy is showing across-the-board weakness, with implications for the war as well.

“Russia has been heavily reliant on North Korea for almost a year for military support, both in the form of munitions and soldiers,” Tannebaum said. “That doesn't strike me as a signal of anything that's going so well.”

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The Kremlin workarounds

Taken together, the pileup of economic danger signs would seem to

support Trump’s statement that Moscow is in “big financial trouble”. Last month Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent went further, suggesting that a new round of sanctions would bring the “full collapse” of Russia’s economy.

But it’s not clear that those new sanctions are coming. And for a variety of reasons, experts see neither an imminent collapse nor any likelihood that Putin will soon slow his war effort.

“The fact that Putin continues his war despite 19 rounds of EU sanctions, and after more than three years, is a clear sign of policy failure,” Clayton Siegle, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told The Cipher Brief. “President Trump’s August ultimatum for Putin to end the war or face severe consequences changed nothing.”

Experts say that “failure” has many roots. For one, Putin prepared the Russian economy for the sanctions. Prior to the 2022 invasion, Russia spent years stashing away more than $600 billion in central bank reserves, only half of which are now subject to Western sanctions. Less than a month before he ordered his troops into Ukraine, he cemented a new partnership with China – which has proved to be a critical customer for Russian oil and other items on the sanction lists.

“We have to remember, this was one of the largest economies in the world up until three years ago,” Tannebaum said. “This wasn't Iran, this wasn't a hermit kingdom like North Korea. To truly atrophy this economy was always going to take time. It was always like a vice grip where you just keep tightening the pressure. Unfortunately, we haven't tightened it enough.”

After Russia’s early setbacks in Ukraine, Putin put his country on a war footing that included a military-spending-induced boom in 2023-24. That gave the economy an artificial but powerful jolt – Russia’s economy grew by more than 4% in that period, a higher rate than the U.S.

“From a macroeconomic standpoint, (Russia) was actually in very good shape for this massive invasion of Ukraine,” Graham said, adding that the wartime boost raised wages and stimulated poorer regions of the country.

“You put all of this together and you still have a Kremlin that is able to maintain the necessary level of public support, and raise the money that it needs to continue this conflict.”

Russia has also benefited from lax enforcement of the sanctions, and clever workarounds of its own.

The New York Times reported recently that several global financial institutions, particularly in China and the UAE, have faced no consequences for facilitating Russian transactions. The reason? A concern that sanctioning these banks – China’s in particular – would cripple international trade and damage global supply chains.

And while the oil sector has taken a big hit, the revenues keep coming.

In 2023, China imported record amounts of Russian energy, and India, Turkey, and some members of the EU have also continued to purchase Russian oil and LNG. Europe still imports nearly a fifth of its gas from Russia – that plan to wean the continent off Russian fossil fuels won’t come to fruition until 2027.

Sanction-busters: 1,000 aging tankers

Russia has also made extensive and profitable use of the so-called “shadow fleet,” vessels carrying illegal Russian oil exports via a complex web of transshipments. These ships are typically older, with questionable ownership, flying third-country flags and often sending false location information – all meant to hide their connections to Russia. According to S&P Global Market Intelligence, the shadow fleet now numbers nearly 1,000 vessels and accounts for about 17 percent of oil tankers sailing today.

In a September report, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) said that governance of the shadow fleet must be "radically improved." Saiz, a co-author of the report, said the fleet remained “a vital lifeline” for Russia.

“The ease with which vessels can obtain flags without scrutiny, avoid ownership transparency and escape enforcement actions has created the conditions for an entire parallel shipping ecosystem,” the report said.

The EU’s most recent sanctions package includes a new effort to target the shadow fleet, identifying more than 500 vessels and adding them to its sanction lists. This would presumably make ports less willing to work with them. But Saiz and other experts say Russia continues to add vessels to take the place of ships on the lists.

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New and improved sanctions?

Certainly the sanctions haven’t succeeded in making Putin a global pariah. Last month, the Russian leader hosted representatives from more than 70 countries at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. That same week, Putin traveled to Beijing to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the second world war. Putin stood alongside Xi Jinping and India’s Narendra Modi, and announced that China and Russia had agreed to build a pipeline that would send Russian gas from Siberia to China.

For now, the U.S. intelligence community’s threat assessment – issued in March – looks accurate. “Russia has proven adaptable and resilient, in part because of the expanded backing of China, Iran, and North Korea,” the report said. “Russia has shown it can navigate substantial economic challenges resulting from the ongoing drains of the war, Western cost imposition, and high inflation and interest rates, for at least the near term by using financial and import substitution workarounds.”

Might a new round of sanctions change things?

Trump has continued to threaten new penalties against Russia, and Bessent’s “full collapse” remark came with a claim that the economic troubles would force Putin to negotiate.

“A lot of that is just rhetoric from Secretary Bessent,” Tannebaum said. “Let's be very clear, this administration has not imposed a single sanction on anyone related to the war in Ukraine…We're long past time for words on this.”

“It's hard for me to imagine a set of sanctions that would lead to the collapse of the Russian economy,” Graham said of Bessent’s claim, and he added a cautionary note. “That begs the question: are we really interested in the collapse of the Russian economy? Chaos in Russia, from the standpoint of US national interest, is really not a good thing.”

Graham, who served in the early 2000s as Senior Director for Russia at the National Security Council, noted that Russia still has 5-6,000 nuclear warheads, and recalled that as the Soviet Union was unraveling, the U.S. was worried about a resulting economic calamity.

“We want Russia to be weaker,” he said. “We want it not to be able to prosecute this war at the intensity it has up to this point, but crippling or crashing the Russian economy has first- and second-order consequences that are actually quite negative from the standpoint of U.S. national interests.”

“Sanctions have hurt the Russian economy,” Gen. Phillip Breedlove, a former Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, told The Cipher Brief, “but they have never changed Russian actions on the battlefield… There's a whole host of things we could do that would truly bring Russia to their knees and we haven't done it.”

Experts agree on a short list of measures that might move the needle when it comes to Russia’s prosecution of the war: imposing secondary sanctions aggressively against buyers of Russian oil – as Tannebaum said, “really forcing third countries to make a choice between Russia and a decent swath of humanity”; boosting enforcement for the financial-sector sanctions; better policing of the “shadow fleet” traffic in Russian oil; and – an idea that has been discussed for years – seizing the roughly $300 billion in Russian sovereign assets frozen in the West.

The latter is controversial; it has never been done, and opponents argue that it would violate a long-standing principle of global finance.

“There is absolutely a precedent of not trying to cross that line of seizing a sovereign's assets,” Tannebaum said, but then he added: “You also don't see a sovereign invade another sovereign in the 21st century.”

Siegle has argued that in addition to the secondary sanctions on buyers of Russian oil, a surcharge should be imposed on every barrel of imported Russian oil, in return for the waiving of those tariffs.

“Russia is still making enough from oil sales, those sold on the G-7-compliant market and those via the shadow fleet,” Siegle said. “This new surcharge would crush Moscow’s oil revenues and provide a new cash flow that could be used to confront Putin and defend Ukraine.”

Graham says that no economic sanctions will match the power of effective military aid to Ukraine.

“It's the battlefield that's critical here, not sanctions, particularly if we're looking at the near term,” Graham said. “If Russia is not making progress in the actual battle, that is something that is going to lead to reconsideration in the Kremlin of whether it makes sense to continue this horrific loss.”

Sanctions busting 101

Russia has one more answer to the West’s sanctions, and it comes from an unlikely place: the university campus.

Russia’s elite Higher School of Economics has created a master’s program focused on sanctions evasion. The two-year course, taught in Russian and English, trains students to navigate Western sanctions and untangle compliance issues for Russian firms. Annual tuition: $6,260.

Igor Lipsits, a former professor at the university, told Russian media that “there’s a recognition that sanctions are here to stay. People are expected to learn how to work around them.”

Tannebaum said the degree program was one more piece of evidence to suggest that sanctions were hurting the country. “If they're not hurting them, why are you teaching people how to evade sanctions?”

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
Forget Guerrillas and IEDs & The Next Asymmetric War Will Be Engineered https://belimedia.com.ng/forget-guerrillas-and-ieds-the-next-asymmetric-war-will-be-engineered https://belimedia.com.ng/forget-guerrillas-and-ieds-the-next-asymmetric-war-will-be-engineered

OPINION — For most of modern history, asymmetric conflict conjured a familiar image: guerrillas in the hills, insurgents planting roadside bombs, or terrorists striking with crude weapons. The weak have traditionally offset the strong with mobility, surprise, and a willingness to take punishment.

That world is vanishing. A new age of synthetic asymmetry is emerging, one defined not by geography or ingenuity but by the convergence of technologies that enable small actors to wreak large-scale disruption. Unlike past asymmetry, which grew organically out of circumstance, this new form is engineered. It is synthetic, built from code, data, algorithms, satellites, and biotech labs. Here, “synthetic” carries a double meaning: it is both man-made and the product of synthesis, where disparate technologies combine to produce effects greater than the sum of their parts.

The implications for global security are profound. Power isn’t just about the size of an army or the depth of a treasury. It’s increasingly about who can combine technologies faster and more effectively.

A Brief History of Asymmetry

The weak finding ways to resist the strong is as old as conflict itself, but each era has defined asymmetry differently – shaped by the tools available and the political conditions of the time.

Nineteenth and 20th century resistance fighters, from Spain’s guerrilleros against Napoleon to Mao’s partisans in China, pioneered strategies that leveraged terrain, mobility, and popular support to frustrate superior armies. These methods set the template for Vietnam, where North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces offset American firepower by blending into the population and stretching the war into a contest of political will.

The late 20th century brought new asymmetric forms. In Afghanistan, the mujahideen used Stinger missiles to neutralize Soviet air power. In Iraq, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became the great equalizer, allowing insurgents to impose costs on heavily armored U.S. forces. Al-Qaeda and later ISIS demonstrated how transnational terrorist networks could project power globally with minimal resources, using ideology and spectacular violence to substitute for armies.

By the early 2000s, the cyber domain opened an entirely new front. The 2007 attacks on Estonia, widely attributed to Russian actors, showed that digital disruption could cripple a modern state without conventional force. Just three years later, the Stuxnet worm revealed how code could achieve effects once reserved for kinetic strikes, sabotaging Iranian nuclear centrifuges. These incidents marked the beginning of cyber as a core tool of asymmetric power.

The Arab Spring of 2011 revealed another evolution. Social media allowed activists to outmaneuver state censorship, coordinate mass mobilizations, and project their struggles globally. Authoritarian regimes learned just as quickly, harnessing the same tools for surveillance, propaganda, and repression. Asymmetric power was no longer only about insurgents with rifles; it could be exercised through smartphones and hashtags.

What began as the playbook of the weak has now been eagerly adapted by the strong. Russia weaponized social media to influence elections and deployed “little green men” in Crimea, deniable forces designed to blur the line between war and peace. Its use of mercenary groups like Wagner added a layer of plausible deniability, allowing Moscow to project power in Africa and the Middle East without formal commitments. China has fused state and private industry to pursue “civil-military fusion” in cyberspace, using intellectual property theft and digital influence campaigns to achieve strategic goals without firing a shot. Even the United States, though historically the target of asymmetric tactics, has employed them, using cyber operations like Stuxnet and financial sanctions as tools of coercion.

This adaptation by great powers underscores the shift: asymmetry is no longer just the recourse of the weak. It has become a strategic option for all actors, strong and weak alike. These episodes trace an arc: from guerrilla tactics shaped by terrain to a world where asymmetry is engineered by design.

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Convergence as a Weapon

Synthetic asymmetry is not the product of a single breakthrough. It’s a result of technologies intertwining, with emergent results exceeding the sum of the parts.

● Artificial intelligence and autonomy turn cheap drones into swarming strike platforms and enable generative AI-fueled propaganda that is instantly localized, highly scalable, and adapts in real time.

● Biotechnology, leveraged by the democratization of tools like CRISPR and gene synthesis, opens doors to agricultural sabotage, engineered pathogens, or personalized biotargeting once confined to elite labs.

● Cyber and quantum computing erode modern infrastructure–today through leaked state tools in criminal hands, tomorrow through quantum’s threat to encryption.

● Commercial space assets put reconnaissance and global communications in reach of militias and small states.

● Cryptocurrencies and decentralized finance fund rogue actors and blunt the power of sanctions.

● Undersea infrastructure opens a highly asymmetric chokepoint, where low-cost submersibles or sabotage can sever global fiber-optic cables and energy pipelines, inflicting massive economic damage.

This is less about any one killer app than about convergence itself becoming a weapon.

Asymmetric warfare has always been about imbalance, but the shift to synthetic asymmetry is an exponential leap. A single phishing email can cripple a city’s infrastructure. Off-the-shelf drones can threaten billion-dollar ships. AI-powered disinformation efforts can destabilize national elections. This new ratio of effort to impact is more disproportionate than anything we’ve seen before.

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Where Synthetic Asymmetry Is Already Here

Ukraine's defense shows what convergence looks like in practice. Commercial drones retrofitted for combat, AI-assisted targeting, crypto-based crowdfunding, and open-source satellite intelligence have allowed a middle-sized country to hold its own against one of the world’s largest militaries. The drone is to the 21st century what the AK-47 was to the 20th: cheap, accessible, and transformative.

In Gaza, reports suggest AI-driven targeting systems have accelerated lethal decision-making. Proponents say they improved efficiency; critics warn they lowered thresholds for force and reduced accountability. Either way, the software changed the calculus of war. When algorithms operate at machine speed, traditional political checks on violence weaken.

Iran has demonstrated how low-cost drone technology can harass U.S. naval forces and regional shipping. These platforms cost a fraction of the vessels and missile defenses required to counter them. Combined with cyber probes against Gulf energy infrastructure, Iran illustrates how synthetic asymmetry allows a mid-tier state to impose global strategic costs.

China’s campaigns against Taiwan go beyond military intimidation. They include AI-generated disinformation, synthetic social media accounts, and coordinated influence operations designed to erode trust in democratic institutions. This is synthetic asymmetry in the cognitive domain, an attempt to shift political outcomes before shots are ever fired.

In parts of Africa, mercenary groups operate with funding streams routed through cryptocurrency wallets, supported by commercial satellite communications. These mercenaries operate in gray zones, blurring the line between private enterprise and state proxy. Accountability vanishes in a haze of digital anonymity. Ransomware gangs, meanwhile, already display near-peer disruptive power. They freeze hospitals and pipelines, extract ransoms, and launder funds through crypto markets. Add generative AI for phishing and deepfake voices for fraud, and these groups begin to resemble stateless proto-powers in the digital realm.

The Private Sector as a Geopolitical Actor

Synthetic asymmetry also elevates the role of private companies. Commercial satellite firms provided Ukraine with near-real-time battlefield imagery. SpaceX’s Starlink network became essential to Kyiv’s communications, until its corporate leadership balked at enabling certain military uses. Crypto exchanges, meanwhile, have been both conduits for sanctions evasion and partners in enforcement.

These examples reveal a new reality: private entities now hold levers of power once reserved for states. But their interests are not always aligned with national strategies. A tech CEO may prioritize shareholder value or brand reputation over geopolitical objectives. This creates a new layer of vulnerability—governments dependent on private infrastructure must negotiate, persuade, or regulate their own corporate champions to ensure strategic alignment. The private sector is becoming a semi-independent actor in world politics.

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The Cognitive and Economic Fronts

Perhaps the most destabilizing form of synthetic asymmetry lies in the cognitive domain. Deepfakes that impersonate leaders, AI-generated news outlets, and precision microtargeting of narratives can shape perceptions at scale. The cost of attack is negligible; the cost of defense is nothing less than the integrity of public discourse. For democracies, the danger is acute because open debate is their lifeblood.

Synthetic asymmetry also reshapes geopolitics through finance. North Korea has bankrolled its weapons programs through crypto theft. Russian oligarchs have sheltered assets in opaque digital networks. Decentralized finance platforms move billions across borders beyond the reach of traditional oversight. This financial shadow world undermines sanctions, once a cornerstone of Western statecraft, and allows actors to sustain pressure that would once have been crippling.

Why Democracies are Both Vulnerable and Strong

Herein lies the paradox: democracies are more exposed to synthetic asymmetry precisely because of their openness. Their media, economies, and political systems are target-rich. Legal and ethical constraints also slow the adoption of equivalent offensive tools.

Yet democracies hold underappreciated strengths: decentralized command cultures that empower rapid adaptation, innovation ecosystems that thrive on openness and collaboration, and alliances that allow for collective defense. The task is to recognize culture itself as a strategic asset and to organize defense not around any single domain, but across all of them.

Ethical and Legal Frameworks in Flux

The rise of synthetic asymmetry is colliding with international law and norms written for an earlier era. The legal status of cyber operations remains contested: is a crippling ransomware attack on a hospital an act of war, or a crime? The Tallinn Manual, NATO’s best attempt at clarifying how international law applies in cyberspace, remains largely aspirational.

AI-driven weapons systems pose even sharper dilemmas. Who is accountable when an algorithm selects a target in error? Should lethal decision-making be delegated to machines at all? The pace of technological change is outstripping the slow processes of treaty-making, leaving a widening gap between capability and governance, a gap where much of the risk resides.

Beyond Cold War Deterrence

Traditional deterrence, threatening massive retaliation, works poorly in a world of synthetic asymmetry. Many attackers are diffuse, deniable, or stateless. They thrive in gray zones where attribution is murky and escalation is uncertain.

What’s required is not just more technology, but a new doctrine for resilience: one that integrates cyber, cognitive, biological, economic, and space defenses as a single system. That doctrine has not yet been written, but its absence is already being exploited. At ISRS, we see this convergence daily, working with governments and institutions to adapt strategies for engineered asymmetric disruption.

We are at a hinge moment in strategic affairs. Just as the machine gun upended 19th-century doctrine and nuclear weapons reordered 20th-century geopolitics, the convergence of today’s technologies is reshaping the distribution of power. The future won’t be decided by who fields the biggest army. It will be decided by who can synthesize technologies into a disruptive force faster. That is the coming age of synthetic asymmetry. The question is whether democracies will recognize it and prepare before it fully arrives.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Fri, 10 Oct 2025 14:06:35 +0100 FirstHandNews
China is Forgetting its History with Russia https://belimedia.com.ng/china-is-forgetting-its-history-with-russia https://belimedia.com.ng/china-is-forgetting-its-history-with-russia OPINION — For the past month, it was an onslaught of news and photos of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in meetings with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Tianjin, China and then at the 80th anniversary military parade in Beijing celebrating the end of World War II and then press reports of the first joint submarine patrol between the Russian navy and China’s PLA navy. Mr. Putin must be pleased with the attention Mr. Xi was providing to him personally, and to a Russian Federation that invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a sovereign nation that had security assurances in 1994 from Russia.

Indeed, Mr. Putin must be pleased with the international attention he’s getting, despite the devastation he’s inflicting on Ukraine and the tens of thousands of casualties on both sides due to Russia’s invasion and Putin’s refusal to seek a halt to these hostilities. President Donald Trump invited Mr. Putin to Alaska to discuss ending this conflict, but apparently this public attention and request from Mr. Trump wasn’t enough from a seemingly over-confident Mr. Putin.

What is ironic is the attention and support Mr. Xi provides to the Russian Federation and its leader, Mr. Putin. Certainly, students and others in China must be aware of China’s contemporary relations with Russia (Soviet Union) and relations dating back to the 19th century. Are the textbooks informing students of the 42 divisions – over one million troops -- the Soviet Union deployed on China’s border in 1969, with indications that Moscow was considering a nuclear strike on Chinese nuclear facilities? Or the military clash that year on the Ussuri River, with both sides taking casualties?

In fact, Russia is the only country that has not returned Chinese territory taken during the Century of Humiliation and the unequal treaties imposed on a weak China during the 19th century and the rule of the Qing dynasty. The Treaty of Peking (1860) ceded to the Russian Empire land east of the Ussuri River to the Pacific Ocean, to include Vladivostok. Over 1.5 million kilometers were ceded to Russia during this period and incorporated into the Russian Empire. Russia hasn’t returned this seized territory to China. Others have: Britain returned Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories to China in 1997; Portugal returned Macau to China in 1999.

At the centennial of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 2021, Mr. Xi said: “After the Opium War of 1840, however, China was gradually reduced to a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society and suffered greater ravages than ever before. The country endured intense humiliation, the people were subjected to great pain, and the Chinese civilization was plunged into darkness. Since that time, national rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.”

These were powerful words and a commitment to ensure that China is never again so humiliated. The irony, of course, is that China has permitted Russia to retain Vladivostok and other territory seized during this period of weakness during the Qing dynasty. Hopefully, textbooks in China accurately document this period and the treatment China received from the Russian Empire.

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In fact, it’s not hard to understand why China was so eager to work with the U.S. to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Indeed, China contributed substantially to the eventual defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and contributed to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1986 decision to withdraw all combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 1988. Mr. Gorbachev said Afghanistan had become “a bleeding wound”. By 1991, Mr. Gorbachev resigned from the Soviet Union that was bankrupt and demoralized; this was the end of the Cold War.

It would be unfortunate if we now entered a second Cold War. China should reconsider its support to Mr. Putin with his war of aggression in Ukraine and his goal of recreating the Russian Empire. China has made significant economic and military progress since the 1979 normalization of relations with the U.S. Indeed, it was China’s relationship with the U.S. that contributed to China’s economic renaissance, now with the second largest economy in the world. China’s relations with the Global South and others are based not only on the Belt and Road initiative, but on its support to sovereign, independent countries. A close relationship with a revanchist Russian Federation is not in China’s interest.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:26:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Riding the Tiger: Why Xi and Putin’s ‘Axis of Autocracies’ Could End the Way Churchill Predicted https://belimedia.com.ng/riding-the-tiger-why-xi-and-putins-axis-of-autocracies-could-end-the-way-churchill-predicted https://belimedia.com.ng/riding-the-tiger-why-xi-and-putins-axis-of-autocracies-could-end-the-way-churchill-predicted “Dictators,” Churchill observed, “ride to and fro on tigers from which they dare not dismount.” “And,” he added, “the tigers are getting hungry.”

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION -- Churchill penned those words when mankind was on the precipice of what would be the most devastating conflict in human history. The men who took it over the edge - Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and a leadership in Japan that would increasingly take on the characteristics of a military dictatorship under men such as General Hideki Tojo - were driven by ambition; animus for their enemies, real, imagined and contrived; and a will to use any means at their disposal to ensure their countries assumed what they saw as their rightful places in the world.

The leaders of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan took their countries into war because of conditions they had fomented. Cynically exploiting political radicalization, economic pressures, and societal fervor stoked by authoritarian leadership and militarist-nationalist ideology, they dismantled democratic institutions – thus removing the brakes on both repression and aggression - and promulgated pervasive propaganda that created a climate where war appeared both inevitable and justified.

Once at war, they desperately clung to their illusions of national greatness and delusions of personal grandeur as their countrymen were killed, their nations devastated and their militaries defeated. In the end; with Hitler’s suicide in a dank bunker; the bodies of Mussolini and his mistress hanging in a Milan square; and Tojo’s drop through a trapdoor with a hangman’s noose around his neck; the tigers feasted.

The nature of the relationship among the Axis powers of the Second World War is worth considering within the context of the recent meeting of the leaders of the ‘Axis of Autocracies’ in Beijing. The extension by Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping of invitations to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and a massive military parade celebrating the end of the Second World War to Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was in keeping with Xi’s intent to send a signal of unity in opposition to the so-called ‘rules-based’ international order dominated by the U.S. Further, the Chinese leader will have seen the presence of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Turkish President Recep Erdogan among some twenty invitees to the Beijing festivities – coming, as they did, amid trade tensions with Washington and with the 2027 deadline he has set for his military to be ready to act against Taiwan nearing - as evidence his message is finding broader resonance.

"Global governance,” Xi said, “has reached a new crossroads." The new order he envisions would, the Chinese leader said in comments clearly directed at the U.S., “take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics, and practice true multilateralism."

What he did not say, and did not need to say, was that his country and party would be at the center of a realignment of global power that would bear little similarity to the current world order for which the Chinese leader has nothing but contempt.

As China has long demonstrated, it has no regard for adherence to norms of behavior that the failed U.S. policy of engagement was intended to promote. Indeed, its aggressive and expansionist policies vis-à-vis its neighbors; its disregarding of treaty obligations in the case of Hong Kong; its resort to influence operations to suborn foreign governments and international institutions; its exploitation of Belt and Road initiative projects that turn recipients into debtor nations; its use of espionage means to steal the intellectual property and national wealth from rival nations, their businesses and industries; and its brutal repression of political opponents and ethnic minorities demonstrate that Beijing neither recognizes nor accepts any international rules of conduct.

While North Korea and Iran play lesser, supporting roles in this Axis, the relationship with between Russia and China is central to Xi’s desire to put together a global system of strategic and economic ties that supersedes the post-war, U.S.-dominated world order.

Xi’s message clearly resonated with Putin. Addressing his Chinese counterpart as “dear friend,” the Russian President said that Moscow’s ties with Beijing are “at an unprecedentedly high level.” Citing Soviet assistance to China during the war, going on that: “We were always together then, we remain together now.” Putin’s avowals of what he would have termed ‘fraternal friendship’ in his earlier life notwithstanding, Russia likely sees its reliance on Beijing for support as being driven by the necessities of the Ukraine war and surely does not envision long-term dependence on China.

However, what Putin also surely understands - if Xi did not make the point explicitly clear to him in conversations between the two - is that the state of the Ukraine war is a significant factor in the timing and nature of Chinese planning for ‘reunification’ of Taiwan with the mainland insofar as it serves to distract and diffuse any Western – read U.S. – response to such an undertaking.

Consequently, there is every incentive for Beijing to ensure there is no resolution of that war prior to any move it makes against Taiwan. In such an instance, the U.S. would find itself having to contend with China backed by Russia should it choose to counter a move by Xi to seize the island. It is, of course, unclear what form Beijing-Moscow war-time cooperation would take. But ties between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan might be instructive in this regard.

As is the case with relations between Moscow and Beijing today, the connection between the two most powerful Axis powers was rooted in a desire to undo the existing – then Anglo-American and now U.S. led - world order. Germany and Japan fought their war as ostensible allies. But it was a strangely distant union. They were bound together more by de facto strategic interdependence than by formal alliance. The two countries did sign a series of compacts. Chief among these were 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact (according to which both parties agreed to work against the Soviet-directed ‘Comintern’, or Communist International), and the Tripartite Pact of 1940, establishing an “Axis” alliance which also included Italy.

There were also several supporting economic and military cooperation agreements, the most significant of which was the "No Separate Peace” agreement of 11 December 1941. Signed following U.S. entry into the war, it formalized joint prosecution of the war against the U.S. and Britain by the Axis, pledging that the signatories would not seek a separate peace without mutual consent.

These arrangements were integral to the wartime calculations of Germany and Japan. But none of them formally bound either country to come to the aid of the other in event of war. Moreover, their ability and willingness to develop and implement a joint strategy for waging the war was hampered by geographical distance, divergent interests, and occasionally conflicting operational priorities.

There is, for instance, no evidence that the timing of Tokyo’s December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor was coordinated with Berlin. The attack’s timing was primarily dictated by Japan’s urgent need to break U.S.-led embargoes and secure critical resources, rather than a calculated move to exploit any German "distraction" of the Allies.

But Germany’s war in Europe did create opportunity for Japan in the Asia-Pacific by significantly weakening the Western colonial presence in the region, indirectly making a Japanese attack more viable and thus influencing Tokyo’s risk calculus.

With major Western powers preoccupied—Britain fully engaged in Europe and North Africa, and the U.S. focused on supporting Britain and preparing for possible conflict—Japanese leaders judged that the Western colonial powers in Asia (Britain, the Netherlands, and France) were vulnerable to rapid Japanese offensives. That assessment enhanced Japan’s confidence in the success of those operations but was not the determining factor in their timing.

Moreover, Hitler’s declaration of war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor puzzled Allied leaders and historians since given America’s massive industrial potential; his own experience in the First World War when entry of America into the war tipped the balance against Germany; and the fact that Tokyo did not join the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, a non-decision that allowed Stalin to shift reserves from Siberia to confront the German army threatening Moscow.

It appears the German dictator declared war on the U.S. - even though the declaration removed any remaining obstacles to full American involvement against him in Europe - primarily because he thought war with America inevitable, wanted to unleash his U-Boats on ships carrying Lend-Lease material to Britain, and sought to present the Axis as a united front. He also saw the U.S. as a decadent, racially mixed nation and underestimated its capacity to quickly gear up for war, believing Germany could defeat the Allies before significant American power could be brought to bear. His decision proved a crucial strategic blunder as it unified America’s population and industries behind a total war effort that was ultimately decisive.

The February 2022 promulgation of a “Partnership Without Limits” by Xi and Putin on the margins of the Winter Olympics not only signaled a warming of relations between their countries. It also implied at least tacit Chinese backing for the Russian invasion of Ukraine that occurred just a few days later.

As was the case with the Axis powers, that announcement was presaged by other agreements between Beijing and Moscow. The establishment of formal diplomatic ties after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 2001 signing of a ‘Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation’ set the stage for strategic, economic, and security collaboration between the two countries. Over the following years, they resolved border disputes, held joint military exercises, expanded energy trade, and cooperated within such international organizations as the SCO.

While ties between Russia and China on economic, diplomatic and military matters have deepened, the relationship – as was the case with the Axis - is marked more by a joint desire to challenge the U.S. than by deep mutual affinity. Despite declarations in the 2022 joint statement that the friendship between the two countries “has no limits” and that there are “no forbidden areas of cooperation,” Putin is no doubt well aware that Xi has other motives in supporting Russia.

Not least among them are using the Ukraine war to draw down Western military stockpiles and taking advantage of Moscow’s relative loss of influence in Central Asia. And Russia remains deeply wary of Chinese strategic intentions and intelligence activities. Notably, recently leaked Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) documents indicate Moscow’s growing concern over Chinese espionage targeting Russian military, scientific, and geopolitical assets. The FSB has labeled China as an "enemy" and initiated counterintelligence programs designed to counter aggressive Chinese recruitment of Russian scientists, officials, and businessmen—especially those with access to sensitive state institutions.

Like the (successful) intelligence operations mounted by Stalin’s Soviet Union against its erstwhile Western allies during World War Two, Chinese intelligence has intensified its attempts to gain insight into Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and its knowledge of Western combat systems.

The FSB has documented Chinese front organizations—including corporate and academic groups—seeking access to information on Russian technological advancements, as well as covert Chinese activities in the Arctic and Russia’s Far East. Moscow has responded by restricting the access of foreign researchers, monitoring users of Chinese platforms like WeChat, and increasing face-to-face warnings to vulnerable officials. These security concerns underscore the reality of the relationship: while Russia and China publicly coordinate on economic and military fronts, deep mutual suspicion and competing strategic ambitions complicate their alliance.

In spurring his country towards war, Hitler exploited economic instability, the national humiliation of the Versailles Treaty, fears of internal enemies in the form of Jews and communists, and a desire to restore German national power by re-building the military and expanding the country to develop a totalitarian, militarized, racially pure state under a supreme leader able to act decisively in his quest to dominate Europe.

The German dictator seized on an opportunity to play on what he rightly perceived as weakness on the part of his potential adversaries to fulfill his dark version of his country’s national destiny. Likewise, the leaders of Imperial Japan exerted enormous influence over the country’s domestic and foreign policy, seizing an opportunity to press for an expansionist war to address economic pressures and resource scarcity. Often acting independently of - and sometimes overruling - civilian authorities, the militarists used propaganda, suppression of political dissent and racialist exhortations to national destiny to justify expansionary war as the only viable path to Japanese strength and salvation, as well as their own power.

Similarly, both Xi and Putin are driven by imperatives; in their cases – assuming their revealing conversation about organ harvesting and eternal life was just aspirational – in the form of actuarial calendars. The former has committed to resolving the Taiwan issue during his time as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary. And the latter undertook the Ukraine invasion as part of an effort to restore Russian power and influence world-wide, but particularly in the former Soviet “the near abroad,” while at the helm in the Kremlin. Both are building up their militaries – Putin out of immediate necessity and Xi to actualize expansionist aspirations - while stoking nationalism to at once garner support for those endeavors and to defray potential domestic threats to their rule.

Although Xi maintains a strong grip on power as China’s paramount leader, internal tensions are rising due to the absence of a succession mechanism, demographic decline and, most importantly, increased public discontent engendered by weak economic growth, prolonged real estate market weakness, record youth unemployment, deflationary pressures, and ballooning government debt.

He faces also elite dissatisfaction fueled by his reluctance to initiate necessary market reforms. Party insiders are said to be concerned over the sustainability of the state-led model and its impact on global competitiveness, as well as the political risk of widespread public dissatisfaction in an environment where social mobility appears impossible and wealth gaps are evident.

In response, the Chinese leader has used surveillance, purges, ideological education, and anti-Western messaging to silence dissent. This approach has made him over-reliant on what the Soviets called ‘the instruments of state repression.”

Even though overt dissent is suppressed, the risk of future instability is rising beneath the surface. Unrest could rapidly appear if economic or political crises dramatically worsen. To avoid the fate of those who ruled the Soviet Union, Xi’s approach over the coming years may be shaped by the need to adapt by opening the economy to some degree to vent off steam while trying. Confronted with such circumstances, he could well be tempted to further ramp up repression while whipping up nationalist fervor around the Taiwan issue. Although adopting such a course might obscure economic difficulties and bolster his authority, it could also increase the risk of reckless foreign policy steps.

The potential for, and the possible consequences of, a rash move by Xi are increasing. China is engaged in intensifying competition that is generating friction with the U.S., especially around Taiwan, the South China Sea and the race to dominate the emerging realm of AI. Regional tensions are likewise intensifying as China’s increasingly aggressive stance has prompted growing concern and coalition-building by Japan, India, Australia and the U.S.

Pushback to China’s exploitive Belt and Road Initiative in the form of growing recipient-country debt and local resentment are complicating Beijing's ambitions and increasing its frustration.

Finally, Beijing has been impacted by American economic decoupling and sanctions. Export restrictions, technological bans, and tariffs imposed by the U.S. are beginning to bite, challenging China’s drive to seize global leadership in AI, semiconductors, and green technology.

Putin, playing on nationalist sentiment over claimed repression of ethnic Russians in Ukraine and a desire to reassert Moscow’s dominion over that nation, plunged his country into a regional war that could – like the Japanese assault on China in the 1930’s – be a prelude to a larger conflict.

The Russian leader faces mounting internal pressures as the war he unleashed grinds into its fourth year. His invasion has devolved into a slogging match that has cost his country immense amounts of blood and treasure for relatively little recompense.

Although the Kremlin has retained control through coercion, propaganda, and material incentives, challenges are surfacing from multiple directions. The costs in blood and treasure of waging a seemingly endless war are straining the economy, rising inflation, and reducing living standards. Importantly, frustration within elite circles is rising due to the costs and duration of a war waged for insufficient territorial gains.

Moreover, Russia is struggling with the spiraling costs and military overstretch of its commitment in Ukraine, which has limited its ability to project power elsewhere. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and Armenia’s distancing from Russia after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have weakened Russia’s network of regional allies. Its position in Belarus and in other former Soviet states is increasingly precarious, with popular uprisings and anti-Russian sentiment rising. This, coupled with sustained Western sanctions and relative international isolation, has resulted in reduced Russian influence on the world stage.

The Kremlin continues to call its Ukraine invasion a "special military operation" rather than issuing a formal declaration of war due to fears of backlash. It has, to date, successfully isolated most of society from the war’s worst impact, suppressed dissent, and delayed difficult political choices. The Kremlin portrays all of this as the consequences of a U.S.-led proxy war targeting the Russian nation and its people. But internal pressures from war fatigue, economic strain, and elite tensions are quietly growing. And the longer the war persists without a decisive victory or settlement, the risk of cracks—in the form of elite disaffection and public unrest —will continue to rise.

Finally, like his Chinese counterpart, Putin could be tempted to engage in more external adventurism to divert attention away from the internal pressure building within his country.

Their mutual antipathy for the U.S. aside, another thing the two modern-day dictators have in common is that both are taking steps to prepare their militaries and people for possible large-scale conflict by intensifying military reforms, working to enhance readiness and developing more advanced weapons systems. Having already put his economy on a war footing, Putin is doing this both to enable operations in Ukraine and to prepare for a possible wider war.

Xi, for his part, has embarked on military modernization and shows of force such as the massive parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II to undergird his strategic messaging regarding his intent to “reunify” Taiwan with the mainland and to ready their militaries for active operations to that end if needed. Finally, China and Russia have engaged in a series of joint military exercises, including recent and upcoming naval drills in the Sea of Japan and Pacific emphasizing anti-submarine warfare, missile defense, and combined arms tactics to counter the U.S. and its allies.

Those exercises may signal something more than theater in terms of cooperation between the two militaries. But they have not shown that ties between the two countries have progressed to the point that they are prepared to implement a joint plan for waging war against the U.S.

Like their Axis forbearers, their strategic interests are likely too disparate to allow for anything more than strategic coordination in broad terms between them. This does not mean the U.S. and its allies would find it easy to confront both adversaries at once. Nazi Germany and Japan did not fight jointly, but Allied victory came at huge cost, nonetheless.

At this stage, the key question is whether, when and how Putin intends to end his assault on Ukraine. At present, the Kremlin is publicly evincing no willingness to end this war absent the achievement of at least his minimalist demands: no NATO membership for Ukraine and occupation of the four Russian-annexed regions of that country (in addition to Crimea).

If Ukraine does not cede control over those territories, it appears Putin intends to pursue a fight and negotiate strategy until his goals are achieved. However the war ends, the U.S. will then have to decide if it is prepared to try to engage Russia with an eye towards creating a rift between it and China.

With the latter on a course that appears to be inexorably leading to a confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan, and Washington clearly preferring not to have to simultaneously deal with two adversaries on different fronts, the questions of whether, how and how soon the war in Ukraine can be ended, and what tack the Russian leader will take thereafter are of great significance to U.S. national security.

In the years since Churchill wrote about the dangers for and from dictators in riding a tiger, others have used the same analogy. Jefferson Starship even wrote a song about it. Science fiction writer Robert A. Heinlein cautioned all who would try it that “the first principle in riding a tiger is to hold on tight to its ears.” But it was John F. Kennedy who most succinctly addressed the perils past leaders courted by engaging in the practice. “Those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger,” he cautioned, “ended up inside.” One wonders how tight a grip the dictators in Beijing and Moscow have on the big cats they sit astride.


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:26:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
Can NATO Still Scare Putin? https://belimedia.com.ng/can-nato-still-scare-putin https://belimedia.com.ng/can-nato-still-scare-putin

EXPERT INTERVIEW – Polish President Karol Nowrocki signed a classified decree over the weekend allowing armed forces of NATO member states to be present in his country after Poland’s airspace was violated by an incursion of 19 Russian drones last week.

Moscow’s incursion, which Western security experts see as a ‘test’ by Russia (even though it has denied those claims) that has prompted a series of responses intended to fend off a potential Russian attack in the future. And Poland isn’t alone. Romania, Lativa, Estonia and Lithuania have also reported drone incursions by Russian since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Experts believe that any effective strategy to address the incursions must be focused on deterring Russian President Vladimir Putin. And despite earlier promises to impose stricter sanctions on Russia if President Putin does not end the war in Ukraine, President Donald Trump now says that the U.S. will only carry through with those sanctions if NATO member states do the same and end all purchases of Russian oil.

THE CONTEXT

  • Data from the Center for Information Resilience and reported by The Wall Street Journal shows that Moscow launched close to 6,300 drones in July of this year, up from 426 just one year earlier.
  • According to officials, at least three Russian drones were shot down last week as Polish F-16 and Dutch F-35 fighter jets were scrambled.
  • Acting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Dorothy Shea told the UN Security Council that "The United States stands by our NATO allies in the face of these alarming airspace violations…And rest assured, we will defend every inch of NATO territory”, adding that "These actions, now with the addition of violating the airspace of a U.S. ally – intentionally or otherwise – show immense disrespect for good-faith U.S. efforts to bring an end to this conflict."
  • On Friday, September 12, NATO launched operation Eastern Sentry to bolster deterrence. The mission includes enhanced air policing, expanding existing operations there. European Sentry is a “multi-domain activity” including aircraft, sensors and air defenses.
  • Air policing is the use of military fighter aircraft to protect airspace from unauthorized penetration and ensure air traffic safety from threats. NATO Air Policing is a part of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) framework, providing 24/7/365 coverage of NATO airspace. Begun in 1961, the NATO Air Policing mission provides airborne quick reaction forces (QRFs) to member countries.
  • As a part of the broad set of assurance measures since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Allies are providing additional assets to enhance air policing along NATO’s eastern borders. To that end, Allies supplement the existing NATO Air Policing forces in the Baltic States, deploy additional aircraft to Poland, and augment the national air policing capabilities of the Bulgarian and Romanian air forces.

    THE INTERVIEW

    The Cipher Brief spoke with former Supreme Allied Commander General Phil Breedlove (Ret.), who also served earlier in his career as a military fighter jet pilot, to better understand what’s stake and what options NATO has for implementing its own form of deterrence from future Russian aggression. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity. You can also watch our conversation on The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel.

    General Philip M. Breedlove

    Gen. Breedlove retired as the Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, SHAPE, Belgium and Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany.  He also served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff.

    The Cipher Brief: How serious of an issue was Russia’s drone incursion into Poland?

    Gen. Breedlove: I think it is serious, but it's not serious in the way that some in the press are reporting it. I've seen some press calling this an attack on Poland. I don't think that Mr. Putin intended to attack Poland, but I do believe it was completely and 1000% deliberate and that he is testing NATO and testing Poland. And for that reason, it is important. It is serious and we need to be taking appropriate action.

    The Cipher Brief: Many experts are saying that what the U.S. decides to do in response could be consequential in terms of deterring President Putin. What do you think needs to be done to give NATO what it needs to be effective?

    Gen. Breedlove: The very first thing would be a simple statement by President Trump saying, "This is wrong, Mr. Putin, stop it," and he needs to say it publicly for the whole world to see.

    Second, I would encourage our government to help NATO to come to a better place on how we defend our skies. We are in a posture called air policing, that is a peacetime posture and operates under peacetime Rules of Engagement. Air policing is really a result of 9/11. It is a functionality of alert aircraft that are designed to address renegade - that's the official term - renegade aircraft, meaning aircraft that are not squawking appropriately, talking appropriately, or are flying in the wrong airspace. And all they can do in peacetime is to go up and to investigate and try to warn off the airplanes and this is only when a foreign country is flying over your airspace. So, as an example, when a British or a U.S. airplane is flying over Estonia, they have zero rules of engagement that allow them to engage the enemy, except in self-defense. If the enemy makes a move toward the aircraft, they can defend themselves. If the enemy makes a move to drop a bomb though, there are no rules of engagement for the air policing. I've been advocating since May of 2016 that we need to change our posture to an air defense posture with an air defense rule of engagement set, which would allow an American pilot to defend Estonia if the need arised.

    The Cipher Brief: It’s not hard to imagine how a situation could escalate quickly. But you had an entire career to think about these types of things. You've also been a huge advocate of no-fly zones. You thought a no-fly zone needed to be imposed on Ukraine from day one. Could that have any bearing here now?

    Gen. Breedlove: Absolutely. And we don't want to cry over spilt milk or water under the bridge, but we proposed a set of operations back in 2014, [when Russia invaded Crimea] and if we had adopted any of those, we would be in a different place than we are now. We are at the crux of being in the same situation again. In three or four years, we will be answering for the decisions we make now. And if we were to establish some sort of zone that says, "Mr. Putin, stop," publicly, loudly, so the Russian people can hear it and Mr. Putin can hear it, we will find ourselves in a different place in three years than if we just continue along the path that we're currently on.

    The Cipher Brief Threat Conference is happening October 19-22 in Sea Island, GA. The world's leading minds on national security from both the public and private sectors will be there. Will you? Apply for a seat at the table today.

    The Cipher Brief: Another thing that you have been very vocal on is deterrence. And the fact that the U.S. has really, despite actions that it has taken in the past, has not yet deterred the Russian president from aggressive acts against his neighbors. There's a sanctions package that's just waiting to be passed right now that a lot of Republicans in Congress are trying to push forward and it hasn't really gotten the support yet from the president. What impact might those sanctions have?

    Breedlove: I'm a fan of sanctions, but we also have to be intellectually honest and understand that sanctions have never, ever changed Mr. Putin's battlefield actions. Sanctions have hurt Russia, they've hurt the Russian people, they've hurt the Russian economy and they're having an impact, and we need to keep them going. But sanctions alone have never changed Mr. Putin's battlefield actions. It's going to take more. I hope we adopt the sanctions. We need to tell Mr. Putin, "We are going to put these sanctions on you," and then do it. We've already said that and we’ve passed that red line a couple of times now, but this time we need to actually do it.

    The other thing that would be a smart move by our president and our country would be to use every penny of frozen Russian assets to buy weapons for Ukraine. Why is this important? Most of that money belongs to oligarchs who are right below Mr. Putin, and you start taking their money and their boats and all that stuff away from them and he's not going to have as easy a time moving around in his own political circles. We need to start punishing those oligarchs by using their money to support the war effort in Ukraine. It would be important for the world to hear, especially the Russian people, that Russian money is paying for Ukrainian weapons.

    The Cipher Brief: Using those frozen Russian assets has been another point of conversation for some time now that feels like a decision needs to be made one way or another. Whose decision is it right now, is it Europe?

    Gen. Breedlove: Well, it's all of us. There are multiple systems that are involved, and this is going to have to be something that western leaders - to include our president - would have to rally to get it to move forward. It can't be a NATO action because you know Mr. Putin has at least two of our leaders in his pocket and they're going to vote against that if it's a NATO action. So, this has to be more of a coalition of the willing EU, NATO kind of thing where all the nations involved, including ours says, "This money is now going to the manufacturers in Europe and the manufacturers in America who are going to put forward weapons for Ukraine." That is the picture we need the Russian people to see, that their money, these oligarchs’ money is being used to buy Ukrainian weapons.

    The Cipher Brief: What about other methods of deterrence?

    Gen. Breedlove: I believe that we have strategic deterrence. I believe that we have conventional deterrence inside NATO, but I would tell you that tactical nuclear deterrence is beginning to fade because Mr. Putin continually talks about Russia lowering the bar and being ready to use tactical nuclear weapons. He's doing that to deter us, and it has worked. Former President Biden's administration was completely deterred. Mr. Trump's administration is nearly completely deterred when it comes to that realm. But here's the part that I think we need to think about. The previous administration said dozens of times, ‘We will defend every inch of NATO’. When President Biden said that, here's what President Putin heard: ‘Every other country is fair game have at it.’ So, he's essentially retaken Georgia politically. He's in the middle of doing the same in Moldova. He's attacking at will in Ukraine. So, we need to change that posture. We need to establish conventional deterrence outside of NATO because it has been forfeited and given away, and that is a problem.

    The Cipher Brief: There's a lot of talk right now, a lot of speculation, a lot of concern, and a lot of talk about World War III when you're looking at the alignment of China and Russia. How realistic do you think that is?

    Gen. Breedlove: That's exactly what Mr. Putin wants you to think. That is the exact result he wants, and he wants people like you and me talking about it and enhancing the message and getting everybody fearful of War War III. This is what is called reflexive control [Russian military theory based on the belief that you have control over your enemy by imposing assumptions that change the way they act]. Mr. Putin is exercising reflexive control, and it is working wildly. He is succeeding magnificently in controlling Western thought and especially, the decisions of Western leaders.

    As I said before, Mr. Biden's administration was nearly completely deterred, and this administration is in the same place. Our most senior policy maker in the Pentagon is absolutely deterred, and we need to get past that. We need to think about how President Kennedy faced these kinds of problems during the Cuban missile crisis, how former President Reagan faced these problems during the intermediate range missile crisis and at how we’ve faced down the Soviet Union and Russia in the past. We seem to be somewhat incapable of doing that now.

    Researchers Ian Coleman and Connor Cowman contributed to this report.

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      Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:26:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
      Ex&CIA Station Chief’s Firsthand Account from Ukraine’s Frontline https://belimedia.com.ng/ex-cia-station-chiefs-firsthand-account-from-ukraines-frontline https://belimedia.com.ng/ex-cia-station-chiefs-firsthand-account-from-ukraines-frontline Cipher Brief exclusive: Former six-time CIA station chief Ralph Goff details the status of the frontlines in Ukraine and where Kyiv needs the most help from its allies.

      EXPERT Q&A — The Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace this week underscores how far Russia is from the negotiating table and agreeing to a just, sustainable peace in Ukraine. Ralph Goff, a former six-time CIA station chief, got an on-the-ground account of this reality in Ukraine, telling The Cipher Brief about the meat-grinder tactics of Russia, and how Ukraine is relying on technology to defend against this.

      Cipher Brief CEO and Publisher Suzanne Kelly spoke with Goff live from Ukraine, for insights into how Ukraine is faring with the battlefield reality of today, and why increased Western support is desperately needed. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

      The Cipher Brief: The Russian drone incursion into Poland activated NATO, with the EU responding as well. What’s your take on this through an intelligence filter?

      Goff: The flight of anywhere between 19 and 23 Russian drones over Poland - which the Russians claim either didn't happen, or was some sort of mistake, or the Ukrainians jammed their drones so they wandered over Polish airspace, yada-yada-yada. Excuse after excuse - It was a test. This is Vladimir Putin testing the waters after the Alaska Summit, after the last two weeks of back and forth with the European allies about where to go from here in efforts to get Russia to the negotiating table. This is absolutely vintage Vladimir Putin who - like any two-year-old child - is testing his parents' forbearance.

      In this one, at least in my opinion, he may have made a big mistake. This is a violation of NATO airspace so Article 5 applies. The Poles have already invoked Article 4, which isn't much but it does mean that NATO allies gather and discuss the issue. [Ed note: Right after our interview with Goff, NATO announced Operation Eastern Sentry].

      But at the same time, Putin's made a mistake because he's given NATO a gift. He's also given a gift to the Trump administration where they can react by establishing a no-fly zone over all of Ukraine or maybe a no-fly zone over the approaches to Poland, including into the airspace of Belarus by saying, "Hey, because these drones are a threat to airspace, we're taking them out before they even get here." So we'll see. I think this is a real acid test of the will of the NATO allies and the will of the Trump administration to show Vladimir Putin that he can't always have his way.

      The Cipher Brief: You've been traveling with a small group of folks to some of the areas along the front lines in Ukraine. What does ground truth look like there?

      Goff: What it looks like is the Russians are making slow gains, but they're advancing slower than the Western powers advanced during World War I. So it’s nothing to brag about, but it is a steady advance and it's something that the Ukrainians are having a problem dealing with.

      The challenge to the Ukrainians - because they lack the manpower - is to kind of protect their manpower, try to save lives and try to husband their resources in terms of manpower. Whereas the Russians are just throwing men into it. I mean, one of the most horrifying things I heard all week was from a commander out in one of the battalions who said they are capturing Russian soldiers who, from the time they left their house - to the time they were in Ukrainian captivity - was just 12 days. Twelve days from the time they left home to the time they were captured.

      The Cipher Brief: So there's no training anymore. There's no training or organization, really?

      Goff: There's no training. They're basically giving them uniforms, sticking them on a bus or a train, sending them out to the front, giving them a weapon and sending them out to fight. 12 days. However, technology is making a difference.

      Unfortunately, the ratio of casualties which was always very highly in favor of the Ukrainians, is beginning to shift. The Russians are making adjustments. Putin is reckless, but he's not stupid. So, we're seeing a situation where the Russian casualty rate is diminishing a bit and the Ukrainian casualty rate is staying the same, but it's still a net loss for Kyiv. Ukraine just doesn’t have the manpower to match Russia.

      One of the areas where they're having problems is in what we call the ‘mid-range’, anywhere from 40 to 70 miles from the front lines. The Russians are dominating that space right now. They're able to bring their forces in, distribute them for their assaults and trickle down, and the Ukrainians just haven't had the means to strike them in that zone to break these formations up before they get closer to the front, where the Russians will send 50 guys knowing that in the end, maybe only two of them will be alive. But if those two guys have advanced 50 meters, that's a gain.

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      The Cipher Brief: The Cipher Brief was there with you just a couple of months ago in May and there was a lot of talk then about how there was a ‘no-man buffer zone’ that had formed along the front because of this ubiquitous use of drone technology. No one could actually go into that space without being targeted and killed by drones. Can you give us a sense of what day-to-day life is like on the front lines right now?

      Goff: The day that we visited at battalion headquarters on the front, it was pretty quiet. We were watching 40 or 50 drone feeds at any given time, and there wasn't much going on there, but that said, there are times when the front becomes active. And yes, it is a death zone, but again, the difference now is that the Russians are willing to take casualties, so they will send men into that death zone, whereas the Ukrainians are forced to respond.

      Let's say you have five Ukrainians in a position they successfully defend, and they hold off the Russians. Let's say they kill 10 or 20 Russians. But if they lose two guys, they're down to three. The next assault of 50 guys eventually comes and it just wears them out. So it is a numbers game. And the Putin administration, for some bizarre reason, continues to be able to recruit and mobilize. Mostly it's economic because they're recruiting soldiers from the poorest regions of the former Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation. These guys are being offered recruitment bonuses and money that is millions of rubles, which is thousands of U.S. dollars in comparison, but it's money they never would have dreamed of having. Then a couple of days later, they're either dead or in Ukrainian captivity. It's bizarre.

      The Cipher Brief: You've spent a lot of time in that region professionally, and of course you're a retired senior CIA officer so you've got a lot of knowledge about what happens in these areas. If you were writing a report back today, what would you say are the top opportunities and challenges for the Ukrainian troops who are fighting along the front right now?

      Goff: The top opportunities are that, if you're fighting guys who 12 days ago were sitting at home and you've been fighting a war for two or three years, you have a huge advantage in terms of your experience and your abilities, so they have that.

      The challenge though, is keeping those guys alive. So for us in the West, for the United States, for NATO, I think the key here is to provide weapons, ammunition, and a non-ending supply. It can't be like last year when the bill before Congress to supporting Ukraine was frozen for months. Finally, it passed, but at the last moment, literally, and Ukrainians were hanging on by their fingertips then. Literally, it was like the cavalry coming over the hill to protect against the last charge of the enemy. So we can't allow that to happen again. We've got to enable the Ukrainians to be properly equipped and properly armed, and that includes helping them solve the problem of the mid-range distance with the types of weapons that can strike out 40, 50, 60, 70 miles from the front.

      The Cipher Brief: The criticism has always been that the U.S. has given Ukraine just enough not to lose, but never enough to win. Is there anything in the places that you visited or from the leaders that you talked to that surprised you?

      Goff: No real surprises other than it's just surprising that their morale is still so high. You go to these frontline units and their morale is high. There is no one sitting around morosely. And then you go to cities like one we visited on the Black Sea, it was a lovely place, and people were on the beach. It's a little weird at first to see people hanging out on the beach like a normal beach day, but then you think, "Hey, look, this is their daily reality," right? We're marking the anniversary of 9/11 in Ukraine where one could argue that every day is 9/11.

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      Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:26:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
      As Trump Expands Caribbean Strikes on Cartels, Much is Still Unclear https://belimedia.com.ng/as-trump-expands-caribbean-strikes-on-cartels-much-is-still-unclear https://belimedia.com.ng/as-trump-expands-caribbean-strikes-on-cartels-much-is-still-unclear OPINION — “Extraordinarily violent drug trafficking cartels that the United States has designated as terrorist organizations have wrought devastating consequences on American communities for decades, causing the deaths of tens of thousands of United States citizens each year and threatening our national security and foreign policy interests both at home and abroad…In the face of the inability or unwillingness of some states in the region [the Western Hemisphere] to address the continuing threat…we have now reached a critical point where we must meet this threat to our citizens and our most vital national interests with United States military force in self-defense. Accordingly, at my direction, on September 2, 2025, United States forces struck a vessel [a Venezuelan speedboat] at a location beyond the territorial seas of any nation that was assessed to be affiliated with a designated terrorist organization and to be engaged in illicit drug trafficking activities.”

      Those are excerpts from a September 4, 2025, letter to Congress from President Trump under the 1973 War Powers Resolution which requires a report within 48 hours after U.S. military forces undertake an action “into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,” without Congress having previously adopted a declaration of war.

      Other requirements of such a letter are the “circumstances necessitating” U.S. armed forces; the “constitutional and legislative authority” for their use, and the “estimated scope and duration of the hostilities.”

      I will discuss the first two requirements below, but as to the last, Trump makes clear he sees no end to this self-declared war on drug cartels by saying, “It is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that will be necessary. United States forces remain postured to carry out further operations.”

      I should note here that back in January 2024, with the presidential campaign getting underway, The New York Times reported that Trump’s political campaign had released a video titled “President Donald J. Trump Declares War on Cartels,” and Trump promised to “deploy all necessary military assets, including the U.S. Navy” to impose a full naval embargo on the cartels and to “designate the major cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”

      On January 20, 2025, immediately after his inauguration, Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) that created “a process by which certain international cartels [such as Tren de Aragua (TdA) and La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)] and other organizations will be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” The EO said further that TdA and MS-13 “present an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I hereby declare a national emergency, under IEEPA [International Emergency Economic Powers Act], to deal with those threats.”

      Having taken those actions, Trump expanded his anti-drug cartel war to include last month doubling up to $50 million the reward for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Nicolás Maduro for violating U.S. narcotics laws. Maduro, as head of the Cartel of the Suns, was first indicted on federal charges of narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine in 2020, during former President Trump's first term. The initial reward was $15 million. It was increased to up to $25 million during the last days of the Biden administration when Maduro assumed a third term as Venezuela’s president despite evidence that he had lost the previous presidential election.

      At this time, the U.S. does not recognize Maduro as the rightful president of Venezuela.

      It is against that background – Trump’s self-declared war against Western Hemisphere drug cartels and Maduro’s running Venezuela – that the U.S. last month began deploying a Navy force to the Caribbean near Venezuela. By early this month it included three Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers — the USS Sampson, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Gravely — which are designed to counter threats from the air, land, sea and even undersea simultaneously. Both the Sampson and Gravely have a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment to deal with intercepted drug situations, according to Navy releases.

      However, by late August, the Pentagon had also deployed an offensive force that appears to have more than halting possible drug shipments in mind.

      Arriving in the area was the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, including the USS Iwo Jima equipped with AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, with 2,200 Marines. Additionally there were two amphibious transport dock ships, the USS San Antonio and the USS Fort Lauderdale, plus several Navy P-8 surveillance planes and one attack submarine in the region.

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      It was with that significant Navy force in the area that on September 2, Trump announced on Truth Social: “Earlier this morning, on my Orders, U.S. Military Forces conducted a kinetic strike against positively identified Tren de Aragua Narco terrorists.” Trump said the strike “occurred while the terrorists were at sea in International waters transporting illegal narcotics, heading to the United States. The strike resulted in 11 terrorists killed in action.”

      The New York Times reported the next day that “a senior U.S. official said a Special Operations aircraft — either an attack helicopter or an MQ-9 Reaper drone — carried out the attack on Tuesday morning against a four-engine speedboat loaded with drugs.”

      At a briefing for congressional staffers September 9, Pentagon officials acknowledged that the boat had turned around after spotting a military aircraft, and the boat was headed back toward shore when it was sunk.

      Other than these limited details, and the widely-seen Pentagon black-and-white video, neither the White House nor the Pentagon have released additional details on the event.

      Exiled Venezuelan journalists reported that the destroyed boat and eight of its dead occupants were from the small Venezuelan fishing village of San Juan de Unare in a poor and crime-ridden section of Venezuela’s northwestern coast. Three of the dead were allegedly from nearby Guiria.

      According to Latin American news reports, more than 20 years ago, San Juan de Unare became a transit point for drugs, and back on September 1, not one but three boats set out headed east for Trinidad and Tobago (T and T) [not to the U.S.], a key Caribbean transit hub for the international drug trade. It was normal for boats from San Juan de Unare to travel in flotillas, with the logic that some will manage to reach their destination. In this case, the boat hit was a faster speedboat, equipped with four engines of 200 horsepower each.

      One more thing worth noting from the Latin press is that the normal crew for similar drug boats would have been three or four, and for that reason the additional passengers could have been men who were either escaping the Maduro regime or had found jobs in Trinidad and were on round trip rides.

      These are elements to consider as we remember the U.S. military killed all 11 speedboat passengers outright, without the normal at sea stoppage and searching for drugs as usually done in such circumstances.

      That was the case last Saturday when Venezuelan government announced on Saturday that a U.S. destroyer [the USS Jason Dunham] intercepted, boarded and occupied a Venezuelan tuna fishing vessel for eight hours in the waters of the South American country's Special Economic Zone on Friday.

      There are many issues to be dealt with about the September 2 incident and Caribbean military buildup. Last Wednesday, 25 Democratic Senators sent a letter to President Trump telling him, “Classifying a clear law enforcement mission as counterterrorism does not confer legal authority to target and kill civilians.”

      In turn, they asked 10 questions starting with: “Please clarify the legal and substantive basis for targeting and killing civilians suspected of being affiliated with a designated entity. Please also provide a copy of all legal assessments conducted by the White House, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, or any other entity prior to the strike.’

      Another question was: “As noted above, in your September 4th War Powers Report to Congress, you note the ‘potential for further such actions.’ However, you do not specify in that report, nor have you specified elsewhere, any legal authority to take military action to target and kill civilians, including those suspected of committing crimes. What is your legal authority to conduct lethal military operations against civilians at sea, within Venezuela or within other Latin American countries?”

      The Senators asked for answers by September 17. Let’s see if they get any answers at all.

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      Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, in a September 10, interview on the USS Iwo Jima with Fox correspondent Rachel Campos-Duffy said, when asked about this U.S. Caribbean buildup, “We’re going to seek peace through strength. We’re going to put America first. It’s our hemisphere. It’s our homeland, but we are not going to sit back and watch the American people be threatened. We are not going to sit back and watch the American people be poisoned. We’re not going to see people be trafficked, see violent groups exist within our country.”

      Hegseth then added, “That’s why you see mass deportations. That’s why you’re seeing criminality being locked down. That’s why our border is being locked down. This [the U.S. military force in the Caribbean] is an extension of that. This is an understanding of exactly how America should project power.”

      Although Pentagon officials apparently have not yet shared such details on the September 2 strike with Congress, Hegseth claimed to Campos-Duffy, “I watched the strike live. We knew exactly who it was; exactly what they were doing; exactly where they were going; what they were involved in.”

      Hegseth’s words do not replace the need for public disclosure of the facts behind such claims, nor does his rhetoric answer the Democratic Senators’ questions about the constitutional and legal justifications for what’s been going on.

      This is all the more true with Trump’s announcement on September 15 that the U.S. military struck another boat allegedly carrying drugs from Venezuela. Trump said three people aboard were killed. A video included in Trump’s announcement shows that the boat, which had only two engines, was not moving when it was blown up. This strike further adds to the questions surrounding this issue.

      The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

      Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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      ]]>
      Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:26:08 +0100 FirstHandNews
      Can the West Really Stop Russia’s War in Ukraine? A View from the Frontlines. https://belimedia.com.ng/can-the-west-really-stop-russias-war-in-ukraine-a-view-from-the-frontlines https://belimedia.com.ng/can-the-west-really-stop-russias-war-in-ukraine-a-view-from-the-frontlines EXPERT Q&A — Russia has not slowed its assaults on Ukraine, ceaselessly raining missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities while pushing forward - albeit slowly - on the frontlines. Former Senior CIA Officer Glenn Corn got a firsthand account of how Ukraine is faring under fire, telling The Cipher Brief about the resilience of the Ukrainians, the sabre-rattling from Russia aimed at dissuading Western support, and what Kyiv is seeking from the U.S. and Europe.

      Cipher Brief CEO and Publisher Suzanne Kelly spoke with Corn from Ukraine, for an on-the-ground picture of the challenges, opportunities and immediate actions needed to counter Russia’s invasion. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

      The Cipher Brief: Russia’s attacks have really been intensifying against Ukrainian cities. You've witnessed that. What has this latest barrage been like from your perspective on the ground?

      Corn: We were woken up in the morning about 6:00 AM by strikes inside of Kyiv by the Russians, including one strike which damaged the Council of Ministers building downtown. I think the Russians are claiming that was not deliberate, which is interesting. It tells me something when the Russians are very quick to say that they were not behind something, because that tells me they're worried about the response.

      The Cipher Brief: We've seen heavy missile attacks in civilian areas before, so this is not entirely new. But it has been stepped up. It was a bit like this when we were there with you a few months ago. Is it wearing on people differently now?

      Corn: The Ukrainians are incredibly resilient, and honestly, I'm not seeing that they're cowered by these attacks. I'm sure people are upset, and I think just days ago, the Russians hit a group of pensioners that were at a post office to get their pension checks and killed a group of civilians - 20-plus. People respond to that. They're angry about that. The main thing I'm hearing and seeing though is that they're waiting for the Western response. What is the West going to do? We've given Putin a chance to negotiate a ceasefire, a way out of this disastrous war, and he's not taking it. In fact, he's doubling down and people here are asking, "When is the West, including the United States, or maybe led by the United States, going to respond?" And I think many Americans are probably asking the same question.

      The Cipher Brief: That's been a question for a long time. When the West steps up and for example, says it will provide more long-range missiles to Ukraine - the response from Moscow is threats and saber-rattling. This saber-rattling deterred the Biden administration from taking a more aggressive approach to supporting Ukraine. What do you think needs to happen now, for the West to provide effective deterrence against President Putin?

      Corn: Let's just go back in history, to 2022. The Russians drew several red lines: Finland joining NATO was a red line, they said they were going to respond against the West. They didn't do that. If we gave the Ukrainians ATACMS, F-16s, Moscow said that could result in a nuclear response. They didn't do that.

      I think there are a lot of threats that are coming from the Kremlin. It's easy for me to say, of course, because I'm not sitting in the White House, but I think that those threats are designed to deter us from making decisions or taking action..

      If we talk about the deep strike capability, the Ukrainians are doing that on their own. My personal view, based on some of the things we've heard from the Ukrainians we've spoken with, is that they don't need that as much as they need a mid-strike capability, because the information that we heard is that the Russians are preparing for another large-scale offensive in the next couple of weeks, maybe even less than a week. And the Ukrainians are going to have to be able to strike the logistics points, the collection points for Russian troops if the Russians try and mass forces along the front to strike at any particular part of the front lines.

      And we all know the Ukrainians are stretched personnel wise. So, having that capability would be very valuable. But obviously that's a strategic decision. My own view is that we should give the Ukrainians the weapons they need and they should be able to use them as they need to defend themselves and to stop this Russian onslaught. And if that means striking a Shahed factory deep inside of Russia, or a factory where they're producing these Kinzhal missiles, we should let them do it. And I don't think that Russia is going launch a nuclear war over that.

      The Cipher Brief: Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently accused Finland of laying the groundwork for a NATO attack on Russia - right in the midst of a Russian drone incursion into Poland. Russia began a troop build up along its border with Ukraine in 2021, saying, "There's nothing to see here, there's nothing to see here." And then all of a sudden, Russia declared Ukraine a threat and invaded with ground troops and paratroopers dropping into Kyiv. Are you concerned about the Russian rhetoric now around Finland and Russian drone incursions into other neighboring countries?

      Corn: If we go back to before the Second World War, Stalin used provocation to start a war with Finland, to invade Finland. They had Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the nineties through the mid-2000s, who was used to scare the West. Then they had Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was used, in my opinion, as an example of who could come to power if Putin were to lose power. Back in the nineties, people worried about who would follow if Boris Yeltsin lost power, you could have Zhirinovsky and that would have been a disaster for the West. So, I think Medvedev is being used to some degree for propaganda and deterrence purposes. I don't think what he says carries much weight.

      I'm pretty positive that Finland is not preparing to invade, or NATO is not preparing to invade Russia across the Finnish border. I think that's all hyperbole. It's designed to make excuses for some of the things they're doing and maybe to rally support inside of Russia for a cause which, my guess is, doesn't have as much popular support as the Russian regime would like. Especially as Russia's economic situation continues to worsen, which it is doing.

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      The Cipher Brief:You briefed President Trump on the threat from Russia during his first term in office. You were still working at the CIA at the time, but you've talked to him about Russia in the past. If you were briefing the president today after your latest trip to Ukraine, what would be in that brief?

      Corn: That the Ukrainians are ready for a deal. It's not the Ukrainians that are the problem. Putin is the problem. Putin is pushing, as a bully would do. They're trying to bully their way to a settlement that they want, which is in favor of Moscow, and it's time for the United States to stand up to Russia. In my experience, if we do that, the Russians will be willing to negotiate in a more sincere manner, but they need to see force on the other side, and we should not let them deter us with their threats, their saber-rattling, Medvedev's comments. I think if you look at past action and response, that tells you a lot. And we should look at that and learn from that.

      The Cipher Brief: Besides a more severe package of sanctions being prepared in the Senate right now, what other things could be included in a show of force to Putin that you feel like might actually make a difference?

      Corn: Secondary sanctions, yes, I like what the president's saying to the Europeans. They need to take a step, too. They need to show that they have skin in the game. And enough with the excuses that they're relying on Russian oil and gas. They need to make changes. They've got to do that, because we're at the point now where we all need to do something and it's going to be painful for everybody.

      The additional provision of weapons systems, including air defense systems, are critically needed. We talked about long-range weapon systems. We should give them the ability to use those systems the way that they need to be used, and let the commanders decide how they want to use them.

      Some of the things we're doing elsewhere right now, make sense to me. For example, what we're doing in the Caribbean and the message we're sending to Venezuela, we shouldn't forget that is a Russian ally and a People’s Republic of China ally, and so we should be putting pressure on Maduro. We should be putting pressure on any Russian ally, in my opinion, around the world.

      And I've been saying this for two plus years now, that we should be showing the Russians that - just like what Ronald Reagan did with his strategy during the Cold War - we are going to challenge them wherever they challenge us. And we're going to make them have to decide where they're going to spend their very, very limited — and I have to stress that — their limited funds.

      They have economic problems. We can exasperate that. And it's unfortunate that we would have to do that, but we should do that, because the Russians are not only challenging the Ukrainians now, they're doing things like threatening the life of European officials when they're in the air.

      Russian drones are violating Polish airspace. There's a whole list of things they're doing which is very aggressive, and there needs to be a strong response to those things. We need to make Russia understand that they will pay a price, there will be a significant consequence if they cross a line, and they seem to be crossing the line, so now it's time to show them the consequences.

      And the last thing I'll say is what I wrote an article with you on: I think the president needs to start messaging the Russian people directly. We, the U.S. government, need to message them directly. The president has given their leader a chance for peace, and he's not taking it. He should be held accountable by the people of Russia for whatever economic pain they're feeling, and for whatever consequences come from policies that we're going to have to make to punish Moscow for its continued aggression against its neighbors, not just Ukraine, but others like Georgia and Moldova, too.

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      Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:26:08 +0100 FirstHandNews